Quarterly Risk Assessment September to November 2004

Transcription

1 F A S T Update Early warning unit Madagascar Quarterly Risk Assessment September to November 2004 F T A S

2 Madagascar September November 2004 Page 2 Contents Relative Government and Civil Direct Actions 3 Country Stability and Relative Conflictual Actions 4 IDEA Average Domestic Conflict and Cooperation 5 IDEA Average International Conflict and Cooperation 6 Appendix: Description of indicators used 7 The FAST Early Warning System 8 FAST Update Subscription: Contact FAST Desk Officer Phone: Fax: mailto:fast@swisspeace.ch Country Expert: Richard Marcus

3 Madagascar September November 2004 Page 3 Relative Government and Civil Direct Actions FAST Relative Government Direct Actions Relative Civil Direct Actions 0.0 9/01 11/01 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/0 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 11/03 1/04 3/04 5/04 7/04 9/04 11/04 Average number of reported Events per month: 115 Indicator descriptions: see Appendix Risk Assessment: The single largest driving social force in Madagascar during the fourth quarter of 2004 was the escalating price of the food staple, rice. During this period rice prices rose to the very high level of 6000 FMG/kilo (US$0.64). In an effort to mitigate the crisis the government began importing rice and selling it at a parallel subsidized price through MAGRO, a food store chain owned by President Marc Ravalomanana. In some cities, such as Toamasina, government rice disappeared from the market; in others, such as Antananarivo, only a fraction of what was needed was available. In certain instances shop owners were accused of speculating on the rice market, thereby driving free market rice prices higher. Protesting mobs burned down a shop in Toamasina, and there were protests in Bealanana city. MPs accused the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce of incompetence in dealing with the crisis, fueling the agitation among their constituents. Economic pressures combined with political opposition continue to be one of President Ravalomanana s greatest challenges. Unless he is able to stem the trend towards economic deterioration at the level of living standards rather than macro-economic indicators, it appears likely that the relationship between state and society could once again deteriorate, although it is improbable that the situation would become unmanageable, let alone see a return to a situation of 2002 proportions. Although the radical opposition is growing and the formal opposition is continually more active, no opposition leader, party, or movement has been successful or charismatic enough to win the type of support sufficient to be disruptive to the state. Conflict should thus remain confined to the realm of factionalism, and not result in large-scale violence. University faculty, unions, opposition ethnic agents, and even angry mobs have challenged the government. For instance, on October 1st a university faculty in Mahajanga went on strike; and in Toamasina the faculty union, SECES, threatened to retain students results unless they were paid, and, in November, threatened a nationwide strike. This drew an angry reaction from the government, which accused them of trying to destabilize the regime, but they also won promises of payment. For their part other civil unions, such as the Syndicat des Inspecteurs des Domaines et de la Propriété Foncière de Madagascar (SIDPMF) and the Union of Deeds Office Employees (SADPF) threatened to strike over back wages (the latter were successful in their demands). A new sort of civic threat emerged during the fourth quarter of 2004: ethnic agitation within the National Assembly. A group of MPs, who have not yet identified themselves, came together in October to form the Group of 17 a reference to the seventeen ethnic groups in Madagascar, other than Merina. The President is a member of the Merina, which are based in the region around the capital and have long maintained a position of economic privilege. The Group of 17 claims to be fighting the Merina s unfair economic advantage, but the government has accused them of playing on ethnic fears for political gain. Either way, this is a destabilizing social force.

4 Madagascar September November 2004 Page 4 Country Stability and Relative Conflictual Actions FAST Country Stability Conflictual /01 11/01 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/0 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 11/03 1/04 3/04 5/04 7/04 9/04 11/04 Average number of reported Events per month: 115 Indicator descriptions: see Appendix Risk Assessment: While country stability has increased overall, there have been more incidences of conflict. This phenomenon is related to a general popular questioning of whether President Ravalomanana will ever be able to fulfill the economic promises implicit in his campaign for office. The sharp rise of rice prices, and the inability of the government to handle this problem, has led to popular support for opposition calls to the return of state-rice pricing policies. It has also led, on occasion, to mob violence and provided a focus for, as yet limited, social movements. The inability of the governance to rein in rural banditry is perhaps of equal concern. Should the government be seen to be reneging on its undertakings to improve living conditions, lower inflation, and limit banditry, then increased rural instability is possible. Strikes continue to be a destabilizing factor. Though not uncommon in Madagascar, they have become an effective tool for social movement and change. Even the threat of a strike by student groups, university faculties, and civil service sector workers in particular, has become interpreted as social action. Examples of strikes or threatened strikes have come from JIRAMA (Water and Electric Company currently in a privatization process) whose workers went on strike for 24 hours, demanding salary increases, threatening to turn off the electricity in Antananarivo. During the fourth quarter of 2004 the Syndicat des Inspecteurs des Domaines et de la Propriété Foncière de Madagascar (SIDPFM) voted for a general strike and succeeded in their wage payment demands. The university teachers union in Mahajanga, a local branch of the national SECES union, went on strike; the national SECES union and the national students union threatened to go on strike. The SECES won commitments from the government by this threat alone. The leading TIM party education branch accused the teachers union of trying to destabilize the government. The radical opposition, the CRN led by former president Zafy Albert, continues to be the most destabilizing opposition force, having accused President Ravalomanana of having fascist, dictatorial tendencies. The CRN party seeks what it calls reconciliation, which in this case means that the dominant TIM party should give way to a more broadly composed transitional government. The CRN has argued for a national reconciliation convention, and has drawn comparisons between the circumstances in Madagascar to those in Côte d Ivoire. Some members of the CRN have been accused of participating in the newly formed Group of 17, an organization aimed at reducing Merina ethnic influence (a charge they deny). The AKFM opposition held its national convention without incident, though its election of an elderly anti-colonial nationalist as its leader is not likely to win favor with the ruling TIM party. The AVI opposition party led by Norbert Ratsirahonana has long been a presidential supporter and partner with the TIM. In late 2003, however, the AVI began distancing itself from the TIM. It has since become clear that Ratsirahonana has ambitions to replace Jacques Sylla as prime minister. AVI boycotted meetings with the government and National Assembly in October, and on the 25th of that month demanded a change in government. AVI members included criticisms of the police and security measures in their invective. Speculating on rice prices drove the government to threaten and occasionally crack down on rice traders exploiting the combination of pressing demand and high prices. Some of these traders were high-level businessmen with government ties. Zafy Albert led demonstrations and a rally accusing the government of poor governance in failing to deal with the effects of intolerable inflation. In Antsiranana, the home town of Zafy Albert, the CRN threatened Merina ethnic group representatives. This is a pattern resembling that which was employed by former President Ratsiraka in Toamasina during the 2002 conflict. President Ravalomanana is Madagascar s first Merina president. Thus the 2001 elections marked a watershed in that for the first time people from coastal areas were willing to support a Merina political leader. This was a problem for Ratsiraka who had long since relied on the ethnic divide between the côtiers and the Merina to perpetuate his hold on power.

5 Madagascar September November 2004 Page 5 IDEA Average Domestic Conflict and Cooperation FAST Average Domestic Conflict Average Domestic Cooperation /01 11/01 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/0 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 11/03 1/04 3/04 5/04 7/04 9/04 11/04 Average number of reported Events per month: 115 Indicator descriptions: see Appendix Risk Assessment: The fourth quarter the trend has been positive, with conflict decreasing and cooperation increasing, though this latter tendency should be viewed with caution, as it reflects cooperation between groups in opposition to the government, rather than between the government and other parties or civil society. In other cases there tends to be cooperation within the private sector and civic groups, excluding the government, such as that resulting in an average private sector wage increase of about 10 percent in Antananarivo. Exceptions to this rule are sporadic, such as government market interventions to stem the rise of rice prices, state-funded roads construction in Antalaha in the wake of significant hurricane damage, MP s efforts in Mahajanga to maintain the peace in the wake of rising social strife against high rice prices, and collaborative efforts between the central and regional government to recover from violent attacks by radical elements seeking President Marc Ravalomanana s political demise. Where there have been relations between the government and civil society or private business interests these have tended to be cool. For instance, the state owned JIRAMA announced that there would be no new price increases in the future. However, as it is trying to privatize and it has yet to rationalize its pricing mechanism it is likely that a successful privatization will lead to higher prices in any case (which the government can then tacitly blame on the new corporation). Similar problems about shipping costs loom as the country s largest harbor, in Toamasina, is going to be privatized. Urban transporters are private but regulated. They met with the Ministry of Transportation to seek a fare increase to offset rising fuel costs and other inflationary pressures. In November they threatened to strike if they were not allowed to raise prices. In the sphere of political parties the domestic competition remains unchanged in the fourth quarter from the previous two quarters. The Solidarité Parlementaire pour la Démocratie et l'unité Nationale (SPDUN; Parliamentary Society for Development and National Unity) held its national conference in December 2004, advocating, to the ruling party TIM s chagrin, a good governance platform. The SPDUN is a coalition of moderate parties challenging the president s TIM party. It is comprised of all major parties except the TIM, Arema (of former President Didier Ratsiraka), and the CRN (of former President Zafy Albert), including the MFM, the AKFM Fanavaozana, AVI, and the RPSD Vaovao. The only credible challenge that President Ravalomanana could face would be from a united opposition. As of yet no single leader has yet emerged to capture the imagination of the Malagasy people, but the SPDUN and its high level of organization represents a move in that direction -- and could prove a potent force in the next legislative elections. More radical opposition members, the CRN and the Arema, began combining forces in the third quarter of The new Platform for Solidarity and Action (PSA) joined them after it formed in August. In the fourth quarter Leader FANILO, of one-time Ratsiraka collaborator Herizo Razafimahaleo, appeared to join forces with them after earlier attempts to work with the SPDUN. This unusual marriage between once violently competing political forces can best be explained by personal politics, especially for Zafy in his quest for a return to power.

6 Madagascar September November 2004 Page 6 IDEA Average International Conflict and Cooperation FAST Average International Conflict Average International Cooperation 0 9/01 11/01 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/0 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 11/03 1/04 3/04 5/04 7/04 9/04 11/04 Average number of reported Events per month: 115 Indicator descriptions: see Appendix Risk Assessment: The fourth quarter of 2004 showed a slight rise in Average International Cooperation but a more marked rise in international conflict. The rise in conflict is not related to international claims against Ravalomanana but rather international criticism of opposition tactics. There is a difference in perception about Madagascar s fight against corruption. Leading international watchdog organizations have reported favorably on the president s efforts. The new US ambassador made special note of this when presenting his credentials to President Ravalomanana in October and several other key allies have noted progress and a new willingness by officials at the highest levels to engage in positive political and economic reform. However, the perception within the country is less sanguine. It is unclear if the negative sentiment in Madagascar is tied more to opposition comments or a perceived lack of change at the micro level for the average citizen. In June 2004 Britain had condemned the opposition and the CRN in particular, as unpatriotic. In October the British Ambassador s comments were more stinging towards the CRN even while he heaped praise on Marc Ravalomanana and the government. One factor driving the rise of the International Conflict indicator was the tensions with Amnesty International which moved to Sudan because it did not agree with the way Madagascar treats prisoners. The government dissolved the local office of the Malagasy Red Cross Society on the pretext that it does not report to the government and the Red Cross replied by criticizing the government s lack of transparency. In October the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund announced that they would reduce by half Madagascar s multilateral debt burden in response to Madagascar s successful liberalization under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. The US Agency for International Development announced a new five-year plan and thirteen new projects in rural areas. In November the US also announced that Madagascar would continue to be one of the eight countries to benefit from US Millennium Challenge Corporation funding. The US did nothing to reduce debt unilaterally, but it did act in concert with the Paris Club of bilateral donors which agreed to reduce US$ 900 million of US$ 1.6 billion in outstanding bilateral loans. In October the German government began a series of talks with the Malagasy government to set up a new cooperation program and agenda that will probably lead to increases in German funding. Other forms of cooperation included a successful senate visit by French experts in decentralization and emergency importation of rice from Thailand. Madagascar s privatization program has helped its international position. Vanilla, the largest export, was already private, but now with petroleum liberalized, the privatization of electricity and water services under way, and liberalization of the sugar industry beginning this quarter, trade opportunities are growing. Cooperation continues and at a high level as President Ravalomanana and his TIM party enjoys strong and persistent international support. More than democracy, he is seen as having brought about a sea change in Malagasy political life, increasing Malagasy engagement in the global economy, and stability to a country on the brink of civil war. While Ravalomanana s support at home is under challenge, that from overseas remains strong, as shown by the significant economic pledges in the second and third quarters, and the debt reduction in the fourth quarter. This support is unlikely to waver in the near future. The question asked has not been whether to support Ravalomanana, but how much support is necessary to ensure his success. It is unclear if the increased levels of support he has garnered since the fall of Ratsiraka, coupled with increased levels of foreign business, are enough to ensure his political future. However, the universally positive position he holds with Western interests, the African Union, most African countries, and the SADC, is likely to act as a critical factor in expanding Ravalomanana s international political base.

7 Appendix : Description of indicators used Page 7 Variable Name Civil Sector Relative Civil Direct Actions Government Sector Relative Government Direct Actions Description / Definition Proportion of Civil Direct Actions compared to All Civil Actions. Civil Direct Actions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct action limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors. Proportion of Government Direct Actions compared to All Government Actions. Government Direct Actions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors. Conflict Carrying Capacity Country Stability Relative Conflictual Actions The Conflict Carrying Capacity (or CCC) is a composed index that depicts the overall stability of the country or region of interest. The CCC is operationalized in terms of the multiplicative interaction among three Proportional measures: (1) civil contentiousness or the Proportion of civil actions that are reported as contentious or "direct" and thus challenge (at least implicitly) the state's monopoly on conflict regulation; (2) state repression or the Proportion of state actions that are reported as extra-institutional or "direct" both in response to direct challenges from the civil sector and those initiated by the state to repress and control opposition; and (3) violent contention or the Proportion of actions entailing physical damage to persons or property. the index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability. The country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country. Proportion of all actions belonging to all conflictive categories reject, accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize, and force to all actions (all Events belonging to the 22 WEIS cue categories). IDEA Scale IDEA Average Domestic Conflict Average Domestic Cooperation Average International Conflict Average International Cooperation IDEA indicators are used to display Proportions of conflict and cooperation events in time. Each event category is assigned a IDEA rating (value), ranging from -7 (extreme conflict) to 13 (extreme cooperation). Zero value events are excluded from these calculations. The Average Domestic Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (IDEA) values of all conflictive intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative IDEA values divided by the total number of conflictive domestic events). For interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). The Average Domestic Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (IDEA) values of all cooperative intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive IDEA values divided by the total number of cooperative domestic events). The Average International Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (IDEA) values of all conflictive interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative IDEA values divided by the total number of conflictive international events). For interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). The Average International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (IDEA) values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive IDEA values divided by the total number of cooperative international events).

8 The FAST Early Warning System Page 8 Who are we? FAST (German acronym for Early Analysis of Tensions and Fact-finding ) is the early warning project of swisspeace, based in Berne, Switzerland. In 1998 the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) assigned swisspeace to set up a political early warning system for early identification of impending armed conflict and political crisis situations. What do we want? FAST aims to enhance political decision makers ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent political strategies can be formulated either to prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or to identify opportunities for peacebuilding. How do we work? FAST uses both quantitative and qualitative methods for its analysis. The centerpiece in the quantitative analysis is based on event data analysis and the respective tools developed in the framework of the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions and Cultural Survival (PONSACS) at Harvard University. The logic of event data analysis is fairly simple: all events considered relevant to conflict escalation and de-escalation are assigned a certain numeric value according to a distinct conflict scale. These values can then be added up for specific time intervals and graphically displayed in a curve over time. The quality and quantity of data input is crucial for the success of such a method. In order to gather the quality and quantity of data required to suit early warning purposes, FAST sets up its own local information networks (LINs) and thus overcomes shortcomings of existing information sources (e.g., international news wires). A unique set of data is collected for each country completely independently from Western news-media coverage. For qualitative data analysis, FAST contracts internationally renowned country experts. What are our products? FAST products are risk assessments tailored to individual customers' needs. The standard product ( FAST Update ) consists of three to five charts depicting the latest conflict related trends and a concise expert interpretation. As the time-series of collected data grow, FAST analysts will apply statistical methods to go beyond retrospective description and forecast future developments. FAST Updates are available in either hard copy or electronic form, covering time intervals as chosen by the customer. Which countries do we monitor? Africa: Angola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia Asia: Europe: Middle East: Afghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Caucasus region, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro Palestine