Early warning program. F A S T Update. Afghanistan. Semi-annual Risk Assessment December 2004 to May swisspeace

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1 F A S T Update Early warning program Afghanistan Semi-annual Risk Assessment December 2004 to May 2005 F T A S

2 Afghanistan December 2004 to May 2005 Page 2 Contents Country Stability and Relative Forceful Actions 3 Relative Government and Non-Government Direct Actions 5 IDEA Average Domestic Conflict and Cooperation 7 IDEA Average International Conflict and Cooperation 9 Appendix: Description of indicators used 11 The FAST International Early Warning Program 12 Subscription: Contact FAST International: Phone: Fax: mailto:fast@swisspeace.ch Country Expert: Dr. Conrad Schetter Rainer Glassner

3 Afghanistan December 2004 to May 2005 Page 3 Country Stability and Relative Forceful Actions Average number of reported events per month: 166 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: The pattern of the Country Stability index corresponds directly to the curve development of the Forceful Actions. The Forceful Actions curve shows a decline since June 2004 what was interpreted by some to mean an end of insurgency in Afghanistan. However, since March 2005 we can witness the increase of Forceful Actions deriving from the rise of insecurity incidents. Factional fighting and clashes between Neo-Taliban and Coalition troops continue to be the main conflict lines in Afghanistan. Clashes between local militias primarily took place in the North (Badakhshan, Taloqan, Balkh, Faryab) and are often linked to the control over the drug trade, e.g. on 12 January several people were killed when militias clashed in Maymana. Furthermore, the upcoming parliamentary elections are triggering violence. On 15 May members of Jumbesh, the party of Rashid Dostum, attacked a parliamentary campaign event of Hizb-i Azadi in Faryab. One man was killed and 20 wounded. As in the past, the highest rate of attacks of Neo-Taliban on government and Coalition forces occurred in the southern provinces such as Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul, but also in the south-east (Khost) and east (Kunar). Traditionally insurgent activities increased in the spring linked to improving weather conditions. The security situation deteriorated sharply in May. Since March more than 200 Neo-Taliban were killed by the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Coalition forces. Since December 2004, 30 US Soldiers were killed. Alone 15 US soldiers died in a helicopter crash near Ghazni on 6 April. One Romanian soldier died when his car hit an explosive devise in Kandahar province. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was also targeted in Baghlan (26 May), Badakhshan (4 April) and near to Kabul (30 May). The Taliban are increasingly attacking police stations, targeting police chiefs as well as Afghans collaborating with the US military (esp. truck driver). Terrorist attacks became more sophisticated and well planned. On 29 May the head of the Kandahar Uleman Shura Mullah Mawlawi Abdullah Fayaz who was very outspoken against Taliban terrorist activities was assassinated in Kandahar. This was closely followed by a suicide bombing at his funeral prayer in Kandahar on 1 June that claimed at least 21 lives, among them the police chief of Kabul General Akram Khakrezwal. At the same day there was a confirmed attempt to bring down an US-plane equipped with surface-to-air missile. Attacks on NGO staff have also been on the rise: On 14 December a Turkish engineer was kidnapped and killed in Kunar and a British consultant was killed in Kabul on 7 February.

4 Afghanistan December 2004 to May 2005 Page 4 Although the Neo-Taliban movement was declared dead at the beginning of the year, renewed violence and clashes suggest a different picture, with an even more organized and vicious resistance force. Parts of the insurgents seem to radicalise more and alienate themselves from the Afghan population. With the upcoming parliamentary elections the number of attacks by Neo-Taliban and other anti-government forces are very likely to increase. Therefore the level of Forceful Action is likely to maintain its high degree during the summer until the parliamentary elections in September 2005 and the country stability will continue to be weak.

5 Afghanistan December 2004 to May 2005 Page 5 Relative Government and Non-Government Direct Actions Average number of reported events per month: 166 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: Both Government and Non-Government Direct Actions continue to remain on a relatively low level. Generally Non-Government Direct Actions exceed that of the Government. Government Direct Action reached its lowest point in May, while the level of Non-Government Direct Action continuously increased since February The development of Non-Government Direct Actions indicates the widespread discontent with the current situation in Afghanistan. This discontent is expressed in different ways by diverse groups. Social grievance is one striking cause for protests. Teachers in western Afghanistan went on strike for a higher payment (26 April), closing schools for children. Raising anger about insecurity set off protests all over the country. In Kandahar, a demonstration against a series of criminal kidnappings and the murder of one child turned violent (7 March). Several hundred women took to the streets in Kabul on 5 May to protest against the brutal murder of an Afghan mother and her two daughters who worked for a foreign aid group in Baghlan. Furthermore protests against land grabbing occurred in several provinces: Demonstrators accused the governors of Khost on 29 December and Balkh on 7 March for illegal land seizure. In addition, land disputes with refugees returning after several years abroad triggered protests in Taloqan on 8 March and in Kunduz on 13 March. Several riots also emerged in jails. In Kabul's Pul-i- Charki jail 5 policemen and 4 prisoners were killed on 17 December after a day-long siege after inmates killed their guards in an attempted jailbreak. In Kabul jail 45 women protested against abuse and illtreatment by prison guards by setting fire to their blankets in their prison cells as they continued their three-day protest on 1 December. In Bamyan thousand people held a peaceful demonstration on 21 February in support of their governor, following Karzai s announcement to replace the current governor with the former women s affairs minister, Habiba Sarabi. With t (2004) Afghanistan cultivates more than 85% of the world s opium production. In response to international pressure, the Afghan government intensified a country-wide poppy eradication campaign during the winter. Under pressure, the US-administration officially announced on 22 January that aerial spraying would not be used anymore as a poppy eradication method. Nevertheless, such spraying occurred in Helmand province less than two weeks later (3 February). Efforts of the Afghan government to get a handle on the increasing opium production resulted in violent clashes between farmers and anti-drug police in several regions (South: Kandahar and Uruzgan, East: Nangarhar and

6 Afghanistan December 2004 to May 2005 Page 6 Kunar, and South West: Farah) causing casualties on both sides. In the north fights related to the drug economy took place between private militias and the police in Taloqan on 21 February and between militias and Tajik border guards on 2 February. Violent demonstrations in Takhar on 30 May against the district chief of education - or according to other sources against poppy eradication - left three Afghans dead. In addition, political protests linked to US involvement in Afghanistan and elsewhere were reported: Heavy-handed house-to-house search operation by US forces led to the accidental kills of at least one boy (23 March) in Kunar and a 75 year old man (16 May) in Khost. This spurred several protests such as a rally in front of the governor s office in Nangarhar on 24 May. Violent protest erupted after a report in the 9 May edition of Newsweek claimed that interrogators at Guantanamo desecrated the Koran. Protests started peacefully in Jalalabad on 10 May, but turned violent a day later when vehicles, government buildings, the Pakistani consulate as well as several UN and foreign aid agency offices were looted and set on fire. Violent protest soon spread to at least 15 other provinces and lasted several days, leaving 16 people dead. These have been the largest anti-american protests in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban. However, while well organized it remains unclear who fuelled the rallies. More and more Afghans are disappointed with the current political, economic and social situation in Afghanistan as well as with the slow reconstruction process. This discontent can lead to an increase of various forms of Non-Government Direct Action and will increasingly be directed against the presence of international organizations, in particular American ones. Protests in rural areas are likely to increase if farmers face unreasonable poppy eradication campaigns or do not receive an adequate compensation for giving up poppy cultivation.

7 Afghanistan December 2004 to May 2005 Page 7 IDEA Average Domestic Conflict and Cooperation Average number of reported events per month: 166 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: The domestic situation in Afghanistan over the last 6 months was characterized by a constant medium level of Domestic Conflict and a constant low level of Domestic Cooperation. After the presidential election on 9 October 2004, Hamid Karzai took a long time to form a new cabinet, which was sworn in on 24 December. Unlike the previous cabinet most of the appointed ministers are technocrats with the exception of some powerful commanders such as Ismail Khan, the disempowered emir of Herat, appointed as Minister of Energy, and Rashid Dostum as Chief of Staff of the Afghan army. This was done very likely to secure their support in still tenacious times. Especially among the provincial and district governors the number of commanders is still high. Furthermore, the ethnic and regional balance of the new cabinet changed: Especially the once influential Panjshiri group lost ground; only foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah remained, while the number of Pashtuns in the core ministries increased, triggering conflicts within the state bureaucracy. As reaction to the appointment of Anwar-ul Haq Ahady, the former director of the central bank and the leader of the Pashtun nationalist party, Afghan Mellat, as Finance Minister, high-ranking ministerial official resigned from their positions. The parliamentary elections, which were envisaged for March this year, were postponed to 18 September 2005 because of logistic reasons and the lack of preparedness by the Afghan government as well the international community. Due to disputes over district boundaries and missing information on population figures, the district elections were even pushed to spring 2006, with the focus being on provincial council and Wulesi Jirga elections this year. By the 22 May deadline for candidate registration more than individuals had put their name forth. The heterogeneous list of the candidates includes over 600 women as well as ex-taliban such as the former foreign minister Abdul Wakil Mutawaqil. The electoral system, which builds on a single non-transferable vote, is highly criticized, because many feel that it will not adequately reflect the parliamentary representation of the people: Individuals can reach parliament with 80% or 2% of the vote, depending on the vote distribution in a given province. Furthermore, the government decided to exclude parties from the election. Early on, the upcoming elections increase the political tensions across the country. On 11May the candidate Akhtar Mohammad Tolwak was killed in Ghazni province.

8 Afghanistan December 2004 to May 2005 Page 8 Despite the fact that several commanders switched sides from the Taliban to the government, these religious extremists still form a severe opposition against the Kabul administration. Besides attacks on Afghans representing the government, the Taliban are also threatening ordinary people if they are collaborating with the government or foreigners. In line with this aggressive opposition Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, rejected the amnesty, which was offered to him by Sibghatullah Mujaddidi, the head of the national peace commission, on 9 May. The DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration program) witnessed successes with more than disarmed militiamen by the end of May. Due to the DDR, warlords such as Mohammad Fahim of the Panjshir valley and Abdulrab Sayyaf of Paghman close to Kabul lost military power. However it is worth mentioning that many of the collected weapons were classified as defective or obsolete. To what extend weapons are still widespread in Afghanistan was demonstrated on 2 May, when an ammunition depot of a disarmed warlord exploded in Baghlan, killing 28 people. While the influence of the commanders decreased and the administration made some efforts to gain influence across the country, the government will likely have to face the opposition of several groups such as the Taliban and various warlords for years to come. As mentioned before, it is very likely that over the next months the upcoming parliamentary elections will lead to an intensification of domestic conflicts, much of it may occur along ethnic, tribal or religious lines.

9 Afghanistan December 2004 to May 2005 Page 9 IDEA Average International Conflict and Cooperation Average number of reported events per month: 166 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: The International Conflict and Cooperation graph is in general characterized by a stable course. Since the autumn both the International Conflict and Collaboration lines reduced slightly. While both curves remained on a medium level, the values of International Conflict are in general higher than the ones of International Cooperation. During the reporting time the international military presence faced several changes: Turkey took over the lead of ISAF in Kabul on 13 February. Apart from that, the responsibility for the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) changed in order to relief the US troops, which managed most of the PRTs in the past: Spain, Italy and Lithuania took over the PRTs in western Afghanistan in spring, while Canada will become responsible for the PRT in Kandahar. During the last months the US-government manifested its interest in Afghanistan. The Senate approved the provision of about 75 billion US$ for the ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and 780 millions US$ for the war on drugs in Afghanistan. While the visit of Hamid Karzai in Washington on 23 May was overshadowed by mutual accusations such as the fact that two Afghans were tortured and killed in US custody in Baghram and that Hamid Karzai is too reluctant to fight Afghanistan s drug economy in the end both sides agreed on a strategic partnership, committing to long-term US involvement in Afghan reconstruction and security. The relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan is still controversial. While there are still occasionally fire exchanges between Pakistan and Afghan military forces on the joint border, most conflicts are provoked by Taliban seeking to infiltrate Afghanistan from Pakistan territory. On the other hand talks about a gas pipeline running from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan were held among the concerned countries on 16 April. It was agreed that the construction work on the US$ 3.2 billion project will begin end of Tensions between Afghans and the domestic as well as international development organizations increased since winter drastically. Complaints about corruption and inefficiency of several NGOs became public. The Minister of Planning, Mohammad Ramzan Bashardost, resigned on 13 December after criticizing NGOs to work solely for their own benefit. As a reaction to the negative public opinion 90 international and domestic organizations agreed on a code of conduct on 31 May to ensure greater transparency and accountability. Furthermore, many Afghans regard the mushrooming number of restaurants and bars for the expatriates in Kabul with strong reservations. The Ministry of the Interior

10 Afghanistan December 2004 to May 2005 Page 10 shut down several guesthouses/restaurants on the suspicion of prostitution and serving alcohol to Afghans over the past months. Meanwhile, expatriates became victims of terror attacks or kidnappings. As the reaction to the kidnapping of an Italian aid worker on 16 May (released on 9 June) and the bomb attack on an Internet café on 7 May, both in Kabul, most international organizations tightened up their security regulations. Because of several attacks on de-mining teams in southern Afghanistan in late May, several organizations, among them the United Nations, suspended projects in that region. It is likely that expatriates will be target of attacks for reasons of political extremism as well as banditry in the future. While Afghanistan will remain within the scope of US- geo-strategic thinking, the security provision in the country will shift more and more to Afghanistan other Western allies. The situation along the Afghan-Pakistan border is likely to remain instable.

11 Appendix : Description of indicators used Page 11 Variable Name All Events Relative Forceful Actions Description / Definition IDEA categories: a count of all coded events with WEIS cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all WEIS cue categories) plus an additional 11 IDEA event cue categories (Event type: other ). Proportion of Forceful Action events compared to All Events. The indicator Forceful Actions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. This includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Non-government Sector Relative Nongovernment Direct Actions Proportion of Non-government Direct Actions compared to All Events. Non-government Direct Actions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct action limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors. Government Sector Relative Government Direct Actions Proportion of Government Direct Actions compared to All Events. Government Direct Actions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors. Conflict Carrying Capacity Country Stability The Conflict Carrying Capacity (or CCC) is a composed index that depicts the overall stability of the country or region of interest. The CCC is operationalized in terms of the multiplicative interaction among three Proportional measures: (1) civil contentiousness or the Proportion of civil actions that are reported as contentious or "direct" and thus challenge (at least implicitly) the state's monopoly on conflict regulation; (2) state repression or the Proportion of state actions that are reported as extra-institutional or "direct" both in response to direct challenges from the civil sector and those initiated by the state to repress and control opposition; and (3) violent contention or the Proportion of actions entailing physical damage to persons or property. The index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability. The country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country. IDEA Scale IDEA Average Domestic Conflict Average Domestic Cooperation Average International Conflict Average International Cooperation IDEA indicators are used to display Proportions of conflict and cooperation events in time. Each event category is assigned a IDEA rating (value), ranging from -7 (extreme conflict) to 13 (extreme cooperation). Zero value events are excluded from these calculations. The Average Domestic Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (IDEA) values of all conflictive intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative IDEA values divided by the total number of conflictive domestic events). For interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). The Average Domestic Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (IDEA) values of all cooperative intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive IDEA values divided by the total number of cooperative domestic events). The Average International Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (IDEA) values of all conflictive interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative IDEA values divided by the total number of conflictive international events). For interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). The Average International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (IDEA) values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive IDEA values divided by the total number of cooperative international events).

12 The FAST International Early Warning Program Page 12 Who are we? FAST International is the early warning program of swisspeace, based in Berne, Switzerland. The program is funded and utilized by an international consortium of development agencies consisting of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). What do we want to achieve? FAST International aims at enhancing political decision makers and their offices ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner so that coherent political strategies can be formulated to either prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or identify windows of opportunity for peacebuilding. How do we work? FAST International uses both qualitative and quantitative methods, with the combination of methods being determined in each case by customer needs. The centerpiece of FAST International is the collection of single cooperative and conflictive events by means of a web-based software, applied by local staff using a coding scheme called IDEA (Integrated Data for Event Analysis), which is based on the WEIS (World Interaction Survey) coding scheme. The monitoring by FAST International is done independently from Western media coverage, thus providing for a constant influx of information. This information is collected by FAST International s own Local Information Networks (LINs). The quantitative empirical analysis is based on composed indicators developed within the IDEA framework. Since even the most profound quantitative analysis requires interpretation, FAST International cooperates with renowned country/area experts. What are our products? FAST International offers different early warning products tailored to customer needs. The only standard product available to the general public is the, which provides the reader with an overview of developments on a semi-annual basis. It consists of three to five tension barometers (graphs), displaying cooperative and conflictive developments, which are analyzed by FAST s country/area experts on the basis of specific indicators. Whenever major changes occur in one of the countries or regions under scrutiny, FAST releases Special Updates, which follow the structure of the regular s. s are available in either hard copy, in electronic form on the respective country page or by subscription. Which countries do we currently monitor? Africa: Asia: Europe: Angola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia Afghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Russian Federation/North Caucasus region