~I~ ~ I ~Im II~ D E 9 3 D A. Date Printed: 11/03/2008. JTS Box Number: Tab Number: Document Title: Document Date: Yemen. Document Country: R01951

Transcription

1 Date Prnted: 11/03/2008 JTS Box Number: Tab Number: Document Ttle: Document Date: Document Country: lfes D: lfes 13 9 The Republc of Yemen: Pre- Electon Preparatons of Report of Delegaton Yemen R01951 ~~ ~ ~m ~ D E 9 3 D A

2 /THE REPUBLC OF YEMEN ~ /' Pre-Electon Preparatons '.., Report of the Delegaton 25 January -1 February 1993 ELECTORAL REFORM SOCETY Mchael Meadowcroft Patrck Bradley Gllan Felvus F. Clfton Whte Resource Center nternatonal Foundaton for Electon Systems t, rg th Street. NW ' Washngton. DC NTERNATONAL FOUNDATON FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS Ketll Klne Dr. ROlla!d Wolfe

3 REPORT OF DELEGATON 25 JANUARY - 1 FEBRUARY 1993 CONTENTS A. B. NTRODUCTON CONTEXT General Unfcaton Economc Constrants C. UNDERPNNNG Electoral Law Poltcal Partes Law Press and Publcatons Law The Consttuton Poltcal mplcatons Admnstraton Electon System Poltcal Partes The Electoral Process Regstraton Nomnaton Campagn Pollng Day and Countng of Ballots Recoounendatons 10. Specal Cases Mltary and Paramltary Women 11. Tecbnjcal Support :, 12. Observer Teams and the Future 38 CONCLUSON 38 APPENDCES A B C D nformaton Plan for Meda Coverage Draft Electon Publcty Manual Republc of Yemen Electon Law Republc of Yemen Poltcal Partes Law

4 1 THE REPUBLC OF YEMEN PRE ELECTON PREPARATONS ERS/FES DELEGATON 25 JANUARY - 1 FEBRUARY 1993 FOREWORD So that t could have the maxmum effect on the forthcomng Yemen electon we publshed an earler draft verson of our Report. Ths fnal verson dffers very lttle from the draft and manly adds extra text where re-readng suggested that further amplfcaton was necessary. The Report represents the vews of us all but, as a mnmum of textual analyss would show, t s the result of a number of dfferent pens, partcularly that of Keth Klen who drafted a consderable amount of the Report. We have made no attempt to unfy the text ". nto ether Brtsh or Amercan Englsh - a majorty vote on such an ssue would not necessarly have been an adequate exercse of democracy!, " "

5 A. NTRODUCTON 1. The unfed Republc of Yemen was commtted to holdng democratc electons by 22nd November 1992, e wthn thrty months of the formal date of unfcaton. The Yemen Government prepared the electon law, the law governng partes, and apponted the Supreme Electon Commttee (SEC). Then, at the begnnng of September 1992, the Electoral Reform Socety (ERS) was approached by the GOvernment wth a vew to sendng a delegaton. At that tme, wth the electon st1 planned for November, t was to be a pre-electon assessment team wth a relatvely narrow bref. 2. By the end of October t was becomng apparent to the Government, and to the SEC, that the detaled preparatons for the electon could not adequately be completed n tme and that the electon would therefore have to be postponed. ntally a date n md-february was chosen but shortly afterwards Tuesday, 27th Aprl, was fxed. Clearly ths changed the character and ams of the proposed delegaton and a broader prospectus was agreed between ERS and Dr Abdulkarm A Eryan, the Mnster of Foregn Affars: status and role of poltcal partes; ctzen educaton and tranng; role of the meda; electon offcal tranng; electon observaton. 3. The Brtsh Foregn and Commonwealth Offce and the Westmnster Foundaton for Democracy agreed to share the costs of the delegaton but t was clear that fnance would only be avalable for a three person delegaton. The nternatonal Foundaton for Electoral Systems (FES) of Washngton DC then agreed to share n the delegaton and to fund two further members. The FES porton of the delegaton was funded by the US Agency for nternatonal Development. The eventual team comprsed: Mchael Meadowcroft (ERS) Former Parlamentaran; Keth Klen (FES) Drector of Programs, Afrca and the Near East; Patrck Bradley (ERS) Chef Electoral Offcer, Northern reland; Gllan Felvus (ERS) Conservatve Agent; Dr Ronald Wolfe (FES) Specalst n legal reform; arabc speaker. The delegaton was n Yemen from 26th anuary to 1st February and the two FES members were able to stay for an extra day whch proved to be very valuable for ts work. There were no restrctons on the delegaton and we were able to meet mnsters, MPs, offcals, partes, meda representatves, and dplomats. We should have preferred to travel further afeld from the captal, Sana'a, but n the event we only had tme to vst Aden, Taz and vllages en route. We were greeted everywhere by helpfulness and by generous hosptalty. We wsh to place on record our thanks to the many Yemens who helped the delegaton pack so much nto a ~hort tme. n partcular we apprecated the work of Abdelhameed M Nasser, of the Mnstry of Foregn Affars, who facltated the delegaton's numerous appontments and travel arrangements.

6 B. CONTEXT 1. GENERAL Background and early development The Republc of Yemen, formed on 22 May 1990 when the Yemen Arab Republc (YARlNonh Yemen) merged wth the Marxst People's Democratc Republc of Yemen (pdry/south Yemen), occupes about 200,000 square mles n the strategc south western comer of the Araban pennsula, where the Red Sea meets the Gulf of Aden, separatng t from Somala and Ethopa. t recently fnalsed a border agreement wth the Sultanate of Oman, but the much longer border wth Saud Araba remans largely undefned. Hot sem desert terran separates the Red Sea coast (the Thama), the Gulf coast, and the eastern Desert from the mountanous nteror. The newly unfed country has a combned populaton varously estmated at between mllon and 14 mllon people (12.5 mllon beng the fgure currently cted by the Supreme Electons Commttee). The great majorty of people are Arabs; most of those lvng on the Thama are of mxed Arab and Afrcan stock. Snce ancent tmes, Yemen has enjoyed a rch hertage of varous Semtc languages and cultures, ncludng Mnaena, Sabean, Hmyartc, and Hebrew. The northern captal, Sanaa, prdes tself on havng been the home of Noah's son Shem after the great flood of bblcal (and Koranc) antquty. Much later (loth Century BC), the Queen of Sheba (Saba) travelled from her captal at Marb n Hadhramaut to meet Kng Solomon n Jerusalem. The Hmyartes (ls BC onwards) were nvaded and nfluenced heavly by Romans, and later the Ethopans and Persans. At the dawn of manknd, ths comer of the Araban Pennsula served as a prmary transt pont nto Asa for peoples comng from the Hom of Afrca, and t s dong so agan today, as perhaps 50,000 Somals uprooted by the present crss have recently sought protecton there. The remoteness of Yemen's hgh mountan ranges from cvlsatons to the north offered a safe haven from persecuton for many groups of people, often slamc dssdent movements, who settled there over the centures. Securty was mantaned by extensve fortfcatons, vglantes and trbal allances. Suspcon of the outsde world was always hgh. Yet from the south and east, the pcture was somewhat dfferent. Coastal Yemen has been relatvely open to outsde nfluences. t has engaged n commercal martme trade (and overland trade, as well) snce earlest tmes, from as far east as ndonesa, the ndan subcontnent, Persa, Oman, and East Afrca on the ndan Ocean, and wth Ethopa, Sudan, and Egypt va the Red Sea... Not surprsngly, the dfferng degree of external exposure of Yemen's mountan versus coastal people has resulted n somewhat dsparate atttudes between the Northerners and Southerners, partcularly wth respect to acceptance of change, the desrablty... of modernzaton, and the prospects for a peaceful transton of power. The anomaly s that whlst Yemen present a facade of ethnc and cultural homogenety, the dchotomy of coastal versus mountan atttudes underles a multcoloured patchwork of other hstorcal. trbal, regonal, sectaran, and now deologcal, loyaltes, afflatons, and nterests that present a serous challenge to attempts to admnster t from the centre. About 60 per cent of the populaton are orthodox Sunn Muslms, whle the remander are Sh'te Zayd Muslms, who ruled North Yemen untl r 1

7 4 The Perod of slamc Rule slam orgnally came to Yemen durng the lfetme of the prophet Mohammed, but n 893 AD mam al-had la al-haqq Yahya, the founder of Zayd slam and the Yemen mamate, arrved. A sa):yd or descendant of the prophet through hs daughter, Fatma, and son-n-law Al, and hs grandsons, Husayn and Hasan, he was followed by thousands of other sa~ds n subsequent centures. The sa):l'jds clam descent from the Quraysh trbe of the Hejaz, and are thus consdered Northern Arabs (Adnans), as opposed to the ndgenous people of Yemen, who are Qahtans, clamng eponymous descent from Qahtan. The Zayds carne to domnate the mountanous northern part of the country. whle the Sunns predomnated n southern and desert areas. Under the Zayd system, the latter were unable to qualfy for the mamate because they were not of ts lneage. By the 16th Century, Yemen formed part of the Ottoman Empre, whch exercsed at least nomnal soveregnty over the North untl the end of World War. Wahhabsm, the purtancal sect of slam that today controls Saud Araba, drove the Zayd mams out of Yemen brefly early n the 19th Century, but Egypt's brahm Pasha actng n the name of the Turksh sultan returned the favour, expellng the Wahhabs n The Egyptans remaned n Yemen untl 1840 when they were replaced by the Turks who gave the Zayd mams full autonomy n the nteror. When Turksh occupaton ended after World War, mam Yahya began expandng hs area of control, resultng n confrontatons wth the Brtsh n Aden and wth Saud Araba. n he sgned border treates wth both powers. The border agreement wth Saud Araba, seen as hghly unfavourable by most Yemens because t cedes mportant areas that were part of Yemen hstorcally. came up for renewal agan n 1992, but remans un-reconfrmed. Concerned by the dsruptve potental of a populous democracy on ther southern flank, the Sauds are now usng lack of fxed borders to challenge ongong petroleum exploraton and producton actvtes by Western companes between the 16th and 17th parallels. After World War n, Yemen began playng a more actve nternatonal role, jonng the Arab League and the Unted Natons, and establshng dplomatc relatons wth other countres, whle the mam contnued to serve as both ruler and sprtual leader. Ths led to growng dssatsfacton, and n 1949 mam Yahya was assassnated n a palace revolt. Hs son, mam Ahmad, replaced hm, and took an even more actve role n Arab poltcs, eventually jonng a paper allance n 1958 wth Egypt and Syra known as the Unted Arab States. The Republcan era n the North nternal strfe contnued under mam Ahmed, however. and after SUfVlvmg a 1961 assassnaton attempt, he ded n Hs successor. Crown Prce Mohammed, quckly overthrown by pro-egyptan mltary offcers on 26 September 1962, nonetheless managed to escape. He organsed proroyalst trbes under hs command aganst the new rulng junta, led by Egyptan-leanng Col. Abdullah al-salal. Republcan rule n the north before the 1990 merger s dvded nto three perods: (1) the Sallal era ( ), a tme of contnued cvl war charactersed by foregn mltary nterventon n whch the republcans were supported by Egypt, whle Jordan and Saud Araba supported the royalsts; (2) a ten-year transton perod ( ) durng whch the

8 ant-egyptan facton among the republcans rolse to the forefront of Yemen poltcs, yeldng a republcan-royalst reconclaton n The Yemen natonalsts were led by presdent Qad Abd al-rahman al-ryan n a bloodless coup n 1974 and was subsequently assassnated n 1977; and (3) the Al Abdullah Salh perod (1978-), durng whch North Yemen acheved substantal poltcal stablty and wtnessed growng prospects for ol-based development. n 1970, the Y AR adopted ts frst consttuton and ntated electons to a Consultatve Councl n early Brtsh colonalsm n South Yemen J The Brtsh presence lt' South Yemen began n 1839, when forces of the Brtsh East ndes Company occuped Aden. Over tme, the Brtsh were able to establsh control over whathad been a fragmented terrtory, occasonally through cesson as n the case of the slands of Kura Mura (1854) and Perm (1857), at other tmes through actual purchase of large tracts on the manland. From 1886 to 1914, Brtan sgned protectorate treates wth numerous local rulers. By 1937, the area thus Controlled had grown to 24 sultanates, emratesl'and shekhdoms, was desgnated the Aden Protectorate as a whole, and dvded nto West and East Aden protectorates for admnstratve purposes. : n 1959, sx states of the West Aden protectorate formed the Federaton of the Emrates of the South, later enlarged to 10 members. n 1963, despte strong opposton from ts populaton, the colony of Aden proper was added to ths group, whch was then renamed the Federaton of South Araba. ', ", Republcan rule n the South Two rval poltcal groups arose out of the opposton to Brtsh presence n south Yemen: the Natonal Lberaton Front (NLF) and the Front for the Lberaton of South Yemen (FLOSY). The NLF led by Qahtan al-shaab was able to gan control of the component local governments, defeat FLOSY decsvely, destroy the Federaton, and force the completon of Brtsh evacuaton on 30,November 1967, ahead of the scheduled departure of 9 January Members of the NLF delegaton negotatng wth the Brtsh n Geneva n November 1967 ncluded Al Salm aj-bedh, now vce-presdent of Yemen's presdental councl. n 1970 the country was renamed the People's ~mocratc Republc of Yemen. The 1970s and 1980s were decades of contnung poltcal turmol n the PDRY. Al-Shaab! was forced from offce n 1969, and unscheduled changes n the top leadershp occurred agan n 1971, 1978 and 1980, when Al Nasr Muhammad was narned as head of state, whle retanng hs post as prme mnster., n 1985 Muhammad resgned from the prme mnstershp n favour of a new cabnet headed by Haydar Abu Balcr al-attas, amdst growng opposton to hs polces. On 13 January 1986, Muhammad ordered securty guards to open fre on poltcal opponents sttng n a meetng he had called, leadng to more than a week of btter fghtng n the streets of Aden and elsewhere n the country that left 10,000 to 15;000 people dead. Wthn a month, Muhammad's supporters had been defeated, he was n exle, and aj-anas was desgnated charman of PDRY's presdum, the poston he held untl the 1990 merger.

9 2. UNFCATON The am of untng North and South Yemen had been pursued spasmodcally over many years. On occason the two sdes had entered nto constructve dscussons only to be aborted by volent ncdents or by deep-seated poltcal dsagreement. Two events catalysed the negotatons of 1988 and 1989 whch lead to the eventual unfcaton. Frst, the end of the Sovet empre had a sgnfcant effect on the Marxst regme n the People's Republc of Southern Yemen. Ther deologcal underpnnng dsappeared wth the collapse of the Sovet regme and the rulng party, the Yemen Socalst Party (ysp), recast tself wth a more extrovert and co-operatve style. The YSP representatves we met were frank about the shortcomngs of the past. Second, though n the desert the boundary between North and South Yemen was hazy, the dscovery of the frst sgnfcant ol deposts were certanly on both sdes of that border. There were obvous gans to be made by explotng these reserves jontly and ths would clearly be facltated by unfcaton. The unfcaton took most observers by surprse and ts relatvely smooth accomplshment has kept t out of the headlnes. Consequently there s lttle general realsaton n the West of the remarkable achevement. The two halves are very dfferent n background. The north s a clear and commtted Muslm regon whereas the south, whlst stll beng Muslm by convcton, does not have the same attachment to vsble Muslm fonnulares. The dfference n approach can be drawn from the fact that the north wshed the consttuton and laws of the new republc to ~ shar'a, whereas the south nssted successfully that they should ~ on shar'a. The north's government was run by the General People's Congress (GPC) whch s an amalgamaton of numerous nterests and whch, snce unfcaton and the legajsaton of partes, has already lost a number of MPs from ts ranks. The unfcaton draws ts legtmacy from a new consttuton ratfed by the two former legslatures and approved overwhelmngly n a referendum n May To avod the potentally dangerous problems that excludng mnsters from the two governng regmes could brng, the leadng postons have been shared between the two partes (YSP and the Gpc), the exstng mnsters have all stayed n offce, or been absorbed nto the Government at a hgh level, producng a large and unweldy Cabnet. The frst parlamentary electons are seen as the means of determnng who should form the ongong Government When we tentatvely suggested to a YSP MP n Aden that unfcaton and democracy were rather a surprse to us, he repled: "When we found we'd gone for democracy, we were surprsed, never mnd you!" Surprsed or not, t s clear that there s a detennnaton that genune democracy should be part of the unfcaton "deal". The two postponements of pollng day nevtably cast doubt n some mnds as to the depth of commtment to democracy of the rulng partes. There were even a few who even now questoned whether they would take place n Aprl. Our vew, shared by the SEC, though not by all the partes, s that from a logstcal pont of vew, t would have been vrtually mpossble for Yemen to have been ready for electons last November. No-one n authorty even hnted that they were bac:ktrackng on ther commtment to genune democracy. Havng got over forty legal partes campagnng wth varyng ntensty, and havng got the regstraton process well under way, t would be very dffcult - and rsky - even to contemplate callng a halt Our mpresson s that Yemen s determned to demonstrate ts ablty to have free electons and to be an example to the Mddle East generally.

10 The delegaton was S1lck by the wde dvergence of percepton between supporters of the governng partes (GPC and YSP) and that of the opposton, of the possblty of far electons. The Government and ts supporters stress ther full commtment to the democratc process and pont to the cross party make up of the Supreme Electon Commttee, n partcular the charmanshp of key commttees by opposton party representatves, as evdence of ther sncerty. n complete contrast, the opposton appears convnced that the whole process s flawed and that the SEC s ncapable of preventng Government manpulaton of the meda and of the electoral machnery. The delegaton, havng done ts best to test the declared processes objectvely, beleves that the governng partes are,genunely commtted to multparty democracy and to an"open democratc process but that, by reason of ther entrenched poltcal domnance, they have the potental to exert an excessve nfluence on the campagn. Gven the natural desre to maxmse electoral success t would be unusual for a party delberately to refran from usng every avalable opportunty. The YSP dd tell us, however, that, n the nterests of consoldatng democracy, they would not be puttng forward a full slate of YSP canddates but would look for sympathetc ndependents to back n approprate consttuences. ;' One potental ndcaton of the determnaton of the governng partes to mantan ther: hold on power at all costs wll be the extent to whch they co-operate electorally. There s a relatvely wdespread belef that the GPC and YSP wll forge a formal electoral allance, n effect to put forward a sngle, unted, government canddate aganst a dvded opposton. There were, however, those - partcularly n the ranks of the GPC - who expressed themselves to be passonately opposed to any such formal allance. We accept that the sngle member consttuency, majortaran, votng system selected, tself encourages cross party tactcs at the consttuency level but we would be concerned f there were natonally organsed canddate wthdrawals. There are two helpful ndcatons of the depth of commtment to the democratc process. Frst, t s apparent that the members of the SEC, drawn from a wde, though not balanced, cross-secton of partes, are workng n a consensual way and reachng decsons cooperatvely n the general nterest of free and far electons. Ths s evdent n the occasonal splts that have occurred between the leadng party members on the SEC and ther party organsatons. Second, t was put to us by opposton partes on a number of occasons that, even f the process EaS shown to be flawed to ther detrment, t would stll be mportant to accept the result n the broader nterest of buldng democracy. No doubt there wll be lmts to such unselfshness. ' L '!! 3. ECONOMC CONSTRANTS Yemen remans one of the poorest and weakest countres n the Arab world. llteracy s hgh; school enrolments are extremely low; 1987 per capta ncome was $420 and $590 for South and North Yemen, respectvely; and most of ts nhabtants are engaged n agrcultural actvtes. Roads between prncpal ctes (Sanaa, Ta,zz, Hodeda, Aden and Saada (and towns n between) have mproved n the last 20 years, but large parts of the country are stll only accessble usng four-wheel drve vehcles va a dusty track or dry rver bed. Yemen has no ralroad or permanently flowng rver.!.

11 The most and fertle hghlands are the country's chef agrcultural regon. Major Yemen crops nclude cotton, produced n the Thama, grans, fruts, coffee, tobacco and Qaal, a relatve of the coffee tree that produces a leaf chewed daly by much of the northern populaton for ts powerful caffene stmulant effect. Qaa1 use was banned n the PDRY, except on Frdays untl unfcaton. Valuable fsheres exst, partcularly n the ndan Ocean, but large-scale explotaton has been dffcult to organse. Apart from petroleum, salt and some qualty grante and marble, Yemen has no commercally explotable mnerals. Vrtually all non-agrcultural needs are mported, 80 percent beng smuggled. Untl very recently, annual remttances of ncome by Yemens workng n the Araban Pennsula, prncpally n Saud Araba, were a major source of hard currency and ncome. Durng the Persan Gulf War, however, Yemen's abstenson from votng on the U.N. Resoluton mposng sanctons on raq after Saddam Hussen's nvason of Kuwat, so offended Saud Araba, Kuwat and other members of the Gulf Cooperaton Councl that they expelled hundreds of thousands of Yemen expatrate workers. The returnees reman largely unemployed. Some are n wretched refugee camps n the Thama plan, but there are reports that others are begnnng to fnd thdr way back to ther former employers. Large lnes are formng every day at the Saud Araban embassy n Sanaa, as Yemen workers queue up for entry vsas that wll allow them to return to work. Yemen's agrcultural resources are facng sgnfcant threats at present. Ground water supples are beng exhausted, and the water table has dropped sharply n many areas, due to poor agrcultural practces, ncludng the ntroducton of bananas and other crops requrng large amounts of water. Coffee export, for whch Yemen was once so famous, has been devastated by the substtuton of _ producton n areas that were once dedcated to rasng coffee. Whle hghly lucratve for producers, Qaat producton has not only destroyed the foregn currency earnngs Yemen once enjoyed, but has converted large areas of land that once grew food for the domestc market, leavng the country ncreasngly dependent on food mports to feed tself. For these and other reasons, Yemen's gross domestc product shrunk by 4.8 percent n 1991, unemployment stood at an estmated 26 percent, and parallel market currency rates fell from about 30 rals to the dollar n June 1992 to nearly 48 by January Hgh nflaton rates have been met wth domestc dsturbances and notng n late 1992, coupled v.th 85 percent salary ncreases to government workers. Not all of Yemen's economc prospects are negatve, however. A large pentup demand for consumer goods exsts n the country, whch means that nvestments n local ndustres engaged n mport substtuton should thrve. Wealthy tradng and ndustralst famles, usually of southern orgn, have arsen n recent years and developed the manageral, commercal and fnancal sklls needed for economc modernzaton. Aden, now termed the "economc captal" of the merged country, retans ts potental for economc development. Durng the frst half of the 20th Century, ts large natural deepwater harbour became one of the world's busest ports, engaged prmarly n refuellng, servcng and entrepot facltes for shps transtng the Suez Canal. The closng of the Suez Canal, concdng wth the departure of the Brtsh n 1967, caused the economc collapse of the port. Despte the reopenng of the Canal n 1975, the unsettled, restrctve poltcal and economc

12 clmate of the 1970s ancl 1980s, and changes n world shppng patterns, ensured traffc through Aden would not return to the level of actvty t once enjoyed. The natural advantages and strategc geographcal locaton of the Aden port reman, bowever. Assumng a successful poltcal transton ensues from the upcomng electons, and gven a lberal economc envronment, and enlghtened, effcent, externally.,orentated management, Aden port could once agan make a major contrbuton, partcularly as a transt ste for contaner traffc at the Western end of the ndan' Ocean and as a free trade and manufacturng,, rone.. Yemen has also take strdes to lberalze nvestment opportuntes. n 1988, North Yemen was ranked 94th on a lst of 97 non-communst countres n ter:nsof ts nvestment clmate. Snce unty,yemen has attempted to Ulprove ts standng by Ssung what s now the most lberal nvestment law n the Arab world and establshng a General nvestment Authorty (GlA) to. facltate and promote nvestment. Yemens own large amounts offoregn captal abroad: one report recently estmated $32 bllon. Havng been drven out of the Gee countres, many would lke to employ ther money at bome. Durng 1992, GlA offcals reported approvng nearly YR 30 bllon (about US$ *1 bllon) n non-petroleum nvestment applcatons, greater than the total nvestment mplemented durng the entre prevous decade. Ths s partally a result of the pressure of large amounts of pent-up captal that found the earler nvestment clmate unwecomng, but s certanly also an expresson of general Yemen optmsm regardng the unfcaton process. GlA offcals noted, bowever, that nvestment applcatons had slowed somewhat n late 1992, concdng wth the electon postponement. r-

13 JV C. UNDERPNNNG 1. ELECTORAL LAW Electoral Regstraton Process - general comments. A total of 1,890,646 persons were regstered to vote at the Referendum on the Consttuton held on 15 & 16 May The offcal estmate of the populaton, as at 1 July 1990, was 11.3 mllon. (Varous sources have estmated that at that tme some 2.5 mllon Yemens were workng abroad, manly n Saud Araba, and subsequent to the events n and about the Gulf War may of those returned home]. Assumng that those of 18 years of age and over consttute approx. one half of the populaton that means that the total number of elgble electors s at least 5 mllon. Clearly then there s stll much to be done to encourage c.tzens to regster. Those regsterng for the 27 Aprl electon totalled 2.7 mllon, of whch about 300,000 are women. Commendable efforts were and are beng made to nvolve women fully n the electoral process, although the stated ams of the electoral law and of the SEC were not always mplemented qute as enthusastca1y at the actual centres. We acknowledge the progress made so far whlst urgng further efforts to encourage the full democratc partc.paton of women. The strrngs of spontaneous organsaton by women keen to exerc.se ther rghts should be asssted as, perhaps, the healthest and most encouragng consequence of the regstraton process. Of course there are varous reasons why t may well be dffcult to obtan as hgh a regstraton rate as desred. The relatvely hgh level of llteracy s one such reason whch makes the process that much more dffcult. Also the hstorc constrant on the role of women s one that wll take tme to overcome. One fear expressed to us, that may more easly be expunged s that perceved lack of real secrecy n the votng process; after all can not an ndvdual's ballot paper be traced? Such unease s not confned to Yemen and addtonal safeguards can be bult nto the system to remove such fears. The forthcomng electon s unque n varous ways and, n any event, as any changes n the law could not be mplemented untl after the electon t s thus more approprate to concentrate on the general nature of the regstraton process and, accordngly, we would make the followng comments and suggestons on some of the specfc artcles of the Electon Law. Artcle 11 - the annual regstraton revew to be carred out each January Artcle 49(b) refers to general electons takng place n November of each electon year. That would result n a gap of some nne months between the preparaton of the Regster and a pollng day. The closer the regstraton perod s to the poll the more accurate the regster to be used. Conversely the older the regster the more naccurate t wll be. Accordngly we would suggest that the perod specfed for regstraton be reconsdered f the month of November s to reman desgnated as the perod for future parlamentary general electons. t should at least be possble to regster up to the end of the precedng Aprl. Of course, the tmng of local electons would also have some nfluence n the selecton of the most approprate perod. The revew referred to n paragraph a. of Artcle 11, of the voters' regster could be expanded to ncluded a revew of the number and locaton of the regstraton and pollng statons. A draft lst of the proposed locatons could be publshed a month or so

14 before the canvass s to commence and provson made for the submsson of, and the determnon of, any suggested amendments receved. That would make for a more open selecton process and would lessen the potental for serous complants. We expect that, as the party sytem develops, the poltcal partes wll play an ncreasng role n encouragng the publc to regster to vote. However, the current emphass s on the ndvdual takng the ntatve to regster. f effect, ths s a "passve system when, n fact, an actve" system s requred f there s to be a sgnfcant ncrease from the present level - partcularly n respect of women, only some 20 per cent of whom m:e currently regstered despte strenuous effolts. We recomm'end that the regstraton,'authortes accept a responsblty for contactng potental electors to encourage them to regster. Artcle 56 - provdes for the ntroducton of a new canddature n the event of the death of an exstng canddate after the deadlne for the nomnaton of canddacy. The lmtaton set by Artcle 62, requrng the electon stll to be held on the 'set date, may well be mpractcal should the death take place only a day or two before pollng day.. t would, n such crcumstances, be best to provde for an adjourned poll to enable the "late canddate to have suffcent tme to make the publc aware of hs/her polces and partcularly so should s/he be an ndependent. t would also enable the necessary admnstratve'tbanges to be made. Artcle 65 - provdes for the extenson of the votng hours to 8pm. We would suggest that ths extenson be strctly lmted to those who are n the pollng staton at 6pm and unable to vote due to the number of electors awatng the ssue of a ballot paper. deally the doors of the staton should be closed at 6pm and no further voters to be admtted except those already n the staton to be processed. Experence alsewhere would ndcate that that procedure helps to reduce the possblty of electoral abuse that otherwse mght occur. lj, " " Ancle 70 - to help mantan publc confdence n the countng process we would suggest that a copy of the sgned report gvng the countng detals and the result for each electoral dstrct by mmedately posted n a publc place, n or near the count centre, as soon as the count has been concluded. That does not preclude the Supreme Electon Commttee from later challengng any suspect result. t does, hoy/ever, help to dspel rumour and enables the meda to keep the electorate nformed as to the progress of the poll. nd'eed, t makes for a more nterested and nformed publc and thus helps to get the publc more nvolved. t may be' that publc securty consderatons may well ndcate that, as least at the forthcomng electons, t would be best to avod such publc tenson. t would be desrable for paragraph d. of Artcle 70 to make t clear that after the deadlne set for challenges to the results, the ballot papers and other documentaton wll be destroyed under the supervson of the Supreme Electon Commttee. Artcle 71 would then ndcate, should the above recommendaton be mplemented, that the Supreme Electon Commttee would conj1l'l, or otherwse, the results reported by the COlntng Commttee. Artcle 79 4 would thus need to be amended to take that change nto account. Artcle 83 precludes members of local councls beng concurrently members of parlament. We would suggest that, n the lght of experence ganed over the next number of years, that l.! t "!..!

15 ... constrant be revewed. Such dual membershp has Dot been found to be undesrable n other countres. 2. POLTCAL PARTES LAW Our man concern here s the apparent non-applcaton of the law. That, f t were to contnue untl close to the electon, would present practcal dffcultes, for example n the verfcaton of a canddature on behalf of a poltcal party as requred under Artcle 53 of the Electon Law. Also t runs counter to the constructon of the publc percepton that the forthcomng electons are to be properly and effectvely organsed. Of course we are aware that the delay n the mplementaton of the Law s due to techncal dffculty as opposed to the lack of determnon. However, as mentoned above, the publc percepton of event, no matter how naccurate, s just as mportant as the real poston n assurng the publc that a far and free electoral system s n operaton. Addtonally we are concerned lest the delay n the mplementaton wll lead to the loss, or late payment, of the State's susbsdes avalable under the provsons of Artcle 17, n Part Four, of the Law. The settng up of partes, and especally so n the run-up to such an mportant electon, s an expensve operaton. The early avalablty of any properly authorsed fnancal assstance, such as State subsdes, s a most mportant objectve. t would, for example, assst n the producton of newspapers, as provded for under Artcle 30, to publcse a party's polcy or vewpont on mportant ssues. Whlst we do understand that at the present there s the clear need to develop and foster the unty of the country and that need wll probably reman a most mportant one for some tme to come, nevertheless we would hope that n the longer term there could be a lessenng of the prescrbed constrants applyng to the formaton of poltcal partes. For example Artcle 11 precludes the nvolvement of a person born of a Yemen mother as opposed to a Yemen father. 3. PRESS AND PUBLCATONS LAW Whlst n some ways prescrptve the Law has ntroduced some sgnfcant safeguards or rghts. For example Artcle 18 provdes, as of rght, for access by journalsts to offcal sources whlst Part Four provdes to ctzens and others the rght of correcton and reply. On the other hand Artcle 29 does constran non-yemen JOUrnalsts from journeys throughout the country unless the Mnstry s nformed n advance. There may be n the desgn of that. Artcle some degree of concern for the securty of such persons n certan areas but we feel that overall t would be best not to have such a constrant. Perhaps after the experence of a number of electons n the unted country t may be found possble to reframe the law. At ths pont we wsh to refer to the detaled nformaton plan for meda coverage drawn up by the nformaton Commttee of the Supreme Electon Commttee. t clearly ndcates the postve role that the nformaton Commttee perceves for ts self not just n relaton to the Press and Publcaton Law but to each and every aspect of publcty relatng to the electons. We were most mpressed by the determnaton of the charman of the Commttee to mplement the plan n an mpartal and equtable manner. A copy of the plan, n ts Englsh language format, s attached as Appendx A. Though the man weght of the press s pro-government there are - n addton to the offcal party newspapers - some notable ndependent journals. The healthy concept of a "fourth estate" of ndependent journalsm s begnnng to be establshed.

16 J.) 4. THE CONSTTUTON The draftng of the consttuton of the unfed Yemen nvolved negotatons for vrtually the decade from 1971 to t was then enacted by the parlaments of the then two separate unts of Yemen before beng put to, and approved by, a popular referendum n May Part 2 of the consttuton prescrbes the basc rghts and dutes of ctzens whlst Part 3 enshrnes the rght of the people to a free, secret and equal franchse. t also covers n good detal the organsaton of the House of Representatves as well as the Presdental Councl and the Councl of Mnsters. n these respects t provdes substantal Safeguards for the democratc process... s. POLTCAL MPLCATONS. Yemen has never had the level of economc resources that ol explotaton n partcular has brought to many other Arab regmes n the Mddle East. To that extent they have sometmes been regarded as the poor relaton of the Arab world. Added to ths the northern republc was perceved as a strctly Muslm COUDtry whose governng regme had dffcultes n ensurng that ts wrt ran throughout ts terrtory and tended, rghtly or wrongly, to be rather suspcous of vstors who mght draw attenton to or even exacerbate ths stuaton. Unless one had a farly specalst nterest n the regon or n arab affars, the northern republc dd not mpnge greatly on the news nor on one's general conscousness.!, By contrast, the southern republc had a very hgh publc profle most of t uncomplmentary to western eyes and ears. The apparent contradcton of an arab and Muslm country also beng a thoroughgong communst state baffled the external commentators to whom t appeared to be an nexplcable paradox. The accdent of tmng whch placed the unfed Republc of Yemen n the UN Securty Councl at the tme of the crss over the raq nvason of Kuwat - whch Yemen refused to condemn - led to feelngs of frustraton and even antagonsm on the part of the alles. n addton many Brtsh people stll recall the colonal outpost of Aden and the outbreaks of volence there from tme to tme. As s readly conceded by the Yemens, there s currently DO fully democratc Arab country. n the often opaque poltcs of the regon the Yemen stuaton s, perhaps, more dffcult to dscern than most. t appears as f Yemen, havng taken the plunge nto unfcaton, has been unable to stop there and has been sezed wth the dea of democracy. Once havng embarked on ths path the momentum seems to have nexorably carred them on n a determnaton to buld a model democracy for the Mddle East. As one slab leader put t to us: -Yemen wll surprse you... we shall havefoll democracy. not the democracy of the eye dropper. Democracy predates slam. and the West contnued wth the concept of the consultatve Councl whle the Arab and Muslm world went to autocracy and was consequently retarded- The success of the Yemen electon s vtal for the future status and development of the country but t has a poltcal mportance for the whole regon.,,. 1

17 6. ADMNSTRATON Admnstraton - Commttee structure: SupREME ELECTON COMMTTEE Consstng of fve members nomnated by Parlament and twelve others representng partes and ndependents. For ths transtonal commttee the provsons of the Electoral Law were amended so that the makeup of the Commttee s: three representatves from the GPC, three from the YSP, nne from poltcal partes and two ndependents. SX SUB-COMMTEEES Techncal Meda Fnancal Secretaral Securty Legal each consstng of three members. EGHTEEN GOVERNORATES Each wth a Supervsory Commttee of three people. Those comprsng the Commttee supervsng the Governorates (and the consttuences below) must be multparty - no more than one member from the same party - no more than two from the same coalton or allance of partes. 301 CONSTTUENCES Each wth a "prncple" commttee of three people POLJNG STATONS (approx) Each pollng staton has three male and three female supervsory staff. All supervsory staff had to meet certan crtera: Educated lterate Good morals Ablty to deal wth problems Not to be resdent n dstrct n whch workng :

18 7. ELECTON SYSTEM Every electon system has a dfferent effect on the poltcal culture and party system of a country. Party lsts produce strong, natonally controlled, partes. Preferental systems n whch voters number the canddates n ther preferred order - produce more consensual poltcs and tend to reward the more able ndvdual canddates. Sngle member seats, partcularly when, as n Yemen (and the UK) there s no provson for a rerun f no canddate secures 50% of the vote, tend to encourage tactcal votng a2ansl the most dslked canddate rather than freely for one's frst choce. To avod ths the partes may feel they need to do pre-electon deals over nomnatons rather than rsk 'splttng' the vote. n the context of the Yemen, wth many powerful, locally based poltcal leaders ths system may well have been the prce for the support and nvolvement of these leaders for the democratc process. t s to be hoped that ths electon system does not produce ether so dsproportonate result n party terms or so fragmented a parlament as to nhbt the effectve workng of government and the contnued development of democracy. 8. POLTCAL PARTES The more than forty regstered partes n Yemen are mostly small n sze and are centered around a partcular ndvdual, famly or trbe. Whle all poltcs and poltcal afflaton n.. Yemen s strongly nfluenced by personalty and by personal and famly loyalty, there are some partes whch do have hstorcal roots that go beyond personalty or have a broader level of deologcal or organzatonal coherence. There are currently few means of testng the varous partes' grassroots strength and abltes to become permanent, vable poltcal forces. Some ndcatons of popular support and organzatonal capacty wll come wth the nomnaton of canddates, as only the stronger partes are lkely to feld anythng close to a full slate of 30 1 canddates. The pre-electon negotatons on party cooperaton and coaltonbuldng wll also be a sgnfcant ndcaton of relatve party strength as reflected n each partes' ablty to negotate favorable terms for tself.! : t, On another level, party strength and vsblty have been derved from partcpaton n the current House of Representatves whch encompasses the 159 members of the former Y AR Consultatve Assembly (mostly OPC-afflated) and the 111 members of the DPRY Supreme People's Councl (YSP-afflated). Some of these members have swtched party allegance snce the legaluton of opposton partes, wth slab pckng up several seats n that way. n addton, 31 members of the current House have been apponted by the government, about half of whom were drawn from opposton groups, ncludng the Democratc Unonst Party and the Natonal Democratc Front. Eleven partes have been gven a further measure of strength and legtmacy through representaton on the Supreme Electons Commttee. The OPC and YSP both have three members on the 17- member body. Nne other partes have one representatve each, namely slab, A-Hakb, the Federaton of Popular Forces, the League of the Sons of Yemen, the Baathst Party-raq, the Democratc Nasserte Party, the Nasserte Correctve Party, the Nasserte Unonst Party, and the Septembersts Party. These latter representatves were elected by groups of partes rather then drectly by ther own separate partes. The Poltcal Partes Law (Law No. 66) has not yet been mplemented, as the Commttee for Poltcal Partes and Organzatons whch s called for n the Law has not become operatonal.

19 Therefore, poltcal partes are operatng wthout formal legal status. They are thus not Jegally bound by the restrctons mposed by the law, nor are they assured of the rghts that the law guarantees them. Wthout legal status, for example, partes cannot brng sut n a court of law. They also do not receve the State subsdy whch s provded for n the Law. (Artcles 18-19), and partes' access to government-owned meda durng the electon campagn perod s not guaranteed as specfed n the Law (Artcle 31). (nstead, the SEC's nformaton Commttee has developed a de facto defnton of a party deservng meda access as one whch s runnng a mnmum number of parlamentary canddates n the Aprl electon.) The ERSFES delegaton held extended dscussons wth four partes durng ts vst to Yemen, the YSP, the GCP,!slah, and the Nasserte Unonst Party. The delegaton also met wth other partes n group meetngs. The followng descrptons of poltcal partes n Yemen are based on those meetngs as welllls other secondary sources. The lmted nature of the descrptons s a reflecton of the delegaton's lmted tme n Yemen, and not a reflecton of any favortsm on the part of the delegaton nor of the relatve strength or legtmacy of the partes. The General People's Congress (GPC) One of the two current rulng partes, the General People's Congress marks ts exstence as. a poltcal party from the begnnng of the unfcaton perod. ts orgns actually go back to the early 1980s when t was created by the government of the Yemen Arab Republc as a loosely structured consultatve body made up of local leaders and government offcals. The central government used the early verson of the GPC as a mechansm of mantanng contact and dalogue wth local leaders on ssues of both local and natonal mportance. Durng the 1980s, no other poltcal organzaton was legal n North Yemen. The GPC was gven formal poltcal party status at the tme of unfcaton. Thus, the GPC as poltcal party ntally comprsed nearly all government and trbal leaders n the north. Ther loyalty arose not from deology, but rather was to the government power whch dstrbuted resources, and to some extent to the person of Presdent Al Abdallah Salleh. The GPC remans the party of "the establshment", stll numberng most of ts supporters n the north, wthout a strong party dentty or deology. t has lost sgnfcant support n the north to newer, more deologcal partes, partcularly!slah, and to a lesser extent to the personaltybased partes whch are mostly GPC offshoots (and sometmes GPC creatons). Snce unfcaton, n addtonal to seekng to gve tself a coherent centrst program, the GPC has attempted to broaden ts membershp from a small "vanguard" of local leaders and government offcals to a more broadly based popular organzaton of card-carryng members. t now clams 1.6 mllon members. ts polces are moderate n terms of free-market economcs wth a lmted government role, and a secular socety that respects the values of slam n educaton and elsewhere. t s probably far to say that a vote for the GPC n Aprl s a vote n support of Presdent Salleh and the status quo. Yemen Socalst party (YSP) The Yemen Socalst Party s the former sngle party n the DPRY and t joned the GPc. after unfcaton as a co-rulng party. Because of the former DPRY's much smaller

20 populaton f for DO other reason, the YSP s clearly a junor partner n the current government. t, lke the GSP, has struggled to defne a meanngful program n the postunfcaton, post-stalnst world. t categorzes tself as a socal democratc party. and professes.to have dfferences wth the GPC that are more programmc than deologcal. ts leaders nclude Al Sad al-bedh, the current Vce Presdent, and Haydar Abu Bakr al-attas, the Prme Mnster. The YSPstated to the.delegaton that they now had more members n the north than n the south. n conversaton wth the ERS/lFES delegaton, two members of the YSP' poltboro emphaszed ther party's focus on democracy and modernzaton. They defned the YSP less n contrast to the GPC than to the fundamentalst partes and others whch they clamed not to be fully commtted to non-volence, democracy and modernzaton. They were nsstent that ther party was not longer radcal nor to be feared by other poltcal elements Yemen. t dd not expect to wn a majorty n the new parlament and would be content to be just one of the voces represented there. The poltboro members spoke repeatedly about the mportance of the new parlament Comprsng all parts of the poltcal spectrum n Yemen. The battle that they felt was most mportant to fght was aganst those who oppose democracy, Dot aganst any of the other manstream partes. ".. YSP parlamentary canddates wll chosen by the party's grassroots organs, and ratfed by the Central Commttee. The poltboro members sad that the YSP mght not run canddates n every consttuency and mght rather support ndependent canddates and even those from other partes who were commtted to the values of democracy and democratzaton. They assured the ERS/FES delegaton that the YSP would nomnate female canddates, but they could not say how many. Despte ther vagueness on YSP deology, they stated that the strength of ther party's canddates wll be the YSP program (rather than famly or trbal connectons).!! The YSP and the GPC have been n negotatons for months to fnd a mutually satsfactory way of cooperatng n the parlamentary electons. The apparent goal of these talks s to avod runnng canddates head-te-head n the consttuences, whch they realze would only ad the smaller partes. Meetngs between the partes were contnung at the tme of the ERS/FES vst n late January, wth stll no apparent agreement. Possbltes ncluded a full merger between the two partes as well as less radcal forms for cooperaton. Observers reported that factons wthn the YSP were dvded on whch strategy was most conducve to the survval of the party or at least the retenton of ther personal power... slah (The Reform Party), : " Most observers dentfy at least three nternal strans wthn the slah, whch s Yemen's largest slamcst party. One s a prmarly northern trbal element of conservatve shekhs and ther followers who were formerly afflated wth the GPC (and may stll be). The leader of ths facton s Shekh Abdallah bn Hussen al Ahmar. The second element s the Muslm Brotherhood, a more explctly relgous facton whch calls for the nsttutonalzaton of sllmc Law but does not appear to oppose the development of multparty democracy. ts leader s Shekh Abdul Majd Zndan. The thrd component of slah draws prmarly from the conservatve Wahab sect of slam whch has ts base n Saud Araba. The core belefs of ths facton, whch s relatvely. weak wthn slah, do not allow for pluralsm or a compettve poltcal system.

21 The!FESERS delegaton met wth Shekh Abdallah bn Hussen n Sana'a, along wth an slah member of parlament, Abdullah al-al:waa. They descrbed slab as a moderate and democratc party. They sad that slah was commtted to democracy and pluralsm n Yemen, and to partcpaton n the electoral process despte what they vewed as the GPCYSP conspracy to retan power through any means. They objected to the rulng partes' abuse of ther current poston, n ther monopoly on government power, n the dstrctng process, n establshng the makeup of the SEC, n ther use of the army as potental votng blocs, and elsewhere. They vewed talks of an allance between the GPC and the YSP as an attempt to push slah, and all the smaller partes, out of any role n the future parlament and government. They also emphassed ther comrltment to full female emancpaton and stated that slah was lkely to. have a number of women canddates. Nasserte Unonst Party (NUP) There are as many as fve Nasserte partes n Yemen. The Nasserte Unonst Party clams to be the only one wth legtmate hstorcal connecton to the pan-arabst Nasserte movement of the 1950s and '60s. They assert that the other so-called Nasserte partes are recent creatons of the YSP and GPC, establshed to confuse the voter to the determent of the NUP. The ERSFES delegaton met wth Ahmed Abdul Rahman Qarhash and other leaders of the party n Sana'a. They expressed dssatsfacton wth many elements of the electoral process to date, ncludng the makeup of the SEC and some of ther decsons. They expressed grave doubts about the ultmate farness of the vote. Despte these msgvngs, they were wllng to accept the flawed process as a step n the drecton of true democracy. They wll run canddates n about a thrd of the consttuences, and expect to be well represented n the new parlament. They planned to use that base to contnue to buld the strength of the party and of democracy. Other Partes About three dozen partes exst n Yemen n addton to the four dscussed above. Some have hstorcal roots, but most date ther current ncarnaton from the post-unfcaton perod. Any categorzaton of these partes accordng to relatve strength or by deology s crude and potentally msleadng, but t s possble to generally group them as leftst, centrst, and rghtst partes. Among the leftst partes, whch would nclude the YSP, there are: the Natonal Democratc Front (prncpal fgure, Abdullah Salam), the Yemen Unonst Bloc (prncpal fgure, Umar al-jaw), the Consttutonal Lberals (prncpal fgure, Abdur Rahman Nu'man), and the Baath-raq and Baath-Syra partes. n the center, along wth the GPC, one can dentfy the Republcan Party (prncpal fgures, Muhammad Abu Luhum and Sadq bn Abdallah bn Hussen), the Septembersts (prncpal fgure, Col. Ahmad Karhash), and several partes of Hamdsts, descrbed as pragamatsts who want to go back to the golden days of Presdent Hamd. The rght wng partes, n addton to slah, nclude the League of the Sons of Yemen (prncpal fgures, Abdur Rahman al-jm and Muhsn Fard), and Al-Hakh (the Party of

22 Truth, prncpal fgure Qad Ahmad Ash Sham). There are several small fundamentalst slamc partes whch have professed lmted commtment to the democratc process. There has latterly been an attempt to draw a number of opposton partes together n a loose coalton called the Natonal Conventon. The gudng sprt behnd ths s Mohammed Rahman a-jfr. At the tme of the delegaton's vst to Yemen there were suggestons that the Conference was havng dffculty n keepng ts consttuent members together. 9_ THE ELECTORAL PROCESS Electons are not new to Yemen, but truly compettve, mult-party electons are. Wsely, the Yemens are relyng on ther experence wth legslatve electons as a gude for preparatons for the 1993 electon, but they also seem to realze that the Aprl electon s sgnfcantly dfferent from past electons and therefore the past practces are not a suffcent gude for the organzaton of the current electon. The dfferences le n the fact that the Aprl electon wll be n the context of a pluralstc, mult-party system where a large number of poltcal partes and canddates wll be competng for the 301 seats n the new legslature. Ths competton wll provoke a temptaton on the part of partes and canddates to go beyond the accepted bounds of campagn practces and to use llegal or unethcal means of securng votes. The temptaton to resort to llct practces wll be accompaned by a suspcon that the opposng partes and canddates wll also resort to llegtmate means of ncreasng the vote totals. Because of ths ncreased level of temptaton and suspcon whch s nherent n any newly establshed compettve system, there must be bult nto the system addtonal safeguards that were not necessary n prevous sngle-party electons..,,. A second dfference arses from the fact that the rulng partes have the status of beng two out of the several dozen competng partes n the electon, yet at the same tme, they stll control many of the resources of the state. Unlke n prevous electons, safeguards must be put nto place to ensure that the rulng partes wll not msuse state resources to ther electoral advantage. Prmary among these safeguards n a hgh level of transparency, where decsonmakng processes that relate to electon admnstraton as well as the use of publc funds and other resources are fully open to scrutny by all ctzens. Ths requres a level of openness to publc questonng and crtcsm that may go beyond the practces of the past. A thrd major dfference les n the need for partcpaton n the Aprl electons to be as hgh as possble n order to provde true legtmacy to the new governnent. The relatvely low partcpaton rates of past electons wll no longer be acceptable, because the new government wll acheve secure legtmacy only nsofar as t s establshed wth the consent of the Yemen people. Therefore, the SEC must nsttute polces that are conducve of a hgh partcpaton rate. Most mportantly, the SEC should make t as easy as possble for ctzens to regster and to vote and should undertake an actve program to nform voters and to encourage ther partcpaton. t was evdent to the ERS/FES delegaton that the government of Yemen and the SEC are fully cognzant of the specal nature of the upcomng electon and have made a good start n ntroducng the needed safeguards and n encouragng voter partcpaton. Ths chapter of the ERSFES report wll look more closely at how the Electoral Law and related laws are beng put nto practce, and at the planned steps n the process leadng up to Aprl 27, wth a focus on the specal needs of a mult-party electon. The followng secton wll not descrbe the

23 sequence of planned events n detal, but wll rather underlne areas needng clarfcaton, revson, or montorng. a) Regstraton Regstraton Organzaton Voters' regstraton began n Yemen on 18 January at approxmately 2,000 regstraton centers around the country. n each regstraton center, two branch commttees have been establshed, one made up of three men and the other of three women. These branch commttees report to prncple or man commttees establshed n each of the 301 consttuences, havng '3 smlar structure of one presdent and two members. Supervsory commttees have been formed n each of the 18 provnces or governorates. These threemember supervsory commttees have organzatonal and budgetary responsblty for all regstraton and electon actvty n ther provnces. They report drectly to the Supreme Electon Commttee n Sana 'a. Durng the last week n January, the ERSFES delegaton vsted more than ten regstraton centers n and around Aden, Ta'z and Sana'a, where regstraton was proceedng smoothly. Elgble voters come to the regstraton centers between 0800 to 1300 and 1500 to 1800 any day of the week. They can prove ther elgblty to vote by producng ther natonal dentty card or two wtnesses who wll vouch for the nformaton beng gven. Regstraton workers fll out three forms, one of whch s gven to the voter as hs/her regstraton certfcate. A black-and-whte photo s taken and attached to the certfcate. A second photo s retaned wth the duplcate forms, eventually to be sent to the consttuency center. The process as observed by the delegaton takes 5-10 mnutes per person. On average, each regstraton center had an estmated 3,000 elgble voters n ts assgned area. f a perfect partcpaton rate was to be acheved, an average of 100 ctzens should be regstered per day. As Yemen entered the second week of the regstraton perod durng the delegaton's vst, regstraton rates were runnng well below that average. Revew and Revson Process The regstraton perod s scheduled to end on February 19. Followng the close of regstraton, there wll be a perod when regstraton lsts for each center wll be posted publcly. Appeals may be made to add or delete names from the lst before the defntve lst s establshed that wll be used on Aprl 27. Secton Two of the Electoral Law ncludes detaled provsons for ths revson and appeal process. n the future, regstraton wll take place n January of each year. n a "normal" year, followng a one month regstraton perod, the followng steps wll be undertaken:

24 Feb. l~s: Feb. 1-20: Feb. -March 15: March 16-20: March 16-Aprl5: Aprl S-May 31: Votng regsters are posted n publc places n each consttuency.. Applcatoncan'be made to the dstrct (prncpal) commttees to nsert or delete names. Commnee rules on deleton and nserton applcatons. Commttees' decsons are posted. Judcal appeals to the commttees' decson may be fled. Coun of frst nstance's rulng may be appealed to the provncal Coun of Appeals. n a normal year, therefore, the regstraton, revew and appeal process takes fve months. For ths transton electon n Aprl 1993, Artcle 85 of the Electoral Law permts the SEC to establsh the tme lmts for the varous steps that are descrbed n Part Two of the Law. n 1993, all steps leadng to the establshment of a fnal voters' regster must be completed by the day on whch electons are called, whch s March 28 at the latest (thrty days pror to the electon date.) Thus, the fve-month process must be condensed to a lttle more than two months. All appeals and revsons to the regsters must be completed wthn about fve weeks of the end of the regstraton perod. The Functon of Regstraton Among the many functons of a pre-electon regstraton process, two are perhaps the most mportant. t s perhaps useful to keep these two functons n mnd when examnng the regstraton process n Yemen. The frst functon of a voters' regstraton whch takes place pror to electon day s that t accomplshes the essental and tme-consumng task of establshng who s an elgble voter. Potental voters come to a regstraton center wth proof of ther ctzenshp and are gven a certfcate that attests to ther elgblty as voters. Carryng out ths task pror to electon day allows the processng of voters to proceed much more smoothly and quckly on electon day tself. Just as mportantly, pror regstraton allows for the publc postng of regstraton lsts, and thus gves all ctzens the rght and responsblty to partcpate n ensurng that the lsts are accurate. For a regstraton cenfcate to provde relable dentfcaton of the voter on electon day, t must be relatvely secure from counterfetng and from beng transferred from one ndvdual to another. The prmary safeguard that the SEC chose to ensure ths relablty was to requre that a photograph be taken of each regstrant and attached to hslher regstraton certfcate. The second mportant functon of regstraton s that t provdes a wealth of useful nformaton to electon admnstrators. Ths s especally true n countres such as Yemen, where voters must vote n the consttuency where they are regstered. As a result of the regstraton process, those who are planung the electon know wth some precson how many voters to expect n each consttuency and n each area of the consttuency. Wth ths nformaton, the approprate number of pollng stes can be set up, and the correct number of ballots and other materals can be sent to each ste.

25 Regstraton and the establshment of regstraton lsts for each pollng staton also contrbutes to the preventon of electon day fraud by makng t more dffcult for a person to vote more than once. The advantages of pre-electon regstraton are accompaned by some dsadvantages. Most mportantly, t puts an extra burden on the voter, who must take'part n the frst step of the process--gettng regstered--n order to take part n the second-"cast.ng hslher vote on electon day. Puttng the burden on the potental voter to regster some weeks or months before an electon means that some nevtably wll not or cannot regster. And they wll not, therefore, be able to vote. The potentally exclusonary effect of regstraton makes t ncumbent on the authortes to make regstraton as smple and easy as possble, assumng that the goal s to have as hgh a percentage as possble of elgble voters exercse ther rght to cboose ther leaders. Strengths of the Regstraton Process n Yemen Yemen, as do most countres, has chosen to nclude a voters regstraton process n ts Electoral Law. n dong so, t has mplctly chosen to bear the very large expense of conductng regular regstraton campagns as well as to work aganst the potentally dsenfranchsng effect of the regstraton requrement. The ERSFES delegaton was generally mpressed by the Government of Yemen's success n meetng both of those responsbltes. The government had already commtted several mllon dollars to the regstraton process, wth most of that money gong toward the costs of hrng the thousands of needed regstraton workers (at 700 rals a day) and of buyng two polarod cameras for each regstraton center for the takng of photographs of the voters for the regstraton certfcate. The SEC had also establshedapproxrnately 2,000 regstraton centers, 5 to 17 centers n each of the 301 consttuences. n prncple, no voter would have to travel an undue dstance n order to regster. The thrty-day regstraton perod also gave adequate tme to each voter to regster. n addton, the SEC sought to mtgate some of the nconvenences of the regstraton process by establshng both men's and women's commttees at each of the regstraton centers. Ths was partcularly mportant for women, who could produce ther proof of ctzenshp to an alwomen's commttee, and would have ther photograph taken by a woman. n prncple, women who wear vels n publc, as do a majorty of the women n the former North Yemen, would have no reluctance to remove ther vels for a female photographer. The SEC also sought to ncrease the rate of partcpaton n the regstraton process by conductng a publc nformaton campagn through the government and prvate meda. An nformaton commttee was establshed wthn the SEC whch was gven the responsblty of devsng and carryng out such a campagn n collaboraton wth representatves of the varous meda. A more detaled descrpton of the meda campagn follows n a later secton of ths chapter.

26 Problems wth the Regstraton Process The delegaton observed several problems wth the regstraton process, partcularly n the area of partcpaton, whch should be noted. Frst, n regard to women's partcpaton, the delegaton was told that, more than a week nto the regstraton perod, women's co~!lfes. had been consttuted only n the ctes of Sana'a, Ta'z, Aden. and HOdedah. Whle these ctes do consttute the largest concentratons of elgble voters, the lack of women's commttees n most areas of the COUDtry. was potentally dsenfranchsng all women n those areas. The SEC sad that the number of establshed women's co~ttees was growng daly durng the second week of the regstraton perod, but the possblty~maned that the S~C would not fulfll ts ~gal oblgaton of establshng women's commttees at all regstnton centers, and that a sgnfcant percentage of women would be dened the rght to regster and therefore to vote... The requrement of a photograph to be attached to each regstraton certfcate also consttuted a major barrer to full partcpaton by women. The delegaton was told that women would accept beng photographed wthout vels by other women, and havng that photograph be a part of the certfcate. The problem arose from the second copy of.the photograph, whch was retaned at the regstraton center and would eventually be pas~ed on to the prncple commttee n each consttuency where t would be fled wth the duplcate certfcates. Many women (and/or ther husbands, fathers and older brothers) dd not want ther photographs travelng beyond the local center, where they are lable to be seen by men. There seemed to be some publc mspercepton that the duplcate photographs would.be sent to the governorate level, or even to Sana'a. t was not clear to the ERSlFES delegaton, however, whether an understandng that the photos would not crculate beyond the consttuency level would releve the anxety of most women.! l,.! n the regstraton centers vsted by the delegaton durng ts stay n Yemen, female regstraton was runnng at a rate that was approxmately 10-20% of that of male regstraton. t was clear that many f not most women would choose not to regster and vote, because of the photograph requrement or for other reasons. Many women were lkely to not even have the opton of regsterng unless the SEC worked very quckly n establshng women's commttees n all areas of the country. The publc nformaton campagn to promote regstraton was underway at the tme of the delegaton's vst. Both the news and program components of :government rado and televson devoted sgnfcant tme to regstraton and to the more general topc of mult-party democracy. Some Yemen observers complaned, however, that ths programmng was both too lttle and too late. One reason for that lack seemed to have been the SEC's nformaton Commttee's lateness n ssung the plan and gudelnes for meda coverage of the electon process. b) Nomnaton The nomnaton of canddates for seats n the natonal parlament s the next step n the dectoral process after the completon of regstraton. Accordng to the Electon Law, n a -normal" year when the electon of parlament takes place n November, electons must be,,

27 called by the Charman of the Presdental Councl at least one month before the electon date (Artcle 49). Applcatons for canddacy must be submtted wthn ten days of the call for an electon (Artcle 52). Therefore, accordng to the Electon Law, n 1993 the perod for the nomnaton or applcaton of canddates must begn by March 28 at the latest, 30 days before the Aprl 27 electon, and extend for ten days, untl Aprl 6. However, as noted above, Artcle 85 of the Electon Law permts the SEC to reduce any tme perod provded for n the law. At the tme of the delegaton's vst, t was not clear what day has been or wll be set by the SEC for the Openng of nomnatons, nor was t clear whether the nomnaton perod would extend for ten days or less..... The lack of clarty n the Electon Law, partcularly for ths transtonal electon, gves rse to several ssues and questons regardng ths step of the process. The ERSFES delegaton was not aware of whether these ssues had yet been addressed by the SEC at the tme of ther vst ) The Electon Law specfes that applcatons for canddacy are submtted to the Commttee durng the ten-day perod. t does not specfy, however, whch Commttee receves those applcatons, the Prncple Commttee at the consttuency level, the Supervsory Commttee at the provncal level, or the Supreme Electons Commttee n Sana'a. The law also does not specfy f the applcaton must be presented to the Commttee by the canddate n person. Especally f applcatons are to be receved by the SEC n Sana'a, the logstcs of presentng t ether n person or through the post may prove to be an undue burden on canddates n consttuences n the far north or east of Yemen. ) The Electon Law states that canddates' lsts are to be posted n publc places n each consttuency on the day followng the end of the l<h1ay applcaton perod. The Law also mples that whchever Commttee whch receves the applcatons for canddacy wll revew them and regster then offcally only after verfyng the partculars ncluded n the applcaton. These requrements also present a logstcs and communcatons challenge no matter whch Commttee receves and revews the canddates' applcatons. ) The Law s slent on how a potental canddate mght appeal the decson of the Commttee f hslher applcaton s turned down. The Law also gves no gudance to the Commttee on how dsputes are resolved f, for nstance, more than one canddate apples n a consttuency clamng afflaton wth the same poltcal party.. v) There s no provson n the Law for a canddate to regster hslher symbol or color at the tme of applcaton. The lack of a symbol or sgn assocated wth each canddate wll have mplcatons for the desgn of the ballot, as descrbed n the followng secton. The nomnaton of canddates was a topc of ntense dscusson and speculaton at the tme of the ERSFES delegaton's vst. Few f any of the poltcal partes had made publc the lst of canddates who would be runnng under that party's banner. n some consttuences, however, the lkely feld of canddates seemed to be publc knowledge. Some potental. canddates, partcularly those who wll be runnng as ndependents, had made ther ntentons known. n a country where the person s lkely to be a stronger atttaetor of votes than the

28 party, there seemed to be consderable maneuverng gong on to en1st strong local personaltes wth a partcular party. The most ntense forum for maneuverng and negotaton seemed to be between the two rulng partes, the GPC and the YSP. Dscussons were contnung through January and nto February about a possble merger of the two partes and about pre-electora1 agreements that would fall short of formal merger. There was speculaton that the two partes would agree not to run canddates aganst each other n some or all of the consttuences. Whle there s nothng llegal or even nherently undemocratc about ths knd of pre-nomnaton negotaton, t was worrsome to the smaller partes and ndependent canddates who see greater chances for ther own success f the two largest partes are compettors on Aprl 27 rather than alles. e.campagn The Electon Law does not establsh a fxed perod for the electoral campagn pror to general electons, but t does allow the SEC to establsh the rules governng the campagn, ncludng, presumably, the begnnng date for the offcal campagn perod (Artcle 34). The Law does specfy that campagn actvty must end on the day before electon day. The rules for campagnng are specfed n detal n the SEC's Electon Publcty Manual, whch was n draft form at the tme of the ERSFES delegaton's vst n late January. (See Appendx B.) Ths document, drafted by the SEC's nformaton Commttee, elaborates on the gudelnes contaned n the Electon Law n presentng a detaled descrpton of the rghts and lmtatons of a canddate n publczng hslber canddacy and platform. The Manual antcpates the use of fve major meda for the canddates' publcty campagn whch wll be controlled by the SEC, namely publc meetngs, posters, televson, rado, and the government-controlled press. t s antcpated that the manual wll have the force of law, and any volaton of the gudelnes contaned theren wll be consdered an electon crme. (See Chapter 1, Paragraph 18 of the Manual.) The general thrust of the Manual s to (1) remove from government control the use of the means of mass communcaton n the context of electon nformaton and electoral campagnng, (2) provde prescn1>ed means for all canddates to use government owned and controlled meda on an equal bass, and (3) lmt the tme perod, meda and messages that canddates tnay use n publczng ther canddacy and platforms. l '.. L".,. ' Publc Meetngs The Manual specfes that canddates should hold publc meetngs n ther consttuences to present ther platforms to the voters. To hold meetngs held n publc locatons, the canddate must apply for a permt to the Electon Admnstraton Commttee at least one day pror to the planned event. Ths commttee s gven jursdcton to supervse and organze all electon ralles n the consttuency. (Nether the Manual nor the Electon Law descrbes the membershp of the Electon Admnstraton Commttee or how t s apponted.) The Comnuttee can approve or deny the applcaton, and the canddate tnay appeal negatve decsons to the courts. The Commttee's responsbltes nclude establshng a number of publc stes as approprate locatons for electon ralles wthn the consttuency, and allocatng the use of these stes farly to the varous canddates. The canddate may use party headquarters or other prvate property.,

29 26 for electon meetngs and ralles wthout applyng for a permt from the Commttee, but the Commttee must st be nfomlro one day n advance of the event. The Manual does not specfy on what date offcally sanctonro electon ralles may begn. Posters Accordng to the Manual, a canddate may hang publcty posters wherever he/she wshes on prvate property wth the permsson of the property owner. (See Manual secton ) The Manual goes on to mpose strct lmts on where electon campagn materal may be postro, presumably on publc buldngs. The Electon Admnstraton Commttee wll establsh a group of walls and buldngs where canddates may place posters. Each Commttee-approvro space wll be dvdro so that each canddate wll have an equal area for lrslher posters. These publc spaces wll be avalable for use by canddates begnnng the nnth day pror to votng day _ n each approvro space, the canddate may place only two posters. The subject matter of the posters s lmtro to the canddate's platform, and announcements of date and place of electon ralles. The Manual does not specfy a date on whch canddates may begn placng prntro publcty materal on prvate property. t also s slent on the publcaton and dstrbuton of leaflets, brochures, etc. that are usro to publcze a canddate's platform and canddacy. Televson The Electon Law states that the government meda shall put ther means at the dsposal of the SEC_ (Artcle 35.) The SEC's nformaton Commttee has usro that authorty to provde for the mroa a Plan for ther coverage and publcty of the parlamentary electons as well as a Manual on electon publcty. The Plan specfes the types of nformaton that should be dssemnatro by the offcal meda through the sx phases of the electoral process, through ther news and general programmng. The Manual descrbes how poltcal partes and canddates may use the meda as a means of publczng ther canddacy and platform. Under the supervson of the nformaton Commttee, the two televson statons wll ar two half-hour programs daly of electon publcty n the eght days precedng votng day. These eght hours wll be made avalable to qualfyng poltcal partes to publcze ther platforms. The prmary qualfyng crteron for partes s that they have at least 30 acceptro canddates runnng n 30 construences. The nformaton Commttee wll make the determnaton regal dng whch partes qualfy for televson tme wthn fve days of the end of the canddacy applcaton perod. Each elgble party wll be allotted two ten mnute segments to be ared n one of the two evenng tme slots for electon publcty, before and after the 9:00 p.m. news. (Wth eght ho~ avalable, the nformaton Commttee can provde program tme for up to 24 poltcal partes.) Televson srudos wll provde a schroule for tapng the partes' two segments. All partes wll be lmted to a set format, gvng no techncal advantage to any partcular party. One person wll be desgnated by!8ch party to present the party's platform, and t can be assumed that the unform format wll be of the -talkng head- varety_

30 ;/./ The format descrbed aoove does not permt the publczng of canddates names, nor does t gve access' to ndependent canddates. A second programmng format, however, s desgned to publcze canddates' names along ",>jb ther consttuences. n two half-hour nstallments to be ared each evenng durng the nne days precedng votng day, an announcer wll read the names of con.~ences and then the Dames of all the approved canddates n tha consttuency. Ten second~ wll be alloted to the readng of each canddate's name. As hs!her name's beng read, a pcture of one of the canddate's publcatons or posters wll be shown.,'ths readng of co~tuences and canddates wll proceed sequetally through all 301 consttuences, and wll'be repeated over the course of the nne days as tme allows. ~, Rado TheElecton Publcty Manual de.~bes a smlar plan for poltcal partes' and canddates' use of government rado. For the publczng of party platform.~, there wll be two daly one.and-half-hour program.~ (as opposed to two daly half-hour televson program.~), one ared n the mornng and the other n the afternoon, durng the eght days precedng votng day. Each qulfyng poltcal party wll be enttled to two half-hour segments (a.~ opposed to two ten-mnute telev~on segment~). A party'.s 3D-mnute segment wll be produced a.~ a drect address gven by member of the party explanng the party's platform. The prmary qualfcaton for a party to be allotted rado tme s that t ha.~ at least S approved canddates n 15 consttuences. : As v.th televson, there wll be a second electon publcty program on rado, durng whch the names of con.~tuences and approved canddates and ther poltcal afflaton wll he read. Ths hour-and a-half program wll be ared twce durng each of the nne days pror. to votng day. Local rado staton.~ are forbdden 10 undenake any drect or ndrect publcty actvty on behalf of any canddate or poltcal organzaton. Government Press The Electon Publcty Manual al~o descrbes the role of the government-owned press n publczng partes and canddates durng the campagn perod. As Wth rado and telev~on, two formats are planned, one for publczng party platform.~ and the second for canddates and ther platform.~ or slogan.~. Each wll be publshed as electon publcty SUJlllement~ n the government newspapers A-hawra, A-Jumburya, and 14 October. The party publcty supplement wll be dwbuted n the three newspapers durng the eght days precedng votng day. Each day, the four-page supplement wll carry four partes' fuupag~ presentatons. Thus, there wll be space for 32 partes over the course of the eght days. To qualfy for ths publcty, a party must have 30 approved candda,tes n 30 consttuences. Each party may layout t~ page n the format t chooses. The presentaton must be lmted to an explanaton and defense of the party platform, and may not drectly crtcze other poltcal partes. ',

31 :ls n the same three newspapers, the nformaton Commttee wll supervse the publcaton of an 8-page supplement gvng publcty space to canddates.. Ths supplement wll be ssled daly durng the nne days pror to votng day. Each of the eght pages wll be dvded equally nto forty boxes, gvng space for 320 canddates to advertse n each daly ssue. Canddates' boxes wll be grouped together by consttuency The canddate can layout hslher advertsement n the format that he/she chooses, but the presentaton must be lmted to the canddate's name, poltcal afflaton, platform andlor slogan. Crtcsm of any other canddate or party s forbdden. As wth rado and televson, the nformaton Commttee wll supervse the preparaton and prntng of these newspaper supplements to ensure that they conform to the rules o(the SEC and that techncal advantage s gven to no canddate or party. Problems and Recommendatons ) The Electon Law and the nformaton.commttee's documents seem to provde nsuffcent gudance regardng l,'hen a canddate may begn campagn actvtes. Are ralles and meetngs forbdden pror to a certan date? Can a canddate begn to hold publc meetngs and engage n other overt campagn actvtes pror to the end of the applcaton/nomnaton perod? s the dstrbuton of campagn.lterature-flers, leaflets, newsletters - forbdden pror to the end of the nomnaton perod? ) The nformaton Commttee Manual strctly lmts the format for rado and televson publcty on behalf of poltcal partes and canddates. Whle ths s conducve of a level playng feld, not gvng advantage to a party that mght have the resources to make a more sophstcated presentaton, t makes for borng rado and televson. The nformaton Commttee should search for ways to make both the canddates' publcty and the publc nformaton campagn as nterestng and nnovatve as possble wthout sacrfcng the goal of farness and objectvty. ) Much power s gven to the Electon Admnstraton Commttees and to the nformaton Commttee to control the campagn and propaganda actvtes of the canddates. Because of ths, the SEC should establsh suffcent safeguards to ensure that the nformaton Commttee and all the Electon Admnstraton Commttee act n ways that are far and unbased, and s perceved as beng the same.. d. Pollng Day and Countng of Ballots The crtcal 24 or 36 hours of the electon process wll come on Aprl 27 and 28 when the people of Yemen cast ther ballots and those ballots are counted and the results announced. Based on experences wth electons n emergng democraces elsewhere, Apr127 s not lkely to l!e the occason of wholesale fraud, vote theft or voter ntmdaton. The day does present the possblty, however, of more localzed, "retal" attempts to manpulate the votng or the countng. More mportantly, Aprl 27 and 28 s when the suspcon and fear of large-scale fraud and manpulaton wll run very hgh. A major concern of the SEC durng ths perod wll be to reduce that level of suspcon and fear.

32 Other. major concerns of these days that must be foreseen and carefully addressed pror to Aprl 27 are the desgn of the ballot; the desgn, procurement and dstrbuton of other electon materal; the organzaton of the votng process tself at the thousands of pollng statons; the potental for volence, and the need for adequate securty; and the effcency and transparency of ballot countng procedures. These wll be the topcs brefly dscussed n ths secton. Ballot Desgn Artcle 2S of the Electon Law gves the SEC the responsblty of preparng the ballot papers, but the law provdes very lttle gudance on how the ballot s to be desgned. There s even a lack of clarty over whether the canddates wll te dentfed on the ballot wth the ad of sgns or symbols (see Artcle 64). The law does mply that the voter wll be asked to record hslber vote on the ballot paper, and specfes that that act be done n secret. Therefore, the law seems to rule out the use of a French-style multple ballot system, where there s a ballot paper for each canddate. The SEC's nformaton Plan for Meda Coverage assumes a more defnte ballot desgn when t nstructs the meda to nclude n ther nformatonal programmllg'nstructons on how the voter s to wrte the name of hs/her canddate on the electon ballot. f ndeed the ballot s desgned so that the voter ndcates hslher choce by wrtng n the name of hslber chosen canddate, ths seems to present an sgnfcant hurdle for the majorty of Yemen voters who are llterate. n many countres where llteracy s hgh, poltcal partes and canddates are dentfed on the ballot wth a symbol, color and/or flag n addton to ther wrtten name. Some ballots also nclude a photograph of each canddate. The vsual symbol or color s part of the canddate's campagn lterature and posters, so that voters are famlar wth the symbol of. ther preferred canddate. The act of votng then s smplfed as the llterate voter can put hs X or fngerprnt next to the symbol of hs canddate, wthout needng to recognze the canddate's wrtten name. n ths way, many llterate voters can vote wthout assstance, and thus mantan the secrecy of ther \'ote.,. Ths type of ballot desgn, however, present many complcatng factors. Frst, all canddates n a consttuency must choose a unque symbol or sgn that they regster wth the Electon Commttee at the tme of ther canddacy applcaton. Currently, ths step s not requred n the Electon Law. Moreover, ths system requres that dfferent ballots be prnted for each of the 301 consttuences. Therefore, ballots could not be prnted untl the nomnaton process s completed, whch may be less than 20 days pror to electon day. Even f ballots were beng prnted n Yemen, ths would be an mposng task. The ERSFES delegaton was told, however, that ballots were to be prnted by the Brtsh-based company Thomas De La Rue Ltd, wth fnancng from the European Communty. The sngle-member dstrct electoral system, the bref campagn perod, and the choce to have the ballots prnted n Europe together make t nearly mpossble for unque ballots to be prnted for each consttuency that wll dentfy each canddate by name and symbol. "., t may, therefore, be necessary to use the desgn mpled n the nformaton Plan, where the voter s presented wth a ballot on whch he/she must wrte the name of hslber canddate. n ths case, all reasonable efforts should be made to enable voters, both lterate and llterate, successfully to wrte out the name of ther canddate so that they can cast a vald ballot, as

33 often as possble wthout assstance. t mght be suggested that a lst of approved canddates be posted n each votng center so that lterate and sem-lterate voters can copy the name of ther canddate onto the ballot. We also hope that the countng commttees wll accept wrtten names that are clear n ntent even though ms-spelt. Other Electon Materal The other essental tems to be dstrbuted to each pollng center nclude ballot boxes and ndelble nk, along wth the many requred forms for recordng the processes and procedures of votng day. Another tem whch s often used s a votng booth or screen, whch may be produced locally or may be dstrbuted by the central electon commttee. Because votng screens help to ensure the mportant rght of a secret ballot, t may be worthwhle to purchase and dstrbute unform screens to every pollng staton, so that votng secrecy s not abrdged by local practces. The Electon Law says lttle about the desgn of the ballot box. Artcle 66 mples that t should have a slot for ballots that can be locked and sealed at the end of the votng day. Other specfcatons mght be recommended. t should be large enough to hold all the ballots expected to be cast at the pollng place of each branch commttee. n other words, one ballot box should be provded for the men's commttee and one for the women's commttee, and the boxes should be large enough so that there s no need for second box at any commttee. t should be possble to seal and/or lock both the ld to the box and the ballot slot. Commonly used materals for ballot boxes are wood, metal, plastc or cardboard. Caradboard ballot boxes are by far the least expensve, and can be as secure and durable as other models. For psychologcal reasons, however, a stronger appearng materal may be requred, such as metal or plastc. Ballot boxes should be marked wth seral numbers to ad n the trackng of specfc boxes and n ballot securty. The Electon Law specfes that the ballot slot be sealed wth sealng wax at the close of the votng day. The SEC mght consder other smpler methods of sealng both the ld and the slot, such as adhesve-backed paper or plastc seals. Ether of these optons s nexpensve, easy to use, and provde the same type of securty that sealng wax does: t reveals f the ld or slot has been tampered wth. Both plastc and paper seals are commonly made wth seral Dumbers to provde added securty. The Electon Law nstructs the SEC to provde an ndelble substance that wll be placed on the thumb of every voter once he/she has voted (Artcle 31). Most commonly, an ndelble nk s used, for the purpose of preventng a person, who may llegally regstered n more than one place, from votng more than once. Several manufacturers produce an nk that cannot be washed off for at least 24 hours. n many countres where ndelble nk s used to mark voters' fngers, however, there have been complants that the nk can be washed off. The SEC should carefully test nk samples before choosng one to purchase. n addton, t should ~fully test the actual nk, once t s delvered from the suppler. The actve ngredent n. ndelble nk s usually slver Dtrate, whch tends to snk to the bottom of the contaner. Unless the contaner s frequently shaken by the poworkers durng the votng day, the soluton may become too dluted to be ndelble. t s also mportant to apply nk to the nal part of the thumb, because t s n the cutcle that the nk s best absorbed and from whch t s most dffcult to be removed. A further safeguard s the use of UV lamps, whch are now avalable n battery form, to check whether efforts have been made to remove the nk.

34 Votng Procedures. Procedures to be followed at pollng statons on electon day are outlned n Artcles 58~66 of the Eleqon Law. t s the understandng of the ERS/FES delegaton that the votng process wll be admnstered at the pollng statons by three-member branch commttees, smlar to the branch commttees whch admnstered the regstraton process. As wth regstraton; there wll be a men's commttee and a women's commttee. n general, voters wll vote at the same locaton where they regstered. The SEC admts, however, that there wll not be a perfect correspondence between those two locatons, for two reasons: (1) n some cases, the SEC ""ll determne that the buldng or room used for regstraton s not sutable for votng, because t s too small or bas some other dsadvantage; and (2) there,wll probably be a need for more votng statons than there were regstraton centers. deally, the number of regstered voters at anyone branch commttee should not exceed , so that all voters can be processed durng the avalable 10 hour perod. Therefore, f more than 700 men or women have regstered at one center, that regstraton lst should be dvded among two or more electon branch commttees. f possble, t would probably be preferable to locate the two or more commttees who are sharng a regstraton lst n the same general locaton, for example n adjonng classrooms f the votng were taldng place n a school. Voters must then be well nformed n the days before electon day where they should go to vote. t t,.. ' The Electon Law specfes that voters who have lost ther regstraton certfcate may vote f ther name appears n the regster and f they are able to verfy ther dentty by means determned by the SEC (Artcle 63). Often, ths verfcaton process requres that the voter obtan a certfcate from a local communty leader, or that slbe brng one or more wtnesses to the votng staton who are well known n the communty. Ths nevtably slows down the processng of voters, but t s a desrable means of not dsenfranchsng elgble voters. The law does not, however, provde any means for someone to vote f hs/her name has been nadvertently left off the regstraton lst. Ths fact should be well publczed n the SEC's nformaton campagn, to encourage ctzens to check the regstraton lst durng the revew perod to make sure that ther names appear on the lst. Artcle 64 of the Law gves nstructons to branch commttees on how they can assst llterate voters. Accordng to the Law, an llterate voter may be asssted by another elgble voter whom slhe trusts and by a member of the branch commttee. t s not clear whether the llterate voter lls1 be asssted by bnlh of these ndvduals. The SEC should clarfy that questons and ssue clear nstructons to the branch commttees. Whle an element of ballot secrecy s lost, t s essental that assstance DQ1 be provded by the commttee member alone, as that could gve rse to the suspcon that the member s nfluencng the llterate voter or msrepresentng hs vote when the name s wrtten. Voters must be well nformed of ther rghts n ths matter through the SEC's nformaton campagn. Because the branch commttee members wll be called upon on electon day to nterpret and carry out the provsons of the Electoral Law and many other regulatons and procedures set by the SEC, and because they are the 'face of democracy' that wll be presented to all Yemen ctzens on that crucal'day, t s essental that they be well traned n ther task. t.! l..!

35 32 s recommended that at least the branch commttee charmen and women be gven a one or two day tranng course coverng the electon law and procedures, as well as other ssues that they wll have to address n the course of ther dutes, such as crowd control and securty. Tranng sessons should nclude a smulaton of the votng staton set-up and of the processng of voters; to gvecommnee charmen practce at resolvng'the types of problems that wll arse on votng day. We noted, ncdenta1y; that because branch commttee serve n a dfferent area to that n whch they are regstered, they are effectvely dsenfranchsed. One mportant element that s sometmes neglected n tranng electon offcals s the physcal arrangement of the room where voters are processed and cast ther vote. A well-organzed and one-way flow of'traffc through the pollng staton wll greatly contrbute to the effcency wth whch voters can be processed, and also adds to the'securty of the system. As often as possble, votng should take place n a room wth both an entrance and an ext door. The Law specfes that votng wll begn at 8:00 a.m. (Artcle 65); n order to begn processng voters by 8:00, the branch commttees should begn to set up the votng room by DO later than 7:00 a.m. f ballots, ballot boxes and other' materals are stored at the consttuency level before votng day under the supervson of the prncple commttees, the branch commttee members must arrve at the consttuency headquarters early enough on the mornng of Aprl 27 so that they can return to ther pollng ste by 7:00. Experence has shown that the dsbursement of electon materals to branch charmen often takes longer than s antcpated, as t s a process that must be done carefully to ensure strct accountablty of the ballot papers and other materal. Artcle 61 of the Electon Law states that canddates may be present n the pollng statons, and that they may appont representatves to montor the electon process n ther place. The rghts and dutes of the canddates' representatves are not specfed n the law. t s recommended that the SEC ssue explct gudelnes for these representatves n ther role as montors of the votng and countng process. At the tme of the ERSFES vst to Yemen, the SEC was also begnnng to consder the ssung of credentals to non-partsan domestc montors and to nternatonal observers. The SEC s to be commended for ts wllngness to open the votng and countng process to the scrutny of both domestc and nternatonal observers. t s recommended that gudelnes for both types of observers be ssued by the SEC, specfyng ther role, and ther rghts and responsbltes. The SEC should also be prepared to ssue badges or other forms of credentals to both domestc and nternatonal observers. ' Securty Yemen has conducted electons n the past several years that have not been accompaned by a dsruptvely serous amount of volence on pollng day. However, the danger exsts that ndjvduals or groups wll want to dsrupt the votng process on Aprl 27, or, more lkely, wll volently express ther dspleasure wth the results when they are announced durng the nght of Aprl 27 or on Aprl 28. An adequate level of securty must be provded at every pollng ste, to assst wth controllng the crowds watng to vote, and to ensure that volence s not used to dsrupt the votng process. Adequate securty must be mantaned also durng the crucal perods, lkely to occur after nghtfall, when the pollng statons are closed, the '

36 ballot boxes are sealed, the boxes are transponed to the consttuency center, and the countng.of the ballots takes place. Artcle 61 of the Electon Law states that frearms or any other weapons are not allowed to be carred wthn a pollng staton precnct. Presumably, t wll be the securty forces that are assgned to the pollng staton who wll enforce ths artcle of the law. Two areas of ambguty reman, at least n the mnds of the ERSFES delegaton, regardng weapons n. the pollng Statons. Frst, does the term 'weapon" nclude the knfe (gamba) that many Yemen men tradtolauy carry n ther belt? Secondly,the defnton of a pollng staton precnct s not specfed n the Law. t s recommended that the SEC ssue clear nstructons ~gardng where the permeter of the precnct s to be drawn. The SEC should also address the ssue of the gamba. Only wth clear gudelnes wll the securty forces be able to enforce ths part of the law fully and farly.. ; J! Countng Procedures The procedures for countng ballots are descrbed n Artcles of the Electon Law. After the closng of pollng statons, the branch commttee completes'b form that ncludes the number of regstered voters who have and who have not voted, and the number of ballot paper ssued. Ths form s sgned by the commttee members and by the canddates' representatves. Then, the entre commttee and the representatves transport the ballot box to the seat of the prncple Commttee, the consttuency center, for countng. Although the electoral law prescrbes the above procedure t was suggested to the delegaton that countng of the ballot papers wll take place n each precnct. The stuaton should be clarfed. Artcle 67 specfes that countng wll not begn untl all commttees and all boxes n the consttuency have arrved at the center. Because some pollng statons may stay open untl 8:00 p.m., and because some branch commttees may have to travel a sgnfcant dstance, t s lkely that the countng of votes wll not begn untl 10:00 p.m. or later n many locatons. Countng s done under the supervson of the Countng Commttee, whch s, presumably, the same as the prncple commttee, though the Law does not make that clear. The countng of each box s done separately, presumably by the branch commttee charman and members (although ths too s not specfed n the Law). The ndvdual box totals are added up on a statement that s sgned by all branch commttee members and the canddates' representatves. The Prncple, or Countng, Commttee announces the wnner of that consttuency as soon as the count s complete. The countng process descrbed s straghtforward, and only a few comments need to be made. (1) t s recommended that standard forms be ssued to the branch commttees for ther accountng of ballots, voters, etc., and to the countng commttee for the statement recordng the vote totals. (2) n the rush to count the ballots and to see the result, countng offcals are often lax n followng the requred ballot accountng procedures. The record of ~ots and voters must be kept scrupulously throughout the day, especally n these fnal steps, as ths s the only way of defntvely resolvng questons of vote fraud. (3) Access to the countng room must be tghtly controlled so that only the approprate people have access to the ballots as they are beng counted. At ths stage, a chaotc and crowded countng room leaves open the possblty of lapses n ballot securty. (4) After the results are. announced at the consttuency, ballots wll be packed nto several ballot boxes and transponed to the SEC n Sana 'a. The SEC wll revew and certfy the results. Adequate securty.!! j-..!"

37 measures should be put nto place to ensure that the ballot boxes reacb Sana'a safely wthout beng tampered wth. t may be necessary to allow canddates' representatves to accompany the boxes to Sana' a, partcularly n the case of a close vote. c. Recommendatons ) Ballots should be desgned to facltate as much as possble the unasssted votng by lterate, sem lterate and llterate voters. The SEC should work closely wth the De La Rue Company n the desgn of the ballot to ensure that the desgn s approprate to the needs and amdtons of.yemen. ) The SEC should consder provdng standardzed votng screens or booths for every pollng staton as a means of helpng to guarantee voter's rght to cast a secret ballot.-_ ll) Enough pollng statons and branch commttees should be establshed so that each branch _ commttee bas a regstraton lst that contans DO more than voters. v) The SEC should clarfy the process for assstng llterate voters, and that process should be ODe of the focuses of the publc nformaton campagn. v) Branch commttee members, or at least the charmen and women, should receve a thorough tranng n ther dutes pror to electon day. The tranng should nclude a smulaton of the votng process and gudelnes on the physcal arrangement of the pollng staton. v) The SEC should ssue gudelnes on the roles, rghts and responsbltes of canddates' representatves, non-partsan domestc poll montors, and nternatonal observers. v) The SEC should clarfy the defnton of a pollng staton precnct and the polcy on whether a gamba s weapon that may not be carred nto a pollng staton precnct. v) The countng process should not be neglected n terms of provdng adequate tranng to the countng and branch commttees on count procedures and n terms of provdng adequate controls and securty untl the ballot boxes are receved by the SEC. 10. SPECAL CASES a. Mltary and paramltary By the very nature of ther occupaton, mltary personnel, and specfcally army personal, po~ specal operatonal dffcultes to both the electoral regsraton and votung processs. ther dutes may requre them to the transferred at very short notce from the locaton where they are regstered as electors to some dstant place. Even f DOt so transferred they may have dffculty, due to the need to provde contnuous securty throughout the tme the poll s open, n beng released from ther dutes to go and vote themselves.

38 ~ was of some concern that no specal arrangements appeared to have been made for mltary personnel to vote,.e. postal or proxy votng. 35 Havng spoken to servce personnnel n Sana;a Aden, md Taz t became obvous that at the pont n whch we were n Yemen there bad been no partcular orchestraton of the mltary vote. Of those ntervewed some ba~ regstered where they lved wth ther famles,.e. n vllages away from camp, some bad regstered n ther camps, and some bad not bothered to regster at alt. Fears were expressed to us; however, as ndeedweluve also experenced n varous other countres, that the mltary ~ would be jntucncoo by ther offcers n the c8stng of ther ballots. t was also perceved by some that the ejecton J:esults n certan electoral areas could be unfarly nfluenced by the ncluson of a sgnfcant number of regstered ~tary votes who had been transferred,nto the areas' durng the regstraton Perod. Ths s sgnfcant n a c:onsttency based majortarln e1ectoo system. We expressed CODvern to the Legal Commttee regardng the movement of mltary personnel and, therefore, the dsenfranchsement of troops, and the logstcal problem of releasng mltary personnel from camps to ther home vllages to cast ther vote.!.. We were advsed by the Legal Commttee that a solder's place of work for regstraton pmposes bad been defned as the camp at whch be s statoned and that RegstratonlPollng Statons bad been set up n some camps. t was unclear whether ths Was Ol a large scale or only n certan Governorates. We were also advsed that safeguards were n pjace to prevent there beng any undue nfluence of offcers over the troops n ther command. We were further advsed that a new commttee was beng set up to montor the whole queston of mltary votng. b. Women Regstraton Commttees t was dstwbng to note that n some areas, partcularly n the Sana'a Governorate, women's regstraton commttees were DOt n place by the nnth day of regstraton. We were told n one regstraton centre that they dd DOt expect a women's commttee and would only send for one should the demand be great enough. When ths pont was rased wth the Legal Commttee we were assmed that the law would be followed and commttees set up wthn days. We were not n Yemen long enough to cbeck that ths bad been followed through. Photographs The need to ensure the securty of the regster at ths frst mult-party electon UDdema:ndahly led to the decson to append photographs of the elector to the regster and to bs/her relaned document. Ths requrement for photographs for regstraton was causng a certan number of problems: a. Some women dd DOt want to remove ther vels for the photographs to be taken. b. Some women objected to a second pbotograph beng kept wth the electon commttees. Ths occured especally n the urban areas. t " 1

39 Atttudes One of the greatest probl.ems wth women's regstraton was the atttude of the men. We found n some aresa that although the women had no objecton to the regstraton system the men, whether husbands, fathers, or brothers, dd not agreed wth women regsterng to vote, and. therefore" kept ~e.:women away from the regstraton centres. MedalPublcty We were told on many occasols, n dfferent Governorates, that the publcty Surroundng 1he regstraton of women had not beeladequate. Centres had not dsplayed notces statng 1hat separate regstraton commttees were avalable f~ women and n one centre partcularly, whch was normally.used as a mltary offcer's club, the women were most reluctant to enter premses whch would normally be for, men only. Wben these ponts were rased we were assured that the televson would be used atpeak vewng tme to publcst ~th the localty of regstraton centres and the avalablty of women's comnttees. Assurances that notces and posters would be dsplayed locally outsde regstraton centres clarfyng the poston of :women's regstraton commttees were borne out by on ste observaton by the delegaton. Conclusons Although t s probable that the regstraton of women wll be relatvely low, the Supreme Electon Commttee have made efforts to ensure a far system as far as possble, and have taken nto account the specal needs of women n the Yemen. Whlst t s apparent that some areas are not as well organsed as others, t s apprecated that ths s a frst electon and mportant foundatons have been lad to buld upon n the future. 11. TECHNCAL SUPPORT At the tme of the ERSFES delegaton vst to Yemen n late January, preparatons were well underway for the Aprl 27 electon. The SEC had been,n operaton for about fve months, and was to all appearances workng well as a body, able to make compromses and arrve at decsons n a tmely manner on the many large and small poltcal and admnstratve matters nvolved n the process. ts sx subcommttees, whch nclude Techncal, Legal, nformaton, and Securty subcommttees, had charmen elected from the full SEC, and were apparently functonng effectvely. Under the drecton of the Techncal, Subcommttee, the regstraton process had been mplemented, ncludng the recrutment and tranng of most of the needed regstraton workers, and an mpressve communcaton system had been put nto place whch would contnue to functon throughout the electoral perod. The Legal and nformaton Subcommttees were workng together to resolve contentous ssues and to dssemnate polcy decsons around the CO\Dtry. n short, the Yemens were effectvely and resourcefully negotatng ther way around the many potental ptfalls that can dsrupt any democratc electoral system, especally one whch s beng establshed for the frst tme. No one n Yemen wll make the clam that they have acheved a perfect democracy, although t Can justfably lay clam to beng a model for the Arab world. Even though the preparatons for electons are currently proceedng farly smoothly, there are ways n whch externa1 donors can assst the Yemens n makng ther experment n mult-party democracy a model of success rather than falure. The ERSFES delegaton has dentfed areas of need n both materal support and techncal support...,- -': "

40 The mplementaton of mujt1'811y electoral process s a very costly project, and ths cost can create sgrfeant budgetary Stran for a country of lmtea resources such as Yemen. The gov~~ through. the SEC, las already spent mllons of dollars on the regstraton Jjrocess alone, most sgnfcantly for the purchase of cameras for the regstraton centers. and de salares,of the thousands of tempotwy workers who are members of the wpervsory, prncple and branch codlllttees.' t s suggested that exlerna1 donors mght assst wth the purchase of Other supples add materals that can be antcpated. Ths lst would nclude ballots, ballot boxes, votng screens, add Ddebe nk, and, possbly, battery operated uv lamps. Extemal donors could also effectvely assst the success of ths electoral process through sevent areas of teclm'all support. Foremost s pouwojker tranng, whch bas been seen n other countres as a essental step n ensurng that electon day pjoceeds as smootby and as free of fraud as possble. More than ted thousand pouworkers wll evenbjady Deed to be traned. Ths should begn wth a thorough tranng of central and provncal electon offc8ls, and possbly contnue wth the tranng of a travelng group of core traners. External donors could assst by provdng experts n the desgn and mpjementaton of pollworker t'anng~ 37 l ':, Arotber area that s too often neglected at the tme of frst mujt1'811y electons s voter educaton, as carred out by the government or de electon commsson. n Yemen, de nformaton Subcommttee of the SEC las planned, and already begun, ad mpressve program of voter nformaton usng the government-controlled mass meda. To be effectve, t s mportant that the nformaton Subcommttee have the resources to carry out ts program as planned. t s also mportant that the program be magnatve and nterestng, and that t reach out to ad sectors of Yemen socety n all areas of the country. External donors mght consder provdng techncal asss1ance n ths crucal area. The credblty of a electoral process, partcularly n the context of both nter-party suspcon and 8 Df'.Wly-estab1shed system, can be heghtened through a program of ejecton montors and observers. The most effectve electon montors are local ctzens who have a vested nterest n a successful outcome. Ther nterest can be n the success of democratc electons n general, that s, a non-partsan nterest, OJ' n the success of a partcular party or canddate. Ether type of domestc montor can playa very mportant role n reducng the chances of fraud durng the votng and counrlng process, as well as n reducng the fear of fraud and of 'other abuses of the system. To be effectve, both partsan and non-partsan domestc montors must undergo a tranng 011 the electoral law and regulatons, and on ther roles, rghts and responsbltes. Ths s an area wbere external donors mght assst by provdng traners, and possbly advsors from other DCWly democratzng countres who have acted as electon montors. The SEC and the Mnstry of Foregn Affars n Yemen bave ndcated dler wllngness to welcome nternatonal observers of the Aprl electons. nternatonal observers,lke domestc montors, can playa useful role n reducng both fraud and the suspcon of fraud. Just as mportantly, observers from outsde Yemen can assst both Yemens and the nternatonal communty n assessng de legtmacy of the electoral exercse. Donor COUDtres, therefore, can gve asss1ance to Yemen democracy by sendng observer delegatons. A further need that s best met by ad external donor or non-governmental group s de coordnaton of the brefngs and deployment of observer delegatons, so Chat dley are used as effectvely.. $ possble.. :