Japan s Response to the Shifting Global Order

Transcription

1 Japan s Response to the Shifting Global Order Professor Sally Paine Strategy & Policy Department U.S. Naval War College This presentation represents the thoughts and opinions of the author, not necessarily those of the U.S. government, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy Department, or the U.S. Naval War College. Emperor Meiji ( ) 1

2 Tōjō Hideki on the stand International Military Tribunal of the Far East, ca

3 Japan s Response to the Shifting Global Order THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION I. Modernization vs. Westernization II. Incorrect and Missed Lessons WORLD WAR I AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION III. Implosion of the Regional and Global Order IV. Incomplete Institution Building 3

4 I. MODERNIZATION VS. WESTERNIZATION The Industrial Revolution Steam Power Iron Industry Textiles Insurance/Banking Railways/Telegraph Steamships Mass Markets/Trade Armaments Rapid rise in per capita income Manchester, England 1843

5 The Industrial Revolution The Destruction of Traditional Societies Steam power and textiles Industrial Revolution Economic growth Changed balance of power

6 Commodore Matthew G. Perry s Squadron, Japan,

7 TO THE WAR CRIMES PROSECUTOR: Tokugawa Japan believed in isolation and had its doors locked tightly. Then along came Perry in his black ships to open those doors; he aimed his big guns at Japan and warned If you don t deal with us, look out for these; open your doors, and negotiate with other countries too. [Japan] for its own defense took your own country as its teacher and set about learning how to be aggressive...why don t you subpoena Perry from the other world and try him as a war criminal? Lt Gen Ishiwara Kanji ( ) Architect of 1931 Manchuria invasion 7

8 Studying the Problem QuickTime and a decompressor are needed to see this picture. Iwakura Mission,

9 Japanese Grand Strategy Goal: Transform Japan into a great power Environment: Preempt Russia in Korea and China. Failing Qing dynasty (power vacuum) Accelerating Western imperialism Russia on the march (Trans-Siberian Railway) Two-phase grand strategy stage 1: domestic reforms (make Japan strong) stage 2: activist foreign policy (net an empire) Avoid war in stage 1 so as not to derail reforms. 9

10 PHASE 1: Domestic Reforms 1869 feudal domains disbanded 1872 compulsory elementary education 1873 universal military conscription 1878 Army General Staff 1882 Bank of Japan 1882 new criminal code 1885 Western Cabinet system under prime minister 1886 Imperial Tokyo University 1887 modern civil service examination 1889 Constitution 1890 Diet (Parliament) 1890 reorganized court system 1890 code of civil procedure 10

11 PHASE 2: Expansion Sino- Japanese War Russo- Japanese War

12 Second Sino-Japanese War ( ) Japanese soldiers with gas masks in China,

13 Russia Japan China Korea Fishing for Korea French Cartoon, ca

14 Tonghak Rebellion Outbreak of First Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) Tonghak Unrest Battle Tonghak Advance Tonghak Plan Tonghak Retreat Korean Advance Qing Advance Japanese Advance 14

15 Japan China Port Arthur Battle of Yalu Pyongyang Weihaiwei Seoul Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) 15

16 Japanese Gains in the Sino-Japanese War Demise of the Chinese Regional Order DOMESTIC Validated controversial westernization program Increased prestige of military, especially the army REGIONAL Japan replaced China as dominant regional power Beginnings of Japanese Empire (Taiwan, Pescadores) INTERNATIONAL Japan became a recognized great power ( 1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance) Russo-Japanese arms race Russian foreign policy shift from Europe to Asia

17 Trans-Siberian Railway Manchurian Route 1. Save on construction costs 2. Contain Japan 3. Stake claim to Manchuria 17

18 Boxer Rebellion ( )

19 Russo- Japanese War (1904-5) Port Arthur Mukden Tsushima POPULATION Russia 126,367,000 (1897) Japan 45,000,000 (1903) ARMY IN EURASIA Russia 1,135,000 (Jan. 1904) Japan 150,745 (Jan. 1904) 19

20 Japanese Gains in the Russo-Japanese War Confirmation of the First Sino-Japanese War IMMEDIATE WAR OBJECTIVE Russian troop withdrawal from Manchuria Japanese sphere of influence in Korea Validated Westernization program EXPANSION OF EMPIRE So. Manchuria sphere of influence (Russian railways) Southern half of Sakhalin Island (Russian territory) Japan the dominant regional power in East Asia

21 Russian sphere of influence Spheres of Influence 1907 treaty 1912 treaty Japanese sphere of influence Northern Islands 21

22 II. FLAWED MILITARY LESSONS Combined with an Incorrect Self-Assessment Battle of Shahe (Sha-ho) 1904

23 False Operational Lessons: Will Power Trumps Material Superiority ASSAULTS ON PORT ARTHUR Storm Date Casualties No Japan Russia 1 st 8/ ,000 3,000 2 nd 9/ ,500 1,500 3 rd 10/ ,000+? 4 th 11/26-12/4 14,500 6,900 1/2/05 Fall of Port Arthur POST-WAR JAPAN Overlooks weapons systems Exaggerates own personnel Minimizes logistical problems Discounts enemy will Russian troops posing with Japanese dead 23

24 False Strategic Lessons: The Army Won the Wars While the Diplomats Lost the Peace First Sino-Japanese War Liaodong Peninsula MISSED Diplomacy Alliances Mediation War loans Intelligence Public diplomacy International law 24

25 Missed Strategic Lessons Cooperative Adversaries and Sins of Omission Neither Adversary Leveraged Its Strengths Strategic depth Overwhelming manpower superiority Resource superiority Neither Adversary Targeted Japanese Weaknesses Essential sea lines of communication Manpower shortage Logistical difficulties fighting inland Failed to contest river crossings or transit through passes Failed to draw the Japanese deep inland to fight 25

26 Army-Navy Debate over Self-Assessment Navy Argument: Japan the Maritime Power ADM Yamamoto Gombei ( ) POSITIONS Admiral 1904 Navy Minister Prime Minister, , FAILED PLANS Navy dominant service Empire not essential for defense Jettison empire in time of war ARMY-NAVY SOLUTION Separate chiefs of staff Decline of joint operations OUTCOME: Navy becomes interested in maritime empire 26

27 The Moat Japan the Sea Power POSITIONS Key naval theorist Vice Admiral 1915 President Naval War College Vice Admiral Satō Tetsutarō ( ) Among the Powers in the world, there are only three countries that can defend themselves primarily with navies. They are the UK and the US and Japan. History of Imperial Defense,

28 Army-Navy Debate over Self-Assessment Army Counter-Argument: Japan the Continental Power POSITIONS Chief of General Staff , , Field Marshal 1898 Prime Minister , President of Privy Council , BELIEFS Empire essential for defense Manchuria = Japan s life line Marshal Yamagata Aritomo 28 ( )

29 Japan the Continental Power Asian Monroe Doctrine POSITIONS Minister of War Governor-General Korea Prime Minister Marshal 1916 BELIEFS Eventually all of Asia should be under the control of our Emperor. General Terauchi Masatake 29 ( )

30 Japan the Continental Power Japan First Policy POSITIONS War Minister , Prime Minister Foreign Minister Colonization Minister Japan should free itself from previous conditions of being an island and develop its national future as a continental power. MISSES Moat provides sanctuary Survival depends on trade, not resources per se General Tanaka Giichi ( ) 30

31 Naval Arms Limitations Conferences Debate within the Navy DEATH OF NAVAL ARMS CONTROL 1922 Washington Naval Treaty UK, US, Japan navies 5:5:3 tonnage ratio Right of supreme command = military veto 1930 London Naval Conference UK, US, Japan navies 10:10:7 tonnage ratio 1935 London Naval Conference Japan walked out 1936 Arms limitations expired 31

32 Grand Strategy The Nexus between Economic and Military Power Admiral Katō Tomosaburō ( ) Navy Minister Prime Minister National defense is not a monopoly that belongs to military men. Simply put, no war can be fought without money. Even if we would match the US in terms of military power where would we get the money? The US is the only country from which Japan can borrow money. If the US is the enemy, this is impossible and we would have to make money for ourselves. Unless we are prepared to do so, we can never fight Thus, war with the US is simply impossible. 32

33 Grand Strategy The Constraints Memo: The New Defense Plan, fall 1941 Japan Could Not: Invade the United States Occupy the U.S. capital Blockade the U.S. coastline But the U.S.: Could do all of the above to Japan Therefore: War vs. the U.S. = Unwinnable Admiral Inoue Shigeyoshi ( ) 33

34 Strategic Assassinations Misunderstanding Japan s Geography and Economy Assassinations of Prime Ministers 1931 Hamaguchi Osachi 1932 Inukai Tsuyoshi Replaced by ADM Saitō Makoto End of Party governments 1936 ADM Saitō Makoto Assassinations of Finance Ministers 1932 Inoue Junnosuke 1936 Takahashi Korekiyo 34

35 Continental vs. Maritime Powers Continental Powers Border on main enemies Focus on territorial control Preemption by garrisoning surrounding buffer zones Therefore large standing army is key BUT Army has great political influence at home Economic policies favor army, state planning Maritime Powers Moat provides comparative security No need for large, expensive standing army Focus on trade, wealth accumulation, economic growth Navy key for homeland defense and trade protection Reliance on trade, wealth, and navy grand strategy 35

36 Positive-Sum vs. Negative-Sum World Orders Maritime vs. Continental World Orders Maritime Global Order = Positive Sum (Win-Win) Focus on wealth creation 1. Freedom of navigation 2. Free trade 3. International laws and institutions facilitating trade Together produce economic growth (a win for all) Continental Global Order = Negative Sum (Win-Lose Big) Focus on territorial confiscation 1. Spheres of influence 2. Negative-sum territorial disputes 3. Security through the destabilization of neighbors Together impede growth (a win for one, a lose for the rest) 36

37 Follow on Effects of Mis-self-identification Death of Grand Strategy Foreign policy reduced to a single instrument: the military False belief that operational success = strategic success Marshal Yamagata Aritomo ( ) General Tanaka Giichi ( ) 37

38 III. Implosion of the Regional and Global Order: World War I and the Great Depression 38

39 Collapsing Regional Order China the Failed State China s Revolutions Fall of the Qing Dynasty 1913 Failed revolt of South China 1916 Failed imposition of new dynasty Main Warlord Wars of 1920s (North China) Anhui-Zhili War (1920) First Zhili-Fengtian War (1922) Second Zhili-Fengtian War (1924) Fentian-Zhejiang War (1925) Fengtian-Feng Yuxiang War (1925-6) Nominal Reunification of China Northern Expedition under Nationalists (1926-8) 39

40 Collapsing Regional Order China the Failed State, continued Coup Attempts within the Nationalist Coalition 1929 Four North/South China coup attempts 1930 War of Central Plains 1931 South China coup attempt 1933 North China coup attempt 1936 South China coup attempt Nationalist Encirclement Campaigns vs. Communists st Encirclement Campaign nd Encirclement Campaign rd Encirclement Campaign th Encirclement Campaign th Encirclement Campaign 40

41 The Treacherous Regional Environment Post-World War I Economic Depression in Japan Rice Riots 1918

42 Tokyo Earthquake ,000 homeless 100,000 dead

43 Collapsing European Order Empires Overthrown or Weakened

44 Great Depression The Rise of Communism and Fascism Vladimir I. Lenin ( ) 44

45 Collapsing World Order Communism in Russia Comrade Lenin cleans the world of scum.

46 Communist Expansion Founding of Communist Parties 1920 Iran, India, Turkey 1921 China, Outer Mongolia 1922 Japan 1925 Korea 1930 Vietnam, Siam, Laos, Malaya, Philippines Soviet Funding of Chinese Factions Nationalist Party Chinese Communist Party Manchurian warlord Inner Mongolian warlord Xinjiang warlord Chiang Kai-shek Mao Zedong Zhang Zuolin Feng Yuxiang Sheng Shicai 46

47 Collapsing Regional Order Hostile Neighborhood Anti-Japanese Neighbors Nationalism in China Nationalism in Korea Communism in Russia Focus of Japanese Overseas Investments Korea China (Manchuria) Western Protectionist Response to the Great Depression Smoot-Hawley Tariff 1930 Other Western powers follow suit 47

48 Japan s Rejection of the Global Order The Manchurian Incident Close up of the damage = Manchurian Incident, 18 Sept

49 Manchurian Incident Regional War Japanese troops enter Mukden, 18 September

50 Chinese Boycotts Opening Campaigns of Second Sino-Japanese War ( ) 1931 Invasion of Manchuria 1932 Assault on Shanghai 1933 Invasion of Rehe (Jehol), Hebei 1933 Great Wall Campaign 1937 Invasion of coastal + central China 50

51 Japan Alone Withdrawal from League of Nations Japan s Defense Chinese had blown up the railway track (False) Manchuria was not an integral part of China (False) Only Japan could stop Bolshevik spread to China (½ true) 51

52 Manchukuo Japanese Puppet State Building Hsinking, Manchukuo

53 The Road Not Taken Japan s Keynes Finance Minister (1931-6) off gold standard devaluation of yen ( exports) money supply ( consumption) govt spending ( deficit) public works investments civil control over military spending cooperation with West anti dismemberment of China pro Chinese economic development Takahashi Korekiyo ( )

54 Dangers of a Political Army The army does not stop at planning to send troops abroad for military reasons, but interferes in diplomatic and economic decision making as well, so that our country does not have a unified policy. Because the army s general staff interferes with other state organs we should abolish it and unify the army s administration [under the war ministry]. The navy s general staff happily does not have the same invidious effects as the army s, but it is an unnecessary organ. We should abolish both general staffs at the same time. Takahashi Korekiyo ( ) 54

55 Dangers of Autarky Our country is poor in natural resources and I doubt that we can compete in an autarkic economic environment. We must think about our position in the world and form a budget in keeping with our people s wealth. Financial trust is an intangible. Maintaining that trust is our most urgent duty. If we focus only on defense, we will cause bad inflation and that trust will collapse. Thus, our national defense will not be secure. The military should think about this Takahashi Korekiyo ( )

56 Heavenly Punishment Young Officer s Revolt On Ethiopian Invasion by Italy: If a country increases its empire and puts money into it, how big a profit is it going to have? Until the profits come in, the home country has to carry [the colony] Military % of GNP % Military % of Budget % % Takahashi Korekiyo ( )

57 Young Officers Revolt February 26 Incident (1936) Dead Inspector General of Military Education Lord Keeper of Privy Seal Finance Minister Severely Wounded Grand Chamberlain Mutineers: 1,027 recruits Consequences Army in control No more truth to power Inflexible foreign policy Unlimited objective in China

58 Russia Dangerous Neighbors Adolf Hitler Joseph Stalin Hirota Kōki ( ) ( ) ( )

59 Enemies on Two Fronts Anti-Comintern Pact, 24 Nov Ambassador Foreign Minister Kintomo Mushakoji Joachim von Ribbentrop ( ) ( ) 59

60 Marco Polo Bridge Incident 7 July 1937 Marco Polo Bridge 60

61 Russian Script for China Chinese, Not Russians to Die Fighting Japan AREAS OCCUPIED BY JAPAN UP TO 1937 AFTER

62 IV. INCOMPLETE INSTITUTION BUILDING The Founding Fathers (Genrō) Diet Difficult International Environment Uncooperative adversaries Angry neighbors Preoccupied fascist friends Economic depression Brilliant leaders dead 62

63 Incomplete Institution Building The Constitution Direct Control Implied Controls Electorate Emperor Genrō Privy Council Inner Minister Diet Imperial Household Ministry Reps. Peers Cabinet Genl Staffs Home Min. Justice M. Other Min. Army/Navy M. Local Assemblies Prefectures Cops Judiciary Army/Navy 63

64 Meiji Constitution Imperial Prerogatives Emperor Meiji (b. 1852, r ) 64

65 Incomplete Institution Building Change in the Civil-Military Balance Prince Itō Hirobumi Marshal Yamagata Aritomo ( ) ( ) Civilian control over military Military rule through Emperor Party prime ministers Non-party cabinets Cooperation with UK + USA Cooperation with Axis Constitutional monarchy National mobilization Rule thru House of Representatives Rule through War Ministry 65

66 Yamagata s War Ministry Military ministers and chiefs of staff had direct access to emperor 1900 active-duty army + navy ministers = veto over Cabinet military issuance of Imperial Orders = bypass prime minister

67 Incomplete Institution Building The Confusion of Ends and Means Japanese advance, Henan, China,

68 Inner Cabinet Missing Institutional Mechanisms Prime Minister reading imperial rescript at Diet opening,

69 Incomplete Institution Building End of Joint Operations Joint Operations at Weihaiwei,

70 Incomplete Institution Building Process Stovepipe General Tōjō Hideki ( ) Prime Minister Foreign Minister 1942 Army Minister Education Minister 1943 Home Minister Industry Minister

71 Province/City Refugees % Population Anhui 2,688, Beijing (Hebei) 400, Chahar 225, Fujian 1,065, Guangdong 4,280, Guangxi 2,562, Hubei 7,690, Hebei 6,774, Henan 14,533, Hunan 13,073, Jiangsu 12,502, Jiangxi 1,360, Manchuria 4,297, Nanjing (Jiangsu) 335, Shandong 11,760, Shanghai (Jiangsu) 531, Shanxi 4,753, Suiyuan 695, Tianjin (Hebei) 200, Wuhan (Hubei) 534, Zhejiang 5,185, TOTAL 95,448, Refugees and Homeless during the Second Sino-Japanese War Shanghai 1937 Lary & MacKinnon, Scars of War,

72 Japan s Response to the Shifting Global Order Professor Sally Paine Strategy & Policy Department U.S. Naval War College This presentation represents the thoughts and opinions of the author, not necessarily those of the U.S. government, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy Department, or the U.S. Naval War College. Emperor Meiji ( ) 72