F A S T Update. Bosnia and Herzegovina. Quarterly Risk Assessment November 2002 to January Early warning unit

Transcription

1 Update Early warning unit Bosnia and Herzegovina Quarterly Risk ssessment November 2002 to January 2003 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

2 Update Bosnia and Herzegovina November 2002 January 2003 Page 2 Contents Country tability and Normalized orceful ctions 3 Normalized Civil and Government Direct ctions 4 Goldstein Domestic Cooperation and Conflict 5 Goldstein International Cooperation and Conflict 6 he Early Warning ystem 7 ppendix: Description of Indicators used 8 Contact : Phone: ax: swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

3 Update Bosnia and Herzegovina November 2002 January 2003 Page 3 Country tability and Normalized orceful ctions Risk ssessment: he graph highlights a continuous decrease in forceful actions, with a proportional increase of measures of stability. While the run up to the elections in October 2002 saw an increase in forceful actions and confrontations, these decreased after the elections, as stability increased. his increase is, however, not indicative of the new political forces elected. he victory of the nationalist parties among the three nations of Bosnia saw an extensive bargaining period between the parties and international actors which should not be confused with the stability of the new authorities once fully established. he new state-level government was only established in mid-january after nearly two and a half months of negotiations. he formation of the government was further delayed by the new rule which allows the High Representative to scrutinize most governmental candidates before taking office. he government is based on the three nationalist parties (Croat Democratic Community, erb Democratic Party and the Bosniak Party of Democratic ction), but also incorporates two moderate nationalist parties from the Bosniak community (Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina) and the Party of Democratic Progress (PDP). he three members of the Bosnian presidency are members of the three main nationalist parties, as are the presidents of the erb Republic and the Bosniak-Croat ederation. he government of the erb republic for the first time includes several Bosniaks from the Party of Democratic ction, as well as a number of Croats. he dominant parties here are the erb Democratic Party and the Party of Democratic Progress. he ederation government was still not established by late January. he trend towards stability occurred in spite of a number of violent incidents occurring towards the end of the year, including the murder of three Croats by a Bosniak, apparently motivated by radical Islamic convictions. he quick arrests prevented a noticeable negative impact on Bosnia s stability. source of potential instability will be the relations between the three nationalist parties over crucial decisions awaiting Bosnia, such as the accession to Partnership for Peace which requires a joint army or the creation of a joint customs service. urthermore, relations between the nationalist parties and the High Representatives are likely to be conflictual. Dr lorian Bieber Country tability Normalized orceful ctions /02 8/02 9/02 10/02 verage number of reported events per month: 200 Indicator Description: see page 8 11/02 12/02 1/03 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

4 Update Bosnia and Herzegovina November 2002 January 2003 Page 4 Normalized Civil and Government Direct ctions /02 8/02 9/02 10/02 verage number of reported events per month: 200 Indicator Description: see page 8 Risk ssessment: Overall the period under consideration has seen a marked decline in direct civil actions related to the completion of the elections in October 2002 and a low stagnating level of government direct actions. he most noticeable civil direct action occurred when on Christmas eve a radical Islamist Bosniak killed three members of a Croat family near the predominantly Bosniak town of Konjic. he perpetrator claimed to be affiliated with two Islamist organizations, among them the ktivna Islamska Omladina (IO). Both denied his membership. he IO was also held responsible for burning a nativity display in Mostar. hese incidents were particularly remarkable, as in the past most attacks against returning refugees and minorities occurred in the erb entity against Croats and Bosniaks. Only few such acts have taken place in Bosniak areas since the end of the war. he reason for the absence of an overall polarization of the social climate and an increase in civil and governmental direct actions was the swift arrest of the suspected assassin the day after the murder and his subsequent confession. s a result, a spiral of either revenge or allegations of complicity by public authorities did not emerge. he overall earlier decline of civil direct actions is closely linked to the conclusion of the elections and no larger incidents in the erb republic against returnees. With the exception of the arrest of a suspected terrorist by OR troops in October, the international military troops did not conduct any major operations during the period in question, such as the arrest of indicted war criminals. fter the surrender of the former erbian president Milan Milutinovic in January 2003 to the International War Crimes ribunal in he Hague, pressure continues to mount on the authorities of erbia and of the Bosnian erb entity to arrest Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, the remaining indicted war criminals. he United tates in January 2003 renewed its threat on Yugoslavia for financial sanctions by March if Mladic is not arrested. ny arrest is likely to lead to a sharp increase in direct civil actions, triggering doubtlessly a considerable degree of instability in the erb entity, due to the continued popularity of the two fugitives among many erbs. Dr lorian Bieber Normalized Civil Direct ctions Normalized Government Direct ctions 11/02 12/02 1/03 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

5 Update Bosnia and Herzegovina November 2002 January 2003 Page 5 Goldstein Domestic Cooperation and Conflict /02 8/02 9/02 10/02 verage number of reported events per month: 200 Indicator Description: see page 8 Risk ssessment: s in the previous period, the degree of domestic conflict exceeds the level of cooperation. his trend did not see any major shifts in the past months. he electoral victory of the three nationalist parties during the October 2002 elections reaffirmed the polarized political climate in the country and the absence of any real prospect in the medium future for any significant improvements. wo key reasons why the victory of the nationalist parties did not trigger a more pronounced increase in the conflictual climate have been the apparent willingness of the nationalist parties to cooperate with each other and the swift recognition of the electoral victory by the international community in Bosnia, especially the High Representative. ensions emerged after the High Representative imposed new rules, which strengthen the state-level institutions. His decision to introduce a new ministry of justice and more contentiously, a ministry of security, as well as abolishing the rotation of the prime minister prompted a walkout of erbian deputies from the state parliament in December lthough the deputies later returned to parliament, erbian deputies remain concerned over maintaining the dominance of the entities over the state institutions. he creation of the ministry for security particularly raised fears in the erb entity, that the entity s exclusive prerogative over defense would be eroded. he establishment of the ministry has been facilitated by the discovery of arms smuggling to Iraq by the Bosnian erb arms industry with the support of Bosnian erb army officials. dditionally, the international community, in a report for the High Representative, suggested the creation of a unified customs service, thus proposing ending the primacy of the entities in this domain. s customs constitute a major source of income for the entities, this proposition has been met by sharp resistance particularly from Bosnian erb representatives. Dr lorian Bieber verage Domestic Conflict verage Domestic Cooperation 11/02 12/02 1/03 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

6 Update Bosnia and Herzegovina November 2002 January 2003 Page 6 Goldstein International Cooperation and Conflict /02 8/02 9/02 10/02 verage number of reported events per month: 200 Indicator Description: see page 8 Risk ssessment: verage International Conflict verage International Cooperation 11/02 12/02 1/03 While conflict exceeds cooperation in Bosnia s international context, the difference has diminished overall in the period under consideration here. Generally, relations with Western countries continue to remain good. he U preoccupation with combating terrorism of Islamic fundamentalist origin has also impacted Bosnia. While Bosnia has been generally seen as a positive example of tolerant Islam, some foundations active in Bosnia, sponsored by Middle Eastern governments or NGOs, came under scrutiny. In October, OR troops arrested a suspected terrorist near the northern city of uzla. he revelation that the arms company Orao in the erb entity, together with Yugoslav companies, broke the arms embargo against Iraq negatively affected the relations between the United tates and the erb entity, but did not have repercussions on the state-level, as defense and the army have been exclusive competence over the entities. Relations with Croatia and Yugoslavia have improved substantially in recent years, but remain tense in regard to Yugoslavia (erbia in particular). ome tensions existed in the run-up to the erbian presidential elections when the main contender and president of Yugoslavia, Vojislav Kostunica, described the erb entity to belong to the same family (see previous report). his statement was not repeated by Kostunica and with the failure of erbian presidential elections and the conclusion of Bosnian elections for which these statements were also exploited resulted in a calming of bilateral relations. statement by erbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in early January 2003 created again tensions in the relations between Bosnia and erbia. He suggested that any independence of Kosovo should also result in a reconsideration of the Bosnian borders. he link between the two issues has been fairly commonly invoked by both erbian and international officials, but the reiteration by the prime minister negatively impacted the bilateral relations. In an improvement of Yugoslav-Bosnian relations, the Yugoslav parliament ratified the Dayton Peace ccords in December lthough largely a symbolic gesture, as Yugoslavia has been obliged previously to fulfill its obligations arising from the international treaty, it represented an affirmation of Yugoslavia s commitment to the existing borders. Dr lorian Bieber swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

7 Update he Early Warning ystem Page 7 Who are we? (German acronym for Early nalysis of ensions and act-finding ) is the early warning project of swisspeace, based in Berne, witzerland. In 1998 the wiss gency for Development and Cooperation (DC) assigned swisspeace to set up a political early warning system for early identification of impending armed conflict and political crisis situations. What do we want? aims to enhance political decision makers ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent political strategies can be formulated either to prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or to identify opportunities for peacebuilding. How do we work? uses both quantitative and qualitative methods for its analysis. he centerpiece in the quantitative analysis is based on event data analysis and the respective tools developed in the framework of the Program on Nonviolent anctions and Cultural urvival (PONC) at Harvard University. he logic of event data analysis is fairly simple: all events considered relevant to conflict escalation and de-escalation are assigned a certain numeric value according to a distinct conflict scale. hese values can then be added up for specific time intervals and graphically displayed in a curve over time. he quality and quantity of data input is crucial for the success of such a method. In order to gather the quality and quantity of data required to suit early warning purposes, sets up its own local information networks (LINs) and thus overcomes shortcomings of existing information sources (e.g., international news wires). unique set of data is collected for each country completely independently from Western news-media coverage. or qualitative data analysis, contracts internationally renowned country experts. What are our products? products are risk assessments tailored to individual customers' needs. he standard product ( Update ) consists of three to five charts depicting the latest conflict related trends and a concise expert interpretation. s the time-series of collected data grow, analysts will apply statistical methods to go beyond retrospective description and forecast future developments. Updates are available in either hard copy or electronic form, covering time intervals as chosen by the customer. Which countries do we monitor? frica: sia: Europe: ngola, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, DRC / Kivu region, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, omalia fghanistan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Caucasus region, Pakistan, ajikistan, Uzbekistan lbania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, erbia-montenegro Middle East: Palastine swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

8 Update ppendix: Description of Indicators used Page 8 ll Events ll ctions Direct ctions orceful ctions Normalized orceful ctions Normalized Civil Direct ctions Normalized Government Direct ctions Conflict Carrying Capacity IDE categories: a count of all coded events with WEI cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all WEI cue categories) plus an additional 11 IDE event cue categories (Event type: other ). WEI categories: a count of all coded events with cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all WEI cue categories). Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct actions regardless of origin or target. he indicator orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. his includes noninjury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Proportion of orceful ction events compared to ll Direct ctions. he indicator orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. his includes noninjury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Proportion of Civil Direct ctions compared to ll Civil ctions. Civil Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors. Proportion of Government Direct ctions compared to ll Government ctions. Government Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors. he Conflict Carrying Capacity (or CCC) is a composed index that depicts the overall stability of the country or region of interest. he CCC is operationalized in terms of the multiplicative interaction among three Proportional measures: (1) civil contentiousness or the Proportion of civil actions that are reported as contentious or "direct" and thus challenge (at least implicitly) the state's monopoly on conflict regulation; (2) state repression or the Proportion of state actions that are reported as extra-institutional or "direct" both in response to direct challenges from the civil sector and those initiated by the state to repress and control opposition; and (3) violent contention or the Proportion of actions entailing physical damage to persons or property. the index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability. Country tability he country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country. Cooperative Proportion of all actions belonging to all cooperative categories yield, comment consult, approve, promise, grant, reward, agree, request, and propose to all actions (all Events belonging to the 22 WEI cue categories). Conflictual Proportion of all actions belonging to all conflictive categories reject, accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize, and force to all actions (all Events belonging to the 22 WEI cue categories). Goldstein verage he Goldstein verage Domestic Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative Domestic Conflict (Goldstein) values of all conflictive intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative Goldstein values divided by the total number of conflictive domestic events). or interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). Goldstein verage he Goldstein verage Domestic Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive Domestic (Goldstein) values of all cooperative intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum Cooperation of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative domestic events). Goldstein verage International Conflict Goldstein verage International Cooperation he Goldstein verage International Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (Goldstein) values of all conflictive interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative Goldstein values divided by the total number of conflictive international events). or interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). he Goldstein verage International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative international events). swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation