Early warning unit F A S T Update India/Kashmir Quarterly Risk Assessment S A F

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1 Update Early warning unit India/Kashmir Quarterly Risk ssessment March to May 2004 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

2 Update India/Kashmir March May 2004 Page 2 Contents Country tability and Relative orceful ctions 3 Relative Government and Civil orceful ctions 4 Goldstein verage Domestic Conflict and Cooperation 5 Goldstein verage International Conflict and Cooperation 6 ppendix: Description of indicators used 7 he Early Warning ystem 8 Update ubscription: Contact : Phone: ax: mailto:@swisspeace.ch Country Expert: Dr. Bettina Robotka swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

3 Update India/Kashmir March May 2004 Page 3 Country tability and Relative orceful ctions Relative orceful ctions Country tability /02 10/02 12/02 2/03 4/03 6/03 8/03 10/03 12/03 2/04 4/04 verage number of Events per month: 258 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: he Relative orceful ctions graph stays on a slightly more moderate level compared to last year. he Country tability graph remains on a somewhat higher level than during 2003 with marked ups and downs. he period from March to May was determined by the forthcoming Indian elections in pril and May. lthough the first and the second rounds of talks between the ll Parties Hurriyat Conference-(nsari) (PHC-()) and the Indian Government on January 22nd and March 26th did not bring any visible positive results they created an atmosphere of high expectation for the time after the Indian elections. he outcome of the elections - a re-election of the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) - was taken for granted: on pril 23rd a third round of talks with a widened agenda was announced by the Vajpayee government for the end of June. he second determining feature of the period was the election campaign. Only the ruling People s Democratic Party (PDP) of Mufti ayyed, the National Conference (NC) of Omar aroukh, the Indian National Congress (INC) and some Hindu parties of Jammu took part in the elections. Both PHC factions and the separatist organizations outside the PHC announced a boycott stating that elections were no answer to the situation in Kashmir. Militant groups vowed to prevent polling and attacked candidates and election rallies. Even the Panun Kashmir Movement, an organization of the Kashmiri Pandits, announced an election boycott. he outcome of the elections - a change of government from a BJP coalition to an INC coalition - came as a shock to the Kashmiris. he nsari-led PHC which had put all their stake in the Vajpayee led talks felt that the rules of the game under the new government are likely to be reset, which created a feeling of uncertainty. he election results for the Kashmiri contesters showed a strengthening of the support base of the ruling PDP, although several of their candidates lost their seats in the Lok abha. he NC lost ground, but its leader Omar bdullah won a seat. With an INC coalition government, the conditions for the talks on Kashmir between India and Pakistan and between India and the Kashmiris have certainly changed. he new INC government will have to find a stand of its own. lthough the new government has announced to pick up the threads of talks where the old government had left them, the priorities and sensibilities will surely change. first contact with the Kashmiris planned at the beginning of July will show the outlines of the new set-up. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

4 Update India/Kashmir March May 2004 Page 4 Relative Government and Civil orceful ctions Relative Civil orceful ctions Relative Government orceful ctions /02 10/02 12/02 2/03 4/03 6/03 8/03 10/03 12/03 2/04 4/04 verage number of Events per month: 258 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: Both lines show marked ups and downs during the period whereas the Relative Civil orceful ctions graph constantly remains higher than the Relative Government orceful ctions graph. his changes in May with a sharp increase in Government orceful ctions crossing the line of Civil orceful ctions. Despite the partial decline in Relative Civil orceful ctions the level of violence remained relatively high. Militants attacked several official buildings, among them the Jammu jail, the media center in rinagar, police stations and an army training camp. During the election campaign in pril and early May, attacks on candidates and election rallies were frequent. On pril 25th, Mehbooba Mufti, daughter of the Chief Minister Mufti, escaped an assault on her life when militants attacked her convoy on her way from a rally in Kulgam. grenade attack on a PDP rally in Uri left 11 dead. he INC headquarter in rinagar was attacked on pril 23rd and on May 7th an INC leader was killed in an attack in Doda District. n attack was even launched by militants on the house of the Mirwaiz, the religious leader of Kashmiri Muslims. he Government orceful ctions, meaning the army, the police and para-military troops, showed also a high level especially during the months of pril and May. hey tried to counter the anti-poll campaigns of the different Kashmiri political organizations, arresting their leaders and activists. On pril 16th, 13 members of an anti-poll team where arrested. Residents of rural areas of Baramulla complained about army atrocities including ransacking of household goods, misconduct against women and beatings of youngsters. During the polling days, voters are reported to be virtually dragged to the polling boots by the army personal; on pril 26th police fired tear gas shells on people shouting anti-election slogans. ame scenarios with people driven out of their homes for polling were reported from Dewsar on May 5th and from Doda on May 10th. n increase of army action took place after the elections in Kashmir. On May 14th, the Human Rights Bureau was reported to have decided to bring the growing number of incidents of custodial killings to the notice of mnesty International and sia Watch. On May 16th, the Chairman of the Jammu and Kashmir Democratic ront (LKD), Pandit Bazaz, asked India to stop human right abuses and the catch and kill policy in Kashmir. lso, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation ront (JKL) stated that there has been a significant increase in human rights abuses after the poll boycott. orceful demonstrations against state terrorism organized by the PHC and the Kashmir Human Rights orum are reported from rinagar during May. he election campaign and the elections themselves have vividly shown that the begin of talks with the Indian government has in no way lessened the dedication of the separatist forces to stick to their demands. he new Indian government will have to show a road to a solution for Kashmir, otherwise the situation could deteriorate. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

5 Update India/Kashmir March May 2004 Page 5 Goldstein verage Domestic Conflict and Cooperation verage Domestic Conflict verage Domestic Cooperation /02 10/02 12/02 2/03 4/03 6/03 8/03 10/03 12/03 2/04 4/04 verage number of Events per month: 258 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: he Domestic Conflict graph has stayed at almost the same high level as during the last year. he Domestic Cooperation graph has remained at a comparatively low level with ups and downs since ugust he Indian elections are central in respect of conflict and cooperation within Kashmir during the last three months. hey are the bone of contention for the question of how to solve the Kashmir conflict. aking part in the elections for the central Indian parliament is perceived by most of the separatist forces (political and militant) as accepting the status of Kashmir as a federal unit of India. herefore, they announced a boycott of the elections and initiated an anti-election drive during the whole period implying their protest against being treated as part of India. he militant forces amongst them tried to push their anti-election campaign by attacking election rallies, candidates, party headquarters and polling stations. he ruling PDP and the INC as well as the NC as the most important political forces contested the elections, which brought them the critique and wrath of the pro-boycott forces. his struggle is shown in the conflict graph. he cooperative factor is the electioneering of the pro-election forces and the voting of the Kashmiri people. he low turn-out in most urban areas of the valley coincides with the areas of influence of the separatist forces. Higher turn-out came from far-flung areas like Ladakh and interestingly also from border areas. Even keeping in mind coercive and bogus voting, the overall turn-out should be somewhere between 20% and 25%. Despite very different agendas as how to reach their goals the political manifestos of both anti-election and pro-election mainstream political forces support by and large a common agenda, especially with regard to the resolution of the Kashmir problem. nother issue regarding conflict and cooperation is the division of the separatist movement and ongoing initiatives for a unification. he offer of PHC-() leader nsari to step down in order to promote unity among the separatist forces was rejected by the other parties. he leader of the rival PHC-(G) faction, Gilani, and People s League (PL) leader heik ziz pointed at their own initiative for unification in an ittihadi (unification) movement which had already been on since the beginning of this year. he future of the situation in Kashmir will depend on the progress made in the talks between the Kashmiris and the Indian government about a resolution of the Kashmir situation. pecifically, this includes a widening of topics touched upon in the talks, real progress in their implementation, inclusion of a broader spectrum of Kashmiris into the talks and the creation of possibilities for Kashmiris to talk to each other by issuing travel documents and by generally promoting contacts between Kashmiris of both sides of the Line of Control. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

6 Update India/Kashmir March May 2004 Page 6 Goldstein verage International Conflict and Cooperation verage International Conflict verage International Cooperation /02 10/02 12/02 2/03 4/03 6/03 8/03 10/03 12/03 2/04 4/04 verage number of Events per month: 258 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: International Conflict moves at a slightly lower level this year than during 2003, although the overall level remains high. International Cooperation is lingering at a rather low level, which tends to come down to an absolute low at the end of May. With the ceasefire along the Line of Control being effective during the whole period, a major factor of reduction of the international conflict potential stays in place. fter having started talks with the Indian government Kashmiris took initiatives to get in touch with Pakistan. he PHC demanded direct talks with Pakistan and decided to attend the reception on the occasion of Pakistan National Day on March 23rd. Pakistan kept at its positive attitude in respect of talks with the neighbour country including the Kashmir question, but Musharraf ruled out the Line of Control as an international border. he change in government after the elections in May brought a delay in the time schedule for talks as the new government needs time to take over and to review its stand. his delay brought a certain factor of insecurity into the matter with the INC calling for a modification of the dialogue process with Pakistan. Besides, with the BJP in the opposition the INC is expected to be in a more difficult situation regarding possible progress in the talks. irst signs of the expected changes have already surfaced when the INC tried to side line the importance of the Kashmir problem for the Indo-Pak talks. remark of the new External ffairs minister Natwar ingh recommending the ino-indian mode to be followed in Indo- Pak relation provoked an immediate response from Pakistan. Pakistan rejected this proposal saying that the Kashmir problem is not a border dispute but a problem of the fate of 13 million people. lthough the next round of talks has been announced for the end of June the process is expected to be more difficult than before. On a broader international level, the interest of Britain and U in the progress of the negotiation process is still valid. In March, the British High Commissioner visited Kashmir and talked to several separatist leaders. fter the elections, U ssistant tate ecretary for outh sian ffairs, Rocca, confirmed U interest in the progress of the talks. he merican Kashmiri Council urged the new Indian government to move forward in resolving the Kashmir issue. ince May 21st a so-called Kashmir roadmap is published on the webpage of Kashmirwatch.com which was developed with the help of an merican task force and has been accepted by the PHC-(). On the negative side, the fencing along the Line of Control is going on and will be completed by the end of June. he Indian Kashmiri leaders have been prevented from attending the Kashmir conference in Brussels in pril and in London at the end of May as their travel documents were not issued. he international interest in and pressure on the progress of a resolution of the Kashmir problem exists. he international political constellations will probably promote the dialogue. he inclusion of all Kashmiri groups in the dialogue will be a basic condition for its success. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

7 Update ppendix : Description of indicators used Page 7 Variable Name ll Direct ctions Relative orceful ctions ll Civil Direct ctions Relative Civil orceful ctions ll Government Direct ctions Relative Government orceful ctions Conflict Carrying Capacity Country tability Goldstein Goldstein verage Domestic Conflict Goldstein verage Domestic Cooperation Goldstein verage International Conflict Goldstein verage International Cooperation Description / Definition Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct actions regardless of origin or target. Proportion of orceful ction events compared to ll Direct ctions. he indicator orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. his includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Civil Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors. Proportion of Civil orceful ction events compared to ll Civil Direct ctions. he Indicator Civil orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by non-governmental, or civil sector actors. his includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Government Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors. Proportion of Government orceful ction events compared to ll Government Direct ctions. he Indicator Government orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by political, or government sector actors. his includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. he Conflict Carrying Capacity (or CCC) is a composed index that depicts the overall stability of the country or region of interest. he CCC is operationalized in terms of the multiplicative interaction among three Proportional measures: (1) civil contentiousness or the Proportion of civil actions that are reported as contentious or "direct" and thus challenge (at least implicitly) the state's monopoly on conflict regulation; (2) state repression or the Proportion of state actions that are reported as extra-institutional or "direct" both in response to direct challenges from the civil sector and those initiated by the state to repress and control opposition; and (3) violent contention or the Proportion of actions entailing physical damage to persons or property. the index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability. he country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country. he Goldstein verage Domestic Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (Goldstein) values of all conflictive intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative Goldstein values divided by the total number of conflictive domestic events). or interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). he Goldstein verage Domestic Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative domestic events). he Goldstein verage International Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (Goldstein) values of all conflictive interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative Goldstein values divided by the total number of conflictive international events). or interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). he Goldstein verage International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative international events). swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

8 Update he Early Warning ystem Page 8 Who are we? (German acronym for Early nalysis of ensions and act-finding ) is the early warning project of swisspeace, based in Berne, witzerland. In 1998 the wiss gency for Development and Cooperation (DC) assigned swisspeace to set up a political early warning system for early identification of impending armed conflict and political crisis situations. What do we want? aims to enhance political decision makers ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent political strategies can be formulated either to prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or to identify opportunities for peacebuilding. How do we work? uses both quantitative and qualitative methods for its analysis. he centerpiece in the quantitative analysis is based on event data analysis and the respective tools developed in the framework of the Program on Nonviolent anctions and Cultural urvival (PONC) at Harvard University. he logic of event data analysis is fairly simple: all events considered relevant to conflict escalation and de-escalation are assigned a certain numeric value according to a distinct conflict scale. hese values can then be added up for specific time intervals and graphically displayed in a curve over time. he quality and quantity of data input is crucial for the success of such a method. In order to gather the quality and quantity of data required to suit early warning purposes, sets up its own local information networks (LINs) and thus overcomes shortcomings of existing information sources (e.g., international news wires). unique set of data is collected for each country completely independently from Western news-media coverage. or qualitative data analysis, contracts internationally renowned country experts. What are our products? products are risk assessments tailored to individual customers' needs. he standard product ( Update ) consists of three to five charts depicting the latest conflict related trends and a concise expert interpretation. s the time-series of collected data grow, analysts will apply statistical methods to go beyond retrospective description and forecast future developments. Updates are available in either hard copy or electronic form, covering time intervals as chosen by the customer. Which countries do we monitor? frica: ngola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, omalia sia: Europe: fghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Caucasus region, Pakistan, ajikistan, Uzbekistan lbania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, erbia and Montenegro Middle East: Palestine swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

F A S T Update. Ethiopia. Quarterly Risk Assessment February 2004 to April Early warning unit

F A S T Update. Ethiopia. Quarterly Risk Assessment February 2004 to April Early warning unit Update Early warning unit Ethiopia Quarterly Risk ssessment ebruary 2004 to pril 2004 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation Update Ethiopia ebruary 2004 pril 2004 Page 2 Contents Country