Quarterly Risk Assessment December 2003 to February 2004

Transcription

1 Update Early warning unit Bosnia and Herzegovina Quarterly Risk ssessment December 2003 to ebruary 2004 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

2 Update Bosnia and Herzegovina December 2003 ebruary 2004 Page 2 Contents Country tability and Relative Conflictual ctions 3 ll Civil and Civil Direct ctions 4 ll Government and Civil Direct ctions 5 Goldstein verage International Conflict and Cooperation 6 ppendix: Description of indicators used 7 he Early Warning ystem 9 Update ubscription: Contact : Phone: ax: mailto:@swisspeace.ch Country Expert: Dr. lorian Bieber swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

3 Update Bosnia and Herzegovina December 2003 ebruary 2004 Page 3 Country tability and Relative Conflictual ctions Country tability Relative Conflictual ctions /02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 11/03 1/04 verage number of reported events per month: 154 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: Country tability continues to be at a high level. here has been an improvement since the last reporting period and in the overall perspective over the past 2 years, stability has in general increased. Conflictual ctions continue at the same time at relatively unchanged levels. Recent months have seen a number of events, which both in their short and long term effects might have a substantial stabilizing effect, like the establishment of a state level ministry of defense and the creation of a unified intelligence service. ome of the fundamental reforms during the last months follow earlier patterns of international imposition and of conflict among the governing nationalist parties. his has been the case over the appointment of the new minister of defense and was also exemplified in the decision of the High Representative to unite the separate municipalities of Mostar after the Bosniak and Croat parties were unable to agree on the city s reintegration. distinct break with this pattern was the swift adoption of the law establishing a state-wide intelligence and security agency, thus abolishing the entity agencies. he decision of parliament to establish a unified V system (by 2006) and to create a joint customs service falls in-between these two types with a decision taken by the parliament only after intense pressure and deadlines of the Office of the High Representative (OHR). In terms of overall political stability, there has been a strengthening of the opposition with the emergence of plans for stronger cooperation among the social democratic parties in both entities. t the same time the governments have been weakened by two developments. irst, the removal of the deputy president of the erb Democratic Party (D) and former member of the Bosnian presidency, Mirko arovic, from his party office by the High Representative over alleged support for Radovan Karadzic led to the resignation of the entire party leadership. econd, the ederation premier hmet Hadzipasic has come into conflict with his own party, the Bosniak Party of Democratic ction, as party officials felt that the government did not consult sufficiently with the party and did not follow the party s policies. While the nationalist parties remain dominant, their position has weakened in recent months due to these developments. s a result of recent reforms, the state-level has been significantly strengthened - amounting to a defacto reform of Dayton in many areas (security especially). he effects on stability are threefold. irst, the resistance to these reforms has been limited and domestic support is increasingly forthcoming. econd, in the short- and mid-term the substance of these reforms will most likely lead to an increase in Conflictual ctions over newly contested issues arising from the reform, in particular in the recalibration of state-entity relations. hirdly, the reforms are likely to improve the sustainability of the state and have a long-term stabilizing effect on Bosnia and Herzegovina. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

4 Update Bosnia and Herzegovina December 2003 ebruary 2004 Page 4 ll Civil and Civil Direct ctions ll Civil ctions ll Civil Direct ctions /02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 11/03 verage number of reported Events per month: 154 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: he level of Civil Direct ctions (displaying conflictive events) has remained significantly low in comparison to ll Civil ctions throughout the past months and there has been no sign of increase despite a series of high profile bomb attacks in arajevo. he number of high profile car bombs and assassination attempts in arajevo were mostly related to organized crime. he most prominent victim was aib orlakovic, a military police commander during the war and alleged leading figure in organized crime. he bomb attack which killed him in January 2004 was the 11th bomb explosion in arajevo over merely a six week period. ll these attacks have been concentrated in arajevo and did not have any larger Bosnia-wide implications. hese incidents have dominated media reporting and conveyed a renewed sense of insecurity. imilar incidents have occurred frequently in the past, and as the graph suggests, do not constitute an overall increase in the number of Civil Direct ctions. his view has also been taken by the EU police mission in Bosnia which noted the continued high level of security in arajevo. Considering the dominant role of nationalist parties, their relationship to international organizations has greatly impacted Civil Direct ctions in the past. ome recent decisions have alienated the governing parties from the international administration, including the unification of Mostar, opposed in its imposed form by both HDZ and D, the arrest of high-ranking HDZ officials and the dismissal of D vice-president arovic. While these steps have been more far-reaching than other international decisions over the past year, the parties have given no indication to engage in an outright confrontation with the international community which would result in a serious increase of extra-institutional strategies of the parties and increases in Civil Direct ctions. he prime sources of Civil Direct ctions are likely to be related to organized crime and to possible reactions by nationalist groups and individuals in the erb Republic, if renewed attempts of OR to arrest Karadzic and Mladic are going to be successful. 1/04 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

5 Update Bosnia and Herzegovina December 2003 ebruary 2004 Page 5 ll Government and Civil Direct ctions ll Government Direct ctions ll Civil Direct ctions /02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 11/03 verage number of reported Events per month: 154 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: hroughout most of the reporting period (Dec. 03 eb. 04), Civil Direct ctions outnumbered the Government Direct ctions. Only in January 2004 the rate of Government Direct ctions by far exceeded the actions related to the civil sector. he Government Direct ctions are constituted by the unprecedented support of R police forces in attempts of the OR troops to arrest Radovan Karadzic in the town of Pale in January. he same month, OR and local police jointly arrested three high-ranking Croat officials. mong them the former Croat member of the Bosnian presidency, nte Jelavic (dismissed by the OHR in 2001), and the former ederation minister of defense for involvement with organized crime. he increased activity of the police - possibly signaling success of police and, more important, judicial reforms which had been pursued vigorously by the international community - was best exemplified by the arrest of the deputy director of Interpol in Bosnia on suspicion of accepting bribes for tipping off suspects. he arrests in recent months show the increased effectiveness of Bosnian domestic institutions and thus pose an increased threat for both organized crime and the political elite, both from the nationalist parties and some of the current opposition for having links with organized crime dating back to the war. he recent high-profile bomb attacks place additional pressure on the authorities to tackle organized crime. number of protests have been held in response demanding more swift action by local and international security forces. hese protests were a response to the fact that there were no immediate arrests following the wave of bombing in arajevo in December and January. Considering judicial reforms and early success of the police, especially in cooperation with international forces, suggests a potential increase in Government Direct ctions in this area. uccess or failure of police and judiciary to confront organized crime will have an impact on the overall reforms. s the High Representative identified the absence of a state-level police force as one reason for the limited results, pressure might grow on new state level police competencies. In particular the newly created intelligence and security agency will be under scrutiny for its ability to address organized crime. 1/04 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

6 Update Bosnia and Herzegovina December 2003 ebruary 2004 Page 6 Goldstein verage International Conflict and Cooperation verage International Conflict verage International Cooperation -1 7/02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 11/03 1/04 verage number of reported events per month: 154 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: he average level of International Conflict continues steadily to exceed that of Cooperation. Both have been, however, declining in recent months and subject to fewer fluctuations than earlier. Cooperation between key international organizations and the dominant nationalist parties has slightly improved, but as mentioned earlier, internationally imposed decision-making continues in some areas. he regional context has also changed considerably since the last reporting period. New and more conservative/nationalist governments have come to power in both erbia and Croatia. he electoral success of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) in Croatia had no significant impact on Bosnia to date and relations between the two countries continue to remain close, mostly as a result of the dominance of the moderate stream within the new/old ruling party in Croatia which prioritizes on EU integration effectively precluding a more assertive role in Bosnia. In erbia, the electoral success of the erbian Radical Party (R) and the new coalition with the Democratic Party of erbia (D) under the leadership of Vojislav Kostunica is more problematic. While the success of these parties did not primarily rest on their nationalist rhetoric, their success can be seen as an encouragement for the nationalist parties in the Bosnian erb Republic, where the erb Democratic Party (D) maintains close ties to the D. his might reinvigorate the D, which has been weakened by the overall limited performance of the R government and the mass-resignation of the party leadership. he dismissal of arovic was criticised by erbian premier Kostunica, which had little effect and is unlikely to influence the decision making of the OHR. he arrest of the remaining indicted war criminals at large has become a pronounced priority among international peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, which has lead to a number of raids as well as the freezing of assets and arrests of alleged supporters of the fugitive Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. his contributed to some tensions but did not result in any substantial conflicts in the erb Republic between parties and international forces. n increase in the rate of international conflictual events can be expected in the coming period both over erbian-bosnian relations and the more coordinated efforts to arrest Karadzic and Mladic - dictated by the approaching deadline for the ICY to complete its work and the dwindling international military presence (reductions from 12,000 in December 2003 to 7,000 troops by June 2004 were announced). he reduced number of imposed regulations and laws by the High Representative in recent months could also point at a greater degree of cooperation with the political parties, which might not only result in an increase in cooperation, but also bodes well for stability. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

7 Update ppendix : Description of indicators used Page 7 Variable Name Description / Definition ll Events ll ctions Direct ctions Relative ctions Relative Direct ctions IDE categories: a count of all coded events with WEI cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all WEI cue categories) plus an additional 11 IDE event cue categories (Event type: other ). WEI categories: a count of all coded events with cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all WEI cue categories). Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct actions regardless of origin or target. Proportion of ll ctions to ll Events. Proportion of Direct ctions compared to ll ctions (WEI-Categories). Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct actions regardless of origin or target. Civil ector Count of all coded events belonging to the WEI cue categories (1 to 22), that involve only nongovernmental, or civil sector actors. ll Civil ctions Civil Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: Civil Direct ctions threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors. Relative Civil Proportion of all civil actions to all civil events (with non-governmental, or civil sector actors). ctions Proportion of Civil Direct ctions compared to ll Civil ctions. Relative Civil Direct Civil Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: ctions threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors. Government ector ll Government Count of all coded events belonging to the WEI cue categories (1 to 22), that involve only the ctions political sector, or government actors. Government Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: Government Direct threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass ctions direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors. Relative Proportion of all Government ctions to all Government Events (with political, or government Government ctions sector actors). Proportion of Government Direct ctions compared to ll Government ctions. Relative Government Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: Government Direct threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass ctions direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors. he country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to Country tability improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country. Relative Conflictual ctions Goldstein Goldstein Goldstein verage Proportion of all actions belonging to all conflictive categories reject, accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize, and force to all actions (all Events belonging to the 22 WEI cue categories). Goldstein indicators are used to display Proportions of conflict and cooperation events in time. Each event category is assigned a Goldstein rating (value), ranging from -10 (extreme conflict) to 10 (extreme cooperation). Zero value events are excluded from these calculations. he Goldstein verage indicator is a cumulative average of all events that are classified with a positive or negative value by Goldstein's conflict/cooperation scale. he indicator displays the mean of the conflict/cooperation event values, excluding all zero value events. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

8 Update ppendix : Description of indicators used Page 8 Variable Name Description / Definition Goldstein verage International Conflict Goldstein verage International Cooperation he Goldstein verage International Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (Goldstein) values of all conflictive interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative Goldstein values divided by the total number of conflictive international events). or interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). he Goldstein verage International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative international events). swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

9 Update he Early Warning ystem Page 9 Who are we? (German acronym for Early nalysis of ensions and act-finding ) is the early warning project of swisspeace, based in Berne, witzerland. In 1998 the wiss gency for Development and Cooperation (DC) assigned swisspeace to set up a political early warning system for early identification of impending armed conflict and political crisis situations. What do we want? aims to enhance political decision makers ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent political strategies can be formulated either to prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or to identify opportunities for peacebuilding. How do we work? uses both quantitative and qualitative methods for its analysis. he centerpiece in the quantitative analysis is based on event data analysis and the respective tools developed in the framework of the Program on Nonviolent anctions and Cultural urvival (PONC) at Harvard University. he logic of event data analysis is fairly simple: all events considered relevant to conflict escalation and de-escalation are assigned a certain numeric value according to a distinct conflict scale. hese values can then be added up for specific time intervals and graphically displayed in a curve over time. he quality and quantity of data input is crucial for the success of such a method. In order to gather the quality and quantity of data required to suit early warning purposes, sets up its own local information networks (LINs) and thus overcomes shortcomings of existing information sources (e.g., international news wires). unique set of data is collected for each country completely independently from Western news-media coverage. or qualitative data analysis, contracts internationally renowned country experts. What are our products? products are risk assessments tailored to individual customers' needs. he standard product ( Update ) consists of three to five charts depicting the latest conflict related trends and a concise expert interpretation. s the time-series of collected data grow, analysts will apply statistical methods to go beyond retrospective description and forecast future developments. Updates are available in either hard copy or electronic form, covering time intervals as chosen by the customer. Which countries do we monitor? frica: ngola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, omalia sia: Europe: fghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Caucasus region, Pakistan, ajikistan, Uzbekistan lbania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, erbia and Montenegro Middle East: Palestine swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation