THE SCHUMAN PLAN A CRUCIAL MOMENT IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS. Constantin Emil BUCUR, Assistant Professor, PhD, University of Bucharest

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1 THE SCHUMAN PLAN A CRUCIAL MOMENT IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS Constantin Emil BUCUR, Assistant Professor, PhD, University of Bucharest Abstact: This study intends to present some aspects regarding the implications and perception of the Schuman Declaration in the context of the European integration phenomenon, process initiated in the second half of the 20th Century. Necessarily, the material treats issues regarded from the historic and international relations perspective. The stake of this research wishes to be both to emphasize the meanings of the Schuman Plan in the dynamics of the European post - World War II relations, as well as the reorientation occurred, thanks to the remodeling concept introduced by the authors of the respective document, at the level of the decision factor, as regards the management of European bilateral and/or multilateral relations, both from the point of view of political aspects, and of the economic ones. Thus, I have tried to focus on the evolution of these intra-european relations both at political and diplomatic levels, using, particularly, the interpretation of the edited archived documents, journals and other sources of memoirs. As far as the scientific analysis elements are concerned, I have tried to build my vision on making use of a few masterpieces from the specialized literature. Therefore, a special attention should be granted to the work of Simon Duke, The Elusive Quest for European Security, from EDC to CFSP, London, MacMillan Press Publishing House, Ltd., Not in the latest, the conclusions of this study intend to prove that the Schuman Plan represented a real impulse for the European integration phenomenon, on one side and, on the other side, the respective project represented a real turning point in the history of international relations, generally, and of the European ones, particularly. Thus, by making use of it, the European politicians and diplomats have begun abandoning, step by step, the line of conflict of divergences, understanding thus the fact that only through honest and transparent cooperation, each of them was able to bring to their countries, without using the instrument of violence in the relations between them, the benefits and advantages of the economic development of the other. Keywords: European Studies, European Integration, Schumann Plan, Franco-German Reconciliation During a man s lifetime, France survived three wars, instigated by her neighbour across the Rhine. The first war ended in the mutilation of our national territory and utter humiliation. Victorious in the second one, France recovered Alsace and Lorraine, but at the cost of people and materials which left her heartless and ruined The third war witnessed our army falling apart at the first encounter, our government ready to surrender, our nation withstanding the occupation, organized burglary, forced labour and detention of two million people. 1 In the 5th decade of the 20th century, when the European nations were just coming out of the world war, they began showing real signs of recovery at the economic level, partly due to the substantial financial support offered by the United States, in form of what has remained known in history under the name of Marshall Plan. This plan would lead, in fact, to the creation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Soon afterwards, a defensive system, which was intended to protect the west-european countries from a possible soviet aggression, was created, by setting up two collective security organizations: Western European Union (WEU) and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This construction also presented a few vulnerable points, soon noticed by the nations having sealed the agreements 347

2 from Brussels and Washington, among which, the most obvious was, certainly, the omission to include in these organizations, Germany, actually what had remained from the German state, unoccupied by the Soviets, specifically the Federal Republic of Germany, country that had a huge potential of economic development and which would have been primordially aimed for both by the fearful and also by the possible aggression of the Red Army. Thus, the security guarantees offered by Washington to the Europeans in the treaty signed in the capital of the United States, on April 4th, 1949, created favourable conditions for the latter to initiate the first meaningful gestures on political and diplomatic plans, which would lead to the onset of the process of European integration. The person that may be fully invested with the title of paternity for this concept and phenomenon of European integration was Jean Monnet, who considered that the first step in opening a new era in the political and economic relations between the European nations, a new period of collaboration and effort coordination, in order to achieve their common interests and to eliminate any kind of divergence, would have been a reconciliation between the big rivals of the two world wars, which had affected the entire mankind, a historical French German reconciliation. Jean Monnet believed in the idea that peace and tranquillity of the European continent might be reached by means of an alliance, limited only to economic targets, between France and Germany.2 The Schuman Plan, presented by the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, on May 9th, 1950, envisaged an European federalist-type projection, whereas the Declaration specified, among others, that: The French government proposes the placement of the entire French- German coal and steel production under a common High Authority, in an organization open to the participation of other European states. 3, and, towards the end of the document, the fundamental target of the project was defined to be as follows: By putting in common the basic production and by creating a High Authority the first concrete foundations of an European Federation, which is indispensable in maintaining peace, shall be immediately laid. 4 In fact, an opinion similar to the one mentioned by Robert Hostiou can also be found in one of the works of Gérard Soulier.5 The idea, far from being just a mass-media coup 6, as I consider that a more indicated expression might be: a coup d image, remains, in fact, in my opinion, one of the most remarkable innovations in the domain of international relations of the 20th century, which simultaneously fulfilled and satisfied the endemic tendencies of France, twice invaded in that century by her neighbour across the Rhine, in providing its own security, refusing vehemently to accept that Germany, which was under the occupation of the four allies, should benefit from the mineral resources of the Saar and Ruhr regions, as the United States desired to rehabilitate economically the main loser of the European war. Thus, the Schuman Declaration mentions, among others, the following:... The solidarity of production which shall thus be achieved shall guarantee that any war between France and Germany shall become not only unthinkable, but also materially impossible. 7 In addition to the fact that the Schuman Plan removed the political dispute between the two antagonist neighbours from the Western Europe in the manner of having control over the regions of Ruhr and Saar, the project linked, in the positive meaning of the term the Federal Germany from the Western block, in the evolution of Cold War at the geopolitical and geostrategic levels.8 The idea of Jean Monnet, as well as of many people from his entourage, who effectively worked at conceiving the project by means of which both 348

3 international paralysis related to the manner in which Federal Germany would be attracted on the western side of the Cold War s barricade, and the rivalry between France and Germany would be defused, was simply brilliant in its simplicity. In fact, Jean Monnet mentions in his memories that, in the eve of launching the Schuman Plan, only nine persons were aware of that initiative. Those persons were: Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Bernard Clappier, René Pleven, René Mayer, Pierre Uri, Etienne Hirsch, Robert Marjolin and Paul Reuter. They were joined by Konrad Adenauer, whom Robert Schuman consulted in March 1950, and who could have been deemed, partly, as a co-author of the Declaration of May 9th, the same year, next to Monnet and Schuman.9 The international events shall accelerate the materialization of this idea of Jean Monnet. On June 24th, 1950, the armed forces of the Democratic People s Republic of Korea started the attack against their neighbour, the South Korea, attack that shall generate in a war in the Korean Peninsula for three years. The Korean war, through its implications for the United States, shall make the factors of decisions from Washington to adopt a strategy according to which it was necessary to rearm the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and to invite it to join NATO, considering that the Americans had required the Europeans to increase their contribution at their own security, because the American armed forces were engaged in another theatre of operations far beyond the boundaries of Europe. One may say that the very discretion displayed around the drafting of the Schuman Plan represented an important factor for its success, because the forces which were possibly hostile to the Plan, and here I refer mainly at the French employers organization in the domain, were put in front of a true fait acompli, of a major reorientation of perception, in the post-war European policy the only possibility for those being to adopt the vision of Jean Monnet and of his peers. Thus, on November 13th, 1950, Jules Aubrun, President of the French Iron and Steel Employers' Federation, sent René Pleven a letter in which he complains of being sidelined from the negotiations on the Schuman Plan. His gesture was however late-occurring and intended to spare some susceptibilities of the French employers from the field.10 The Schuman Plan and the creation of the Council of Europe, with the headquarters in Strasbourg, were the first stages of the European integration process. The treaty enacting the Council of Europe was sealed on May 5th, 1950 and foresaw that the body was made up of a Parliamentary Assembly, which had consultative role, and an Intergovernmental Committee. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted in August 1950 a recommendation by means of which pronounced in favour of forming an European army. Soon after, on August 11th, 1950, negotiations regarding the European integration, inclusively in the domain of security and defence, shall take place in a solemn session of the Council of Europe s Assembly; there, the discussions were about the cooperation between the members of the organization, in the context of the existence of a strong impetus of the federalist stream. On that occasion, the former British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, gave a speech, declaring to be:... in favour of immediate creation of a unified European army, under unique command This European army that Winston Churchill imagined would be led by an European Minister of Defence. The proposal of the former British Premier had some weak points. Thus, Churchill s project did not mention, for example, if the newly created European army would be put under the control of a supranational authority, according to the model of the Schuman Plan regarding the Coal and Steel Economic Community, or if that would benefit from an integrated command 349

4 of the national military units. The Churchill s project did not include his very own country, because the Great Britain was still advocating for keeping his colonial empire and a privileged bilateral relation with the United States, and his attitude towards the first steps of the process of European integration was loose and eluding. In the same session of the Council of Europe s Assembly, on August 11th, 1950, after the speech of Winston Churchill, followed the public address of the French socialist, André Philip, who proposed the creation of an European army on the same principle that had enlivened the Schuman Plan, referring at the principle of supranational control over that structure of European defence. The United States of America, voiced by the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, proposed the creation of a structure within NATO, where, next to the members of the Washington Treaty, military units belonging to the FRG should be included, which meant granting this country the right to rearm, less than five years after the end of the World War that the 3rd German Reich had started. This proposal was received generally favourably by the Europeans, except for France. Though, initially, France opposed vehemently at the adhesion of the Federal Germany to NATO and at any kind of involvement of the armed forces of this country in the project regarding the creation of a unified European army, the decision factors from Paris seemed to become aware in time of the fact that the rearming of the western side of Germany could no longer be postponed without end and that it was better if there were German soldiers, it should not be a German army. J.C. Masclet, in a number of the magazine Que sais-je?, mentions, in fact, that his formula may summarize the entire Pleven Plan.12 Paris s change of perspective was due to the warnings coming from Washington, the main pillar in providing the European security, according to which, the United States would take part at the defence of the continent, but they would expect a much more consistent contribution from their European allies in the defensive against the subversion of communism.13 The American Secretary of State had mentioned, in fact, that the assistance of his country, already involved in the Korean conflict, directly depended on the possibility of the European partners to equip a number of at least 60 divisions, out of which at least 10 would have been the contribution of Germany.14 The international events evolved favourably, so that, a conference of the three ministers of foreign affairs toot place in New York, between September 12th and 14th, 1950, where Dean Acheson, Ernest Bevin and Robert Schuman participated, accompanied by the High Representatives for Germany: John McCloy, on behalf of the United States, André Francois Poncet, from France and Sir Ivone Kirkpatric, representing the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as well as the Secretaries of Defence from these three countries. This reunion preceded in fact the North-Atlantic Council s summit. On that occasion, the three governments harmonized their points of view as far as the rearming of the Federal Republic of Germany was concerned, in the sense that the three ministers asserted in the press release issued at the end of their meeting, that the Allies would treat any attack from any direction against the Federal Republic as an attack against them. It was practically an extension of the principles animating NATO at the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.15 During this conference, a few important decisions were adopted, as far as the rearming of the FRG was concerned, specifically, the discussions were about the probability of this country s involvement in the production of weaponry under the strict control of the allies, the development of a unified military force which objective would be to defend Western Europe 350

5 and, not in the latest, matters related to the security of the Western Berlin. Dean Acheson pleaded again in favour of the integration of the armed forces of the Federal Republic in a unified European army, but this proposal faced the reticence of his discussion partners.16 A decision was however made at the North-Atlantic Council, which opened its works on September 26th the same year, stipulating, in accordance with the proposal of the American Secretary of State, that the unified pack of proposals for FRG should be in suspension with consolation phrases, until we would make arrangements with France, so that both would have given up something.17 In fact, the expression consolation phrases, invented by the diplomats of the countries participating at the North-Atlantic Council, hid, in reality, the principle agreement of all the participants in favour of the adhesion of FRG, as soon as possible, at a structure subordinated to NATO in form of a unified force under centralized command... in order to prevent aggression and to provide the security of the Western Europe.18 The North-Atlantic Council decided, at least in the version of perception of the American representatives, to create an integrated force under the political and strategic command of NATO, specifying that the respective project should meet the agreement adhesions of all the allies. The Secretary of State of the United States, Dean Acheson, would specify the following referring at the possibility of creating an European army under the auspices of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization: an integrated force under a centralized command which would hinder any aggression and would provide the security of the Western Europe. 19 To these resolutions aiming directly at his country, the Chancellor Kondrad Adenauer expressed his support in view to co-opt FRG within an integrated force inside NATO. However, France remained reticent as regards the rearming of the Federal Republic and the adhesion at NATO of its neighbour across the Rhine. Thus, one of the direct consequences of this state of fact, as far as the European political relations are concerned, might be deemed to be the drafting, at the initiative of the French government, of the project of the European Defence Community, as an alternative at the adhesion of the Federal Republic at NATO. In conclusion, one might assert that the Schuman Plan represents the starting point for the phenomenon of European integration, due to the impulse of the generous, even idealistic idea, of the great French politician and statesman, Jean Monnet, in favour of the process of integration at national level. On the other side, the respective moment marks, in the European political and diplomatic relations, a small and slightly invisible change of perspective, as far as the vision in domain is concerned, from the political realism to a harmonious union of characteristic elements, specific to the paradigms of political idealism and realism in international relations. Notes: 1 Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1967, p Martin Holland, Integrarea europeană şi ideile lui Jean Monnet, in POLIS, nr. 3/1995, p Robert Hostiou, Robert Schuman et ľeurope, Paris, Cujas, 1969, pp Ibidem 5 Gérard Soulier, ĽEurope Histoire, civilization, institutions, Paris, Armand Colin, 1994, p

6 6 Ibidem 7 Documents on British Policy Overseas, Roger Bullen şi M. E. Pelly (eds.), series II., vol. I., The Schuman Plan, the Council of Europe and Western European Integration, London, Her Majesty s Stationary Office, 1986, p Alain Guyomarch, Howard Machin and Ella Ritchie, France in the European Union, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998, p Jean Monnet, Mémoires, Paris, Arthème Fayard, 1976, pp Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Correspondance , Lausanne, Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'europe, Centre de recherches européennes, 1986, pp Simon Duke, The Elusive Quest for European Security, From EDC to CFSP, London, MacMillan Press Ltd, 2000, p Gérard Soulier, Op. cit., p Simon Duke, Op. cit., p Ibidem, p Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs , Chicago, Henry Regenery Company, 1965, p Keesing`s Contemporary Archives, vol. nr. VI., , Bristol, Keesing`s Publications Limited, p A. Three-Power Conference in New York 17 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, New York, W.W. Norton and Company, 1969, p Simon Duke, Op. cit., p Dean Acheson, Op. cit., p. 16. Bibliography Acheson, Dean, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, New York, W.W. Norton and Company, Adenauer, Konrad, Memoirs , Chicago, Henry Regenery Company, de Gaulle, Charles, War Memoirs, New York, Simon and Schuster, Documents on British Policy Overseas, Roger Bullen şi M. E. Pelly (eds.), series II., vol. I., The Schuman Plan, the Council of Europe and Western European Integration, London, Her Majesty s Stationary Office, Duke, Simon, The Elusive Quest for European Security, From EDC to CFSP, London, MacMillan Press Ltd, Guyomarch, Alain; Machin, Howard and Ritchie, Ella, France in the European Union, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London, Macmillan Press Ltd, Holland, Martin, Integrarea europeană şi ideile lui Jean Monnet, in POLIS, nr. 3/1995. Hostiou, Robert, Robert Schuman et ľeurope, Paris, Cujas, Keesing`s Contemporary Archives, vol. nr. VI., , Bristol, Keesing`s Publications Limited, p A. Three-Power Conference in New York Milward, Alan S., The Reconstruction of Western Europe, London, Methuen, Monnet, Jean, Mémoires, Paris, Arthème Fayard, Monnet, Jean, Schuman, Robert, Correspondance , Lausanne, Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'europe, Centre de recherches européennes, Soulier, Gérard, ĽEurope Histoire, civilization, institutions, Paris, Armand Colin,