F A S T Update. Serbia and Montenegro. Quarterly Risk Assessment May to July Early warning unit

Transcription

1 Update Early warning unit erbia and Montenegro Quarterly Risk ssessment May to July 2004 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

2 Update erbia and Montenegro May July 2004 Page 2 Contents Country tability and Relative Conflictual ctions - erbia 3 Relative Civil and Government Direct ctions - erbia 4 verage International Conflict and Cooperation -erbia 5 Country tability and Relative Conflictual ctions - Montenegro 6 verage Domestic Conflict and Cooperation - Montenegro 7 ppendix: Description of indicators used 8 he Early Warning ystem 10 Update ubscription: Contact : Phone: ax: mailto:@swisspeace.ch Country Expert: Dr. Dusan Pavlovic swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

3 Update erbia May July 2004 Page 3 Country tability and Relative Conflictual ctions - erbia Country tability Relative Conflictual ctions /02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 11/03 1/04 3/04 5/04 7/04 verage number of reported events per month: 107 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: s a result of the presidential electoral campaign the graph indicates a decline in Country tability in May and June. he campaign was at times nasty, causing physical clashes between party members. Considering the political context of erbia the curve returned to a relatively high degree of stability in July after the presidential elections. he level of Relative Conflictual ctions was comparatively stable in the period under observation. he major contenders at the presidential election were Boris adic, from the Democratic Party, and omislav Nikolic, put up by the Radical Party. Dragan Marsicanin, the government s candidate (from Democratic Party of erbia), suffered a crushing defeat, receiving only 14% of the votes in the first round. During the campaign, omislav Nikolic - deputy president of the Radical Party, Milosevic s ally from the 1990s known for fanning the flames of ethnic dissent - attempted to refine his performance so as to present himself as more palatable to the West and ethnic minorities in erbia. Yet, Boris adic, supported by the West and a number of erbian and ethnic minority political parties, beat omislav Nikolic by a healthy margin, winning 53% against 47% in the runoff. Even before his election, Boris adic pledged not to demand fresh elections from the government for at least one year. adic embraced the idea of cohabitation and vowed he would work together with the Kostunica government towards adopting a new constitution. he key factors of instability of the country appear to lie among the parties that back the government. he ocialist Party of erbia, still formally headed by lobodan Milosevic, threatened it would withdraw its support if the government extradites the four indicted generals to the ICY (see page 5). Because of frequent infightings, it is not clear for how long the Kostunica government will be able to endure. or instance, the Minister for Capital Investment, Velimir Ilic, threatened he would cut off the fingers of Mladjan Dinkic, Minister of inance, and his mafia for interfering in the sector of telecommunication. Velimir Ilic stands up for the interest of Bogoljub Karic, a tycoon from the Milosevic era, who wants to regain his share of ownership in Mobtel, the biggest erbian telecom provider. (t this point the government claims it possesses more than 50% of Mobtel, but the precise ownership structure is not clear.) he government is seriously shaken by the electoral defeat of its candidate at the June elections. It will, however, manage to survive without reshuffle for a time as the premier Kostunica, who in pril ruled out the idea of cooperating with Boris adic, gave in and now tacitly agrees to work together with the Democratic Party that, in return, vowed to vote for the most critical legislation in the parliament put forward by the government. he June presidential elections stabilized the political scene in the country to a certain degree. wo upcoming events that could significantly modify the political landscape, destabilize the government, and bring about early parliamentary elections, are the local elections (called for eptember 19), and direct elections for the ssembly of the tate Union of erbia & Montenegro (due in pring 2005). swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

4 Update erbia May July 2004 Page 4 Relative Civil and Government Direct ctions - erbia Relative Civil Direct ctions Relative Government Direct ctions /02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 11/03 1/04 3/04 5/04 7/04 verage number of reported events per month: 107 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: he major reason for the overall higher level of Civil Direct ctions is the social protest of dissatisfied workers. he protests did not abate throughout the period under observation, and culminated at the end of July. ince the beginning of the year, the driving force behind the protests has been the fear of the workers in the firms facing privatization or bankruptcy. he workers major demands from the government are to restructure enterprises by throwing in fresh money directly from the state budget and by providing new jobs, rather than to push the firms into bankruptcy. However, this time, these protesters were joined by workers from public firms that are under direct control of the government. hese firms demand the payoff of back wages. In mid-july the miners of RB Bor, the largest mine complex, kept the highway Beograd-Nis under blockade for 24 hours, demanding from the government to take better care of the mine complex. he government quickly gave in and agreed on a generous financial package to appease the protest. his offered an instructive example to other firms in state hands, so that by the end of July several firms were under strikes and raspberry growers even threatened to block communications in the whole of Central erbia. dditional trouble was caused by the fact that the government has already broken the limit of the set public deficit for this time of the year and has therefore no room for further spending. In the past few years, real wages in the public sector grew much faster than productivity and growth rate. By continuing to pursue its policy of increasing public spending, the government runs a risk of complicating its relations with the IM, which insists on a public deficit not higher than 2.5% of GDP, but also of breaking the inflation threshold that was set at 8.5% for he May peak in Civil Direct ction is also a consequence of the increased ethnic tensions in multicultural areas such as Vojvodina and outh erbia. he trend of hate speech, which started after the December 2003 elections, continues in Vojvodina. he target are members of all ethnic minorities but mainly Hungarians. hey are repeatedly threatened by radical erbs, who represent the idea of an ethnically consistent erbia, to leave the country. lthough the tensions seem to have abated in June and July, the Hungarian political parties from Vojvodina and even Hungary s foreign minister asked the premier Kostunica to provide better protection to minorities. urthermore, the lbanian community in outh erbia continues to refuse to take part in erbian political life. he lbanian population did not participate at the presidential elections, but lbanian political parties announced they would participate at the local elections in eptember. In July, three lbanian parties adopted a platform that demands autonomy for Bujanovac, Presevo and Medvedja and the ability for these three communities to become a part of Kosova. It is not clear whether this strategy will work, but it undoubtedly suggests that the entire lbanian population does not recognize the erbian state. his creates firm ground for instability in the region of southern erbia. ocial protest continues to pester erbian politics in the months to come. he government seems to be united in refusing to make further concessions to the current protesters. It is supported by president adic, who also opposes the blockades. However, if the protest grows in number, the government might prove too weak to resist. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

5 Update erbia May July 2004 Page 5 verage International Conflict and Cooperation - erbia verage International Conflict verage International Cooperation /02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 11/03 1/04 3/04 5/04 7/04 verage number of reported events per month: 107 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: he International Conflict curve continues to show a fluctuating course. In May and July the conflict between erbia and the international community increased. he reason for the June drop can be explained by the abstinence of the international community from chiding the Kostunica government for not fulfilling its international obligations. his was done in order not to upset the electorate, which has no sympathy for Western demands, in the light of the presidential electoral campaign. he increase in International Conflict in May and July is explained by the concentrated attack of the ICY prosecution. Carla del Ponte, the chief ICY prosecutor, went all out to accuse the erbian government for deliberately failing to arrest Ratko Mladic, wanted for genocide in Bosnia in 1995, and the four erbian generals, wanted for war crimes in Kosovo in In mid-july, Carla del Ponte secretly requested the extradition of Goran Hadzic, wanted for war crimes in Croatia in the 1990s, three days before the extradition was made public. However, the erbian police seems to have deliberately let Goran Hadzic disappear before the indictment was made public. Immediately after having sworn in, Boris adic traveled to Washington to patch up the relations with the U administration. fter his 10 day visit, the new U ambassador to Belgrade, Michael Polt, stated that the erbian government is doing its best in cooperation with the U to find and deliver Ratko Mladic. his trend was captured by the International Cooperation curve, which was on the slight rise in June and July. t this moment the cooperation with the Hague tribunal is the main problem that troubles the relations between erbia and the international community, notably with the U. But even the European Union is now bent on demanding full cooperation with the ICY as a requirement for the start of EU accession talks. ince it took office in March, the Kostunica government struggled to avoid cooperation. his strategy seems now to have run out of steam. If the government receives the necessary pressure from president adic, it is quite likely that the solution for the issue of Ratko Mladic and the four generals is on the sight. However, the eptember local elections could again postpone this resolution, and move the final settlement with the ICY towards the end of the year. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

6 Update Montenegro May July 2004 Page 6 Country tability and Relative Conflictual ctions - Montenegro Country tability Relative Conflictual ctions /02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 11/03 1/04 3/04 5/04 7/04 verage number of reported events per month: 57 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: In May a somewhat lower degree of stability was caused by the killing of Dusko Jovanovic, the chief and editor of the daily Dan on May 27. he police acted swiftly and arrested two suspects. (hey have not been found guilty yet). he July drop in Country tability was caused by an armed attack at members of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church by members of the erbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro. he reasons for the June peak in Relative Conflictual ctions can be attributed to the conflict between the Djukanovic government and the opposition that still permeates Montenegrin politics. he opposition is still boycotting the Montenegrin parliament. his strategy has proven unworkable, so the opposition started to seek another strategy to provoke early elections by organizing a series of mass demonstrations, following the verdict of the Podgorica court against Miodrag Zivkovic, leader of the Liberal alliance of Montenegro. (Zivkovic was sued by premier Djukanovic for libel and fined 8,000.) he energy for protest quickly dissipated (if it ever existed), and the oppositional leaders tried to find other means to make the government call for fresh elections. However, since the opposition itself is divided on this issue, this strategy is bound to collapse, too. Montenegro is seriously riven by ethnic tensions between ethnic erbs and ethnic Montenegrins. he Montenegrin parliament (without the opposition which is mainly pro-erbian) passed legislation on the new flag, the anthem, and the coat of arms. he adoption of the new state symbols underlined the government s resoluteness to carry on with its policy of independent Montenegro (see page 7). his infuriated both fractions of the Montenegrin opposition even more - the erbian part, for insisting on Montenegrin independence; the Montenegrin part, for, as it sees it, abusing and mocking the symbols of the Montenegrin statehood. he conflict between the government and the opposition will continue to dominate but, with a disoriented opposition, it is unlikely that it will seriously shake the political scene in Montenegro. he Djukanovic government is sitting firmly in the saddle, while the largest oppositional ocialist People Party is likely to return to the parliament. he killing of Dusko Jovanovic and clashes of the members of the two churches call for concern, as they point at two enduring destabilizing trends in the Montenegrin society: the problem of organized crime and tensions between ethnic Montenegrins and ethnic erbs. hey will, on the long run, continue to upset Montenegro s overall high stability, a trend present most of the time since July On the shorter run, the events that could negatively influence Montenegrin politics is the deterioration of Montenegro s relations with erbia that could be brought about by upcoming direct elections for the parliament of the tate Union, and the issue of a referendum on independence (see page 7). swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

7 Update Montenegro May July 2004 Page 7 verage Domestic Conflict and Cooperation - Montenegro verage Domestic Conflict 10 verage Domestic Cooperation /02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 11/03 1/04 3/04 5/04 7/04 verage number of reported events per month: 57 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: s predicted in the previous update and reflected in the Domestic Conflict curve, the trend of exacerbation of the relations between erbia and Montenegro continues. fter somewhat vague statements at the beginning of the year about the breakup, the whole government of Montenegro at this point speaks in one voice that the common state with erbia is not a viable option anymore. hortly before July 13 (the day of the Montenegrin state), the Montenegrin parliament passed legislation on the new flag, the anthem, and the coat of arms of Montenegro. he Montenegrin government reiterated it would reject everything that stops short of full independence. he erbian government did not react to this amount of independence talk, but the European Union, which put in lots of effort to keep the tate Union together in 2002, did. On July 26, the EU Council of Ministers repeated that the EU still fears that the split between erbia and Montenegro could hearten further breakups in the region (notably Macedonia). he EU pledged not to allow the referendum on independence in 2005, which is the option the Montenegrin government prefers. It is possible that, in order to avoid the break up and its repercussions, the EU could offer erbia and Montenegro a chance to pursue the policy of integration with the EU on two separate tracks. his will satisfy the erbian government, most of the political parties in erbia and the pro-erbian opposition in Montenegro (which all oppose the split), but will fall short of pleasing the Montenegrin government that seems, at this moment, to care more about independence than about integration with the EU. Despite the appeal of this solution, it is not clear how the matter of direct elections for the assembly of the tate Union, which are due in spring 2005, will be settled. he Montenegrin government wants to avoid these elections by calling a referendum. But if the EU is successful in staving off the referendum, the Djukanovic government is likely to reply by boycotting the elections. (he direct elections, where deputies are elected directly rather then being selected by the member-states s parliaments, are not welcomed by the Djukanovic government as they strengthen the nature of the joint state as a federation rather than as a confederation, which it is now.) he issue of referendum on independence, which will be attempted to be postponed by the European Union, and the issue of direct elections for the parliament of the tate Union, which could be boycotted by the Montenegrin government, underscore the need for caution. hese are issues carrying a high potential for both instability of Montenegro as well as for a deterioration of relations between Montenegro and the international community. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

8 Update ppendix : Description of indicators used Page 8 Variable Name Description / Definition ll Events ll ctions Direct ctions orceful ctions Relative ctions Relative Direct ctions IDE categories: a count of all coded events with WEI cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all WEI cue categories) plus an additional 11 IDE event cue categories (Event type: other ). WEI categories: a count of all coded events with cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all WEI cue categories). Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct actions regardless of origin or target. he indicator orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. his includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Proportion of ll ctions to ll Events. Proportion of Direct ctions compared to ll ctions (WEI-Categories). Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct actions regardless of origin or target. Civil ector Count of all coded events belonging to the WEI cue categories (1 to 22) plus an additional 11 ll Civil Events IDE event forms. his event count is limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors. Count of all coded events belonging to the WEI cue categories (1 to 22), that involve only nongovernmental, or civil sector actors. ll Civil ctions Civil Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: Civil Direct ctions threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors. Relative Civil Proportion of all civil actions to all civil events (with non-governmental, or civil sector actors). ctions Proportion of Civil Direct ctions compared to ll Civil ctions. Relative Civil Direct Civil Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: ctions threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors. Government ector ll Government Events ll Government ctions Government Direct ctions Count of all coded events belonging to the WEI cue categories (1 to 22) plus an additional 11 IDE event forms. his event count is limited to political sector, or government actors. Count of all coded events belonging to the WEI cue categories (1 to 22), that involve only the political sector, or government actors. Government Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors. Relative Proportion of all Government ctions to all Government Events (with political, or government Government ctions sector actors). Proportion of Government Direct ctions compared to ll Government ctions. Relative Government Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: Government Direct threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass ctions direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors. Conflict Carrying Capacity he Conflict Carrying Capacity (or CCC) is a composed index that depicts the overall stability of the country or region of interest. he CCC is operationalized in terms of the multiplicative interaction among three Proportional measures: (1) civil contentiousness or the Proportion of civil actions that are reported as contentious or "direct" and thus challenge (at least implicitly) the state's monopoly on conflict regulation; (2) state repression or the Proportion of state actions that are reported as extra-institutional or "direct" both in response to direct challenges from the civil sector and those initiated by the state to repress and control opposition; and (3) violent contention or the Proportion of actions entailing physical damage to persons or property. the index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

9 Update ppendix : Description of indicators used Page 9 Variable Name Description / Definition Country tability Relative Conflictual ctions IDE scale IDE IDE total IDE verage verage Domestic Conflict verage Domestic Cooperation verage International Conflict verage International Cooperation he country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country. Proportion of all actions belonging to all conflictive categories reject, accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize, and force to all actions (all Events belonging to the 22 WEI cue categories). IDE indicators are used to display Proportions of conflict and cooperation events in time. Each event category is assigned a Goldstein rating (value), ranging from -7 (extreme conflict) to 13 (extreme cooperation). Zero value events are excluded from these calculations. otal of IDE scores for all events per month, summing up all reported cooperative and conflictive events between the two actors and attributing them a certain Goldstein score. Israel>Palestine: ctions with Israel as source, Palestinians as target. Palestine>Israel: vice versa he IDE verage indicator is a cumulative average of all events that are classified with a positive or negative value by IDE's conflict/cooperation scale. he indicator displays the mean of the conflict/cooperation event values, excluding all zero value events. he verage Domestic Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (IDE) values of all conflictive intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative IDE values divided by the total number of conflictive domestic events). or interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). heverage Domestic Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (IDE) values of all cooperative intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive IDE values divided by the total number of cooperative domestic events). he verage International Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (IDE) values of all conflictive interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative IDE values divided by the total number of conflictive international events). or interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). he verage International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (IDE) values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive IDE values divided by the total number of cooperative international events). swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

10 Update he Early Warning ystem Page 10 Who are we? (German acronym for Early nalysis of ensions and act-finding ) is the early warning project of swisspeace, based in Berne, witzerland. In 1998 the wiss gency for Development and Cooperation (DC) assigned swisspeace to set up a political early warning system for early identification of impending armed conflict and political crisis situations. What do we want? aims to enhance political decision makers ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent political strategies can be formulated either to prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or to identify opportunities for peacebuilding. How do we work? uses both quantitative and qualitative methods for its analysis. he centerpiece in the quantitative analysis is based on event data analysis and the respective tools developed in the framework of the Program on Nonviolent anctions and Cultural urvival (PONC) at Harvard University. he logic of event data analysis is fairly simple: all events considered relevant to conflict escalation and de-escalation are assigned a certain numeric value according to a distinct conflict scale. hese values can then be added up for specific time intervals and graphically displayed in a curve over time. he quality and quantity of data input is crucial for the success of such a method. In order to gather the quality and quantity of data required to suit early warning purposes, sets up its own local information networks (LINs) and thus overcomes shortcomings of existing information sources (e.g., international news wires). unique set of data is collected for each country completely independently from Western news-media coverage. or qualitative data analysis, contracts internationally renowned country experts. What are our products? products are risk assessments tailored to individual customers' needs. he standard product ( Update ) consists of three to five charts depicting the latest conflict related trends and a concise expert interpretation. s the time-series of collected data grow, analysts will apply statistical methods to go beyond retrospective description and forecast future developments. Updates are available in either hard copy or electronic form, covering time intervals as chosen by the customer. Which countries do we monitor? frica: ngola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, omalia sia: Europe: fghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Caucasus region, Pakistan, ajikistan, Uzbekistan lbania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, erbia and Montenegro Middle East: Palestine swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation