Quarterly Risk Assessment December 2003 to February 2004

Transcription

1 Update Early warning unit DRC/Kivu region Quarterly Risk ssessment December 2003 to ebruary 2004 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

2 Update DRC/Kivu region December 2003 ebruary 2004 Page 2 Contents Country tability and Relative orceful ctions 3 Relative Government and Civil orceful ctions 4 Goldstein verage Domestic Conflict and Cooperation 5 Goldstein verage International Conflict and Cooperation 6 ppendix: Description of indicators used 7 he Early Warning ystem 9 Update ubscription: Contact : Phone: ax: mailto:@swisspeace.ch Country Expert: René Lemarchand swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

3 Update DRC/Kivu region December 2003 ebruary 2004 Page Country tability and Relative orceful ctions Relative orceful ctions Country tability /02 12/02 1/03 2/03 3/03 4/03 5/03 6/03 7/03 8/03 9/03 10/03 11/03 12/03 verage number of reported events per month: 116 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: s the graphs above indicate the Kivu region has experienced greater stability since December than at any time in previous months, as well as a lowering of the rate of Relative orceful ctions. lthough in sharp contrast with the situation in the Ituri province - where at least 100 people were killed by Hema militiamen of the pro-rwanda Union des Populations Congolaises (UPC) in mid-january - and in Katanga, where Mai-Mai elements are said to have killed 100 people since the beginning of the year, the security situation remains extremely fragile in both North and outh Kivu. In Goma and Bukavu (capitals of North and outh Kivu respectively) rumors abounded in January about an impending third war about to break out, pitting the eastern provinces against the Kinshasa government. fter the refusal of three key pro-rassemblement Démocratique Congolais (RCD) officers - General Laurent Nkunda, and Colonels Eric Ruhorimbere and Elie Gichondo - to attend the inauguration of the new Congolese army in Kinshasa last ugust, the senior commander in the trio (Nkunda), an ethnic utsi from North Kivu, is said to have been plotting a coup, presumably with the blessing of the Governor of North Kivu, erufuli. s difficult as it is to separate fact from rumor, there is little question that the appointment of military commanders by the Kinshasa-based transitional government has injected considerable tension in the provincial capitals. Despite rumors to the contrary, a pro-rcd coup seems unlikely in view of the recent deployment of the 10,800 strong MONUC force in eastern Congo. he warning by MONUC head, William wing, that MONUC will adapt the deployment of its troops to areas where they are most needed has not gone unheeded. But this does not rule out local eruptions of violence between disgruntled Mai-Mai elements and the civilian populations, or between the newly appointed commanders and RCD stalwarts. 1/04 2/04 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

4 Update DRC/Kivu region December 2003 ebruary 2004 Page Relative Government and Civil orceful ctions Relative Civil orceful ctions Relative Government orceful ctions /02 12/02 1/03 2/03 3/03 4/03 5/03 6/03 7/03 8/03 9/03 10/03 11/03 12/03 verage number of reported events per month: 116 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: Behind the ongoing high level of Relative Civil orceful ctions lies a growing tension between ethnic utsi and Mai-Mai militias (or Mai-Mai sympathizers) as well as serious rifts within the Hutu rebels of North Kivu over the issue of repatriation. Hutu militants of the orces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (DLR) are opposed to repatriation to Rwanda. hey are said to be holding hostage some 3,000 Rwandan civilians and ex-combatants. In outh Kivu, along the izi-baraka axis, the principal source of friction is beween the Mai-Mai commander Dunia and Banyamulenge elements. he latter are accused by Dunia and his supporters, notably the notoriously anti-utsi Bembe personality, nzuluni, of preparing for war. here has been reports of vehicles driven by Banyamulenge being stopped and their passengers stripped of their belongings. large number of child soldiers are said to contribute to the climate of insecurity in places like Lemera, izi and Baraka. he process of military integration is running into major snags. he Mai-Mai are by no means unanimous in joining the new army. lthough Mai-Mai representatives are found in the transitional government (4), in the enate (3) and in the National ssembly (10), the local warlords continue to loot, harass and sometimes kill civilians. he Kitenge killings in Katanga, attributed to Mai-Mai, are part of a pattern that extends to outh Kivu. s reflected by the anew about-turn in Relative Government orceful ctions in ebruary 04, the emergence in Kinshasa of a unified government has done little to bring about reconciliation at the provincial level between RCD governors and Mai-Mai warlords. he enmity between ethnic utsi and other communities indigenous to the Kivu region will not come to an end any time soon. Nor will private armies, whether recruited by warlords or by provincial governors, disappear overnight. How to bring about a genuine unification of the armed forces and turn them into a professional instrument for the consolidation of peace in the region is one of the many challenges facing the Kinshasa authorities. 1/04 2/04 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

5 Update DRC/Kivu region December 2003 ebruary 2004 Page 5 Goldstein verage Domestic Conflict and Cooperation Goldstein verage Domestic Conflict Goldstein verage Domestic Cooperation -1 11/02 12/02 1/03 2/03 3/03 4/03 5/03 6/03 7/03 8/03 9/03 10/03 11/03 12/03 verage number of reported events per month: 116 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: he graph above convey a sense of the problems arising from the persistence of domestic conflict and the lack of cooperation at the provincial level, and between the provinces and the transition government. Despite conciliatory gestures towards Kinshasa, there is a wide gap between the formal allegiance of the provinces to the transition government and the realities on the ground. In North Kivu the appointment of military commanders has been the source of chronic tension with the provincial authorities. here is little cooperation between Rwandophones (Hutu and utsi) indigenous to the Congo and other communities. Under the artful leadership of the provincial governor (erufuli), a Hutu, ethnic utsi and Hutu are joining hands in their opposition to Nande and Hunde elements, but this alliance remains fragile. he presence in outh Kivu of anti-utsi and anti-banyamulenge hard-liners (such as nzuluni) raises grave doubts about the prospects for future cooperation, despite recent efforts by NGOs to build inter-ethnic bridges. he most promising initiative in this regard has taken place in Uvira (outh Kivu) with the facilitation of three European organizations (Institut Vie et Paix, NOVIB, DID). rom November 12 to 16 a group of provincial notables drawn from every ethnic group and political persuasion tried to come to grips with the problematics of a durable peace among and within local communities. he aim was to reach agreement on a vision of peace and concord, the restoration of mutual trust, security and acceptance of mutual differences. his is the most encouraging sign so far of a collective will to take a fresh start. Portents of unrest are equally plain, however, from the presence of hard-line Mai-Mai warlords to lingering antagonisms between Banyamulenge and their neighbors. lthough the restoration of mutual trust is still a long way away, there are renewed efforts to re-weave the fabric of a society torn asunder by civil conflict. How far they succeed or fail in promoting cooperation among local communities depends on how much support and encouragement they receive from Kinshasa, as well as on how good a job the MONUC does of ensuring a modicum of peace before and during the elections. 1/04 2/04 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

6 Update DRC/Kivu region December 2003 ebruary 2004 Page 6 Goldstein verage International Conflict and Cooperation Goldstein verage International Conflict Goldstein verage International Cooperation -1 11/02 12/02 1/03 2/03 3/03 4/03 5/03 6/03 7/03 8/03 9/03 10/03 11/03 12/03 verage number of reported events per month: 116 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: here has been a sharp drop in the frequency and intensity of international conflict at the beginning of the year. However, there are still potential areas of friction, notably the refusal of militant DLR leaders to allow the return of ex-combatants to Rwanda, which raises doubts about the capacity of the MONUC to reach its goal of repatriating 10,000 ex-fighters and their families by pril 30, In addition to this, although not officially noted, local people throughout ebruary repeatedly reported on activities of Rwandan troops in the region (see graph). Nevertheless, the conciliatory attitude of Rwanda on a broad range of bilateral-issues has been crucial for a lowering of tension between Kinshasa and Kigali. s rumors spread of an impending coup instigated by certain outh Kivu authorities, Rwanda made it clear that they should expect no support from Kigali. similarly conciliatory stance has been shown by Uganda on the Ituri conflict. he same is true also for Burundi. mong the factors accounting for this lowering of international tension, the following are worth noting: (a) the reinforcement and redeployment of MONUC troops in eastern Congo, along with the impressive performance of MONUC head, William wing, in providing leadership to the peace-keeping force; (b) the supportive role played by the International Committee in upport of the ransition (IC), comprising the ambassadors of fifteen closely engaged states, in encouraging diplomatic solutions; (c) the excellent chemistry between the Minister of External Relations of the DRC, ntoine Ghonda Mongalibi, and his Rwandan counterpart, Charles Murigande. he prospects for continued international cooperation are more promising than at any other time. or this, credit goes to the strengthening of the mandate and manpower capacities of the MONUC under wing s strong leadership. ustained international pressure by donors and the UN remains crucial to the maintenance of peace in the region. What remains unknown is how the forthcoming elections in Burundi and the DRC will affect this still very fragile international equilibrium between the DRC and its neighbors. 1/04 2/04 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

7 Update ppendix : Description of indicators used Page 7 Variable Name Direct ctions orceful ctions Relative orceful ctions Civil ector Civil Direct ctions Civil orceful ctions Relative Civil orceful ctions Government ector Government Direct ctions Government orceful ctions Relative Government orceful ctions Conflict Carrying Capacity Country tability Description / Definition Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct actions regardless of origin or target. he indicator orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. his includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Proportion of orceful ction events compared to ll Direct ctions. he indicator orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. his includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Civil Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors. he Indicator Civil orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by non-governmental, or civil sector actors. his includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Proportion of Civil orceful ction events compared to ll Civil Direct ctions. he Indicator Civil orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by non-governmental, or civil sector actors. his includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Government Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors. he Indicator Government orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by political, or government sector actors. his includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Proportion of Government orceful ction events compared to ll Government Direct ctions. he Indicator Government orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by political, or government sector actors. his includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. he Conflict Carrying Capacity (or CCC) is a composed index that depicts the overall stability of the country or region of interest. he CCC is operationalized in terms of the multiplicative interaction among three Proportional measures: (1) civil contentiousness or the Proportion of civil actions that are reported as contentious or "direct" and thus challenge (at least implicitly) the state's monopoly on conflict regulation; (2) state repression or the Proportion of state actions that are reported as extra-institutional or "direct" both in response to direct challenges from the civil sector and those initiated by the state to repress and control opposition; and (3) violent contention or the Proportion of actions entailing physical damage to persons or property. the index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability. he country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country. Goldstein Goldstein Goldstein verage Goldstein verage Domestic Conflict swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation Goldstein indicators are used to display Proportions of conflict and cooperation events in time. Each event category is assigned a Goldstein rating (value), ranging from -10 (extreme conflict) to 10 (extreme cooperation). Zero value events are excluded from these calculations. he Goldstein verage indicator is a cumulative average of all events that are classified with a positive or negative value by Goldstein's conflict/cooperation scale. he indicator displays the mean of the conflict/cooperation event values, excluding all zero value events. he Goldstein verage Domestic Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (Goldstein) values of all conflictive intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative Goldstein values divided by the total number of conflictive domestic events). or interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values).

8 Update ppendix : Description of indicators used Page 8 Variable Name Goldstein verage Domestic Cooperation Goldstein verage International Conflict Goldstein verage International Cooperation Description / Definition he Goldstein verage Domestic Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative domestic events). he Goldstein verage International Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (Goldstein) values of all conflictive interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative Goldstein values divided by the total number of conflictive international events). or interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). he Goldstein verage International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative international events). swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

9 Update he Early Warning ystem Page 9 Who are we? (German acronym for Early nalysis of ensions and act-finding ) is the early warning project of swisspeace, based in Berne, witzerland. In 1998 the wiss gency for Development and Cooperation (DC) assigned swisspeace to set up a political early warning system for early identification of impending armed conflict and political crisis situations. What do we want? aims to enhance political decision makers ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent political strategies can be formulated either to prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or to identify opportunities for peacebuilding. How do we work? uses both quantitative and qualitative methods for its analysis. he centerpiece in the quantitative analysis is based on event data analysis and the respective tools developed in the framework of the Program on Nonviolent anctions and Cultural urvival (PONC) at Harvard University. he logic of event data analysis is fairly simple: all events considered relevant to conflict escalation and de-escalation are assigned a certain numeric value according to a distinct conflict scale. hese values can then be added up for specific time intervals and graphically displayed in a curve over time. he quality and quantity of data input is crucial for the success of such a method. In order to gather the quality and quantity of data required to suit early warning purposes, sets up its own local information networks (LINs) and thus overcomes shortcomings of existing information sources (e.g., international news wires). unique set of data is collected for each country completely independently from Western news-media coverage. or qualitative data analysis, contracts internationally renowned country experts. What are our products? products are risk assessments tailored to individual customers' needs. he standard product ( Update ) consists of three to five charts depicting the latest conflict related trends and a concise expert interpretation. s the time-series of collected data grow, analysts will apply statistical methods to go beyond retrospective description and forecast future developments. Updates are available in either hard copy or electronic form, covering time intervals as chosen by the customer. Which countries do we monitor? frica: ngola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, omalia sia: Europe: fghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Caucasus region, Pakistan, ajikistan, Uzbekistan lbania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, erbia and Montenegro Middle East: Palestine swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation