Early warning unit. F A S T Update. Burundi. Quarterly Risk Assessment March to May swisspeace Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation

Transcription

1 Update Early warning unit Burundi Quarterly Risk ssessment March to May 2004 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

2 Update Burundi March May 2004 Page 2 Contents Country tability and Relative Conflictual ctions 3 Relative Government and Civil Direct ctions 4 Relative Government and Civil orceful ctions 5 Goldstein verage Domestic and International Cooperation 6 ppendix: Description of indicators used 7 he Early Warning ystem 9 Update ubscription: Contact : Phone: ax: mailto:@swisspeace.ch Country Expert: René Lemarchand swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

3 Update Burundi March May 2004 Page 3 Country tability and Relative Conflictual ctions Country tability Relative Conflictual ctions /02 12/02 1/03 2/03 3/03 4/03 5/03 6/03 7/03 8/03 9/03 10/03 11/03 12/03 1/04 2/04 3/04 4/04 5/04 verage number of reported events per month: 125 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: ince the beginning of the year rising levels of Country tability have gone hand in hand with a drop in the frequency of Conflictual ctions. s shown by the graphs above, there has been only a slight rise in relative levels of conflict over the last two months. Reluctance of the orces Nationales de Libération (NL) to join the transition government constitutes the single most important source of unrest besides criminal acts of a non-political nature. he success of President Domitien Ndayizeye in negotiating the participation of all former rebel factions in the transition government (with the exception of the NL) has contributed in no small way to this climate of relative peace. dditional factors include the generous scale of foreign aid (much of it used to pay the salaries of civil servants and government ministers), and the decision of the UN ecurity Council to send additional troops and peace observers to Burundi by June 1, thus raising the total number of troops on the ground to 5,650. he 2,700 troops previously deployed under the auspices of the frican Union (U) are now integrated into a single peace-keeping force, the newly created Mission des Nations Unies au Burundi (MONUB). Whether this new security force, together with continuing pressure from the government, will be enough to bring the NL hard-liners on board before the end of the transition on November 1 remains to be seen. lthough the country is experiencing a fair degree of stability, one cannot underestimate the seriousness of the obstacles that lie ahead. lthough presidential and legislative elections are to be held shortly after the end of the transition, there is no consensus among parties and former rebel factions about the contents of the post-transition constitution, or the kind of electoral system best suited for Burundi. here is as yet no electoral law, no population census, no voter education program, and the disarmament and demobilization of armed factions is lagging behind. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

4 Update Burundi March May 2004 Page 4 Relative Government and Civil Direct ctions Relative Civil Direct ctions Relative Government Direct ctions /02 12/02 1/03 2/03 3/03 4/03 5/03 6/03 7/03 8/03 9/03 10/03 11/03 12/03 1/04 2/04 3/04 4/04 5/04 verage number of reported events per month: 125 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: here has been a sharp increase in the frequency of Relative Civil Direct ctions, whereas the rates of Direct ctions from the side of the government remained on an either constant level. March and pril saw the longest teachers strike in the country s history, and there has been insistent threats of former rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza to pull out of the government unless his demands were met. On pril 7 some 85 representatives of returnees families staged a sit-in at the offices of the Iteka League to demand food aid and shelter. Meanwhile the leaders of some radical utsi parties, notably the Uprona, have warned against the dangers of a one-man one-vote electoral system for Burundi. he government is facing additional difficulties from returning refugees calling for more land and more aid. Many of the 140,000 IDPs are anxious to return to their communes of origin to reclaim their properties before the arrival of refugees from anzania. he period under review has seen a deluge of strike actions, threats and demands from civil society organizations and political parties. Pierre Nkurunziza, the senior Minister in charge of Good Governance and head of the former rebel faction, Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democratie-orces pour la Defense de la Democratie (CNDD-DD), threatened to suspend the participation of his movement in the government unless the peace accords signed in Pretoria last year were fully implemented. hese include 20 per cent of civil service positions and 35 per cent of intelligence services. pecifically, Nkurunziza insisted on getting a larger share of the provincial governorships and communal administrators as well as a representation in the bureau of the National ssembly. he government, while refuting accusations that it was violating the Pretoria accords, responded by appointing two governors, 29 communal administrators and two ambassadors from the CNDD-DD. Brandishing the threat of opting out of the government unless they get a larger share of the national pie is not limited to the Nkuruzinza faction, but no other former rebel movement has used it more effectively. lthough the government is making every effort to meet the demands of former rebel factions, it cannot remain insensitive to grievances from civil society organizations (like teachers unions), IDPs and returning refugees. he immediate challenge for the government is to prevent radical Hutu factions, including the NL, from capitalizing on grass-roots grievances. ix months away from the elections much remains to be done to ensure a peaceful transition to multiparty democracy. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

5 Update Burundi March May 2004 Page 5 Relative Government and Civil orceful ctions Relative Civil orceful ctions Relative Government orceful ctions /02 12/02 1/03 2/03 3/03 4/03 5/03 6/03 7/03 8/03 9/03 10/03 11/03 12/03 1/04 2/04 3/04 4/04 5/04 verage number of reported events per month: 125 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: s shown above, trends in levels of Government and Civil orceful ctions have moved in opposite directions, with the former clearly in the ascendant until the end of pril. here has been a number of reported cases of use of force by the Burundi army and police against NL elements, ranging from arrests to killings. hus thirty people were reported dead in the commune of Kabezi after a clash in early pril between the army and NL rebels, which also caused the displacement of 30,000 people. round the same time the police arrested some 60 young men in Bujumbura after a soldier was ambushed. ignificantly, equally harsh measures have been taken against utsi extremists. hus on March 21, ten members of the P-masakanya, an extremist utsi movement, were arrested by the police. Behind the sharp decline in the frequency of the use of force by civil society actors lies the success scored by President Ndayizeye in bringing most former rebel factions into the government. hat the has been fairly evenhanded in dealing with extremists on both sides of the ethnic fence also helped. he security guarantees provided by MIB soldiers are yet another contributing factor. Now that it has successfully removed the threats posed by the CNDD-DD and the smaller break-away factions, the government is acting against the NL rebels with renewed energy. In doing so Ndayizeye has the backing of the army, police and most of the civil society organizations, as well as the diplomatic support of neighboring states. here is reason to expect continued relative calm throughout the country, except for Bujumbura Rural, the NL bastion, but things may change with the end of the transition on October 31. Whether the elections scheduled for the end of the year can be held is anybody s guess. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

6 Update Burundi March May 2004 Page 6 Goldstein verage Domestic and International Cooperation Goldstein verage International Cooperation Goldstein verage Domestic Cooperation /02 12/02 1/03 2/03 3/03 4/03 5/03 6/03 7/03 8/03 9/03 10/0311/0312/03 1/04 2/04 3/04 4/04 5/04 verage number of reported events per month: 125 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: he most encouraging sign on the domestic and international horizons has been the growing levels of cooperation on both fronts. or the first time since the genocidal killings of 1972 the government is trying to mobilize public opinion away from ethnicity as a reference point for discriminating between good guys and bad guys. hus with the full backing of the government the international NGO earch for Common Ground organized a three-day meeting in Bujumbura to honor the memory of the nation s unsung heroes, ordinary utsi who saved Hutu lives in 1972, and ordinary Hutu who saved utsi lives in1993. he names of these heroes and heroines were identified through a radio program (Ikingi y ubuntu) produced by tudio Ijambo. his is in sharp contrast with the deliberate silence kept by President Kagame on similar acts of heroism committed by Hutu during the 1994 Rwanda genocide. here has been a remarkable degree of international cooperation as well in putting pressure on the NL to lay down their arms and join the government. hus on pril 30 President Museveni of Uganda, Chair of the Burundi Peace ummit, warned of tough action against NL rebels for their stubborn refusal to join the peace talks, going so far as to raise the possibility of sending units of the Uganda People Defence orces (UDP) to Burundi if needed. outh frican Deputy-President and facilitator of the Burundi peace-process paid a visit to Bujumbura on March 23 to hold talks with key stakeholders in the peace process, while the UN ecurity Council expressed concern about continued clashes in Bujumbura Rural and urged all parties to join in the peace negotiations. he parallel efforts of domestic and international actors in furthering cooperation must be seen as a major step towards peace. Museveni s strong words to NL leaders may yet persuade its mercurial leader, gathon Rwasa, to come on board before the end of the transition. he big unknown is how the ushering in of the electoral process may affect the delicate balance of forces within the government. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

7 Update ppendix : Description of indicators used Page 7 Variable Name ll ctions Direct ctions orceful ctions Relative orceful ctions Description / Definition WEI categories: a count of all coded events with cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all WEI cue categories). Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct actions regardless of origin or target. he indicator orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. his includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Proportion of orceful ction events compared to ll Direct ctions. he indicator orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. his includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Civil ector Civil Direct ctions Civil orceful ctions Relative Civil Direct ctions Relative Civil orceful ctions Government ector Government Direct ctions Government orceful ctions Relative Government Direct ctions Relative Government orceful ctions Conflict Carrying Capacity Country tability Civil Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors. he Indicator Civil orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by non-governmental, or civil sector actors. his includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Proportion of Civil Direct ctions compared to ll Civil ctions. Civil Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors. Proportion of Civil orceful ction events compared to ll Civil Direct ctions. he Indicator Civil orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by non-governmental, or civil sector actors. his includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Government Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors. he Indicator Government orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by political, or government sector actors. his includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Proportion of Government Direct ctions compared to ll Government ctions. Government Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors. Proportion of Government orceful ction events compared to ll Government Direct ctions. he Indicator Government orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by political, or government sector actors. his includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. he Conflict Carrying Capacity (or CCC) is a composed index that depicts the overall stability of the country or region of interest. he CCC is operationalized in terms of the multiplicative interaction among three Proportional measures: (1) civil contentiousness or the Proportion of civil actions that are reported as contentious or "direct" and thus challenge (at least implicitly) the state's monopoly on conflict regulation; (2) state repression or the Proportion of state actions that are reported as extra-institutional or "direct" both in response to direct challenges from the civil sector and those initiated by the state to repress and control opposition; and (3) violent contention or the Proportion of actions entailing physical damage to persons or property. the index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability. he country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

8 Update ppendix : Description of indicators used Page 8 Variable Name Conflictual Goldstein Goldstein Goldstein verage Goldstein verage Domestic Cooperation Goldstein verage International Cooperation Description / Definition Proportion of all actions belonging to all conflictive categories reject, accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize, and force to all actions (all Events belonging to the 22 WEI cue categories). Goldstein indicators are used to display Proportions of conflict and cooperation events in time. Each event category is assigned a Goldstein rating (value), ranging from -10 (extreme conflict) to 10 (extreme cooperation). Zero value events are excluded from these calculations. he Goldstein verage indicator is a cumulative average of all events that are classified with a positive or negative value by Goldstein's conflict/cooperation scale. he indicator displays the mean of the conflict/cooperation event values, excluding all zero value events. he Goldstein verage Domestic Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative domestic events). he Goldstein verage International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative international events). swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

9 Update he Early Warning ystem Page 9 Who are we? (German acronym for Early nalysis of ensions and act-finding ) is the early warning project of swisspeace, based in Berne, witzerland. In 1998 the wiss gency for Development and Cooperation (DC) assigned swisspeace to set up a political early warning system for early identification of impending armed conflict and political crisis situations. What do we want? aims to enhance political decision makers ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent political strategies can be formulated either to prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or to identify opportunities for peacebuilding. How do we work? uses both quantitative and qualitative methods for its analysis. he centerpiece in the quantitative analysis is based on event data analysis and the respective tools developed in the framework of the Program on Nonviolent anctions and Cultural urvival (PONC) at Harvard University. he logic of event data analysis is fairly simple: all events considered relevant to conflict escalation and de-escalation are assigned a certain numeric value according to a distinct conflict scale. hese values can then be added up for specific time intervals and graphically displayed in a curve over time. he quality and quantity of data input is crucial for the success of such a method. In order to gather the quality and quantity of data required to suit early warning purposes, sets up its own local information networks (LINs) and thus overcomes shortcomings of existing information sources (e.g., international news wires). unique set of data is collected for each country completely independently from Western news-media coverage. or qualitative data analysis, contracts internationally renowned country experts. What are our products? products are risk assessments tailored to individual customers' needs. he standard product ( Update ) consists of three to five charts depicting the latest conflict related trends and a concise expert interpretation. s the time-series of collected data grow, analysts will apply statistical methods to go beyond retrospective description and forecast future developments. Updates are available in either hard copy or electronic form, covering time intervals as chosen by the customer. Which countries do we monitor? frica: ngola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, omalia sia: Europe: fghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Caucasus region, Pakistan, ajikistan, Uzbekistan lbania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, erbia and Montenegro Middle East: Palestine swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation