v. M. MOLOTOV THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE MOSCOW 1939

Transcription

1 v. M. MOLOTOV THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE MOSCOW 1939

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3 WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

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5 V. 1\1. MOLOTOV THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE U.S.S.R. AND PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT THE THIRD SESSION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE U.S.S.R. May 31, 1939 FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE MOSCOW 1939

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7 Comrades, the motion made by deputies that the session of the Supreme Soviet should hear a statement by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs is quite understandable. Serious changes have taken place in the international situation recently. From the standpoint of the peaceable powers, these changes have altered the international situation considerably for the worse. We are now confronted by certain results of the policy of the aggressive states, on the one hand, and of the policy of non-intervention on ihe part of the democratic conntries, on the other. Representatives of the aggressive countries are jnst now not averse to boasting of the results the policy of aggression has already achieved. Whatever one may say, there is no want of boasting to be observed here. (Animation.) The representatives of the democratic countries which have turned their backs on a policy of collective security and have pursued a policy of non-resistance to aggression are trying to belittle the significance of the change for the worse that has taken place in the international situation. They still continue to occupy themselves mainly with "soothing" public opinion, pretending that nothing essential has occurred recently. The position of the Soviet Union in the appraisal of current events in international life differs from the position of both these parties. It cannot, as everybody understands, be in any way suspected of any sympathy for the aggressors. It is likewise averse to glossing over the change for theworse that has really taken place in the international situation. It is clear to us that attempts to conceal from public opinion the actual changes that have taken place in the international situation must be countered by the facts. It will then be obvious that the "soothing" speeches and articles are only.

8 ( needed by those who have no desire to prevent the further development of aggression, in the hope of directing aggression, so to speak, in a more or less "acceptable" channel. Not so long ago authoritative representatives of Great Britain and France endeavoured to soothe the public opinion of their countrics by glorifying the success of the ill-fated Munich agreement. They declared that the agreement arrived at in Xlunich in September had averted a European war by means of concessions on the part of Czechoslovakia that were after all comparatively small. It seemed to many people even at that time that in their concessions at the expense of Czechoslovakia the representatives of Great Britain and France in Munich had gone farther than they had a right to. The Munich agreement was so to speak the culminating point of the policy of non-intervention, the culminating point of compromise with the aggressive countries. And what were the results of this policy? Did the Munich agreement stop aggression'? Not in the least. On the contrary, Germany did not rest content with the concessions she received in Munich, that is, with obtaining the Sudeten districts populated by Germans. Germany went farther and just simply put an end to one of the large Slav states-czechoslovakia. There was no great interval between September 1938, when the l\iunich Conference was held, and March 1939, when Germany already put an end to the existence of Czechoslovakia. Germany succeeded in doing this without encountering resistance from any quarter whatsoever, and so smoothly that the question arises, what, properly speaking, Iwas the real aim of the conference in Munich? I At any rate, the elimination of Czechoslovakia, despite the Munich agreement, showed the world where the policy of non-intervention had led, the policy which it may be said had reached its acme in Munich. The collapse of this policy was obvious. Yet the aggressor countries continued to adhere to their policy. Germany Ideprived the Lithuanian Republic of~l and the Memel region. Italy, as we know, was not behindhand. In April, she put an end to the independent state of Albania. After this, there is nothing surprising in the fael that at the end 'of April the head of the German slate in one speech scrapped two

9 important internationaltrealies-the na~'ll agreement between Gel- many and Great Britain and the non-aggression pact between Germany and Poland. There was a time when great international significance was attached to these treaties. But Germany made short work of them, disregarding all formalities. Such was Germany's reply to the proposal of Mr. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, a proposal permeated with the peace-loving spirit. Matters did not stop at the annulment of two international treaties. Germany and Italy went farther. The other day a military and I political treaty they had concluded was published. It is basically of an offensive character. According to this treaty, Germany and Italy are to support each other in any hostilities begun by one of these countries, including any act of aggression, any offensive war. It is not so long since the rapprochement between Germany lind Italy was camouflaged by the alleged need for a joint struggle against Communism. To this end quite a clamour was made about the so-called "anti-comintern pact." In its time the anti-comintern hullabaloo played a certain part in distracting attention. Now the aggressors no longer consider it necessary to usc a screen. There is not a syllable about combating the Comintern in the military and polltlcal treaty concluded by Germany and Italy. But statesmen and the press in Germany and Italy explicitly say that this treaty is directed against the chief European democratic conn tries. It seems clear that the facts mentioned testify to a grave alter- I ation for the worse in the international situation. In this connection certain changes in the direction of counteracting aggression are to be observed in the policy of the non-aggressive countries of Europe too. How serious these changes arc still remains to be seen. As yet it cannot even be said whether these countries are seriously desirous of abandoning the policy of nonintervention, the policy of non-resistance to the further development of aggression. May it' not turn out that the present endeavour of these countries to resist.'lggression in some regions will not serve as an obstacle to the unleashing of aggression in other regions? Such questions are being asked in certain bourgeois publications abroad too. 'Ve must therefore he vigilant. We stand for peace

10 and for preventing the further development of aggression. But we must remember Comrade Stalin's precept "to be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them." Only thus shall we be able to defend to the end the interests of our country and the interests of universal peace. There are, however, a number of signs which show that in the democratic countries of Europe people arc more and more coming to realize that the policy of non-intervention has collapsed, to realize the need for a more serious search for ways and means of establishing a united front of the peaceable powers against aggression. In Great Britain, for instance, people are beginning to talk loudly of the need for a radical change of foreign policy. We, of course, appreciate the difference between verbal statements and real policy. Nevertheless, one cannot but note that this talk is not accidental. Here are a few facts. There was no mutual assistance pact between Great Britain and Poland. Now a decision about such a pact has been reached. The significance of this pact is only enhanced by the fact that Germany has torn up her non-aggression pact with Poland. It cannot but be admitted that the mutual assistance pact between Great Britain and Poland alters the European situation. Or further there was no mutual assistance pact between Great Britain and Turkey, but recently a certain agreement regarding mutual assistance has been reached between these countries. And this pact too alter s the international situation. In connection with these new facts, one of the characteristics of the recent period is that the non-aggressive European powers have been endeavouring to enlist the collaboration of the U.S.S.R. in the matter of counte,racting aggression. Naturally, this endeavour deserves attention. The Soviet Government accordingly accepted the proposal of Great Britain and France to enter into negotiations with the,p ur pose of strengthening political relations between the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and France, and of establishing a peace front against the further development of aggression. How do we define our tasks in the present international situation? "Ve consider that they arc in line with the interests of the

11 other non-aggressive countries. They consist in checking the further development of aggression and to this end establishing a reliable and eftective defensive front of non-aggressive powers. In connection with the proposals made to us by the British and French Governments, the Soviet Government entered into negotiations with them regarding measures necessary for combating aggression. This was in the middle of April. The negotiations begun then have not yet ended. But even at that time it was apparent that if there was a real desire to create an eftective front of the peaceable countries against the advance of aggression, the following minimum conditions were necessary: that an eftective pact of mutual assistarice against aggression, a pact of an exclusively defensive character, be concluded between Great Britain, France and the U.S.S.R.; that a guarantee against attack by aggressors be extended by Great Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. to the states of central and eastern Europe, including all European countries bordering on the U.S.S.R., without exception; that a concrete agreement be concluded by Great Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. regarding the forms and extent of the immediate and elfective assistance to be given to each other and to the guaranteed states in the event of attack by aggressors. Such is our opinion, an opinion we force upon no one but to which we adhere. We do not demand the acceptance of our point of view, and do not ask anybody to do so. We consider, however, that this point of view really answers the interests of security of the peaceable states. It would be an agreement of an exclusively defensive character, operating against attack on the part of aggressors and fundamentally diftering from the military and oftensive alliance recently concluded between Germany and Italy. Naturally, the basis of such an agreement must be the principle of reciprocity and equality of obligations. It should be noted that in some of the British and French proposals this elementary principle did not meet with favour. While guaranteeing themselves from direct attack on the part of aggressors by mutual assistance pacts between themselves and with Poland, and while trying to secure for themselves the assistance of

12 the U.S.S.H. in the event of allack by aggressors on Poland and Rumania, the British and French left open the question whether the U.S.S.R. in its turn might count on their assistance in the event of it being directly attacked by aggressors, just as they left open another question, namely, whether they could participate in guaranteeing the small states bordering on the U.S.S.R. and covering its northwestern frontiers, should these states prove unable to defend their neutrality from allack by aggressors. Thus the position was one of inequality for the U.S.S.R. The other day new British and French proposals were received. In these proposals the principle of mutual assistance between Great Britain, France and the U.S.S.H. on the basis of reciprocity in the event of direct allack by aggressors is now recognized. This of course is a step forward, although it should be noted that it is.hcdged around by such reservations-s-even to the extent of a reservation regarding certain clauses in the League of Nations Covenantthat it may prove to be a fictitious step forward. As regards the question of guaranteeing the countries of central and eastern Europe, on this point the proposals mentioned show no progress whatever from the standpoint of reciprocity. They provide for assistance being given by the U.S.S.R. to the five countries which the British and French have already promised to guarantee, but say nothing about their giving assistance to the three countries on the northwestern frontier of the U.S.S.R., which may prove unable to defend their neutrality in the event of attack by aggressors. But the Soviet Union cannot undertake commitments in regard to the five countries mentioned unless it receives a guarantee in regard to the three countries on its northwestern frontier. That is how mailers stand regarding the negotiations with Great Britain and France. \Vhile conducting negotiations with Great Britain and France. we by no means consider it necessary to renounce business relations with countries like Germany and Italy. At the beginning of last year, on the initiative of the German Government, negotiations were started for a trade agreement and new credits. Germany oltered to grant us a new credit of 200,000,000 marks. As at that time we did 10

13 1I0t reach unanimity on the terms of this new economic agreement, the matter was dropped. At the end of 1938 the German Government again proposed economic negotiations and a credit of 200,000,000 marks, the German side expressing readiness to make a number of concessions. At the beginning of 1939 the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade was informed that a special German representative, lierr Schnure, was leaving for Moscow for the purpose of these negotiations. Subsequently, the negotiations were entrusted to Herr Schulenburg, the German ambassador in Moscow, instead of Herr Schnure, but they were diseontinued on account of disagreement. To judge by certain signs, it is not precluded that the negotiations may be resumed. I may add that a trade agreement for the year 1939 of advantage to both countries was recently concluded with Italy. As you know, a special announcement was published in February confirming the development of neighbourly relations between the U.S.S.H. and Poland. A certain general improvement should be noted 'in our relations with that country. For its part, the trade agreement concluded in March may considerably increase trade between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. Our relations with the friendly power of Turkey are developing normally. Comrade Potemkin's recent visit to Ankara for information purposes was of great positive value. Among the number of international questions which have lately assumed great importanee for the U.S.S.H., I must dwell on the problem of the Aland Islands. You know that for over one hundred years these islands belonged to Russia. As a result of the October Revolution, Finland obtained her independence. By treaty with -our country, Finland also received the Aland Islands. In 1921, ten countries-finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Poland, Sweden, Denmark. Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy-signed a Convention forbidding, as was formerly the case, the fortifieation of the Aland Islands. The governments of the capitalist countries did this with {jut the participation of Soviet representatives. In 1921 the Soviet Republic, undermined by war and foreign intervention, could only protest against this lawless act towards the U.S.S.R. But even then II

14 it was clearly and repeatedly declared by us that the Soviet Union cannot stand aloof from this question and that any change in the juridical status of the Aland Islands to the detriment of the interests of our country was impossible. The importance of the Aland Islands lies in their strategic position in the Baltic. The fortifications on thc Aland Islands may be used for purposes hostile to the U.S.S.R. Situated as they are near the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, the Aland Islands, if fortified, might be used to close to the U.S.S.R. all entrances into and outlets from the Gulf of Finland. That is why, now that the Finnish Government, together with Sweden, wants to carry out an extensive plan for the fortification of the Aland Islands, the Soviet Government requested information from the Finnish Government as to the purposes and nature of the intended fortifications. Instead of complying with this entirely natural wish of the Soviet Union, the Finj nish Government has refused to furnish the U.S.S.R. with the in Iformation and explanations in question. It is not difficult to see that the references to military secrecy which accompanied this refusal are absolutely unconvincing. As a matter of fact the Finnish Government has communicated its plans for the fortification of the Aland Islands to another government-the Swedish Government. And not only so, but has invited it to take part in the carrying out of this whole plan of fortification. Yet under the Convention of 1921, Sweden enjoys no special rights in this respect. On the other hand, the interest of the Soviet Union in the question of fortifying the Aland Islands is not less but greater than that of Sweden. On the proposal of the Finnish and Swedish Governments, the question of revising the 1921 Convention was discussed at a recent meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, without whose sanction it cannot be revised, since the Convention of the ten powers was concluded on the basis of a decision of the Council of the League of June 24, In consequence of the objections of the representative of the Soviet Union there was no possibility of unanimity being reached, which is essential for a decision of the Council to be taken. The results of the discussion in the Council of the League of Nations are known. The Council did not endorse 12

15 the proposal of Finland and Sweden, and did not sanction the revision of the 1921 Convention. It is to be expected that the Finnish Government will draw the necessary conclusions from this I situation. In the light of recent international events, the Aland I Islands question has assumed particularly grave importance for the Soviet Union. \Ve do not consider it possible to reconcile ourselves to any allempt to ignore the interests of the U.S.S.R. in this question, which is of profound importance to the defence of our country. I shall dwell only very briefly on Far Eastern questions and our relations with Japan. Here the most important event this year was our negotiations with Japan on the fisheries question. As you know, the Japanese have a large number of fisheries from us in the Maritime Province, the Sea of Okhotsk, Sakhalin and Kamchatka. By the end of last year they already had 384 fishing lots. Meanwhile, the term of the convention by which the Japanese received these lots had already expired. In the case of many of the lots the earlier estab Iished leases had also expired. The Soviet Government therefore entered into negotiations with Japan on the fisheries question. We declared that a certain number of the lots whose leases have expired could no longer be placed at the disposal of the Japanese from strategic considerations. Although our position was obviously justified, the Soviet point of view met with great resistance on the part of the Japanese. After protracted negotiations, thirty-seven fishing lots were withdrawn from the Japanese and ten new lots granted them in other places. Following this, the convention was extended for another year. This agreement with Japan on the fisheries question is of great political importance, the more so that Japanese reactionary circles did everything to stress the political aspect of this altair, even going to the extent of all sorts of threats. However, the Japanese reactionaries had another opportunity to convince themselves that threats to the Soviet Union do not achieve their aim (loud applause), and that the rights of the Soviet state are securely protected. (Loud applause.) Now as regards border questions. It would seem high time for 13

16 those whom it concerns to realize that the Soviet Government will not tolerate any provocation on the part of Japano-Manchurian troops on its borders. A reminder of this must now be given with regard to the borders of the Mongolian People's Republic as well. In accordance with the mutual assistance pact concluded between the U.S.S.R. and the Mongolian People's Republic, we deem it OUl" duty to render the Mongolian People's Republic all necessary assistance in protecting her frontiers. We take such a thing as a pact of mutual assistance signed by the Soviet Government seriously. I must issue the warning that, on the strength of the mutual assistance pact concluded between us, we will defend the frontier.' of the Mongolian People's Republic with the same determination as our own. (Loud applause.) It is time it were realized that the accusations of aggression against Japan levelled by Japan against the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic are ridiculous and absurd. It is also time it were realized that there is a limit toall patience. (Applause.) It would therefore be best if the constantly recurring provocative violations of the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. and the Mongolian People's Republic by Jnpano-Manchurian troops were abandoned in good time. We have given warning to this effect through the Japanese ambassador in Moscow as well. There is no need for me to deal with our altitude towards China. You are well acquainted with Comrade Stalin's statement about giving support to nations which have become victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their countries. This fully applies to China and her struggle for national independence. We are consistently pursuing this policy in practice. It is fully in line with the task which faces us in Europe, namely, the establishment of a united front of peaceable powers against the further extension of aggression. (Loud applause.) The U.S.S.R. is not what it was, say, in 1921, when it was just starting its peaceful, constructive work. \Ve have to speak of this because even to this day some of our neighbours are apparently unable to realize it. (Laughter.) And it must be admitted that the U.S.S.H. is no longer what it was only five or ten years ago, that the 14

17 U.S.S.R. has grown in strength. (Applause.) The foreign policy ' of the Soviet Union must reflect the changes in the international situation and the greater role of the U.S.S.R. as a powerful factor of peace. There is no need to show that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is fundamentally peaceful and opposed to aggres sion. The aggressive countries themselves are best aware of this. (Animation.) Very belatedly and hesitatingly, some of the democratic powers are coming to realize this plain truth. (Animation.) Yet, in the united front of the peaceable states that are really opposing aggression, the Soviet Union cannot but occupy a foremost place. (Loud and prolonged applause. All rise and cheer Comrade MolotoD.) On the conclusion of Comrade Molotov's statement, the Supreme' Soviet of the U.S.S.R., on the motion of Deputy M. A. Burmistenko, unanimously adopted the following resolution: "Having heard the statement of Comrade V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, on the foreign policy of the Government of the U.S.S.R., the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics fully and entirely endorses the foreign policy of the Government."

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