Craig Charney Briefing Center for National Policy Washington, DC April 3, 2008

Transcription

1 Afghanistan: Public Opinion Trends and Strategic Implications Craig Charney Briefing Center for National Policy Washington, DC April 3, 2008

2 Sources National Opinion Polls This presentation is based on scientific, national, randomly-sampled opinion surveys taken by trained, professional Afghan interviewers and Afghan polling groups. Charney Research Polls: Nov respondents ABC News survey May respondents Charney Research survey Nov respondents Charney Research survey Oct respondents ABC News survey Oct respondents ABC News survey Mar respondents Asia Foundation survey Other Polls: Sep respondents -- CBC/La Presse/ Globe and Mail Jun respondents -- Asia Foundation Nov respondents -- PIPA/ U Md Jun respondents -- Asia Foundation Nov respondents -- PIPA/ U Md All by Afghan Center for Social and Opinion Research except Charney 2004 (Afghan Media Resource Center) Charney Research 2

3 Optimism is down substantially from 2005, but has recovered a bit from the Springtime lows. 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Mar 04 64% 77% 11% 6% Direction of the Country Oct 05 21% Jun 06 55% 44% 22% Oct 06 Wrong Direction 62% 24% Nov 06 42% 24% Jun 07 Sep 07 51% 28% Right Direction Nov 07 54% 24% Biggest drops among those worried about security, economy Regions: Kabul, -28; Ctr-E, -31; SE -38 Gender: Urban men 35+, -36 Occupation: Skilled/Professional/Mgmt, -29; Univ, -38 Attitudes: Security Bad, -30; Economy Bad, -30 Q.11 Charney Research 3

4 Although most Afghans still see America positively, a majority now disapprove of America s work in Afghanistan. 80% 68% How would you rate the work of the US in Afghanistan? Biggest changes in zones of conflict 60% 40% 57% 42% 52% 42% Regions: Kabul, -38; E, -37; SE, -38; SW, -31 Gender: Urban women, -33 Occupation: Farm/Farm laborer, % 30% Post-Primary women, -32 Ethnic: Pashtun, -30, Uzbek, -41; Turkmen, -41 Attitudes: Security bad, -38 0% Excellent/Good Fair/Poor US favorability: still 65% (-28 since 05) Q.22d Charney Research 4

5 Confidence in US/NATO forces has dropped and they now risk wearing out their welcome. How confident are you the ability of US, NATO, or ISAF Forces to provide security? When do you think US military forces should withdraw from Afghanistan? 67% 60% 53% 60% 60% 45% 48% 46% 40% 31% 40% 36% 20% 20% 0% Q.65f, Q Very/somewhat confident Not very/not at all confident 0% Not till security restored or never In two years or less Charney Research 5

6 Two key factors explain confidence in the US and NATO: presence and civilian casualties. 80% US/NATO Force Presence 76% Awareness of Civilian Casualties 60% 57% 52% 46% 40% 20% 30% 32% 23% 35% 0% US/NATO Strong US/NATO Weak Caused by Taliban Caused by US- NATO US Work Good/Excellent Very/Somewhat Confident in US/NATO Charney Research 6

7 Taliban 21% Many of last year s swing voters have swung to the Taliban Swing Groups 21% Taliban Index Results 2006 Taliban 12% 10% 11% 27% 7% 5% Swing Groups 18% 17% 8% 7% 13% 11% 42% 45% Fence Sitters Taliban Opponents Taliban Waverers Strong Opponents Soft Taliban Charney Research 7

8 The sources of Taliban support are religion and security amid trouble What do you think is the main reason people in your area help or support the Taliban? (Reasons mentioned by 5% or more.) Tactics As a religious duty 23% 24% They think it can improve security 30% 14% They agree with its goals 14% 8% They are threatened or forced 12% 7% Better than the others 6% 5% To protect the opium trade 5% 1% Don t know / no response 6% 39% 2007 Q67, 2006, Q.46 Charney Research 8

9 Afghans are repelled by Taliban tactics. Do you think the following things can be justified or not? Tactics Justified Not Justified Attacks against government officials 2% 94% Attacks against the police Attacks against teachers or schools* Attacks against civilians* Suicide bombings Attacks against US Military Forces 6% 91% 4% 95% 5% 94% 8% 89% 17% 75% *2006 data 2007, Q57, 59, 2006, Q.42,39d Charney Research 9

10 The Taliban and corruption have joined security and the economy among the top national concerns. 60% In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole? What is the next biggest problem? Problems mentioned by 15% or more in % 47% 43% 40% 33% 41% 38% 34% 33% 35% 38% 32% 27% 25% 20% Q.14 0% Security 3% 0% 0% Taliban Economy Corruption Charney Research 10

11 Locally, infrastructure and the economy remain top issues, though concerns with security and water have risen. 50% What is the biggest problem in your local area? What is the next biggest problem? Problems mentioned by 15% or more in % 39% 39% 30% 26% 35% 34% 33% 30% 32% 32% 32% 20% 19% 21%21% 19% 18% 16% 15% 16% 16% 15% 10% 8% 8% 9% 12% 0% Electricity Economy Roads Education Security Water Q.15 Charney Research 11

12 One point of light is that support for Karzai remains fairly strong despite the worsening security situation. How would you rate the work of Hamid Karzai as president of Afghanistan? 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 83% 67% 62% 63% 31% 32% 36% 16% Fair/Poor Excellent/Good Biggest changes among those saying security bad Regions: SE, -46; Kabul, -36; SW, -27; Ctr-E, -31 Gender: Men under 35, -26 Area Types: Urban, -27 Occupations: Laborer/Informal,-30 Students, -28; Post-Primary Women, -26 Ethnic: Uzbek, -34 Attitudes: Security bad, -33 Q.22b Charney Research 12

13 Over one-third of Afghans accept opium cultivation, and few favor aerial spraying to eradicate opium. What is your opinion of the cultivation of poppies for opium? Acceptable Do you think the government should 60% 4% 10% 26% 40% 28% 36% 20% 46% 0% Q.48, 73 8% 9% All: 36% Farmers: 45% All Farmers Only if there is no other way to earn a living In all cases 14% Allow poppy cultivation Eradicate, oppose spraying Eradicate, favor spraying Eradicate, unsure on spraying No response Charney Research 13

14 The most effective ways to reduce opium crops involve financial incentives, not forced eradication. Please tell me how likely each idea is to make or convince farmers in this province to choose not to grow opium (OPIUM PRODUCING PROVINCES ONLY) % saying idea would make farmers much more likely not to grow opium among All residents Farmers only Cash for work to build roads and other useful jobs 40% 42% Loans and cash advances on better terms and lower interest 42% 41% Payment from govt not to grow opium 48% 40% Providing seeds for other crops 40% 37% Building schools and clinics if they don t grow opium 35% 37% Improving irrigation and water supply 38% 33% Building / improving roads 32% 31% Eliminating illegal checkpoints/taxes on roads to markets 22% 21% Providing more compost and fertilizer 23% 19% Eradication of opium crops with no compensation 21% 13% Q.109 Charney Research 14

15 State presence varies widely between regions, weakest in SE, SW, Center, and East Southeast 57% 29% 14% Southwest 43% 34% 23% Central 31% 37% 32% East 27% 35% 38% Northwest 26% 54% 20% Northeast 19% 49% 32% North 18% 48% 34% Central East 8% 48% 44% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Weak or None Fairly Strong Very Stong Charney Research 15

16 The swing groups and Taliban are where the state is weakest, along the Pakistan frontier and towards Kabul. Geography Region Province Control Conflict Swing Groups: 21% E (33%), Ctr (25%) Helmand (40%), Nangarhar (30%) Nobody (29%) Taliban Sympathizers: 21% SE (40%), SW (44%) Helmand (31%), Kandahar (47%) Taliban (49%), Nobody (43%), Warlords (34%) Top 5 conflict provinces (39%) Occupation Retired (26%) Farmer/farm laborer (25%) Retired (32%) Laborer / informal business (27%) Ethnicity Urban Pashtun (28%) Rural Pashtun (37%) Ghilzai (38%) 16 Charney Research

17 The swing groups are positive on the country, Karzai and the economy, but unsure of the future. Swing Groups: Taliban Country Direction Positive: 55% right direction Sympathizers: Negative: 28% right direction Karzai Job Performance Living Standards Vs 2004 Favorable 69% Positive, 31% Negative Improving 63% better, 32% worse Hostile 54% Negative, 43% Positive Worsening 40% better, 48% worse Expectations Year from now Divided 48% better Pessimistic 28% better Charney Research 17

18 Swing Afghans favor democracy and women in parliament. Swing Groups: Taliban Sympathizers: Democracy and Islam (2006) Parliament Works for the People (2007) Islam can be democratic Fence-Sitters 59% to 28%, Waverers 72% to 14% Confident, 53% to 43% Democracy challenges Islam 50% to 40% Not confident, 55% to 40% Women in Parliament (2006) Yes, 74% to 25% No, 52% to 45% Charney Research 18

19 Swing Afghans are fairly cool to the U.S. Swing Groups: Taliban Sympathizers: US Work in Afghanistan US Favorability US Military Presence Waverers: 41% positive, 54% negative Fence-Sitters: 28% positive, 68% negative Waverers: 60% favorable, 36% unfavorable Fence-Sitters: 42% favorable, 55% unfavorable (Few very favorable) 1/3 oppose US presence; few strong supporters 76% negative, 16% positive 69% unfavorable, 25% favorable 69% oppose Charney Research 19

20 Swing Afghans are ambivalent on fighting the Taliban and America s military presence and actions. Taliban Overthrow Swing Groups: Ambivalent: 27% say bad, few say very good Taliban Sympathizers: 63% say bad Negotiating with Taliban Complaints About Foreign Military Confidence US/NATO can provide security Attacks on US Forces 63% favor 72% favor 38% civilian casualties 17% intrusive searches 16% poorly behaved / disciplined 8% too weak / lose gains 40% civilian casualties 12% poorly behaved/disciplined 11% intrusive searches 55% not confident 82% not confident Almost ½ fence-sitters, 1/3 waverers don t oppose 63% don t oppose US Withdrawal Half want US out within 2 years 81% want US out in 2 years, 40% out now Charney Research 20

21 Morality, Democracy, Development, Girls Education, are Potential Wedge Issues Several wedge issues can divide swing groups from Taliban sympathizers. Morality: brutal Taliban tactics shock even Taliban sympathizers Democracy: Swing groups like it, Taliban says it s un- Islamic Girls schools: Almost half of swing groups have daughters in school Karzai Government: Swing groups are not anti-karzai. Development: We build what people need, Taliban destroys Charney Research 21

22 Strategic Keys to Winning the Swing Groups Geographic Areas: E, Center, SE, SW The keys to support for US/NATO forces are presence and effectiveness on security while avoiding civilian casualties. Avoiding collateral damage and insensitivity is imperative. Apologize and compensate when these occur; investigate and prosecute when justified. We need more boots on the ground and fewer bombs there. Increase NATO/US forces and especially build the ANA faster. Need to find tactics that reduce risks of casualties and increase security for civilians, even if it reduces force protection for our forces. U.S. must support national reconciliation to justify fighting Taliban. They are responsible for war, not us. Don t alienate swing Afghans through aerial opium spraying -- provide the economic alternatives farmers want. The priorities in swing areas are the same as country-wide: work on jobs, power, and security in swing areas. And communicate: let people know about it. Get more PRTs in action. We need to get up close and personal. Consider District Reconstruction Teams in key provinces. Radio is important too distribute more. Use texting over cellphones where appropriate. Charney Research 22