Early warning unit. F A S T Update. Afghanistan. Quarterly Risk Assessment March to May swisspeace Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation

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1 Update Early warning unit fghanistan Quarterly Risk ssessment March to May 2004 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

2 Update fghanistan March May 2004 Page 2 Contents Country tability and Relative orceful ctions 3 Relative Government and Civil Direct ctions 4 Goldstein verage Domestic Conflict and Cooperation 5 Goldstein verage International Conflict and Cooperation 6 ppendix: Description of indicators used 7 he Early Warning ystem 8 Update ubscription: Contact : Phone: ax: mailto:@swisspeace.ch Country Expert: Dr. Conrad chetter swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

3 Update fghanistan March May 2004 Page 3 Country tability and Relative orceful ctions Country tability Relative orceful ctions 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 11/03 1/04 3/04 5/04 verage number of Events per month: 187 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: he long-term situation in fghanistan is characterized by a leveling of Country tability and Relative orceful ctions on a medium level. While in ebruary 2004 the situation improved, since March the situation deteriorated again and caused an approaching of both curves. Within the reporting time factional fighting between various warlords broke out repeatedly and destabilized the political situation. Especially western fghanistan, which experienced political stability in the last years, was affected by armed conflicts in Herat on 21 March and in Maymana on 8 pril. lso the war between the U-led Coalition against errorism and the Neo-aliban intensified: While violent conflicts between both opponents, the Neo-aliban and the Coalition orces, decreased earlier this year, attacks of the Neo-aliban against targets of the fghan ransitional dministration () and Coalition orces increased dramatically across the east and south of the country since March urthermore, clashes between the Neo-aliban and Coalition orces occurred frequently in Uruzgan, Zabul, Khost, Kandahar, Helmand and Kunar during the last three months. On account of the insecure situation, the Coalition orces launched the military operation Mountain torm in southern and eastern fghanistan, in which thousands of U and fghan forces are engaged. Within the last three months more than 300 casualties on both sides have been reported. gainst the background of the unstable situation in fghanistan, the International Donors Conference in Berlin, 31 March to 1 pril, concentrated mainly on strategies how to improve the security in fghanistan and how to combat the dramatic increase of opium cultivation. Currently two third of the worldwide opium is produced in fghanistan. positive outcome of the conference was that the international community pledged U$ 8.2 billion to support fghanistan s reconstruction. he recent deterioration of security after a short phase of an improved stability marks a dramatic setback for the reconstruction of fghanistan. he presence of the fghan rmy and international military (e.g. Provincial Reconstruction eams, PRs) is by far too exiguous to provide security in the whole country. he destabilizing factors (esp. Neo-aliban, opium cultivation, warlordism) and the lack of security and violent clashes will continue in the near future. he sporadic and locally shifting appearance of fighting indicates that nearly any region is unstable, but also that the outbreak of a countrywide war is unlikely. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

4 Update fghanistan March May 2004 Page 4 Relative Government and Civil Direct ctions Relative Civil Direct ctions Relative Government Direct ctions 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 11/03 1/04 3/04 5/04 verage number of Events per month: 187 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: he graph shows that Civil Direct ctions including actions by civil society, warlords and Neo-aliban by far outnumber the Direct ctions of the government. his indicates the weak, on Kabul concentrated, power of the and the dominance of military and political opponents. However the fostered their efforts to reduce the power of the warlords by the intensification of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process. he main phase of the demobilization started slowly on 17 May in Kabul while most of the warlords refuse to reduce their power basis. lready the test run in winter 2003/4 revealed that the design of the DDR program does not seriously jeopardize the position of the warlords. hus it is doubtful that the DDR process is completed in mid as envisaged by the. nother way to demonstrate a regaining of power of the was that Karzai enacted the execution of an fghan murder on 3 May. his found a great approval by fghan civilians, but was criticized by human rights organizations. he preparation of the presidential and parliamentary election, which Karzai postponed from June to eptember on 27 March, influenced government as well as civil actions. Karzai enacted a long-awaited election law on 26 May. he new law earmarks that a presidential candidate is required to collect the signatures of 10,000 supporters. he voter registration, which initiated to the 2nd phase, is still lagging and constricted through intimidation and threats by the Neo-aliban and other militants. On 25 pril the Neo-aliban stated to derail the elections and to kill whoever participate in the elections. hus two Britons of an election team were killed in Nuristan on 6 May, and a UN election team was attacked with rocket grenades and gunfire in Paktia on 18 March. lso assaults against girls schools emerged in the reporting time. Militants attacked two girls schools in the provinces of Kapisa on 10 March and Laghman on 17 March; three schoolgirls were poisoned in Khost province on 2 May. Personal changes in the government as well as political decisions provoked demonstrations: he removal of planning minister Haji Mohammad Mohaqeq on 7 March, an ethnic Hazara, caused a demonstration of 2,000 Hazaras in Mazar-I harif. In Kabul thousands of sacked soldiers continued to hold large-scale protests on 10 March, demanding pay and redundancy money. urthermore the intensification of the jihad against opium cultivation, proclaimed by Hamid Karzai, provoked actions: On 5 May hundreds of farmers demonstrated in Nangarhar against the drug politics of the government. inally Dostum s military intervention in Maymana was triggered by a demonstration against the governor Enayatullah Enayat on 8 pril, which turned out violently. In the future, Civil Direct ctions will continue to be stronger than the government ones. hus all actions of the will trigger repercussions of civil actors. urthermore the political reconstruction process produces losers who continually will resist against any changes. Especially the elections in late summer, the anti-drug campaign and actions to reduce the power of the warlords (such as the DDR program) will foster Civil Direct ctions. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

5 Update fghanistan March May 2004 Page 5 Goldstein verage Domestic Conflict and Cooperation verage Domestic Conflict verage Domestic Cooperation /02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 11/03 1/04 3/04 5/04 verage number of Events per month: 187 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: he graph is characterized by nearly the same situation over the last year. While the curve of Domestic Conflict remains on a very high level and shows a continuous increase since December, the curve of Domestic Cooperation remained low. his great gap indicates the permanent conflicts and the reluctance of cooperation between the on the one side and the warlords and the Neo-aliban on the other side. he last three months demonstrated that conflicts could erupt always and everywhere in fghanistan. hus the city of Herat, the stronghold of Ismail Khan and one of the most secure and stable places in the last two years, faced a sudden outbreak of violence on 21 March. he unsettled death (assassination or accident) of Mirwais adiq on 21 March, fghanistan s Civil viation Minister and son of Ismail Khan, prompted an armed confrontation between the troops loyal to Ismail Khan and Karzai s local military commander Zahir Nahibzadeh who was blamed to be the assassin of adiq. In this violent clash between 50 and 100 people were killed. lso from the uneasy northern fghanistan, in which clashes between Rashid Dostum and Mohammad tta occurred continuously during the last three years, fighting took place in Balkh in pril and in mid-may, and in aryab in pril. Especially the conflict in aryab demonstrated the weakness of the government. Here the militias of Dostum expelled the governor Enayatullah Enayat, who could escape safeguarded by British soldiers on 8 pril. In both cases, in Herat as well as in Maymana, Kabul sent troops to calm down the situation. Karzai used the presence of -forces in Herat to urge unsuccessfully Ismail Khan to disarm his forces while Karzai visited the town on 11 May. Regarding the confrontation between the and the Neo-aliban, Karzai endeavored to incorporate moderate members of the Neo-aliban. However Mullah Dadullah, a leading aliban commander, rejected Karzai s invitation and denied talks between the and the aliban. Despite this statement members of the Hizb-I Islami, an ally of the Neo-aliban, announced after a meeting with Karzai their support for the holding of elections. his meeting took place with regard to the increasing number of attacks on the staff and offices of the by the Neo-aliban. olely in Kandahar five murderous attacks on governmental staff and offices occurred between 21 pril and 3 May, totally killing 14 people. nother hotspot is Zabul, where clashes are ongoing. or example the Neo-aliban killed a district police chief and eight fghan soldiers on 14 pril. he permanent confrontations between the and the regional power-holders remain the dominant line of conflict in fghanistan. If the will not find a right balanced way how to cope with the warlords this conflict will disable the whole process of political and economic reconstruction. More precarious, NGOs and other aid organizations abandoned the entire south and east of fghanistan due to the conflict with the Neo-aliban. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

6 Update fghanistan March May 2004 Page 6 Goldstein verage International Conflict and Cooperation verage International Conflict verage International Cooperation /02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 11/03 1/04 3/04 5/04 verage number of Events per month: 187 Indicator description: see appendix Risk ssessment: Both curves constantly run on a medium level relatively close to each other. lthough the conflictual curve is higher, there is a visible trend of an improved International Cooperation and a decreased level of International Conflict in pril and May. he Donors Conference, which took place in Berlin on 31 pril and 1 May, was an important sign for the long-term commitment of the international community towards the reconstruction of fghanistan. 50 countries pledged U$ 8.2 billion to support fghanistan s reconstruction process during the next three years. n additional outcome of this conference was a declaration on counter-narcotics in which fghanistan and its neighboring countries agreed on strengthen the collaboration in the fight against the cultivation and trafficking of opium. nother important conference on fghanistan s regional economic cooperation took place in Kyrgyzstan/Bishkek on May, on which all attending countries stressed their willingness to cooperate with fghanistan. lso international organizations strengthened their engagement in fghanistan: he UN ecurity Council extended the mandate of the UN mission in fghanistan (UNM) by another year on 26 March, and the NO plans to provide troops for five military-civilian PRs in the north of fghanistan by the end of June. he number of PRs is meanwhile expanded to 13, while Washington stationed in addition to the 11,000 U-troops further 2,000 U- Marines in fghanistan in pril. he strong commitment of the international community towards fghanistan contrasts the constant attacks against civil and military targets of the international community in southern and eastern fghanistan. hus the UN suspended its activities in the restive Kandahar province and surrounding areas on 25 pril. In the serial of attacks by militants one urkish aid worker in Zabul was killed on 5 March and two Britons in Nuristan province on 6 May. lso repeatedly attacks occurred against U military bases and vehicles. ll in all five U-soldiers were killed in the reporting time in Uruzgan on 18 March, Khost on 31 March and Helmand on 15 May. In Kabul assailants killed two I soldiers on 11 May and 23 May. gainst the background of the mistreatments of prisoners in Iraq by U soldiers the investigation of systematic and routine abuse of prisoners in fghanistan by U soldiers aroused public attention in May. lthough the international community shows a great commitment towards fghanistan, the insecure and unstable situation in most parts of the country reduces drastically the scope of actions of international organizations. hus the reconstruction concentrates on the urban centers, especially Kabul. his trend amplifies the gap between rural and urban regions, one of the most severe conflicts in fghanistan. swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

7 Update ppendix : Description of indicators used Page 7 Variable Name ll Direct ctions Relative orceful ctions Civil ector ll Civil ctions Relative Civil Direct ctions Government ector ll Government ctions Relative Government Direct ctions Conflict Carrying Capacity Country tability Goldstein Goldstein verage Domestic Conflict Goldstein verage Domestic Cooperation Goldstein verage International Conflict Goldstein verage International Cooperation Description / Definition Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct actions regardless of origin or target. Proportion of orceful ction events compared to ll Direct ctions. he indicator orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. his includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Count of all coded events belonging to the WEI cue categories (1 to 22), that involve only nongovernmental, or civil sector actors. Proportion of Civil Direct ctions compared to ll Civil ctions. Civil Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors. Count of all coded events belonging to the WEI cue categories (1 to 22), that involve only the political sector, or government actors. Proportion of Government Direct ctions compared to ll Government ctions. Government Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors. he Conflict Carrying Capacity (or CCC) is a composed index that depicts the overall stability of the country or region of interest. he CCC is operationalized in terms of the multiplicative interaction among three Proportional measures: (1) civil contentiousness or the Proportion of civil actions that are reported as contentious or "direct" and thus challenge (at least implicitly) the state's monopoly on conflict regulation; (2) state repression or the Proportion of state actions that are reported as extra-institutional or "direct" both in response to direct challenges from the civil sector and those initiated by the state to repress and control opposition; and (3) violent contention or the Proportion of actions entailing physical damage to persons or property. the index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability. he country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country. he Goldstein verage Domestic Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (Goldstein) values of all conflictive intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative Goldstein values divided by the total number of conflictive domestic events). or interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). he Goldstein verage Domestic Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative domestic events). he Goldstein verage International Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (Goldstein) values of all conflictive interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative Goldstein values divided by the total number of conflictive international events). or interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). he Goldstein verage International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative international events). swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation

8 Update he Early Warning ystem Page 8 Who are we? (German acronym for Early nalysis of ensions and act-finding ) is the early warning project of swisspeace, based in Berne, witzerland. In 1998 the wiss gency for Development and Cooperation (DC) assigned swisspeace to set up a political early warning system for early identification of impending armed conflict and political crisis situations. What do we want? aims to enhance political decision makers ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent political strategies can be formulated either to prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or to identify opportunities for peacebuilding. How do we work? uses both quantitative and qualitative methods for its analysis. he centerpiece in the quantitative analysis is based on event data analysis and the respective tools developed in the framework of the Program on Nonviolent anctions and Cultural urvival (PONC) at Harvard University. he logic of event data analysis is fairly simple: all events considered relevant to conflict escalation and de-escalation are assigned a certain numeric value according to a distinct conflict scale. hese values can then be added up for specific time intervals and graphically displayed in a curve over time. he quality and quantity of data input is crucial for the success of such a method. In order to gather the quality and quantity of data required to suit early warning purposes, sets up its own local information networks (LINs) and thus overcomes shortcomings of existing information sources (e.g., international news wires). unique set of data is collected for each country completely independently from Western news-media coverage. or qualitative data analysis, contracts internationally renowned country experts. What are our products? products are risk assessments tailored to individual customers' needs. he standard product ( Update ) consists of three to five charts depicting the latest conflict related trends and a concise expert interpretation. s the time-series of collected data grow, analysts will apply statistical methods to go beyond retrospective description and forecast future developments. Updates are available in either hard copy or electronic form, covering time intervals as chosen by the customer. Which countries do we monitor? frica: ngola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, omalia sia: Europe: fghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Caucasus region, Pakistan, ajikistan, Uzbekistan lbania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, erbia and Montenegro Middle East: Palestine swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation