THE SOVIET UNION: PROSPECTS FOR REFORM

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1 Mini-Review MR-84E THE SOVIET UNION: PROSPECTS FOR REFORM Wolfgang Koerner Political and Social Affairs Division 20 February 1991 A & iciocio Bibliothèque du Parlement Research ranc

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3 pir~4k~ (; CANADA THE SOVIET UNION: PROSPECTS FOR REFORM It is now apparent not rule over promised land like Mikhail Gorbachev will Soviet reform is lurching along an uncertain path favoured methods Soviet repression have again been applied in Baltics and Gorbachev is now seen by many as little more than an interim leader desperately clinging to power who decry recent events However to those as certain evidence a return to Stalinist absolutism one might suggest exercise common sense In coming to understand events as y unfold it is important that we do not do so through prism our own values and our own political framework It is tempting to assume that once Soviet 11 people are granted ir political rights y will exercise m in a fashion similar to our own expect a people institutions and Our traditions are not irs and we cannot with little knowledge free markets suddenly or experience to accommodate democratic mselves responsibilities for which y are in no sense adequately prepared to This is not to suggest that Russians will never assert socio-democratic values similar to it is merely to emphasize that ir seeming desire to do so may not be~as natural -an inclination ~as~we~would~like-to believe In part Gorbachev s dilemma is similar to that Russian rulers before him Czarist and Bolshevik alike Desirous bestowing freer institutions y would at some point recoil from immensity and apparent impossibility task usually when it became a question surrendering or weakening ultimate authority state historical absence democratic institutions has meant that any genuine effort to emancipate society had to be a leap into unknown end result which might be not an orderly system constitutional government but anarchy an explosion pent-up popular grievances and aspirations which could destroy not only ruling authority empire but empire itself

4 2 One is here reminded Alexander I and Nikita Khruschev good intentions Czar former imbued with Enlightenment precept began his reign with a flurry reforms se included abolition worst forms corporal punishment efforts to ameliorate conditions serfs a thorough re-organization inefficient machinery administration sive educational reform and by standards times progres- Khruschev Stalin s successor was tempted to reform by dictates a more humanist socialism lasted long Holy Al aimed Neir experiment Alexander came to support reactionary absolutism and education was soon subjected to strict thought control at eradicating any progressive ideas Revolution and echoes French Similarly ffl~ruschevwas never able to take principles reform to ir logical conclusions While he may have hoped to improve situation Soviet peasant he never tampered with collective farm system In end he did not outlive his critics who saw serious reform as undermining essential character Soviet system and ir privileged status within it A mild form criticism could tolerated under eir system from time to time only requirement was that be its expounding not do excessive injury to assumptions upon which ruling authority was based or that it be in interest state to have it vented Certain works Solzenitsyn were ficially published when y served purpose helping to criticize excesses Stalinist period Once Solzenitsyn s criticisms proved no longer desirable direct consequence ir insight and relevance to Soviet life a good author found himself in foreign exile Similarly Paul Pestel a young career ficer in Czar Alexander s military and member revolutionary Decenibrists was a welcome friend at court His intellectual iconoclasm was appreciated until it implied crucial step overthrowing Czar Pestel reupon became not first revolutionary to be hanged for drawing wrong conclusion reforms initiated by Gorbachev are as far-reaching and pround as any in Russian history Perestroika represents more than a

5 3 mere tinkering with a moribund system or a program specific reforms It is a process without a definite objective designed to encourage Soviet citizenry to take ir destinies into ir own hands Partly because he remains a socialist its chief architect Gorbachev like his reform-minded unknown predecessors has This is unandab not taken that final leap into for leaps into unknown are leaps faith and dogmas Marxist-Leninist ideology permit no such heresy motives for reform are to be found in concrete circumstances with which Gorbachev is faced and not in any democratic sentiment y se problems had long been focus Soviet concern but had never been confronted by degree realism brought to Soviet thinking and policy-making by Gorbachev If his experiment is to he needs not only to convince Russian people but also to acquire more Western trade and technology modernize Russia s He needs se for three basic reasons : inefficient overcentralized planning methods to to improve efficiency economy as a base for Soviet militaryindustrial complex and to modernize non-defence sectors in order to be able to provide his people with basic necessities life Gorbachev s reforms were meant to have a twold purpose First y were to encourage Soviet people to adopt new initiatives in addressing ir socio-economic problems excessive reliance on state and thus to turn from ir Secondly y were to present a more positive image Soviet Union to West hope was that a less belligerent Russia would find it easier to attract investment loans and expertise required to ~deal with country s problems Although recently tarnished Soviet Union s image was dramatically altered with freeing Eastern Europe and initial attempts to move towards more democratic politics However western investment and loans have been slow in coming partly due to what are perceived as reverses to democratic process and Gorbachev s alignment with more conservative elements Soviet hierarchy Gorbachev has assumed much power and can like his Czarist predecessors rule by decree However issuing decrees is one thing having m fulfilled is anor While ideology collectivism has been discredited it has not been

6 4 replaced by any compelling new sense purpose and Russians remain a people more famous for ir poetry than ir industry last vestiges individual initiative and market economics were abolished when Stalin undid reforms Lenin s new economic policy [NEP] This is sometime ago ( 1929) and it is refore not surprising that successes perestroika have been in foreign policy rar than in domestic arena Instilling long-forgotten values in a public become lethargic and dependent is no easy matter Indeed despite his best efforts Gorbachev has lost control domestic agenda; this perhaps explains his apparent retreat to precepts a less desirable era In terms international politics while image Soviet Union has improved its ability to project power and effectively to pursue Soviet strategic interests has declined Indeed it would not be an exaggeration to argue that Soviet Union no longer has power left to shape events in matters foreign policy Its most important decision was to relinquish a position it could no longer hold and its achievement was to do so in a spirit cooperation Although Soviets still have a large arsenal new currency international power is economic and technological although still important to international only be one as a contributor 1 Thus Soviet role can now and not a shaper events ir strategic position in Eastern Europe is gone challenge domestic problems having brought home realization that Soviet control over Eastern ~Europe ~could be maintained only at too dear ~a~cost : Similarly Gorbachev soon recognized inevitable with regard to East Germany dramatic changes in Soviet foreign policy n came about as a series controlled predicated by internal economic collapse and realization that Soviet rebuilding could not succeed in isolation question that remains is to what extent can West be a positive contributor to Soviet rebuilding? are experiencing economic ir At present Western nations own economic downturn and dominant European Germany will for some time to come be pre-occupied with socio-economic costs and realities integration However Soviet

7 5 Union is too large to ignore Some have placed ir hopes on Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe but CSCE is neir an effective security regime nor an appropriate economic adjustment and planning vehicle for serious If Soviets are to be helped it will have to be done through European Community recent retrenchment Soviet attitudes is certainly reason for concern especially given that Gorbachev s liberal guard has now abandoned him However unmaking a revolution can be equally as problematic as making one It is doubtful wher Gorbachev could have long survived had he placed himself on radical fringe He seems to have decided that change had to be controlled and proceed by consensus and this may ~help account for recent retreat to a more conservative politics At same to any great extent control is not something he can claim If anything can help keep Soviet Union from sliding into eir anarchy or Stalinist ani it is that conservatives and reformers must by now both realize that salvation lies in economic restructuring and political reform though y may differ on speed with which se are to be brought about and on nature ir exact content status quo is not a viable option re was already much ficial talk need for reform under Andropov Gorbachev s predecessor and former head KGB It is refore not unreasonable to hope that a commonality interest may be found between radical and conservative factions question is wher that illusive consensus can be broad enough to accommodate concerns~ varying etbnic groups and republics ~To~have~assumedthat Gorbachev 5 reforms were going to proceed smoothly and apace was to suffer from naivety and wishful thinking