F A S T Update Pakistan

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1 Update Pakistan Early warning unit Quarterly Risk ssessment November 2002 to ebruary 2003 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

2 Update Pakistan November 2002 ebruary 2003 Page 2 Contents North-West rontier Province (NWP) and Balochistan:! Country tability and orceful ctions! Government and Civil Direct ctions 3 4 Entire Pakistan: Country tability and orceful ctions 5 Government and Civil Direct ctions 6 verage Goldstein Domestic Conflict and Cooperation 7 verage Goldstein International Conflict and Cooperation 8 he Early Warning ystem 9 ppendix: Description of Indicators Used 10 Contact : Phone: ax: Visit our Website at: swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

3 Update Pakistan November 2002 ebruary 2003 Page Country tability and orceful ctions (NWP, Balochistan) Country tability Normalized orceful ctions /01 9/01 11/02 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/02 11/02 1/03 verage number of reported events per month: 133 Risk ssessment: he above graph indicates a relatively high level of tability and a relatively low level of orceful ctions. In fact, the level of orceful ctions almost always decreased when the level of tability improved. he first phase of declining orceful ctions and increasing tability, between July 2001 and January 2002 was coincidental with the war in fghanistan: most of the islamist groups looked beyond the Durand Line and thousands of them even went there for fighting the Northern lliance and the mericans. he second phase, starting in ebruary 2002, was marked by a decline of tability and a rise of orceful ctions lasting until July his was when Pasthun Jihadists returned to the NWP and Balochistan and joined hands in the street with those who had stayed there to protest (by violent as well as non violent means) against the policies of President Musharraf: collaboration with the U against the alibans, repression of the islamists as spelled out in his 12 January speech, control of the Madrasas in large numbers in the NWP- and registration of foreign students. In May, the U persuaded General Musharraf to intensify the search for l Qaeda people and alibans in the Pashtun area (including Waziristan, one of the ribal gencies). he third phase, starting in July 2002 was marked by erratic evolutions but ended in the return to a certain stability and a decreasing number of orceful ctions. his corresponds to the election campaign in October, and then the formation of new governments in the NWP and Balochistan. In the former province, the islamist alliance (the Muttahida Majlis-I-mal) won a majority of the seats and kram Durrani was elected Chief Minister in November s a consequence the tability graph shows a peak in that month. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

4 Update Pakistan November 2002 ebruary 2003 Page 4 Government and Civil Direct ctions (NWP, Balochistan) Normalized Government Direct ctions Normalized Civil Direct ctions /01 9/01 11/02 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/02 11/02 1/03 verage number of reported events per month: 133 Risk ssessment: he graphs show that the evolution of the Government Direct ctions and Civil Direct ctions run in parallel, which is quite comprehensible since the former are mostly responses to the latter. he first minor peak of Civil ction in October 2001 coincides to the anti-merican demonstrations following the U attitude towards fghanistan. he relative insignificance of this peak shows how limited this mobilisation was: the NWP and Balochistan were not the epicentres of the protest which was much more intense in Karachi, for instance and most of the demonstrations were under a kind of remote control anyway even monitored by the tate. he second and third peak in the first half of 2002 were due to the policy of Musharraf vis-à-vis the islamists: after announcing the ban of five movements on 12 January 2002, the Pakistani President had people arrested (at least some of them in the NWP and Balochistan). In November 2002, only 40 or so had been charge sheeted before being released for some reason the others had already been freed. s a result, there was no need to intensify Direct ctions from the islamists point of view. he fourth peak in eptember 2002 was due to the heat of the election campaign, when PPP (Pakistan People s Party) and PML (N) (Pakistani Muslim League-Nawaz) activists demonstrated against the ban of their leaders, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz harif, who had not been allowed to contest and even to return to Pakistan. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

5 Update Pakistan November 2002 ebruary 2003 Page Country tability and orceful ctions Country tability Normalized orceful ctions /02 6/02 7/02 8/02 9/02 10/02 11/02 12/02 1/03 verage number of reported events per month: 302 Risk ssessment: 2/03 he political stability of Pakistan steadily improved between May 2002 and January imultaneously, the use of Direct ctions decreased in a symmetric manner. his is largely due to the growing assertiveness of General Musharraf who benefited from the support of the U-led nti-terrorism coalition after the 11th of eptember he graph starts in May 2002, just after the plebiscite of pril 30, which legitimized the power of President Musharraf. During summer, stability still improved, from a purely institutional point of view, given the way Musharraf had the Legal ramework Order (his Constitution ) amended: the national assembly which was about to be elected could be dissolved by the president, like the state assemblies. hese assemblies were elected in October 2002, exactly three years after Musharraf s coup. herefore he had complied with the injunction of the upreme Court which requested him to relaunch the democratic process in this very time frame. t first sight, the election results do not support the cause of stability since the islamists of the MM (Muttahi mal) have achieved an unexpected breakthrough with more than 50 seats in the central assembly and a majority of them in the NWP assembly. But this achievement is largely due to the mere impact of their recent unity: they still represent about voters only 80% of them Pashtuns, from the NWP, Balochistan or Karachi. Besides, they are not such a threat to Musharraf. His very superficial repression of the jihadis shows that he still appreciates their collaboration. he government even tried hard to have some of the MM candidates returned, especially in Balochistan. On the other hand, Musharraf s two arch enemies, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz harif are out: the PPP remains the first party with 7 millions votes (twice the MM s) but it has been badly affected by the defection of ten MPs who joined the government. he PML(N) is left with one tenth of the voters only, because of the attractiveness of the PLM(Q), a party born from a fraction of the PLM(N) after a scission was engineered by Musharraf. he PLM(Q)-led coalition is sufficient for keeping the PPP and the PLM(N) out, and the Prime minister, Jamali a Baloch may be conveniently weak for Musharraf. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

6 Update Pakistan November 2002 ebruary 2003 Page Government and Civil Direct ctions Normalized Civil Direct ctions Normalized Government Direct ctions /02 6/02 7/02 8/02 9/02 10/02 11/02 12/02 1/03 verage number of reported events per month: 302 2/03 Risk ssessment: During the observed period, the Normalized Civil Direct ctions graph and the Normalized Government Direct ctions graph maintained a rather even level. Violence and government response tended to decrease between May and ugust-eptember 2002 and then started to rise again. here have been many acts of violence in Pakistan in Most of these violent acts have been terrorist actions reacting to the new line of Musharraf (pro-u and anti-islamists) that he spelled out in his speech of 12 January 2002: 23 January, Daniel Pearl was kidnapped, 17 March, attack against a Protestant temple in the Diplomatic Enclave of Islamabad (2 mericans were killed), 8 May, 11 rench men were killed in Karachi, 14 June, attack in front of the merican Consulate in Karachi (11 people died). he aim of these terrorists acts was to dissuade Musharraf to remain aligned on the U. But they have been isolated acts whose architects were not entrenched in any particular region or ethnic group. hey were orchestrated in such a way that it was not relevant to deploy troops and launch large scale repression on a given territory, like in Karachi in the 1990s, for instance. his explains the rather low level of violence shown on the graph. But the psychological impact of such violence has been tremendous. It has led the Westerners (including many diplomats) to leave the country in large numbers and to close down their schools, cultural institutes etc swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

7 Update Pakistan November 2002 ebruary 2003 Page verage Goldstein Domestic Conflict and Cooperation verage Domestic Conflict verage Domestic Cooperation /02 6/02 7/02 8/02 9/02 10/02 11/02 12/02 1/03 verage number of reported events per month: 302 2/03 Risk ssessment: he level of Domestic Conflict fluctuated around 6 points during the observed period, which means that the increasing political stability did not translate into significant change in society in terms of Domestic Cooperation. his state of things is largely due to the fact that, besides terrorist attacks, Pakistan has been very badly affected by anti-christian and sectarian violence. When westerners have become too few or too well protected for being targeted by islamist terrorists, they started attacking Pakistani Christians who, from their point of view, represent the West. In ugust, attacks against a Christian school at Murree caused the death of 6 innocent people. ew days later, five people died after a Christian hospital has been attacked. hias continued to be assaulted by islamist movements too. orming about one fifth of the population, they have been a traditional target of the unni radical movements. ensions had first emerged in the wake of Zia s islamisation policy. It was reinforced by the Iranian Revolution (ehran supported Pakistani hias and the audis Pakistani unnis). he anti-hia inclination of the alibans had its own repercussions on Pakistan too. In 2002, there have been 85 attacks against hias, including many selected killings of medical practitioners, one of the finest elite groups among the hias. While Domestic Conflicts emerging from ethnic tensions are receding in the background, including in Karachi where the Mohajirs are supporting Musharraf the MQM (Muttahidda Quami Movement) has eventually joined the ruling coalition, religious fractures undermine civil peace in most parts of the province. Even Punjab, the pivotal province of Pakistan, is badly affected swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

8 Update Pakistan November 2002 ebruary 2003 Page verage Goldstein International Conflict and Cooperation verage International Conflict verage International Cooperation /02 6/02 7/02 8/02 9/02 10/02 11/02 12/02 1/03 verage number of reported events per month: 302 Risk ssessment: he graph of International Conflict shows a downward trend over the period under review, whereas the graph of International Cooperation tended to rise till ugust 2002 and then it reached a plateau. hese graphs reflect the evolution of the Pakistani-Indian relations. fter the 13 December 2001 attack against the Indian Parliament, New Delhi had mobilised soldiers on the Indo-Pak border. he risk of chirurgical strikes against islamist training camps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir/zad Kashmir were high till June, when, according to merican sources, both countries were about to open hostilities at one point. ensions receded under merican pressures during the following six months. his process resulted in the pulling out of the soldiers on both sides in November-December However, negotiations have not been resumed yet. New Delhi expects Islamabad to stop transborder terrorism (the crossing of the Kashmir Line of Control by islamist militants likely to organise bomb attacks or suicide squads in India) and considers that the Inter ervice Intelligence the Pakistani intelligence agency supports these groups. he Indian government has sent a list of 20 terrorists who allegedly have been active in India and who would be residing in Pakistan but Islamabad pretends that none of them are supposed to reside in Pakistan. Regarding International Cooperation, the U have praised Pakistan so far for its effective support in the fight against l Qaeda. he captures of bu Zubeida in aislabad on pril 6, 2002 and heikh hmed aleem in Karachi in July have been very much appreciated. However, the transfer of nuclear technology by Pakistan to North Korea has been denounced by Washington in October 2002 and may make the cooperation between the United tates and Pakistan more complicated in the near future. 2/03 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

9 Update he Who are we? Early Warning ystem Page 9 (German acronym for Early nalysis of ensions and act-finding ) is the early warning project of swisspeace, based in Berne, witzerland. In 1998 the wiss gency for Development and Cooperation (DC) assigned swisspeace to set up a political early warning system for early identification of impending armed conflict and political crisis situations. What do we want? aims to enhance political decision makers ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent political strategies can be formulated either to prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or to identify opportunities for peacebuilding. How do we work? uses both quantitative and qualitative methods for its analysis. he centerpiece in the quantitative analysis is based on event data analysis and the respective tools developed in the framework of the Program on Nonviolent anctions and Cultural urvival (PONC) at Harvard University. he logic of event data analysis is fairly simple: all events considered relevant to conflict escalation and de-escalation are assigned a certain numeric value according to a distinct conflict scale. hese values can then be added up for specific time intervals and graphically displayed in a curve over time. he quality and quantity of data input is crucial for the success of such a method. In order to gather the quality and quantity of data required to suit early warning purposes, sets up its own local information networks (LINs) and thus overcomes shortcomings of existing information sources (e.g., international news wires). unique set of data is collected for each country completely independently from Western news-media coverage. or qualitative data analysis, contracts internationally renowned country experts. What are our products? products are risk assessments tailored to individual customers' needs. he standard product ( Update ) consists of three to five charts depicting the latest conflict related trends and a concise expert interpretation. s the time-series of collected data grow, analysts will apply statistical methods to go beyond retrospective description and forecast future developments. Updates are available in either hard copy or electronic form, covering time intervals as chosen by the customer. Which countries do we monitor? frica: ngola, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kivu region, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, omalia sia: Europe: Middle East: fghanistan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Caucasus region, Pakistan, ajikistan, Uzbekistan lbania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, erbia-montenegro Palestine swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

10 Update ppendix: Description of Indicators used Page 10 Variable Name Description/ Definition ll Events ll ctions orceful ctions IDE categories: a count of all coded events with WEI cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all WEI cue categories) plus an additional 11 IDE event cue categories (Event type: other ). WEI categories: a count of all coded events with cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all WEI cue categories). he indicator orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. his includes noninjury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Normalized ctions Proportion of ll ctions to ll Events. Normalized orceful ctions Proportion of orceful ction events compared to ll Direct ctions. he indicator orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. his includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Civil orceful ctions he Indicator Civil orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by non-governmental or civil sector actors. his includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Government Direct ctions Conflict Carrying Capacity Country tability Goldstein Goldstein verage Domestic Conflict Goldstein verage Domestic Cooperation Goldstein verage International Conflict Goldstein verage International Cooperation Government Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors. he Conflict Carrying Capacity (or CCC) is a composed index that depicts the overall stability of the country or region of interest. he CCC is operationalised in terms of the multiplicative interaction among three Proportional measures: (1) civil contentiousness or the Proportion of civil actions that are reported as contentious or "direct" and thus challenge (at least implicitly) the state's monopoly on conflict regulation; (2) state repression or the Proportion of state actions that are reported as extra-institutional or "direct" both in response to direct challenges from the civil sector and those initiated by the state to repress and control opposition; and (3) violent contention or the Proportion of actions entailing physical damage to persons or property. the index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability. he country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country. Goldstein indicators are used to display Proportions of conflict and cooperation events in time. Each event category is assigned a Goldstein rating (value), ranging from -10 (extreme conflict) to 10 (extreme cooperation). Zero value events are excluded from these calculations. he Goldstein verage Domestic Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (Goldstein) values of all conflictive intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative Goldstein values divided by the total number of conflictive domestic events). or interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). he Goldstein verage Domestic Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative domestic events). he Goldstein verage International Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (Goldstein) values of all conflictive interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative Goldstein values divided by the total number of conflictive international events). or interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). he Goldstein verage International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative international events). swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

F A S T Update. Bosnia and Herzegovina. Quarterly Risk Assessment November 2002 to January Early warning unit

F A S T Update. Bosnia and Herzegovina. Quarterly Risk Assessment November 2002 to January Early warning unit Update Early warning unit Bosnia and Herzegovina Quarterly Risk ssessment November 2002 to January 2003 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation Update Bosnia and Herzegovina November 2002