Early warning program. F A S T Update. Afghanistan. Semi-annual Risk Assessment June to November swisspeace

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1 F A S T Update Early warning program Afghanistan Semi-annual Risk Assessment June to November 2005 F T A S

2 Afghanistan June to November 2005 Page 2 Contents Country Stability and Forceful Events (relative) 3 Confrontational Government and Non-Government Events (relative) 5 Conflictive and Cooperative Domestic Events (average weighted) 7 Conflictive and Cooperative International Events (average weighted) 9 Appendix: Description of indicators used 11 The FAST International Early Warning Program 12 FAST Update Subscription: Contact FAST International: Phone: Fax: mailto:fast@swisspeace.ch Country Expert: Rainer Glassner

3 Afghanistan June to November 2005 Page 3 Country Stability and Forceful Events (relative) Average number of reported events per month: 168 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: The Country Stability index slightly declined during the first half of the reporting time and stabilized afterwards on a medium level (0,5). Meanwhile, the Forceful Events curve reached its highest level for years but decreased towards the end of the reporting time. The war on terror continued to be dominant over the past six months but the security situation deteriorated. In the aftermath of the parliamentary elections, which were held in a relatively calm setting, a sharp increase of attacks against international personnel as well as Afghans in connection with pro-governmental functions could be witnessed. In 2005 so far 1500 Afghans were killed along with 90 US soldiers, which is twice the number of On the28 th June a US CH-47 Chinook transport helicopter was brought down in Kunar by the Taliban, killing all 17 members of a US Special Forces unit. They were on their way to reinforce 4 US soldiers on ground patrol in Kunar who had been attacked before. Three of them were also killed that day. Another helicopter was shot down on 25 th September in Zabul, killing 5 American soldiers. While up to now the conflict concentrated mainly on the south and south-eastern parts of Afghanistan, recently ISAF troops in other regions came under fire as well. In Mazar-i Sharif, quiet so far, a British soldier was killed and six others were injured when they were engaged by small arms fire. A month later (25.11), two Swedish soldiers died in Mazar-i Sharif when a remote-controlled bomb struck their vehicle. The Taliban increasingly attacked police stations, which resulted in more than 200 policemen killed this year. On 12 th October, 18 policemen were killed in one single event in Helmand. Along with frequent attacks against the Afghan National Army that is deployed alongside coalition forces, this led to a noticeable increase in the number of desertions. Half of the 205 th Afghan National Army corps, which is deployed outside Kabul, has deserted. The insurgents changed their tactics significantly. They are more sophisticated and able to reach new levels of coordination and technological knowledge. On the 14 th November, suicide bombers struck in waves, a tactic known from Al Qaida, when they rammed their car bombs into an armored German ISAF car on the Jalalabad road in Kabul. One German soldier was killed and two others severely injured in this first suicide blast. One hour later a second suicide attack was carried out against a Greek ISAF convoy in Kabul. Two Greek soldiers were wounded and six Afghans killed. Four days later a Portuguese ISAF peacekeeper was killed and three others wounded in an attack in Kabul. Despite a change in tactics within the insurgency, open battles between Coalition Forces and Taliban still occur. Within four days in June, about 178 Taliban were killed in Mian Nisheen district on the borders of Kandahar, Zabul and Uruzgan.

4 Afghanistan June to November 2005 Page 4 The relation between warlords in the provinces and the central government is still tense. Fierce fighting between two commanders in Farah left 17 people dead on the 22 nd June. In Faryab followers of Abdul Malik and former Jumbesh leader Rashid Dostum clashed, leaving four wounded on 29 th September. Forces loyal to Malik and Dostum have clashed frequently in the past. Even though the US military officially sees the shift in Taliban tactics as born out of desperation, it is a clear sign of considerable assistance from the outside. Technological improvements and tactics used in Iraq have been copied. It seems doubtful whether the usually relatively calm months of the winter period can be enjoyed this year. With the change of tactics the Neo-Taliban freed themselves from this obstructed halt. Thus an increase in Forceful Events and a deterioration of the Country Stability can be expected.

5 Afghanistan June to November 2005 Page 5 Confrontational Government and Non-Government Events (relative) Average number of reported events per month: 168 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: While the curve of Government Confrontational Events has remained on a low level during the last two years, the curve of Non-Government Confrontational Events, increased during this year. The latter reached a peak in October in the direct aftermath of the elections, when several demonstrations were held in support of inferior candidates. However, the curve later dropped again to the same level as before. Government Confrontational Events rose until mid summer but has ever since been declining steadily in the reported period. The government successfully reduced the area under poppy cultivation in Accordingly the number of households involved in poppy cultivation fell by 13%. The drop of 21% in cultivated area compared to 2004 was relativized by the small decrease in actual opium production, which was, due to good weather, only 2.4%. Consequently, the value of the drugs was estimated to be close to the level of However, Counter-Narcotics Forces fought heroin factories more effectively. On 2 nd June they destroyed 15 heroin factories in Achin (Nangahar). In late October, during a four days raid in Nangahar, 30 opium-processing laboratories were destroyed and kg of opiates were burned. Interior Minister Ali Ahmad Jalali resigned on 27 th September amid widespread reports of disagreements with Karzai over the appointment of factional leaders to provincial posts. Jalalis decision was also motivated by frustration regarding efforts to stem the illegal opium and heroin trade as well as to bring to justice those government officials involved. The judicial sector became even more dominated by Islamists. Supreme Court chief Fazl Hadi Shinwari, an ally of the Saudi-backed fundamentalist leader Rasul Sayyaf, has appointed Pir Mohammad Rohani as administrative chief to the Supreme Court. The latter previously served as the rector of Kabul University in the time of the Taliban s reign. In October a local court in Kabul sentenced the editor of the Haqoop-i-Zan magazine to two years in jail for publishing blasphemous articles. Hundreds of candidates all over the country went to the streets after the elections to demonstrate against unfair elections and to demand the recounting of the votes. Others protested against their disqualification. Meanwhile some ballots were put into quarantine because of suspected fraud, and the EU stated that in certain provinces the counting process has revealed worrying cases of fraud. After the murder of a candidate belonging to the minority Shia Hizb-i Wahdat party in Mazar-i Sharif several thousand Afghans demanded the removal of province governor Atta Mohammed Nur whom they claimed to be involved. The Interior

6 Afghanistan June to November 2005 Page 6 Ministry dispatched 300 rapid-reaction troops to help the local police to restore the order. Furthermore, dismissed officers of the Afghan Army staged a series of demonstrations in Kabul, Nangahar, Kunar and Laghman to press for the payment of outstanding salary and for reinstatement. In Khost people took to the streets on 16 th October to protest against the assassination of a pro-governmental cleric, who was killed by a bomb planted in a mosque. In addition political protests against the US involvement in Afghanistan were reported: about Afghans protested in front of the main American base in Baghram against the arrest of some villagers. In Khost two people died when police fired on tribesmen who protested against a plan to construct an airport on their land. This was regarded as a facility for foreign military forces. The decline of area under poppy cultivation results mainly from the 96% drop in one of the leading Opium provinces (Nangahar). As promises that led to the reduction were not fulfilled (alternative livelihood) an increase in production can be anticipated. This, in turn, will lead to conflict when the government and the international community will try to enforce eradication. These unfulfilled promises can be linked to the general feeling of Afghans about their political, social and economical situation that is marked by frustration and is likely to increase Confrontational Non-Governmental Events. The feeling of being sidelined by inferior candidates of the election might enhance this even further.

7 Afghanistan June to November 2005 Page 7 Conflictive and Cooperative Domestic Events (average weighted) Average number of reported events per month: 168 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: The Cooperative Domestic Events curve is still on a constant medium level but took off steadily after the elections. Meanwhile, Conflictive Domestic Events increased in June and remained on the reached level throughout the period under review, only slightly decreasing in November. The parliamentary elections on 18 September increased the political tension. In the run-up to the elections 7 candidates were killed and some minor clashes occurred between rivals. Election workers were under attack as well. Five days before the election started, seven Afghan civilians were shot dead in Uruzgan after Neo-Taliban found voter-registrations in their car. Nevertheless the polling day itself was very calm. The speaker of the Taliban had announced some days ahead that they won t target voters. The single-non-transferable-vote system was used in the election and any sign of party affiliation on the ballot paper was prohibited. The system led to very close calls with sometimes 20 votes deciding whether a candidate was elected or not. Consequently, allegations of fraud were voiced by a number of candidates. Voter turnout was low (53%) compared to the presidential election last year (70%). Turnout of females fluctuated between 3.7% in Zabul, and 57.3% in Paktia. Many of the elected are warlords (e.g. Mohaqeq and Sayyaf in Kabul) with ties to armed groups. This despite the existence of a law which should disqualify every such person. Former communists achieved an unexpectedly bad result while some former Taliban won a seat (e.g. Maulawi Mohammed Islam Mohammadi, former governor of Bamyan; Mullah Rocketi from Zabul). Women were guaranteed 27% of all seats in parliament via quota. However, in some areas woman did remarkably well. In Herat a woman turned out first in the parliamentary elections and in Kunduz, Balkh and Ghazni were the highest vote winner the provincial elections. Reacting to the ongoing national reconciliation effort several commanders of the Taliban and Hizb-i Islami switched sides to the government. Amongst them were some key figures such as the former viceand-virtue minister Maulavi Habibullah or Qazi Abdul Rahman the former chief of justice in Kunar. However, the Taliban still pose a major threat as they increased their attacks on Afghans working with the government or with foreigners. Especially pro-governmental religious leaders were attacked and killed.

8 Afghanistan June to November 2005 Page 8 On 7 July the government of Afghanistan announced the completion of the DDR-program (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of former combatants). More than militiamen (which were formerly registered with the Afghan Militia Forces) turned in their arms, and nearly all heavy weapons have been collected. It has to be mentioned that many of the weapons were classified defective and that small arms are still widespread. To follow up the DDR program, the government subsequently started a program to disarm illegal armed groups (DIAG). It is questionable how professional the new parliament will be. As a consequence of the voting system and the sidelining of political parties it is fractured and weak. Furthermore, it remains unclear how voting blocs will form. The legitimacy of the elected women is undermined through the quota system, which let them bypass male candidates that received far more votes. Since people move up from the next place of the list if one member of the parliament dies or is killed, this will most likely (and has already) result in several assassination attempts in the future.

9 Afghanistan June to November 2005 Page 9 Conflictive and Cooperative International Events (average weighted) Average number of reported events per month: 168 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: During the last six months, the International Conflict and Cooperation graphs are both characterized by a stable course. The level of Cooperative International Events rose slightly in anticipation of the parliamentary election. However, it remained stable in the aftermath despite the official end of the Bonn process. The Conflictive International Events constantly remained on a high level. NATO has taken over more responsibility in Afghanistan. ISAF s strength is expected to increase to men when taking over the lead in the south of Afghanistan. Since August Canada is responsible for the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar, currently under the mandate Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The two mandates won t be combined as envisaged by the US. Instead ISAF will continue to focus on stabilization while OEF will carry out counterterrorism missions. The US announced a plan to spend 5 billion US$ over the course of the next five years in Afghanistan. The money will go towards projects that include health and education, broadening democracy, and economic development. In September the USA announced a plan to reduce their troop level in Afghanistan by up to 20%. This would result in the biggest troop reduction since the fall of the Taliban. As a result, NATO would have to cover that reduction to maintain the same level of international security presence in Afghanistan. The relation between Pakistan and Afghanistan remains tense. The Neo-Taliban still use the North West Frontier Province in Pakistan as a save haven for their operations in Afghanistan. The retreat to Pakistan became even easier for the Neo-Taliban during the last months because the earthquake in Pakistan in October tied up the Pakistani army. Significantly more attacks against expatriates are witnessed all over Afghanistan. This leads to tightened security measures on the side of the international staff. The security situation still continues to be unstable and volatile in Kabul. An Indian truck driver working on road reconstruction was abducted in Nimruz on the 19 th November. The Taliban beheaded him after his Indian company passed a deadline to leave Afghanistan. On 31 August a British man working on a road project in the West was kidnapped and later found dead. A drug trafficker with alleged links to the Taliban has become the first man extradited from Afghanistan to face US charges. Two former Afghan intelligence chiefs were sentenced to prison in the Netherlands for war crimes. In London another warlord was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

10 Afghanistan June to November 2005 Page 10 On 23 November Uzbekistan told NATO allies that they can no longer use its territory or airspace in support of their missions in neighboring Afghanistan. Uzbekistan had already ordered the US military out before. However, Uzbekistan has not yet fully decided about ISAF s use of their airspace and facilities. It is most likely that in the course of a strategic shift within the insurgency international development organizations become more prone to violence. It has to be seen whether the ISAF countries have the ability and willingness to tackle the problems in the south. Most likely, the US will reduce their troops in Afghanistan. After the end of the Bonn process, the International Community must define a new agenda for their cooperation with and assistance for Afghanistan.

11 Appendix: Description of indicators used Page 11 Country Stability Cooperative International Events (Average Weighted) Conflictive International Events (Average Weighted) Cooperative Domestic Events (Average Weighted) Conflictive Domestic Events (Average Weighted) Confrontational Events (Relative) Confrontational Government Events (Relative) Forceful Events (Relative) The Country Stability index reflects three independent factors: (i) challenges by non-government actors to the state's monopoly of force; (ii) state repression; and (iii) violence entailing physical force against persons or property. The index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability. Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events (i) that have a positive value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where at least one actor comes from outside the country. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8. Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where at least one actor comes from outside the country. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8. Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events (i) that have a positive value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where all actors come from inside the country. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8. Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where all actors come from inside the country. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8. Number of Events (i) that are of confrontational nature such as 'Threaten', 'Demonstrate', 'Reduce relationships', 'Expel', 'Seize' and 'Force' and (ii) where at least one Initiator is a non-government actor divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1. Number of Events (i) that are of confrontational nature such as 'Threaten', 'Demonstrate', 'Reduce relationships', 'Expel', 'Seize' and 'Force' and (ii) where at least one Initiator is a government actor divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1. Number of Events (i) that entail the use of physical force against persons or property divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1.

12 The FAST International Early Warning Program Page 12 Who are we? FAST International is the early warning program of swisspeace, based in Bern, Switzerland. The program is funded and utilized by an international consortium of development agencies consisting of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). What do we want to achieve? FAST International aims at enhancing political decision makers and their offices ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner so that coherent political strategies can be formulated to either prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or identify windows of opportunity for peacebuilding. How do we work? FAST International uses both qualitative and quantitative methods, with the combination of methods being determined in each case by customer needs. The centerpiece of FAST International is the collection of single cooperative and conflictive events by means of a web-based software, applied by local staff using a coding scheme called IDEA (Integrated Data for Event Analysis), which is based on the WEIS (World Interaction Survey) coding scheme. The monitoring by FAST International is done independently from Western media coverage, thus providing for a constant influx of information. This information is collected by FAST International s own Local Information Networks (LINs). The quantitative empirical analysis is based on composed indicators developed within the IDEA framework. Since even the most profound quantitative analysis requires interpretation, FAST International cooperates with renowned country/area experts. What are our products? FAST International offers different early warning products tailored to customer needs. The only standard product available to the general public is the FAST Update, which provides the reader with an overview of developments on a semi-annual basis. It consists of three to five tension barometers (graphs), displaying cooperative and conflictive developments, which are analyzed by FAST s country/area experts on the basis of specific indicators. Whenever major changes occur in one of the countries or regions under scrutiny, FAST releases Special Updates, which follow the structure of the regular FAST Updates. FAST Updates are available in either hard copy, in electronic form on the respective country page or by subscription. Which countries do we currently monitor? Africa: Asia: Europe: Angola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia Afghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Russian Federation/North Caucasus region