Straights - the only passageway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

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1 ( VOLUME V, O. 5, MAY 1987 SECURTY AFFARS 1411 K STREET,.W. * SUTE 1002 * WASHGTO, D.C (202) Turkey and ts Relatons: East and West Fd. ote: To those acquanted wth ts unque and fascnatng hstory, a short vst to Turkey exposes a deep crss of natonal dentty. Ths crss wll determne not only Turkev's future global poltcal algnment, but the future of A TO as well. Moreover, how ths dentt'v crss s resolved wll also mpact drectly on srael's mltary securtn. Durng the sx centures pror to the end of World War 1,presentday Turkey consttuted the heartland of the Ottoman Empre, the largest and most powerful slamc state n the world. The members of ts Turkshspeakng rulng class dentfed poltcally as Muslms, not as Turks; they rejected almost completely ther ethnc or lngustc dentty. The same was true for the rest of the Muslm nhabtants of' the empre as well. n addton, from the mdnneteenth century untl the end of World War 1, most Muslms lvng outsde the empre looked to ts ruler the Ottoman Sultan as thcr Calph,.c., ther poltcal and sprtual leader. n short, almost all Muslms, both wthn and outsde of the empre, looked to the Ottoman sultan for leadershp. n lght of the above, t s remarkable that the Turks were wllng to gve up ths honored poston. After the Ottomans were defeated n World War 1, ther most outstandng general, Mustafa Kemal (who later took the name Ataturk) abolshed the Ottoman calphate and empre. He and hs followers drew up a consttuton whch totally rejected the slamc dentty as the bass for loyalty to the state; they opted nstead for a secular poltcal dentty based upon Turksh ethnc and lngustc dentty. Ther new state was to be called Wth Turkey nato, the alles control the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles the only passage way between the Black Sea and the Medterranean. Ths would prove a major handcap for the Sovets n tme of conflct. Turkey and t was to bc part of the Western world. Ths was a revolutonary act to say the least, establshng a secular Westernorented republc n the central part of that most Muslm of empres. "Turkey has undergone a revolutonary experment... abandonng the slamc world for the West." Jonng the West Startng from the early 1920s, Turkey dd everythng t could to sever ts tes Western Tech Aganst the West As we go to press, detals of the raq bombng of a U.S. shp n the Persan Gulf are fragmentary. However, the U.S. avy clearly experenced the conundrum faced for years by srael. Western natons have placed ther most advanced weapon systems ones for whch other Western natons may as yet have no countermeasure nto the hands of countres n the Mddle East whose poltcal and mltary allances may shft n unpredctable ways. wth the slamc world and to bccome a full and actve partner of the West. For example, durng the Korean war, n order to show how deeply commtted t was to the Western Allance, t sent troops to Korea, to fght alongsde ours, even though Korea was a dstant land of almost no nterest to Turkey. And as all Amercans who came nto contact wth the Turks n Korea durng those dffcult years know, the Turks fought valantly and bravely, contrbutng greatly to the alled war effort. Ther frends needed help and, as they say n Turksh, "frends are lke brothers; they must do everythng n ther power to help each other n tme of need." t was therefore only natural that when the U.S. suggested that Turkey jon ATO, Turkey dd so enthusastcally, thus ensurng that n the event of a war between ATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Russans would have dffculty usng ther only year roundfunctonng Black Sea ports because Turkey controls the Bosphorus and Dardenelles Straghts the only passageway between the Black Sea and the Medterranean. n 1974, relatons worsened even further when the Greek mltary junta then rulng Athens sponsored a coup n Cyprus. The coup was letd by a Greek Cyprot terrorst who had slaughtered Turksh Cyprots n the past. Turkey then felt compelled to ntervene mltarly n Cyprus, occupyng the northern part of the sland. n response to pressure from the Amercan Greek communty, the U.S. Congress reacted by mposng a mltary embargo aganst Turkey, untl the Turks wthdrew ther forces from Cyprus. Those who knew Turkey well tred to explan that, as t s a basc tenent of Turksh culture not to gve n to pressure, the embargo would have the opposte effect, preventng any Turksh government from wthdrawng ts troops. As predcted, the Turks dd not wthdraw ther troops. Moreover, they responded by expellng U.S. forces both from the jontlyoperated Turksh mltary bases, and from the lstenng posts on Turksh terrtory whch enabled us to montor mltary developments n the USSR and 1974 TurkshAmercan frendshp would reman sold untl 1964, when relatons began to sour. n that year, Presdent Johnson, on the advce of the notorous George Ball, threatened to cut off ad to Turkey t' the Turks landed troops on Cyprus, an act whch the Turks understood as protectng ther el'low Turks on Cyprus from threatened volence by the much more numerous and betterarmed Greek Cyprots. The Turks were deeply dsapponted and shocked by our behavor. How could we as frends, not understand ther oblgaton to defend ther brethren'? Turkey's dentty Crss Fnally n 1978, the U.S. Admnstraton managed to persuade the Congress to lft the embargo, but by then the damage was done. The Turks, our devoted frends untl the md1960s, now no longer trusted us and began to search for reasons why we rejected them, and why we faled to lve up to our sde of the frendshp. The hghly educated secular and Westernorented eltes reasoned that we felt a stronger knshp wth the Greeks because we thought the modern Greeks to be the descendants of the (Cont. pg. 5)

2 Page 2 Page 2 EDTORALS Don't Rush the Summt A ReaganGorbachev summt should be convened to sgn an arms control agreement that fulflls the securty needs of both countres. At present, we are pleased to see the Sovets respondng to ther own selfnterest n a manner that corresponds to many of our nterests. Deployed Pershng ls capable of httng Sovet targets from Europe, matchng SS20s capable of httng ATO captals from the Sovet Unon worked well to focus the Sovets' mnds. However, asde from the serous verfcaton problems remanng, our ATO alles have rased serous questons about future U.S. commtments to the defense of Europe. The rapd pace of apparent Sovet concessons on major ssues has exposed a weakness n ATO: whle the Sovets are able to reach an agreement and nsst that ther alles accommodate Sovet vews, the U.S. must accommodate the vews of ts alles before reachng an agreement. Havng focused so long on U.S.Sovet problems, ATO has faled to update ts strategy. Untl we reach some fundamental agreement about the future of ATO, the U.S. must be wary of major changes n blateral U.S.Sovet relatons. Decades ago, the alles opted for a defense based on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. ukes were a cheap defensve opton. European populatons over tme protested the nstallaton of Amercan nuclear weapons on ther sol, but, remnded of the burgeonng cost of tanks, planes and shps, contnued to choose economc development and socal spendng over defense spendng. The U.S. dd much the same thng. Over the years, our combned mltary strategy has not kept up wth changes n our relatve economc, mltary and poltcal status. And t has not kept up wth changes n the EastWest balance. Ths should not be construed as a suggeston for the U.S. to dmnsh ts commtment to Western securty, but rather to reexamne the roles of the ATO alles under varous scenaros of dependence on nuclear arms n the European theatre. The U.S. not smply the present admnstraton has a specal oblgaton n ths reassessment. As we approach an electon year, Democrats and Republcans have a responsblty to work together to make a coherent, cohesve Amercan polcy that can be supported by whoever wns n Both partes have to look good before the voters, and voters should be prepared to penalze the demagogues. The begnnng of a new ATO strategy would be to recognze that dependng only on nuclear deterrence s not appealng. (Presdent Reagan correctly assessed the alled mood for "somethng safer" when he proposed SD as a way out of nuclear dependence.) But nuclear deterrence cannot be abandoned before we formulate an allance poston on nuclear defenses, shortrange nuclear mssles, tactcal nuclear weapons, conventonal defenses, defense spendng, French and Brtsh nuclear forces, and even the possblty of a nuclearfree Europe (unlkely as t seems). We should make headway on those nterrelated areas and others before we change the U.S.Sovet equaton. Then t wll be tme for a summt meetng. A Mddle East Reykjavk? The U.S. rushed off unprepared to the Reykjavk meetngs, so strong was admnstraton nterest n a summt meetng n the U.S. and n sgnng an agreement wth the Sovets. By focusng on the ntended result and neglectng the process, Reykjavk would have been a dsaster f not for Presdent Reagan's frmness on SD. Some members of the U.S. foregn polcy establshment arc makng the same mstake regardng the Mddle East. The same nterest n an ntended result and neglect of necessary, f panful, processes domnates some U.S. thnkng on an "nternatonal peace conference" for the Mddle East. An nternatonal conference should ratfy an agreement, not try to negotate one. The noton that we must do somethng because "tme s runnng out" s smply false. Tme may, n fact, be on the sde of the real moderates n the regon. For at least two reasons, U.S. polcy would be wellserved f we remaned slent: ) the poltcs of the Mddle East make t unlkely that there wll be a conference. f we recommend a conference now, and t fals, t wll be understood as our blunder; and 2) t s not n our nterest to have the Sovets take part n a multlateral conference to resolve Mddle East problems. Each ssue deserves closer examnaton. 1) The dffculty n arrangng for Arabs and sraels to talk resdes on the Arab sde. The srael government has made many attempts to talk wth Arab government representatves. srael moderates meet Arabs (ncludng Palestnans), talk to them and survve. Arab moderates are assassnated by other Arabs. Untl Palestnans are free to speak wthout fear of ther "brothers," a conference to deal wth ther predcament gnores the very people t s ntended to serve. What sort of selfdetermnaton s that? From the standpont of securty, srael and the U.S. have made clear who canot represent "the Palestnans." However, that seems to be less of an ssue for "the conference" than who the Palestnans themselves agree can represent them. Pror to the summt meetng n Algers, the PLO was splntered nto factons supported by raq (Abu dal); Syra (George Habash and Abu Musa); Jordan and Egypt n a lmted way (Yasser Arafat). The U.S. dea was to obtan agreement from some members ofone of the more "moderate" groups (Arafat's) to tactly accept some Palestnan natonals from the West Bank as representatves n the Jordanan delegaton n Algers, however, no West Bankers were even nvted to attend! Furthermore. several of the PLO factons agreed to reunfy around a hardlne poston and Arafat had to renounce hs Jordanan connecton. Beyond the problem of the Palestnans s the problem of Syra. Presdent Assad s n a poston to spol any settlement, and has reason to. He was Defense Mnster n 1967 when the Golan Heghts were lost. He was Presdent n 1973 when he tred to regan them by force and lost more terrtory. f somehow Jordan could be satsfed on the West Bank, Assad would be the only member of the 1967 troka that had not settled accounts wth srael poltcally or mltarly. He would fall under tremendous pressure to do somethng. For hm the status quo may be preferable. raq s stll n a state of war wth srael no armstce, no cease fre and would therefore have to be part of any nternatonal conference. t s entrely unclear that Syra would jon a conference wth raq, or vce versa. And wth whom does one talk n Lebanon? Snce ranansponsored Hzbollah s attackng srael, does ran have to attend'? f Hzbollah attends, can Amal? f Hzbollah and Amal attend, can they represent those Shtes who follow Musa Sadr, the mam who dsappeared n Lbya? Should the Druze come? The "duly consttuted" government of Lebanon? These are not problems the U.S. can solve. We mght offer to help where we can, but must recognze that many of those groups do not welcome our advce or support. 2) Sovet partcpaton. The Sovets have Mddle Eastern outposts n Syra, Lbya and Yemen. They also work wth some of the PLO. The Syrans were thrashed by srael, the Lbyans by Chad, and the Yemens by other Yemens. The PLO has been done n by just about everybody. raq, once nearly a Sovet satellte, s supported by antsovet Arab states and seems to prefer buyng weapons from the West. The Sovets have made no great nroads n ran. Ther track record s abysmal. However, they are stll tryng. Every week n the Arab press there are stores about Sovet frendshp delegatons, parlamentary delegatons, trade delegatons, mltary delegatons vstng some Arab country. n a recent ntervew, U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pckerng was sangune about sraelsovet relatons, sayng, "t s better for states to talk to each other. We would not look wth dsfavor upon the resumpton of relatons." Maybe not, but we should be concerned f there s a heavy prce attached. Snce t was the Sovet Unon that took the ntatve n breakng dplomatc relatons wth srael n 1967, there s no reason to offer nducements for resumpton of relatons now. To do so would be counterproductve ndeed. Pavng the way for the Sovets to reenter the Mddle East would bejust as poor a polcy now as t was n the days before Sadat vsted Jerusalem. The U.S. should not be embarrassed at beng the only nfluental superpower n the regon. Summt meetngs are meant to bless agreements arrved at on a lower level. Lkewse, an nternatonal conference on the Mddle East should awat that happy, but elusve day when srael and one or more addtonal Arab states have reached an agreement. Secretary Shultz n Moscow Frmness, dgnty, senstvty, ntegrty, clarty these are some of the qualtes exemplfed by Secretary of State George Shultz n hs recent trp to Moscow. He set the standard for senor Amercan offcals (and former offcals) representng the myrad Amercan nterests that requre balance when a representatve of our government travels abroad. Mr. Shultz dealt wth human rghts not only for Jews, but for all Sovet ctzens; he skllfully handled the varous arms control proposals; he spoke out on Sovet televson aganst abuses n the Sovet system; and aganst Sovet spyng on our nstallatons n Moscow. There was a specal pognancy and specal sgnfcance n the Secretary's attendance at the Moscow Seder. Replete wth yarmulka and rased wne glass, he represented the full moral weght of the U.S. government behnd the fundamental ssues of human rghts. At the same tme, he dramatzed the unspoken connecton between Sovet falure to lve up to the Helsnk Accords (whch made the Moscow Seder necessary) and the prospect of Sovet fulfllment of'any future arms control commtments. U.S.Saud Securty Relatons Two current tems of U.S.Saud mltary news should be read n tandem: ) the Sauds have been unable to acheve full operatonal capablty of more than one of the fve U.S.bult AWACs arcraft they purchased n 1981; and 2) the Sauds want to buy 1215 F15s before McDonnell Douglas stops producng them, n order to have spares to replace those lost n tranng or (potental) combat. The spares would stay n the U.S. One way to reconcle ) our concern for the securty of Saud Araba and the Western ol supply wth 2) our concern for the securty of srael faced wth an armsladen Saud Araba, s to maxmze drect U.S. nvolvement n the Saud mltary system. Whether or not Congress approves the sale of addtonal F 15s, ths would be an approprate tme to contract formally for the U.S. operaton of Saud AWACS for as much as the next ten years.

3 Page 3 by Max Snger The goal of the Contras s to have a freely elected government n caragua. They have always preferred to acheve ths goal by negotatons, and they have publcly and formally commtted themselves to stop fghtng and start talkng whenever the government s ready to negotate wth them. The Contras can acheve ther goal by wnnng a poltcalmltary vctory. For the Contras, success does not mean a vctorous army fghtng ts way nto Managua. But the success they seek free electons almost certanly requres ether an extraordnary and decsve change n the Sandnsta regme Such guerrlla domnance over EPS unts would sgnfcantly undermne the morale and legtmacy of the Sandnsta regme. Whle the outcome s qute uncertan, there are several reasons to thnk the Contras may well be able to accomplsh the necessary mltary tasks. Frst, they had acheved ths level of success by the end of 1984, shortly before they had to pull most of ther forces out of caragua for almost two years because of the cutoff of U.S. government ad and ncreased Sandnsta ar power from the Sovet Unon. Of course the Sandnstas have been greatly strengthened snce then, so we have to see whether the Contras' mprovements wll be enough to mantan ther edge. Second they have done well n several substantal battles wth the EPS n the last year or so. And, snce the U.S. ad started flowng agan at the end of 1986, they have overcome most of the Sandnsta efforts to prevent them from rentroducng a large number of unts nto the The Central Amercan countres don't want to commt themselves aganst the Sandnstas before the U.S... the European democraces won't abandon ther comfortable llusons f the local democraces don't clearly call them for help. or ts replacement by an nterm government whch would serve less than a year untl free electons are held. The Contras are now usng mltary means to acheve ths goal. Does ths mean they are seekng a "mltary vctory'?" o. Ths artcle wll outlne what s necessary for them to acheve vctory, and consder brefly ther chances of success. The Struggle The poltcalmltary cvl war between the Sandnsta regme and Contras wll be fought n three arenas: () the hlls and jungles of rural caragua, whch wll be the man ste of the mltary part of the struggle; () the corrdors of nternatonal dplomacy, where the poltcal conflct wll be waged; and () the ctes of caragua, where the endgame wll eventually be played. The job of the mltary force n the overall effort s to demonstrate to other countres that the Sandnsta government does not control caragua and to exst as an alternatve bass of hope for caraguans who do not want to have to accept lvng under the Sandnsta regme ndefntely. These poltcal purposes lead to several mltary tasks. Frst the Contras have to show that they can operate successfully as guerrllas n large parts of the populated rural areas of caragua at least n the mountan zone, possbly also n parts of the Pacfc zone. ["Operatng successfully" means that they control the terrtory except when the Sandnsta army Ejercto Popular Sandnsta (EPS) sends large forces to a partcular area n whch case the guerrlla forces have to be able to keep from beng trapped.] Second, they have to show that they can defeat an EPS force up to the sze of a battalon (about men) whenever they can engage one n bathe where t can not be renforced n tme or protected by overwhelmng ar power. How the Contras Can Wn Ed. ote: Mr. Snger, Presdent of the Potomac Organzaton,has wrtten extensvely on the conflct n CentralAmerca. Most of ths pece summarzes hs artcle n "The atonalrevew "of 13 February He dscussed thepoltcalsde more extensvely n "Commentary" July 1986 and "The atonal nterest" Wnter mountan areas where they had been fghtng before. The Contras have to show they can operate n successfully as guerrllas n large parts of the populated rural areas of caragua. The State of the EPS Thrd, the EPS s handcapped by the dsloyalty of many of ts solders. t s crucal to avod ether overstatng or understatng ths pont. The EPS s not so weak that a mltary rebellon or uprsng can be expected. t s capable of maneuverng and marchng, and can occupy towns and put down cvlan crowds and street gangs. f an EPS unt catches a Contra guerrlla unt by surprse, or n a stuaton where the guerrllas are overwhelmngly outgunned, t s lkely to be able to hold together and successfully explot ts advantage. But there s good reason to doubt how relably the Sandnsta solders wll tght f the Contras are able to engage them n heavy battle when t s relatvely easy for a dsloyal or unmotvated solder to fre nto the ar, or smply to hde. Any battalon n whch enough solders do that can be defeated by the Contras. But there s no way to test a Sandnsta battalon wthout brngng t nto heavy battle. The challenge for the guerrllas s to be cautous enough not to get nto stuatons where the EPS has an overwhelmng advantage, but not so cautous that they never brng substantal Sandnsta forces under enough pressure to crack. Another thng that wll sgnfcantly nfluence the guerrlla war s the feelngs of the EPS solders toward ther Cuban advsers. f the Cubans have "accdents" when gong nto combat alone wth an EPS platoon or company, then they wll have to stay n groups. n that case they wll not generally be avalable for use to stffen unts smaller than a battalon, greatly lmtng ther value. ndeed, t may turn out that, because they can not produce enough relable junor offcers, the EPS cannot effectvely use small unts n zones where the Contras are operatng. And an army that must always operate n battalonszed unts s a clumsy nstrument for guerrlla warfare. n bref, there are reasons to thnk that the guerrllas have a pretty good chance of reestablshng effectve control n much of the populated mountan area of caragua but there are reasons for uncertanty as well. We may have at least a frst answer by summer. Terrtory s not Essental t s also mportant to note what s not requred for the Contra forces to do therjob. To be successful the guerrllas do not have to take and hold any partcular pece of terrtory aganst a sustaned attack by Sandnsta dvsonal forces, supported by tanks, artllery, and ar power. ether do the guerrllas have to establsh permanent bases n caragua, nor should they let the populaton n a gven area become dependent on ther protecton. Some argue that the Contras can and should take and hold a large pece of terrtory n the Carbbean zone so that an alternatve government could be created. They argue that the terran and logstcs dffcultes would make t mpossble for the EPS to brng enough of ts strength to bear to reconquer such a terrtory. Ths mght be a good approach, but t s not necessarly the only good strategy. Most sgnfcantly, the guerrllas do not necessarly have to operate n the urban areas. For unless the poltcal sde of the war s prosecuted as successfully as the mltary, the guerrllas are not lkely to acheve ultmate success. The Poltcal Struggle ow we must turn to the poltcal struggle, whch s n much greater doubt although the fundamental facts should make t much easer. Here the prmary task s to shft the forces of nternatonal poltcs aganst the Sandnstas. The poltcal campagn should erode foregn democratc, moral and materal support for the Sandnstas and so gve potental nternal opposton a bass for belevng that the Sandnstas are fghtng a tde that wll ultmately preval. One reason ths struggle has faled so far s that, despte the Presdent's speeches prasng "freedomfghters," on the whole the admnstraton has gven the mpresson that t s ashamed of the Contras, partcularly the armed resstance. At least untl very recently, the State Department has sought to avod publcty for the young farm boys who are fghtng aganst the Sandnstas, and to focus attenton on the Contras poltcal apparatus, the Unted caraguan Opposton (UO). Yet the poltcans of UO are far less attractve to ordnary Amercans than the fghtng heroes of the armed resstance forces. The wder struggle for nternatonal sympathy and poltcal support mght be summarzed, "After you, Alphonse," because everyone has been watng for someone else to go frst. Part of the reason Congress s reluctant to accept Presdent Reagan's vew of the Contras and the Sandnstas s that most of the other democraces do not seem to be buyng t although the prvate assessment of many foregn leaders s much more lke Reagan's than s ther publc poston. The Central Amercan countres don't want to commt themselves aganst the Sandnstas before the U.S. shows that t s gong to stck to the fght. The European democraces won't abandon ther comfortable llusons f the local democraces don't cooperate n clearly callng on them for help. And round and round t goes n a pattern that s sadly famlar to our generaton.

4 Page 4 Ed. ote: ext month wll mark the ffth annversary of Operaton Peacefor Gallee. Ths then s an mportant tme to remember some of the orgnal dscord n Lebanon, the ramfcatons of whch stll determne who, n many cases, s alled wth whom. Durng the Lebanese war of the md 1970s, the Lebanese Chrstans were battlng what the Western meda ncorrectly labeled "leftwng" Muslms. Actually, the Chrstans were most often fghtng the Palestnans. The Syrans, of course, knew ths to be the case. The Syrans were afrad the Palestnans mght defeat the Chrstans; take over Lebanon; attack srael; and possbly drag Syra nto a war wth srael when Syra mght not be prepared to fght that battle. Consequently, for some tme the Syrans supported the Chrstans aganst the Palestnans whose nterests the Syrans constantly clam to be protectng. The battle for Zahleh was the frst tme the sraels ntervened massvely on the sde of the Chrstans n Lebanon. But when the Phalangsts decded to capture Zahleh, a largely GreekOrthodox Chrstan town near the Lebanese Syran border, Syra turned on the Chrstans. Most Western correspondents seemed unable to explan ths turn of events. t s qute smple, and s explaned by ethncty and the map of the regon. f Assad Falls Syra's rulers are Alawtes a margnally slamc group from Lataka, the largely Alawte Syran provnce located drectly north of the SyranLebanese border. The Alawtes consttute approxmately 1012% of Syra's populaton and are hated and looked down upon by the Sunn Muslms who make up about 70% of the populaton. f a Sunn coup aganst the Alawte regme n Damascus ever took place (or f Presdent Assad ded and there was no orderly successon), the Alawtes would have to retreat from Damascus back home to Lataka n order not to be lqudated. Unfortunately for them, the only way to get there by land through Syran terrtory s through the deeply relgous Sunn ctes of Homs and Hama the latter of whch became famous not long ago when Assad's troops massacred 12,00025,000 Sunn Muslms. Assad and/or hs fellow Alawtes could obvously not expect red carpet treatment from the people of Hama as they made ther escape back to Lataka. The Back Door There s only one other escape route from Damascus to Lataka westward nto Lebanon, then north through the Bekka valley travelng through northeastern Lebanon and over the Syran Lebanese border. As can be seen on the map, the town of Zahleh controls a most mportant stretch of ths escape route. Assad and hs cohorts could never let ths Sometmes Events n The Mddle East Are ot As Complcated As They Seem cty fall under the control of others. Hence, the Syrans had no choce but to use every means at ther dsposal to keep the Phalangsts from capturng Zhaleh. The mportance for srael And what has ths to do wth srael? The battle for Zahleh was the frst tme the sraels ntervened massvely on the sde of the Chrstans n Lebanon aganst Syra. And Others Understandng the Alawte need for an escape route through northern eastern Lebanon and also helps one comprehend the seemngly contradctory poston of Suleyman Franjyeh, the Chrstan warlord of northern Lebanon. Franjyeh almost always toes the Syran lne and dspses the Gemeyel famly whch runs the Phalangsts n the south (and whose scon Amn Gemeyel s presdent of Lebanon). He has good reason to beleve that the Gemeyels murdered hs son. Although he clearly needs the Syrans to mantan hs control n the north, he occasonally takes ant Syran postons. t seems the Syrans need Franjyeh as much as he needs them, for he and hs clan control the northern Lebanese part of the Alawte escape route to Lataka.

5 DPas a ws C "Glasnost" Versus "Skrytnost" by Jm Gurard, Jr. Ed. ote: Mr. Gurard s a consultant n governmenal affars and a frequent contrbutor to "Securty Affars. " At a tme when "glasnost" (the Russan word for openness) s all the rage, we badly need a word for ts opposte for the closedness and the hddenness n whch the Sovet regme keeps ts people. Snce twothrds of the Sovet Unon's populaton lves n and around "closed ctes" (such as Gorky, where Andre Sakharov was exled), we mght look to ths source for a proper antonym. The Russan term for such ctes s "zakryty gorod," from the verb "zakryt," meanng "to close." An even more approprate root mght be the related Russan verb "skryt," meanng "to conceal." F X Fnta Wth mnmal semantc engneerng, the new term becomes "skrytnost" pronounced SKREETnost and soundng, qute approprately, lke the secretness behnd whch the Sovet state masks ts true character. Wthout the routne use of such a term, t wll appear to many (the unthnkng) among us that there s lttle or no "closedness" n the USSR when, n fact, "skrytnost" remans the nherent nature of the place. Just as Sovet colones appear not to exst (because we do not bother to call them that) and just as the Sovet SD appears not to exst (because our publc dplomacy "experts" do not call t anythng at all) so, too, wll Sovet "skrytnost" appear not to exst, or at least to be a thng of the pre "glasnost" past, untl we begn callng t by ts proper name. Turkey (Cont. from p. 1) ancent Greeks, whose wrtngs and deas are one of the major sources of Western culture. Consequently, they concluded, the Turks would never be accepted as full partners wth the West. The lesser and uneducated relgous Turksh masses explaned the stuaton otherwse: to them, t was only natural that the U.S. would take Greece's sde because Greece was a Chrstan country, as were the U.S. and ts other ATO partners. Muslm Turkey could never expect equal treatment n the Western Chrstan world. o longer trustng us, the younger generaton, especally the mdlevel offcer class, has begun to search for other alles. Some now see neutralsm as the answer, even though ths mght seem to us unrealstc because the Turks lve next door to the Sovet bear and have lost thrteen wars to the Russans durng the past three centures. Lookng to the Arabs Others, ncludng many of Turkey's leaders, have begun to queston whether the Turks erred n leavng the slamc world. At the same tme, young and mddleaged people n the Arab world, most of whch was part of the Ottoman empre untl the end of World War, have also begun to reexamne ther feelngs about the Turks. Untl the md1970s, Arabs referred to the Ottoman Turks as mperalsts who exploted the Arabs. Today, many Arabs say that they were wrong to turn ther backs on the Ottomans and ally themselves wth the Chrstan West. The Turks are very much aware of these changng Arab atttudes and are watchng ths phenomenon wth great nterest. evertheless, f they could choose, most would defntely choose algnment wth the West over algnment wth ther Muslm brothers to the south and beyond, because they know that these countres have lttle to offer Turkey. But they do see ths as one of the possble alternatves to rejecton by the West. (Some) of Turkey's leaders have begun to queston whether the Turks erred n leavng the slamc word. ran ". ; _.. ho urs K1 Actve Sovet Treates of Frendahlp L"'. =1 Malor Cuban Mlhav ry = avel Operwtlonl Daploymene» Australa \m7 uclar Submarne Oporatng Area _ Sa Unaa of Communl catlon. L 0Ovesea Faclltl l Maor Sovet Arms Cl nt Sovet and East European Mltery Adveor WMaor Concentratonel Sovet Reconnaleance Arcraft Faclhlte As our Easternmost ATO ally, Turkey looks across areas of very actve Sovet nterest. m _ Subscrbe (or send a gft to someone who needs to be nformed) L An annual subscrpton to the JSA Securty Affars s $ t s a small prce to pay to better understand Amercan defense and securty needs and how a frm strategc relatonshp between the US and srael can beneft both countres. JSA s the only Jewsh organzaton solely devoted to explanng the lnk between US natonal securty and srael's securty, and assessng what we can and must do to strengthen both. ame 3 Address Make checks payable to JSA and send to 1411 K Street, W, Sute 1002, Washngton, D.C JSA s a nonproft, taxexempt educatonal organzaton. m wa a, ORTrH Chna a.., PACFC V' Japan 'OCEA mone (oymt Abrad 1EW Os hn Aust.ra orag Are. Pappn ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~' 'gno. Abroad * _ «M ' Zala",nd. J ATO's Role At ths crtcal juncture n Turksh hstory, we must look for ways to strengthen ts bonds wth the West. f that country, whch occupes one of the most crucal peces of real estate n ATO, s to reman part of the Western allance, we must do all we can to help t both mltarly and economcally. Turkey smply does not have the fnancal resources necessary to modernze ts mltary hardware, much of whch s of World War or Korean War vntage. Unless ts Western alles, especally the U.S., help t do so, Turkey wll not be able to carry out ts crucal ATO msson. Economcally, Turkey has just appled for full membershp n the European Common Market. Because of ts huge labor surplus (whch many Europeans fear wll flood Western Europe lookng for work) and because of the types of goods Turkey produces, almost every European country s reluctant to accept t nto the EEC. The Turksh Prme Mnster realzes ths and s wllng to make accommodatons wth the EEC. Under any crcumstances, these dffcultes must be overcome because EEC membershp s one more way of tyng Turkey to the West. Turkey s at a crossroads. t has undergone a revolutonary experment durng the past seventy years, abandonng the slamc world for the West. As such, t serves as a possble example for the rest of the Muslm world as well. f Turkey can be accepted equally by the West, other Muslm countres mght eventually make t as well, f not, maybe the tradtonal approach s rght and the antwestern slamc poltcal dentty was correct after all. f Turkey leaves the Western allance, t would not be surprsng f t decded to try to resume ts hstorc role as the leader of the Muslm world. f ths happens, t wll do so wth a vengeance aganst us and our alles around the world. Ths s probably our last opportunty to te ths most mportant ATO ally to the West.

6 Page 6 EWSBREFS JUST WHAT MAP S THE STATE DEPARTMET USG??: A regulaton publshed Aprl 1987 by the Allowances Staff of the State Department covers maxmum per dem allowances for foregn areas. There s an alphabetcal lstng of countres; under each country s a lst of major ctes; followng each entry s a maxmum allowance and an effectve date. For very small countres, there are no ndvdual ctes lsted, only one allowance for the country. On page four, after Hungary, celand, nda, ndonesa, ran (wth an allowance of $160/day effectve 4187!), raq and reland s srael wth an allowance of$104/day. Contnung down the page past taly, vory Coast, Jamaca and Japan, there s a lstng for Jerusa lem at $ 103/day! We ask the State Department by what standard they call Jerusalem a country. PHOTOS OF KRASOYARSK: Accordng to "Jane's Defence Weekly", the frst satellte photograph of the Sovet radar at Krasnoyarsk apparently confrms U.S. clams that the nstallaton volates the 1972 ABM Treaty. One of the crucal ssues has been the orentaton of the radar antennae. Outwardlookng radars are permtted under the treaty, but the photographs confrm U.S. clams that the radars pont northeast across 4000 km of Sovet terrtory towards the Arctc. The photo was released by Sweden's Space Meda et work havng been taken by the European SPOT commercal remotesensng satellte. The Sovet counterclam that Krasnoyarsk s a spacetrackng radar was refuted by photo evdence that the radars are not upwardpontng. The pcture corresponds broadly to the drawngs and descrptons n the Pentagon publcaton "Sovet Mltary Power 1987", but does not ndcate the proporton: one of the array structures stands 27 stores hgh. POLLG O DEFESE: A poll of Amercan atttudes toward securty ssues commssoned by the Commttee on the Present Danger ndcated that: Only 5% know that the U.S. defense budget equals less than 10 percent of GP; 59% beleve the Sovets spend more on ther mltary than the U.S. does on ours; 60% beleve SD s a way to lmt the usefulness of nuclear weapons; 7 1% do not "trust the statements of Sovet leader Gorbachev on arms control"; 66% beleve the Sovets are volatng arms control agreements, whle 16% beleve they are abdng by them; and 42% would lke the U.S. to concen trate on negotatng new agreements wth the Sovets, whle 5 1% sad the U.S. should focus more on gettng the Sovets to abde by current agreements. CAM RAH BAY: The Sovet Ambassador to Australa categorcally dened that hs country has a mltary base at Cam Ranh Bay, assertng that the faclty only provdes food and water for Sovet shps and has the capacty to make mnor repars. An Australan ft X 3 o < c; UB defense source commented later, "Do the Sovets serously expect us to beleve that the Bear and Badger reconnassance arcraft patrollng the South Chna Sea have flown there all the way from Vladvostok?" ALSO VETAM: Leavng Vetnam, Swss ad representatves sad Hano stll has over 6,000 people n "reeducaton camps" more than 10 years after Hano took over South Vetnam. AUSTRALA WARS LBYA: The BBC reported that the Australan government has warned Lbya aganst nterferng n the affars of the small slands of the South Pacfc, wth a specfc reference of the establshment of tes between Lbya and Vanuatu. (Vanuatu establshed relatons wth the Sovet Unon three months ago.) The Lbyan news agency reports Khaddaf's response that, "the small natons of the Pacfc Ocean are endangered by France, the U.S., Brtan, Zonsm and racsm, whch want to transform the Pacfc nto a regon for nuclear tests and wagng World War ll." Followng the Australan protest, Vanuatu changed ts mnd about allowng a Lbyan embassy n ts captal. AB. AD THE CARB., PART : Venezuelan authortes have ssued a warnng to the Carbbean countres that a Lbyan agent, recently expelled from from Surname, s operatng n ther area. Abdul Salaam Ashur, beleved to be Muammar Khaddaf's personal emssary, came to Venezuela after Surname, and met wth two other Lbyans who quckly left the country. Venezuelan authortes, who deported Ashur, beleve he s offerng Carbbean revolutonary and terrorst groups money, tranng and arms to brng them under drect Lbyan nfluence. n return, these Carbbean mltants mght be expected to attack U.S. and other Western nterests. (See ewsbrefs January 1987.). KOREAS (AD OTHERS) AFGHASTA?: Photographs, reported taken at a Sovet nstallaton n Afghanstan, show solders who appear to be orth Korean posng near armored vehcles. One expert on Afghanstan sad that snce 1981 there have been reports of Cuban, Vetnamese and other nonsovet communst troops sghted n that country, but none of those reports have been confrmed. The photographs, obtaned by the humantaran organzaton Mercy Fund, show the solders wearng standard Sovet unforms wthout rank or nsgna. Afghan resstance leaders sad the lack of nsgna ndcates that the solders are probably not troops from any of the Sovet Unon's Asan republcs. Other ntellgence sources sad that whle the unforms are not the same as those ssued to Afghan Communst troops, they are dentcal to those of orth Korean and Warsaw Pact forces who have clandestnely fought n Afrca and Southeast Asa. WHAT THEY ARE SAYG GERASMOV, Sovet spokesman: You cannot have any commtments (about the number of Sovet Jews that wll be permtted to leave the country) when you talk nformally. As to the 10,000 or 1,000; you see, we do not have quotas. We do not order ths flow of people rom our country to (srael). t depends on the number of applcatons. We sad...we are gong to apply new rules to ths and we are gong to solve these cases sympathetcally and the exceptons wll only be for securty reasons. So, f we have 10,000 applcatons they wll be looked after... but we cannot guarantee. (srael has nvted a Sovet consular delegaton to srael to nspect Sovet property. Followng that, there has been consderable speculaton n the srael press and among srael poltcans about recprocal delegatons. Asked about ths, Gcrasmov repled) The dfference s that we do have certan thngs to do there. We have Sovet ctzens and we have Sovet real estate n (srael). (srael) does not have real estate to look after and we have no ctzens of (srael) for you to worry about. There would be no recprocty. RELATED: A senor Sovet dplomat n the U.S. sad ol Sovet partcpaton n an nternatonal peace conference: You should understand that our actons now (relatng to srael) are not payment for a tcket to an nternatonal conference. We are a great country, a superpower, and we do not pay entrance fees. ceedy A''A SHARASKY, commentng on Prme Mnster Shamr's statement that f Sovet Jews don't come to srael "there s no mportance n ther mgraton.": t's very sad to hear such remarks. 'm fully n favor of Jews comng to srael, to our country. But f Mr. Shamr wants srael to be the center of Jews all over the world a sprtual. materal center, all over the world he must express concern about all the Jews, even those not ready to make alyah. We must be concerned about Jews beng free and havng the opportunty to lve n the free world, as well as enouragng them to come to srael. RELATED: YOSEF MEDELEVCH, former Sovet prsoner and now charman of the Sovet Jewsh Educaton and nformaton Center: f we say that all Jews are responsble for each other, then srael, more than anywhere, has to guarantee the fate of all Jews everywhere, n all the daspora. ROGELO RAMREZ, Charman of the caraguan atonal Assembly Legslatve Affars Commttee, speakng n Damascus, sad caragua s opposed to srael's occupaton of Arab terrtory, ncludng the Golan Heghts, and frmly supports the Palestnan people's struggle to acheve ther rght to selfdetermnaton and the establshment of ther own ndependent state. He added prase for "the Syran people's lberal and progressve struggle under Presdent Hafz alassad n confrontng the aggressve mperalst and Zonst schemes n the Mddle East." KG HASSA OF MOROCCO (notng the presence of Polsaro leader Abdelazz at the Palestne atonal Councl meetng n Algera. Abdelazz had equated Morocco wth srael at the meetng, and called Moroccan solders n the Western Sahara "Zonsts."): The Kng sad n a rado address that no Moroccan wll henceforth attend any poltcal or cultural gatherng where a PLO delegate s attendng or makng an address. Moroccans must walk out of any gatherng f a Palestnan rses to speak about Palestne, and anyone who gnores ths ban wll fnd hs house door smeared wth "what cannot be menloned."