TRAPPED BY CONSOCIATIONALISM: THE CASE OF LEBANON

Transcription

1 Topcs n Mddle Eastern and Afrcan Economes TRAPPED BY CONSOCIATIONALISM: THE CASE OF LEBANON By Samr Makds and Marcus Marktanner * Amercan Unversty of Berut Department of Economcs and Insttute of Fnancal Economcs Berut, Lebanon Abstract Motvated by the fact that Lebanon s consocatonal democracy has faled to prevent the outbreak of a long lastng cvl conflct and perodc poltcal crses, we re-examne the role that ts poltcal formula had played n ths regard. We argue that consocatonalsm has exactly cemented what t was supposed to overcome, namely vertcal and horzontal nequalty. As Lebanon remaned socally dvded, t became vulnerable for nternal conflct, whch n turn was fueled by external factors. Our emprcal results suggest that Lebanon s extremely unequal relatve to ts democratc and economc development level and that ths nequalty has substantal power n explanng armed conflct. A transton towards a fully fledged democracy would further reduce Lebanon s conflct potental. Samr Makds Amercan Unversty of Berut P.O. Box / Economcs and IFE Rad El-Solh / Berut Lebanon Phone: Ext Emal: makds@aub.edu.lb Marcus Marktanner Amercan Unversty of Berut P.O. Box / Economcs and IFE Rad El-Solh / Berut Lebanon Phone: Ext Emal: marktanner@aub.edu.lb * We are thankful for the valuable comments of the partcpants of the poster sesson of the 12 th Annual MEEA Meetng, San Francsco, January 3, 2009.

2 Topcs n Mddle Eastern and Afrcan Economes I. Introducton Whereas sectaran power sharng mght have proven successful n preventng domestc conflct n a number of countres, t faled n Lebanon. Nether could consocatonalsm prevent a 16-year lastng cvl war begnnng n 1975, nor could a modfed verson of t, whch was re-negotated n 1989, elmnate Lebanon s nternal and external conflct rsk. In ths paper we argue that Lebanon s consocatonalsm s the culprt of ths nstablty, not the soluton. Lebanon has been trapped by sectaran based consocatonalsm, whch has rendered t greatly vulnerable to destablzng outsde shocks. Only a transton towards a full fledged secular democracy that mandates greater poltcal accountablty and economc governance and promotes ncreased equalty of access to economc opportuntes would permt Lebanon to buld mmunty aganst destablzng external nfluences emanatng from ts geopoltcal poston. In ths paper we focus on the role of economc nequalty n contrbutng to Lebanon s vulnerablty The remander of the paper s organzed as follows: Secton two dscusses Lebanon s consocatonalsm as a fragle poltcal model. A bref revew of the causes of Lebanon s cvl war and ther lnks to consocatonalsm follows n secton three. Secton IV assesses emprcally how the falure of the country s consocatonal system to reduce vertcal and horzontal nequalty was a contrbutng factor to war lkelhood. Secton V concludes wth a summary of our major fndngs and outlook. II. Lebanon s Consocatonalsm: A Fragle Poltcal Model The basc argument for consocatonalsm, as opposed to a smple majorty rule, s that t prevents the outbreak of open conflct n socally heterogeneous socetes (see Ljphart, A., 1984, Andeweg, R., 2000). Moreover, n places where domestc conflcts arse, especally n developng countres, a consocatonal form of democracy s more lkely to restore lastng peace (see Bnnngsbo, H. M., 2005). However, there are many cases of faled consocatonalsm. For a revew of some promnent cases see Schneckener (2002). 1

3 Topcs n Mddle Eastern and Afrcan Economes Ethncally, Lebanon s vrtually homogenous. Yet, on the eve of ndependence n 1943, ts populaton was dvded almost equally between Chrstans and Muslms. These relgous communtes are further broken down to 18 recognzed relgous sects wth three prncpal communtes: Maronte Chrstans, Sunn, and Sh a Muslms. In theory, therefore, Lebanon was a good canddate for adoptng the consocatonal model. The three prncpal communtes ganed the most poltcal power wth clear advantages beng ntally accorded to the Marontes. Ths was to assure that the poltcal supremacy they enjoyed under the French mandate would not dmnsh after ndependence. Artcle 95 of Lebanon s 1943 consttuton stated that for a temporary but unspecfed perod, relgous communtes would be equtably represented n publc employment and cabnet posts. The prncple of equtable representaton was not defned. An unwrtten natonal accord reached among poltcal leaders on the eve of ndependence specfed that the presdent would be Maronte, the speaker of the house Sha, and the prme mnster Sunn. The presdent apponted the prme mnster and cabnet members and could, wth the approval of the councl of mnsters, dssolve the parlament. Under the natonal accord, Chrstans enjoyed a 5 to 4 majorty n parlament. A sectaran formula has been assduously appled to cabnet posts among the three largest relgous communtes followed by the other communtes. Dependng on the cabnet sze, other offcally recognzed small communtes may or may not be represented but an equal balance between Chrstans and Muslms has always been mantaned. Under the sectaran power sharng formula, ndvdual ctzens from dfferent relgous communtes, whle assumng the same oblgatons vs-à-vs the state, enjoy unequal poltcal rghts. Dfferent standards also pertan to personal status laws of marrage, dvorce and nhertance, whch fall under the jursdcton of the offcal bodes of the respectve relgous communtes. Mantanng a sectaran balance mpled that no sngle poltcal or relgous group, or the army, could mpose ts hegemony or deology on the socety. Wth the excepton of the cvl war perod, ths helped foster cvl lbertes such as freedom of speech, meda pluralty, and parlamentary electons. 2

4 Topcs n Mddle Eastern and Afrcan Economes At the same tme, the dctum of the delcate sectaran balance led to the emergence of a weak state that faled to mplement effectve poltcal and admnstratve programs. For example, serous socal polcy reforms ntated by Presdent Fouad Chehab n to promote mproved publc sector performance and greater equalty largely faled to take hold. Ths was due to opposton by entrenched poltco-sectaran specal nterests that feared redstrbutve reforms. Provoked by the fall of the pro-western monarchy n Iraq n 1958 and the unfcaton of Egypt and Syra as the Unted Arab Republc, a lmted cvl conflct broke out between pro- and ant- Western factons n Lebanon. Its settlement resulted n Presdent Chehab assumng the presdency as a compromse canddate. Although mnor, ths conflct already demonstrated the country s vulnerablty to outsde events. Yet, the most crucal moment was clearly the 1967 Arab-Israel war and the resultng nflux of Palestnan refugees. The 1967 war and the Palestnan problem created a poltcal and economc shock that Lebanon could not absorb or accommodate peacefully, whch, combned wth ts relgous dvsons, eventually paved the way for the outbreak of the cvl war n The war was formally settled by the Taf Accord n 1989, whch was brokered n the Saud cty of Taf, followng dplomatc efforts by Saud Araba and Western powers. It was ncorporated n the Lebanese Consttuton n The Accord led to a more balanced sectaran formula of power sharng, a long standng demand of the Muslm communty n the pre-war years. For example, t establshed party n parlamentary representaton between the Chrstan and Muslm communtes. Durng the Taf negotatons, there was not a sngle poltcal actor who could have advocated mmedate poltcal reforms towards a full fledged democracy. Nonetheless the Taf Accord ncluded a provson that allowed for the establshment of a natonal body whose task would be to look nto the elmnaton of the confessonal nature of the system. Untl today ths body has not been establshed, leavng the country hostage to sectaran strangleholds. Although the Taf Accord led to a settlement of the cvl war, Lebanon has yet to tackle the major problems of the sectaran system wth ts nherent negatve mpact on economc and socal development. 3

5 Topcs n Mddle Eastern and Afrcan Economes In addton, the Taf Accord allowed for the temporary statonng of Syran troops n Lebanon to help re-establsh order. In effect, they remaned untl Aprl 2005 when, followng the assassnaton of former Prme Mnster Rafc Harr on February 14, they were forced to wthdraw under Western pressure and recurrng street demonstratons. Throughout ther stay, Syra s poltcal nterests dctated how the domestc poltco-sectaran balance was to be mantaned, and how smmerng poltcal dfferences were to be resolved. Ths was done rrespectve of whether or not ther resoluton was n concurrence wth the provsons of the Taf Accord. After the wthdrawal of Syra, the country sld nto a deep natonal poltcal crss wth two major opposng poltcal camps vyng for power. The frst ncluded the opposton partes Hzbullah and Amal (both Sh a) and the Natonal Free Movement (prmarly Maronte), along wth alles from varous relgous groups. The second comprsed pro-government partes, ncludng the al Mustaqbal (Future) Movement (Sunn), the Progressve Socalst Party (Druze), the Lebanese Forces (Maronte) and ther alles. Smlar to the cvl war experence, each camp has been agan supported by foregn powers that seek to promote ther own regonal poltcal agenda. The crss ntensfed especally after the Israel onslaught of July 23, 2006 that followed the capture of two Israel solders by Hzbollah n a cross border rad. It lasted untl August 14 of that summer and followed the UN Securty Resoluton 1701 of August 11, 2006 that called for a cease fre (but not heeded untl a few days later) and for a substantal enhancement of UN peace keepng forces n South Lebanon. In addton to the loss of human lves and damage to ts economc base, Lebanon sank further n the quagmre of regonal and nternatonal poltcal rvalres. The perod that followed the summer 2006 war wtnessed rsng poltcal tensons between the two camps. A government crss provoked by resgnatons of the opposton cabnet mnsters led to a de facto closure of Parlament for several months. It was occasoned by a consttutonal dspute between the government and opposton, prolonged strkes n downtown Berut, huge demonstratons and counter demonstratons, and the nablty to agree on a successor to the presdent when hs term ended on November 22, All factors together brought the county to 4

6 Topcs n Mddle Eastern and Afrcan Economes the verge of renewed cvl conflct n the frst week of May, Only after renewed Arab league medaton efforts, led by Qatar, the protagonsts could agree on a settlement of ther dspute. The so-called Doha agreement of August 15, 2008 was a compromse settlement - though more n favor of the opposton partes - that specfed the mmedate electon of the chef of the army as the compromse presdental canddate, the formaton of a new government wth an agreed upon dvson of cabnet seats between the two camps, and the modfcaton of the electoral law that had been a demand manly of the Chrstan opposton. The new presdent of the republc was elected on May 25, 2008 and a new government was formed shortly afterwards (for a more detaled revew of these developments see Makds, Kwan and Marktanner, 2010). As of ths wrtng, the country awats the outcome of the parlamentary electons scheduled for June 7, Whatever the outcome, we argue that as long as the present sectaran model stays n place, Lebanon wll reman vulnerable to destablzng external threats. We agree wth Hudson (1997) that Lebanon s precarous poltcal system can only be resolved by transtng from the present consocatonal sectaran model to a full fledged secular democracy. III. Causes of the Lebanese Cvl War, : A Bref Revew Lebanon s home to a substantal part of the factors that domnate the lterature on the causes of cvl conflct. Ths lterature focuses manly on the concepts of greed, often assocated wth the explotaton of natural resource wealth, and grevance, generally the result of poverty, poltcal, economc and socal nequtes (see Coller P. and Hoefler A., 2004; Coller, P. and Sambans, N., 2005; Berdal, M. and Malone D. M., 2000; Arnson C. J. and Zartman I.W., 2005; UNCTAD, 2004). The nteracton of socal, ethnc and sectaran heterogenety wth economc factors ncorporates a partcularly strong conflct rsk (Keen, D., 2000; Sambans, 2000; and Reynal- Querol, M. 2002). However, the complexty of the causes of cvl conflcts s not lmted to greed and grevance and ther nteracton wth socal factors. External nterventon s another mportant cause of conflct as well as ts duraton (see for example Elbadaw I. and N. Sambans N., 2000). Economc factors dd not play a decsve role n the onset of the Lebanese cvl war. In fact, shortly before the cvl war, Lebanon had a vbrant merchant class, comparatvely hgh per capta 5

7 Topcs n Mddle Eastern and Afrcan Economes ncomes, an economy growng at consderable rates, and expandng employment opportuntes. These condtons weaken the economc causes for cvl conflct. Yet, economc development was regonally and horzontally hghly unequal. Rural regons wth Sh a domnance were generally the poorest. Regonal economc dspartes n ncome dstrbuton led to mgraton from rural to urban centers and to an unchecked and rapd growth of poor suburbs around major ctes, partcularly Berut. The overlap of economc nequalty wth sectaran dvsons had poltcal consequences. For example, n 1974 the relgous leader of the Sh a communty, Imam Musa al Sadr, launched the Amal movement. Moblzng poltcal support wth the objectve of enhancng the laggng poltcal but especally economc status of the Sh a communty n the country, Amal presented tself as a movement of the dspossessed. A second goal of Amal was to act as a countervalng force to the growng nfluence of Palestnan organzatons n South Lebanon. After 1982, t grew nto one of the major warrng factons n the Lebanese cvl war. Thus whle the prmary causes of the cvl war mght have related to domestc poltcal grevance, smultaneously fed and exploted by external powers n pursut of ther own regonal agendas (Makds and Sadaka, 2005), prevalng economc nequaltes also played a role, as we demonstrate below, by contrbutng to a hgh level of war lkelhood. Muslm poltcal leaders regularly artculated poltcal grevance ssues and called for more equal power sharng wth the Chrstans and economc benefts, ncludng greater access to publc sector employment as well as opportuntes to partcpate n or control prvate economc enterprses. Yet, as the Maronte establshment regularly ressted such calls, fearng the loss of poltcal power, coalton buldng wth external partes n support of domestc agendas followed. In turn, external partes exploted domestc poltcal conflct to further ther own nterests. The external factors, whch placed ncreasng strans on the Lebanese poltcal system, were related to the rsng mltary power of resdent Palestnan poltcal and mltary organzatons, partcularly after the 1967 Arab-Israel war. Whle ther actvty was drected at keepng the Palestnan cause alve, these organzatons presence became ntrcately lnked to Lebanese 6

8 Topcs n Mddle Eastern and Afrcan Economes domestc poltcal affars. The domestc and regonal poltcal agendas could hardly be separated. The prevalng weaknesses of the sectaran system were exploted by Palestnan organzatons to strengthen ther poltcal and mltary postons. For ths purpose, they forged allances wth dsenchanted Lebanese sectaran (Muslm) and non-sectaran (leftst and natonalst) poltcal partes. They regarded such allances a means to pressure the Maronte poltcal establshment to accept poltcal reforms and greater sharng of economc opportuntes. These developments nevtably nvted external nterventons, most notably by Syra and Israel, both of whch had ther own respectve regonal poltcal agendas. Thus Lebanon became ncreasngly vulnerable to outsde destablzng nfluences. IV. An Emprcal Approach to Lebanon s Consocatonal Trap Our man argument s that consocatonalsm has faled n Lebanon, thus helpng pave the way towards the cvl war. There are major aspects to ths falure. Our focus here s on one major aspect, namely how the falure of Lebanon s conscocatonal system to reduce the level of nequalty, f not actually ncreasng, has contrbuted to rasng the level of the country s vulnerablty to war. We approach ths hypothess emprcally from a cross-sectonal perspectve as follows. Frst, we argue that f Lebanon s consocatonal model had succeeded, t should have algned Lebanon s vertcal nequalty much more wth ts general level of economc development. We though suspect that Lebanon s level of nequalty s statstcally sgnfcantly greater than what s predcted by ts poltcal and economc level of development, bearng n mnd that vertcal nequalty has also a strong horzontal dmenson. If ndeed there s emprcal evdence for an equalty defct, whch we argue s a major ndcator for democracy falure, the queston we then would lke to address pertans to the role ths equalty defct plays n explanng Lebanon s war lkelhood. In order to tackle ths queston, we buld a panel dataset that conssts of all countres n the world for whch observatons were avalable n the 2005 World Bank Development Indcator Database. For each country, nne observatons are taken, correspondng to eght consecutve fve-year averages begnnng wth the perod and endng wth the one of as well as 7

9 Topcs n Mddle Eastern and Afrcan Economes the four-year average of the perod. Averages were chosen n order to smooth out the observatons and to obtan a more balance panel dataset. Table 1 summarzes data and sources. Table 1: Data and Sources Varable Descrpton Source Per Capta Income (Income) Per capta ncome n 2000 USD, natural log Polty 2 Score; ranges between -10 and Polty +10 wth hgher scores ndcatng greater democratc practces. Inequalty Muslm-Chrstan Polarzaton (MCP) Regonal Ol (LnRegOl) Regonal Polty (RegPoL) Regonal Refugee Densty (LNRegRefDens) War Country (WarCtry) Estmated Household Income Inequalty Indcator. Reads lke Gn-coeffcent. Mssng values were estmated usng ARIMA (1,0,0) forecastng. Lkelhood of obtanng a Muslm and a Chrstan n two random drawngs from populaton. Assumed to be constant. Populaton-weghted fuel exports as a percentage of GDP per regon (natural log) Populaton-weghted Polty score per regon Regonal average refugee denstes (refugees per 100,000, natural log) Dummy for a country that experenced at least one year of armed conflct durng the observatons World Bank Development Indcator Database (WDI). Gurr, Marshall, and Jaggers (2007), Polty IV Dataset. Unversty of Texas Income Inequalty Data Project (UTIP) Calculated usng data from the World Chrstan Encyclopeda World Bank Development Indcator Database (WDI). WDI for non Palestnan refugees and Unted Natons Relef and Works Agency for Palestne Refugees n the Near East (UNRWA). Uppsala Conflct Data Program (UCDP) and Internatonal Peace Research Insttute, Oslo (PRIO): Armed Conflcts Dataset. We specfy the followng pooled OLS equaton Inequalty = β + β Income + β Polty + β MCP + β RegPol + β LnRegRefDens + β7lebanon Dummy ε LnRegOl + β + (1) and logstc regresson ( War Country ) P LN P(No War Country = β ) 0 + β Income 1 + β Polty 2 + β 3 MCP + β RegPol + β + (2) 6LnRegOl + β 7LnRegRefDens ε 4 + We begn wth a dscusson of equaton (1), whose results are summarzed n Table 2. 8

10 Topcs n Mddle Eastern and Afrcan Economes Table 2: OLS Results of Determnants of Inequalty Const Income I II III IV V VI VII (66.7)**** (56.82)**** (51.5)**** (56.5)**** (58.1)**** (30.0)**** (30.6)**** (-19.8)**** (-14.7)**** (-14.4)**** (-14.4)**** (-15.6)**** (-8.9)**** (-9.2)**** Polty (-3.9)**** (-3.81)**** (-1.6)* (-1.6)* (-3.8)**** (-4.1)**** Muslm Chrstan Polarzatom (0.9) Regonal Polty Regonal (-3.3)**** (1.0) Ol (ln) (9.3)**** (3.3)**** (3.1)**** Reg. Ref Dens. (Ln) (-3.3)**** (-4.0)**** Lebanon 11.4 Dummy (3.6)**** N 1,146 1, ,015 1, Cross Unts F-Stat Adj. R **** = sgnfcant at 1%, *** = sgnfcant at 5%,** = sgnfcant at 10%,*= sgnfcant at 15%, t-stat n parentheses. 9

11 Topcs n Mddle Eastern and Afrcan Economes The regresson results of Table 2 show that ncome, poltcal development, the regonal economc structure and regonal refugee densty are sgnfcant explanatory factors of nequalty. All coeffcents carry the expected sgn except for refugee densty. Thus, hgher ncomes and more advanced democratc practces reduce nequalty whle the presence of hgh regonal ol rents, whch s an ndcator for the lack of economc dversfcaton, undermne equtable socal development. Counter-ntutvely though, hgher refugee denstes correlate nversely wth nequalty, whch most probably captures the fact that rcher and more equal countres are more lkely to host more refugees. Regonal polty s not robust although t carres the expected sgn. Nether s the Muslm-Chrstan polarzaton varable a sgnfcant explanatory varable. The most mportant result of Table 2 s that the Lebanon dummy s hghly sgnfcant, ndcatng that Lebanon s level of ncome nequalty s roughly 11 ponts hgher than predcted. Yet, t s mportant to note that the Estmated Household Income Inequalty Dataset dd not have an observaton for Lebanon. Gates (1998, p. 143), however, documents a Gn coeffcent of 53.7 for For the year 1997, the Food and Agrcultural Organzaton (onlne) lsts Lebanon wth a Gn coeffcent of 56. We therefore assumed for Lebanon a value of 53 for all observatons, whch s probably a rather conservatve estmate. Turnng to equaton (2), whose results are summarzed n Table 3, among the determnants explanng whether a country s a war country, per capta ncome, polty, and nequalty are the only sgnfcant varables. Thus, as per capta ncomes, democratc practces, and equalty ncreases, the lkelhood of beng a war country decreases. Ths, of course, does not mean that regonal factors are not relevant n the case of Lebanon. The opposte has been qualtatvely dscussed n the prevous sectons. It smply states that they are not sgnfcant from a crosssectonal perspectve. 10

12 Topcs n Mddle Eastern and Afrcan Economes Table 3: Logstc Regresson Results of Determnants of the Lkelhood of Facng at Least One Year of Armed Conflct durng Observatons Const Income Polty Inequalty Muslm- Chrstan I II III IV V VI VII VIII (15.6)**** (11.5)**** (1.5)* (1.6)* (1.5)* (1.6)* (0.9) (1.8)** (-15.1)**** (-9.9)**** (-6.2)**** (-6.2)**** (-6.2)**** (-6.1)**** (-3.8)**** (-6.3)**** (-4.3)**** (-3.6)**** (-3.6)**** (-3.7)**** (-3.6)**** (-2.5)*** (-3.6)**** (4.7)**** (4.7)**** (4.8)**** (4.2)**** (2.3)*** (4.3)**** Polarzaton (-0.3) Regonal 0.02 Polty (1.3) Regonal Ol (ln) (0.8) Reg. Ref Dens. (Ln) (-0.3) Lebanon 10.3 Dummy (0.1) N 1,358 1,144 1, ,015 1, ,015 Cross Unts Percent Correctly 70.5% 73.9% 76.3% 75.7% 76.2% 76.2% 77.1% 77.1% Classfed **** = sgnfcant at 1%, *** = sgnfcant at 5%,** = sgnfcant at 10%,*= sgnfcant at 15%, t-stat n parentheses

13 Topcs n Mddle Eastern and Afrcan Economes Wth the war country equaton at hand, we can next elaborate more on how Lebanon s trapped by consocatonalsm. To llustrate ths we use the parameters of Model III, whch s the most parsmonous, n order to estmate the lkelhood of beng a war country accordng to Lkelhood War Ctry = 1 1+ Exp( ( Ineq 0.37 Income 0.04 Polty )) (3) We begn by estmatng Lebanon s war country lkelhood usng some stylzed facts that roughly characterze Lebanon n 1975, the year the cvl war erupted. Assumng a per capta ncome level of 4,000 (n 2000 USD), an nequalty ndcator of 53, and a polty score of 4, Lebanon s lkelhood of beng a war country s 70.4%. If Lebanon s equalty defct had been dsmantled and been 42 nstead of 53, the war country lkelhood would be 56.4%. Had Lebanon been addtonally a full democracy wth a polty score of 10, whch mples the overcomng of the confessonal system, the war lkelhood would have been 50.5%. Thus, from a cross-sectonal perspectve, Lebanon could reduce ts war country lkelhood by almost 20 percentage ponts, had t dsmantled ts equalty defct and advanced democratzaton to a fully fledged democracy. Lastly, had Lebanon s per capta ncome been $5,000, ts war country lkelhood would have been below 50%. At least from a statstcal perspectve, Lebanon s thus substantally trapped n a stuaton wth a hgh war lkelhood, whch can be attrbuted to the system s nablty to reduce prevalng nequaltes and to advance further n democratc capacty buldng. V. Conclusons: Towards Secular Democracy The most benefcal outcome of Lebanon s consocatonal democracy s that t allowed for levels of freedom and cvl rghts that placed Lebanon well ahead of other Arab countres. Nonetheless, the Lebanese experence demonstrates that nether consocatonalsm nor relatvely hgh per capta ncome and rapd economc development are suffcent guarantees aganst the onset of domestc conflcts n developng countres wth sgnfcant socal or relgous dvsons. Ths s especally the case when such 12

14 Topcs n Mddle Eastern and Afrcan Economes countres are vulnerable to destablzng or negatve regonal nfluences from ongong conflcts and non-democratc neghborng regmes. Under such condtons, consocatonalsm may serve a useful purpose, but only as a temporary poltcal arrangement towards a more vable poltcal system. The ultmate objectve must be to sheld the country aganst destablzng external factors through socal coheson buldng. Lebanon has not accomplshed ths objectve. The qualtatve analyss of our paper shows how external factors, namely the Arab-Israel conflct but also the prevalence of hghly autocratc regmes n the regon dragged Lebanon nto a maelstrom of poltcal mstrust and uncertanty. Poltcs, whch s supposed to become a postve sum game, was ncreasngly perceved as a zero-sum game. Yet, our emprcal exercse has also shown that Lebanon s consocatonal model has faled to create a more equal economc opportunty socety and that from a crosssectonal perspectve, unequal opportuntes are a hghly robust predctor of armed conflct. Whether Lebanon could have prevented the cvl war f t had had a substantally more equal socety s, n lght of the country s exposure to adverse geoeconomc and geopoltcal nfluences, dffcult to answer. There s, however, lttle doubt that ts vulnerablty to outsde ntervenng factors would have been much less. As vulnerablty to destablzng external nterventons has been one of Lebanon s major weaknesses, t follows that the objectves of any poltcal reform must be to strengthen ts ablty to sheld tself from the combned nfluences of sectaran dvsons and external nterventons. In our vew, the move towards a secular multparty democracy provdes the most approprate condtons for a stable poltcal system and sustaned development for Lebanon. The case of Lebanon has shown that sectaransm has cemented ntal nequaltes rather than helped to overcome them. Redrectng poltcal leadershp away from de facto ntra- towards nter-sectaran poltcal accountablty wll promote better governance, mproved redstrbutve polces, and strengthen Lebanon s mmunty aganst domestc conflcts. 13

15 Topcs n Mddle Eastern and Afrcan Economes Lebanon s not yet ready to adopt a completely secular system. The ntaton of a transtonal phase of reforms that would eventually lead to a fully-fledged secular democracy s necessary. Ths process entals the resoluton of a number of natonal ssues that range from the redefnton of the economc consttuton and the completon the dvson of power to personal status laws, electoral reforms, and deconfessonalzaton of poltcal and publc nsttutons. As Lebanon s famous for ts economc entrepreneurshp, t remans to be hoped that poltcal entrepreneurshp wll eventually follow to resolve Lebanon s trap of consocatonalsm. VI. References Andeweg, R Consocatonal Democracy. Annual Revew of Poltcal Scence 3. Arnson, C.J., and. Zartman, I.W (Eds.) Rethnkng the Economcs of War, the Intersecton of Need, Creed and Greed. Woodrow Wlson Center Press and the Johns Hopkns Press. Bnnngsbo, H. M Consocatonal democracy and Post conflct Peace. Wll Power- Sharng Insttutons Increase the Probablty of Lastng Peace after Cvl War? Paper presented at the 13th annual meetng of the Natonal Poltcal Scence Conference, Norway. Coller, P. and Hoeffler, A Greed and Grevance n Cvl War. Oxford Economc Papers 56(4). Coller, P., and. Sambans, N., (Eds.) Understandng Cvl War, Evdence and Analyss Vols. 1 and 2, World Bank. Elbadaw, I. and Sambans, N External Interventons and the Duraton of Cvl War. World Bank Polcy Research Workng Paper Food and Agrcultural Organzaton (onlne), Inequalty n Access to Food and to Income, (Accessed: September 30, 2008). Gates, C The Merchant Republc of Lebanon: Rse of an Open Economy, I. B. Taurs, London. Hudson, M Tryng Agan: Power-Sharng n Post-Cvl War Lebanon Center for Contemporary Arab Studes, School of Foregn Servce, 251 ICC, Georgetown Unversty, Washngton, DC, USA. 14

16 Topcs n Mddle Eastern and Afrcan Economes Keen, D., Incentves and Dsentwnes for Volence n: Berdal, M., and Malone, D. M. (Eds.) Greed and Grevance: Economc Agendas n Cvl Wars. Lynne Renner Publshers. Ljpart, A Democratc Patterns of Majortaran and Consensus Government n Twenty-One Countres. New Haven: Yale Unversty Press. Makds S., Kwan, F. and Marktanner, M Lebanon: The Constraned Democracy and ts Natonal Impact n: Elbadaw I. and Makds, S. (Eds.), Explanng the Democracy Defct n the Arab World: Ol, Conflcts and Beyond, forthcomng Makds, S Rebuldng wthout Resoluton, the Lebanese Economy and State n the Post-War Perod. In Bnder, L. (Ed): Rebuldng Devastated Economes n the Mddle East, Palagrave: Macmllan. Makds, S and Sadaka, R, 2005 "The Lebanese Cvl War, ", P. Coller and N. Sambans (eds.), Understandng Cvl War :Evdence and Analyss, Vs. I and II (The World Bank). Marshall M. G. and Jaggers K. (onlne), Polty IV Project: Poltcal Regme Characterstcs and Transtons, , (accessed: September 28, 2008). Reynal-Querol, M Ethncty, Poltcal Systems and Cvl Wars, Journal of Conflct Resoluton 46(1). Sambans, N Ethnc War: A Theoretcal and Emprcal Enqury nto ts Causes. DECRG World Bank paper. Schneckener U. 2002, Makng Power-Sharng Work: Lessons from Successes and Falures n Ethnc Conflct Regulaton. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 2.. UNCTAD Least Developed Countres Report. Unversty of Texas Inequalty Project, Estmated Household Income Inequalty Data Set (EHII), (Accessed: September 30, 2008). Uppsala Conflct Data Program (UCDP) and Internatonal Peace Research Insttute Oslo (PRIO): Armed Conflcts Dataset, (Accessed: November 30, 2008). 15