F A S T Update. Kyrgyzstan. Quarterly Risk Assessment August to October Early warning unit

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1 Update Early warning unit Kyrgyzstan Quarterly Risk ssessment ugust to October 2003 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

2 Update Kyrgyzstan ugust October 2003 Page 2 Contents Country tability and Relative orceful ctions 3 verage International Conflict and Cooperation 4 verage Domestic Conflict and Cooperation 5 Relative Cooperative and Conflictual ctions 6 ppendix: Description of indicators used 7 he Early Warning ystem 11 Contact : Phone: ax: ubscription: swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

3 Kyrgyzstan ugust October 2003 Page 3 Country tability and Relative orceful ctions verage number of reported events per month: 129 Indicator description: see appendix Country tability Relative orceful ctions 5/01 7/01 9/01 11/01 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 Update Risk ssessment: Over the past two years, the level of Country tability has remained high, and within the past three months it even increased slightly. t the same time, the level of Relative orceful ctions, which has been oscillating over the past two years, remarkably decreased over the past three months. he stabilisation of the situation in the country is the result of several factors. In the past three years, Kyrgyzstan s economy slightly recovered leading to a 10 percent poverty level decline. However, 44 percent of Kyrgyzstan's population still lives below the poverty line. n additional 14 percent are considered to be extremely poor - living near starvation with no means of support -, making the country one of the poorest in the CI. With the support from International inance Institutions, the Kyrgyz government started in 2002 a program to fight poverty and stimulate sustainable economic growth until he program is mainly financed by tax revenues and external loans. However, as the revenue base remains lower than expected and loans are diverted, Kyrgyzstan's much-publicized program seems to be endangered. his year Kyrgyzstan s budget deficit is reaching nearly 30 million UD contributing another burden to the increasing external debt that stands currently at 1.5 billion UD. Worst affected by poverty is outhern Kyrgyzstan, into which the Islamic Movemen t o f Uzbekistan (IMU) intruded in 1999 and ince then, the security situation in this region remained stable. However, Kyrgyz officials don t exclude that splinter groups of the IMU, which a number of countries including the United tates have declared an international terrorist organization, may re-organize and renew intrusion into outhern Kyrgyzstan. Counterterrorism operations in fghanistan severely weakened the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, seemingly haven led to a change in its tactics. ccording to Kyrgyz National ecurity ervice, the IMU has financed and logistically supported the Bishkek and Osh bombings. even people were killed in the attack on a Bishkek market in December 2002 and one died in the bombing of a currency-exchange office in Osh in May o far, three men have been detained in connection with the bombings. Despite its seemingly tactical changes, Kyrgyz officials still perceive the Movement as a paramilitary organization capable to intrude Kyrgyzstan. o meet well-prepared a re-organized IMU, Kyrgyzstan pushed for the opening of a Russian airbase in Kant, nearby Bishkek, within the framework of the CI Collective ecurity Organization. On 23 October, the Kant airbase was inaugurated by Kyrgyz President skar kaev and Russian President Vladimir Putin, who emphasized that, unlike the U-led antiterrorism coalition base at Manas airport, Kant will be a permanent establishment aimed at providing air support for an antiterrorism, rapid-reaction force of more than 5,000 troops from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and ajikistan working under the auspices of the CI Collective ecurity reaty. Whether the Kant base will contribute to stabilisation of Kyrgyzstan remains to be seen. Dr. Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

4 Kyrgyzstan ugust October 2003 Page 4 verage International Conflict and Cooperation verage number of reported events per month: 129 Indicator description: see appendix verage International Conflict verage International Cooperation 5/01 7/01 9/01 11/01 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 Update Risk ssessment: he above graph reflects a medium level of International Cooperation and Conflict whereas over the past year the level of International Conflict only slightly exceeded the level of International Cooperation. o respond adequately to possible external threats to the country s stability, the Kyrgyz government pursues a multivectoral foreign policy. It broadly cooperates with foreign governments, intergovernmental institutions and international organisations in order to foster the security of the country however with varying success. ensions remain high between Kyrgyzstan on the one hand and ajikistan and Uzbekistan on the other hand. In ugust, Kyrgyzstan started to reinforce its border defenses in response to reports that a group of armed militants might have been trying to enter Kyrgyzstan. group of militants, including eight Kyrgyz citizens, were reported to have tried to cross the fghan border into ajikistan's Gorno-Badakhshan utonomous Oblast, which borders on Kyrgyzstan. In 1999 and 2000, members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan took this route to intrude outhern Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan s border security is not only endangered by the IMU, but also by an increasing number of illegal border crossings of Kyrgyz and Uzbek citizens, widely tolerated by Kyrgyz and Uzbek border officials. However, border officials from time to time try to stop the unofficial border traffic by violent means. On 10 October two Uzbek citizens were killed and one Uzbek and a Kyrgyz citizen were severely wounded at the common Kyrgyz-Uzbek border. his incident led to recriminations between the two countries over the use of firearms by Uzbek border troops on the two countries' common border. Despite reconciling steps from both sides, so far no agreement has been reached between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan on the issue of handling illegal cross border migration. Even so, no solution has been reached between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan on the issue of landmines Uzbekistan laid along its frontiers with Kyrgyzstan after Muslim militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan launched armed incursions in 1999 and ince the Uzbek authorities have been unresponsive to Kyrgyz requests to remove the landmines, Kyrgyzstan is proceeding on its own. In summer 2003, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Emergency ituations and Ecology announced to begin the process unilaterally, however it seems to be lacking funds and experience. Outstanding is also the question of delimitation and demarcation of the common Kyrgyz-Uzbek border. he Kyrgyz side had asked its Uzbek counterpart for the return of three oil and gas fields on the border between the two countries to Kyrgyzstan. During the oviet era, Moscow had handed the fields over to Uzbekistan for their development. fter the disintegration of the UR, the Uzbeks kept working on the fields, arguing that the area where the fields were located was disputed territory. o far, disputes between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are timely solved on government working-level. Only very few local NGOs are engaged to resolve peacefully conflicts in the border area. heir possibilities to influence government decisions, in order to make them more sustainable, is however minimal. Dr. Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

5 Update Kyrgyzstan ugust October 2003 Page 5 verage Domestic Conflict and Cooperation verage number of reported events per month: 129 Indicator description: see appendix verage Domestic Conflict verage Domestic Cooperation 5/01 7/01 9/01 11/01 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 Risk ssessment: s the above graph demonstrates, until mid-2002 the level of Domestic Conflict clearly exceeded the level of Domestic Cooperation. By the end of 2002, both lines converged, even timely overlapped. ince early 2003 both lines again diverged, however not to such extend as they did in his points to a stabilization of the domestic situation in Kyrgyzstan. However, threats to domestic stability still remain. Kyrgyz officials are increasingly worried about the Hizb ut-ahrir al Islami (Islamic Liberation Party), a banned party which aims to establish a caliphate, i.e. a Muslim state, in Central sia, however, without resorting to violence. Its members receive no military but merely religious training. ince late 1990ies, Hizb ut-ahrir is active in poverty-affected and government-neglected outhern Kyrgyzstan. ince early 2000, it started even agitating in Northern Kyrgyzstan. Over the past months, Kyrgyz ecurity ervices report an expansion of its activities, specifically in distributing leaflets and propagating among young people. Hizb ut-ahrir is trying to discredit the authorities, while presenting itself to the world as an organization of people persecuted for their religious beliefs. tarting from 2003, Kyrgyz authorities were bolstering their efforts to counter the growing influence of Hizb ut-ahrir by increasing persecution of its members. Discoveries of new caches of extremist leaflets, books, and magazines during the first half of 2003 had led to 1,500 people being put under observation by lawenforcement agencies. ccording to the National ecurity Committee (former KGB), about 2,000 Kyrgyz citizens are members of Hizb ut-ahrir. he Kyrgyz tate Committee on Religious ffairs even estimated between 3,000 and 5,000 Hizb ut-ahrir adherents in Kyrgyzstan. Members caught are mostly convicted of distributing movement leaflets in which they are inciting religious hatred and seeking the overthrow of the constitutional system. Normally they receive low sentences up to five years of imprisonment. Often the defendants are denied lawyers and are subjected to torture by law enforcement officials. o far, the government s approach towards Hizb ut-ahrir seems to be a carrot and stick approach. While increasing persecution, at the same time it tries not to outlaw Hizb ut-ahrir members. Recently, the government discussed ways to improve the population s religious education by introducing ethic lessons in schools and universities and to disseminate information on religious topics particular on traditional Islam through mass media. It remains to be seen if this approach contributes to a cease of Hizb ut-ahrir activity in Kyrgyzstan. Dr. Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

6 Update Kyrgyzstan ugust October 2003 Page 6 Relative Cooperative and Conflictual ctions verage number of reported events per month: 129 Indicator description: see appendix Relative Cooperative ctions Relative Conflictual ctions 5/01 7/01 9/01 11/01 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 Risk ssessment: Over the past years, the level of Relative Conflictive ctions was similar to the one of Relative Cooperative ctions in Kyrgyzstan. his trend changed in the last three months whereas the level of Relative Conflictive ctions decreased and the level of Relative Cooperative ctions increased. However, as the latest peaks in the graphs reflect, this stabilising trend is not unchallenged. Over the last year, political debates between the government and opposition continued, although they gained less and less publicity. Outstanding opposition figures became less capable of mobilizing masses for demonstrations, whereas the government at the same time managed to resurrect parts of the moderate opposition for its goals. In ugust, more radical opposition forces held a kurultai (congress) in the outhern Kyrgyzstan town of ksy. he congress adopted a series of resolutions, none of them reflecting a clear opposition strategy. One resolution blamed President skar kaev for the country's poor economic situation, another called for the government's resignation. Most of the delegates ended up calling for the formation of a common opposition bloc of candidates for parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for 2005, but they didn t succeed to take concrete steps to make their calls real. In general, over the observed period, the political debate in Kyrgyzstan moved away from outspoken criticism of the government and demands of the removal of President kaev to more substantial discussions about concrete measures undertaken by government and international organizations. Early eptember, the Legislative ssembly (lower house) of the Kyrgyz parliament saw lengthy debates about the removal of Bishkek's statue of oviet founder Vladimir Lenin from the city's main square. Communist deputies accused the government of violating a law protecting the statue. his law has been adopted in the early 1990ies in commemoration of Lenin s revolution that saved the Kyrgyz nation from being extinguished by the sarist troops. t the same time, human rights activists focused on a police-training program which was launched by the Organization for ecurity and Cooperation in Europe (OCE). Being highly critical of this program, especially of that part of the program that involves providing riot gear and training to the Kyrgyz police, they uttered their concerns that the program is directed against peaceful citizens seeking to assert their rights. he Kyrgyz authorities had asked for assistance in reforming and modernizing the country's law enforcement agencies after police shot dead five demonstrators in March o convince human rights activists of the usefulness of the program, government and OCE will have to do much needed public relation. Dr. Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

7 Update ppendix: Description of indicators used Page 7 Variable Name Description / Definition IDE categories: a count of all coded events with WEI cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all ll Events WEI cue categories) plus an additional 11 IDE event cue categories (Event type: other ). WEI categories: a count of all coded events with cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all WEI cue ll ctions categories). Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, Direct ctions demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct actions regardless of origin or target. he indicator orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. his includes orceful ctions non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Proportion of orceful ction events compared to ll Direct ctions. Relative he indicator orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. his includes orceful ctions non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Conflict Carrying Capacity Country tability Cooperative Conflictual WEI Cue 1 Yield 2 Comment 3 Consult 4 pprove he Conflict Carrying Capacity (or CCC) is a composed index that depicts the overall stability of the country or region of interest. he CCC is operationalized in terms of the multiplicative interaction among three Proportional measures: (1) civil contentiousness or the Proportion of civil actions that are reported as contentious or "direct" and thus challenge (at least implicitly) the state's monopoly on conflict regulation; (2) state repression or the Proportion of state actions that are reported as extra-institutional or "direct" both in response to direct challenges from the civil sector and those initiated by the state to repress and control opposition; and (3) violent contention or the Proportion of actions entailing physical damage to persons or property. the index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability. he country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country. Proportion of all actions belonging to all cooperative categories yield, comment consult, approve, promise, grant, reward, agree, request, and propose to all actions (all Events belonging to the 22 WEI cue categories). Proportion of all actions belonging to all conflictive categories reject, accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize, and force to all actions (all Events belonging to the 22 WEI cue categories). Proportion of yield events (WEI cue category 1) to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. Consistent with McClelland's original categorization, we organize the events within the yield cue category to include yield to order (WEI sub-category 11: includes surrendering, submitting to arrest), yield position (WEI sub-category 12: retreating, evacuating, surrendering possessions) and acknowledge responsibility (cknowledge responsibility is equivalent to the original WEI category 13: dmit Wrongdoing, Retract tatement.) Proportion of comment events (WEI cue category 2) to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. Consistent with McClelland's original categorization, we organize the events within the comment cue category to include many different types of remarks, differentiating among decline comment, pessimistic comment and optimistic comment (WEI categories 21 25). Proportion of consult events (WEI cue category 3) to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. Consistent with McClelland's original categorization, we organize the events within the consult cue category to include discussions, meetings and hosting meetings (WEI categories 31 33). Proportion of approve events (WEI cue category 4) to all WEI cue category events as reported in a specific time interval. Consistent with McClelland's original categorization, we organize the events within the approve cue category to include praise, empathize and forgive events. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

8 Update ppendix: Description of indicators used Page 8 Variable Name 5 Promise 6 Grant 7 Reward 8 gree 9 Request 10 Propose 11 Reject 12 ccuse 13 Protest 14 Deny Description / Definition Proportion of promise events (WEI cue category 5) to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. Consistent with McClelland's original categorization, we organize the events within the promise cue category to include promise material support (including subcategories of economic, humanitarian and military support), promise other support, and assure events (WEI categories 51 54). Proportion of grant events (WEI cue category 6) to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. Consistent with McClelland's original categorization, we organize the events within the grant cue category to include extend invitation, provide shelter (including the sub-category, grant asylum), improve relations, ease sanctions (including the sub-categories, observe truce, demobilize armed forces and relax censorship, administrative sanctions and curfew) and release/return events (WEI categories 61 66). Proportion of reward cue category events (WEI cue category 7) to all WEI cue category events (all we organize the events within the reward cue category to include extend economic, military and humanitarian aid and rally support events (WEI categories 71 73). Proportion of agree cue category events (WEI cue category 8) to all WEI cue category events (all we organize the events within the agree cue category to include assent/approve, agree/accept and collaborate events (WEI categories 81 and 82). Proportion of request cue category events (WEI cue category 9) to all WEI cue category events (all we organize the request cue category to include requests for information, material aid (including sub-categories of economic, humanitarian and military aid) and protection and solicit support events (WEI categories 91 95). Note that the WEI Request cue category (09) is reserved for events involving an actor requesting assistance for his/her own country or group. Proportion of propose cue category events (WEI cue category 10) to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. Consistent with McClelland's original categorization, we organize the propose cue category to include offer proposal (including the subcategory, propose truce or cease-fire) and call for action events (WEI categories 101 and 102). Note that the WEI Propose cue category (10) is restricted to events involving an actor proposing an action for a country or group other than his/her own. Proportion of reject cue category events (WEI cue category 11) to all WEI cue category events (all we organize the reject cue category to include reject proposal, defy norms (including sub-categories, political flight, disclose information, establish parallel institutions and protest resignation (he resignation must be reported as a protest, otherwise it is an adjustment (IDE code 26).)) and refuse to allow (including sub-categories, impose curfew, censor media and veto) events (WEI categories 111 and 112). Proportion of accuse cue category events (WEI cue category 12) to all WEI cue category events (all we organize the accuse cue category to include criticize/blame (ll judicial indictments and similar official "charges" are included under the IDE djudicate category (24).) and denounce/denigrate events (WEI categories 121 and 122). Proportion of protest cue category events (WEI cue category 13) to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. he WEI Protest cue category (13) is equivalent to the IDE Complain category. herefore, we organize the WEI protest cue category/ide Complain category to include informal and formal complaint events (WEI categories 131 and 132). Proportion of deny cue category events (WEI cue category 14) to all WEI cue category events (all we organize the deny cue category to include deny an accusation events (WEI categories 141 and 142). swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

9 Update ppendix: Description of indicators used Page 9 Variable Name Description / Definition Proportion of demand cue category events (WEI cue category 15) to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. Consistent with McClelland's original 15 Demand categorization, we organize the demand cue category to include issue order (insist/demand compliance) events (WEI category 150). Proportion of warn cue category events (WEI cue category 16) to all WEI cue category events (all 16 Warn we organize the warn cue category (he WEI Warn cue category (16) is distinct from the WEI threaten cue category (17) in that Warn does not imply negative sanctions should the action be carried out.) to include give warning events (WEI category 160). Proportion of threaten cue category events (WEI cue category 17) to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. Consistent with McClelland's original 17 hreaten categorization, we organize the threaten cue category to include non-specific, sanctions, nonmilitary, military force threats as well as give ultimatum events (WEI categories ). Proportion of demonstrate cue category events (WEI cue category 18) to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. Consistent with McClelland's original 18 Demonstrate categorization, we organize the demonstrate cue category to include protest demonstration, military demonstration and control crowds events (181 and 182). Proportion of sanction cue category events to all WEI cue category events (all actions) as reported in a specific time interval. he anction cue category is equivalent to the WEI Reduce Relationship 19 anction cue category (19). Compatible with McClelland's original Reduce Relationship categorization of events, the sanction cue category includes reduce routine activity, reduce or stop aid, impose sanctions, halt negotiations and break relations events (WEI categories ). Proportion of expel cue category events (WEI cue category 20) to all WEI cue category events (all 20 Expel we organize the expel cue category to include all expel and expel people events (WEI categories 201 and 202). Proportion of seize cue category events (WEI cue category 21) to all WEI cue category events (all we organize the seize cue category to include all seize people (includes sub-categories of criminal 21 eize arrests, political detentions and abductions and hijackings) and seize possession (includes subcategories of no force-use crime and covert monitoring (he act of spying was moved from the WEI ccuse category (121) to be included in the sub-category of Covert monitoring.)) events (WEI categories 211 and 212). Proportion of force cue category events (WEI cue category 22) to all WEI cue category events (all 22 orce we organize the force cue category to include riot, bombing, physical assault and military engagement events (WEI categories ). verage verage Domestic Conflict indicators are used to display Proportions of conflict and cooperation events in time. Each event category is assigned a rating (value), ranging from -10 (extreme conflict) to 10 (extreme cooperation). Zero value events are excluded from these calculations. he verage indicator is a cumulative average of all events that are classified with a positive or negative value by 's conflict/cooperation scale. he indicator displays the mean of the conflict/cooperation event values, excluding all zero value events. he verage Domestic Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative () values of all conflictive intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative values divided by the total number of conflictive domestic events). or interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

10 Update ppendix: Description of indicators used Page 10 Variable Name verage Domestic Cooperation verage International Conflict verage International Cooperation Description / Definition he verage Domestic Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive () values of all cooperative intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive values divided by the total number of cooperative domestic events). he verage International Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative () values of all conflictive interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative values divided by the total number of conflictive international events). or interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). he verage International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive () values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive values divided by the total number of cooperative international events). swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

11 Update he Early Warning ystem Page 11 Who are we? (German acronym for Early nalysis of ensions and act-finding ) is the early warning project of swisspeace, based in Berne, witzerland. In 1998 the wiss gency for Development and Cooperation (DC) assigned swisspeace to set up a political early warning system for early identification of impending armed conflict and political crisis situations. What do we want? aims to enhance political decision makers ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent political strategies can be formulated either to prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or to identify opportunities for peacebuilding. How do we work? uses both quantitative and qualitative methods for its analysis. he centerpiece in the quantitative analysis is based on event data analysis and the respective tools developed in the framework of the Program on Nonviolent anctions and Cultural urvival (PONC) at Harvard University. he logic of event data analysis is fairly simple: all events considered relevant to conflict escalation and de-escalation are assigned a certain numeric value according to a distinct conflict scale. hese values can then be added up for specific time intervals and graphically displayed in a curve over time. he quality and quantity of data input is crucial for the success of such a method. In order to gather the quality and quantity of data required to suit early warning purposes, sets up its own local information networks (LINs) and thus overcomes shortcomings of existing information sources (e.g., international news wires). unique set of data is collected for each country completely independently from Western news-media coverage. or qualitative data analysis, contracts internationally renowned country experts. What are our products? products are risk assessments tailored to individual customers' needs. he standard product ( Update ) consists of three to five charts depicting the latest conflict related trends and a concise expert interpretation. s the time-series of collected data grow, analysts will apply statistical methods to go beyond retrospective description and forecast future developments. Updates are available in either hard copy or electronic form, covering time intervals as chosen by the customer. Which countries do we monitor? frica: sia: Europe: ngola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, omalia fghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Caucasus region, Pakistan, ajikistan, Uzbekistan lbania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, erbia and Montenegro Middle East: Palestine swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation