An assessment of NATO s command of ISAF operations in Afghanistan

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1 GR129 An assessment of NATO s command of ISAF operations in Afghanistan In August 2003, NATO took command of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) operations in Afghanistan. This was the first NATO operation to take place outside of the Euro-Atlantic area and represents a turning point for the organisation. NATO must prove itself successful within Afghanistan in order legitimise its new role as global peacekeeper to the post- 911 world order. There is talk of NATO having a future peacekeeping role in Iraq, and the Alliance s leadership is keen for the organisation to replay a prominent role. However, if its command of ISAF is used as a yardstick, NATO s future in Iraq looks uncertain. ISAF The initial mandate for NATO s command of ISAF was centred purely around Kabul and its immediate surroundings. This was a continuation of the original UN ISAF mandate to develop the security of the capital to allow UN personnel and the Transitional Authority to operate. However, in October 2003, NATO ministers approved a plan to expand the ISAF remit. It would now allow the organisation gradually to take control of the nationally-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), as well as create new ones. These teams had been sent out to secure the regions of the country beyond the capital. NATO was not an entirely new entrant on the Afghanistan security scene when it took the lead on ISAF. It had previously been providing assistance to Germany and the Netherlands during these countries leadership of ISAF III from February Through this involvement, NATO had become aware of the huge logistical and resource drain of the ISAF operation s requirement for the lead nation of the campaign to be rotated every six months. In turn, this system undermined the Afghan Transitional Authority s confidence in the continued presence of peacekeepers within their country. 1 of 5

2 Thus NATO s leadership role has provided a sense of continuity to the ISAF operation, as well as providing an operational headquarters hosted by Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) at Mons, Belgium. The situation today The International Security Assistance Force forces currently comprises 6,500 personnel operating in and around the capital. As part of the expansion of the ISAF mandate, NATO now has command over the German PRT in Kunduz and NATO chiefs had hoped to have new PRTs in place in Maimana and Faizabad by June However, the security situation in Afghanistan remains dire. The areas outside of Kabul remain a nightmare for security forces, with continuing conflict between tribal and ethnic groups. In April 2004 alone: Fighting erupted in the north-west as a result of conflict between regional commander General Dostum and the provincial governor. Two aid workers were shot in Kandahar province. Seven people, some of them government employees, were shot dead in south-eastern Afghanistan. By contrast, Kabul itself remains a relative safe haven, although this was the case before NATO took command of ISAF. However, a significant number of attacks continue to occur within the capital, and have done so during the NATO presence. In December 2003 and January 2004 there were a number of suicide bomb attacks within the city, directed towards ISAF personnel and security forces. The attacks resulted in the death of at least one Canadian ISAF soldier and many civilians. These attacks forced NATO to change the way it dealt with civilians, creating a greater distance between peacekeepers and the city s residents. Very soon, this bred a degree of distrust on both sides. More recently, in early May, the 2 of 5

3 apparent stoning to death of two Westerners in Kabul illustrated that a number of security challenges remain within the city. Moreover, the poor security situation is holding back elections within the country. Originally planned for June, EU and UN officials now believe they will have to be put back until September. In fact, even this date may be too soon, but there is great pressure from Washington to have something in place before the US elections in November. How to assess the ISAF operation Has NATO s command of ISAF been successful? Yes, to some extent. Within the NATO area of influence in Kabul, the security situation is no worse than it was when the ISAF presence was first established under UK and later Turkish command. And since the change in patrol techniques following the early 2004 suicide attacks, there have been fewer reports of insurgency. However, since October 2003, NATO has been keen to expand outside of the city and improve security in regions outside Kabul through the use of PRTs. The North Atlantic Council decided this was the direction the NATO command of ISAF should take. It is an important objective, because the Transitional Authority needs security across the country, not just in the capital, in order to create a stable and democratic system. NATO seems to have been less successful at achieving this expansion, which is a far more difficult task than the initial Kabul-focused initiative. There is still only one PRT under NATO control, despite the organisation s planners original hopes to have five in place by June. Indeed, in a recent meeting with Hamid Karzai, NATO delegates slipped this target until September. In addition, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer sees no part for NATO in combating Afghanistan s crippling narcotics trade. This is despite his admitting a link between drug trafficking and the current security problems. 3 of 5

4 NATO needs more troops in the country to achieve its modest PRT targets, but has been unable to get any real commitment out of its members. Recently Nicholas Burns, US Ambassador to NATO, called on member states such as Turkey and Germany to commit more troops. Spain has said it will increase its number following troop withdrawal from Iraq although none have yet appeared. US troops are too pre-occupied conducting operations against Taleban and Al-Qaeda supporters elsewhere in the country to commit to a NATO security force. A greater problem may arise in October 2004, when the majority of the Canadian and German troops (some two-thirds of the total ISAF force) are scheduled to leave Afghanistan. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has constantly called for more troops and greater commitment from members with little success. This is despite his recent attempt to shame European members into cooperation. There seems to be no political will to send troops into what are clearly very dangerous regions. The US experience in Iraq is creating anxiety amongst European politicians US troop returning home in body bags continue to affect the level of support given by domestic voters to the Bush administration. European leaders do not want to risk the same situation with Afghanistan. NATO and Iraq? Does NATOs command of ISAF in Afghanistan prove its credentials as global peacekeeper? And is there a place for NATO in Iraq? It cannot be argued that NATO s command of ISAF has been a disaster. They have taken over and developed a pre-existing operation, and have largely achieved their remit within Kabul. However, when it comes to the development of new initiatives to combat insecurity outside of the original ISAF remit, NATO hasn t performed particularly well. It does not appear to have enough leverage over its member states to have new forces involved with novel initiatives. The NATO leadership appears to lack either enough coercive power or charismatic authority to get its member states to do what it 4 of 5

5 wants. This is despite the leadership s successful expansion eastwards of NATO in April 2004 to include seven new central and eastern European states. NATO may have a potential role in Iraq which complements its role in Afghanistan. Alliance troops could be sent in to maintain security in cities within the country where coalition forces have already setup a relatively stable governance regime. This would free the mainly US and UK coalition forces to focus on other, more unstable regions where their abilities may be more appropriate. However, even this limited operation would take some very hard bargaining by de Hoop Scheffer to convince members to send further troops to a NATO operation in Iraq. The NATO command of ISAF illustrates that the Secretary General may not have the ability to achieve this. If he can t persuade Turkey or Germany to send troops to Afghanistan, what hope does he have of getting members opposed to the Iraq conflict to send peacekeeping troops to Basra or Baghdad? Ultimately, NATO has fulfilled the basic ISAF commitments for security in Kabul. No more no less. But its inability to generate any enthusiasm over Afghanistan even amongst its new members is disappointing. If it is to become the new, all-singing, all-dancing global peacekeeper, NATO really must try harder. Disclaimer The views of authors are their own. The UK Defence Forum holds no corporate view on the opinions expressed in papers or at meetings. The Forum exists to enable politicians, industrialists, members of the armed forces, academics and others with an interest in defence and security issues to exchange information and views on the future needs of Britain s defence. It is operated by a non-partisan, not for profit company. UK Defence Forum papers are archived at - the last three years being accessible only to members and subscribers prior to that they are in the public domain subject to usual conventions. May of 5