F A S T Update. Kazakhstan. Quarterly Risk Assessment August to October Early warning unit

Transcription

1 Update Early warning unit Kazakhstan Quarterly Risk ssessment ugust to October 2003 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

2 Update Kazakhstan ugust October 2003 Page 2 Contents Country tability and Relative orceful ctions 3 verage International Conflict and Cooperation 4 verage Domestic Conflict and Cooperation 5 Relative Cooperative and Conflictual ctions 6 ppendix: Description of indicators used 7 he Early Warning ystem 11 Contact : Phone: ax: ubscription: swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

3 Kazakhstan ugust October 2003 Page 3 Country tability and Relative orceful ctions Country tability Relative orceful ctions /01 5/01 7/01 9/01 11/01 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 verage number of reported events per month: 143 Indicator description: see appendix Update Risk ssessment: s the graph demonstrates, Kazakhstan is a country with a high degree of stability. lthough somewhat more fluctuating, Relative orceful ctions remained comparatively low. It peaks from time to time when tensions between government and political opposition are culminating, as they did during the eptember and October 2003 local elections. On 20 eptember, elections to local Maslikhats (councils) were held throughout Kazakhstan. By-elections to local councils took place on 12 October in order to fill seats that were left vacant after the first round. In both rounds voter turnout was significantly low, despite the fact that political debates around the elections were heated. In addition, opposition candidates faced harassment and intimidation. ccording to the Central Election Commission, half of the candidates who won council seats were members of the pro-government Otan (atherland) Party. he centrist zamat (Citizen) Party, ul (Village) Party, the grarian Party, and the moderate opposition k Zhol (Right Way) party gained some few seats. 60% of the elected deputies declared their party affiliations, the rest declared themselves as independent candidates. he elections to local Maslikhats marked the beginning of a series of elections Kazakhstan will be conducting in the years to come. Parliamentary elections are scheduled for autumn 2004 and presidential elections for winter In anticipation of this election marathon, existing political parties are re-aligning and new political parties are emerging. t the end of October, the Rukhaniyat (pirituality) Party was founded, committed to promoting civil and international harmony, political stability, and resolving social issues. he party intends to act as a bridge between the government and the public, and to fight for social equality and a flourishing economy. t the same time, the eldest daughter of President Nursultan Nazarbaev, Dariga, who heads the Khabar television agency and the Congress of Kazakh Journalists, occurred on the political scene. In late October, she announced that the public association sar, founded by her, would be turned into a political party. sar s main goal is to provide help to less-well-off segments of the population, especially young people. he president s daughter s outreach to the political scene has been widely perceived as a first step to succeed her father in the presidency. he October 2003 presidential election in zerbaijan, when father liev gave over to his sun Ilkhom, set an example for President Nursultan Nazarbaev's daughter to run for presidency. However, Dariga Nazarbaeva repeatedly rejected claims about her presidential ambitions. he was quoted to have said that she sees no alternative to President Nazarbaev for the next 10 years. hese latest developments may show the way towards heated election races in the upcoming years determined by ongoing confrontation between the government and outstanding opposition figures. In anticipation to this, the EU commission issued a communiqué stating that Kazakhstan, which aspires to the OCE chairmanship in 2009, needs to put greater effort into the process of democratization, particularly in ensuring free and fair elections, freedom of the media and public organizations, and to the independence of the judiciary. Dr. Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

4 Update Kazakhstan ugust October 2003 Page 4 verage International Conflict and Cooperation verage International Conflict verage International Cooperation -1 5/01 7/01 9/01 11/01 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 verage number of reported events per month: 143 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: he graph above demonstrates the continued and sustained efforts of the Kazakhstani government to cooperate broadly with foreign governments, intergovernmental institutions and international organizations in order to foster security of the country. Its multi-vectored foreign policy is based on peaceful co-existence with its neighbors. However, the complicated political and military environment Kazakhstan finds itself in, led the government to improve its combat readiness over the last years. During the observed period tensions rose between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Uzbek border guards wounded a Kazakh citizen whose cow had strayed over the border in early eptember. In reaction to this incident, Kazakhstani media reported on the increasing number of such incidents at the common Uzbek- Kazakhstani border. Kazakhstani deputies asked to clarify the situation along the Kazakh-Uzbek border. In reply to the Kazakhstani reaction, the Uzbek Embassy in lmaty issued a statement accusing the Kazakh media of biased reporting about recent incidents along the two countries borderline. he embassy asserted that certain people in Kazakhstan are trying to use the border incidents for populist or other narrow political ends, thereby creating tensions and provoking anti-uzbek resentments. fter recriminations over the use of firearms at the border, the Kazakhstani and Uzbekistani Border ervice agreed in-mid October on not using firearms at the common border unless there is a direct threat to their lives or the lives of others. his renewed effort to achieve a peaceful resolution of border problems demonstrates both states interest in maintaining good relations to secure stability in Central sia. Despite the governments general willingness to co-operate, border issues remain a source of potential conflict in Central sia. Earlier this year tensions rose on a local level about the delimitation of one small section of the 1,251km long Uzbek-Kazakhstani frontier. Local Kazakhs protested the handing over of their villages to Uzbekistan. uthorities managed to agree. However, questions remain about the placing of markers in villages that straddle the border. On the government level, the delimitation of the common border strains Russian-Kazakhstani relations. Controversial is the border line between the northern part of West Kazakhstan Oblast bordering Russia's Orenburg Oblast. he dispute specifically concerns the Ilek River, which supplies Kazakhstan's giant Karachaganak oil field. he access to urgently needed water resources raises concerns already now. China s water-use policy in the Ob-Irtysh basin is regarded more and more with discomfort from the Kazakhstani and Russian sides. China is planning an extensive development of irrigation-based agriculture using the waters of the Black Irtysh River, which will lead to the exhaustion of the region's water resources. Kazakhstan and Russia fear that this may pose a threat to the health of the population and the viability of the ecosystem of the whole region. o far, no agreement among Kazakhstan, Russia, and China has been reached on the sustainable use of the water resources; however talks between the three governments are ongoing. Dr. Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

5 Update Kazakhstan ugust October 2003 Page 5 verage Domestic Conflict and Cooperation verage Domestic Conflict verage Domestic Cooperation -1 5/01 7/01 9/01 11/01 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 verage number of reported events per month: 143 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: ince the beginning of 2003, both Domestic Conflict and Cooperation remained fairly stable, whereas the level of Domestic Conflict still exceeds the level of Domestic Cooperation. he relative stability of both graphs mirrors the overall stability in the country, which is only challenged from time to time by rising tensions between the government and the opposition. hese tensions came to another culmination point when the local Maslikhats election took place in eptember and October everal major opposition groups consolidated their efforts in order to take part in local elections. he unregistered Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan, the Communist Party, the Pokolenie (Generation) Pensioners Movement, and various local election blocks aligned to increase the influence of local councils and to reduce that of local executive bodies. Besides, they conducted seminars for candidates, campaign workers, and election observers. fter the Maslikhat elections, the aligned opposition as well as independent local election observers claimed that the elections fell short of international standards. During the election campaign, opposition candidates faced pressure from the authorities. Especially candidates who worked for organizations financed from the state budget or whose relatives worked for such organizations were being pressured to withdraw from the elections. On the election-day, Local Election Committees proved to have little knowledge of the legislation, and their activities at the polling stations were not transparent. he most frequent violations reported were carelessness in keeping records of eligible voters and handling ballots, allowing people to vote for family members, violations of voting secrecy, and campaigning on election-day. Briefly after Kazakhstan s local elections, the European Parliament issued a resolution critical of Kazakhstan s human rights record, particularly its treatment of the independent media and of its imprisonment of prominent opposition figures. he resolution called for the speedy release of journalist ergei Duvanov and politician Ghalymzhan Zhaqiyanov from prison. While the confrontation between government and opposition concentrates mainly on prominent opposition figures involved in politics, the government seeks to find a common language with the civil society. In order to achieve this, it set up a Civic orum in October where NGO representatives and government officials met. o speed up the cooperation between state bodies and NGOs, the government introduced a state order system. hrough this, state agencies will be financing societal impact projects that will be implemented by NGOs. o far, the government has earmarked some few $285,000 in the 2003 state budget for such projects. Dr. Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

6 Kazakhstan ugust October 2003 Page 6 Relative Cooperative and Conflictual ctions Relative Cooperative ctions Relative Conflictual ctions /01 7/01 9/01 11/01 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 verage number of reported events per month: 143 Indicator description: see appendix Update Risk ssessment: During this year, the curves Relative Cooperative and Conflictual ctions have continuously shifted away from each other. his is attributed to the decreasing level of conflict and the increasing level of cooperation on domestic as well as on international level. ince the end of 1990ies, Kazakhstan s economy is flourishing due to high gains from oil and gas field extractions. However, within the last years, the Kazakhstani government followed a more protective investment policy by giving preference to foreign investors who propose involvement of Kazakhstani firms in their projects. oreign investors not involving Kazakhstani firms face an increasing amount of problems: hey complain about tightened immigration regulations concerning expatriate personnel, superfluous checks by tax agencies, and complicated customs procedures. t the same time, the government pushes foreign investors to concentrate less on Kazakhstan s natural resources and more on the underdeveloped high-technology and agricultural sectors. o achieve these goals, it started programs to support especially the rural sector. It devised a wide-ranging one billion U-dollar program to improve agriculture and rural living conditions in the country until Over 40 percent of the country s population is living in rural areas mainly relying on social allowances, subsistence economy and petty trade. Poor living conditions in the countryside imply a potential for socially motivated conflicts, especially in the outh of Kazakhstan where, over the last years, the Kazakhstani authorities registered a rise in radical Islamic activity. More and more people affiliated with the unregistered Hizb ut-ahrir (Liberation) Party, aiming at establishing a Kalifat in Central sia by peaceful means, are arrested. In ugust, three men were being arrested for allegedly running a clandestine printing house in hymkent that produced Hizb ut-ahrir literature. he men are being prosecuted for producing and distributing material inciting interethnic and inter-confessional hatred. In October, a group of adherents of Hizb ut-ahrir were charged with engaging in illegal religious activities in Baikonur. ince the party s appearance in Kazakhstan in 2000, most Hizb ut-ahrir activity has been reported in outh Kazakhstan and Zhambyl oblasts. Hizb ut-ahrir is not officially banned in Kazakhstan, making it more difficult for the authorities to deal with it. o far, Hizb ut-ahrir members were mostly unemployed young men. his has changed during the last year: he alleged Hizb ut-ahrir members who have been interrogated in connection with the printing-house turned out to be government employees. Despite these recent developments, Kazakhstani officials don t perceive Hizb ut-ahrir as a serious threat to Kazakhstani security. he sentences they impose are minimal in comparison with those imposed in neighboring countries. By putting special emphasis on the development of rural areas, the government tries to eliminate one of the major reasons that may drive people into Hizb ut-ahrir. Dr. Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

7 Update ppendix: Description of indicators used Page 7 Variable Name Description / Definition IDE categories: a count of all coded events with WEI cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all ll Events WEI cue categories) plus an additional 11 IDE event cue categories (Event type: other ). WEI categories: a count of all coded events with cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all WEI cue ll ctions categories). Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, Direct ctions demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct actions regardless of origin or target. he indicator orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. his includes orceful ctions non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Proportion of orceful ction events compared to ll Direct ctions. Relative he indicator orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. his includes orceful ctions non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Civil ector Count of all coded events belonging to the WEI cue categories (1 to 22) plus an additional 11 ll Civil Events IDE event forms. his event count is limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors. Count of all coded events belonging to the WEI cue categories (1 to 22), that involve only nongovernmental, or civil sector actors. ll Civil ctions Civil Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, Civil Direct demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action ctions limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors. Relative Civil Direct ctions Proportion of Civil Direct ctions compared to ll Civil ctions. Civil Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors. Government ector ll Government Count of all coded events belonging to the WEI cue categories (1 to 22) plus an additional 11 Events IDE event forms. his event count is limited to political sector, or government actors. ll Government Count of all coded events belonging to the WEI cue categories (1 to 22), that involve only the ctions political sector, or government actors. Government Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: Government threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass Direct ctions direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors. Relative Government Direct ctions Proportion of Government Direct ctions compared to ll Government ctions. Government Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors. Conflict Carrying Capacity he Conflict Carrying Capacity (or CCC) is a composed index that depicts the overall stability of the country or region of interest. he CCC is operationalized in terms of the multiplicative interaction among three Proportional measures: (1) civil contentiousness or the Proportion of civil actions that are reported as contentious or "direct" and thus challenge (at least implicitly) the state's monopoly on conflict regulation; (2) state repression or the Proportion of state actions that are reported as extra-institutional or "direct" both in response to direct challenges from the civil sector and those initiated by the state to repress and control opposition; and (3) violent contention or the Proportion of actions entailing physical damage to persons or property. the index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

8 Update ppendix: Description of indicators used Page 8 Variable Name Country tability Cooperative Conflictual Description / Definition he country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country. Proportion of all actions belonging to all cooperative categories yield, comment consult, approve, promise, grant, reward, agree, request, and propose to all actions (all Events belonging to the 22 WEI cue categories). Proportion of all actions belonging to all conflictive categories reject, accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize, and force to all actions (all Events belonging to the 22 WEI cue categories). WEI Cue 1 Yield 2 Comment 3 Consult 4 pprove 5 Promise 6 Grant 7 Reward 8 gree Proportion of yield events (WEI cue category 1) to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. Consistent with McClelland's original categorization, we organize the events within the yield cue category to include yield to order (WEI sub-category 11: includes surrendering, submitting to arrest), yield position (WEI sub-category 12: retreating, evacuating, surrendering possessions) and acknowledge responsibility (cknowledge responsibility is equivalent to the original WEI category 13: dmit Wrongdoing, Retract tatement.) Proportion of comment events (WEI cue category 2) to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. Consistent with McClelland's original categorization, we organize the events within the comment cue category to include many different types of remarks, differentiating among decline comment, pessimistic comment and optimistic comment (WEI categories 21 25). Proportion of consult events (WEI cue category 3) to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. Consistent with McClelland's original categorization, we organize the events within the consult cue category to include discussions, meetings and hosting meetings (WEI categories 31 33). Proportion of approve events (WEI cue category 4) to all WEI cue category events as reported in a specific time interval. Consistent with McClelland's original categorization, we organize the events within the approve cue category to include praise, empathize and forgive events. Proportion of promise events (WEI cue category 5) to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. Consistent with McClelland's original categorization, we organize the events within the promise cue category to include promise material support (including subcategories of economic, humanitarian and military support), promise other support, and assure events (WEI categories 51 54). Proportion of grant events (WEI cue category 6) to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. Consistent with McClelland's original categorization, we organize the events within the grant cue category to include extend invitation, provide shelter (including the sub-category, grant asylum), improve relations, ease sanctions (including the sub-categories, observe truce, demobilize armed forces and relax censorship, administrative sanctions and curfew) and release/return events (WEI categories 61 66). Proportion of reward cue category events (WEI cue category 7) to all WEI cue category events (all we organize the events within the reward cue category to include extend economic, military and humanitarian aid and rally support events (WEI categories 71 73). Proportion of agree cue category events (WEI cue category 8) to all WEI cue category events (all we organize the events within the agree cue category to include assent/approve, agree/accept and collaborate events (WEI categories 81 and 82). swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

9 Update ppendix: Description of indicators used Page 9 Variable Name Description / Definition Proportion of request cue category events (WEI cue category 9) to all WEI cue category events (all we organize the request cue category to include requests for information, material aid (including 9 Request sub-categories of economic, humanitarian and military aid) and protection and solicit support events (WEI categories 91 95). Note that the WEI Request cue category (09) is reserved for events involving an actor requesting assistance for his/her own country or group. Proportion of propose cue category events (WEI cue category 10) to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. Consistent with McClelland's original categorization, we organize the propose cue category to include offer proposal (including the subcategory, propose truce or cease-fire) and call for action events (WEI categories 101 and 102). Note 10 Propose that the WEI Propose cue category (10) is restricted to events involving an actor proposing an action for a country or group other than his/her own. Proportion of reject cue category events (WEI cue category 11) to all WEI cue category events (all we organize the reject cue category to include reject proposal, defy norms (including sub-categories, 11 Reject political flight, disclose information, establish parallel institutions and protest resignation (he resignation must be reported as a protest, otherwise it is an adjustment (IDE code 26).)) and refuse to allow (including sub-categories, impose curfew, censor media and veto) events (WEI categories 111 and 112). Proportion of accuse cue category events (WEI cue category 12) to all WEI cue category events (all 12 ccuse we organize the accuse cue category to include criticize/blame (ll judicial indictments and similar official "charges" are included under the IDE djudicate category (24).) and denounce/denigrate events (WEI categories 121 and 122). Proportion of protest cue category events (WEI cue category 13) to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. he WEI Protest cue category (13) is equivalent to 13 Protest the IDE Complain category. herefore, we organize the WEI protest cue category/ide Complain category to include informal and formal complaint events (WEI categories 131 and 132). Proportion of deny cue category events (WEI cue category 14) to all WEI cue category events (all 14 Deny we organize the deny cue category to include deny an accusation events (WEI categories 141 and 142). Proportion of demand cue category events (WEI cue category 15) to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. Consistent with McClelland's original 15 Demand categorization, we organize the demand cue category to include issue order (insist/demand compliance) events (WEI category 150). Proportion of warn cue category events (WEI cue category 16) to all WEI cue category events (all 16 Warn we organize the warn cue category (he WEI Warn cue category (16) is distinct from the WEI threaten cue category (17) in that Warn does not imply negative sanctions should the action be carried out.) to include give warning events (WEI category 160). Proportion of threaten cue category events (WEI cue category 17) to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. Consistent with McClelland's original 17 hreaten categorization, we organize the threaten cue category to include non-specific, sanctions, nonmilitary, military force threats as well as give ultimatum events (WEI categories ). Proportion of demonstrate cue category events (WEI cue category 18) to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. Consistent with McClelland's original 18 Demonstrate categorization, we organize the demonstrate cue category to include protest demonstration, military demonstration and control crowds events (181 and 182). swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

10 Update ppendix: Description of indicators used Page 10 Variable Name 19 anction 20 Expel 21 eize 22 orce Description / Definition Proportion of sanction cue category events to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. he anction cue category is equivalent to the WEI Reduce Relationship cue category (19). Compatible with McClelland's original Reduce Relationship categorization of events, the sanction cue category includes reduce routine activity, reduce or stop aid, impose sanctions, halt negotiations and break relations events (WEI categories ). Proportion of expel cue category events (WEI cue category 20) to all WEI cue category events (all we organize the expel cue category to include all expel and expel people events (WEI categories 201 and 202). Proportion of seize cue category events (WEI cue category 21) to all WEI cue category events (all we organize the seize cue category to include all seize people (includes sub-categories of criminal arrests, political detentions and abductions and hijackings) and seize possession (includes subcategories of no force-use crime and covert monitoring (he act of spying was moved from the WEI ccuse category (121) to be included in the sub-category of Covert monitoring.)) events (WEI categories 211 and 212). Proportion of force cue category events (WEI cue category 22) to all WEI cue category events (all we organize the force cue category to include riot, bombing, physical assault and military engagement events (WEI categories ). verage verage Domestic Conflict verage Domestic Cooperation verage International Conflict verage International Cooperation indicators are used to display Proportions of conflict and cooperation events in time. Each event category is assigned a rating (value), ranging from -10 (extreme conflict) to 10 (extreme cooperation). Zero value events are excluded from these calculations. he verage indicator is a cumulative average of all events that are classified with a positive or negative value by 's conflict/cooperation scale. he indicator displays the mean of the conflict/cooperation event values, excluding all zero value events. he verage Domestic Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative () values of all conflictive intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative values divided by the total number of conflictive domestic events). or interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). he verage Domestic Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive () values of all cooperative intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive values divided by the total number of cooperative domestic events). he verage International Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative () values of all conflictive interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative values divided by the total number of conflictive international events). or interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). he verage International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive () values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive values divided by the total number of cooperative international events). swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

11 Update he Early Warning ystem Page 11 Who are we? (German acronym for Early nalysis of ensions and act-finding ) is the early warning project of swisspeace, based in Berne, witzerland. In 1998 the wiss gency for Development and Cooperation (DC) assigned swisspeace to set up a political early warning system for early identification of impending armed conflict and political crisis situations. What do we want? aims to enhance political decision makers ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent political strategies can be formulated either to prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or to identify opportunities for peacebuilding. How do we work? uses both quantitative and qualitative methods for its analysis. he centerpiece in the quantitative analysis is based on event data analysis and the respective tools developed in the framework of the Program on Nonviolent anctions and Cultural urvival (PONC) at Harvard University. he logic of event data analysis is fairly simple: all events considered relevant to conflict escalation and de-escalation are assigned a certain numeric value according to a distinct conflict scale. hese values can then be added up for specific time intervals and graphically displayed in a curve over time. he quality and quantity of data input is crucial for the success of such a method. In order to gather the quality and quantity of data required to suit early warning purposes, sets up its own local information networks (LINs) and thus overcomes shortcomings of existing information sources (e.g., international news wires). unique set of data is collected for each country completely independently from Western news-media coverage. or qualitative data analysis, contracts internationally renowned country experts. What are our products? products are risk assessments tailored to individual customers' needs. he standard product ( Update ) consists of three to five charts depicting the latest conflict related trends and a concise expert interpretation. s the time-series of collected data grow, analysts will apply statistical methods to go beyond retrospective description and forecast future developments. Updates are available in either hard copy or electronic form, covering time intervals as chosen by the customer. Which countries do we monitor? frica: sia: Europe: ngola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, omalia fghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Caucasus region, Pakistan, ajikistan, Uzbekistan lbania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, erbia and Montenegro Middle East: Palestine swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation