Barack Obama s first term saw the rise

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1 speci a l editio of th e atla tic tim es FOR TH E 49th Mu ich Secu r it y Cofer ece February 2013 Muich, Germay I this issue Fast Power 2 Joh Chipma, head of the Iteratioal Istitute for Strategic Studies, o why speed is of the essece i moder statecraft. Fightig fit? 4 Muich Security Coferece Chair Wolfgag Ischiger wars: If Europe s militaries do t get serious soo about poolig ad sharig their defese capabilities, the cotiet will lose its status as a global security actor. Hobbes or Locke? 6, 7 Former geeral ad CIA director Michael Hayde examies the erodig US-Europea cosesus o the limits of state actio ad the legitimate use of force. Strategic affairs 8, 9 The US, Germay, Frace ad Russia four coutries, four ew security policy doctries for the 21st cetury. The Presidet s me 11 Joh Kerry ad Chuck Hagel have both served i the Vietam War ad the US Seate. They are cautious warriors. We profile Obama s omiees for State ad Defese. Star Wars redux 12 The success of Israel s Iro Dome system has lauched reewed debate about the feasibility of more sophisticated missile defese shields. Misreadig Mali 13 The North Africa coutry is the latest flashpoit i the war agaist Islamist extremists. But the real problem i Mali is that rival tribal elites are backig jihadist groups for opportuistic reasos, argues Wolfram Lacher. Takig stock Four Middle East aalysts o the cosequeces of the Arab Sprig for regioal alliaces ad global security strategies. Joystick combat 18, 19 Droe warfare is the preserve of the West so far. But 60 states are developig umaed aerial vehicle capabilities. Ae-Marie Slaughter bemoas the lack of iteratioal safeguards ad Letta Tayler wats to kow the legal ratioale for droe attacks. Cyber security The Ecoomist o the hype ad fear surroudig cyberwarfare; Kasperky Lab s hut for Red October; ad Sadro Gaycke why Germay is bettig o passive cyber defese. The Security Times is also available olie. Barack Obama s first term saw the rise of the light footprit strategy as the ew, defiig elemet of America itervetio aroud the world. By his words, but truly by his actios over the first four years of his presidecy, Obama made it clear that the days of legthy US wars of attritio ad occupatio were over. He pulled out of Iraq, attempted a time-limited surge i Afghaista ad the sped the America pullback of forces. He declied to put boots o the groud i Libya or itervee except at the margis i Syria. Istead, he iitiated a strategy of lightig-strike attacks that played to the US military s eormous techological advatage, while keepig America casualties low. Droes decapitated al Qaeda s leadership i Pakista, where Obama approved, directly or idirectly, early 300 strikes, six times the umber lauched durig Presidet Bush s etire presidecy. Cyberweapos were deployed agaist Ira, temporarily cripplig its erichmet capabilities at the Nataz erichmet site. Special forces showed they could lad udetected i the courtyard of the world s most wated terrorist, a stoe s throw from Pakista s mai military academy, dispatch him i miutes, ad leave before the Pakistai military had time to respod. The appeal of these operatios eeded o explaatio: they were quick, they were covert, ad they were iexpesive. As Geeral David Petraeus, the war commader who wet o to lead the CIA, asked while still at the spy agecy, What presidet would t wat a light footprit? Best of all i Presidet Obama s view, they did ot cost a trillio dollars, they did ot ivolve placig 100,000 America troops i harm s way, ad they did ot require years of effort to rewire societies, as the US tried, ad failed to do twice i a decade. Mr. Obama has appoited a secod term atioal security cabiet that also prefers a light footprit led by two Vietam veteras, Joh Kerry ad Chuck Hagel, who are deeply suspicious of America s ability to shape the world i its image. But the iroy of their appoitmet is that they take office at the very momet that the light footprit may be losig popularity. Eve withi Obama s ier circle, may questio whether it is suited to the challege of maitaiig US leadership aroud the world. Seior military officials are quietly begiig to voice fears that over time the droes, o matter how valuable a tactical tool, are exactig a huge price, agerig whole societies eve as they decimate terror cells. Cyberwar is triggerig cyber retaliatio, as Saudi Aramco discovered whe a attack, apparetly begu i Ira, took thousads of their computers offlie. May woder whether that attack, ad others like it, are the leadig edge of somethig more calamitous, especially i the absece of global rules about whe ad how this powerful ew weapo should be used. Ad over time, the light footprit has seemed, to may aroud the world, as somethig of a excuse for a Uited States exhausted by war, but reluctat to ivest i shapig a ew world. The limits of the light footprit have bee evidece i may places aroud the globe. But owhere more tha i Syria. Whe the uprisig agaist Bashar Assad gaied steam, may i Washigto expected Presidet Obama to follow, at a miimum, the same path he took i Libya. There he set i droes, helped take out Muammar Qaddafi s air defeses, ad, whe eeded, ra bombig rus. It was a operatio tailor-made for the light footprit: a attack from afar, with few Americas at risk. The Libya troops preparig to slaughter civilias i Beghazi were bombed before they could reach the city. As Obama later said i a speech, while he was reluctat to use force his ow doctrie required him to employ it whe our iterests ad values are at stake. I this case, America iterests were remote. But America values certaily were at risk: May members of Obama s cabiet, led by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clito ad the ambassador to the Uited Natios, Susa Rice, recalled their regret that the US acted too slowly i Rwada, two decades ago. Obama ever quite used the phrase resposibility to protect, but he said a failure to act would betray our fellow huma beigs. But if you ask Syrias ow beig bombed ad shot by govermet forces, that betrayal is uderway. No oe accuses Obama of deliberately igorig their plight. But iside the White House, the cost seemed just too high. With Syria, a light footprit is ot possible i the way it was i Libya. It is impossible to bomb Syria troops, embedded i the coutry s most crowded cities, without killig civilias, too. Puttig US forces o the groud seems a certai recipe for awful casualties, at a time the America electorate had made it clear they are tired of 11 years of war. Ad as the rebellio i Syria ow approaches the two-year mark, the West has appeared icreasigly impotet. Obama rightly says that the US caot police the world i places Walkig away from war Obama s light footprit strategy meas fewer US boots o the global groud By David E. Sager Nisch Fotolia/Has-Jörg David E. Sager is chief Washigto correspodet of the New York Times ad the author of Cofrot ad Coceal: Obama s Secret Wars ad Surprisig Use of America Power. private Security Strategy where its iterests are distat; coutries with much more at stake must take the lead, with the US i a support role. But i Syria s case, either the Arab League or NATO is willig to play the role it did i Libya. By the begiig of 2013, it became clear that Obama was trapped by his ow doctrie: the cost of itervetio seemed greater tha the cost of igorig the values that Mr. Obama had talked i Would he itervee if Assad used chemical weapos? I the summer of 2012, Obama said that would chage my calculus. Today, it is ucertai whether eve that would trigger the use of America force. He has got to fid the happy medium betwee ot committig us to a decade log groud war ad choosig ot to do aythig, Ae Marie Slaughter, who was head of policy plaig at the State Departmet i Obama s first two years of office, told me (see her article o droe warfare, page 19). What accouts for this chage? Those who participate i White House debates over itervetio sese i Obama a greater awareess tha he had four years ago of the limits of America ifluece. Iside the Situatio Room, he ofte expresses his doubts that sedig 100 troops, much less tes of thousads, will ifluece log-term outcomes somethig very differet tha his covictio, i 2009, that a surge i Afghaista could make a sigificat differece. Obama s bitter experiece with that surge helps explai his cautio. New to the presidecy, he yielded to advice from Clito ad Secretary of Defese Robert Gates to make a stad i Afghaista, ad to show that America had resolve i a war of ecessity. He came to regret that decisio almost istatly. That led to a classic Obama move: to water dow the objectives, so that America could leave. His aides created a committee iside the White House called Afgha Good Eough that, true to its ame, reduced the expectatios of what America could accomplish i the short term ad elimiated may of the grader log-term goals that Washigto talked about so ofte over the past decade, from eradicatig the drug ecoomy to remakig the justice ad educatio systems. Now those goals are dow to a very few: Keep Kabul from fallig to the Taliba, retai a force i the regio capable of iterveig if Pakista s uclear weapos appear at risk of goig loose. But what of the bigger goals of stabilizig Afghaista, buildig schools ad justice systems, ad assurig some level of political stability? They have all goe out the door. The situatio is obviously ot very cofidece-ispirig, Hia Rabbai Khar, Pakista s foreig miister, said i a iterview i mid-jauary. A resposible trasitio meas that you have achieved your objectives ad the you leave. It s ot We leave i Jauary. It s We leave whe the objectives are achieved. I his secod term, Obama s sese of cautio is boud to collide with his desire for some legacy achievemets. He wats to be remembered for far more tha the fact of his electio as America s first Africa-America presidet, ad for more tha stabilizig a America ecoomy that he iherited at a time of crisis. He kows that past presidets are remembered today for the buildig of big istitutios: Roosevelt ad Truma for spurrig the creatio of the Uited Natios, the World Bak ad the Marshall Pla; Keedy for the test ba treaty ad, after his death, the Nuclear No-Proliferatio Treaty; Nixo for the opeig to Chia. So far, Obama s biggest accomplishmets have bee more purely defesive, startig with the decapitatio of the cetral leadership of al Qaeda. It was a impressive feat, but ot oe that history ca poit to as a example of America leadership i buildig global istitutios. So i the ext few years, the light footprit will have to be accompaied by somethig grader. Obama s early iitiatives poit the way: America leadership o global warmig, o reducig the umber of deployed uclear weapos i America s arseal, o cotaiig Ira. But he will have to attempt those goals without much help from Cogress, where he does ot have the votes for big treaties, big trade deals or big dollops of foreig aid. He will have to pursue a foreig policy more like Eisehower s, egieerig world evets i more subtle ways from the Oval Office, without the grad promises of the early days of his presidecy.

2 2 February 2013 Soft? Hard? Smart? Fast! Speed has become a attribute of power ad a ecessary coditio of success By Joh Chipma We live i the age of Fast Power. Our sese of stability, ad ideed the rise of isecurity, is dramatically affected by the speed with which evets happe ad the very may differet agets of power with which govermets ad the private sector have to deal with. Power today is more plural tha ever before ad adequate resposes to its malig use have also to be more various. Govermets, ad the defese ad foreig miistries that serve them, have to be readier to act at speed if they are to shape, rather tha be shaped, by chagig evets. I the past, strategists asked if a coutry had soft power, hard power, or smart power. Today they must assess the quality of a state or of a alliace s fast power if they are to make a proper appreciatio of the capability to respod to threats ad to chage. For strategists, military power is still the most importat compoet of power because it has the greatest coercive ifluece whe judiciously exercised. But military power mixes today with diplomatic, ecoomic, fiacial, market, people reputatioal ad idea power. If there is a balace of power today, it is oly the balace betwee these differet types of power. This is the ew reality with which leaders must cope, ad the proof lies i the way battles were fought i The Germa state fought the power of the market, the Egyptia army the power of the people; states i ecoomic declie foud their iteratioal reputatio weakeed, those with fiacial power gaied more diplomatic clout. Well promoted ideas, whether jihadist messages or atioalist appeals rallied quick support. Their perceived evil effects were ofte bluted by swift actio, whether through droe attacks or use of cyber techiques. These realities mea that our cetury has gaied a eo-darwiia flavor: it is ot so much survival of the fittest, as power to the most agile that is the operatig maxim. It is speed, rather tha heft, that ca determie diplomatic ad eve military victories the creatio of fiacial advatage ad the establishmet of political leadership. Speed has become a attribute of power ad a ecessary coditio of success i this fast-movig age. Fast power the ability to shape evets at speed effectively is see as vital. Militaries prize rapid deploymet forces, fiacial houses computer-geerated trades, diplomatic establishmets the quick wi of the special evoy. Fast power of course risks beig mistake power, which is aother reaso why the sese of istability is heighteed, as govermets, busiesses ad others are forced to react at such speed to evets that shift at such pace. Ad fast power, like ay other form of power, is most effective whe it operates i formatio. Yet the ability of govermets to cosult ad settle o co-ordiated actio seems perversely to have slowed, just whe it is required to accelerate. I 2013, the ability to deal with risig isecurity i may regios of the world will deped hugely o how diagosis is haressed to prescriptio, ad speed to soud public policy, aticipatig where possible, reactig where ecessary. Yet if speed is ecessary, so is mometum, ad sometimes the maiteace of mometum requires strategic patiece, the ability to exercise prudece i the cause of a more settled ad log term solutio. Balacig speed with patiece ad choosig correctly, will be the measure of effective strategy. As always, ispirig others to be suppliers rather tha mere importers of security will also be the sig of leadership, ad has become all the more ecessary as Wester powers exhibit strategic fatigue from the log egagemets i Iraq ad Afghaista. Speed was ecessary this Jauary i Mali. The chace that rebels might arrive at the capital city Bamako would have give them too great a advatage ad too large a lead i their efforts to establish a sigificat sactuary for terrorist activity. Frace acted as the catalytic power i decidig o itervetio; broadeig the coalitio of support to the Mali govermet ad delegatig to local actors became almost immediately the ext phase. The priority to assist Malia forces to cotrol their territory is oe that other Europea powers will wat to assist i, while the active deploymet of special forces could coceivably egage other allies, icludig from the Gulf. Aimatig the relevat regioal orgaizatio, Ecoomic Commuity of West Africa States (ECOWAS), to take a icreasig role will be essetial. Whereas i the past, regioal solutios for regioal problems became a liberal sloga, it has ow become a ecessary purpose of well-judged Wester policy. There is simply ot the capability for the habitual exporters of military power the US, UK, Frace, ad a few others, to iitiate, let aloe sustai the operatios so frequetly called for. ECOWAS will have to hold territory, while a political solutio that has regiowide support gets shaped. Regio-led iitiatives have bee the orm i Syria, ot ecessarily to the very best effect. But the absece of a UN cosesus coupled with the fear of log term embroilmet i the Levat has meat that idividual states, especially from the Gulf, have doe a good deal of the strategic ruig: the Uited Arab Emirates (UAE) orgaizig military forces, Qatar ad Saudi Arabia supplyig fudig ad equipmet, ad Ira maitaiig its support for the regime. While the Lebaoizatio of Syria cotiues amid huge loss of life, the geopolitics of the Middle East would be as profoudly chaged by a surprise early solutio to the coflict as by its legthy extesio. As the US ad Europea powers will ot be i the forefrot of the security solutio, the authors of a ew dispesatio will be primarily local. The ew local is i fact, a evolvig term of art to describe...our cetury has gaied a eo-darwiia flavor: it is ot so much survival of the fittest, as power to the most agile... the curret strategic realities. The Global Ageda Coucil o Geopolitical Risk of the World Ecoomic Forum, (of which this writer is a member), cocluded i its 2013 risk assessmet that: govermets are more shackled by regioal cocers ad their domestic costituecies at the expese of tacklig larger scale global issues that eed collective leadership to resolve. I this cotext, as the report argues, there is a de-globalizatio of risk, i that ot every local coflict is coected to a cetral strategic order. But the realizatio that ot every local coflict ca go global i tur ca iduce a sese of brikmaship, eve recklessess, i local actors, that tests the resolve ad patiece of cocered global players ad heightes the sese of istability. Uderstadig what ca be cotaied ad what might spill-over is the crucial strategic judgmet that eeds to be exercised. Timig is of the essece. I 2013, a careful strategic patiece will have to be exercised cocerig Ira ad its uclear program. Serious talks have bee difficult to revive. The Supreme Leader is i charge, but with presidetial electios scheduled to take place i the summer of 2013, it is hard to imagie a breakthrough deal maturig before, or oe comig soo after, the polls are held. Most idepedet aalysts cotiue to judge that 2014 is the more likely year for the Iraia uclear program to reach a crucial stage; yet both Israel ad Gulf Arab states will be ervous about a earlier breakout capacity. The ever elusive grad bargai with Ira that could iclude some loose co-operatio over Afghaista post-2014, will cotiue to be advocated by may as the correct goal of Wester policy. However, the umerous domestic costituecies i the West, the Middle East ad Ira itself that would eed to be placated for such a bargai to be struck make it ulikely. Maagig the Iraia uclear program s challeges alogside a degeeratig Syria situatio will require a large effort of diplomatic agility. Europe s security chiefs i 2013 will be pre-occupied with the ear-abroad challeges of Africa, the Middle East ad South West Asia i a year i which the US is Joh Chipma is Chief Executive, The Iteratioal Istitute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Lodo. IISS Security Strategy boud to recofirm its rebalacig towards Asia. Last year, the pivot, as it was first styled, was aimated i part by the strategic demad pull from America s Asia allies, some of whom were cocered that America idifferece would leave them exposed to a self-cofidet Chia. Sice the, territorial disputes betwee Chia ad Japa ad Chia ad other claimats to the South Chia Sea have worseed. Both the US ad Asias will wat to kow how Europe ca cotribute to Asia s delicate strategic balace. The revised Frech defese White Paper will o doubt cotai its ow mii versio of the pivot, but i geeral, Europe is see as havig decliig ifluece ad clout strategically. As close strategic allies of the US, ad with huge iterests i the high-growth Asia-Pacific, Europeas will be asked i 2013 what their role i Asia ca be i the comig years. Asia security will deped o variable egagemet by may differet powers. That is o less true i the other regios of the world. Wester states will o the oe had appreciate stroger regioal roles played by local actors, but also worry that regioal states might craft solutios or take iitiatives that ru couter to perceived Wester desires. That is the reality of a more egalitaria strategic order. A reasoable goal for Wester players i these differet regioal theaters is to stay i the strategic maagemet game ad keep their relevace. That will ofte mea actig quickly to shape diplomatic outcomes ad to ifluece security agedas. Wester states will ievitably see a declie i their relative hard power as military budgets cotiue to shrik ad the appetite for the use of military power dissipates. What they must cotiue to cultivate is their Fast Power. The itelliget ad timely use of coercive force, coupled with agile diplomacy, joied by effective coalitio buildig, ca still be strategically sigificat. Strategic extroversio is itself a asset. As the growth egies of the global ecoomy shift southwards, Wester coutries eed to retai their speed ad flexibility of actio abroad. I a fast movig world, the absece of fast, decisive strategic thikig ad diplomatic actio will leave those i the slow lae out of the traffic. At the Muich Security Coferece (MSC) that commitmet to strategic agility should be compelligly reaffirmed. Publisher: Detlef W. Priz Executive Editor: Theo Sommer Editors: Peter H. Koepf, Kevi Lych, Lutz Lichteberger Seior Art Director: Paul M. Ker Layout: Mauel Schwartz, Mike Zastrow Times Media GmbH Tempelhofer Ufer Berli, Germay ifo@times-media.de Phoe Fax ISSN Press deadlie: Jauary 28, 2013 Fotolia/Miguel

3 February Risig powers, exaggerated hopes The US ad Europe still eed to set (much of) the global ageda By Volker Perthes I today s globalized ad multipolar world, major problems will o loger be solved, crises o loger maaged, ad rules o loger defied, let aloe implemeted, without the cotributio of ew or re-emerget great ad middle powers. Not oly Chia has become aother idispesable power: Global goverace, i order to be successful, also eeds the active ivolvemet of Idia ad Brazil, Idoesia, South Korea ad Mexico as well as Turkey, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt or Vietam. Some of these coutries are still emergig ecoomies. Politically, however, most of them have crossed the threshold that has log limited their access to the kitche of iteratioal decisiomakig. Ad it is these coutries ad some others that are likely to trigger ad produce the growth that the world ecoomy eeds i the years to come. The power ad ability to impose order or to solve problems of global relevace is more widely distributed today tha it ever was sice the formatio of the state system. The five permaet members of the Uited Natios Security Coucil still defed their veto right, ad their military power is umatched. However, they o loger commad sufficiet resources, competece, ad legitimacy to cope aloe with global challeges or crises with worldwide impact. Bipolarity is a thig of the past ad is ulikely to re-emerge i a ew Sio-America G2-form. It is also very ulikely for the foreseeable future that ay oe club of atios, such as the G7 or G8, could agai assume a quasihegemoic positio i the world ecoomy or i world politics. Eve the G20 i its curret compositio may ot really represet the forces that ca ad will shape the iteratioal order i the 21st cetury. The coceptual ad practical challege for leaders ad pudits i the Uited States, Europe, Japa ad other members of the Old West is either to igore the demads of risig powers to have more ifluece i global politics, or to be overly ethused by the fact that these powers are gaiig weight. Relative shifts i global power relatios are a reality, ad they eed to be accommodated politically ad istitutioally. There is o doubt, for example, that the Security Coucil eeds to become more represetative if it is to preserve, or regai, its legitimacy i matters of iteratioal peace ad security. Ad it will be impossible to retai the de-facto moopoly of the Uited States ad the EU over the chief positios i the IMF ad the World Bak. At the same time, however, it should be clear that ay accommodatio of shiftig power relatios, ad of risig-power iterests, is at best a meas to better itegrate these powers ito iteratioal efforts at maagig global problems. It is ot, by itself, a recipe to solve ay of the world s vital issues. Thus, while it may be impolite to say so, more voice ad weight for emergig powers i global goverace istitutios does ot automatically make these bodies Volker Perthes is the Executive Chairma ad Director of Stiftug Wisseschaft ud Politik (SWP), the Germa Istitute for Iteratioal ad Security Affairs, Berli. Strategic Order swp more legitimate ad effective. Icreasig the umber of players at the table will, while ecessary, obviously also icrease the difficulty of reachig decisios. Ad while the US or Europe may wat to see certai risig powers represet their respective cotiets i global istitutios, other regioal coutries ted ot to see these powers as their represetatives. O the cotrary, i may cases smaller regioal coutries feel threateed, or margialized by the rise of their eighbors. Moreover, while risig powers rightly demad more voice i iteratioal rule-makig, they do ot ecessarily wat to subject themselves to bidig rules ad regulatios. Or, as Patrick Stewart from the Coucil o Foreig Relatios has put it, they are seekig greater weight i global goverace, but ot ecessarily more global goverace. Give the record of established powers, this is othig to be astoished or morally idigat about. It is simply a fact that eeds to be take ito cosideratio i ay effort to build iclusive regioal or global regimes. More importatly still, risig powers do ad will cotiue to seek commo platforms to demostrate their icreased iteratioal weight, but this does t mea that they do have a commo ageda. The most visible groupig, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, Idia, Chia, South Africa), clearly shows that well-marketed acroyms caot paper over differeces of iterests. Brazil, Idia ad South Africa are usig this format i a pragmatic way to pursue their iterests. There is little agreemet betwee them o the oe, ad Russia or Chia o the other had, however, with regard to political values or to fudametal questios of iteratioal order. Cosider the compositio of the UN Security Coucil or the uclear-arms privilege which the permaet members of the Security Coucil claim for themselves. Chia, after all, is the mai oppoet of Idia becomig a permaet member of the Security Coucil. The iability of the West to domiate the global ageda does t therefore imply that others would set this ageda or assume the resposibility to maage ad resolve regioal ad iteratioal coflicts. The role of Wester powers has ot disappeared; it has just become more complicated. For the time beig, the US ad Europe will still have to provide most of the iput i terms of ideas, stadards, ad eve resources to shape the Most powers that are positioig themselves for a more active role o the world stage are democracies. ageda of cooperatio, particularly with regard to iteratioal security ad global sustaiability. They will have to make this ageda both legitimate ad iclusive i order to be effective, ad they will have to work with variable coalitios. Two geeral rules may apply here: First, to solve ay problem of global relevace, the US ad Europe eed to work both with those who are causig these problems ad those who ca help to solve them, regardless of ideological differeces. No oe i their right mid would demad that we eed to wait for Chia to become democratic i order to cooperate with it o such issues as climate chage, iteratioal fiace, developmet, the oproliferatio of WMD, or eve iteratioal peacekeepig. Similarly, o a regioal level, it would be self-defeatig to coditio the cooperatio with Ira o matters of commo cocer such as the stabilizatio of Afghaista o the emergece of a liberal regime i Tehra. Secod, we eed to appreciate the fact that a icreasig umber of risig powers share our values yet still have differet, but legitimate iterests. The really good ews for the West is that most powers positioig themselves for a more active role o the world stage are democracies. Withi the G20 oly two states Chia ad Saudi Arabia explicitly do ot wat to be liberal democracies, while a third oe Russia has developed ito a autocracy with a democratic façade. All the others may expose differet shapes ad forms of democracy, but they share the geeral priciples of iclusive ad competitive electios, resposible govermet, civil liberties, ad huma rights. The ot so good ews is that eve democratic risig powers ofte do ot share the political agedas of established idustrialized democracies. There are clear differeces, for example, regardig the priorities of climate protectio ad ecoomic developmet. Also, alog with may other states i the global South, emergig democracies ted to defed the priciple of oiterferece, ad they are geerally reluctat to support ay US or Europea attempts to project democracy or huma rights ito other coutries. Moreover, some of the most importat of these states differ substatially with the US, ad ofte also with the EU, about the right approach toward regioal coflicts, especially i the Middle East. I 2010, Washigto made a serious mistake whe it disavowed a Turkish-Brazilia attempt to mediate i the coflict over Ira s uclear program, rather tha buildig upo those attempts. Not too few policymakers i the Uited States ad i Europe have bee aoyed with the attempts of emergig democratic powers to pull their weight i world politics regardless of the approaches chose by Washigto, Paris, or Berli. Partly, such reactios reflect old thikig, still rooted i the categories of the Cold War. I that era, it was clear that democratic atios could differ over details, but would agree about the mai questios of iteratioal politics. Those who pursued a differet ageda o substatial matters were either ot part of the democratic camp or were t importat iteratioal players. Oe of the realities of the globalized, multipolar world is that shared democratic values do ot guaratee agreemet about at least some of the burig questios of iteratioal politics. The more democracies there are, the more coflicts of iterests ad differeces are likely to emerge betwee democratic states ad powers. There is little reaso to be aoyed whe states like Idia, Turkey, Brazil or South Africa are settig priorities differet from those of Europe or the Uited States, or have differet views about how to deal with the Arab- Israeli coflict, Ira, developmet aid, democracy promotio or evirometal protectio. Sometimes they may simply have a poit. The world is goig to be more pluralistic, ot oly with respect to the domestic structures of a icreasig umber of relevat states, but also with regard to the agedas that democratic powers follow o the iteratioal scee. The task here for established Wester democracies is twofold: they still have to take the lead i buildig pragmatic ad variable coalitios of the relevat of all coutries, regardless of their political systems, that eed to cotribute to solvig or at least maagig global problems. Ad they should at the same time lear to appreciate that other democratic atios may have quite differet views o questios of regioal ad world order. Uless such democratic differeces are accepted, we will hardly be able to traslate those commo values which risig ad established democracies share, ito commo approaches to iteratioal issues. Fotolia/scusi

4 4 February 2013 Two years ago, at the Muich Security Coferece, NATO Secretary Geeral Aders Fogh Rasmusse itroduced the cocept of Smart Defese, callig o coutries to pool ad share capabilities, to set the right priorities, ad to better co-ordiate our efforts. I priciple, Europeas have accepted that closer defese cooperatio is essetial to maitai, ad hopefully expad, existig military capabilities. I the Fraco-Germa declaratio For a stroger Europea Security ad Defese of Feb. 6, 2012, for istace, the two govermets state: I times of strategic ucertaity ad limited resources, joit defese projects are idispesable for a strog defese. We have to be willig to make the ecessary decisios. These kids of statemets ad declaratios have, by ow, become rather commoplace throughout the EU. But i reality decisio-makers have ot bee willig to make the ecessary decisios, remai ulikely to do so, ad disagree about what that meas. The cocepts of Smart Defese ad Poolig & Sharig importat as they are have yet to gai real tractio. This is a uacceptable state of affairs, leadig to massive losses i Europea capabilities capabilities that are already very limited. I fact, the ability of Europe to be a reasoably capable security actor is very much at stake. The memories of the Libya itervetio, where the two bestequipped Europea militaries struggled to get the job doe, requirig massive US support from behid, are all too fresh. Ivo Daalder, the US ambassador to NATO, recetly said that Libya exposed worrisome treds i Europe s ability to act without relyig heavily o US help. For him, the lack of ecessary muitios was a sigal that there is a lack of ivestmet i critical core capabilities by the alliace, ad that the cotiuig cuts i defese spedig raise, over time, serious questios about sustaiability. NATO would ot be able to udertake a similar campaig i te years time if this is picture alliace/abaca The time to act is ow A make-or-break momet: Europeaizig our defese is the oly sesible way forward By Wolfgag Ischiger ot addressed, he said. Ad he is, regrettably, absolutely right. Startig to Europeaize our defese is the oly reasoable way forward, for three reasos i particular. First, moey. The defese sector is feelig a tighteig of fiacial screws, partly as a result of the euro crisis. Capabilities affected by defese cuts sice 2009 have bee lost. Of course, most NATO states had already log failed to reach the selfdeclared goal of spedig two percet of their respective GDPs o defese. Moreover, Europea taxpayers moey is spet icredibly iefficietly: Europea fightig power amouts to a tiy fractio of the America military potetial, although Europea spedig makes up almost 40 percet of US defese expeses. We must produce more bag for the buck ad we ca! The key is to fially itroduce the idea of EU itegratio ito the way we orgaize our defese arragemets. This does ot imply immediate huge steps toward a EU military multiple syergy effects ca Ambassador Wolfgag Ischiger is Chairma of the Muich Security Coferece. EU Defese Policy private be created i areas with fewer costitutioal ad political implicatios, such as traiig ad procuremet. Ad we should ot hesitate to ask hard questios, such as how efficiet it is for almost all 27 EU coutries to maitai their ow air force sometimes composed of ot more tha a few doze aircraft. Secod, as today s security eviromet cotiues to become more complex ad upredictable, the demads placed o our armed forces have cotiued to expad. Dealig with these greater demads will require more ad better iteroperability, coordiatio ad effectiveess of Europea militaries. It is udeiable that the crises that might directly or idirectly affect Europe s security, ad i which we may have to fulfill our resposibility to protect people from mass atrocities, are umerous, upredictable, ad complex. Third, the ecessity to be better prepared for complex ad upredictable crises is magified by the Uited States pivot toward the Pacific. No doubt: this will put greater pressure o Europe to operate o its ow i its ow eighborhood. Whether it is Kosovo or Afghaista, Libya, Syria, or Mali: If we wat to be able to react better ad more adequately to emergig coflicts, istabilities, or mass atrocities, we must pool ad share military capabilities much more. If we fail to do so, the combiatio of scarce fiacial meas, more complicated tasks, a upredictable security eviromet ad decreasig US focus o Europe will lead to a permaetly weakeed Europe as a actor o the global ad regioal security stage. Poolig ad sharig is a complex edeavor. We are talkig about a area that has for ceturies bee part of the core of atioal sovereigty. Ad it requires dealig with tough ad ucomfortable questios: How do the armed forces have to be structured especially i the cotext of reforms that are uder way i may coutries so that they ca be completely or partly Europea i the future? Which capabilities might coutries be willig to give up ad trust others to provide them? What Frech fighters refuel over Libya, a coflict where "the two bestequipped Europea militaries struggled to get the job doe." does poolig mea for the idustrial base ad the procuremet process, which traditioally caters to atioal eeds? How could a military egagemet with pooled forces be authorized? Who would carry the ultimate resposibility? Clearly, these are difficult questios. But the process of Europea itegratio must ot stop at the gates of military barracks, eve if gettig there will be tough ad complicated, ivolvig differet ad difficult stakeholders. I order to accompay ad support this process, the Muich Security Coferece, joied by McKisey & Compay, has started a ew iitiative a coferece series o The Future of Europea Defese. A first Europea summit i April of 2013 will aim at providig fresh impulses to Poolig & Sharig. Last December, we orgaized a roudtable i Berli, with represetatives from the Foreig, Defese, ad Ecoomics miistries, members of the Budestag, defese idustry represetatives, military leaders, ad idepedet experts. Oe of the few thigs most participats agreed o was this: We have to do much better, ad it will be very difficult. But the degree of difficulty ca ever be a excuse. As former US Defese Secretary Robert Gates said i his farewell speech i Brussels i 2011: Gettig Europea defese o track will take leadership from political leaders ad policy makers o this cotiet. Put simply: Europe s ability to be a capable security actor is at stake. Americas wo t ivest ad will ot be ivested i Europea defese if Europe does t start movig i the right directio. Ad the widow for Europe to do somethig about this deficiecy by ivestig more, ad by Europeaizig defese is ot goig to stay ope idefiitely. Hopefully, the Europea Coucil will aouce meaigful ew steps at its December meetig whe security ad defese are o its ageda. The time to act is ow i The comig era of diplomacy Barack Obama s cabiet omiees herald a ew emphasis o persuasio By William Richard Smyser Presidet Barack Obama s most importat cabiet omiees, Joh Kerry as secretary of state ad Chuck Hagel as secretary of defese, reflect his recogitio that we live i a ew world a world i which a surge of diplomacy that mirrors the chagig global power patter is overdue. The chages i the world are of two kids, both of which will require itese ad far-reachig diplomatic efforts for the Uited States ad other govermets. The first chage is that may states are becomig more prosperous ad more powerful. Stadards of livig are risig all over the world. Ad states are ofte stregtheig militarily as well as ecoomically. The secod chage is that states are reachig further afield i their iterests ad cotacts, o loger cofiig themselves to oe area or oe cotiet but lookig for frieds ad ofte markets everywhere. This brigs ever more coutries ito cotact ad perhaps ito disagreemet. Icreases i atioal power ad prosperity ofte promote argumet, ot agreemet. By omious coicidece, the world must ow deal with the same type of problem that Europe faced almost exactly a cetury ago ad failed disastrously to solve. The, more states rose to sigificat power ad wated larger territories ad their ow places i the su. The Europeas fought World Wars I ad II ad almost destroyed themselves ad each other. Now the atios that are risig i wealth ad power are all over the world, ot oly i Europe but i Asia, the Middle East, Africa ad Lati America. They do ot have the same destructive commitmets that Europea powers had, but they have some major ad potetially competig iterests. Those could prove dagerous. Chia, the major example of a emergig power, presets both a strategic ad a ecoomic challege. Other risig states, whether Brazil, Idia, Idoesia, Ira, Japa or Nigeria, to ame just a few, preset a similar though ot idetical mix. Their strategic ad ecoomic claims may vary ad will almost certaily grow over time. They could coflict with others. Recet books forecast a ew era domiated by a Asia boom ad by a shift i global ifluece toward the East. That will take some time, as the Uited States ad Europe are still hefty players. But the age of the G-20 has defiitively supplated that of the G-7, with all that this may mea for the world ad for perhaps tese relatios betwee risig ad decliig states. Each of the ewly surgig states will eed picture-alliace/dpa The British politicia Sir Samuel Hoare ( ) is ofte portrayed as the archetypal diplomat. close ad cosistet diplomatic attetio. US ad other Wester leaders must brig those risig powers ito the global system at the appropriate level, ot oly to protect their ow ifluece but to avoid the disasters that marked the rise of such states i the 20th cetury. They must practice dexterous diplomacy i potetially turbulet times. That will require wide egagemet, flexible attitudes, ad a readiess to adjust. Asia presets a completely differet geostrategic challege from the cofrotatio i which the Uited States ad NATO faced the Soviet Uio durig the Cold War i Europe. The Asia coutries are ot coected o lad with easily idetifiable borders. They may be separated by dozes or hudreds of miles of ope ocea where ships ad aircraft ca (ad do) travel ad where ay deploymet, whatever its itetio, could provoke a reactio. A example of a potetial risk is the dispute betwee Chia ad Japa over tiy islads i the East Chia Sea (Sekaku i Japaese; Diaoyu i Chiese). Both claim those islads as their territory because the islads could legitimize claims to wide ocea surfaces ad trade laes as well as to perhaps sigificat uderwater mieral resources. Recetly istalled admiistratios i Tokyo ad Beijig -- like ew govermets aywhere show o sigs of yieldig. Likewise, Washigto s shift of forces icludig capital ships -- to Asia has Beijig worried. Moreover, the US has treaties with may coutries i the regio. Whatever the realities or the risks may be, states i Asia, the Middle East ad elsewhere ow sometimes appear to be movig toward wider relatios ad perhaps rivalries that could produce dagerous cofrotatios. Yet they have oly limited experiece i the kids of diplomatic dialogue that could ease those cofrotatios. Such potetial crises go beyod ay particular coutry ad beyod ay sigle cotiet. Whe terrorists kill a US Ambassador i Libya, whe potetially powerful political forces emerge i Nigeria, or whe a ew terrorist threat arises eve ear such a remote spot as Timbuktu i Mali, a US Presidet must thik of how he ca best protect his coutry s iterests ad also, how he ca best prevet a icidet from spiralig out of cotrol. But this is ot oly a America cocer. As the world chages, it will be importat for more states ot oly to develop closer relatioships with others but also to make sure that those relatioships lead to more cooperatio istead of competitio. That will almost certaily require may more diplomatic cotacts ad associatios tha i the past. Strategic Order W. R. Smyser, a former US diplomat, teaches Iteratioal Relatios at Georgetow Uiversity. private Obama will wat to use his reewed icumbecy to promote peace after America has lost thousads of me ad wome as well as trillios of dollars i Iraq ad Afghaista. He has made clear that he wats to wid dow US military egagemets ad cocetrate o diplomacy. Although most Americas do ot ormally applaud diplomatic successes as ethusiastically as military victories, this may be a differet time. As the world eeds to fid its path ito the ew cetury, a era of strategic diplomacy will eed to become part of that path. Ad oe of its objectives will be to brig ewly powerful states ito the iteratioal system i ways that will add to strategic stability istead of coflict. By selectig two decorated military veteras for his seior cabiet posts, Obama makes sure that the Uited States will ot go to war lightly durig his presidecy, ad that it will kow how to coduct such a war decisively ad victoriously oce egaged. Like other actios take by Obama, it also reflects his determiatio to be his ow ma i diplomacy as well as i other matters.

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6 6 Februar The Uited Stat still walki Divergig approaches to combati At loggerheads over US Pershig missiles: Germas protestig agaist NATO s Double Track decisio i Are America ad Europe partig ways o how they view fudametal security matters? Some might view the questio as tiresome ad simply respod: Agai? Certaily the security relatioship has ever bee without its issues, ad trasatlatic views o these matters eve i the good old days of the Cold War were frequetly at odds. Europe emerged from World War II exhausted, its oce ad future domiat power tredig pacifist, ad the cotiet s citizes demadig (ad receivig) icreased social services. Trasatlatic debates over adequate levels of defese spedig have bee leged: recall US Defese Secretary Robert Gates brutal characterizatio of atios uwillig to devote the ecessary resources...to be serious ad capable parters i their ow defese. Ad there were bitter debates, sometimes spillig out i to the streets, about the wisdom of specific actios like the 1980s cruise missile ad Pershig deploymets. Not ulike their views o defese expeditures, some Europeas seemed more willig to be defeded by uclear weapos i Kasas or Wyomig tha i Molesworth, Comiso or Wüschheim. Tough issues. Heated debates. But I wat to suggest that today is differet. For the last half of the 20th cetury, whatever their divergig views o budgets or specific actios, Europe ad America (occupyig similar positios o the same log arc of culture ad history) had similar ideas o the proper role of the state i security ad whe the use of force was legitimate. It is that latter cosesus that is ow erodig. This became clear to me i the Sprig of I had bee ivited to the Germa Embassy to give a lucheo talk to a large group of Europea ambassadors. I iteded to talk i a cadid way, amog frieds, o some of the more cotroversial actios that had bee udertake by the CIA i the war o terror. I felt obliged to set the stage ad defie the thikig behid our actios so I bega with four core beliefs. The Uited States was a atio at war. We were i a armed coflict with al Qaida ad its affiliates. This coflict was global i scope. Ad those charged with America security could oly fulfill their resposibilities by takig this fight to the eemy wherever he might be. I added that I believed those four statemets represeted cosesus thikig ot just i my agecy, but across my govermet ad my atio. It was t far ito luch before it was clear to me that o other coutry represeted i that room picture-alliace/dpa accepted the legitimacy of ay of those four seteces. They ot oly rejected their legitimacy for themselves; they rejected their legitimacy for the Uited States. Some may be tempted to dismiss this as simply the product of alleged Bush Admiistratio excesses or excited America rhetoric ( old Europe ew Europe... freedom fries... with us or agaist us ) that uecessarily straied trasatlatic relatios. As troublig as all this might be, it was also trasiet, or so the story wet. I reality, though, the emotioal cotet of these exchages ad isesitivities teded to obscure what was becomig a geuie divergece i fudametal thikig. It was t about style; it was about substace. The failure to recogize that may be why may Europeas were surprised whe Presidet Obama, acceptig a Nobel Peace Prize largely for ot beig George W. Bush, lectured his audiece o just war theory ad o his moral ad costitutioal resposibilities to defed the Uited States. He did so because, despite campaig rhetoric to the cotrary, he was as comfortable with my four luchtime seteces as was his predecessor. I September 2009, more tha two years after my lucheo remarks ad well ito the Obama admiistratio, gufire from America special forces helicopters i souther Somalia killed Saleh Nabha, a otorious al Qaida leader. Sice this attack took place outside of a iteratioally recogized theater of coflict (like Iraq or Afghaista), its lawfuless higed o the uique America defiitio of the coflict. As it happeed, this was a exclusively America operatio, but there is t a itelligece service i Europe (especially Wester Europe) that would have passed locatioal data o Nabha to the Uited States had they kow the data would be put to this purpose. For them, such actio would have bee illegal. But similar targeted killigs, more ofte with droes tha with maed aircraft, have bee routie over the past four years i places like Yeme ad Pakista. So too have bee idefiite detetios, military commissios ad a cosistet America refusal to provide hostile Europea Thomas Hobbes ( ) judges with America iformatio. America policies have ot bee without cotroversy at home, but the obvious cotiuity betwee two very differet Presidets suggests that the curret America approach is both bipartisa ad edurig. Europeas who would dowplay the differeces as temporary ad persoality-drive should thik agai. So too should those who might argue that the trasatlatic legitimacy gap is cofied to coflictig views o how to fight terrorism ad therefore its effects, Wikipedia (2) Save tos of. CO 2

7 y es ad Europe: g together? g terrorism By Michael Hayde while paiful ad importat, ca be maaged or isolated. Actually, terrorism both the threat ad the respose may be the paradigm for the ew ormal. I the idustrial age, the importat pieces o the atioal security chess board were atio states, ad players teded to move pieces aroud with oe or aother versio of hard power. I the idustrial age, most broad cultural, techological ad ecoomic treds teded to stregthe the state. (Remember whe makig a phoe call was such a complex Joh Locke ( ) udertakig that we etrusted it oly to govermets or govermet-ru moopolies?) Threats geerally came from atio states ad we relied o atio states to deal with them. (For much of the discussio here I am deeply idebted to my fried, metor ad former boss Bret Scowcroft, i particular his A World i Trasformatio, Atlatic Coucil, 26 April) We still rely o states to defed us, but much else has chaged. May 21st cetury treds have eroded the power of the state. Iformatio age coectivity has pushed power (ad threat) dow to sub-atioal uits ad eve to idividuals. Most of us are old eough to remember whe a religious zealot i a cave i the Hidu Kush did ot represet much of a persoal dager. No loger. Oe could make a equally compellig argumet that cyberthreats are but aother expressio of the same log term global treds, ad it is o coicidece that we are ow strugglig to determie appropriate state actio to defed citizes i this domai. Ad it s o surprise that oe of the discussios durig the Muich Security Coferece will weigh the relative merits of a law-eforcemet versus a military approach. Similarly, despite good Mexica- America state-to-state relatios, crimial cartels have made the souther border of the Uited States as threateed, violet ad ustable as it has bee i early a cetury, ad sigificat swathes of Mexico are ugovered. Although doe uder a patia of law eforcemet, the Mexica army alog with America droes ad America supplied combat helicopters give much of this struggle the air of a battlefield rather tha a crime scee. All of which argues that this is ot just about releasig prisoers from Guatáamo or respodig to oe or aother suit or petitio. Rather, it is about creatig a ew paradigm to defie the extet ad the limits of state actio i a truly ew security eviromet. The attacks of 9/11 forced America to quickly act agaist oe expressio of this ew eviromet. If Americas are ope to charges of beig too casual ad too uilateral i developig ew models, Europeas bear some burde for too picture-alliace/augeklick/sammy Mikoff At loggerheads over Iraq: Germa chacellor Gerhard Schröder ad US Presidet George W. Bush i quickly codemig those who had to act ad who had to choose amog imperfect alteratives. How ideed does oe couter a adversary who rejects Geeva s prime cotetio the distictio betwee combatat ad o-combatat ot just for its victims but for its followers as well? How are states to deal with lethal oppoets who reject Westphalia s tacit uderstadig that states are the legitimate home of sovereig power ad have a moopoly o the legitimate use of violece? With these two pillars rejected by those who are ow so empowered to do us harm, how should that shape our defiitio of appropriate state behavior? Aswers are eeded, but they are either easy or obvious. Ad lack of movemet ow ot oly makes us less safe, but sets the stage for harmful overreactio whe catastrophe befalls. Geeral (ret.) Michael Hayde is a former director of the CIA ad the Natioal Security Agecy. He is curretly a pricipal at the Chertoff Group, where his area of focus icludes techological itelligece ad couteritelligece. chertoff group Trasatlatic Ties If we still truly occupy similar positios o that log cultural ad historical arc, there may be much to gai from ufettered but equally u-codemig dialogue betwee us. If ot betwee us, the where? With whom? Near the ed of that discussio at the Embassy luch i 2007, oe Europea Ambassador remided me that, We are all childre of the Elightemet. Recogizig that this was a subtle call for uity (ad a barely veiled criticism), I quickly respoded that, although that was certaily true, at the momet we Americas were rather fixated o Hobbes whereas the Europeas seemed to be stuck o Locke. As this is beig writte, Frech aircraft are attackig adherets of al Qa'ida i the Islamic Maghreb i orther Mali. Although wrapped i the "legitimacy" of a earlier era (edorsed by the Uited Natios, requested by the Malia govermet ad cosistet with past Frech behavior i the "post-coloial space"), this actio suggests some reaso for hope with the regard to evetual covergece betwee America ad Europea views toward ew threats. Perhaps our commo cultural heritage still ca serve our cotemporary eeds. Surely both philosophers (ad both cotiets) would seem to have somethig to offer. Deliverig solutios. Our etwork makes the world a little smaller. We work aroud the clock i over 130 coutries all over the world to attai oe sigle goal: makig your logistics eve more efficiet. Ad this is why we ca offer you a seamless trasportatio chai from oe sigle source by rail, road, sea, or air. Our additioal logistics services make eve the most complex tasks aythig but impossible. To fid out more, visit

8 8 February 2013 Forty-six years after Geeral de Gaulle s decisio to leave NATO s military orgaizatio, Frace has fially settled its dilemma. Last November, former Socialist foreig miister Hubert Védrie submitted a report to Frech Presidet Fraçois Hollade, emphatically statig the ewly foud Frech cosesus regardig NATO: Frace s (re-) exit from the itegrated military commad is ot a optio. Istead, Frace should assert itself much more i the Alliace ad wield greater ifluece, while beig vigilat ad rigorous. Hubert Védrie coied the term hyperpower to describe the Uited States i the late 1990s ad was critical whe Nicolas Sarkozy egieered a stuig break with the de Gaulle-Mitterrad legacy by returig to the itegrated military commad i April A self-described realist, Védrie had all the credetials to make the argumet agaist a re-exit. I his recommedatios, faithful to a classic eo-gaullist visio, he calls for vigilace regardig a umber of traditioal Frech cocers. These iclude preservig a military alliace focused o collective defese, actig as little as possible as a political ad military alliace ad based o uclear deterrece. I typical fashio, he wars of the coceptual ad theoretical risk of phagocytosis, a loss of Frech ability for threat aalysis, reflectio ad predictio of scearios ad eve plaig. Vigilace is also required toward the preservatio of Frace s ad Europe s idustrial defese base. Frace does ot wat Ballistic Missile Defese ad Smart Defese to become a vehicle for America military PHILIPPE WOJAZER/AFP/Getty Images picture alliace/abaca The Obama doctrie Americas are used to beig the hawks i world affairs, ad Europeas the doves but those roles have reversed uder Presidet Obama By Daiel Twiig Hubert Vedrie (right) hads his report recommedig Frace s cotiued membership of NATO s itegrated military commad to Presidet Fracois Hollade. exports to the Europea market at the expese of Frace s ad Europe s defese idustry. Other Frech reservatios towards missile defese are well kow ad still stad: it should be complemetary ad ot a substitute to uclear deterrece, politically cotrolled by the Allies ad should ot jeopardize cooperatio with Russia. Tryig to accommodate a wide spectrum of Frech political sesitivities, Védrie advocates a Europeaizatio of the Alliace, a Frech ad Europea idustrial strategy i NATO ad, simultaeously, the costructio of a Europe of Defese withi the framework of the Europea Uio. Europe should seize the momet precisely because there The Uited States, protected by two oceas ad with a global rage of allies ad iterests, has foud for a cetury that it must go abroad to shape ad lead a dagerous world. But Presidet Barack Obama seems, i some respects, to prefer to stay home. Whereas George W. Bush s foreig policy was maximalist, Obama s is miimalist. A foreig policy assessmet oly halfway through his presidecy is o doubt ufair he may yet vaquish Ira s uclear weapos program, put a overdue ed to Syria s bloody civil war, stad dow Chiese aggressio i Asia waters, ad oversee a historic wave of trade liberalizatio. But he has ot yet. The Obama Doctrie appears less ambitious. Here are its elemets to date. Natio-buildig at home, ot abroad: Presidet Obama took office so determied to ed the war i Iraq that he failed to egotiate a follow-o force to sustai stability there. I Afghaista, after a decade of allied sacrifice ad real gais, the admiistratio astoishigly is ow flirtig with the zero optio of leavig o US forces there after Obama prefers to focus o atio-buildig at home. But will he be able to if Iraq or Afghaista backslide ito civil war, or if Syria s violet spillover egulfs the Middle East? For all the tactical efficacy of droe strikes, the Uited States caot possibly defeat terrorism without at the same time workig to build free ad prosperous societies i coutries, like Pakista, that urture terror. Resistig trasformatioalism: Notwithstadig excellet speeches about bridgig the gap betwee America the Muslim world, Presidet Obama has treaded more gigerly i his policies. He did ot support Ira s Gree Revolutio ad has stood back from the opportuities iheret i the Arab Awakeig, allowig post-strogma societies i the Middle East to devise ew political arragemets for themselves. Obama has a uaced uderstadig of the limits of power ad the tragedy of iteratioal politics from his oft-cited readig of Reihold Niebuhr. But the greater tragedy may be decliig to use America s great power to more actively support Arab ad Iraia liberals desperate to build free societies agaist fierce oppositio from Islamist ad acie régime forces. Leadig from behid : I Libya, Syria, ad ow Mali, we have see Washigto s Europea allies push for, or carry out themselves, armed itervetios to uphold huma rights ad regioal stability. Americas are used to beig the hawks i world affairs, ad Europeas the doves but those roles have reversed uder Presidet Obama. This turs the trasatlatic bargai o its head: Europeas ow seem more cocered with policig out-of-area crises, with America playig a supportig role. But is such passivity really i Washigto s iterest? Ca Europe really lead i matters of is a certai willigess or desire o the part of the Americas for the Europeas to play a greater role i the Alliace. I other words, the combiatio of the US pivot to Asia, America expeditioary fatigue ad ew cuts i the US defese budget make it more ecessary ad less impossible for Europeas to play a larger role i their ow defese. But Védrie s admoitios for Europe to take o more resposibility for its ow security both withi NATO ad the EU will be hard to follow. Serious questios hag over the future of Europe s political will ad capacities i a time of sustaied defese austerity. Besides some modest achievemets i Fraco-British defese cooperatio uder the Lacaster House treaty of 2010, the Frech war ad peace without America at the frot? Rebalacig America power toward Asia: America s pivot Daiel Twiig is Seior Fellow for Asia at the Germa Marshall Fud of the Uited States. These are his persoal views. germa marshall fud of the us Security Doctrie The Védrie doctrie has bee welcomed i much of Asia ad across party lies i Washigto. But as Joseph Nye argues, the Uited States has bee pivotig to Asia sice the ed of the Cold War. It would be more accurate to say that Obama himself pivoted away from seekig a G-2 codomiium with Chia to balacig agaist it. His admiistratio s support for liberalizatio i Myamar has bee historic but seior US officials say the process is drive by Naypyidaw, ot Washigto. It is also uclear Or how to assert ifluece i the face of dimiished resources By Fraçois d Alaço Fraçois d Alaço is Foreig News Correspodet for the Frech ewspaper La Croix. private Security Doctrie project for commo Europea defese seems remote, i the face of a British ad Germa preferece for the NATO framework. Oce stretched by three simultaeous armed coflicts i Afghaista, Côte d Ivoire ad Libya, Frace faces the prospect of substatial cuts i its defese budget. A ew white paper o defese ad atioal security will be submitted to Fraçois Hollade by the ed of February, followed by the adoptio of a ew loi de programmatio militaire (LPM) for Frech Defese Miister Jea-Yves Le Dria believes there are several ways for Frace to bridge the gap ad maitai its strategic rakig. Europea Uio Battlegroups created i 2007 could be deployed. A ew impetus should also be give to Europea poolig ad sharig of military capabilities ad to the cosolidatio of the Europea Defese idustry i spite of the failed deal betwee the British ad the Europea defese compaies BAE ad EADS. Iitiated by the Frech, the icomig Europea Uio military traiig missio i Mali if the pivot is more tha a rhetorical policy; Presidet Obama has already authorized defese budget cuts of early $900 millio ad supports more. Usetimetality towards allies: Eve amidst the rebalace, Asia allies like Japa ad frieds like Idia have felt eglected by this America presidet. Similarly, Obama s attetio to the trasatlatic relatioship seems iversely proportioal to the affectio Europeas feel for him. Despite sigificat defese trasfers, the US admiistratio appears as cocered with prevetig Israel from attackig Ira as prevetig Ira from developig uclear weapos. Hardheadedess is a virtue i iteratioal relatios. America s allies, however, expect it to be directed more at US adversaries tha at our frieds. A trade policy high i ambitio, if ot results: Presidet Obama commedably seeks to double US exports as part of a ecoomic recovery program. His admiistratio has sketched out a trasformative visio of a Atlatic marketplace ad a Tras-Pacific Partership. But movemet o both has bee very slow at least as slow as the three years it took for Obama to sed Cogress free trade agreemets with Korea ad other coutries egotiated by his predecessor. The potetial for a ambitious trade opeig is promisig if Obama ca deliver. Presidet Joh F. Keedy said America would pay ay price ad bear ay burde i support of liberty. Presidet Obama has made clear that uder his leadership, America will ot do quite so much. But strategic miimalism ad a focus o the domestic, meas problems abroad oly grow, ievitably pullig America ito crises o less favorable terms. The world looks to America for strategic iitiative to solve its thoriest problems. At the momet, demad for this leadership is greater tha supply. (EUTM Mali) was supposed to be a example of Europea actio i support of a Africaled military itervetio. I practice, i spite of a early pledge to avoid direct ivolvemet i its former coloy, Frace, oce agai, fids itself i the positio of deployig troops aloe i support of a failig Africa state ad directly cofrotig the Tuareg ad Islamist militias allied with al-qaeda i the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Oly the future will tell whether Frace has the reach ad meas to sustai this type of military campaig ad mobilize a multiatioal egagemet i atio-buildig. Fraçois Hollade has isisted that the Frech military role will oly last util a Africa force ca take the field i support of the Malia army. Still, it is ot clear how ad whe the log-promised Africa itervetio force will go ito actio. Thus Frace may be uable to avoid a log egagemet with its ow military right out frot. I Afghaista, sice havig left Kapisa provice, where the Frech army was deployed, Paris s attempt to play a role i promotig a political solutio has ot bee very coclusive. Likewise, recet talk of a Frech/ Europea stabilizatio missio i a post-assad Syria remais hypothetical. As Hubert Védrie said i his report, the success of a proactive Frech policy to achieve greater ifluece will ot oly deped o the political will of its Europea parters but foremost o maitaiig a certai level of military capability while at the same time reducig the debt ad improvig its ecoomic competitiveess. Fidig a way out of this Gallic coudrum will be a tough call.

9 February Each presidetial term sice 2000, Vladimir Puti has had a ew foreig policy doctrie. I the early 2000s, this was a alliace with the Uited States, coupled with the Europea choice. I the mid-2000s, it was replaced by a policy of defesive self-assertio, maifested i the Muich speech. Dmitri Medvedev s presidecy, which was de facto Puti s third term, was marked by a reset with Washigto ad the quest for moderizatio resources i the West. Puti s formal retur to the Kremli has ushered i yet aother iteratio of his foreig policy, which might be called sovereigizatio. Above all else, Mr. Puti has moved to cosolidate power at home, challeged by big city protesters i the witer of 2011/12. Seeig the protesters as paws of the US State Departmet which did ideed fiace some civil society ad democracy buildig programs, Puti ordered the cacellatio of USAID activities i Russia ad the legal bradig of Russia NGOs which accept fudig from abroad as foreig agets. The Kremli wet eve further whe, i respose to the US Magitsky Act, which applied sactios agaist Russia officials suspected of havig caused death i detetio of a corporate lawyer, it eded the practice of adoptio of Russia childre by US foster parets. Actually, Presidet Puti himself is itroducig somethig like Magitsky-i-reverse by legally restrictig Russia officials from owig assets ad property abroad. Evidetly, Puti wats both to do away with the vestiges of Russia s uequal status vis-àvis the West rooted i the 1990s foreig aid recipiet, democracy class drop-out, orphas-for-adoptio coutry ad to reduce the exposure of Russia officialdom to potetial pressure from the outside so that these same officials are better cotrolled by the Kremli iside. Cotrol is the true objective sovereigty is the sloga ad atioalism is the soul of this policy. I terms of foreig policy per se, Puti s mai project is Eurasia ecoomic itegratio. The Customs Uio of Belarus, Kazakhsta ad Russia, i operatio sice 2009, is beig upgraded to a sigle ecoomic area of the three, with the goal of a ecoomic uio by picture alliace/dpa Puti has bee workig hard persoally to expad the itegratio effort to iclude Kyrgyzsta ad Tajikista; ad he has offered Customs Uio membership to Ukraie, which is tor betwee the appeal of short-term gais i the east ad its log-term aspiratios to joi the west. Moscow has also bee cultivatig Tashket hopig to egage Uzbekista, a key coutry i Cetral Asia. This is ot the begiig of a ew Soviet Uio, to be sure; ad a degree of itegratio betwee Russia ad some of its eighbors makes sese i ecoomic terms. Puti, however, also seeks to ehace Russia s geopolitical stadig vis-à-vis its two biggest eighbors i Eurasia: the Europea Uio to the west ad Chia to the east. The Puti doctrie The New Puti Doctrie: Cotrol is the true objective, sovereigty is the sloga ad atioalism is the soul of his policy By Dmitri Trei Russia Presidet Vladimir Puti observes troops durig strategic commad staff exercises i the Caucasus regio i September Moscow s approach toward the EU, meawhile, has chaged fudametally. Europe is o loger Dmitri Trei is Director of the Caregie Moscow Ceter. Security Doctrie caregie.ru regarded there as a metor or eve a model. Russia o loger seeks a relatioship with it that would have, i Romao Prodi s memorable phrase, everythig i commo except the istitutios. Istead, the relatioship is gettig more trasactioal, symbolized more by addig ew pipelies ad bickerig over visas tha by professig commo values. Ideed, Moscow has ot oly accepted the values gap betwee itself ad the EU, but has begu to proudly advertise its ow more traditioal values, such as atioal sovereigty, religious faith, ad traditioal family i cotrast to Europe s uchecked freedoms which, i its view, erode society ad evetually doom it. Puti has also moved to re-reset relatios with the Uited States. Elimiatig elemets of perceived iequality has bee metioed. Politico-military issues, icludig arms cotrol, which featured promietly i the Medvedev iterlude, have bee assiged a back seat. Puti s ow priority is expadig trade ad ecoomic cooperatio with Americas o the model of the 2011 Roseft- ExxoMobil deal. Over the years, the Russia Presidet has come to prefer the compay of Wester CEOs to that of Wester politicias. I a highly symbolic gesture, Puti missed ot oly the Chicago NATO summit, but also the G-8 meetig at Camp David somethig o other world leader had doe before. Havig stopped pretedig that Russia is affiliated, however loosely ad idirectly, with the West, Puti felt free to take a more robust posture iteratioally. The crisis i Syria has give him a opportuity to demostrate that posture. Russia did ot like US-led military itervetios before, whether i the Balkas or i Iraq. It acquiesced i Libya, hopig to stregthe what Dmitri Medvedev called moderizatio alliaces with the West, but was bitterly disappoited as the impositio of a o-fly zoe morphed ito regime chage. O Syria, Moscow is stadig firm, givig o pretext for itervetio to those who wat to push or ease Bashar al-assad out of power. Russia also cotiues to give Damascus material assistace ad moral support. I its view, a Islamist takeover of Syria must be preveted by all o-military meas available. Nearly two years ito the Syria uprisig, Assad is still holdig out, ad Washigto is egotiatig the future of Syria directly with Moscow somethig ot see sice the ed of the Cold War. Fially, Puti has also pivoted to Asia-Pacific. The Asia- Pacific Ecoomic Cooperatio (APEC) summit i Vladivostok was the most visible, but ot the oly sig of the east-west geopolitical rebalacig ow takig place at the Kremli. Moscow uderstads the importace of the rise of Asia, ad of Chia i particular, ad is seekig to fid ways to develop its easter provices, which otherwise risk tiltig, ecoomically, toward the great eighbor across the river. Thus, while takig great care to maitai good relatios with Beijig, Moscow is reachig out to others i the regio, from Tokyo ad Seoul to Delhi ad Haoi, to expad trade ad ivestmet ad develop political cotacts. At some poit, drive by the same logic, Russia may eve discover the value of tras-pacific ties with North America. Dealig with Russia i the ext few years will mea dealig directly with Vladimir Puti, ad it will ot be easy. There will be calls to opposig the Kremli s authoritariaism, ad dire warigs agaist ay retur to realpolitik. Yet, opposig Russia, or simply igorig it, will carry its ow price. Russia is, ad will cotiue to be, for the Russias themselves to fix. Wester values eed to iform Wester iterests, ot to replace them. The oly possible solace will be that eve though the relatioship betwee Russia ad the West may become more cotetious tha it was i Medvedev s halcyo days, at least there will be o disillusiomet i the ed. The Merkel doctrie Ulike her Defese Miister, Chacellor Merkel rules out Germa combat deploymets By Peter Daused Lieuteat Geeral Has Werer Fritz looks at the world differetly sice he started his latest job ie moths ago: Now he scas it for crisis zoes. As director of the Germa Defese Miistry s ewly established Strategy ad Deploymet (SE) departmet, he has to look today at where Germa soldiers could be deployed tomorrow. His boss, Defese Miister Thomas de Maizière, wats Germay to meet the security policy expectatios the iteratioal commuity is placig o Germay. The problem is, Agela Merkel does t. More ecoomic clout, more political ifluece, more military resposibility i a time of global power shifts, this triad sets the toe for security policy debates. Behid a rhetorical façade of uity, the Germa chacellor ad her defese miister are respodig very differetly to a situatio where fear of a overly mighty Germay has trasformed ito a powerful pressure of expectatios. Whereas de Maizière would like to get the Germa public used to the idea that Germay s armed forces could be deployig to, ad fightig i crisis zoes more ofte, Merkel does ot wat to be resposible for ay more combat missios. The defese miister believes it s time for a thorough public debate about the cocept ad role of the Budeswehr as a globally active deploymet force yet the Chacellor is sayig othig. picture alliace/dpa Chacellor Agela Merkel is determied to keep Germa troops out of combat deploymets. Defese Miister Thomas de Maizière wats to take resposibility. Federal electios are due this fall, ad Merkel kows that voters like their chacellor but dislike farflug deploymets. Merkel has o itetio of riskig her popularity. Yet this latet dispute betwee the miister ad his boss is about more tha electio year politics. As the US realigs toward the Pacific, de Maizière believes that we Europeas have to accept that burdes will be shared differetly. Merkel passes these burdes o to third parties, immediately. Eve with a ew army, Germay caot solve all the problems of security, the chacellor said at the latest Budeswehr coferece. She appealed to other coutries, especially those of growig ecoomic importace to take more resposibility. We are actig i our iterest whe we help parters work effectively to maitai ad regai security ad peace i their regios, Merkel said. She meat, by givig them Germa advisers to trai their soldiers ad the tools that Germa idustry produces for fightig effectively, amely: Germa weapos. Thou shalt equip, ot itervee, might therefore be Merkel s first commadmet of security policy. Take resposibility would be de Maizierè s. O the record, the Defese Miister uses his boss s rhetoric. Loyalty is a cardial virtue to him. Iterally, however, he seems to be equippig himself. It s commo kowledge, he ofte says, that Germay is a leadig power i Europe ad NATO. Germay s elarged ecoomic ad political presece automatically begets a greater resposibility for security policy, de Maizière believes. The price of greatess is resposibility, Churchill said, the miister recetly told a Germa ewsweekly, addig: Oe ca vary that: The price of ifluece is resposibility. De Maizière believes that resposibility meas the Budeswehr may eve have to itervee where Germa iterests do ot immediately hag i the balace, ad has goe o record sayig so. Alliace parters iterests could suffice, he said. I Mali, that kid of argumet could justify far more tha a logistics ad traiig missio if it were t for Merkel. I security policy, Agela Merkel has travelled far. Her jourey bega i the summer of 2002, i the dispute over the Iraq war. Merkel reproached Chacellor Gerhard Schröder for refusig to joi the war, took sides with US Presidet George W. Bush, castigated the SPD-Gree coalitio for what she called its ati-america attitude ad spoke of how postwar Iraq could flourish like postwar Germay did. She kept doig so util Schröder wo re-electio. Merkel s jourey the took her through the war zoes of Iraq ad Afghaista. She saw bloodstaied fatigue. She saw military futility. Ad she saw that voters did t like ay of it the blood, the hopelessess, the defese of Germa iterests i the Hidu Kush moutais. Ad so Merkel s jourey eded i absolute distrust of military deploymets. I the case of Mali, she has offered Budeswehr plaes to trasport Ecoomic Commuity of West Africa States (ECOWAS) forces to the capital Bamako. The deploymet of Germa troops to Mali as part of a EU traiig missio caot be ruled out. It is also possible that the Budeswehr might provide the Malia military with logistical ad strategic Peter Daused is a political correspodet for the Germa weekly Die Zeit. Die Zeit Security Doctrie advice. That would help repair the damage doe whe Germay voted o to the UN itervetio i Libya. With a chacellor watig o part i combat missios ad a defese miister who caot rule them out, Germay that leadig Europea power is udecided about what kid of security policy it wats. For the ext eight moths, that wo t chage. De Maizière will remai loyal he has o other optio. Especially sice Merkel s security policy campaig stace has log bee decided: She s doig a Schröder. Sayig o to combat missios is the way to wi electios i Germay.

10 10 February 2013 Burdeed with leadership Germay struggles to accept its ew role as the udeclared Europea hegemo By Stefa Korelius Germay s biggest foreig-policy problem could be a old acquaitace Germay itself. While the world frets over the dagers emaatig from Syria, or tries to uderstad the history of the Sekaku Islads, the souds of a familiar chat are audible i Europe oe that does t appeal to Germa ears. It is the old sog of the hegemo, of the predomiat power. I the backgroud, melodies murmur about balace of power, alliaces, Pa-Germaism. Ad despite the sweet harmoy of evets like the aiversary celebratios of the Elysée Treaty i Berli, it is impossible ot to hear the growig discord: Germay has become too strog to submit to the will of the majority i Europe. Yet it is too weak to fashio that will o its ow. Semi-hegemoic is how the historia Ludwig Dehio oce described this predicamet. Ad eve if the parallels to Dehio s aalysis of the late 19th ad early 20th cetury power struggles do t exted very far, the specific observatio stads: I recet years, ad quite agaist its will, Germay has stumbled ito a leadership role for which there is o model i the postwar era. It was a gradual process, begiig, for all itets ad purposes, o the day of reuificatio a day that Fraçois Mitterrad ad Margaret Thatcher feared for precisely that reaso. It does t take much historical uderstadig to idetify the sheer size of a uited Germay, ad especially its ecoomic stregth as a source of irritatio i Europea power politics. Hardly surprisig, therefore, that the jury is still out o the mior historical cotroversy of whether Helmut Kohl offered the euro as a kid of isurace policy for the cotrol of Germa ecoomic power, i retur for which he was allowed to uify the coutry. (That political pragmatists bega cosiderig the idea of a commo currecy log before uificatio ad that Jacques Delors wared agaist the dagers of moetary uio without appropriate political structures well before 1989 has doe little to ihibit this debate.) Today, more tha 20 years later, the ecoomic imbalaces have become obvious. They are the cause of much political tesio, as well as the perceptio of Germay as a eo-hegemoic power that ot oly imposes its versio of ecoomic policy o the rest of the cotiet but, thaks to a commo market ad relatively cheap currecy, is domiatig Europe s export busiess as well. This is also the source of Germay s political leverage. Whoever fiaces the crisis, whoever, i case of doubt, pays the debts ad, beyod ay doubt, vouches for the stability of the currecy, gets to set the rules ad the process for log overdue reforms. Cosequetly, the euro crisis is ot oly about sovereig debt, ecoomic mismaagemet ad lack of competitiveess i the souther peripheral states: It is also about a leadership crisis for Germay. Ultimately, it is a major political ad atioal security problem for Germay. Because if there is oe thig the political class i Berli has iteralized it is this: Germa exceptioalism withi Europe is bad for the coutry. Germay does t kow what to do with its ew stregth. The public perceptio of the problem makes this glarigly obvious: Germas do t like havig figers poited at them, or havig the ca of resposibility kicked their way. The majority of Germas still see the euro crisis as the other picture alliace/bildarchiv Moheim The devil is i the detail: Germas ad their EU parters alike are wary of the eed for Berli to shoulder more resposibility. coutries problem. At the ceter, the crisis is yet to really arrive. A diametrically opposed view reigs i the crisishit coutries, where Merkel has bee burig i effigy for moths ad Nazi clichés are back i fashio. Oe Spaish commetator said the coutry s treatmet i the crisis smacked of Versailles. I Italy, Merkel is ridiculed as the Kaiser of Europe. Throughout the cotiet, the Germa chacellor has become the cover moster of choice for Europea periodicals. Still, as a geo-ecoomic power Germay does ot oly elicit fear amog its eighbors. The labor market reforms eacted uder the SPD-Gree govermet of Gerhard Schröder a decade ago remai exemplary; Italy s prime miister is oe of may Stefa Korelius is the foreig policy editor of the Germa daily paper the Süddeutsche Zeitug. SZ Germay i Europe who ackowledge Germay s culture of stability. The Germa model is the subject of busiess bestsellers, its people s alleged atioal characteristics of idustriousess, persistece ad a quest for perfectio reap ogoig admiratio. I the Neue Züricher Zeitug, Thomas Paulse attests to Germay s soft power attributes, a etirely ew export for a atio that prefers to reduce itself to Joha Wolfgag vo Goethe ad Joha Sebastia Bach. Ad yet, uease remais o several frots. First, Germay s stregth is ot evely distributed. That ca be dagerous. The coutry s ecoomic clout is ot accompaied by a willigess to shoulder more resposibility i dealig with iteratioal security problems. Just as the shock over Germay s decisio to sit out the Libya coflict was fadig, Berli kept the West o teterhooks agai after Frace lauched its Mali itervetio before evetually seeig fit to dispatch two Budeswehr Trasall cargo plaes. Frace deserved more, icludig immediate political support. I crisis-wracked Europe, the impressio could take hold that Germay is perfectly willig to leverage its ow ecoomic iterests while duckig its allies atioal security eeds. Secod, Europe s fixatio with itself (ad Germay) meas the quiet departure of a political heavyweight the US has goe practically uoticed. As a Europea power, the Uited States was a immovable costat i Europe s postwar arithmetic. Give the lack of strategic challeges o this side of the Atlatic, America s realigmet is hardly surprisig. For Germay ad Europe, however, it also poses a dager as log as Helmut Kohl s foreig policy wisdom applies that Europe s uificatio ad trasatlatic partership are two sides of the same coi. I scrutiizig their ow malaise, the Americas must also recogize that they are sufferig from the same symptoms as the atios of Europe: low competitiveess; globalizatio blues; excessive debt. Perhaps the two sides could lear a few thigs from oe aother or at least sidelie oe problem by workig to establish a trasatlatic free trade zoe. Third, the greatest dager may be that Germay s ew power will provoke a coutervailig power ad divide the Europea Uio. No matter how well meaig Berli s euro-crisis-policy might be, what couts is perceptio ad the battered atios of Europe have the distict impressio their role is simply to follow orders. The Germa govermet ca ivoke the spirit of Adeauer ad de Gaulle as much as it wats to, claim that o solutio is possible without Frace, ad that there will have to be agreemet about the right ecoomic model for Europe. I the ed, the words of the British playwright William Somerset Maugham apply to states as well: Our atural egotism leads us to judge people i their relatio to ourselves. We wat them to be certai thigs to us. M U N I C H H A S C O U N T L E S S S I G H T S O F O F F E R T H E H OT E L BAY E R I S C H E R H O F I N C L U D E D Sice 1841, the privately maaged, award-wiig Hotel Bayerischer Hof is valued iteratioally for its elegat atmosphere ad the amiable, highly persoal service. Here, the highest levels of luxury come as stadards with its stylish 280 rooms ad 60 suites set i the heart of Muich, withi walkig distace of the reowed museums, Kusthalle, art galleries ad of the Opera, as well as of the fiest shoppig areas. The hotel offers a choice of five restaurats (Gourmet, Mediterraea, Polyesia, Bavaria ad Spa Cuisie), amog them the restaurats Atelier (1 Micheli star) ad Garde, re-styled by Axel Vervoordt, the famous iterior desiger. Guests have a choice of 40 fuctio rooms with a capacity of 10 up to 2,500 persos, six bars ad the Night Club with live Jazz. Frech architect Adrée Putma desiged the Blue Spa, the welless area o three floors, with a paoramic rooftop terrace. The latest additio is the luxury ciema astor@ Ciema Louge, also desiged by Axel Vervoordt. Welcome to the best that Muich lifestyle has to offer. Promeadeplatz 2-6 D Müche Fo Fax ifo@bayerischerhof.de

11 February Foggy Bottom s ew Brahmi Patiece ad diplomatic fiesse: Joh F. Kerry s life has bee a preparatio for the post of US Secretary of State By Marti Kligst Joh Kerry was ervous; o trace left of the otherwise uflappable poise. Wait ad see what the ext 90 miutes brig, he said gruffly, lookig dow at the restless flock of reporters from his six feet four iches. The Presidet had prepared meticulously for his secod debate agaist Mitt Romey, Kerry told them. Barack Obama s lethargic performace i the first outig would be a thig of the past, he added. The Seator from Massachusetts kew what was o the lie that ight. If, i the comig miutes, somethig were to agai go wrog for Obama agaist his Republica challeger, Kerry would carry much of the blame. He had helped the presidet prepare for the debates, playig the role of Mitt Romey i practice sessios. Like two sparrig parters, they had rehearsed every attack ad couterpuch. So much depeded o this secod performace: Obama s re-electio, America s future directio ad Kerry s prospect of becomig Secretary of State. Oly if Obama remaied i the White House did Kerry stad ay chace of succeedig Hillary Clito, who had said repeatedly she would ot stay for a secod term. The rest is history. Joh Kerry will become the 68th US secretary of state. His cofirmatio by the Seate is a mere formality. Fially, he might thik. Kerry had worked tirelessly for the Presidet. As early as 2004, durig his ow bid for the presidecy, Kerry haded Obama, the a largely ukow state seator from Illiois, the coveted keyote speaker slot at the Democratic Party s atioal covetio, makig him famous overight. Whe Obama ra for presidet four years later, Kerry became oe of his early supporters, despite Kerry s friedship with the Clitos. Still, he was ot Obama s first choice for State. The Presidet would have preferred to give that office to Susa Rice, his outspoke ambassador to the UN. Somehow the 69-year-old seator ad powerful chairma of the Seate Foreig Relatios Committee was too covetioal, too much a old-school diplomat. Eve withi his party, Kerry s upper-crust tastes for fie food ad fabrics have eared him a reputatio as a Bosto Brahmi. Yet the seate Republicas let it be kow that they would do everythig i their power to block the omiatio of Rice as secretary of state. Obama backed dow. Already facig battles with cogressioal Republicas over the atioal debt, immigratio ad tougher gu laws, he had o iterest i oe more battle of wills. Kerry s momet had arrived. Ad give the multitude of dagerous flashpoits i today s world, he was the ecessary choice ayway. North Korea remais upredictable, Ira is still workig to get a uclear bomb, Israelis ad Palestiias are uited i mutual hatred, Chia is armig Marti Kligst is the US correspodet for the Germa weekly Die Zeit. Die Zeit Presidetial Picks ad seekig hegemoy i Asia, Syria threates to collapse uder its civil war, the future of Egypt ad a strig of states i the Middle East ad Africa remai ucertai ad o oe kows what will become of Afghaista ad Pakista whe NATO ad US forces soo pull out. Joh Kerry has a huge advatage over all his rivals. Hardly ayoe ca match the extesive list of political cotacts all over the world that he has amassed over the years. Kerry will ot have to arduously lear foreig policy. It was practically put ito his cradle. His father was a diplomat. At age 11, youg Joh was set to a Swiss boardig school ad leared several foreig laguages. Frace became a secod home. As a boy he bicycled through divided Berli. At a coferece i Brazil i the mid-1990s his secod wife, the eormously wealthy Teresa Heiz, took a likig to Kerry ot oly because he spoke so persuasively about the eviromet but also because, at a Catholic mass, he sag hyms i Portuguese. Teresa Heiz, the ketchup heiress, was remided of her ow childhood i Mozambique. I fact, Kerry has already bee servig as America s de facto shadow foreig miister for the past four years. Obama ad Clito repeatedly set him o delicate missios. Whe, i 2009, Afgha Presidet Hamid Karzai refused to admit that his reelectio had ot bee free ad fair, Kerry bega workig o him. For at least 20 hours he pressured, cajoled ad pleaded with the itrasiget Presidet, accompaied him ceaselessly through the palace garde ad drak, by Kerry s ow accout, at least 300 cups of tea. I the ed, Karzai agreed to call a secod roud of votig. Kerry s legedary patiece ad diplomatic fiesse were also i demad i the immediate aftermath of the killig of Osama bi Lade i Pakista. The coutry s military ad itelligece services felt duped by the Americas. Relatios were profoudly jeopardized. For early two weeks, Kerry soothed the Pakistais eflamed emotios. The result was a joit statemet that cosisted of little but empty phrases, yet kept the Pakistais o side. Kerry also shares Europea cocers over climate chage. I 1983 he visited Germay s Black Forest to study the effects of acid rai. He uderstads that destructio of the eviromet, that floods, droughts ad scarce water ca cause wars ad mass migratios, ad that they directly ifluece foreig policy. His commitmet to evirometal protectio has ot wo him may frieds amog Republicas. However, like his predecessor Hillary Clito, Kerry will ot eter his ew job with a ow ageda, let aloe a grad desig. To a large extet, US foreig policy is determied by the White House ad upredictable occurreces. Also like his predecessor, Kerry is a pragmatist ad iteratioalist. If aythig, he is eve more opposed tha Clito to imperialist saber rattlig. If there is oe profoud isight that Kerry shares with the presidet ad the ext secretary of defese, Chuck Hagel, it is that military itervetios, especially deploymets of groud troops, are bad optios ad should always be the very last optio. If oe were to sum up the Obama admiistratio s creed i three terms, they would be disegagemet, cotaimet ad multilateralism. I other words: edig wars, limitig coflicts ad stregtheig military ad diplomatic alliaces. I fact, all three me were forged by the Vietam War. Kerry ad Hagel fought there as soldiers, were wouded ad repeatedly decorated. It would take the more coservative Hagel may years to grasp the seselessess of that war. The left-leaig Kerry joied the protest movemet as soo as he retured, throwig his medals i the mud i frot of the Capitol Buildig durig oe demostratio. Like Hagel, Kerry voted i favor of the Iraq War after the 9/11 attacks ad soo regretted it. Whe Kerry was commadig a Swift boat i Vietam, Barack Obama was still a small boy. Yet the bitter disputes ad the psychological ad political effects of the war also marked him. I 2004 Obama was elected to the Seate ad give a seat o the Foreig Relatios Committee. There he met the Vietam veteras Chuck Hagel ad Joh Kerry. Their distrust of military itervetios impressed him deeply. His trust i their judgmet has led to their omiatios to head up the Petago ad the State Departmet. picture alliace/ladov Tamig the Petago The ext US Defese Secretary Chuck Hagel? faces dautig budgetary, as well as military challeges By Christoph vo Marschall picture alliace/ap Images Barack Obama is lookig to push the reset butto o US defese policy. The Petago, he believes, must icorporate strategic lessos from ati-terrorist operatios while slashig costs. The ma the US presidet wats to carry out those reforms is Chuck Hagel. But the omiatio of Obama s choice for defese secretary is o shoo-i. I the decade sice 9/11, the US defese budget has more tha doubled. The aggregate of the Petago s base budget ad supplemetals for its wars climbed from $316 billio i 2001 to $687 billio i Give Washigto s debt problems, that figure ow has to shrik. George W. Bush respoded to threats that he believed stemmed from the terrorist safe haves i Iraq ad Afghaista by usig maily big deploymets of groud forces. The Obama admiistratio ow views the costs ad risks associated with this traditioal meas of wagig war with skepticism. Today the govermet s attitude ca be summed up as look before you leap. Obama s people have embraced special operatios, ragig from extesive use of umaed droe aircraft to track dow ad kill al Qaeda commaders to computer worms that disrupted Ira s uclear program. The admiistratio is lookig hard at what the battlefields of the future will be like, what role cyberwars could play ad what it all meas for the traiig ad equippig of the US armed forces. Also, the geostrategic focus is shiftig from Europe ad the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific regio. I Washigto, however, these issues together with all others, it seems are deadlocked betwee the political camps. So far, Democrats ad Republicas have failed to fid cosesus i both their assessmet of the situatio ad the priorities they set. Ad wheever aswers are forthcomig, they are practically irrecocilable. Earlier, such situatios could be resolved i a politically seductive, if costly maer: To prevet ay side from beig harmed, old programs were kept ruig while fiacig was foud for ew oes. That is o loger a optio. As a result, the coflict is comig to a head i the battle over Chuck Hagel s omiatio. His cofirmatio by the Seate is aythig but certai. Persoal racor is addig heat to coflictig staces o the issues. The coservatives hardly care that Hagel is both a Republica ad a decorated Vietam vetera. What couts for them is that he s tured his back o the party maistream ad joied the opposig camp. The presidet has praised Hagel s idepedet thikig. As a seator from Nebraska he voted for the war i Iraq i 2002 but opposed the Iraq troop surge i The loomig decisio to cut the US military presece i Afghaista to oly 6000 after NATO pulls out i 2014 could facilitate a resurgece of the Taliba. His critics regard Hagel s advocacy of resolvig the Iraia uclear crisis diplomatically without jeopardizig cotacts through tougher sactios ad saber-rattlig as a dagerous form of appeasemet. His distaced relatioship with Israel has bee criticized both by Republicas ad ifluetial Christoph vo Marschall is the White House Correspodet ad Washigto Bureau Chief for the Berlibased daily Der Tagesspiegel. private Presidetial Picks Democrats icludig Seator Chuck Schumer although he recetly came out i favor of Hagel s omiatio. Regardless of whether the omiatio passes the Seate or Hagel falls victim to a coalitio of Israel supporters ad seators who do t share his strategic priorities, ay US defese secretary would face the same challeges, especially the fiacial oes. This year the Petago will have to cut a additioal $52 billio from its already reduced budget, ad a total of $500 billio over the ext five years if Democrats ad Republicas fail to agree o cuts elsewhere i the budget, triggerig automatic cuts for the military. Shrikig the budget from $690 billio i 2011 to $616 billio i the curret fiscal year was achieved without ay major cuts i weapos acquisitios. The drawdow i Iraq ad reduced operatios i Afghaista cut costs o their ow. Now, previously utouched items could also be affected. Does the Petago really eed 1.4 millio professioal soldiers ad 800,000 civilia employees? Who s keepig a eye o the legio of private cotractors? Will the warships already ordered meet the requiremets for coflicts i the future? As droes keep multiplyig, should t the umber of covetioal warplaes be reduced? Who should have authority over the droe program ad its lethal operatios the CIA as ow or, as earlier, the Defese Departmet? Hagel also supports slashig the coutry s uclear arseal by 80 percet. That aloe could save $100 billio over te years, oefifth of the Petago s required savigs. The omiee s hearigs i the Seate will provide a opportuity to explore such issues. Whether lawmakers use that opportuity i today s polarized political climate is aother questio.

12 12 February 2013 Missile defese is feasible Iro Dome ca reduce missile threats, protect huma lives, ad gai time ad political latitude i a crisis By Karl-Heiz Kamp Aother roud of the Israeli-Palestiia crisis eded i November last year i a familiar way: a ceasefire was agreed upo, with both sides claimig victory ad with hardly ay chace for a lastig peace settlemet. However, at least oe good piece of ews emerged from this otherwise edless story of coflict i the Middle East: the Iro Dome missile defese system, developed by Israel agaist the threat posed by Palestiia missile attacks, had worked very well. Almost 90 percet of the missiles aimed to detoate i Israeli villages were itercepted before they could harm the civilia populatio, accordig to some estimates. This success has cosequeces far beyod the immediate regio directly ivolved i the crisis. First, it proves that missile defese is ideed possible, ad ca be successfully employed i a coflict eve Karl-Heiz Kamp is the Research Director at the NATO Defese College i Rome. The views expressed i this paper are the resposibility of the author aloe. NDC if the attackig rockets have a flight time of less tha a miute. Secod, the example of Iro Dome shows that the advatages of missile defese should ot be couted oly i terms of lives saved though these aloe would be eough to justify the sigificat cost of such a system. I this case, missile defese also provided the Israeli govermet with political leeway ad flexibility i a period of extreme tesio. Had Palestiia missile attacks killed large umbers of wome ad childre, the resultig political pressure for a itervetio could have led to a Israeli ivasio of Gaza to fid ad destroy the lauchers. Hece, deployig missile defese capabilities does ot escalate a coflict as critics frequetly claim o the cotrary, it actually dimiishes the pressure for further escalatio. The US has bee workig for decades o a missile defese system to protect its territory, as well as those of its allies Presidet Reaga dubbed it the Strategic Defese Iitiative (SDI). NATO recetly supported this approach by makig missile defese a core elemet of its overall defese posture as stated i its ew Strategic Cocept. Of course, there is a differece betwee a strategic defese capability for a etire regio ad oe like Iro Dome which is iteded for the battlefield. The purpose, however, is the same: to reduce missile threats, to protect huma lives, ad to gai time ad political latitude i a crisis. The demad for this is obvious. Missile techology is mushroomig globally, ad costatly improvig i terms of rage ad accuracy. Geographical distace o loger offers sufficiet protectio agaist missile threats from Norther Africa, the Middle East or East Asia. Criticism ad rejectio of missile defese evertheless seem as old as the idea itself: it cotiues to be fiercely opposed by may, both iside ad outside NATO as well as i Russia. Oppoets have always argued that so techically ambitious a idea as missile defese Iro Dome could ever work i practice; ad that, eve if a defese capability were to be built up, it could be easily eutralized by coutermeasures. I such a sceario, icomig warheads would be accompaied by decoys, which would effectively puzzle detectio radars. Oppoets of missile defese hold that tests provig the opposite were maipulated by the arms idustry. They eve claim that missile defese is dagerous, as it could igite arms races based o mass procuremet of missiles so as to saturate defeses. Moscow i particular seems to see missile defese as a aggressive step by NATO ad the US, raisig the eed for a Russia coutermove. Fially, there is the argumet that eve a workig missile defese could ever offer oe hudred percet security: it would provide at best the illusio of security, which is just ot worth the moey. What is most surprisig is that the critics have ot chaged their argumets much sice the time of Roald Reaga, eve if the Cold War is ow history, the world has chaged completely, ad cell phoes today have greater capabilities tha the supercomputers of the early 1980s. Missile defese is ideed a extremely ambitious project because, as someoe put it, the aim is to shoot dow a rifle bullet with a rifle bullet but this is exactly what happeed late last year o the Israeli border with Gaza. The US ad NATO have cotiuously developed their capabilities to detect ad destroy icomig missiles. Missile defese is feasible o the regioal as well as o the strategic level. Eve a defese system that is less tha oe hudred percet foolproof ca provide political decisio-makers with room for maeuver, which they would ot have with missiles costatly detoatig i their cities. This is ot to say that missile defese is a silver bullet for all the security problems of the Euro-Atlatic alliace, but it remais oe crucial elemet i a broad spectrum of meas ad tools. The first tool of trasatlatic security the first lie of defese, so to speak will always be the use of diplomacy to defuse crisis situatios ad prevet missile threats from emergig. Should this effort fail, deterrece ca be the secod lie of defese, commuicatig to a potetial aggressor that the price to be paid for attackig will always exceed ay beefits he might hope to gai by doig so. Should deterrece too prove usuccessful, the Atlatic alliace will still have the reassurace of missile defese as its third optio to guaratee the safety of allies ad parters territories. For the supporters of this third lie of defese, the recet cofirmatio of Iro Dome s reliability was of fudametal importace. I this sese, the implicatios of its success exted far beyod the Middle East, ad will have a impact o the etire Atlatic alliace. picture alliace / dpa Debukig the missile defese hype Eve if idepedetly cofirmed, Iro Dome s much-vauted success does ot prove that missile shields work By Subrata Ghoshroy Iro Dome may well prove to be a step forward i defese systems of its type. But Israel seems to have shared little iformatio to date, ad so there is o way for outside observers to kow how successful it actually is. But let s debuk the myth that Iro Dome eve if as successful as advertised i the Gaza coflict costitutes proof that missile defese, writ large, works. Termiology is importat here. Iro Dome is primarily a rocket defese system, ad rockets are fudametally differet from missiles. Rockets do ot have a guidace system; missiles do. Rockets Subrata Ghoshroy is a research associate at the Massachusetts Istitute of Techology's Program i Sciece, Techology, ad Society. follow a trajectory that is determied by the positio ad agle of the laucher ad the propellat. So, oce they are fired, ad the radar detects their lauch, they are easily tracked. Tamir Iro Dome s iterceptor missile has its ow small radar, which provides fial guidace toward the target rocket ad its warhead, before the iterceptor igites its ow payload ear the rocket. The resultig explosio creates a shrapel cloud that, if successful, puctures the rocket warhead, which explodes several kilometers high i the air. [...] The reported success of Iro Dome appears to be geeratig iterest i other coutries, with Brazil, Idia, Sigapore, ad South Korea amog those described as iterested i acquirig the system. That supposed success also seems to have bee coflated with proof that missile defese i geeral works. NATO is deployig Patriot batteries i Turkey to itercept Syria missiles. Ad missile defese true believers are pushig lasers agai, eve though billios of dollars have bee spet o MIT Iro Dome failed attempts to build lasers that reliably shoot dow large missiles. Raytheo, for example, is advertisig a Laser Phalax as the weapo system of the future that could replace everythig i the tactical battlefield from Iro Dome to the curret Phalax system, used by the Navy ad adapted as a lad-based system that has bee called extremely effective i stoppig rocket attacks o the Gree Zoe. This ethusiasm for missile defese ad particularly laser missile defese glosses over decades of expesive failure. Like Israel, the Uited States has aimed to produce a layered system, icludig lad- ad sea-based platforms that will itercept icomig missiles i various phases of trajectory boost phase, mid-course, ad termial phase. The cumulative sum spet so far is about $200 billio. Yet, there are still major challeges to fieldig a effective system. Although very little data is i the public domai, some aalysts questio the 90-to-95 percet itercept rate advertised by the Israeli military. The Israelis eed to be forthcomig with Cogress, providig data to back up the claims of such a astroomical success rate. There should also be idepedet ivestigatio of those claims. A exteded versio of this article was published i the Bulleti of the Atomic Scietists o Dec. 13, 2012 uder the title: Iro Dome: Behid the hoopla, a familiar story of missile-defese hype For the full versio see: A Israeli Iro Dome defese system fires a missile to itercept a Palestiia rocket fired from the Gaza Strip i November 2012.

13 Security Flashpoits February 2013S sectio B 13 The widespread assumptio that itervetio i Mali is about fightig extremists i the North is misleadig, for two reasos. First, the coflict is fudametally betwee rival elites i orther Mali. Secod, the biggest obstacle to progress i the North is the political deadlock i Mali s capital Bamako a obstacle Wolfram Lacher is a associate of the Middle East ad Africa Research Divisio at the Germa Istitute for Iteratioal ad Security Affairs (SWP). SWP that exteral actors have yet to adequately ackowledge. What kid of coflict are we lookig at i orther Mali? The commo iterpretatio is that three extremist Islamist groups, drawig o fighters from across orthwester Africa, have established a reig of terror. This is a superficial readig of the situatio. Assumig Frech military actio succeeds i weakeig the extremist groups as such, ad dispersig them, the war is likely to reveal itself as what it really is: a coflict betwee rival elites withi orther Mali. Some tribal elites have, for the past year, backed oe of the three extremist groups, for largely opportuistic reasos. Other orther elites are behid the secessioist Natioal Movemet for the Liberatio of Azawad (MNLA), or behid the Arab ad Tuareg militias that fought the govermet s Seegal Flashpoit Mali Kayes Bafoulab é Guiea Bamako is the real problem Niger Tribal elites i Norther Mali are backig jihadist groups for opportuistic reasos. The solutio is effective govermet ad military reform By Wolfram Lacher war i the orth util the March 2011 military coup. The coflicts i orther Mali durig the 1990s ad sice 2006 were coflicts betwee these groups. The rift betwee the MNLA ad Asar Die leadership already emerged durig the 1990s ad i 2006 it reflects the persoal ambitios of rival political leaders rather tha ideology. For orther leaders, the costs of associatig themselves with extremists have rise sharply with the Frech itervetio. A probable sceario is that the extremist groups dissolve ito their respective ethic costituecies. May fighters, ad eve some leadig figures, will re-hat themselves to escape the Frech offesive. A core of regioal jihadists would emerge. Precisely that may also be the ideal sceario for Frech military strategists. But the questio is, what happes the? Attempts to break the alliaces betwee local tribal elites ad hardcore extremists will lead to the emergece of armed groups alog ethic ad tribal lies. These groups will cotiue to pursue their idividual political iterests ad will ot be able to accept that their egotiatig positio has eroded by a re-coquest of orther Mali particularly if the military forces drivig this coquest iclude the ethic militias agaist whom the armed groups took up arms i the first place. This coflict withi orther Mali is likely to be much legthier ad more protracted tha the idea of a straightforward campaig agaist extremist groups would suggest. This is the coflict ay exteral actor iterveig i Mali will get ivolved i be it a Africa-led force, be it a EU traiig missio. Kita Nioro du Sahel Koulikoro Bamako Kagaba Two precoditios for success i tacklig the coflict withi orther Mali are the emergece of a effective govermet i Bamako, ad the reform of the Malia army. The political deadlock i Bamako has log bee eglected by exteral actors focusig o the North. Sice the military coup, there has bee almost o progress o a trasitio toward costitutioal order. MAUritaia Nara Baamba Bougoui Ségou Koutiala Sikasso Diabaly Nioo Léré Goudam Niafuké Sa Mopti Djeé Oil ad Gas Eve agreemet o the framework of the trasitio is lackig amog Mali s key political forces. The govermet is iterally divided ad does ot have the legitimacy or the support eeded to egage i ay egotiatios with orther groups. The army is ridde by iteral strife, but mostly cotrolled by the coup leaders who act as a couterweight to the iterim presidet. Noe of this had caused much irritatio to exteral actors, who pressed o with plas for a Africa-led itervetio regardless. Eve whe the coup leaders i December 2012 forced out the prime miister, preparatios for a EU missio to rebuild the Malia army cotiued. The Frech itervetio will also chage the balace of power i Bamako. It remais to be see whether Frace will use its military presece to prevet meddlig i politics by the coup leaders, ad support the re-establishmet of clear military commad structures. Attempts to do so could backfire i the form of reewed tesios withi the army, or a popular backlash agaist eocoloial iterferece i Malia affairs. But eve if Frace succeeds i curbig the coup leaders ifluece, other political forces will still have to agree o a trasitioal framework, ad a effective govermet will still have to be formed. Norther Mali, regio claimed by MNLA as Azawad Taoudei Araouae Tombouctou Diré Koa Douetza Badiagara Burkia Faso Niger Hombori Bourem Gao Asogo Tessalit Uraium Uraium Niger Kidal Fially, there is the issue of fiacial resources: sice Wester govermets suspeded developmet aid after the coup, the Malia state is quickly goig bakrupt. If fuds earmarked for developmet aid are reallocated to the Africa-led ad EU missios, how much loger will there be a Malia govermet that these missios are iteded to support? A purely egotiated solutio i orther Mali is urealistic. Ay strategy to re-establish state cotrol over the North will have to iclude a military compoet. But a Africa-led force provides o quick fix to the problems outlied above. Military actio is doomed to fail i the absece of a capable Malia govermet that reaches out to the parties to the coflict i the orth. Oly a military offesive that is embedded i a Malia-led political process ca achieve progress i the North. The Malia army that is to lead this offesive eeds to be oe that has bee thoroughly reformed, with militia structures dissolved ad clear commad structures established. It also eeds broad political backig. The problem, ad the solutio, lies i Bamako. Niger Méaka Algeria Nigeria Sierra leoe Ghaa Togo Bei Ivory Coast 200 km Wester Sahara ALGERIA Libya War i Norther Mali MAUritaia Sahel NIGER CHAD Importat presece of MNLA fighters Mieral resources Uder Frech cotrol (as of Ja. 27) The Gambia Guiea-bissau 500 km Atlatic Ocea Seegal Sierra leoe Guiea Liberia Bamako Mali IvorY coast Burkia Faso Ghaa Togo Bei NIGERia Sahel Cameroo Cetral Africa Republic

14 14 The Security Times Flashpoits February 2013 The Turks live i the most explosive regio o earth. O their easter border with Ira, a iteratioal coflict with Israel ad the US could break out at ay momet. To their south, i Syria, a savage civil war is ragig. Two years ago the Turkish Prime Miister ad the Presidet of Syria were such close frieds that they vacatioed together. Today Recep Tayyip Erdoga wishes Bashar al Assad straight to hell ad has called him a ew Hitler. Clearly, Turkey s security situatio has chaged radically i those two years. The Arab revolts have swept aside old certaities ad toppled logstadig authoritaria allies. Wester commetators prejudices about Turkish foreig policy ( i the same boat as Ira ) have bee shattered alog with Turkish dreams of a regio with peaceful relatios ad o problems. Alliaces have bee broke ad Turkey ow stads at the threshold of two wars, i Syria ad, perhaps, Ira. More tha 100,000 Syria refugees have sought shelter i Turkey. More arrive every day. Artillery shells from Syria have repeatedly falle o Turkish territory. At the request of NATOmember Turkey, Germa ad Dutch troops have bee takig up positios with Patriot ati-missile batteries i Turkey close to the Syria border. Syria s civil war is tearig apart that coutry ad the surroudig regio. All states there have iterests, especially the Iraias, who are proppig up the Assad regime with practically every meas at their disposal to maitai their vital Mediterraea bridgehead. Tehra has iterveed with militias, advisers ad arms shipmets. Opposig them are Saudi Arabia, Qatar ad other Arab states. Fially, the global powers loom i the backgroud: the US o the rebels side, Russia ad Chia supportig Assad. No coutry ca escape this ew cold war aymore. No oe ca stad aside, let aloe mediate because they are all beig pulled i somehow, icludig Turkey. This Mideast coflict is ot about Suis ad Shiites or religio ad ideology; it is a power struggle chiefly about the hegemoy that Ira is seekig i the Arab world. As a result, Turkey has gaied both ew frieds ad ew eemies. Akara s focus is, of course, o Syria. Before the uprisig agaist Presidet Assad, the coutry was supposed to become Turkey s gateway to the Middle East Old frieds, ew foes Turkey s security situatio has bee stood o its head. By Michael Thuma ecoomically through exports, politically through the co-optig of Assad, strategically through Syria depedece o Turkey. The goal remais the same, but the parters have chaged. Assad has bee discarded; Erdoga bega plaig without him log ago. For more tha 20 moths, Turkey has systematically bolstered the oppositio. The Syria Natioal Coucil is based i Turkey. Akara has close ties with the ewly established Syria Natioal Coalitio i Cairo. The Free Syria Army uses Turkey as a stagig area, repleishes itself with weapos ad other supplies there ad, also o Turkish territory, receives traiig from the US ad the Gulf states. Akara has log advocated iterveig militarily i Syria by establishig a protected zoe i the orth of the coutry, ad resets Washigto s reluctace to do so. Akara has three objectives i Syria: Not log ago the Turkish Prime Miister ad the Presidet of Syria were close frieds. Recep Tayyip Erdoga (right) shakes hads with Bashar al Assad i Aleppo i April First, it wats to see the Alawite regime give way to the Sui-domiated oppositio coalitio, which favors close ties with Turkey. Secod, the Turks regard Syria s Kurdish populatio as a threat ad would keep it i check through the Sui-Arab Free Syria Army ad, if eeded, Turkish security forces. The quasi-autoomy of the Kurds i orther Syria greatly irritates Akara, especially sice a Kurdish party associated with the PKK sets the toe there. Third, Erdoga hopes that a post-assad Syria will be domiated by the Syria Muslim Brotherhood, which his AKP party supports. As i Egypt, a friedly political factio would come to power. These goals put Turkey o a collisio course with Ira. Tehra is doig everythig i its power to prop up Assad. I Syria, Turkish agets operate agaist Iraia militias. Turkish NGOs face battalios of Iraia advisers. But the cofrotatio betwee the regio s two major powers has log sice become more direct. As a NATO member, Turkey has allowed the alliace to establish a major radar complex for its ati-missile system ear the Iraia border, agaist Ira ad Pakista. That ad the NATO Patriot istallatios o the Turkish-Syria border have led to public tirades by the Iraia military brass. That was coclusive proof that Turkey ad Ira are rivals i the regio ad that Wester observers were completely wrog with their assessmet that a alliace was i Michael Thuma is the Middle East correspodet of the Germa weekly Die Zeit. Nicole Sturz Flashpoit Turkey Picture Alliace/DPa the makig. They were take i by Erdoga s paied ad cotiuig efforts to maitai ostesibly amicable relatios with Tehra. Meawhile the coflict with Ira is also straiig ties with Iraq. Two years ago Erdoga s govermet was sigig oe cotract after aother with the admiistratio of Prime Miister Nouri al-maliki i Baghdad. Most remaied o paper oly. Maliki is a ally of Ira who is workig to set up a authoritaria Shiite regime i Iraq. Relatios broke dow completely whe Turkey grated asylum to Tariq al-hashimi, a former Iraqi Sui vice-presidet seteced to death i absetia i Baghdad. Maliki ad Erdoga have bee sipig at each other ever sice. I the wake of the Syria civil war, Turkey has come ito coflict alog its souther ad easter borders with Damascus, Baghdad ad Tehra. Ties with Moscow i the orth are likewise straied. Akara s ew frieds caot fully compesate for these tesios, but at least they give Turks a feelig of ot beig isolated i the regio. Akara s warmig ties with the autoomous Kurdish regio i orther Iraq is the most importat ad astoishig developmet for Turkish security. Turkey has become Iraqi Kurdista s closest tradig parter uder Presidet Massoud Barzai. The Iraqi Kurds have begu supplyig Turkey with oil ad gas. Barzai visited the party coferece of Erdoga s AKP. The Turkish foreig miister travels regularly to Erbil. Akara is also tryig to improve relatios with the Kurds o its ow territory ad push the PKK toward peace. A ew iitiative eve icludes the imprisoed PKK leader Abdullah Öcala. Prime Miister Erdoga seems to have recogized the error of his policy over the last 20 moths, durig which he tried to resolve the Kurdish issue by military meas. His rivals i Damascus ad Tehra used the campaig to their ow advatage; ow Erdoga is tryig to shore up that flak ad seek a compromise solutio. Egypt the largest state affected by the Arab revolt is actually aother of Akara s rivals for hegemoy i the regio. But sice Hosi Mubarak s fall, Erdoga has bee seekig commo groud. The electoral triumphs of the Muslim Brotherhood catapulted a party with close ties to the AKP ito power. Cairo ad Akara share their rejectio of Bashar al Assad ad distrust of Ira. Turkey is helpig Egypt with loas i hopes of gaiig a ew export market. Egypt has become a figurehead for post-revolutio Arab coutries, where coservative, religious politicias ow hold power. Turkey s relatios with Tuisia ad Libya have improved. A glace at the map shows that Turkey s ew frieds i North Africa ad the Gulf are farther away tha the eighbors it o loger calls frieds. That could become a problem for the coutry s security. Erdoga has bet everythig o the Free Syria Army defeatig Assad. If they succeed, Turkey would have extesive ifluece o Syria a key coutry i the Middle East. If the isurgecy fails or Syria collapses, Turkey will have to seek peace withi a much more hostile eviromet. That is also why pacifyig the cross-border Kurdish coflict is so importat. However, membership i NATO will remai the chief pillar for Turkey s security. The Patriot air defese system, which NATO has ow deployed i Turkey, is high-ed military equipmet. It is beig used i the world s most dagerous flashpoits icludig the Middle East ad East Asia. For NATO, though, the deploymet is more a diplomatic tha a military exercise. The mai idea is to show solidarity with a ally ad to gai some ifluece over Akara s decisio-makig. From the outset, NATO was careful ot to get directly ivolved i the Syria crisis. There were may statemets from the Secretary Geeral ad from allies, codemig the Assad regime for slaughterig its people. But obody i the alliace showed ay appetite for a military itervetio. The Afgha experiece is still loomig large i may atioal capitals, ad there is also a widespread feelig that Syria poses a more complex strategic challege tha Libya, where NATO actively supported a Arab sprig rebellio. After all, evets i Syria will ievitably have a impact o Ira ad Israel, which could ot be said about Libya. The developmets o the groud, however, did ot permit NATO to completely detach itself from the ogoig civil war o its southeaster border. The shootig-dow of a Turkish fighter jet by Syria, as well as frequet cross-border shellig from orther Syria ito Turkey forced the alliace to stad by its ally with official statemets last year. It quickly became clear that this would ot be eough. Two factors seemed to have cotributed to the decisio last December to get actively ivolved i the defese of Turkey. The first was a growig cocer that the coflict might spill over ito Turkey. As early as last autum, high-level decisiomakers i NATO started to fear that a desperate Assad regime Nikolas Busse is the NATO ad EU correspodet for the Germa daily Frakfurter Allgemeie Zeitug. FAZ might i its fial hours try to iteratioalize the coflict by firig missiles ito Turkey. Accordig to the Iteratioal Istitute for Strategic Studies, Syria has three battalios armed with SS-21s ad aother three with Scud-B ad Scud-C missiles. This could well be several hudred missiles o mobile vehicles that could reach may parts of Turkey. A big cocer of the military i NATO is that these missiles might get loaded with chemical warheads, eve though it is Showig solidarity NATO s deploymet of Patriot missiles o Turkey s border with Syria is more a diplomatic tha a military exercise By Nikolas Busse Flashpoit Turkey ot etirely clear if Syria has the techical meas to do so. There is o doubt, however, that the regime has a cosiderable stockpile of chemical weapos, ad it has already fired missiles iside the coutry. Turkey lacks a air defese system able to cope with such a threat. The secod factor was ot much talked about i public, although it seems to have bee the decisive oe. May officials i other NATO coutries oticed the huge domestic pressure that the Turkish govermet was facig over the shell- ig from Syria. Although it was appreciated that Turkey showed restrait ad moderatio i its respose, there was a growig cocer that the govermet might oe day feel obliged to egage more actively i Syria, ot least because of the Kurdish issue. Deployig Patriots i Turkey was a easy way for the allies to get access to the decisio-makig i Akara. Now, NATO ca ask for cosultatios o ay major step by Turkey because it may affect its troops i the coutry. The scope ad details of the deploymet are a reflectio of these two factors. NATO has deployed six Patriot batteries. Each of them carries 16 missiles ad ca defed a area of 15 to 20 kilometers agaist ballistic missiles. They are deployed ear three large populatio ceters i the southwest (Kahramamaras, Adaa, Gaziatep), ad supposed to protect some 3.5 millio people. The Patriot batteries are by far ot eough to defed all of Turkey s souther border. I this regard, the deploymet is deterrece old style: Its mai purpose is to sigal to the potetial aggressor that the stakes are high, ad to the Turkish populatio that the alliace has ot forgotte them. Iterestigly, settig up operatio Active Fece did ot create the kid of iteral tesios which have become so commo i NATO i recet years. Oly three allied atios have the moder PAC-3 Patriot system with hitto-kill techology required for the job i Turkey: the Uited States, the Netherlads, ad Germay. But eve Germay, which is always very hesitat whe it comes to military operatios, supported the deploymet after surprisigly few hiccups i Berli. A Germa Patriot missile i its laucher. It was agreed that the Patriots would be deployed at some distace to the Turkish-Syria border to assure the public i both Germay ad the Netherlads that the operatio was purely defesive i ature, ad ot meat to support a o-fly-zoe or other itervetios i Syria. I the ed, the two Europea powers agreed to shoulder the same military burde as the US, with each of the three atios providig two batteries. It is too early to say whether the deploymet will achieve its eds, or is oly a prelude to a bigger NATO role i Syria. The Secretary Geeral has recetly proposed to do operatioal plaig for the evetual use of chemical weapos by the Syria regime. That has bee met with skepticism from allies such as Germay. For the time beig, the deploymet of Patriots i Turkey is a mucheeded assurace for the alliace that the political will for territorial defese is still alive, ad for the Obama admiistratio aother example that the strategy of leadig from behid works. picture alliace/dpa

15 February 2013 The Security Times Flashpoits 15 A Syria ma holds the body of his so, killed by the Syria Army, ear Dar El Shifa hospital i Aleppo, Syria, Wedesday, Oct. 3, Picture Alliace/ap images The Syria impasse Assad must go but the oppositio is ot a credible alterative to the existig regime By Guido Steiberg I early Jauary 2013, the UN aouced its latest casualty toll for the Syria civil war: 60,000 killed. That is a cosiderably higher umber tha previously thought. As a cosequece, the dilemma posed by the evets has become eve more difficult to solve. If the US ad its allies do t itervee more forcefully, may more Syrias are likely to die i the comig moths ad years. If they do support the rebels, it is just as likely that the civil war could become eve bloodier. Although the call for itervetio will grow louder i the comig moths, the Obama admiistratio s reluctace to get more directly ivolved is the most reasoable reactio. Eve providig parts of the isurgecy with more moey ad arms would be a step fraught with uforeseeable risks ad few if ay beefits. It remais obvious that the Assad regime should be removed from power. This already became clear i the first moths of the coflict, whe peaceful protests were met with brutal repressio a policy that triggered the emergece of a armed isurgecy. However, durig the coflict, the oppositio movemet has ot proved itself to be a credible alterative to the existig regime, deservig the support of the US ad its allies. The oppositio-i-exile, first represeted by the Syria Natioal Coucil ad, sice December 2012, the Natioal Alliace, has ot oly ever maaged to wi the trust of the religious ad ethic miorities i the coutry amog them most Alawites, Christias, Druze, ad Kurds but it has also proved icapable of exertig sufficiet ifluece o isurget groups o the groud. The rise of jihadist groups, like the Jabhat a-nusra, is oly oe dagerous outcome of this failure. The Uited States ad its allies are correctly tryig to isolate the jihadists amog the isurget factios, but eve if that policy succeeds, the ideological worldview of the other isurget groups would pose grave problems. May of them are firmly rooted i the itellectual traditios of Syria Islamism ad propagate a violet ati-alawite ideology. This, together with the regime s withdrawal to its Alawite power base, has slowly chaged the ature of the coflict, which has become icreasigly sectaria. If the rebels gai groud, large-scale violet retributios agaist the Alawites ad other miorities are highly likely. Add to this the regioal dimesio. Qatar ad Saudi Arabia are the mai supporters of the Syria oppositio, fiacig political work ad arms shipmets ad turig their respective media empires ito blatat istrumets of ati-syria propagada. The Qatari leadership i particular has opely stated that it sees Islamists ad Salafists as its future political allies i Syria ad the Arab world, Guido Steiberg is a Middle East expert at the Germa Istitute for Iteratioal ad Security Affairs (SWP). swp-berli.org Flashpoit Syria ad that it does ot ecessarily cosider groups like Jabhat al-nusra a threat. Qatar is thus most likely to support exactly those forces. Saudi Arabia is promotig regime chage i Syria primarily because it wats to topple a Iraia ally. The Syria civil war is icreasigly developig ito a proxy coflict of a larger regioal cold war, i which Saudi Arabia ad Ira are the protagoists. It will ot help to reach the Saudis ad their Wester allies most importat goal, though, amely stoppig Ira from armig itself with uclear weapos. Proxy wars, sactios, ad cotaimet will ot chage the Iraia strategic calculatio. Istead, the oly remaiig optios are a Wester military strike, or acceptig the uclear armamet of Ira. As a cosequece, as soo as the last efforts to egotiate have proved futile, the US ad its Europea allies should destroy all relevat parts of the Iraia uclear program with airstrikes. Iterveig i Syria might very well limit future optios i this regard. Eve if the US itervees oly idirectly by steppig up military aid for the Syria rebels, Ira might feel provoked to react i kid ad itesify its support for the Asad regime perhaps eve by sedig troops. This might start a process of escalatio leadig to more direct Wester itervetio, with Wester troops i Syria or its immediate eighborhood beig cofroted by powerful militat adversaries. The Hizbullah, the PKK, al-qaeda or ewly formed pro-iraia groups would try to draw these forces ito a asymmetric fight ad thereby tie the US dow just as happeed i Iraq after Therefore, although the terrible Syria death toll might suggest otherwise, the right policy towards the Syria civil war is oe of restrait. The West should cotiue to explore possible compromise solutios. Although they are ot feasible for the time beig, other opportuities may arise i the future. It should also be prepared for a log ad bloody war, itesifyig its humaitaria aid to Syria refugees i the eighborig coutries ad withi Syria. At the same time, cotigecies might arise such as the deploymet or loss of cotrol of chemical weapos by the Syria regime. Oly i such a sceario, could a limited military itervetio quickly become madatory. The Arab Sprig for Dummies How ad why the West misiterpreted the uprisigs By Florece Gaub For two years, the Arab coutries have bee roiled by revolutio ad sectaria blood feuds. The Arab Sprig seems to tur ito a log Arab Witer. Two years have passed sice Tuisia Mohamed Bouazizi s self-immolatio led to the evets ow kow as the Arab Sprig. Four toppled govermets, 72,000 dead, a NATO operatio i Libya ad a civil war i Syria later, it is still ot clear where the evets of 2011 will lead. Oe thig however is obvious: our ow uderstadig of them was flawed from the begiig. Its ame: The term Arab Sprig emerged first i the magazie Foreig Policy ad proliferated eve before the departure of Egypt s Presidet Mubarak to Europea media outlets, usig a variety of refereces ragig from the Prague Sprig of 1968 to the Europea Sprig of It is hece a Wester term coied for Easter evets, takes ispiratio from Europea history ad describes how outsiders perceive what is goig o o the iside. By default, it is ot oly seasoally iaccurate it all bega i December, after all but also suggests that, like the Europea evets it is amed after, it expresses a demad for political liberties. But was the Arab Sprig really about that? Its goals: As we looked at the Arab Sprig through our ow les of liberal capitalist democracy, we were quick to label its demads as freedom, huma rights ad digity. While this view is ot completely wrog, it still misses the importat socio-ecoomic dimesio, which drove the evets of 2011 ad overestimates the role of the demostrators i the esuig political process. Those who wo the electios i Egypt ad Tuisia did ot wi them o a liberal democratic ticket, but by promisig rectificatio of social ijustice; opiio polls show that the umber of people supportig democracy i Arab coutries actually decreased from 2011 to 2012; a majority of people cotiued to choose strog Florece Gaub is a Researcher at NATO Defese College s Middle East Faculty. The views expressed i this article are etirely her ow. private Flashpoit Arabellio ecoomy over democracy, whereas free speech ad electios raked 5th ad 6th i Egyptia priorities (behid ecoomic coditios, law ad order, fair judiciary ad ucesored media). I other words: the Arab Sprig might have started with oe set of goals it eded up pursuig aother. Its causes: I a attempt to uderstad the rapidly evolvig situatio i North Africa ad the Middle East, Wester media were quick to develop a oversimplified recipe for social dislocatio: dictatorship plus youg populatio plus uemploymet equals uprisig. Social dyamics are of course more complex tha a mathematical additio rather, it resembles extractio of roots where causes meet catalysts topped by a trigger. But mostly, the simplified model lumps together several differet cases ad glosses over the fact that the precise reasos were vastly differet from case to case. Why does it matter to us that it was the effects of a five-year drought i Syria, uemploymet amogst the educated youg i Tuisia, ad dissatisfactio with social stratificatio i Bahrai? Well if we do t uderstad what is goig o exactly, how are we goig to react appropriately? Its tools: The Arab Sprig was ot drive by Facebook ad Twitter. Although there was mobilizatio via social media to some extet, 21 percet of Egyptias ad 5.5 percet of Libyas had access to the Iteret ad although it is true that most Arab users of Facebook were Egyptias, oly 5.1 percet of the Egyptia populatio was o the etwork i 2010, ad oly 2.8 percet of Libyas. This is ot surprisig give that Facebook has bee offered i Arabic oly sice 2009, ot to metio literacy rates i these states. Our exaggeratio of Facebook had more to do with our desire to idetify with the Arab Sprig ad establish a emotioal coectio with what was goig o there tha the actual facts. Mobile phoes, satellite ews broadcasters such as Al-Jazeera, ad workers uios i Egypt played a much more importat role i spreadig the ews tha social etworks Libya reached 100 percet mobile phoe peetratio i 2008, Egypt had 72 percet i If aythig, the Iteret s ad Facebook s popularity i the Arab world have icreased as a result of the Arab Sprig. Its outcome: Although some commetators predicted the fall of all authoritaria Arab govermets, oe should ot forget that oly a fifth of the Arab League s member states have actually see a regime chage, excludig the still ogoig coflict i Syria. Authoritariaism is still the orm, ot the exceptio. As for the ewly elected govermets, their laudry list is log ot oly did they iherit states i bad shape, the uprisigs have dagerously damaged security just as much as the ecoomy (the Arab Sprig is estimated to have cost $55 billio accordig to the cosultacy Geopolicity). To say it blutly: we have to brace ourselves for a log Arab witer.

16 16 The Security Times Flashpoits February 2013 The religious ladscape of North Africa ad the Mideast Tuisia Sui 98 % Christia 1 % Mediterraea Sea Libya Sui 87 % Christia 2 % Palestiia territories Lebao Shia 27 % Sui 27 % Maroite 21 % Greek Orthodox 8 % Druze 5 % Black Sea Sui 98.7 % Christia 1.3 % Israel Jews 75.6 % Sui 16 % Christia 2 % Druze 1.5 % Egypt Sui 90 % Copts 9 % Turkey Sui % Alevite % Christia 0,2 % Syria Sui 74 % Alawite 12 % Christia 10 % Druze 3 % Caspia Sea IraQ Shia 65 % Sui 32 % Christia 1.3 % Kuwait Sui % Shia % Ira Shia 89 % Sui 9 % bahrai Shia 60 % Sui 25 % Christia 14,5 % Qatar Sui 77.5 % Shia 10 % jorda Sui 92 % Christia 6 % Red Sea Saudi Arabia Sui 85 % Shia % U.A.E. Sui 80 % Shia 16 % Arabia Sea 1000 km Source: CIA World Factbook, US State Departmet, PEW Research Ceter, UNHCR Yeme Sui 53 % Shia 45 % oma Ibadhi 75 % Sui 20 % Shia 5 % The great divide Egyptias, disillusioed by growig political factioalism, are losig faith i electios By Stepha Roll The political climate i Egypt is poisoed. Sice Presidet Mohamed Morsi wet ahead with a referedum o the coutry s draft costitutio i December agaist the will of the oppositio, the goverig Muslim Brotherhood ad the o-islamic oppositio have split ito irrecocilable political camps. This factioalism should ot disguise the fact that both groups are extremely heterogeeous. The parliametary electios, due to be held i April accordig to the ew costitutio, are likely to iclude a multitude of parties vyig for the voters favor. Whether these parties will maage to form electoral alliaces is far from certai. More importatly, it is questioable whether they will maage to agree o commo positios oce the ew parliamet opes for busiess. Withi the Islamist camp, the Muslim Brothers ad their Freedom ad Justice Party are clearly the domiat political force. As progressive ad mostly youger figures have left the movemet sometimes forcibly sice Egypt s political upheavals bega i early 2011, the Brotherhood has solidified its coservative profile ad largely avoided policy struggles. However, both the presidetial electio ad the referedum have demostrated that the Muslim Brotherhood caot achieve a absolute majority o its ow. The movemet has therefore sought support primarily amog the Stepha Roll is a associate at the Middle East ad Africa Divisio of the Germa Istitute for Iteratioal ad Security Affairs (SWP). SWP Flashpoit egypt Salafists, who espouse a fudametalist iterpretatio of Islam. The Brotherhood s powerful Deputy Supreme Guide, Khairat el-shater, was give the task of forgig this alliace. The Nour Party ( Party of the Light ), by far the most promiet of the Salafist political groupigs, became the Brotherhood s key parter. However, alliaces like this could grow more uwieldy. Promiet leadership figures have left the Nour Party ad fouded a ew oe with the support of the radical politicia Hazem Abu Ismail, who ejoys substatial popularity amog Salafists. More spliter parties will likely follow. This process of fragmetatio caot but ecumber the Brotherhood s efforts to establish viable alliaces, especially as the Salafists have grow more stridet ad reluctat to compromise i their political demads. The o-islamist oppositio has likewise bee hobbled by coflict amog its parties ad movemets. I the course of the showdow over the costitutio it iitially seemed that liberal, leftist ad atioalist-coservative oppositio parties might agree o a commo platform. Led by Nobel Peace Prize wier Mohamed El-Baradei, former Secretary-Geeral of the Arab League Amr Moussa ad leftist leader Hamdi Sabahi, a former presidetial cadidate, most oppositio parties closed raks to form the Natioal Salvatio Frot. Yet as the parliametary polls approach, cracks have appeared withi this coalitio. All attempts so far to overcome political divisios ad preset commo positios have failed. The various factios also disagree o the importat questio of whether, ad to what extet, leaders should cooperate with forces of the old regime. First ad foremost, however, the o-islamist oppositio has prove uable to reach out to devout Muslim voters. I this respect, a alliace with a moderate Islamist such as ex- Muslim Brother ad presidetial cadidate Moeim Fotouh could prove helpful. Yet Fotouh has picture alliace / Newscom November 2011: Wome voters wait to cast their ballot i Egypt s first parliametary electios after the ouster of Hosi Mubarak. bee busy positioig his Strog Egypt Party betwee the Islamists ad oppositio as a potetial mediator, ad has refused to cooperate. Most Egyptias, meawhile, have watched the political establishmet s tactical maeuverig ad growig fragmetatio with bitteress. Two years after the fall of Hosi Mubarak, may o loger feel they have a stake i politics. They suffer as Egypt s ecoomic ad social coditios cotiue to deteriorate. The persistet political turf wars have bee sappig eergy ad resources from the task of eactig log overdue reforms. The result has bee that growig segmets of the populatio have tured their backs o politics, a tred made plai by the costitutioal referedum: I the 2011 parliametary electios, more tha half of eligible voters tured out. The vote o the draft costitutio failed to draw eve a third of the electorate to pollig statios. Both the oppositio ad the better-orgaized Islamists experieced difficulties i gettig out the vote. This tred is likely to cotiue i the upcomig parliametary electios. Voter turout could prove substatially beeath last year s figures, observers fear. Eve if the political camps succeed i forgig majorities for mucheeded ew legislatio ad reform projects, it remais doubtful if the populace will accept them. The truly strikig rift i today s Egypt does ot ru betwee the political camps, but istead betwee the political establishmet ad the populatio. The Muich Security Coferece A platform for trasatlatic partership Sca the QR code ad visit us o our homepage, where latest ews ad iformatio o security topics are provided regularly: Fid us also o: Facebook Twitter

17 February Waitig for Obama Palestiia ad Israeli leaders seem icapable of ay iitiative By Avi Primor The recet cofrotatios betwee Israel ad the Islamists i the Gaza Strip were followed by uexpected results. Both parties claimed victory, but o oe is etitled to it. I fact this is also meaigless. What o the other had is meaigful is that egotiatios betwee Israel ad Hamas, which both sides categorically rejected, have become a daily reality. It is true that Hamas claims to ever recogize Israel ad to always strive for its destructio. Ad that Israel claims to ever egotiate with a Islamist, ati- Semitic, terrorist orgaizatio. But secret egotiatios betwee both sides have already take place i At that time, the the Israeli Prime Miister Ariel Sharo plaed to evacuate Gaza uilaterally. He refused to had Gaza over i a orgaized maer to a Palestiia authority. But he had oe problem: How to guaratee that the Israeli settlers or army would ot suffer casualties caused by sipers, mies, or other methods durig the retreat. Although Hamas was at that time ot yet i power, Sharo kew that oly they could guaratee him a peaceful retreat should they have a iterest i doig so. Ideed Hamas did have such a iterest, because it wated Israel out of the Gaza Strip. Mutual iterest produced a agreemet, which was perfectly respected. Not oe shot was fired durig the Israeli evacuatio. Today both sides cotiue to swear to egate each other eterally. However, mutual iterest drives them to ever more secret egotiatios ad techical cooperatio. Hamas overridig iterest is to remai i power. For that they have to satisfy the populatio. There is oly oe meas to achieve this goal ad that is to improve the miserable livig coditios of the Gazas. A goal achievable oly with the good will of Israel. Israel, o the other had, eeds calm ad security for the Israeli cities ad villages alog the Gaza border. Everythig Israel has doe to achieve this, short of cooperatio with Hamas, has failed. Hece, today s eforced techical ad pragmatic cooperatio betwee the two swor eemies. Eve though peace egotiatios ad mutual recogitio betwee Israel ad Hamas are out of the questio for the foreseeable future, the pragmatic cooperatio betwee the two sides ca also stimulate peace egotiatios that should take place betwee Israel ad the Palestiia govermet i Ramallah. Palestiia Presidet Mahmoud Abbas is basically iterested i a compromise ad a defiite peace agreemet with Israel. His fear is that he does ot have eough maeuverig power because of the extremists o his ow side who are costatly breathig dow his eck. A Hamas ivolved i cooperatig with the Israeli eemy has fewer optios to exercise pressure o Mahmoud Abbas agaist peace egotiatios. Public opiio polls idicate that a solid majority of Israelis wish to separate from the West Bak, allowig the establishmet of a geuiely idepedet Palestiia state withi the framework of a credible peace agreemet. That same majority thiks, however, that its wish caot be realized. Most Israelis believe that i spite of the good will of the Ramallah govermet there is o oe o the Palestiia side who ca guaratee Israeli security oce the Israeli army evacuates the West Bak. For most Israelis the peace agreemets with Egypt ad Jorda were possible because those coutries possessed the meas of imposig security o their borders with Israel. The Palestiias do ot have that capability ad it must be feared that withdrawig from the West Bak would lead to the same results as i 2005 after the Israeli evacuatio of the Gaza At home at all frequecies worldwide. Four fields of busiess, oe thought make tomorrow s commuicatios egieerig faster, more powerful ad more fail-safe. 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Israel uder Hamas rocket fire (below). picture-alliace/ladov picture-alliace/dpa Avraham Avi Primor is a publicist ad former Israeli ambassador to Germay. He is Presidet of the Israel Coucil o Foreig Relatios. Ceter for Europea Studies Flashpoit Mideast Coflict However, such egatios are ot takig place. The Palestiias are coviced that the Israeli offer to hold direct egotiatios without precoditios is ot sicere. It has oly oe aim ad that is to wi time ad ease iteratioal pressure o Israel, they believe. The Palestiias are ot wrog i their aalysis. The Israeli govermet of Bejami Netayahu, oly arrowly reelected o Ja. 22, has either the ideological will or the political ability to hoestly egotiate a peace agreemet that would ievitably lead to paiful compromises. Uder the preset circumstaces therefore we fid both potetial parters to egotiatios, the Palestiia authority ad the Israeli govermets, icapable of ay iitiative. There is oly oe way out of this stalemate: the itervetio of the iteratioal commuity uder the leadership of the Uites States with firm support from the Europea Uio. Strip: The seizure of power by the Islamists ad costat rocket attacks o Israel. Pullig out of the West Bak would be may times more dagerous for Israel tha the Gaza withdrawal. Oly a iteratioal force, preferably uder US leadership with a clear missio to impose security i the West Bak, i perfect cooperatio ad coordiatio with both the Israeli ad Palestiia security authorities, could covice Israeli public opiio to support a credible peace agreemet. No Israeli govermet ca egage i serious egotiatios without the widespread support of its ow cizizes ad o admiistratio ca avoid talks if a determied public demads it. The key is therefore i the hads of the re-elected America presidet. I his first term of office he proved very kee to try ad solve the Middle East coflict. But he chose the wrog tactic ad failed i his efforts. I the last year of his madate, he had to abado his efforts altogether because of approachig electios. Now, free of the eed to stad for re-electio, it is to be hoped that he will try agai adaptig more suitable tactics to use his overpowerig ifluece o both Palestiias ad Israelis. Whether Presidet Obama is actually ready to ecourage the two sides to resume geuie egotiatios is aother questio.

18 18 The Security Times Flashpoits February 2013 Gilles Migasso/Der Spiegel Fourtee moitors, 4 keyboards: US droe commad ceter i New Mexico. Whe the order comes, the cyber soldiers kill. Wagig joystick war Droes make it possible to egage eemies without the risk of friedly casualties. But the ew geeratio of weapos could remove all accoutability By Joche Bitter ad Ulrich Ladurer At the White House, the secod day of the workig week has come to be kow as Terror Tuesday, isiders say. That s whe, i the Oval Office, Presidet Barack Obama receives a list of idividuals who his itelligece services have classified as terrorists. The presidet the sits i judgemet over life ad death. If he checks off a ame, a droe soo fires its missiles accordigly i Pakista, Afghaista, Yeme or a Africa coutry. Armed with missiles, idefatigable ad deployable pretty much aywhere o earth from computer termials i Florida or New Mexico, military droes have become the weapo of choice for the Nobel Peace Prize laureate Barack Obama. I his book Coceal ad Cofrot, New York Times correspodet David E. Sager vividly depicts how routie the act of orderig extralegal killigs has become for the Presidet. Durig the teure of George W. Bush, betwee 2004 ad 2007 there were 18 attacks by armed droes i the Afgha-Pakistai border areas. Uder Obama, that figure was reportedly 122 just i The CIA aloe has killed 2560 people usig droe attacks i the past eight years, accordig to The Log War Joural, a site aalyzig the war o terror. Is that permissible? Is it wise? Throughout history, differet groups have believed they had attaied the ultimate weapo: the sligshot, the logbow, the rifle, the cao. Armies have always sought to outdo each other o who could kill from a greater distace. Occasioally, scruples got i the way. I 1139 Pope Iocet II baed the use of crossbows because their bolts could peetrate a kight s armor ad thus threateed the etire obility as a class. The weapo was used regardless. However, ew weapos have always teded sooer or later to hit those who iveted them. Today, droes symbolize the techological superiority of the West. Oly it for the time beig ca elimiate its eemies by remote cotrol. This umaed crossig of borders distiguishes these weapos from all others that have come before. Wars have always required the combatats to eter the field of actio. What would it mea for future wars if ayoe, aytime, could attack aywhere from the safety of home? As yet, iteratioal law has o real respose to this elimiatio of borders. If the Petago uses droes i war zoes, such as i Afghaista, these meas are still cosidered appropriate because they are part of military warfare. Also, droe projectiles ca be delivered more accurately tha, say, bombs from jets, although this does ot mea that the killig of iocets ca be avoided. The real problem uder iteratioal law is whe the CIA uses killer droes over the territory of allied states, such as Pakista. The Washigto is violatig the sovereigty of aother state, eve oe o America s side. There may be a justificatio i the case of particularly dagerous extremists who are beyod the reach of justice but who decides if ad whe that is so? Ad what possibilities do the offeders o Obama s kill list have to defed themselves agaist the itelligece services verdict? Wagig war by joystick is eormously popular i the US, ad for good reasos: droes kill the eemy without puttig America s ow troops i harm s way. Usig them is far cheaper tha deployig thousads of ivadig soldiers. That takes a load off America s depleted state coffers. It also satisfies a uspoke but broadly felt setimet amog Americas: of o loger havig to deal with those aoyig, backward societies that produce terrorists ad refuse US help. The coflict i Mali could become the ext example. The setimet amog Germas is ot much differet. Essetially, aythig but groud forces was Berli s iitial reactio to the Frech itervetio i Mali. For the past decade the Germas have tried to help stabilize Afghaista, ivestig platy of mapower ad treasure, but without real success. With the troops due to withdraw soo, the Germa attitude is oe of we wated to help, but they did t wat us. The problem is that, eve after the military drawdow, Afghaista could still pose a threat to the West accordig to Wester govermets. Would t it be wiser to give up the costly ad iefficiet idea of atiobuildig ad just liquidate the jihadists via our moitor screes? Not everyoe agrees. Faith i the efficiecy of droes is othig but a substitute for strategy ad policy, wared the Gree Party s Omid Nouripour, a Budestag deputy ad security policy specialist. Germa Defese Miister Thomas de Maizière sees the matter differetly. He wats more droes, icludig armed oes, for the Budeswehr. A Defese Miistry strategy paper etitled Airpower 2030 says: The capabilities ( ) of umaed aircraft systems must be optimized ad its spectrum of missios expaded ( ) i all fields of recoaissacecommad-effect. Effect is a bit of Budeswehr jargo that obfuscates more tha it says. It meas fire. Wheever Germa troops i Afghaista come uder attack, util ow their superiors at the commad ceter i Mazar-i- Sharif ca oly, as oe of them put it, just watch ad wish them lots of luck. The droes that the Budeswehr curretly uses Germay to deploy armed droes provide live images of the actio but caot support the troops. Twety decisive miutes ca pass before air support arrives. The plaers i Berli wat droes that could costatly accompay groud troops as sharpshooters i the sky. The mere possibility would itself act as a deterret, they say. The seior commader of Germay s air force, Lieuteat Geeral Karl Müller, believes the best droe for the Luftwaffe would be the US Predator B model. Soo, the biggest umaed aircraft i the world could be a regular sight i the skies over Germay. The giat droe is called the RQ-4 Global Hawk (i Germay the Euro Hawk). It may be the Germa armed forces most eye-catchig ew acquisitio sice World War I s Big Bertha cao. With its 40-meter wigspa, the RQ-4 Hawk matches that of a Boeig 737. It was coceived by the US as a replacemet for the legedary U-2 spy plae. With 30 hours of fuel o board it has a operatig rage of 23,000 kilometers. Startig i early 2013, up to five of the giat recoaissace plaes are to be based at Jagel Air Base ear Schleswig i orther Germay. From a altitude of 20 kilometers the Euro Hawk ca idetify ad record practically ay electroic sigal: cell phoe calls, text messages, TV shows, Germa Defese Miister Thomas de Maizière has expressed support for equippig the Budeswehr with armed droes, despite cotroversy over their use. Umaed aerial vehicles (UAVs) are o differet i their impact from maed aircraft. It is always a perso who decides to fire a missile, de Maizière said i a iterview with the ewspaper Bild o Jauary 25. I late Jauary, a govermet reply to a parliametary questio from the oppositio Left Party revealed govermet plas to purchase armed UAVs. The statemet stressed that military commaders had requested the weapos: It is clear from the Budeswehr s combat experieces that sustaiable armed overwatch is absolutely essetial to provide protectio agaist sudde ad serious chages i the situatio o the groud. Util ow, the Budeswehr has deployed oly uarmed droes for aerial recoaissace. Germa forces servig i Afghaista ad Kosovo have access to aroud 60 UAVs, accordig to official statistics. A fial decisio is expected i the sprig. KJL die zeit Joche Bitter ad Ulrich Ladurer are political correspodets for the Germa weekly Die Zeit. die zeit ot to metio rockets ad radar statios. Five remote cotrolled log distace droes that could fly from Germay to New Zealad what use would the squadro be? Never ad uder o circumstaces, de Maizière ad his staff isist, would droes be used the way the Americas do. Flyig a droe from Schleswig to Pakista or Africa to kill terrorists is simply icoceivable. The Budeswehr would use fightig droes as close air support i foreig operatios. De Maizière has said publicly that US droe attacks i coutries where o US troops are statioed are a strategic error. A decade ago, the US adopted a similar positio. After the Israeli army became the first to use umaed aerial vehicles as killig machies, i this case i the Gaza Strip, the US Ambassador to Israel, Marti Idyk, distaced himself from the practice: The Uited States govermet is very clearly o record as agaist targeted assassiatios They are extrajudicial killigs, ad we do ot support that. Two moths later came September 11, 2001, ad everythig chaged. As they always have, evets alter perceptios of what is ad is ot permitted. What is actually so wrog with elimiatig eemies before they themselves ca strike? First of all, the eemy must be idetified. Whe that s doe by itelligece services, the results are doubtful per se. Moreover, how dagerous do people earmarked for death have to be? I September 2012, a droe attack i Yeme killed a ma amed Awar al-awlaki. He was a preacher of hate who ispired a series of terrorists to commit their deeds. That was eough for a death setece. Also, Awlaki was a US citize. Not eve that status shielded him from Obama s droes. The Presidet celebrated Awlaki s death as a milestoe i the fight agaist al Qaeda. I the late 19th cetury, the Europea coloial powers most effective istrumet of coquest was the Maxim gu. With this self-loadig, fully automatic machie gu, the British, Frech ad Germas i Africa wiped out idigeous armies i brief, lopsided ecouters. Whatever happes / we have got / the Maxim gu / ad they do ot, wrote the Aglo-Frech author Hilaire Belloc. Despite their techological prowess, however, the Europeas could ot hold their coloial empires, ot least because with each automatic shot fired, they sowed more hatred. Wars caot be decided through techology aloe, says Christia Möllig, military specialist at the Berlibased SWP Istitute for Iteratioal ad Security Affairs. War is a social ad political evet, ot a purely techological process. Droe attacks i Pakista today are replicatig the effects of the Maxim gu i the old coloies. They kill eemies but, over the loger ru, also icrease hatred of the US. Every missile that the US fires oto Pakistai territory also further eflames extremism. Are we capturig, killig ad deterrig ad dissuadig more terrorists every day tha the madrassas ad radical clerics are recruitig, traiig ad deployig agaist us? asked Defese Secretary Doald Rumsfeld i a memo back i Droe attacks that also kill iocet people are a major reaso that the US ad its allies risk losig this cotest. I May 2009 David Kilculle, a former seior Petago adviser, testified before the Seate Foreig Relatios Committee, advocatig a moratorium o droe strikes. Betwee 2006 ad 2009, the killig of 14 terrorists usig droes resulted i the deaths of 700 dead civilias, he estimated: This is 50 civilias for every militat killed, a hit rate of 2 percet. Kilculle cocluded that usig droes produces far more militats tha it elimiates. There is aother boomerag effect. A estimated 60 states are curretly developig their ow umaed aerial vehicles. Last year the Iraias hijacked a US RQ-170 stealth droe. They piloted it dow from the sky itact, probably usig a maipulated GPS sigal. The Iraia Revolutioary Guards proudly put their trophy o display. Last fall, by its ow accout, Tehra repeated the coup, this time with a small US recoaissace droe. The aoucemet that the captured hardware would be duplicated was also a threat. O October 6 Hizbollah, Ira s proxy army i Lebao, steered a droe 200 kilometers ito Israeli territory. A Israeli jet shot it dow a mere 30 kilometers from the Dimoa uclear reactor. Meawhile, Wester arms techicias are workig o the ext upgrade. Soo, they believe, they ca take the step from the automatic to the autoomous: droes would recogize ad elimiate targets by applyig their ow data aalysis. I collaboratio with Harvard Law School, the NGO Huma Rights Watch has released a study called Losig Humaity: The Case Agaist Killer Robots. I demadig a ba o droes, it details how autoomous weapos could leave o oe accoutable for coflicts ad cripple iteratioal law. Ayoe wary of huma rights activists o this issue might liste to the military istead. David Deptula, a former US Air Force geeral who headed itelligece ad surveillace operatios, has told the British military joural Jae s Defece Weekly: Techologically, we ca take (autoomy) pretty far. But it wo t be techology that is the limitig factor, but policy. So perhaps it s time the policymakers gave the matter some serious thought.

19 picture alliace/photoshot February 2013 The Security Times Flashpoits 19 picture alliace/dpa A US Air Force Predator droe. The US is sowig a dagerous harvest with its use of droes. The advatages are udeiable; far better to target a idividual who has bee idetified as a member of a terrorist orgaizatio at war with the Uited States tha to sed a missile or a bomb that would idiscrimiately destroy his street, his eighborhood, eve his village. Ad better to use selective air strikes tha to sed i soldiers o the groud, with the wholesale destructio that pitched battles betwee two opposig armies typically brigs. Moreover, droes may be the oly effective weapos agaist guerrilla groups hidig out i vast areas of moutai ad desert that are impossible to police o the groud. How o earth are atios to protect themselves agaist the radical Islamist groups that have take over Norther Mali ad are spreadig across the Sahel, some of the most ihospitable terrai kow to ma? Oly eyes i the sky will work, eyes i the sky with oe of the eeds ad vulerabilities of huma pilots. At the very least, a droe war ca keep the eemy udergroud ad o the ru. Reports of al Droe strikes eed rules The absece of checks ad balaces is troublig By Ae-Marie Slaughter Qaeda operatives describe them as costatly fearful, movig houses, avoidig ormal lies of commuicatio, usig decoys. The remats of al Qaeda ad both the Afgha ad Pakistai Taliba are already deeply dug ito their caves i the high moutais; reports from Mali already describe the costructio of a vast udergroud etwork of supply depots ad hideouts. The image that immediately comes to mid is the etwork of tuels costructed by the Vietcog ad the North Vietamese durig the Vietam war. They were fleeig B-52s ad apalm rather tha droes; still, the architects of US droe policy would do well to recall that cotiuous bombig ever succeeded i destroyig the Vietamese will to fight. The costat specter of death from above may wear o the prospective targets, but oce they are killed the fury of the survivors at a faceless, seemigly omisciet ad omipotet eemy just burs all the hotter. Thik of adveture movies where a small bad of heroic humas battle droids, or trasformers, or bioic alies the supposedly idestructible fightig machies are always the bad guys. A better approach would be to combie droe tactics that keep eemy fighters cotiually o edge with a geuiely attractive set of terms that would allow them to lay dow their arms. Leaders whose lives are icreasigly frayed ad axious have greater icetives to come to the egotiatig table while they are still alive, but oly if a actual deal is i the offig. The US has tried to pursue this policy off ad o with the Taliba, but the diplomatic track does ot seem to have bee closely coordiated with the military track. With Ae-Marie Slaughter is Bert G. Kerstetter 66 Uiversity Professor of Politics ad Iteratioal Affairs at Priceto Uiversity ad a former Director of Policy Plaig, US Departmet of State. private droes as with ay other military iitiatives, war ad diplomacy are complemets, ot mutually exclusive alteratives. Alogside questios of efficacy are issues of both morality ad legality. The moral dimesio cocers the ethics of killig without beig exposed to reciprocal risk. As the mother of teeage sos who are ofte glued to video games i which they press a butto ad explode the eemy o the scree, it is hard ot to see droe warfare as a grow-up ad lethal versio of the same game. But war should ever be a game. History is rife with examples of ceasefires amog the treches, whe the soldiers from each side came together for a momet i recogitio of their commo humaity. Uderstadig that the eemy are actual me sos, fathers, husbads, brothers is a essetial part of a path to peace. Droe warfare risks seeig idividual terrorists or those the US govermet has decided are terrorists based o the best evidece it ca muster as turbaed caricatures o a deck of cards. Such power is corrosive uder ay circumstaces. But it is particularly corrosive whe it rus uchecked i the US executive. I believe that the me ad wome I worked with i govermet do their very best to apply the strictest possible scrutiy to decisios as to which idividuals should be o the target list. But I also believe that they are huma, ad thus proe to error. The result is the killig of specific idividuals without ay of the safeguards of the crimial justice system. The absece of checks ad balaces disturbs me deeply as a US citize accustomed to costitutioal protectios. But the procedures the US follows are all the more disturbig as a precedet for other atios the atios that already have droes ad the may more that will acquire them over the comig decade. I the ed, I expect that droes are here to stay. The advatages of their use are simply too temptig. But if so, the the US must take the lead i workig with other atios to create a ew set of rules to gover droe warfare. Without explicit ad public rules, the US ad its allies will evertheless establish some process ad guidace as to whe ad how droes ca be deployed. But its future eemies will ot. The all of us may be cotiually scaig the skies, or the groud, or ideed the walls ad widows of our ow houses, woderig who is watchig ad whe they might strike. pa/dpa MQ-9 Reaper, successor to the Predator. Used by the US Air Force i Iraq ad Afghaista. Uarmed surveillace droe Euro Hawk. Wig spa 40 meters, rage 23,000 kilometers. picture alliace/ladov Uarmed droe Hero TP, leased by the Germa Armed Forces from Israel, employed i Afghaista. Let s thik of 10-year-old Dawlah Nasser Saleh of Yeme. Dawlah ad her parets were amog 12 civilias killed i a botched airstrike o Sept. 2 last year ear their village i al-bayda, a remote Yemei provice. A explosive iteded for a alleged al Qaeda member struck the villagers va, settig it afire ad fligig bodies from the vehicle. But there were o militats i the va, just farmers ad their childre. Rescuers foud Dawlah s body clasped i her dead mother s arms, dusted with flour ad sugar that the villagers were brigig home from the market. Farmers who saw the strike told Huma Rights Watch that two aerial droes ad two warplaes were flyig overhead ad that oe of the plaes carried out the deadly strike. Oly the US is kow to operate droes i Yeme. But the oly admissio of resposibility for the killigs came from aoymous US officials, who told The Washigto Post that the US military carried out A dagerous model The US should reveal its legal ratioale for droe attacks By Letta Tayler Letta Tayler is a seior terrorismcouterterrorism researcher with Huma Rights Watch. Huma Rights Watch the attack with a droe or fixedwig aircraft. There has bee o public US cofirmatio, apology or compesatio to the families of the dead, icludig Dawlah s six orphaed sibligs who are too youg to care for themselves. Such secrecy has become a dagerous hallmark of the US targeted killig program, Presidet Barack Obama s weapo of choice agaist al Qaeda ad its affiliates. I Obama s first term, the US reportedly carried out as may as 425 airstrikes with droes, warplaes or cruise missiles o militat targets i Pakista, Yeme ad Somalia, killig upward of 2,700 people. The US also has ratcheted up droe strikes i Afghaista ad is mullig their use i Mali. The attacks are carried out by the Cetral Itelligece Agecy ad special forces withi the US military that are almost as secretive, with o effective oversight. O the face of it, targeted killigs are a appealig couterterrorism techique. With correct itelligece, droes i particular ca strike with surgical precisio, dramatically limitig civilia casualties, ad they do ot ivolve the upopular deploymet of US troops. But US secrecy, combied with the difficulties jouralists ad idepedet orgaizatios face i reachig targeted areas, make it almost impossible to determie whether the killigs comply with iteratioal law, ad how may of those killed are actually militats who pose a immiet threat to the US. While isistig that civilia deaths are exceedigly rare, US officials refuse to disclose casualty figures or steps they take to miimize civilia harm. Nor will the US detail its criteria for placig suspected militats o its kill lists. What is clear is that local outrage whe attacks go wrog stokes ati-america setimet that could brig more recruits to groups like al Qaeda. The Obama admiistratio coteds it has authority to coduct targeted killigs because the coutry is at war with al Qaeda ad its affiliates ad it is exercisig its right to self-defese agaist a immiet threat. Iteratioal law permits targeted killigs of eemy fighters i battle zoes ad of people posig a immiet risk to life i law eforcemet situatios. However, the admiistratio has failed to explai how it makes this determiatio i areas that are far from a traditioal battlefield. The US Cogress has show scat iterest i compellig Obama to set the record straight. A Seate itelligece pael is expected to questio Obama s couterterrorism tsar, Joh Brea, o targeted killigs durig hearigs Feb. 7 o his omiatio to be CIA chief. But it is ulikely to coditio Brea s cofirmatio o frak replies. Brea has said he favors limitig the CIA s role i targeted killigs, but as CIA chief he may be tempted to shroud the program i greater secrecy. US federal court judges have ot ruled o whether the killigs exceed presidetial authority; whe they have ruled, it is to dey public access to iformatio o the program. The US should reveal its legal ratioale for these strikes. Washigto should also be pressed to fulfill its iteratioal legal obligatios to ivestigate ad provide redress for ulawful attacks ad to cosider compesatio eve for lawful collateral damage. I Afghaista, NATO members icludig the US have recogized the value of compesatig civilias for loss of life or other damage eve whe attacks are lawful. Legality ad effectiveess are ot the oly issues. The secrecy surroudig targeted killigs creates a dagerous model for abusive govermets aroud the world to take out ayoe whom they label a terrorist icludig legitimate political oppoets i ay locatio. The ext stop could be Paris, Lodo, Tokyo, or eve Muich.

20 20 The Security Times Flashpoits February 2013 The true bechmark for maturity ad stability Afghaista will eed costat pressure, advice ad icetives from the Americas to keep Karzai o track By Ahmed Rashid Whe the Soviets withdrew from Afghaista i 1989, the commuist Presidet Najibullah ordered his 100,000 strog army ad a similar umber of militia to adopt a Fortress Kabul strategy. This meat givig up large parts of the coutryside to the Mujahedi, but holdig o to all the major tows ad cities ad keepig some key roads ope. Cotrary to CIA assessmets that he would last a few weeks, Najibullah lasted three years ad would have cotiued loger if the Soviet Uio had ot itself collapsed ad his sources of moey ad arms dried up. The preset Afgha army is likely to adapt the same Fortress Kabul strategy after US ad NATO forces withdraw i 2014 despite the $10 billio plus a year for the past four years that the US has spet o buildig up a 200,000 strog Afgha army ad 150,000 ma police force. Eve though NATO will leave behid a small military force after 2014 ad pay for the etire Afgha defese budget for the ext five years at a cost of $4.1 billio year few Afghas accept that the Afgha army will stad up for log agaist the Taliba. With a 90 percet illiteracy rate ad a 30 percet desertio rate the army also lacks the critical ideological motivatio; who are they defedig? Last year aloe, Ahmed Rashid is the author of the bestsellig books Taliba ad Pakista o the Brik: The Future of America, Pakista ad Afghaista. private Flashpoit Afghaista more tha 60 US ad NATO troops were killed i isider attacks by fellow Afgha soldiers or policeme, which meas NATO forces caot trust the very Afghas they have spet so may years traiig. The Taliba will quickly take the Pashtu belt i the south ad east. (The majority of Taliba belog to the Pashtu tribes that straddle the Pakista-Afghaista border.) Already the geographically dautig provices of Kuar ad Nurista o the border with Pakista have bee abadoed by the Afgha army to the Taliba ad al Qaeda. Other provices whose capital cities are too difficult to defed will follow. Meawhile apart from the army, much of the $90 billio spet i recostructio ad developmet i the past twelve years has bee wasted i corruptio ad poorly implemeted projects, leavig state istitutios barely stroger tha they were i Military failure could be coupled by a political breakdow betwee Kabul ad the Norther warlords belogig to the o-pashtu ethic groups. The most likely cause would be if the govermet ad Presidet Hamid Karzai oce agai decided to rig the presidetial electios set for April 2014, as they did i Karzai caot be a cadidate i 2014 but he will wat to esure that a Pashtu loyal to him wis the presidecy so his family is protected for the future. Such a move could lead to a multidimesioal civil war. So stark is the reality of such a breakdow that Joh Kerry, who patched up the ear failure of the 2009 Afgha presidetial vote, wared i his Ja. 24 seate cofirmatio hearigs for the post of US secretary of state, of the risks attached to the ext electio: If it does t have legitimacy, if we do t succeed i that effort, its goig to be very, very difficult to covice the America people, ad to covice the allies.to stay egaged i this effort. Such a iteral meltdow will persuade eighborig states to oce agai arm ad fud their various Afgha proxies as they did i the 1990s, thereby fuellig a civil war. There will be a mass exodus of refugees, especially of the best- educated ad -qualified, while there is already a massive capital flight. The West, hammered by ecoomic recessio is rushig for the exits ad will ot tur back to try ad put the Afgha pieces back together agai. Last year, more active duty US soldiers committed suicide (349) tha died i combat (295) a clear idicator of the stress of war o Wester armies. The above sceario is the gloomiest o the horizo ad probably the most commoly predicted off the record by US ad NATO officers, as well as by most people i the regio. But the truth is that oe of the major players wats to live with such a sceario or see a cotiuatio of the civil war i Afghaista. Everyoe wats peace ad that icludes the Taliba, the orther warlords ad the eighborig states. So the real questio is, ca the US ad its allies exped sufficiet diplomatic eergy, ad brig to bear eough high-powered itervetio ad ivetiveess to help geerate a ceasefire i the preset war followed by a political deal betwee Kabul, the Taliba ad their protectors i Pakista? Ca the allies also covice the wider regio which icludes Pakista, Ira, Cetral Asia, Idia, Chia ad Russia that o sigle state will have a udue advatage i Afghaista ad o state will iterfere i Afghaista s future? For moths ow there has bee excessive Wester media focus o the timetable for a NATO forces withdrawal ad the questio of how may troops will be left behid after The Petago favors a log draw out time table, with the maximum umber of soldiers beig left behid, while the White House favors a speedier withdrawal ad fewer forces left behid i Afghaista. However the debate i Washigto about troop umbers is misplaced. The real issue, which should top the ageda for the US ad its allies ow, is a trasitio to a ceasefire ad a peace pla rather tha a exit strategy. Ay such pla will have to simultaeously tackle three itesely complicated movig parts. The first ad most importat issue is the urget eed for talks for a egotiated cease fire betwee the Taliba, the US ad the Afgha govermet so that NATO troops ca exit with digity ad the horredous levels of violece be reduced. Afghaista caot be stabilized by fightig to the last day as some US geerals ad thik tak pudits believe. Secret talks betwee US represetatives ad the Taliba bega i Doha, Qatar i But they floudered i 2012 over the first cofidece-buildig measure each side was supposed to take. Sice the there have bee meetigs of the Taliba ad members of the Afgha High Peace Coucil which is the body omiated by Karzai to talk to the Taliba i several Arab ad Europea locatios. However these have bee talks about talks rather tha egotiatios. Now that Presidets Obama ad Karzai have agreed to allow the Taliba to ope a office i Doha, there is reewed efforts to get the US-Taliba ad the Taliba-Kabul talks goig agai, although ow its Karzai who keeps throwig spaers ito the ogoig efforts. Simultaeously there are several levels of regioal talks goig o amog Afghaista s eighbors led by Turkey, Britai, Frace ad others. The delay i all these efforts was due to the US electios which put everythig o hold for moths. Now all the players are hopig that Joh Kerry hits the groud ruig ad quickly appoits a ew Af-Pak egotiator ad mediator. Talks for a ceasefire eed to be sequeced by further egotiatios betwee the Taliba ad Kabul over a political power sharig arragemet that will elarge the space for the ceasefire, itegrate the Taliba ito state structures, allow them to take part i political processes ad ed i a ultimate political agreemet betwee the two to ed the coflict. Fially Karzai must urgetly hold a relatively free ad fair presidetial electio i April 2014 ad starts preparig for that ow brigig all political forces ito the process somethig he has yet to do. Every detail of the votig BINDER recogize precisio by the red triagle. 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21 February 2013 The Security Times Flashpoits 21 picture alliace/abaca The Frech army left Afghaista i It s still ot clear exactly whe other ISAF forces will follow. preparatios beig carried out by the Afgha Idepedet Electio Commissio is beig cotested by Karzai ad their schedule is laggig behid dagerously. Moreover the electios will take place i the midst of the NATO troop withdrawal, leavig the alliace with little leverage i Afghaista. What eeds to be doe eeds to be doe ow rather tha later. This will be the true bechmark for Afgha maturity ad stability ad it will eed costat pressure, advice ad icetives from the Americas to keep Karzai o track. Fially there is the eed to esure that Pakista, which gives sactuary to the Taliba leadership, cooperates with rather tha udermies ay peace process ad allows the Taliba to hold talks with Kabul o their ow terms rather tha terms Pakista may impose. For the first time Pakista s military ad its all powerful Iter-Services Itelligece agecy (ISI) which has allowed the Taliba to mobilize resources for its war agaist the Americas from Pakistai soil for a decade also appears to have chaged its attitude. Army chief Geeral Ashfaq Kayai ow says that edig extremism i Pakista is its mai aim rather tha opposig Idia or tryig to exert ifluece i Afghaista. As such it supports all peace talks ad iitiatives take by ayoe with the Taliba. The ISI is i the process of freeig some oe hudred Taliba whom it earlier jailed, either for maitaiig secret cotacts with Kabul, the Uited Natios or the Americas or those who did ot dace to the ISI s tue. Most of such Taliba are so called moderates who support a ed to the war. Now the same ISI is pushig these freed Taliba to reew their cotacts ad talk peace with their adversary. For the first time i a decade, Kabul ad Islamabad are cooperatig rather tha abusig each other. British Prime Miister David Camero is overseeig a itese series of meetigs betwee the presidets ad the army chiefs of the two coutries. US officials are still sceptical of the ISI s itetios so it becomes vital for Pakista to play further positive cards that will persuade the Taliba to resume talks with the Americas ad Kabul. As a cosequece there is also a vastly improved US-Pakista relatioship, which broke dow last year whe a series of icidets icludig the US raid to kill Osama bi Lade sapped the relatioship cold. (Pakista still has to explai the presece of bi Lade o its soil.) The US, Pakista ad Afghaista have created a core group which meets regularly to discuss all aspects of the peace process. The secret talks the US coducted with the Taliba i Doha i 2011 partly broke dow because of the divisios withi the Obama admiistratio o offerig cocessios to the Taliba. Obama gave the go-ahead for the talks yet ever asserted himself i those talks or made ay effort to bridge the gap betwee the Petago ad the State Departmet. Now, accordig to US officials all the departmets of the US govermet agree o the eed for talks ad both Joh Kerry ad Chuck Hagel as the omiated secretaries of state ad defese, kow the regio well ad uderstad what is at stake. Kerry ad Hagel have high stadigs i the regio ad are the best possible figures to break the logjam, but they must be fully ad opely supported by the presidet. I 2011 the Kabul govermet was also divided o talkig to the Taliba ad several cabiet members tried to sabotage talks by offerig egative advice to Karzai. True to form, Karzai was both adamat ad ambivalet about the eed for talks ad he still eeds to be pushed to the table by the Americas ad the Afghas. The stability of Afghaista will deped o a peace pla beig implemeted. The key to that is whether the secod Obama admiistratio will muster the diplomatic resources, eergy ad political will that is eeded to forge oe. Or will other pressig crises such as Ira, Syria ad Mali cosume the limited diplomatic ad foreig policy space that Obama is willig to spare i his secod term? Afghaista eeds a massive amout of iteratioal attetio, both before ad after NATO forces withdraw. If that is ot there, expect the Taliba to retur to Afghaista i force ad i their wake will be al Qaeda ad other global jihadist groups ready to destabilize Pakista, Afghaista ad Cetral Asia. A great deal is at stake.

22 22 The Security Times Flashpoits February 2013 Not thrivig but ot failig Pakistai democracy is flawed but barrig ecoomic collapse likely to stumble o. By Aatol Lieve ddp images/ap Pakistai Sui Muslim cleric Tahir-ul-Qadri leaves Lahore to lead a ati-govermet march to the capital Islamabad o Ja 13., Qadri, who retured from Caadia exile i December, is demadig sweepig electio reforms before the ext atioal poll. Pakista is headig toward ew electios, ad barrig some uforsee disaster the first trasitio betwee democratically elected govermets i its history. This is importat, but ot as importat as may Pakistai observers would like to thik. Pakistai democracy or perhaps oe should say quasidemocracy, for its rules are i may respects differet from those i the West is of great importace because it marks Pakista off from the dictatorships (former ad remaiig) of the Arab world, ad makes it far less likely that Pakista will experiece revolutioary upheavals like the Arab Sprig. Ad this is all to the good, for a revolutio i Pakista would tear the coutry apart ad pluge it ito a whirlpool of uedig religious ad ethic strife. Yet the resiliece which democracy helps to give Pakista is also itertwied with the rule of political elites, ad patters of corruptio, patroage ad kiship. These help to hold Pakista together ad prevet revolutio, but also prevet ecoomic ad social developmet ad etrech a rage of terrible social oppressios, especially as far as wome are cocered. I Pakista, ulike Iraq, Syria, Libya ad eve Egypt, it has bee possible to replace the existig govermet (albeit ofte by ucostitutioal meas) without destroyig the existig state. Eve uder military rule (with the partial exceptio of Geeral Zia s dictatorship), Pakistai govermets have bee far less savagely cotrollig tha those of the Middle East. This has somethig to do with the British legacy of parliametarism ad the rule of law, but also a good deal to do with the fact that the Pakistai state is simply too weak for a really effective dictatorship. For better or worse, every reformist Pakistai govermet, whether civilia or military, has sooer or later made compromises with the local political elites ad held electios returig some factio of them to power. The good side of this is that it has greatly moderated the potetial ferocity of govermet. The bad side is that it has perpetuated the aformetioed etworks of corruptio, patroage ad kiship. The sheer size ad poverty of Pakista has a good deal to do with this. I the much smaller, ad relatively wealthier states of the Middle East, it was possible for dictatorships to create secret police forces that reached ito every corer of society, strikig terror ad eforcig obediece util the day whe the masses, ifuriated by this oppressio, rose i revolt ad overthrew the whole system. I Pakista, the chief military itelligece service, ISI, ca ideed be savage (as the struggle to crush the separatist ethic rebellio i Balochista demostrates), but it is far too small to exercise cotrol over the whole coutry, or eve a large part of it. Thus i ifluecig electios, it does ot try to rig them across the whole coutry but rather to brig pressure ad favors to bear o specific votes. Electios do therefore act to some extet as a geuie expressio of popular will, at least isofar as gettig rid of oe upopular govermet ad replacig it with aother. Thus i Jauary, Tahirul Qadri, a Caada-based cleric with a middle-class reformist ageda (ad almost certaily ecouraged i secret by the army) led a mass march o Islamabad to demad the resigatio of the govermet of Presidet Asif Ali Zardari ad its replacemet by a caretaker admiistratio icludig represetatives of the military. His call, however, was ot for military govermet as such, but oly for a eutral ad hoest govermet that would prevet riggig of the electios by the icumbets. The military, for its part, does ot at preset ad perhaps for a log time to come desire to take over the govermet. As a umber of officers have said to me, that would mea takig resposibility ot oly for upopular civil wars agaist the Pakistai Taliba ad the Baloch isurgets, but also for the miserable ecoomic situatio, iflatio, power cuts, corruptio, ad the myriad small ad large oppressios which the police, the courts ad local officials visit upo the ufortuate Pakistai citizery. So Pakista will have a electio by the summer of 2013, ad the result will be aother coalitio govermet, most probably led by the mai oppositio party, the Pakista Muslim League (PMLN) which is led by Professor Aatol Lieve is chair of Iteratioal Relatios i the War Studies Departmet of Kig s College Lodo, ad a seior fellow of the New America Foudatio i Washigto DC. Kig's College Lodo Flashpoit Pakista the Sharif dyasty just as the Pakista People s Party is led by the Bhutto-Zardari dyasty. The PMLN is also ru by rural ad urba bosses, but its electoral backboe is the orther Pujabi middle classes ad big farmers. To judge by its past record, uder the PMLN, the govermet would take o a more coservative religious cast, but without aythig like a Islamic revolutio. Ecoomic maagemet would get somewhat better, but without aythig like a ecoomic revolutio. I other words, a elite-ruled Pakista would trudle o much as before. The wild card i this electio is the Tehrik-e-Isaf, or Justice Party, of the aristocratic former cricketer tured populist politicia Imra Kha. Because of popular disgust with the other mai parties, he may do better tha ever before, at least i Khyber-Pakhtukhwa, where idetificatio with the Pakhtus of Afghaista ad hatred of the USA is especially strog. But Imra too is o revolutioary, ad as he makes more ad more compromises with the existig elites, his more idealistic followers have already abadoed him. So it is extremely ulikely that whatever the results, the electios will produce a govermet, which offers a truly ew path for Pakista. What of the militat Islamist rebels, grouped together i the loose alliace of the Tehrik-e- Taliba Pakista, or TTP? I order to uderstad the ature ad limits of the threat from Islamist extremism, the first critical distictio is betwee terrorism o the oe had, ad isurgecy ad revolutio o the other. Terrorism is ow a grave ad alas probably permaet meace across Pakista but to the best of my kowledge, o state has ever bee overthrow by terrorism. To overthrow a state from withi, you eed at least oe of three thigs, ad preferably a combiatio of them: widespread isurgecy i the coutryside; a mass movemet o the streets of the cities; ad mutiy i the army. How likely are ay of these scearios i Pakista? Isurgecy has bee goig o i some of the Pashtu areas sice 2004, but does ot i itself threate the existece of Pakista. These Pashtu isurgecies looked much more meacig i the years before 2009, because of their apparet ability to spread from oe area to aother without the army beig able to stop them. Sice the army couter-offesive i Swat i 2009, the military has however demostrated that it is willig ad able to push the isurgets back. The existetial threat for the military ad Pakista will come if urest spreads to orther Pujab, ot i the form of isurgecy the flat, ope plais of this regio are hardly the right kid of terrai for that but of massive protests i the cities. Pujab has some 56 percet of Pakista s populatio ad 70 percet of its idustry; but above all, the provice, ad especially the orthwester districts of the Potwar plateau provide a majority of Pakista s soldiers, ad especially its ifatry. They have demostrated agai ad agai their willigess to shoot dow members of other Pakistai ethicities, but would they shoot dow fellow Pujabis? Tahir-ul-Qadri s movemet shows the potetial for mass demostratios i Pujab, but could mass urest led by radical Islamists lead to Islamist revolutio ad the destructio of the state? For mass protests to lead to revolutio ad the collapse of the existig order would require a orgaized revolutioary force capable of leadig the masses to seize the istitutios of govermet, ad the of takig cotrol of those istitutios itself; somethig like the Muslim Brotherhood i Egypt, or the Islamic Salvatio Frot (FIS) i Algeria i the early 1990s. I Pakista, such a movemet would eed two thigs: a geuiely revolutioary spirit ad program, icludig a willigess to use ruthless force; ad deep roots i the provice of Pujab. A glace aroud Pakista s Islamist groups makes clear how difficult this would be for all of them to achieve, above all because of Pakista s deep ethic differeces ad Pujab s deep religious oes. Of the two Islamist political parties, the Jamiat-e-Ulemae-Islam (JUI) is overwhelmigly Pashtu with very little Pujabi support. The Jamaat Islami (JI) does have Pujabi support, but it is restricted to relatively arrow social strata i the tows. As to the militats, their problems i mobilizig masses of Pujabis are also formidable. The groups makig up the Pakistai Taliba (Tehrik-e-Taliba Pakista, or TTP), like the JUI, are overwhelmigly Pashtu ad i additio highly localized ad tribal-based. The chief militat allies the TTP have foud i Pujab as of the start of 2011 are the old ati-shia sectaria parties, the Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) ad its eve more violet offshoot, the Lashkar-e-Jaghvi (LeJ). The mass appeal of the sectaria groups is however limited to cetral ad souther Pujab (though they have eough support elsewhere to carry out savage acts of terrorism). The groups with wider prestige are the militats who took part i the jihad agaist Idia i Kashmir, a cause that has great public sympathy i orther Pujab. Of these groups, the most powerful is Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) ad its extesive social welfare wig, Jamaat-ud-Dawa. So far, however, the Pakistai military has bee able to keep the LeT from joiig the Islamist rebellio i Pakista, ot by the threat of repressio, but as a result of a explicit or implicit deal o certai terms. These terms go to the heart of the dilemmas cofrotig Pakista ad the West whe it comes to Pakista s role i the struggle agaist terrorism. As far as Idia is cocered, sice 2008 the LeT has bee held i reserve, ad has carried out o further attacks. The Pakistai military also seems to have bee able to persuade the LeT/JuD leadership that attacks o the West would be absolutely catastrophic, brigig with them the certaity of massive US retaliatio agaist Pakista. O the other had, LeT appears to have bee give free reig to sed its activists to fight agaist the US ad its allies i Afghaista. So far, this approach o the part of the Pakistai military has i fact bee successful both i prevetig LeT from rebellig agaist the Pakistai state ad army, ad i prevetig LeT terrorist attacks agaist the US, Uited Kigdom ad (sice 2008), Idia. Barrig complete ecoomic collapse which the US, Chia ad Saudi Arabia would probably combie to prevet Pakista therefore seems likely to stumble o, without revolutio but also without the reforms that are ecessary to esure its log-term survival, above all i the face of ecological chage. If the state collapses i the ear future, this is likely to be ot because of the stregth of the Islamists, but because the US has bee goaded ito actios agaist Pakista that propel parts of the army ito Islamist rebellio. But that dager is well uderstood i Washigto, ad the oly thig that could lead to such a move would be a really severe terrorist attack by Pakistais withi the US itself. Fortuately, the Pakistai Army also uderstads this dager very well, ad is workig with the CIA to prevet it. We must all hope that they cotiue to be successful.

23 February 2013 The Security Times Flashpoits 23 Islad issues Chia seeks to udermie US alliaces i maritime East Asia By Carlyle A. Thayer Recet tesios betwee Chia ad Japa over the Sekaku/Diaoyu islads i the East Chia Sea ad the aval stadoff betwee Chia ad the Philippies at Scarborough Shoal i the South Chia Sea have exposed the dark side of Chia s so-called peaceful rise. I both disputes Chia has show a willigess to use ot oly heavy-haded political ad diplomatic pressure but also ecoomic sactios ad coercio. Chia aims to recover islads ad rocks, which it claims were Carlyle A. Thayer is Emeritus Professor at the Australia Defece Force Academy, Caberra. usw caberra Flashpoit maritime east asia take from it i the cetury of humiliatio durig the coloial era. Chia s recovery of lost territory is part of a larger drive to become the domiat power i East Asia. To achieve these goals, Chia has become aggressively assertive i East Asia s maritime domai. Chia has also sought to trip up the Uited States rebalacig of its military force posture by udermiig US alliaces ad strategic parterships. Last year Chia ad the Philippies became ivolved i a stadoff over Scarborough Shoal. Chia first deployed Chia Maritime Surveillace (CMS) ships to prevet the Philippies from arrestig Chiese fisherme illegally operatig i its waters. Whe the Philippies refused to give groud ad raised its cocers i public, Bejig respoded by dispatchig early a hudred fishig craft ad additioal civilia eforcemet ships to occupy Scarborough Shoal ad its surroudig waters. The Chiese eve erected a barrier to prevet the Philippies from gaiig etry to the shoal. They added further pressure o the Philippies by suspedig the import of baaas ad cacellig Chiese tourist charter flights. Whe the Philippies sought support from fellow members of the Associatio of Southeast Asia Natios (ASEAN) ad ASEAN s dialogue parters, Chia s political ally, Cambodia, actig as ASEAN Chair, did its best to scuttle Philippie iitiatives. Cambodia eve wet to the extet of isertig wordig ito the fial statemet of the ASEAN Summit that its members agreed ot to iteratioalize territorial disputes i the South Chia Sea. The Philippies objected ad the offedig referece was dropped. Chia the dispatched Fu Yig, its deputy foreig miister, to Maila to read the riot act. She told the Philippies foreig secretary that Chia objected to efforts by the Philippies to iteratioalize the issue by takig the matter to the Uited Natios, raisig it with third parties icludig allies ad holdig high-profile press cofereces. The Philippies, as a treaty ally of the Uited States, has sought backig from Washigto for its dispute with Chia. The US has provided defese assistace to the Philippies to build up its capacity for a miimal credible deterrece. US uclear attack submaries have made symbolic port calls to the Philippies. But i reality the US has bee equivocal about how it would react to a icidet at Scarborough Shoal o the grouds that the shoal was claimed by the Philippies after their Mutual Defese Treaty was siged i Chia has aouced that it will maitai a permaet presece at Scarborough Shoal. I sum, Chia virtually has aexed the rocks without firig a shot. It is clear that the Uited States will ot itervee militarily ad this has led some members of the Filipio elite to raise doubts about the efficacy of the US alliace. Chia also employed heavyhaded tactics i dealig with Japa over the Sekakus. Whe the Japaese govermet bought out private owers of several of the rocks to prevet them from fallig ito the hads of Japaese ultra-atioalists, their Chiese couterparts staged large-scale public protests. Several of the demostratios tured violet ad targeted Japaese busiess iterests. The Chiese govermet, uder domestic pressure, bega a campaig of itimidatio by dispatchig up to te CMS ad other civilia eforcemet vessels to the Sekakus. The Chiese ships deliberately etered Japaese waters ad cofroted Japaese Coast Guard vessels. Chia has kept up ureletig pressure sice September last year whe the Sekaku issue emerged. Its CMS ships regularly itrude ito Japaese territorial waters where they stay for several hours before departig. Chia s State Oceaic Admiistratio recetly has begu to fly propeller drive surveillace plaes ito Japa s air idetificatio zoe. This has prompted Japa to scramble F-15 jet fighters to prevet itrusios ito its airspace. The Japaese media has reported that the Miistry of Defese is cosiderig authorizig the F-15s to fire warig shots. The Uited States is o public record that its security treaty with Japa covers the Sekakus. But it is a ope secret that the US is urgig restrait o Japa ad does ot wat to be draw ito a coflict with Chia over a group of rocks i the East Chia Sea. The tesios over the Sekakus ad Scarborough Shoal are more tha bilateral disputes. They ivolve Chia deliberately attemptig to udermie US security guaratees to two of its treaty allies. The security situatio i maritime East Asia will be exacerbated i comig years as Chia builds up the capacity of its civilia paramilitary eforcemet agecies ad gives priority to moderizig its South Sea Fleet. I a foretaste of what is to come, last year Chia coducted a joit exercise betwee its civilia eforcemet agecies ad its avy to deal with likely icidets i disputed waters. picture alliace/dpa Miamikojima, Kitakojima ad Uotsui islads, part of the Japaese-cotrolled Sekaku Islads i the East Chia Sea, which Chia ad Taiwa also claim. Two Japaese coastguard vessels challege a Chiese fishig boat o Aug. 15, ddp images/ap

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25 Cyber Security February 2013S sectio C 25 Cyberwarfare: hype ad fear So far, olie attacks have ot killed aybody. Does offese really beat defese? EVEN as axiety about jihadi terrorist threats has eased, thaks to the efforts of itelligece agecies ad droe attacks disruptio of the militats sactuaries, fears over Wester societies vulerability to cyberassaults have grow. Political ad military leaders miss o chace to declare that cyberwar is already upo us. America s defese secretary, Leo Paetta, talks of a cyber-pearl Harbor (see page 26). A seior official says privately that a cyberattack o America that would make 9/11 look like a tea party is oly a matter of time. The ightmares are of mouseclicks explodig fuel refieries, fryig power grids or blidig air traffic cotrollers. The reality is already of coutless aoymous attacks o govermets ad busiesses. These seek to disrupt out of malice, or to steal swathes of valuable commercial or security-related data. Some experts believe that such thefts have cost hudreds of billios of dollars i stole R&D (Research ad Developmet). Related topics May of these attacks are purely crimial. But the most sophisticated are more ofte the work of states, carried out either directly or by proxies. Attributio detectig a eemy s figerprits o a cyberattack is still tricky, so officials are reluctat to poit the figer of blame publicly. But Chia is by far the most active trasgressor. It employs thousads of gifted software egieers who systematically target techically advaced Fortue 100 compaies. The other biggest offeders are Russia ad, recetly, Ira (the suspected source of the Shamoo virus that crippled thousads of computers at Saudi Arabia s Aramco ad Qatar s RasGas i August). America ad its allies are by o meas passive victims. Either America, Israel or the two workig together almost certaily hatched the Stuxet worm, foud i 2010, that was desiged to paralyze cetrifuges at Ira s Nataz uraium-erichmet plat. The Flame virus, idetified by Russia ad Hugaria experts this year, apparetly came from the same source. It was desiged to strike at Ira by ifectig computers i its oil miistry ad at targets i the West Bak, Syria ad Suda. Borig, ot lurid For all the hype, policies o cyberwarfare remai cofused ad secretive. The America govermet is brigig i ew rules ad a clearer strategy for dealig with cyberthreats. Barack Obama is said to have siged i October a still-secret directive cotaiig ew guidelies for federal agecies carryig out cyber-operatios. It sets out how they should help private firms, particularly those resposible for critical atioal ifrastructure, to defed themselves agaist cyberthreats by sharig iformatio ad settig stadards. The directive is partly a respose to the stallig of cyber legislatio i the Seate. Republica seators argue that it imposes too great a regulatory burde o idustry, which is already obliged to disclose whe it is subject to a cyberattack. It is also meat Youg Chiese etizes playig olie games. Will some of them become hackers? to gover how far such bodies as the Departmet of Homelad Security ca go i their defese of domestic etworks agaist malware attacks. The Petago is also workig o more permissive rules of egagemet for offesive cyberwarfare, for example to close dow a foreig server from which a attack was thought to be emaatig. Geeral Keith Alexader heads both Cyber Commad (which has a budget of $3.4 billio for ext year) ad the Natioal Security Agecy. He has ofte called for greater flexibility i takig the attack to the eemy. The emergece of ew cyberwarfare doctries i America is beig watched closely by allies who may follow where America leads as well as by potetial adversaries. However, Jaro Limell of Stoesoft, a big computer security firm, says that all levels of govermet i the West lack strategic uderstadig o cyberwarfare. So, although questios aboud, aswers are few. For example, it is ot clear how much sesitive iformatio about threats or vulerabilities govermet agecies should share eve with privatesector firms that are crucial to atioal security. Ofte the weakest lik is their professioal advisers, such as law firms or baks who have access to sesitive data. Almost all (roughly 98 percet) of the vulerabilities i commoly used computer programs that hackers exploit are i software created i America. Makig private-sector compaies more secure might ivolve a cotroversial degree of itrusio by govermet agecies, for example the permaet moitorig of traffic to make sure that every employee is stickig to security rules. Govermet hackers may also like to hoard such vulerabilities rather tha expose them. That way they ca later create backdoors i the software for offesive purposes. Also cotroversial is the balace betwee defese ad attack. Geeral Alexader stresses that i cyberwarfare, the attacker has the advatage. Limell says that, although America has better offesive cybercapabilities tha almost aybody, its defeses get oly three out of te. Settig rules for offesive cyberwarfare is exceptioally tricky. Whe it comes to real, physical war, the capability may become as importat as air superiority has bee for the past 70 years: though it caot aloe brig victory, you probably ca t wi if the other side has it. Chia has log regarded the etwork-cetric warfare that was developed by America i the late- 1980s ad copied by its allies as a weakess it might target, particularly as military etworks share may of the same uderpiigs as their civilia equivalets. The People s Liberatio Army (PLA) talks about iformatioisatio i war, weakeig the iformatio superiority of the eemy ad operatioal effectiveess of the eemy s computer equipmet. Chia s plaig assumes a opeig salvo of attacks o the eemy s iformatio ceters by cyber, electroic ad kietic meas to create blid spots that its armed forces would the be able to exploit. Yet as the PLA comes to rely more o its ow iformatio etworks it will o loger ejoy a asymmetric advatage. Few doubt the importace of beig able to defed your ow military etworks from cyberattacks (ad to operate effectively whe uder attack), while threateig those of your adversaries. But to coclude that future wars will be coducted largely i cyberspace is a exaggeratio. Marti Libicki of the RAND Corporatio, a thik tak, argues that with some exceptios cyberwarfare either directly harms people or destroys equipmet. At best it ca cofuse ad frustrate ad the oly temporarily. I short, cyberwarfare ca oly be a support fuctio for other forms of war. Four horseme Besides the cyber elemet of physical warfare, four other worries are: strategic cyberwar (direct attacks o a eemy s civilia ifrastructure); cyberespioage; cyberdisruptio, such as the distributed deial-of-service attacks that briefly overwhelmed Estoia For all the hype, policies o cyberwarfare remai cofused ad secretive. state, bakig ad media websites i 2007; ad cyberterrorism. Gaugig a appropriate respose to each of these is hard. Limell calls for a triad of capabilities: resiliece uder severe attack; reasoable assurace of attributio so that attackers caot assume aoymity; ad the meas to hit back hard eough to deter a uprovoked attack. Few would argue agaist improvig resiliece, particularly of critical atioal ifrastructure such as power grids, sewerage ad trasport systems. But such targets are ot as vulerable as is ow ofte suggested. Cyberattacks o physical assets are most likely to use what Libicki calls oe-shot weapos aimed at idustrial cotrol systems. Stuxet was a example: it destroyed perhaps a teth of the Iraia cetrifuges at Nataz ad delayed some uraium erichmet for a few moths, but the vulerabilities it exposed were soo repaired. Its limited ad fleetig success will also have led Ira to take measures to hider future attacks. If that is the best that two first-rate cyberpowers ca do agaist a third-rate idustrial power, otes Libicki, it puts ito perspective the more alarmist predictios of impedig cyberattacks o ifrastructure i the West. Moreover, ayoe cotemplatig a cyberattack o physical ifrastructure has little idea how much actual damage it will cause, ad if people will die. They caot kow if they are crossig a adversary s red lie ad i doig so would trigger a violet kietic respose (ivolvig real weapos). Whether or ot America has effective cyberweapos, it has more tha eough covetioal oes to make ay potetial aggressor thik twice. For that reaso, improvig attributio of cyberattacks is a high priority. Nigel Ikster, a former British itelligece officer ow at the Iteratioal Istitute for Strategic Studies, highlights the huge risk to the perpetrator of carryig out a ifrastructure attack give the cosequeces if it is detected. I October Paetta said that potetial aggressors should be aware that the Uited States has the capacity to locate them ad hold them accoutable for actios that harm America or its iterests. He may be over-claimig. Give that cyberattacks ca be lauched from almost aywhere, attributio is likely to remai tricky ad to rely o cotext, motive ad a assessmet of capabilities as much as techology. That is oe reaso why coutries o the receivig ed of cyberattacks wat to respod i kid ambiguity cuts both ways. But poor or authoritaria coutries attackig rich democratic oes may ot have the sorts of assets that are vulerable to a retaliatory cyberattack. The difficulty is eve greater whe it comes to the theft (or exfiltratio, as it is kow) of data. For Chia ad Russia, rasackig Wester firms for high-tech research ad other itellectual property is temptig. The other way roud offers ddp images/ap thier pickigs. I 2009 hackers from a uamed foreig itelligece agecy made off with some 24,000 cofidetial files from Lockheed Marti, a big America defese cotractor. As a result they could eavesdrop o olie meetigs ad techical discussios, ad gather iformatio about the sesors, computer systems ad stealth techology of the F-35 Joit Strike Fighter. This may have added to the delays of a already troubled program as egieers tried to fix vulerabilities that had bee exposed i the plae s desig. Ivestigators traced the peetratios with a high level of certaity to kow Chiese IP addresses ad digital figerprits that had bee used for attacks i the past. Less tha two years later, Chia uveiled its first stealth fighter, the J-20. Theft from thieves As Libicki asks, what ca we do back to a Chia that is stealig our data? Espioage is carried out by both sides ad is traditioally ot regarded as a act of war. But the massive theft of data ad the speed with which it ca be exploited is somethig ew. Respodig with violece would be disproportioate, which leaves diplomacy ad sactios. But America ad Chia have may other big items o their ageda, while trade is a very blut istrumet. It may be possible to idetify products that Chia exports which compete oly because of stole data, but it would be hard ad could risk a trade war that would damage both sides. Cyberdisruptio has uisace value ad may be costly to repair, but it ca be mitigated by decet defeses. Cyberterrorism has remaied largely i the imagiatio of film-makers, but would be worth worryig about if it became a reality. Stoesoft s Limell reckos that, though al- Qaeda ad its offshoots show little sig of acquirig the ecessary skills, they could buy them. Libicki is more sceptical. Big teams of highly qualified people are eeded to produce Stuxet-type effects, which may be beyod eve sophisticated terrorist groups. Also, the larger the team that is eeded, the more likely it is to be peetrated. The Obama admiistratio s attempt to develop a more coheret ad perhaps less secret doctrie of cyberwarfare is sesible so log as it is ot just a excuse for hypig somethig that, as far as is kow, has yet to kill aybody. The idea that offece beats defese is also suspect. If more attetio were paid to fixig the security flaws i Wester software, cyberattackers would have fewer etry poits. Ad more effort should be put ito solvig the attributio problem. Gettig caught is a deterret that state actors take seriously. But give that the essece of cyberwarfare is ambiguity ad ucertaity, gaiig clarity ad certaity will be exceptioally difficult. That makes policy both hard to costruct ad harder still to explai. The Ecoomist, Dec. 8,

26 26 The Security Times Cyber February 2013 picture alliace/ladov "Our missio is to defed the atio", says Leo Paetta. "We deter, ad if called upo, we take decisive actio to protect our citizes." The ext Pearl Harbor from cyberspace? This blood-curdlig sceario is just as real as terrorism, uclear attack or Mideaster turmoil By Leo E. Paetta Today we have to address a ew domai that we must secure to have peace ad prosperity i the world of tomorrow. Cyberspace has fudametally trasformed the global ecoomy. It s trasformed our way of life, providig two billio people across the world with istat access to iformatio to commuicatio, to ecoomic opportuities. Cyberspace is the ew frotier, full of possibilities to advace security ad prosperity i the 21st cetury. Ad yet, with these possibilities, also come ew perils ad ew dagers. The Iteret is ope. It s highly accessible, as it should be. But that also presets a ew terrai for warfare. It is a battlefield of the future where adversaries ca seek to do harm to our coutry, to our ecoomy, ad to our citizes. I kow that whe people thik of cybersecurity today, they worry about hackers ad crimials who prowl the Iteret, steal people s idetities, steal sesitive busiess iformatio, steal eve atioal security secrets. Those threats are real ad they exist today. But the eve greater dager -- the greater dager facig us i cyberspace goes beyod crime ad it goes beyod harassmet. A cyber attack perpetrated by atio states or violet extremists groups could be as destructive as the terrorist attack o 9/11. Such a destructive cyberterrorist attack could virtually paralyze the atio. Let me give you some examples of the kids of attacks that we have already experieced. I recet weeks, as may of you kow, some large US fiacial istitutios were hit by so-called Distributed Deial of Service attacks. These attacks delayed or disrupted services o customer websites. While this kid of tactic is t ew, the scale ad speed with which it happeed was uprecedeted. But eve more alarmig is a attack that happeed two moths ago whe a very sophisticated virus called Shamoo ifected computers i the Saudi Arabia State Oil Compay Aramco. Shamoo icluded a routie called a wiper, coded to selfexecute. This routie replaced crucial systems files with a image of a burig US flag. But it also put additioal garbage data that overwrote all the real data o the machie. More tha 30,000 computers that it ifected were redered useless ad had to be replaced. It virtually destroyed 30,000 computers. The just days after this icidet, there was a similar attack o RasGas of Qatar, a major eergy compay i the regio. All told, the Shamoo virus was probably the most destructive attack that the private sector has see to date. Imagie the impact a attack like that would have o your compay or your busiess. These attacks mark a sigificat escalatio of the cyberthreat ad they have reewed cocers about still more destructive scearios that could ufold. For example, we kow that foreig cyber-actors are probig America s critical ifrastructure etworks. They are targetig the computer cotrol systems that operate chemical, electricity ad water plats ad those that guide trasportatio throughout this coutry. We kow of specific istaces where itruders have successfully gaied access to these cotrol systems. We also kow that they are seekig to create advaced tools to attack these systems ad cause paic ad destructio ad eve the loss of life. Let me explai how this could ufold. A aggressor atio or extremist group could use these kids of cyber tools to gai cotrol of critical switches. They could, for example, derail passeger trais or eve more dagerous, derail trais loaded with lethal chemicals. They could cotamiate the water supply i major cities or shutdow the power grid across large parts of the coutry. The most destructive scearios ivolve cyber-actors lauchig several attacks o our critical ifrastructure at oe time, i combiatio with a physical attack o our coutry. Attackers could also seek to disable or degrade critical military systems ad commuicatio etworks. The collective result of these kids of attacks could be a cyber Pearl Harbor; a attack that would cause physical destructio ad the loss of life. I fact, it would paralyze ad shock the atio ad create a ew, profoud sese of vulerability. As director of the CIA ad ow Secretary of Defese, I have O October 11, 2012 the former CIA director ad outgoig US Secretary of Defese Leo E. Paetta addressed a meetig of Busiess Executives for Natioal Security. Excerpts from the speech o cybersecurity he gave at the Itrepid Sea, Air ad Space Museum i New York a basic documet o a issue that is gaiig ever more sigificace. uderstood that cyber-attacks are every bit as real as the more well-kow threats like terrorism, uclear weapos proliferatio ad the turmoil that we see i the Middle East. But the good ews is this: We are aware of this potetial. Our eyes are wide ope to these kids of threats ad we are a atio that, thak God, is o the cuttig edge of this ew techology. We are the best ad we have to stay there. We are actig aggressively to get ahead of this problem, puttig i place measures to stop cyber-attacks dead i their tracks. We are doig this as part of a broad whole of govermet effort to cofrot cyberthreats. The Departmet of Homelad Security has the lead for domestic cybersecurity, the FBI also has a key part to play i ivestigatig ad prevetig cyber-attacks. Ad our itelligece agecies, of course, are focused o this potetial threat as well. The State Departmet is tryig to forge iteratioal cosesus o the roles ad resposibilities of atios to help secure cyberspace. The Departmet of Defese (DoD) also has a role. It is a supportig role but it is a essetial role. It does ot mea that the Departmet of Defese will moitor citizes persoal computers. We re ot iterested i persoal commuicatio or i s or i providig the day-to-day security of private ad commercial etworks. That is ot our goal. That is ot our job. That is ot our missio. Our missio is to defed the atio. We defed. We deter, ad if called upo, we take decisive actio to protect our citizes. I the past, we have doe so through operatios o lad ad at sea, i the skies ad i space. I this cetury, the Uited States military must help defed the atio i cyberspace as well. To esure that we fulfill our role to defed the atio i cyberspace, the departmet is focusig o three tracks. First, developig ew capabilities. DoD is ivestig more tha $3 billio aually i cybersecurity because we have to retai that cuttig edge capability i the field. Followig our ew defese strategy, the departmet is cotiuig to icrease key ivestmets i cybersecurity eve i a era of fiscal restrait. A cyber attack would paralize ad shock the atio, creatig a ew sese of vulerability. Our most importat ivestmet is i skilled cyber warriors eeded to coduct operatios i cyberspace. We re recruitig, we re traiig, we re retaiig the best ad the brightest i order to stay ahead of other atios. It s o secret that Russia ad Chia have advaced cybercapabilities. Ira has also udertake a cocerted effort to use cyberspace to its advatage. Moreover, DoD is already i a itese daily struggle agaist thousads of cyber-actors who probe the Defese Departmet s etworks, millios of times a day. Throughout the iovative efforts of our cyber-operators, we ve bee tryig to ehace the departmet s cyberdefese programs. These systems rely o sesors; they rely o software to hut dow the malicious code before it harms our systems. We actively share our ow experiece defedig our systems with those ruig the atio s critical private sector etworks. I additio to defedig the departmet s etworks, we also help deter attacks. Our cyberadversaries will be far less likely to hit us if they kow that we will be able to lik to the attack or that their effort will fail agaist our strog defeses. The departmet has made sigificat advaces i solvig a problem that makes deterrig cyber-adversaries more complex: the difficulty of idetifyig the origis of that attack. Over the last two years, DoD has made sigificat ivestmets i foresics to address this problem of attributio ad we re seeig the returs o that ivestmet. Potetial aggressors should be aware that the Uited States has the capacity to locate them ad to hold them accoutable for their actios that may try to harm America. But we wo t succeed i prevetig a cyber-attack through improved defeses aloe. If we detect a immiet threat of attack that will cause sigificat, physical destructio i the Uited States or kill America citizes, we eed to have the optio to take actio agaist those who would attack us to defed this atio whe directed by the presidet. For these kids of scearios, the departmet has developed that capability to coduct effective operatios to couter threats to our atioal iterests i cyberspace. Let me be clear that we will oly do so to defed our atio, to defed our iterests, to defed our allies. Which brigs me to the secod area of focus, policies ad orgaizatio. Respodig to the cyber threat requires the right policies ad orgaizatios across the federal govermet. As part of that effort, the departmet is ow fializig the most comprehesive chage to our rules of egagemet i cyberspace i seve years. The ew rules will make clear that the departmet has a resposibility, ot oly to defed DoD s etworks, but also to be prepared to defed the atio ad our atioal iterests agaist a attack i or through cyberspace. Three years ago, the departmet took a major step forward by establishig the Uited States Cyber Commad. Cyber Commad has the capacity to coduct a full rage of missios iside cyberspace. Ad we re lookig at ways to stregthe Cyber Commad as well. We must esure that it has the resources, that it has the authorities, that it has the capabilities required to perform this growig missio. Ad fially, the third area is to build stroger parterships. As I ve made clear, securig cyberspace is ot the sole resposibility of the Uited States military or eve the sole resposibility of the Uited States govermet. The private sector, govermet, military, our allies - all share the same global ifrastructure ad we all share the resposibility to protect it. Therefore, we are deepeig cooperatio with our closest allies with the goal of sharig threat iformatio, maximizig shared capabilities ad determiig malicious activities. Ultimately, o oe has a greater iterest i cybersecurity tha the busiesses that deped o a safe, secure ad resiliet global, digital ifrastructure. To defed those etworks more effectively, we must share iformatio betwee the govermet ad the private sector about threats i cyberspace. We ve made real progress i sharig iformatio with the private sector. Iformatio sharig aloe is ot sufficiet. We ve got to work with the busiess commuity to develop baselie stadards for our most critical private-sector ifrastructure, our power plats, our water treatmet facilities, our gas pipelies. This would help esure that compaies take proactive measures to secure themselves agaist sophisticated threats, but also take commo sese steps agaist basic threats. Although awareess is growig, the reality is that too few compaies have ivested i eve basic cybersecurity. The fact is that to fully provide the ecessary protectio i our democracy, cybersecurity legislatio must be passed by Cogress. Without it, we are ad we will be vulerable

27 February 2013 The Security Times Cyber 27 picture alliace/dpa O Dec. 17, 2009 hackers maaged to take over the popular microbloggig website Twitter for a hour. A direct lik with Ira was ever established. Biary battlefield Ira has become a provig groud for offesive ad defesive cyberwar techiques By James A. Lewis Ira has etered the raks of cyberpowers. Its capabilities are basic, but i the last year it has moved far ahead of may atios i strategy ad orgaizatio. I tur, the Persia Gulf has become a epiceter for cybercoflict. This is ot cyber war but a outgrowth of larger tesios over Ira s uclear program ad of regioal disputes, where the cotedig powers ow use cybertechiques as a ew tool for coercio. Much of Ira s developmet of cyberpower is a reactio to the vulerabilities created by the Iteret. Like Chia ad Russia, Ira s leaders fear free access to iformatio ad the power of etworks to uleash somethig like the Arab Sprig. Satellites ad Facebook are the electroic meas of a soft war by the West to cause the Iraia family s collapse, said Iraia Iterior Miister Mostafa Najar. Cotrol of cyberspace is of cetral importace to them. Durig the 2009 Gree Revolutio, Iraia security forces expaded their ability to moitor ad disrupt olie disset. Ira developed hackig capabilities to exted its security forces surveillace ad cotrol capabilities, the most otorious example beig the 2011 hack of the Netherlads Iteret compay DigiNotar that allowed Ira to surreptitiously read dissidets s. Ira s efforts to cotrol the Iteret are secod, perhaps, oly to Chia s. Like Chia, from whom it buys telecommuicatios equipmet ad probably James Adrew Lewis is a seior fellow ad director of the Techology ad Public Policy Program at the Ceter for Strategic ad Iteratioal Studies. CSIS receives advice, Ira struggles to isulate itself from the Iteret. Ira joied Russia ad Chia at the World Coferece o Iteratioal Telecommuicatios (WCIT) i December to call for tighter political cotrol of the Iteret. Tehra plas to create a domestic Iteret discoected from the global etwork o which oly approved material will appear, a closed etwork for security forces ad ecoomic agecies, ad eve a religiously sactioed search egie ( Ya Haq ). These are ambitious iitiatives with parallels i Russia ad Chia, but implemetatio faces major ad perhaps isurmoutable obstacles. The Iteret s political effect remais a existetial problem for the regime. Ira s leaders realized i the last two years that cyberspace had become a key vulerability exploited by its may foreig oppoets for itelligece purposes ad, i the case of Stuxet, for attack. Like North Korea, aother power experimetig with uclear weapos, missiles, ad cyber, Ira sees cyber attack as part of the asymmetric military capabilities it wishes to acquire. Stuxet did ot ope Padora s Box. The Iraias were already well o the road to cyberpower because of their eed to supress disset. The repeated foreig itrusios, however, led to highlevel attetio to cybersecurity ad the creatio of a sophisticated orgaizatioal structure to maage cybercoflict. "We have equipped ourselves with ew tools sice cyberwar i the cyberspace is more dagerous tha physical war, said Iraia Revolutioary Guard (IRG) Deputy Commader, Abdollah Araqi. Iraia officials, especially Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolutio (Khameei) have all cited this poit, therefore we are prepared for soft ad physical wars." These ew tools iclude a March 2012 decree from Khameei creatig a Supreme Coucil of Cyberspace to provide a coordiated cyber effort for both offese ad defese. Coucil members iclude seior officials from the security ad itelligece services ad the Miisters of Culture ad of Commuicatios. Three military orgaizatios play leadig operatioal roles: Ira s Passive Defese Orgaizatio, the Basiji ad the IRG. The Passive Defese Orgaizatio is resposible for Ira s Cyber Defese Strategy ad houses Ira s cyberdefese headquarters, which coordiates efforts by the armed forces, the itelligece services, ad the telecommuicatios miistry. Ira held its first atioal cyberdefese exercise i late October The Basiji, a civilia paramilitary orgaizatio, maages the Iraia Cyber Army, which Basiji leaders say has 120,000 voluteer hackers. The umber is certaily a exaggeratio, but the Basiji, created to cotrol disset, use already close coectios with uiversities ad religious schools to recruit a proxy hacker force. The Basiji are cotrolled by the IRG; the Cyber Army, at the IRG s directio, is the likely source of a recet series of troublig icidets aimed at wester compaies The most importat ivolved a major disruptio of computers at Saudi Aramco ad the Qatari compay RasGas. The trigger for these icidets was a cyberattack o Ira s major oil termial at Kharg Islad. Ira appears to have cleverly modified cybercrime malware for the attack. All the data o 30,000 Aramco computers was erased ad the malware may have ifected (but did ot damage) refiery cotrol systems. The Aramco icidet, while ot as sophisticated as Stuxet, was secod oly to Stuxet as a disruptive cyberattack. Simultaeously with the Aramco icidet, there were massive deial of service attacks agaist US baks. The combiatio of the attacks o Aramco ad the bak is best see as a test by Ira of its ew capabilities ad of the US reactio. The likely triggers for the bak icidets, which came i two waves, were the impositio of ew sactios by the US Cogress. The deial of service attacks was owhere ear as damagig as the Aramco attack. Deial of service is a form of olie protest, where the target etwork is flooded with spurious traffic, such as the attacks from Russia used agaist Estoia i The attacks agaist America baks, however, were te times larger tha the attacks o Estoia ad overwhelmed the baks ability to respod. Attacks of this size require computig resources that, i a coutry where the Iteret is tightly cotrolled, mea govermet approval if ot directio. I this, the Iraia efforts follow the patter set earlier by Russia, ad there is a murky collaboratio i cyberactivities betwee Ira ad Russia that appears liked to larger efforts to udercut US espioage programs ad ifluece. The cosesus view of US officials, based o itelligece sources, is that Tehra is resposible for the attacks. I respose, US Defese Secretary Paetta gave a speech i October 2012 that laid out a ew preemptive policy (see page 26). The US would use its ow cyber capabilities to stop cyberattacks that threateed huma life or sigificat ecoomic damage. This was iteded to sigal Ira to curtail its efforts. There was ideed a brief slowig of attacks agaist baks, but they have ow resumed i full force. If the speech was iteded to deter, it shows the limits of cyber deterrece. Havig sigaled Ira, what does the US do ow whe Ira igores the sigal? Ira s techological capabilities for cyberattacks (as i other areas of its military techology) are basic ad routiely exaggerated, but a cofrotatioal style ad pechat for covert hostilities make it a troublig oppoet. Ira s use of its cyber capabilities will be shaped by the larger regioal political ad security cotext, but cyberattack has become aother flashpoit for a already dagerous situatio. This is a space for coflict where the rules are uclear, ad the risks ot yet measured. The other Berli T +49 (0) 30 /

28 Spyig the ad o Today s espioage c are coducted by ge at screes full of cod The h fo Red O 28 The Security Times Cyber Februar Fotolia/oleg zhukov Global cybe moves oto By Eugee How do you imagie a spy? Maybe you cojure up a tall athletic youg ma i a suit ad suglasses who ca hit his target with two gus simultaeously while shootig from the hip ad operate every type of vehicle from a tak to a helicopter. You may also recall a certai hadsome getlema wearig a black tie who prefers his vodka martiis shake, ot stirred; or a udercover aget with a fake idetity who s bee livig i aother coutry for years? Well, today s spy is oe of the above. These days he or she is the classic computer geek likely to be bespectacled, ukempt, too fod of coffee ad fast food, ad someoe who speds hours starig at screes full of code. Nowadays it s these geeks who ca be resposible for massive espioage campaigs coducted over the Iteret. Campaigs like Red October oe of the first coducted o a global scale ad, iterestigly, developed before Stuxet. Red October was a extremely complicated ad quirky cyberespioage campaig targetig diplomatic, scietific, trade ad govermetal orgaizatios, ad oil ad gas compaies i dozes of coutries mostly i easter Eugee Kaspersky is the fouder ud CEO of Kaspersky Lab, ad a leadig global expert i the field of iformatio security. private Europe ad the former USSR, but also i Wester Europe, Cetral Asia ad North America. It was active for at least five years, presumably had access to classified iformatio all that time, ad had bee stealig data from persoal mobile devices ad etwork equipmet too. This campaig was still i full swig whe we published our research, with the stole data still beig set to a umber of commad-ad-cotrol servers. Kaspersky Lab s experts bega their threat research ito this campaig i October 2012 at the request of oe of our parters. At the first stage we had iformatio about just a few computers ifected with a ew malicious program. But by aalyzig the attack ad malware modules, we soo uderstood the colossal scale of this cyber-espioage etwork, which we amed Red October (after the ovel The Hut for the Red October by Tom Clacy) or Rocra. Our researchers cotiue to ivestigate ad reverse all the variats of the malware, ad have bee comig to some iterestig coclusios. The attackers used a uique approach i the developmet of the malware ad the way it attacked. They actually created a multi-fuctioal platform, which was desiged for rapid ad straightforward adjustmet to differet system cofiguratios of each ifected user. This platform was uique to Rocra, ad had othig i commo with previous cyber-espioage campaigs idetified by Kaspersky Lab such as Flame or Gauss. Before iitiatig a attack, the hackers collected as much iformatio as possible o the target orgaizatio. After that, a assault was carefully prepared ad tailored to the specific characteristics of the victims. For istace, the iitially ifected documets set as attachmets were customized to make them especially appealig to the victim, ad every sigle module was specifically compiled with a uique victim ID iside. Later o, there was plety of iteractio betwee the attacker ad the victim, with the opera- They trust us with their Life Trust i extreme situatios Wherever Dräger products are used, the most importat thig is o the lie: life. Whether i the miig idustry, for firefighters or i the maufacturig idustry people are trustig that their equipmet will ot fail them. Every day, they face dagerous situatios. They protect ad save other people s lives. Ad they stay calm all the while. Because they kow that we are at their sides. Ad have bee so for more tha 120 years. ST

29 y 2013 The Security Times Cyber 29 w: ampaigs eks starig e. ut r ctober r-espioage the Iteret. Kaspersky Fotolia/sergey peterma tio beig drive by the kid of cofiguratio the victim had, which type of documets they used, istalled software, ative laguage ad so o. Compared to Flame ad Gauss, which were highly automated cyberespioage campaigs, Rocra was a lot more tailor-made to exploit its targets. The mai malware body acted as a poit of etry ito the system, which could later dowload modules used for lateral movemet. After the iitial ifectio, the malware did t propagate by itself typically the attackers gathered iformatio about the etwork for some days, idetified key systems ad the deployed modules that could compromise other computers i the etwork. I geeral, the Rocra framework was desiged for executig tasks provided by its Commad & Cotrol servers. Most of these tasks were received from the server, executed i memory, reported back to the server, ad the immediately discarded. Several tasks however eeded to be costatly preset i the system, like waitig for a cell phoe to coect. Our ivestigatio ucovered over 1000 modules belogig to 34 differet module categories. The most recet module was compiled o Jauary 8, 2013; however, oe of the commad & cotrol server domais was registered i 2007 revealig how log this campaig has bee i operatio. The mai goal of the attack was to steal ad secretly sed classified iformatio to the remote server. The attackers were focused o stealig documets, ad the iformatio stole was of the highest classificatio level ad icluded geopolitical data of embassies ad other govermetal orgaizatios. For example, we idetified that the malware targeted files with the extesio acid* that appears to refer to the classified software Acid Cryptofiler, used by several etities from the Europea Uio to NATO. Such a complicated campaig required sigificat resources i terms of persoel, kow-how ad time. We assume that a team of approximately 20 worked o the Rocra campaig o a daily basis for five years. As usual with malware, it s impossible to tell for sure who the attacker was. However, based o umerous hits left i the code of the malware, there is strog techical evidece to idicate that the attackers had Russia-speakig origis. Kaspersky Lab, i collaboratio with iteratioal orgaizatios, law eforcemet agecies ad Computer Emergecy Respose Teams (CERTs) is cotiuig its ivestigatio of Rocra. We provide techical expertise ad resources for the ivestigatio. Detectio of such a complicated espioage etwork is yet further evidece that the Iteret is ow a battlefield. Rocra was oe of the largest ad most sigificat espioage campaigs we have ever revealed. It lasted for at least five years, required fie-tuig of the malware for every user, ad required a stable ad solid budget. Espioage has always existed, but ow it s shifted to the cyberworld. That meas that ay compay or orgaizatio, regardless of origi or field, should implemet cybersecurity. We are all potetially edagered. James Bod s time s up. Now the computer geeks have the stage. But I choose to stay optimistic. Ad I have good reaso to. The attackers used kow vulerabilities fixed by vedors ad stopped by most ativirus vedors. We assume that the victims had either outdated security software, or did t have ativirus at all. So maybe the battle s ot all lost just yet? Bavaria brighteig my witer Paoramahotel Oberjoch, Agetur FouadVollmer Rustic huts: quait ad cosy S.Müller/Tourismusamt Müche Royal Bavaria Witer Breaks i Bavaria. Ejoy art & culture Witry waders i the city

30 30 The Security Times Cyber February 2013 Shiftig the cybersecurity paradigm Why Germay is switchig the emphasis from active to passive olie defese By Sadro Gaycke Cybersecurity per se does ot fall withi the remit of foreig policy. But iteratioal relatios ad security policy do: war ad peace, iteratioal stability ad prosperity, ad esurig the idepedece of domestic politics from the ifluece of foreig atios. As of late, cyberattacks ca threate all of these areas. More tha 120 atios worldwide have begu to develop a iterest i offesive hackig capabilities withi their militaries ad secret services. Most of them will soo be able to deter, to ifluece, to maipulate, ad to erode ay other coutry usig this ew tool at a low cost ad with barely ay risk. So ow, foreig policy icludes cybersecurity. It has its ow uique set of challeges ad solutios. The mai cocer is strategic atio state cyberattackers, ot crimials ad activists. The tools are primarily strategies ad policies, ot laws ad techologies. But foreig policy actors eed to ackowledge this ew resposibility, ad start workig o it, so the threat will ot outpace effective policies by too much. For the desig of a cybersecurity foreig policy, a few alteratives ca be idetified. Oe importat distictio is betwee active ad passive cybersecurity strategies. Util ow, approaches to cybersecurity have stressed active defese: cyberattackers should be lawfully prosecuted, or deterred by a threat of military, political or ecoomic retaliatio. This approach seemed realistic i the past, whe most cyberattacks were carried out by crimials, ad it would preserve the traditioal balace of powers. Sadro Gaycke is a computer scietist specializig i strategy ad cybersecurity ad curretly a member of the Policy Plaig Staff at the Germa Foreig Office. FU Berli Passive defese, o the other had, has bee cosidered too difficult. It would cosist of plai ad simple deterrece by deial through secure iformatio techologies. But computers have grow too complex. Ad our depedecies ad demads upo the beefits of this complexity are deemed to be too strog ad too specific to allow eve a partial reform of this eviromet. Yet while active, aggressive staces might spare us the costs of reivetig the computer, this approach brigs its ow set of risks, oce the much more sophisticated, almost ivisible ad highly potet atio-state cyberattacker is take ito accout. Idetifyig such a attacker will remai a highly speculative udertakig, o matter what techical progress is made. There will always be a host of tactical optios to create plausible deiability, to plat false traces, eve to stage whole false flag operatios. Ad without defiite idetificatio, it remais doubtful if this paradigm will ever actually deter ayoe at all. Assigig blame for a cyberattack o the grouds of vague suspicio is more likely to create misuderstadigs ad escalatios, destabilizig iteratioal security i ucertai ways. Also, ay techical attempts to ehace, eve slightly, the small chaces of idetifyig this kid of attack, immediately imply massive, i-depth surveillace of the Iteret ad cotrol of its odes i effect globally edig privacy ad Iteret freedom, ad disruptig techological sovereigty. Noe of this is desirable. As a cosequece, the Germa Federal Foreig Office is curretly explorig a differet strategic approach to cybersecurity foreig policy. It will recosider passive defese as the primary optio to cope with the problem. This approach is i lie with the Federal Foreig Office s declared priciples for cyber foreig policy i geeral. The Foreig Office cosiders IT ad the Iteret a importat asset, a hugely beeficial iovatio i may respects, most of all for freedom ad prosperity. Sice these beefits deserve ad require careful protectio, some guidig priciples were formulated. The first priciple is the protectio of freedom. Freedom is our uttermost priority i all Iteretad IT-related matters. Preservig ad extedig it must be cosidered a importat ad udeiable goal. Fotolia/imaic The secod priciple is the cotiuatio of self-regulatio. IT ad the Iteret became what they are through the joit etrepreeurial power of a ope civil society ad a ope market, ad that is how we believe it should stay. However, self-regulatio has to be resposible ad caot put others at risk. It must be moitored ad evaluated, with the optio to itroduce statutory regulatio if there is a failure to act resposibly. The third ad fial priciple is to foster kowledge ad trasparecy. IT ad the Iteret are complex techologies, with difficult ad multiple iteractios with society, the market ad politics. Yet we still kow too little about these iterdepedecies. Secrecy ad lobbyig further blur the picture. Sheddig more light ito the thicket of the cyberjugle will help regulators ad the lay public to uderstad their ow roles ad futures ad to determie how to implemet the values they cherish i ay future developmet. This set of priorities holds for our policies regardig Iteret freedom matters ad the IT-ecoomy, ad it also applies to cybersecurity. It traslates ito a set of strategic security demads, which curretly guide our thikig o cybersecurity foreig policy. First of all, security must preserve as much freedom as possible ad respect the eed for privacy, eve if the resultig solutios are more costly or complicated. Secodly, security ca be implemeted through self-regulatio, but it will have to be verified wherever critical atioal assets are cocered. We will eed proof that a security solutio provides the degree of protectio we require to remai idepedet Slip-proof PowerTOP Xtra by MENNEKES. Plugs ad coectors for toughest coditios. Steckvorrichtuge für die Welt. Fiches pour le mode. Tomas de corriete parael mudo. Kotaktmateriaal voor de hele wereld. Fichas para o mudo. Prese e spie per il modo. 用于全世界的接插装置 Sigapore MENNEKES Electric Sigapore Pte. Ltd. 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31 February 2013 The Security Times Cyber 31 Cybercrime Facts Social Cybercrime 1/6 OF SOCIAL NETWORK USERS REPORT THAT SOMEONE HAS HACKED INTO THEIR PROFILE AND PRETENDED TO BE THEM US 16 b THE GLOBAL PRICETAG OF CONSUMER CYBERCRIME Europe 12 b Russia 1.5 b Chia 34 b Japa 0.4 b Cybercrime Goes Mobile 31% RECEIVED A TEXT MESSAGE FROM SOMEONE THEY DIDN T KNOW REQUESTING THAT THEY CLICK ON AN EMBEDDED LINK OR DIAL AN UNKNOWN NUMBER TO RETRIEVE A VOIC HIGHEST NUMBER OF CYBERCRIME VICTIMS FOUND IN: Mexico 1.5 b Russia 92% chia 84% South AfriCa 80% Brazil 6 b Global 82 b THE COSTS OF CYBER- CRIME ARE CRIMINAL: E82 BN LOST IN JUST 12 MONTHS. Idia 6 b Australia 1.5 b Source: Norto Cybercrime Report MILLION VICTIMS PER YEAR MORE THAN THE ENTIRE POPULATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 24h 1.5+ MILLION VICTIMS PER DAY 1s 18 VICTIMS PER SECOND from foreig ifluece through military-grade hackers. Ad fially, kowledge ad trasparecy will have to provide the facts ad optios eeded for soud political decisio-makig. More kowledge should be gaied by idustry-idepedet, empirically orieted research, clearig up the fog of ucertaity surroudig may questios of cybersecurity, ad offerig verifiable solutios. Greater trasparecy ca be achieved by publicizig more facts o icidets ad attackers. Both the state ad the private sector must fid ways to share securitycritical iformatio, to iform ad to catalyze a public discourse about the kid ad the depth of cybersecurity eeded ad wated. These requiremets are a ievitable coclusio of the Germa approach to cyber foreig policy. Ad they suggest a paradigm shift i strategic foreig cybersecurity policy for Germay. Our approach explicitly prioritizes passive defese ad dismisses the use of active defese as a domiat strategy elemet. This path will eable security protectio ad idepedece from foreig ifluece i a more efficiet ad verifiable maer, cotributig to iteratioal stability istead of degradig it through speculative accusatios. It requires much less surveillace, cotrol ad cesorship, thus ehacig privacy ad Iteret freedom wherever it is applied. It will also iterfere less with civil society ad the market, as oly critical assets would eed o-site regulatio. We are curretly cosiderig a variety of diplomatic ad strategic measures to realize this paradigm. A priority will be a strog support for approaches that create a sovereig, high-security, o-complex ad miimally etworked iformatio techology ifrastructure for all critical areas. Other measures might iclude: iovative agreemets for software quality improvemet; reportig models that ecourage _110_ID079_eAz_Savere_»Security Times«_290x260mm Satzspiegel_4c (ZEITUNG)_oc_Fassug 01 more ope disclosure of cybericidets; a iteratioally agreed arms cotrol regime to moitor the ope ad legal exploit market, as well as more covetioal diplomatic tools such as the formulatio of orms ad escalatory dyamics; the desig of commuicatio to avoid misperceptios ad esure dialogue; ad the provisio of expertise ad other support to smaller coutries. The price tag for some of these measures might be high. But it is at least a moetary cost ad ot oe i lives ad liberties. With good icetives ad clever politics, a shift toward passive cyberdefese might ot eve be a fiacial burde, but could become a huge opportuity for a ew kid of IT-ecoomy. Everythig depeds o wise policymakig. With the right political levers set to the right places, the passive defese path out of the cybersecurity crisis could become a wi-wi-wi solutio for security, freedom ad prosperity alike. h E r r E N k N E c h T A G U T I l I T y T U N N E l l I N G T r A F F I c T U N N E l l I N G F r A N c E SAvErNE: high SpEED UNDEr ThE vosges. ErNolShEIm-lèS-SAvErNE Project data cotractor S-670, epb Shield (covertible) Spie Batigolles Diameter: 10,020mm TPCI/ Istalled power: 3,600kW Dodi Campeo Tuel legths: 2x 3,860m Berard Geology: buter sadstoe, sadstoe, shell-bearig limestoe The ew high-speed railway lik betwee Strasbourg ad Paris is beig rapidly exteded. The Tuel de Savere is curretly uder costructio o the 106 kilometer log sectio betwee Vedeheim just outside of Strasbourg ad Baudrecourt i Lorraie. The most complex part of the project passes uder the arrowest sectio of the Vosges ad will reduce travel time betwee Alsace ad the Frech capital by 30 miutes. A Herrekecht TBM is pavig the way for TGVs so they ca reach speeds of up to 320 kilometers per hour i the future. The covertible Earth Pressure Balace Ope Mode Shield broke through the first of two almost 4 kilometer log tuels, o Jue 19, 2012 two moths ahead of schedule. The secod tube of the Tuel de Savere will be completed by April Coverig up to 46 meters a day, the high-tech machie Charlotte is well o the way to achievig this goal. Herrekecht AG D Schwaau Phoe Fax marketig@herrekecht.com _110_ID079_eAz_Savere_SecurityTimes_290x260_01_RZ.idd :42

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