United Nations Development Programme. Staying on Track:

Transcription

1 Uited Natios Developmet Programme Stayig o Track: Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

2 The views expressed i this publicatio are those of the authors ad do ot ecessarily represet those of the Uited Natios, icludig UNDP, or their Member States. This report was commissioed by UNDP s Democratic Goverace Group ad Eviromet ad Eergy Group ad was writte by Amelia Thorpe ad Lisa Ogle 1. It has received cotributios from Tim Clairs (UNDP), Estelle Fach (UNDP), Mihoko Kumamoto (UNDP), Pradeep Kurukulasuriya (UNDP), Agus Mackay (UNDP), Phil Matsheza (UNDP), Robert Ous (UNDP), Stefaie Scheliha (GTZ), Davyth Stewart (Global Witess), Asako Takimoto (UNDP), James Tee (UNDP), Jakob Werksma (World Resources Istitute) ad Aled Williams (U4). UNDP is the UN s global developmet etwork, advocatig for chage ad coectig coutries to kowledge, experiece ad resources to help people build a better life. UNDP is o the groud i 135 developig coutries, workig with them o their ow solutios to global ad atioal developmet challeges. Editors: Estelle Fach ad Aga Timilsia Desig ad layout: First Kiss Creative Photo Credits: Cover: top image Curt Caremark,1993/World Bak p. 48 UN Photo/Tim McKulka p. 72 UN Photo/Martie Perret 1 Amelia Thorpe is Iteratioal Programs Director at the Evirometal Defeder s Office (EDO) ad ca be reached at amelia.thorpe@edo.org.au. Lisa Ogle is a Evirometal Legal Cosultat ad ca be reached at lisa@lisaogle.et.

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword 2 List of acroyms 3 Executive summary Why corruptio ad climate chage? Defiig corruptio Iteratioal orms ad stadards Ati-corruptio ad UNDP s madate 11 2 Corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i adaptatio activities Backgroud Plaig ad settig priorities for adaptatio Implemetig adaptatio 20 3 Corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i REDD Backgroud Desig of atioal REDD+ frameworks Implemetatio of REDD Coclusio ad key recommedatios 49 Refereces 50 Aex A: List of developig coutries participatig i the UN-REDD Programme ad the FCPF 57 Aex B: Map of corruptio risks i climate chage adaptatio at the coutry level 60 Aex C: UNCAC as a ati-corruptio framework for adaptatio 64 Aex D: UNCAC as a ati-corruptio framework for REDD+ 67 Aex E: Summary of potetial corruptio risks associated with REDD+ 69 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 1

4 foreword Tacklig climate chage ad fightig corruptio go had-i-had. Both are major challeges that weake progress towards the Milleium Developmet Goals. Corruptio destroys public trust, udermies huma rights ad the rule of law, exacerbates coflicts ad weakes geder iequality. Adverse effects of climate chage, such as breakdow of agricultural systems, malutritio, water shortages, ad more frequet ad violet atural disasters, preset major obstacles to sustaied developmet ad could reverse the progress we have made to date. Successful climate adaptatio coupled with striget mitigatio hold the key to huma developmet for the 21st cetury ad beyod. These are ot without challeges, which ca be compouded by corruptio whe it weakes istitutioal checks ad balaces o power ad results i otrasparet decisio-makig processes. Already corruptio has sigificat impacts o the resposes to climate chage. For example, turig a blid eye to illegal deforestatio ad forest degradatio results i icreased greehouse gas emissios; competitio for scarce resources due to more severe droughts forces some to access these resources through corrupt meas. The poorest ad most vulerable people those without ay power or ifluece, who also bear the brut of the effects of climate chage are the first to suffer setbacks. While emergig iteratioal mechaisms supportig climate chage adaptatio ad mitigatio represet uique opportuities for developig coutries, they are ot without risks. Developig coutries eed efficiet ad equitable access to substatial additioal resources to support their efforts i adaptatio, mitigatio ad sustaiable huma developmet, as well as stregtheed capacity to maage those resources. Trasparet ad accoutable fiacial processes ad mechaisms will be eeded, ad the combied expertise i climate chage ad goverace of the Uited Natios Developmet Programme ca be key to supportig these efforts. Stregtheig priciples of accoutability, trasparecy, itegrity ad the rule of law i the resposes to climate chage will pave the way to a more equitable, sustaiable future for all. The valuable ad timely report you have i had cotributes to this edeavour. Geraldie Fraser-Moleketi Director, Democratic Goverace Group Bureau for Developmet Policy UNDP Veerle Vadeweerd Director, Eviromet ad Eergy Group Bureau for Developmet Policy UNDP 2 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

5 list of acroyms AGF C-MRV COP EITI FCPF FPIC GEF GGM IPCC LDCs MDGs MRV NAPA NLDT NRI ODA OECD PACDE RPP SBSTA SIDS UN-REDD UNCAC UNDP UNFCCC UN Secretary-Geeral s High-Level Advisory Group o Climate Chage Fiacig Measuremet, reportig ad verificatio of carbo Coferece of the Parties (of the UNFCCC) Extractive Idustries Trasparecy Iitiative Forest Carbo Partership Facility (hosted by the World Bak) Free, Prior ad Iformed Coset Global Evirometal Facility Good Goverace for Medicies programme (World Health Orgaizatio) Itergovermetal Pael o Climate Chage Least Developed Coutries Milleium Developmet Goals Measuremet, reportig ad verificatio Natioal Adaptatio Programmes of Actio Natioal Lad Developmet Taskforce Natioal Research Istitute Official Developmet Assistace Orgaisatio for Ecoomic Co-operatio ad Developmet Global Thematic Programme o Ati-Corruptio for Developmet Effectiveess (UNDP) Readiess Preparatio Proposals Subsidiary Body for Scietific ad Techological Advice Small Islad Developig States Uited Natios Collaborative Programme o Reducig Emissios from Deforestatio ad Forest Degradatio i Developig Coutries Uited Natios Covetio Agaist Corruptio Uited Natios Developmet Programme Uited Natios Framework Covetio o Climate Chage Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 3

6 executive summary Climate chage creates a serious challege for sustaiable developmet, with scietific projectios idicatig that billios of people will face food ad water shortages, icreased exposure to diseases, losses of homes, assets ad livelihoods, ad forced migratio. Recogisig the urgecy of the issue, the iteratioal commuity has pledged sigificat fudig for adaptatio ad mitigatio i developig coutries, ad a wide rage of mechaisms ad istitutios for climate fiace are rapidly developig. I order to maitai progress - or eve curret achievemets - towards the MDGs, it is imperative that these fuds be spet effectively ad ot be dimiished or lost through corruptio. Maximisig the effectiveess of climate fiace must iclude steps to reduce the potetial for corruptio, as large ifluxes of resources coupled with a imperative to sped ca create coditios ripe for corruptio. This paper thus idetifies the corruptio risks i relatio to two elemets of the climate chage respose of particular importace to developig coutries: adaptatio, ad reducig emissios from deforestatio ad forest degradatio i developig coutries (REDD+). Adaptatio is particularly importat for developig coutries i view of their vulerability, limited capacity to adapt ad lesser historical resposibility for the causes of climate chage. This paper idetifies the key corruptio risks i adaptio at the coutry level as follows: State capture ad abuse of discretio i the process of adaptatio plaig, resultig i prioritisatio of projects ad programmes favourig vested iterests rather tha areas of greatest vulerability; Bribery, clietelism ad croyism i desig ad procuremet, leadig to poor quality, icomplete ad potetially maladaptive projects ad programmes; ad Petty corruptio i the delivery of projects ad programmes, icreasig the cost ad reducig the effectiveess of adaptatio activities. REDD+, which is to be fuded by developed coutry Parties (ad, potetially, through the market), represets a potetial source of ew reveue for may developig coutries, yet also poses sigificat corruptio risks. I particular, the paper idetifies the key corruptio risks for REDD+ as: Corruptio affectig the REDD+ readiess phase which may be affected by state capture, effected through grad corruptio ad political corruptio, i which powerful idividuals ad groups, such as politicias, loggig compaies, agribusiess ad possibly the military, seek to ifluece the desig of a coutry s atioal REDD+ framework i order to advace their private iterests or to etrech their political power. This ca be a way of legalizig corruptio. 2 Corruptio affectig the implemetatio phase of REDD+ which may also be affected by grad corruptio ad political corruptio but also icludes the risk of petty corruptio, i which the low to mid-level public officials who are resposible for implemetig REDD+ are bribed to igore routie breaches of REDD+ laws (e.g. illegal loggig), or are bribed to create fraudulet lad titles or carbo rights. 2 UNDP (May 2008) Tacklig corruptio, trasformig lives: Acceleratig Huma Developmet i Asia ad Pacific, Asia-Pacific Huma Developmet Report series, Macmilla Publishers Idia Ltd, at p. vii. 4 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

7 executive summary Corruptio affectig the distributio of REDD reveues ad beefits, such as the embezzlemet of reveues ad the misappropriatio of reveues by powerful groups, such as loggig compaies, the military, ad project developers. While the corruptio risks i climate fiace for adaptatio ad REDD+ are cosiderable, there is much that ca be doe to reduce them by adoptig strategies to promote trasparecy, cosolidate fudig, egage stakeholders, ivolve local commuities, ad esure adequate moitorig, reportig ad verificatio. The key recommedatios to reduce corruptios risks i adaptatio ad REDD+ which are outlied i this paper iclude: The eed to avoid fragmetatio of fudig which ca itself create opportuities for corruptio ad ca sed mixed messages to developig coutries about the importace of addressig corruptio; The eed to ecourage developig coutries to ratify ad implemet global ad regioal aticorruptio istrumets, such as the Uited Natios Covetio Agaist Corruptio ( UNCAC ), ad utilize UNCAC as a ati-corruptio framework i adaptatio ad REDD+ activities; The importace of carryig out corruptio risk assessmets i order to ascertai the coditio of the geeral goverace framework i the coutry cocered, ad to tailor the ati-corruptio measures to the coutry circumstaces; The desirability of usig multi-stakeholder accoutability mechaisms to improve trasparecy ad accoutability i desigig, implemetig ad moitorig adaptatio ad REDD+ frameworks; The importace of improvig the capacity of developig coutries to admiister the fuds aticipated to arrive for adaptatio ad REDD+, ad to stregthe their systems for public fiacial maagemet ad procuremet; The eed to stregthe the capacity of civil society to participate ad play a watchdog role ad the eed to establish idepedet recourse ad complaits mechaisms to improve trasparecy ad accoutability; The eed to support ati-corruptio bodies to build their capacity so that they ca raise awareess ad ca develop ad implemet prevetive mechaisms such as system audits, ad are able to ivestigate ad moitor corruptio cases i adaptatio ad REDD+; ad The eed to stregthe trasparecy ad accoutability of local goverace istitutios ad systems. Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 5

8 itroductio 1.1 Why corruptio ad climate chage? Climate chage creates a serious challege for sustaiable developmet, with scietific projectios idicatig that billios of people will face food ad water shortages, icreased exposure to diseases, losses of homes, assets ad livelihoods, ad forced migratio. 3 The impacts of climate chage will be felt worldwide, but will be most devastatig for poor people ad poor coutries. Their high reliace o climate-sesitive sectors such as agriculture, forestry ad fisheries, coupled with high levels of poverty, low educatio levels ad limited huma, istitutioal, techical ad fiacial capacity, mea that developig coutries, ad particularly wome ad idigeous peoples withi them, will bear the brut of climate chage. Uless addressed urgetly, climate chage will seriously costrai progress agaist the Milleium Developmet Goals (MDGs). The problem of climate chage was recogised iteratioally i 1992 with the sigig of the Uited Natios Framework Covetio o Climate Chage ( UNFCCC or the Covetio ). The ultimate objective of the Covetio is to stabilize greehouse gas cocetratios at a level that would prevet dagerous athropogeic iterferece with the climate system, ad to this ed Parties agreed to take actios both to mitigate ad to adapt to climate chage. 4 While the Covetio places the heaviest burde for fightig climate chage o developed coutry Parties, 5 it does provide for sigificat actio i developig coutries. I lie with commitmets made uder the Covetio, ad i respose to icreasigly alarmig scietific projectios, large amouts of fudig are beig pledged by the iteratioal commuity to assist with adaptatio ad mitigatio i developig coutries. 6 I order to maitai progress - or eve curret achievemets - towards the MDGs, it is imperative that these fuds be spet effectively ad ot be dimiished or lost through corruptio. Maximisig the effectiveess of climate fiace must iclude steps to reduce the risks of corruptio, as large ifluxes of resources coupled with a imperative to sped ca create coditios ripe for corruptio. The experiece of developmet assistace shows that corruptio ca seriously compromise developmet outcomes, divertig fuds away from iteded beeficiaries ad udermiig the developmet of local kowledge, skills, goverace ad istitutioal capacity. 7 3 IPCC (2007) Fourth Assessmet Report: Climate Chage 2007, available at data_reports.htm. 4 Mitigatio actios uder the Covetio iclude limitig athropogeic emissios of greehouse gases ad protectig ad ehacig greehouse gas siks ad reservoirs; Adaptatio icludes takig actio to respod to the adverse cosequeces of climate chage ad to build resiliece to future impacts. 5 This is based o a recogitio that developed coutries are the source of most past ad curret greehouse gas emissios. 6 While the figures beig discussed are large (uder the Copehage Accord, for example, developed coutries committed to provide ew ad additioal resources approachig US $ 30 billio for the period , with balaced allocatio betwee adaptatio ad mitigatio), it is importat to ote that they fall cosiderably short of the amout eeded i developig coutries. These issues are discussed further i Chapter 2. 7 Fritz, Verea ad I Kolstad (2008) Corruptio ad aid modalities, Berge, Norway: U4; Trasparecy Iteratioal (2007) Poverty, Aid ad Corruptio TI Policy Positio #01/2007; OECD Developmet Cooperatio Report (2010), Report by Eckhard Deutscher, Chair of the Developmet Assistace Committee; UNDP (2008), Primer o Corruptio ad Developmet, New York, USA. 6 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

9 itroductio I some circumstaces, developmet assistace ca eve icrease corruptio, creatig ew opportuities for ret-seekig activity ad udermiig social orms. 8 As corruptio disproportioately affects margialized ad vulerable populatios i developig coutries, such as wome ad idigeous peoples, corruptio i climate chage mitigatio ad adaptatio activities could have severe cosequeces. For example, where the issue of logterm fiace remais uresolved, corruptio could reduce door cofidece ad thus seriously udermie the provisio of log term, stable fudig for the coutries that are most vulerable to climate chage. This paper focuses o corruptio risks, ad how to address them, i both adaptatio ad REDD+. Adaptatio to the adverse effects of climate chage is a issue for all coutries, ad all Parties to the UNFCCC have committed to udertake adaptatio activities. However, the issue is particularly importat for developig coutries i view of their vulerability, limited capacity to adapt ad lesser historical resposibility for the causes of climate chage. This paper also focuses o a elemet of mitigatio which is of particular importace to may developig coutries: reducig emissios from deforestatio ad forest degradatio i developig coutries (REDD+) 9. REDD+, which is to be fuded by developed coutry Parties (ad, potetially, through the market), represets a potetial source of ew reveue for a umber of developig coutries. The purpose of REDD+ is to establish a large-scale system of fiacial icetives to ecourage forest-rich developig coutries to reduce their levels of deforestatio ad forest degradatio, ad to icrease their carbo stocks. However, while REDD+ has the potetial to mitigate emissios, to assist with adaptatio, 10 improve livelihoods ad provide sigificat biodiversity cobeefits, ay future REDD+ mechaism is also proe to corruptio risks. The purpose of this paper is: to idetify major corruptio risks i the areas of adaptatio ad REDD+ ad to make recommedatios, icludig to UNDP, to assist developig coutry Parties to idetify actios to miimize these risks. The paper will cosider corruptio risks i both the public ad private sectors. 8 While there are may examples where aid has worked effectively to reduce corruptio, some studies suggest that aid as a type of widfall ca i some cases prop up corrupt leadership, create ew opportuities for ret-seekig activity ad subvert domestic accoutability. Ideed this is a particular risk for REDD. The delivery of aid ca also icrease vulerabilities to corruptio. Parallel systems ad structural coditios such as privatisatio ad dowsizig ca reduce oversight ad delivery capacity withi govermet; door behaviour ad privileges such as tax exemptios i recipiet coutries ca udermie social orms ad work agaist compliace. 9 The term REDD+ is defied i sectio below. 10 For example, deforestatio has bee idetified as oe the mai factors exacerbatig the impact of the recet floods i Pakista, with extesive deforestatio siltig up the waterways, leavig Pakista more vulerable to storms: Groewold, N. Climate Chage, Deforestatio ad Corruptio Combie to Drow a Regio, The New York Times, 13 October, 2010, at cwire/2010/10/13/13climatewire-climate-chage-deforestatio-ad-corruptio html. For a discussio of potetial syergies betwee REDD, mitigatio ad adaptatio, see vo Scheliha, S., Hecht, B., ad Christopherse, T., (2009), Biodiversity ad Livelihoods: REDD Beefits, Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Techische Zusammearbeit (GTZ) ad CBD. Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 7

10 itroductio 1.2 Defiig corruptio UNDP defies corruptio as the misuse of etrusted power for private gai. 11 This recogises that corruptio ca take place i both the public ad private sectors, ad may ivolve corrupt iteractio betwee the two. This defiitio is also sufficietly broad to iclude corruptio withi ad by o-govermetal actors. The most commo forms of corruptio which are referred to i this paper are defied i Box 1. Box 1: Forms of corruptio 12 Bribery refers to the act of offerig someoe moey, services or other iducemets to persuade him or her to do somethig i retur. Bribes ca also be referred to as kickbacks, hush moey, or protectio moey. Croyism ad clietelism refer to the favourable treatmet of frieds ad associates i the distributio of resources ad positios, regardless of their objective qualificatio. Embezzlemet is the misappropriatio of property or fuds legally etrusted to someoe i their formal positio as a aget or guardia. Extortio is the ulawful demad or receipt of property, moey or sesitive iformatio to iduce cooperatio through the use of force or threat. Fraud refers to a itetioal misrepresetatio which is doe to obtai a ufair advatage by givig or receivig false or misleadig iformatio. Grad corruptio ivolves bribery or the embezzlemet of huge sums of moey by those at the highest levels of govermet. Nepotism is a form of favouritism that ivolves family relatioships. Its most usual form is whe a perso exploits his or her power ad authority to procure jobs or other favours for relatives. Patroage refers to the support or sposorship by a patro (a wealthy or ifluetial guardia), e.g. to make appoitmets to govermet jobs, or to distribute cotracts for work. Petty corruptio, also called bureaucratic corruptio, ivolves low level cotacts betwee citizes, busiesses ad officials ad geerally takes place where public policies are beig implemeted. It is commo i service delivery, such as i health care, where people use public services. 11 UNDP (December 2008) Corruptio ad Developmet: Ati-corruptio Itervetios for Poverty Reductio, Realizatio of the MDGs ad Promotig Sustaiable Developmet, Primer o Corruptio ad Developmet, New York, USA, at p 7. Prior to 2008, UNDP defied corruptio as the misuse of public power, office or authority for private beefit through bribery, extortio, ifluece peddlig, epotism, fraud, speed moey or embezzlemet. This was similar to the World Bak s defiitio of corruptio as the abuse of public office for private gai (World Bak, 1997: 8), with both defiitios placig the public sector at the cetre of the problem. Sice 2008, UNDP has viewed corruptio more broadly. 12 Source: UNDP (December 2008) Corruptio ad Developmet: Ati-corruptio Itervetios for Poverty Reductio, Realizatio of the MDGs ad Promotig Sustaiable Developmet, Primer o Corruptio ad Developmet, New York, USA, atpp. 7-9; except State capture, which is defied i UNDP (2008) Tacklig Corruptio, Trasformig Lives, p Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

11 itroductio Box 1: Forms of corruptio (cotiued) Political corruptio is the misuse of political power for private gai for preservig or stregtheig power, for persoal erichmet, or both. State capture is where the state is held captive to the actios of idividuals, groups, or firms who ifluece the formatio of laws, rules ad regulatios to serve their ow private iterests. This is a way of legalisig corruptio. Additioally, a umber of distictios ca assist i uderstadig corruptio: desig versus implemetatio risks, grad versus petty corruptio risks, ad supply versus demad side corruptio risks. As the actors ad activities ivolved i adaptatio ad REDD+ shift, the forms of corruptio that are more likely to occur will also chage. I the preset plaig phase, with egotiatios progressig uder the UNFCCC, ad with atioal govermets developig policies ad legislatio for adaptatio plaig, reewable eergy, REDD+ ad other activities, ad local ad regioal istitutios also developig legal ad policy frameworks, there is potetial for grad corruptio, political corruptio ad state capture. As adaptatio ad REDD+ move ito implemetatio, the opportuities for corruptio ad the actors ivolved will shift, so that petty corruptio may become icreasigly sigificat. These phases are ot etirely separate, as laws, policies ad istitutios are cotiually refied ad developed. While the distictio betwee grad ad petty corruptio is perhaps over used, it is importat to ote that both are serious cocers. Grad corruptio, which is particularly prevalet durig times of high spedig, has the potetial to affect the desig ad implemetatio of laws ad policies ad thus to affect large umbers of people. Petty corruptio, which ofte thrives durig periods of ecoomic difficulty whe goods ad services are i short supply, is smaller i scale but ofte has a more direct impact o the poor, who are ofte least able to refuse yet also least able to pay small bribes. 13 The supply ad demad side distictio is useful i highlightig that corruptio rarely ivolves just oe actor, 14 but it is importat to ote that power relatios ca vary cosiderably. While may aticorruptio measures have focused o the demad side by stregtheig oversight i the public sector, the balace of power may ot ecessarily be o the side of the corrupt official who may fid it difficult to deflect pressure from corrupt actors, particularly where state capture is prevalet. 15 This may also be the case with REDD+, where there may be a sigificat power imbalace betwee powerful iteratioal timber compaies ad multiatioal corporatios ad mid to low-level public officials. 13 UNODC 2004, UNDP 2008 Tacklig Corruptio, Trasformig Lives. 14 Supply side risks geerally ivolve corrupt activity o the part of the user or purchaser of services, ad may ivolve offerig bribes to obtai approvals outside the legal framework. Demad side risks ivolve corruptio by the perso vested with the relevat power, such as a public sector official who solicits bribes ad may egage i abuse of discretio, favouritism ad epotism i the chaellig of fuds. For each corrupt activity o the supply side, it is typically possible to idetify corrupt activities o the demad side abuse of discretio by officials teds to be liked to bribery from users or purchasers of services. 15 UNDP 2008 Tacklig Corruptio, Trasformig Lives, p18. Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 9

12 itroductio I cosiderig supply ad demad side risks, it is also importat to ote that corruptio is ot limited to the developig coutries that will beefit from climate fiace. While corruptio is geerally discussed as betwee govermets i developig coutries o the demad side ad cotractors udertakig govermet projects or citizes usig govermet services o the supply side, atioal ad iteratioal doors, cotractors, cosultats, corporatios ad o-govermetal orgaizatios (NGOs) ca also egage i corruptio. It is also importat to distiguish corruptio from lack of capacity ad mismaagemet. Lack of capacity ca ofte lead to corruptio (e.g. a lack of resources for moitorig creates opportuities for corruptio to go uchecked), but is itself separate. Similarly, some activities that result i poor evirometal or ecoomic outcomes may result from poorly-desiged legal systems rather tha from corruptio (e.g. usustaiable but legal loggig caused by perverse icetives). 1.3 Iteratioal orms ad stadards The pricipal iteratioal istrumet cocerig corruptio is the 2003 Uited Natios Covetio Agaist Corruptio (UNCAC), which etered ito force o 14 December 2005 ad is widely ratified. 16 It focuses o four pillars: prevetio, crimializatio of corruptio, iteratioal cooperatio ad asset recovery. There are also two relevat regioal treaties o ati-corruptio: the 1996 Iter- America Covetio Agaist Corruptio ad the 2003 Africa Uio Covetio o Prevetig ad Combatig Corruptio ( Africa Covetio o Corruptio Prevetio ). 17 UNCAC ad these two regioal covetios provide a comprehesive goverace structure to curb corruptio ad ca therefore provide a importat framework for the desig ad implemetatio of ati-corruptio measures i adaptatio activities ad atioal REDD+ frameworks. 18 Aex A cotais a list of REDD+ coutries showig which coutries have ratified each of these ati-corruptio covetios. The 1997 OECD Covetio o Combatig Bribery of Foreig Public Officials i Iteratioal Busiess Trasactios ( OECD Ati-Bribery Covetio ) also provides a framework for curbig corruptio i adaptatio ad REDD+. This Covetio requires sigatory states to make it a crimial offece uder their domestic law for ay perso coductig iteratioal busiess to bribe, or attempt to bribe, a foreig public official i order to obtai busiess. 19 Importatly, this is the oly covetio that focuses o cotrollig the supply side (or active side) of bribery. I the cotext of adaptatio ad REDD+, it would provide a basis for prosecutig idividuals or compaies from developed coutries who seek to pay bribes to public officials i developig coutries i order to secure cotracts or REDD+ reveues. 16 As at 22 October 2010, UNCAC had 140 sigatories ad 148 Parties. 17 The 1996 Iter-America Covetio Agaist Corruptio came ito force o 6 March 1997, ad has bee ratified by 34 coutries. The 2003 Africa Covetio o Corruptio Prevetio etered ito force o 5 August Of the 53 coutries i Africa, 45 are sigatories to the Covetio, but oly 31 coutries have ratified it (as at 5 October 2010). The EU also has a treaty dealig with corruptio, amely, the Covetio of the Europea Uio o the Fight agaist Corruptio ivolvig Officials of the Europea Commuities or officials of Member States. However the EU Covetio has limited applicatio as it oly deals with coduct o the part of officials of the Europea Commuity ad its Member States. 18 I relatio to REDD+, of the 46 coutries presetly participatig i the UN-REDD Programme ad/or Forest Carbo Partership Facility, oly ie have ot yet ratified UNCAC (see Aex A) 19 This Covetio came ito force o 15 February 1999, ad has 38 sigatory coutries, icludig 33 OECD members plus Argetia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Estoia ad South Africa. 10 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

13 itroductio 1.4 Ati-corruptio ad UNDP s madate As the UN s developmet agecy, UNDP s madate is to reduce poverty, meet the Milleium Developmet Goals ad promote sustaiable developmet. UNDP s work o eviromet i geeral ad climate chage i particular cuts across this madate. Similarly, sice the advet of UNCAC ad the regioal ati-corruptio istrumets of the mid-1990s, UNDP has worked to support member coutries to implemet these emergig iteratioal aticorruptio stadards ad thus promote developmet effectiveess. UNDP s ati-corruptio work focuses o assistig member coutries to establish the prevetative measures set out i UNCAC. This icludes providig ati-corruptio policy ad programme advisory services, stregtheig the watchdog role of the media ad civil society, ad producig kowledge products o ati-corruptio, such as the UNDP Primer o Corruptio ad Developmet. 20 UNDP works with its Coutry Offices to provide techical assistace to develop laws ad strategies to prevet corruptio, to establish ad stregthe atioal istitutios icludig ati-corruptio istitutios, ad to desig ad implemet appropriate ati-corruptio itervetios. 21 I additio to specific programs such as UNDP s Global Thematic Programme o Ati-Corruptio for Developmet Effectiveess (PACDE) 22, a key elemet of UNDP s ati-corruptio work is maistreamig ati-corruptio iitiatives ito its existig work streams, such as climate chage, poverty reductio, post coflict recovery, MDGs acceleratio etc. 20 UNDP (December 2008) Corruptio ad Developmet: Ati-corruptio Itervetios for Poverty Reductio, Realizatio of the MDGs ad Promotig Sustaiable Developmet, Primer o Corruptio ad Developmet, New York, USA. 21 UNDP (December 2008) Maistreamig Ati-Corruptio i Developmet: Ati-corruptio practice ote, at publicatios/fiaces/aticor/undp-ac-guidace-note-08e.pdf 22 UNDP (2008), Thematic Programme o Ati-Corruptio for Developmet Effectiveess (PACDE), Project Documet Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 11

14 2 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i adaptatio activities 2.1 Backgroud Adaptatio The urget eed for adaptatio to the adverse effects of climate chage was highlighted by the Itergovermetal Pael o Climate Chage (IPCC) i 2007 ad has sice bee reiforced by further studies. 23 Climate chage will seriously costrai the ability of developig coutries to attai the MDGs, with IPCC projectios idicatig that billios of people will face food ad water shortages, icreased exposure to diseases, losses of homes, assets ad livelihoods, ad forced migratio. 24 These impacts will be felt most by coutries ad commuities that are already vulerable, particularly wome ad childre i developig coutries. 25 The impacts of climate chage are already apparet, ad adaptatio is vital to reduce their social, ecoomic ad evirometal cosequeces ad to build resiliece. Support for adaptatio i developig coutries has bee limited to date, ad there is a urget eed to move beyod plaig ad iformatio-sharig ito cocrete adaptatio activities o the groud, icludig techological (e.g. reiforcig or relocatig ifrastructure i areas vulerable to extreme weather evets), behavioural (e.g. water coservatio), maagerial (e.g. chagig to drought ad/or salttolerat crop varieties) ad policy activities (e.g. itroducig plaig cotrols i areas vulerable to sea level rise). 26 The scale ad diversity of activities ivolved i adaptatio meas that associated corruptio risks are large ad varied. The urgecy of adaptatio makes it critical to idetify ad take actio to reduce these risks: corruptio has the potetial to seriously udermie adaptatio efforts, with dire cosequeces for the most vulerable coutries ad commuities. Corruptio could divert limited resources away from iteded beeficiaries, reducig the speed, scale ad effectiveess of adaptatio. Corruptio could also result i maladaptive activities, which may deliver short-term beefits but exacerbate vulerability i the medium to log term. 27 Corruptio i the use of fast start adaptatio fiace could also work agaist efforts to secure stable, ogoig sources of fudig for adaptatio i the medium ad log term, with serious cosequeces for may vulerable populatios Fiacig adaptatio Estimates of the costs for developig coutries to adapt climate chage rage from US$ 30 to US$ 100 billio i ew ad additioal fiace each year up to The fuds available, however, fall 23 See, e.g., NOAA (2010) State of the Climate 2009, NOAA, which idicates rates of sea level rise 50 percet greater tha uder the IPCC s worst case sceario. 24 IPCC WHO (2009) Geder, Climate Chage ad Health, WHO Draft Discussio Paper geder_climate_chage/e/idex.html 26 UNFCCC (2007) Climate Chage: Impacts, Vulerabilities ad Adaptatio i Developig Coutries, Bo, Germay (hard copy versio dated 2008), 27 OECD World Bak ad Iteratioal Bak for Recostructio ad Developmet (2010) World Developmet Report 2010, WB ad IBRD, The costs will be eve greater if mitigatio does ot keep temperature rises below 2 degrees. 12 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

15 2 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i adaptatio activities far short of this. 29 The shortfall betwee the scale of fuds required for adaptatio ad the amout available makes it vital that fuds are spet effectively ad corruptio risks are reduced. Uder the UNFCCC, developed coutry Parties committed to provide support to assist particularly vulerable developig coutries to meet the costs of adaptatio (Art 4.4). Oe of the major achievemets i this respect is the Least Developed Coutries (LDC) work programme, fiaced through the GEF-maaged LDC Fud. This Fud has eabled LDCs to prepare plas for immediate adaptatio eeds ad i most cases to commece implemetatio of priority climate chage risk maagemet measures, as well as measures that stregthe atioal ad local capacities to maage coutries. the ucertaities of climate chage i the log ru. 30 Curretly, UNDP aloe is supportig more tha 30 of the 49 LDCs with fiace for adaptatio through multiple sources, icludig the LDC Fud. 31 However, additioal fiacig is required for developig coutries, particularly small islad developig States (SIDS) ad lower icome o-ldcs. I 2007 the Parties to the UNFCCC agreed to work together to ehace actio o the provisio of fiacial resources ad ivestmet for adaptatio, with the aim of cocludig a ew agreemet i However, cosiderable divergece remais o issues icludig goverace, access arragemets ad the scale of fuds. 33 I view of the slow pace of UNFCCC egotiatios, ad the urget eed to udertake adaptatio activities, discussios are icreasigly focusig o fast-start fiace for adaptatio betwee ad o sources outside the UNFCCC. The mai sources of fudig for adaptatio are: The impact of climate chage will be felt most by coutries ad commuities that are already vulerable, particularly wome ad childre i developig UNFCCC fuds (fudig through the fiacial mechaism of the Covetio: GEF Trust Fud, LDC Fud, Special Climate Chage Fud) ad the Kyoto Protocol Adaptatio Fud, Multi-lateral sources (e.g. the World Bak s Pilot Programme for Climate Resiliece, the Europea Commissio s Global Climate Chage Alliace Fud, UNDP s MDG Achievemet Fud Eviromet ad Climate Chage thematic widow), Bi-lateral sources (e.g. UK Evirometal Trasformatio Fud, Australia Adaptatio to Climate Chage Iitiative, Germa Iteratioal Climate Iitiative, Japaese Iitiative), ad 29 The Copehage Accord icluded a pledge by developed coutries to provide fudig approachig $US30 billio betwee , but this was to be balaced betwee adaptatio ad mitigatio. To date, the vast majority has goe to mitigatio, ad there have bee some difficulties i idetifyig which fuds are ew ad additioal to ODA The UNFCCC Least Developed Coutries work programme is discussed i sectio UNDP is curretly supportig LDCs to access fiace through the LDC Fud, Special Climate Chage Fud, Adaptatio Fud as well as bilateral sources icludig from the Govermets of Demark (through the UNEP-UNDP CCDARE programme) as well as the Govermet of Japa (through the Africa Adaptatio Programme). 32 Decisio 1/CP.13 (Bali Actio Pla). 33 See curret LCA text, Chapter 2. Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 13

16 2 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i adaptatio activities Private sector sources (private equity fuds, foudatios ad NGOs). The curret climate fiace structures at the iteratioal ad atioal level are hampered by the proliferatio of fudig arragemets, supply drive fudig priorities, weak atioal structures ad capacities, ad low levels of ivestmet i capacity developmet. Addressig these problems will require, amog other elemets, actio to stregthe oversight systems i recipiet coutries. However, the effective oversight of climate chage fiacig will also require ivestmet i specific climate chage capacities ad accoutability structures at the iteratioal, atioal ad local level. Furthermore, the umber of sources for adaptatio fiace is likely to icrease. I December 2009, developed coutry Parties aouced plas to create a Copehage Gree Climate Fud with $30 millio to be spet aually o adaptatio, mitigatio ad other activities i developig coutries betwee 2010 ad Further, i February 2010 the UN Secretary Geeral established a High- Level Advisory Group o Climate Chage Fiacig (AGF) to ivestigate how to scale-up log-term fiacig for adaptatio (ad mitigatio) i developig coutries from public ad private sources Key issues: corruptio i adaptatio This sectio provides a overview of the key corruptio risks associated with the plaig ad implemetatio of adaptatio activities at the coutry level. May of the issues for adaptatio are similar to those experieced i the provisio of developmet assistace. Fragmetatio of fuds ad the pressure to disburse fuds quickly have reduced the effectiveess of aid projects ad icreased their vulerability to corruptio, ad could potetially create similar risks for adaptatio. While may of the lessos from aid effectiveess will be relevat for adaptatio, the particular ature of climate chage may require some variatio i approach. Fragmetatio is a cocer i adaptatio. I additio to the icreasig umber of fudig sources, there is cosiderable diversity ad overlap i the ature, purposes ad goverace of climate fuds. Some provide fudig oly for adaptatio; others also provide for mitigatio ad i may cases provide a greater share to mitigatio over adaptatio. 34 Some provide loas or a combiatio of grats ad loas, some provide techical assistace as well as fudig, ad some are targeted to particular coutries, regios or types of projects. 35 There is also cosiderable divergece i the goverace of fuds: some provide detailed operatioal iformatio ad opportuities for participatio by beeficiaries of adaptatio fudig ad by civil society; others are less trasparet. 36 Some fuds work to coordiate their efforts, while others operate quite idepedetly For example, the UNFCCC LDC Fud ad Special Climate Chage Fud, the Kyoto Protocol Adaptatio Fud, the World Bak s Pilot Programme for Climate Resiliece ad Australia s Adaptatio to Climate Chage Iitiative are all dedicated adaptatio fuds. I cotrast, the Japaese Iitiative provides fudig for both adaptatio ad mitigatio, with the vast majority iteded to go toward mitigatio. 35 For example, Brazil s Fudo Amazôia ad the Africa Developmet Bak s Cogo Basi Forest Fud provide fudig exclusively to forestry projects i particular regios. 36 The Kyoto Protocol Adaptatio Fud is widely recogised for its high level of trasparecy, icludig the majority of developig coutry members o its goverig Board (AFB), as well as provisios for direct access ad provisio for civil society observers at AFB meetigs. 37 For example, there is coordiatio betwee the fuds admiistered by the GEF (the SCCF, LDCF ad GEF Strategic Priority o Adaptatio Trust Fud), while bi-lateral ad private sector fuds ted to be maaged more idepedetly. 14 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

17 2 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i adaptatio activities Fragmetatio betwee adaptatio ad other developmet activities is also a issue, sice may adaptatio projects ad programme are likely to occur i tadem with developmet projects. Separate reportig, ad the lack of basis for comparig which risks ad costs are attributable to climate chage above a pre-existig developmet baselie, could add to the potetial risks of corruptio i adaptatio. Further, discussios i the AGF ad other fora have focused o scalig up ew resources, with limited attetio to esurig that existig resources are ot lost to corruptio. Icreasig local accoutability will be importat both to maximise the effectiveess of ew climate fuds ad to haress domestic resources by reducig illicit outflows of resources ad icreasig reveue collectio. Imperatives to disburse fuds quickly are also a cocer i adaptatio. Icreasigly alarmig scietific projectios, coupled with slow progress i egotiatios for ew commitmets uder the UNFCCC ad Kyoto Protocol, create cosiderable pressure for govermets, multi-lateral ad other istitutios to demostrate that actio o climate chage is beig take. Pressure to disburse fuds ad/or to produce stories of successful implemetatio could reduce the level of oversight, creatig opportuities for corruptio. Efforts to improve aid effectiveess, particularly the 2005 Paris Declaratio o Aid Effectiveess ad the 2008 Accra Ageda for Actio, offer several strategies that may help to reduce the risks of corruptio i adaptatio. For example, the use of sector-wide approaches, cosolidatio of fuds ad/or decisio-makig, stregtheig coutry systems ad ehacig the accoutability of both doors ad parter coutries may be helpful to reduce the risks of corruptio ad ehace the effectiveess of adaptatio. However, it is importat to recogise the differeces betwee climate fiace particularly for adaptatio ad developmet assistace. Developig coutries are arguig strogly i the UNFCCC process that the historical resposibility of developed coutries for climate chage must be reflected i structures ad systems that are ulike those typical of aid ad developmet. While the imperative to reduce corruptio i adaptatio is o less tha i developmet assistace, the strategies that will be appropriate to reduce opportuities for corruptio i adaptatio must reflect these differeces. The followig sectios outlie corruptio risks i the plaig ad implemetatio of adaptatio activities at the coutry level, ad provide suggestios as to how these may be reduced. 2.2 Plaig ad settig priorities for adaptatio Assessig the impacts of ad vulerability to climate chage, ad subsequetly idetifyig strategies ad priorities for adaptatio actios, will be critical to reduce the social, ecoomic ad evirometal impacts of climate chage i developig coutries. To this ed, all Parties to the UNFCCC committed to prepare, publish, implemet ad update programmes for adaptatio (Art 4.1(b)). The UNFCCC LDC Work Programme provides techical ad fiacial support for LDCs to idetify priority activities that respod to their urget ad immediate adaptatio eeds i Natioal Adaptatio Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 15

18 2 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i adaptatio activities Programmes of Actio (NAPAs). 38 NAPAs focus o urget ad immediate eeds, ad are iteded to build upo existig copig strategies rather tha workig from sceario-based modellig. The process for preparig a NAPA icludes: sythesis of available iformatio; participatory assessmet of vulerability to curret climate variability ad extreme evets ad of areas where risks would icrease due to climate chage; idetificatio of key adaptatio measures as well as criteria for prioritizig activities; selectio of a prioritized short list of activities; ad short profiles of projects ad/or activities iteded to address urget ad immediate adaptatio eeds of LDCs. LDCs submit completed NAPAs to the UNFCCC secretariat, where they are published olie, ad the LDC ca the apply to the GEF for implemetatio support uder the LDC Fud. The process for o-ldc developig coutry Parties to pla for adaptatio is less clear. Vulerability ad adaptatio assessmets are icluded i the Natioal Commuicatios that Parties submit to the UNFCCC, but these vary cosiderably i both frequecy ad cotet. 39 Lack of capacity, particularly related to data collectio ad techical expertise, has bee idetified as a key problem for developig coutries udertakig adaptatio plaig. 40 While some iformatio has bee geerated through workshops, tools ad reports uder the Nairobi work programme, its limited reach ad accessibility have bee criticised by developig coutries. 41 Similarly, the support for vulerability ad adaptatio assessmets as part of atioal commuicatios uder the GEF Trust Fud is isufficiet to meet the eeds of developig coutries. 42 The issue of icreasig fiacial support to pla for adaptatio ad, particularly, to achieve adaptatio actio o the groud is a major focus of curret UNFCCC egotiatios. Corruptio could exacerbate the problems caused by capacity limitatios i developig coutries. May adaptatio projects ad programmes will have particular beefits for certai groups. For example, restoratio of magroves will be particularly beeficial for adjacet coastal ladowers ad users of ishore fisheries; developmet of water, eergy ad ifrastructure will have particular beefits 38 The special eeds of LDCs are recogized i Art 4.9 of the Covetio. LDCs are idetified based o three criteria: low icome, weak huma assets ad high ecoomic vulerability. The UN recogizes 49 LDCs, comprisig 33 i Africa, te i Asia, oe i the Caribbea ad five i the Pacific. UNFCCC (2009) Least Developed Coutries uder the UNFCCC, Bo, Germay, ufccc.it/resource/ docs/publicatios/ldc_brochure2009.pdf 39 May developig coutries have submitted oly oe Natioal Commuicatio, which may be over te years old, ad a few have ot submitted ay. UNFCCC (2009) Iformatio o fiacial support provided by the Global Eviromet Facility for the preparatio of atioal commuicatios from Parties ot icluded i Aex I to the Covetio, FCCC/SBI/2009/INF.5 40 UNFCCC (2007) Climate Chage: Impacts, Vulerabilities ad Adaptatio i Developig Coutries, Bo, Germay (hard copy versio dated 2008) p UNFCCC (2010) Views ad iformatio o the effectiveess of the Nairobi work programme o impacts, vulerability ad adaptatio to climate chage i fulfillig its objective, expected outcome, scope of work ad modalities, FCCC/SBSTA/2010/Misc.8 September 21, The GEF has provided $120 millio for Natioal Commuicatios, but much of this has bee spet o areas other tha adaptatio. GEF (2009) Fiacig Adaptatio Actio, p Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

19 2 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i adaptatio activities for compaies ivolved i costructio; distributio of drugs to address the spread of diseases will have particular beefits for certai pharmaceutical compaies. Corruptio could exacerbate the problems caused by capacity limitatios i developig coutries. Corruptio i the process of plaig ad settig priorities for adaptatio may ivolve high level actors, such as political elites, govermet departmets (particularly those resposible for lad use plaig, ifrastructure, health ad atural resource maagemet), powerful atioal ad iteratioal compaies (e.g. major idustries, utilities ad project developers), ladowers ad the military. The followig sectio outlies key corruptio risks for the plaig ad prioritisatio of adaptatio activities Cosultatio with stakeholders The ways i which stakeholders are able to participate i the process of plaig for adaptatio will have a sigificat impact o the outcomes of adaptatio. Corrupt practices i stakeholder cosultatio could iclude: State capture ad abuse of discretio, e.g. vested iterests receivig more iformatio ad access to decisio-makers, ad Bribery, solicitatio, epotism ad clietelism, e.g. officials receivig cash or iappropriate hospitality i exchage for iformatio, access to decisio-makers ad promises of favourable decisios. Egagig a wide rage of stakeholders from all levels of govermet, civil society, wome, idigeous peoples, busiess, trade uios ad other groups will therefore be importat to maximise the effectiveess of adaptatio plas ad their subsequet implemetatio. As corruptio ca occur whe certai groups are able to exercise udue, ufair ifluece, esurig that balaced cosideratio is give to the views of all stakeholders will be critical Idetificatio ad prioritisatio of adaptatio plas The shortfall betwee adaptatio eeds ad the fudig available meas that may importat adaptatio programmes ad projects will have to be delayed. The process of determiig which programmes ad projects to give priority to will thus be crucial to the effectiveess of adaptatio. This is further complicated by the potetial for adaptatio plas to propose solutios to problems that are ot due to climate chage (but rather evirometal mismaagemet or corruptio) ad to propose maladaptive projects ad programmes, which may have short-term beefits but icrease vulerability i the medium to log term, or idirect costs that outweigh their direct beefits For example, a sea wall may protect a particular property i the short term, but icrease erosio i other areas. I the medium to log term the sea wall may ot be sufficiet to protect eve that property, leadig to a waste of resources. Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 17

20 2 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i adaptatio activities Corruptio could reduce the effectiveess of adaptatio plaig by causig coutries to select ad/or prioritise iappropriate programmes ad projects for adaptatio. This could the have flow o cosequeces for fudig ad project implemetatio, with potetially severe impacts o vulerable groups. Corrupt practices i the idetificatio ad prioritisatio of adaptatio activities could iclude: Bribery, solicitatio, epotism ad clietelism, e.g. officials receivig cash or iappropriate hospitality i exchage for plas favourig iterest groups rather tha areas of greatest adaptatio eed, such as ladowers seekig priority for particular properties or regios, Abuse of discretio to facilitate ret-seekig i the implemetatio of fuds, e.g. a preferece for ifrastructure projects with greater opportuities for bribery tha approaches such as ecosystem-based adaptatio, ad Fraud ad collusio by groups seekig favourable treatmet, e.g. provisio of iaccurate iformatio by idustry groups i order to secure the adoptio of particular techologies or methods. This could also iclude activities which are ot ecessarily corrupt but ca weake goverace, such as the formatio ad fudig of astro turf orgaizatios, scietists tasked with producig material to support particular views ad jouro-lobbyig. 44 The lack of capacity i developig coutries to udertake adaptatio plaig ad, more broadly, the lack of oversight by judicial, admiistrative ad civil society orgaisatios are key cotributors to these risks. This is exacerbated by iformatioal asymmetries ad the ovel, complex ature of climate chage sciece (idustry groups ad cosultats may have a greater uderstadig of adaptatio eeds ad respose optios tha officials). Corruptio risks may also icrease due to existig problems of state capture, as well as the low salaries typically paid to officials, particularly i compariso to the potetial profits (ad/or losses) for ladowers, costructio compaies ad other stakeholders as certai adaptatio optios are prioritised over others Recommedatios to reduce corruptio risks i adaptatio plaig There is much that ca be doe to reduce risks of corruptio i adaptatio plaig. May actios are already beig take by UNDP ad other iteratioal, atioal ad regioal orgaisatios to build capacity, ehace trasparecy ad stregthe oversight of adaptatio plaig. Buildig o these, the potetial for corruptio to reduce the effectiveess of adaptatio plaig for vulerable coutries ad commuities ca be cosiderably reduced. Ehacig the capacity of officials ad the trasparecy of plaig processes will be critical to reduce the risks of corruptio i the process of plaig ad settig priorities for adaptatio at the coutry level. I particular, capacity-stregtheig for officials tasked with adaptatio plaig ca be coupled with adequate techical ad fiacial support for short, medium ad log term adaptatio plaig i LDCs ad all developig coutries. UNCAC provides a valuable framework to guide ati-corruptio measures i adaptatio plaig, as outlied i Aex C. 44 Trasparecy Iteratioal (2009) Cotrollig Corporate Lobbyig ad Fiacig of Political Activities TI Policy Positio #06/2009, p Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

21 2 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i adaptatio activities Establishig a trasparet system for the desig ad developmet of adaptatio plas, icludig clear policies ad procedures at all levels of govermet, will be importat prior to commecig adaptatio plaig. Corruptio assessmets developed ad udertake i partership with local stakeholders should be used to idetify potetial corruptio risks ad to develop coutry-specific strategies to reduce these as part of the process of settig up adaptatio plaig systems. Securig buy-i from the public at the start of the process could also help to reduce corruptio risks. Much ca be doe to reduce risks of corruptio i adaptatio plaig, buildig o the work of UNDP ad others to ehace the capacity of officials ad the trasparecy of plaig processes. Udertakig regular ad wide stakeholder cosultatio throughout the process will be critical to reduce corruptio risks. Govermet iformatio must be published, makig use of broadcast ad prit media, local iformatio boards ad commuity meetigs as well as olie systems, ad iformatio-sharig amog stakeholders ad civil society should be ecouraged. Close scrutiy ad assessmet through robust multistakeholder processes should be ecouraged to reduce opportuities for corruptio i adaptatio plaig. Multi-stakeholder processes will also be importat to idetify ad address istaces where corruptio has iflueced adaptatio plaig. For example, review committees comprisig relevat experts ad civil society could be established to verify activities proposed i NAPAs ad adaptatio plas. Stregtheig mechaisms for idepedet oversight, admiistrative ad judicial review, as well as mechaisms to address political corruptio more geerally (such as lobbyig registries, rules o disclosure ad campaig fiacig, coolig off periods, codes of coduct, freedom of iformatio ad whistleblower legislatio, pealties for udue ifluece) will also be importat. Box 2: Supportig adaptatio plaig UNDP has bee providig assistace to over 100 coutries i preparig atioal climate chage vulerability assessmets ad atioal commuicatios to the UNFCCC. UNDP has bee developig aalytical resources (such as the Adaptatio Policy Framework, coutry climate risk profiles ad portfolio screeig methodologies) to support adaptatio plaig i a rage of coutries. The overall objective is to promote o regrets short- ad log-term copig strategies to reduce adverse impacts o vulerable commuities ad coutries UNDP (2008) Climate Chage at UNDP: Scalig Up to Meet the Challege, New York, UNDP Eviromet ad Eergy Group, www. udp.org/gef/documets/publicatios/cc_strategy_web.pdf p. 14. Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 19

22 2 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i adaptatio activities Box 3: Supportig grassroots participatio As part of UNDP s corporate climate chage programme, UNDP places a emphasis o assistace to coutries at the grassroots level. Activities are desiged to: Stregthe a commuity s ability to desig ad implemet climate chage adaptatio measures, Esure a multi-stakeholder process, which icludes ope discussio betwee commuity, local ad atioal levels as well as developmet agecies, Support the dissemiatio of idigeous kowledge o maagig climate-related risks, ad Apply lessos ad practices from commuity-led iitiatives to the preparatio of atioal policies Implemetig adaptatio The focus of adaptatio activities to date has bee o vulerability assessmets ad plaig. While the eed to move ito implemetatio is widely recogised, developig coutries ofte lack the resources ecessary for this. 47 There is a urget eed for developed coutries to provide support for developig coutries to scale up adaptatio efforts to esure the sustaiability of all MDG achievemets. 48 The rage of impacts, vulerabilities ad adaptatio eeds varies cosiderably betwee coutries, regios ad local commuities. Implemetig adaptatio will thus ivolve a very wide rage of activities, icludig techological, behavioural, maagerial ad policy activities. Adaptatio will eed to be udertake at the sectoral level (particularly i the agriculture ad food security, water resources, coastal zoes ad marie ecosystems, terrestrial ecosystems, huma health ad huma settlemets sectors) ad across sectors. Adaptatio must also be itegrated with broader sustaiable developmet plas ad priorities. Esurig that corruptio risks are miimised will be critical to the effectiveess of adaptatio implemetatio. Corruptio risks will vary across sectors; for example, the chaos ad pressure to respod quickly to atural disasters creates particular opportuities for corruptio. 49 Sectors that are highly techical, such as water ad health, are particularly vulerable. The eed for specialised egieerig ad medical kowledge i those sectors make it difficult for those outside 46 UNDP (2010) Advacig Climate Chage Adaptatio i Developig Coutries: A Overview of the UNDP-GEF Portfolio, New York, UNDP Bureau for Developmet Policy, 47 UNFCCC (2010) Adaptatio Assessmet, Plaig ad Practice: A overview of the Nairobi Work Programme o Impacts, Vulerability ad Adaptatio to Climate Chage, ufccc.it/resource/docs/publicatios/10_wp_adap_assess_e.pdf, p UNDP (2010), What will it take to achieve the Milleium Developmet Goals? A iteratioal assessmet, U.S., org/go/ewsroom/2010/jue/le-pud-propose-u-programme-dactio-e-huit-poits.e, p Leeso,P.T. Sobel,R.S. (2008), Weatherig Corruptio 51 The Joural of Law ad Ecoomics 667, pp Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

23 2 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i adaptatio activities the field to moitor or participate i decisio-makig, which i tur icreases corruptio risks. 50 Corruptio risks will also vary depedig o the stage ad the ature of particular projects ad programmes. Corrupt activities i the plaig ad desig stages could ivolve high level actors, icludig all levels of govermet, local ad multiatioal corporatios, ifrastructure suppliers ad cotractors, ladowers, fiacig coutries ad istitutios ad relevat itergovermetal orgaisatios. As adaptatio programmes ad projects are implemeted o the groud, petty corruptio ivolvig smaller orgaisatios, lower-level officials ad idividuals could become more prevalet. Corruptio risks will vary across sectors: for example, the chaos ad pressure to respod quickly to atural disasters creates particular opportuities for corruptio. The followig sectios provide a overview of corruptio risks i the implemetatio of adaptatio activities, focusig o activities that will be udertake i may sectors ad drawig o lessos from corruptio i some key sectors Project ad regulatory desig Most adaptatio programmes ad projects will require cosiderable plaig ad developmet i additio to the plaig udertake at the NAPA/high level. Issues icludig the level of fiacial ad other resources available, the specific locatio ad beeficiaries of projects, appoitmet of staff ad establishmet of maagemet structures, selectio of techologies ad procuremet will eed to be resolved before adaptatio projects ca be implemeted successfully. Corruptio could potetially impact all aspects of project ad programme desig, ad could reduce the capacity of vulerable commuities to adapt to climate chage. Corruptio i project desig could ehace existig iequalities, icreasig the vulerability of wome, idigeous peoples ad other margialised groups. Lad use decisios that favour certai corporate ad persoal iterests, for example, could result i the displacemet of local commuities or reduced access to food, water ad other essetials. Weak eforcemet of evirometal impact assessmet ad other regulatios could lead to maladaptive projects ad adverse evirometal impacts. Corrupt practices i the desig of projects, programmes ad regulatory frameworks could iclude: Nepotism, clietelism ad croyism, e.g. givig preferece to adaptatio activities i areas where decisio-makers ad their families live, rather tha areas of greatest vulerability, 50 I the water sector, the World Bak has estimated that 20 to 40 percet of fiace is lost to corrupt practices. Jacobso, Maria & Tropp, Håka (2010) Addressig corruptio i climate chage water adaptatio 8 Rev Eviro Sci Biotechology 81, sprigerlik.com/cotet/153567m15k17074w/. I the health sector, the World Health Orgaisatio has estimated that corruptio cosumes up to 25 percet of public procuremet spedig, with impacts o patiet sufferig, health outcomes ad mortality rates. World Health Orgaisatio (2010) Medicies: Corruptio ad Pharmaceuticals, WHO Factsheet, factsheets/fs335/e/idex.html Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 21

24 2 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i adaptatio activities Bribery ad solicitatio, e.g. political patroage may be give to officials i exchage for selectio of programmes that could be udertake by particular suppliers, Weak eforcemet of evirometal impact assessmet ad other regulatory requiremets, Double-dippig ad duplicatio of fudig for idetical results that are sought by differet adaptatio programmes/projects, mitigatio or developmet projects Abuse of discretio to develop rules that will eable ret-seekig i the implemetatio of fuds, e.g. complex projects ad regulatory systems with high levels of discretio that may be used to seek kickbacks from cotractors or to sipho fuds for other purposes, ad Fraud ad collusio by idustry stakeholders, e.g. pharmaceutical compaies, equipmet maufacturers ad health providers seekig adoptio of ew drugs ad techologies Procuremet Procuremet is highly susceptible to corruptio risks, especially procuremet of large, capitalitesive ad complex projects. Eergy ad water ifrastructure projects, for example, ofte ivolve may sub-cotractors, makig procuremet difficult to stadardise ad easy to maipulate. This is exacerbated by the large umber of stakeholders, govermet agecies ad private sector orgaisatios ivolved at atioal, regioal ad local levels ad the power imbalaces betwee them. Power imbalaces are a particular cocer betwee upstream ad dowstream water users. Corruptio i procuremet ca have serious cosequeces for project ad programme outcomes icludig poor quality ad icomplete activities with reduced or, i extreme cases, maladaptive projects. Corrupt practices may occur at every stage of the procuremet process, icludig: Iadequate advertisig, short biddig times, tailorig of project requiremets to suit particular bidders to eable officials to solicit bribes for iformatio ad awards of cotracts, Collusio betwee idustry stakeholders to demad certai prices ad coditios, particularly egieerig ad costructio firms, Bribery, solicitatio, epotism, clietelism ad croyism ifluecig the awardig of cotracts, Bribery ad kickbacks i the maagemet of cotracts, for example i exchage for weak eforcemet of cotract or regulatory requiremets, ad Siphoig of project fuds for other purposes, resultig i icomplete or poor quality projects, cocealmet of substadard work, use of substadard materials, biased project supervisio ad cotract variatios. 22 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

25 2 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i adaptatio activities Appoitmet of staff ad committee members The idividuals who implemet adaptatio projects ad programmes will play a major role i determiig their effectiveess. For example, members of supervisory boards ad committees maagig resources, govermet officials collectig fees ad health professioals deliverig services will all be vested with discretio that could be used for corrupt purposes. Corruptio by implemetig officials could icrease the cost ad reduce the effectiveess of adaptatio projects ad programmes. Corrupt practices i the appoitmet of staff ad committee members could iclude: Nepotism, clietelism ad croyism, e.g. officials gratig favourable roles to their frieds, families ad busiess associates, ad Bribery ad solicitatio, e.g. sellig certai roles with high ret-seekig potetial. These could rage from high level roles, such as admiisterig fudig from doors with opportuities to sipho fuds away from adaptatio projects, to lower levels, such as trasportig food, water ad other commodities that may be diverted away from vulerable commuities Service delivery Corruptio i the provisio of essetial services such as water, food ad health services to local commuities could seriously hider achievemet of the MDGs ad sigificatly icrease adaptatio costs. With climate chage already icreasig the scarcity of essetial resources, petty corruptio i the delivery of adaptatio services ad supplies could have serious impacts for the most vulerable commuities. Corrupt practices could iclude: Bribery, extortio ad solicitatio, e.g. by officials i the water sector obtaiig extra-legal charges for ew coectios, maitaiig coectios, deliverig water supplies, givig low meter readigs, repairs of faulty ifrastructure ad processig licece applicatios, Abuse of discretio, e.g. by health professioals recommedig expesive treatmets or drugs i exchage for kickbacks from suppliers, or restrictig access to hospitals or particular procedures to obtai bribes or other beefits, Theft, fraud ad illegal o-sellig of supplies, particularly water, food ad other equipmet, e.g. by officials deliverig emergecy relief, ad Theft ad fraud by cotractors, e.g. medical suppliers providig low quality equipmet, diluted or expired medicies, trasport cotractors siphoig ad failig to deliver supplies. 51 Brucker,T. ad Etie,J. The America Eterprise Istitute (2010) The UN s World Food Program claims that allegatios of a scadal i Somalia are overblow ad isolated, 11 April, The Govermet Moitor, states/somalia-corruptio-ad-the-u-world-food-program htmlhttp:// states/somalia-corruptio-ad-the-u-world-food-program html Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 23

26 2 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i adaptatio activities Recommedatios to reduce corruptio risks i adaptatio implemetatio As coutries scale up efforts to implemet adaptatio there are a umber of steps that ca be udertake to reduce corruptio. Capacity-buildig, ehacig trasparecy ad stakeholder participatio will be crucial to the effectiveess of adaptatio projects ad programmes. Buildig o efforts by UNDP ad others to ehace capacity, trasparecy ad grassroots participatio, there is much that ca be doe to mitigate corruptio risks i the implemetatio of adaptatio ad to ehace the effectives of adaptatio programmes ad projects for vulerable coutries ad commuities. Idetificatio of existig corruptio issues i adaptatio sectors will be importat to reduce opportuities for corruptio i adaptatio. UNCAC should be used to guide ati-corruptio measures, ad additioal tools such as ati-corruptio assessmets should be developed ad applied i partership with local stakeholders. Capacity-stregtheig for officials at all levels of govermet ca reduce the risks of corruptio, particularly coupled with trasparet ad participatory decisiomakig processes, clear rules ad procedures. Ati-corruptio compacts betwee stakeholders may also be useful, particularly i sectors such as water where corruptio levels are already high. 52 Commuity co-operatives ad local maagemet committees should be cosidered wherever possible. Local commuities, NGOs ad other stakeholders should be ivolved i decisio-makig, tederig ad maagemet of adaptatio programmes ad projects. Support should be provided for the cosideratio of commuity-based solutios prior to proceedig with high capital, high techology ad egieerig solutios. Commuity co-operatives ad local maagemet committees should be cosidered wherever possible. 53 Coordiatio betwee climate fiace istitutios ad with other developmet activities should be udertake at every opportuity. Use of sector wide approaches ad the developmet of the multistakeholder climate fiace framework proposed by UNDP 54 could sigificatly reduce the risk of corruptio i adaptatio implemetatio. 52 A ati-corruptio agreemet betwee Trasparecy Iteratioal Colombia ad a Colombia associatio of water egieers was successful i addressig widespread corruptio i the water pipe idustry, leadig to a similar agreemet beig siged i Argetia. Swedish Water House (2006) Corruptio i the Water Sector: Causes, Cosequeces ad Potetial Reform, (Swedish Water House Policy Brief No. 4, SIWI) at p.9 53 The majority of Bolivia s urba water services are orgaised as cooperatives, i which customers are members ad part owers with votig rights. The Iter-America Developmet Bak has reported that two of these cooperatives have bee particularly successful i miimisig corruptio ad deliverig a reliable, high-quality water service to residets. Paul Costace (2005) Are Cooperatives a better way to solve Lati America s water problems? IDB America; Hollad, A-Christi Sjölader (2005) The Water Busiess: Corporatios versus People, Zed Books, Lodo, p Glemarec, Yaick, O. Waissbei ad H. Bayraktar (2010) Huma Developmet i a Chagig Climate: A Framework for Climate Fiace, Discussio Paper, New York, UNDP, 24 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

27 2 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i adaptatio activities Box 4: Coordiatig adaptatio ad developmet UNDP is supportig coutries to access, sequece ad combie GEF-maaged UNFCCC fuds (the LDC Fud, Special Climate Chage Fud ad GEF Strategic Priority o Adaptatio Trust Fud) with other sources of fiace icludig atioal ad bi-lateral fuds. UNDP is also desigig its climate chage iitiatives to itegrate with or complimet ogoig developmet iitiatives i lie with atioal Poverty Reductio Strategies ad/or over archig atioal ad sub-atioal developmet strategic frameworks. 55 As with adaptatio plaig, iformatio o implemetatio must be published, regularly updated ad made available i a wide rage of formats. Close scrutiy ad assessmet through robust multistakeholder processes should be ecouraged to reduce opportuities for corruptio. Stregtheig mechaisms for idepedet oversight, admiistrative ad judicial review will also be critical. Multi-stakeholder accoutability mechaisms for complaits regardig coduct by officials ad the private sector i key sectors could also help to reduce opportuities for corruptio. Box 5: Improvig goverace i the health sector The World Health Orgaisatio s Good Goverace for Medicies programme (GGM) provides a useful model for reducig corruptio risks associated with adaptatio i the health sector. Sice its itroductio i 2004, the GGM has bee expaded from four to 26 developig coutries. The GGM is implemeted i three phases: Phase I: Natioal assessmet of trasparecy ad corruptio i the pharmaceutical sector. Phase II: Natiowide cosultatio amog key stakeholders i the pharmaceutical idustry ad developmet of a atioal GGM framework. Phase III: Implemetatio of the atioal GGM framework i the pharmaceutical idustry, geeral capacity-buildig ad icreasig awareess UNDP (2010) Advacig Climate Chage Adaptatio i Developig Coutries: A Overview of the UNDP-GEF Portfolio, New York, UNDP Bureau for Developmet Policy, 56 WHO (2010) Good Goverace for Medicies, WHO, Adaptatio Learig Mechaism (2010), Itegrated Natioal Adaptatio Pla: High Moutai Ecosystems, Colombia s Caribbea Isular Areas ad Huma Health, ALM, Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 25

28 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ 3.1 Backgroud What is REDD+? Reducig emissios from the global forest sector has a importat role to play i both mitigatio ad adaptatio. Deforestatio ad forest degradatio, through agricultural expasio, coversio to pasturelad, ifrastructure developmet, destructive loggig, fires, etc., accout for 17% of global greehouse gas emissios, or 5.8 GtCO2 aually, more tha the etire global trasportatio sector (14%), ad secod oly to the eergy sector. 57 I 2005, i respose to a joit proposal from the govermets of Papua New Guiea ad Costa Rica, the UNFCCC s COP 11 cosidered the possibility of adoptig a mechaism kow as kow as Reducig Emissios from Deforestatio ad Forest Degradatio, ad i 2007, at COP 13 i Bali, the cocept of REDD+ gaied further support as a potetial mitigatio measure. 58 (for a defiitio of REDD+, see Table 1). The purpose of REDD+ is to establish a large-scale system of fiacial icetives to ecourage developig coutries to reduce their levels of deforestatio ad forest degradatio, ad to icrease their forest carbo stocks. It has bee estimated that fiacial flows for greehouse gas emissio reductios from REDD+ could reach up to US $26 billio a year by The purpose of REDD+ is to establish a large-scale system of fiacial icetives to ecourage developig coutries to reduce their levels of deforestatio ad forest degradatio, ad to icrease their forest carbo stocks. REDD+ has received widespread support from the iteratioal commuity ad was recogised i the Copehage Accord as havig a crucial role to play i mitigatio. To date te coutries 60 have pledged over US $ 5 billio to fast track REDD+, although the mechaism for deliverig this fudig has yet to be agreed. However, at preset, the iteratioal architecture for REDD+ remais uder cosideratio withi the UNFCCC egotiatios, with the curret positio beig reflected i the draft Negotiatig Text of the Ad Hoc Workig Group o Log term Cooperative Actio ( Negotiatig Text ) 61. The topic will be cosidered further at COP 16 i December, i Cacu, Mexico IPCC Fourth Assessmet report, Bali Actio Pla, UNFCCC Decisio 1/CP.13; ad Decisio 2/CP.13. However the term REDD+ did ot become official laguage util the followig year at COP 14 i Poza, Polad, billio- see Report of the Iformal Workig Group o Iterim Fiace for REDD, php?optio=com_docma&task=doc_details&itemid=&gid= Australia, Caada, Belgium, Caada, Frace, Italy, Japa, Norway, Swede, Uited Kigdom ad the Uited States. 61 UNFCCC Advace Versio, Negotiatig Text, of the Ad Hoc Workig Group o Log-term Cooperative Actio uder the Covetio, 13 August 2010, (FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/14). FCCC/AWGLCAA/2010/14. search/items/3594.php?rec=j&priref= #beg 62 COP 16 will take place from 29 November December Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

29 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ The iteratioal REDD+ mechaism as curretly proposed cotemplates five types of forest activities (see Table 1). 63 Table 1: Five elemets of REDD+, with examples Activity Example Reducig carbo emissios 1. Reducig deforestatio Slowig the rate of broad scale or clear fell loggig 2. Reducig forest degradatio Reducig forest areas affected by selective loggig, grazig, fire or fuel wood collectio Icreasig the removal of carbo (the plus ) 3. Coservig forest carbo stocks 4. Sustaiable maagemet of forest 5. Ehacemet of forest carbo stocks Preservatio of existig forests Extedig loggig cycles from 10 years to 30 years to allow a greater amout of carbo to develop i regrowth Forest regeeratio ad rehabilitatio (but ot afforestatio ad reafforestatio) REDD+ Readiess The Negotiatig Text o REDD+ evisages a phased approach to REDD+ i which a coutry first udertakes REDD+ readiess preparatory activities. REDD+ readiess relates to the efforts a coutry udertakes, with the support of multilateral or bilateral iitiatives, to build capacity to be ready for participatio i a REDD+ mechaism. The secod phase ivolves the implemetatio of atioal REDD+ strategies ad measures, ad the third phase ivolves paymets (either fuds, credits, or both) if ad whe a coutry ca demostrate actual emissios reductios (referred to as resultsbased paymets ). 63 Wertz-Kaouikoff, S., ad Agelse, A., (2009), Global ad atioal REDD++ architecture: Likig istitutios ad actios, i Agelse, A., with Brockhaus, M., Kaie, M., Sills, E., Suderli., W.D. ad Wertz-Kaouikoff, S. (eds)(2009), Realisig REDD+: Natioal strategy ad policy optios. CIFOR, Bogor, Idoesia, at pp Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 27

30 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ The two mai multilateral readiess platforms, the UN-REDD Programme 64 ad the Forest Carbo Partership Facility 65 (FCPF, hosted by the World Bak) have defied that REDD+ readiess ivolves a extesive programme that icludes: Establishig istitutioal arragemets for the coordiatio of activities ad ogoig ad meaigful egagemet of stakeholders, with particular focus o the eed for egagemet with idigeous peoples ad other forest-depedet commuities; Developig a comprehesive atioal REDD+ strategy which sets out the coutry s policy ad goverace framework for REDD+. This phase should iclude the developmet of a atioal legal framework for REDD+, cotaiig detailed laws, regulatios ad policies to eable the implemetatio of REDD+, 66 as well as developig a beefit distributio system settig out how REDD+ reveues are to be admiistered ad shared at atioal, provicial ad local levels; Determiig referece levels agaist which ay future emissios reductios will be measured; ad Establishig the systems ad expertise to use remotely-sesed satellite imagig ad groud -truthig to measure curret forest carbo stocks, ad to assess subsequet chages i those stocks, as well as reportig ad verificatio systems. The REDD+ readiess phase is supported by iteratioal door fuds, chaelled maily through the UN-REDD programme ad the FCPF (with the World Bak s Forest Ivestmet Programme (FIP) supportig phase 2 activities). The UN-REDD Programme is to date 67 assistig ie pilot ad twety parter coutries to develop atioal REDD+ strategies. 68 The FCPF is assistig 37 coutries to prepare Readiess Preparatio Proposals (RPP). 69 Aex A cotais a list of all coutries participatig i the UN-REDD Programme ad/or FCPF. 64 The UN-REDD programme is a partership of FAO, UNDP ad UNEP. See 65 See 66 For a detailed aalysis of possible legislative frameworks for REDD+, see Backgroud Aalysis of REDD Regulatory Frameworks, UN- REDD Programme ad Terrestrial Carbo Group, May 2009, prepared by Covigto & Burlig LLP ad Baker & McKezie October To date, oly two coutries have released a atioal REDD+ strategy. I September 2010, Idoesia released a draft atioal REDD+ strategy which is available i Idoesia ad Eglish at ad the Philippies released its fial Natioal REDD-plus Strategy which was approved i September 2010 ad is available at uploads/2010/08/philippie-natioal-redd+-strategy.pdf.. 69 These processes are collectively referred to i this paper as atioal REDD+ frameworks. It should be oted that atioal REDD+ strategies ad Readiess Preparatio Proposals are ot legal frameworks. However, atioal REDD+ frameworks will evetually eed to be uderpied by detailed legislative frameworks.. 28 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

31 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ I additio to these two multilateral programmes, some coutries are also supportig the developmet of REDD+ through bilateral aid. For example, Norway has etered ito bilateral arragemets o REDD+ with Idoesia, Guyaa, Tazaia ad Mexico, 70 Australia with Idoesia ad Papua New Guiea 71, ad Germay with Ecuador Fragmetatio of fudig The curret fragmetatio of fudig sources for REDD+ readiess activities has the potetial to udermie early ati-corruptio efforts due to the differig stadards for trasparecy ad goverace (icludig for safeguards) betwee doors ad mechaisms (e.g. NAMAs, see below). The literature o aid effectiveess idicates that where stadards differ amog doors there is a risk that the recipiet coutries (ad others hopig to receive aid) will receive mixed messages about the importace of addressig corruptio risks. 72 With fragmetatio, there is also a risk that the same REDD+ activity may be fuded twice, e.g. through beig fuded o a atioal basis with the same project receivig either bilateral fudig or credits from the volutary market. There is thus a eed for coordiatio amog the various REDD+ fudig mechaisms to esure that a commo approach is take ad double-coutig does ot occur. It should be oted that the two mai multilateral platforms for REDD+, i.e. the FCPF ad the UN-REDD Programme, have developed good coordiatio backed by a high level of commitmet 73. I additio to a joit delivery i coutries such as the Democratic Republic of the Cogo 74, the FCPF ad UN-REDD Programme are curretly harmoizig their stakeholder egagemet guidelies, developig commo social ad evirometal priciples for REDD+ ad establishig priciples for moitorig goverace for REDD+. The Volutary Database, developed by a joit UN-REDD/FCPF team providig secretariat services to the Iterim REDD+ Partership (Box 6), was also created to respod, i part, to the risk of double-coutig Uder its Iteratioal Climate ad Forest Iitiative, Norway has committed US$1 billio over the ext 7-8 years to Idoesia i exchage for emissio cuts from avoided deforestatio, sigig a Letter of Itet o 26 May UNDP is the fiduciary maager of these fuds. Some of the fuds will be used to assist with REDD+ readiess. Norway has also siged a Memoradum of Uderstadig o REDD+ with Guyaa, ad has pledged $250 millio to assist Guyaa with REDD+ activities. Norway also has bilateral arragemets with Tazaia ad Mexico: 71 Uder the umbrella of its AUD$200 millio Iteratioal Forest Carbo Iitiative, the Australia Govermet has etered ito bilateral arragemets with Idoesia ad Papua New Guiea to provide support for REDD+ activities: hottopics/pdf/ifci_factsheet_1_11dec09.pdf 72 See the OECD Developmet Cooperatio Report (2010), by Eckhard Deutscher, Chair of the Developmet Assistace Committee,OECD Report, p See Joit letter set to the Prime Miister of the Uited Kigdom by the Uited Natios Secretary-Geeral ad World Bak s Presidet, available at 74 See Joit UN-REDD ad FCPF publicatio at dowload&gid=3676&itemid=53 75 This is a publicly available database, ad ca be accessed at Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 29

32 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ Box 6: Iterim REDD+ Partership The Iterim REDD+ Partership 2010, which was established i May 2010 ad has sice bee joied by 69 coutries, is iteded i part to address the problems created by fragmetatio of fudig. The Partership aims to scale up REDD+ activities, to fast track fudig from door coutries, ad to improve the effectiveess, trasparecy ad coordiatio of REDD+ iitiatives ad fiace. 76 After becomig a Parter, each developig coutry is expected to submit iformatio o its fiacig ad policies ad measures o REDD+ to the Secretariat, to be icluded i the Volutary REDD+ Database. This Partership, if established effectively, could cotribute to providig a efficiet ad accoutable meas of trackig the various REDD+ fudig iitiatives to avoid the risk of doublecoutig. Uder the Copehage Accord, developig coutry Parties ca specify the atioally appropriate mitigatio actios (NAMAs) that they ited to udertake, 77 ad may developig coutries have listed REDD+, or some elemets of REDD+, i their NAMAs. 78 This could preset a risk of doubledippig i that a coutry may obtai fudig for REDD+ activities uder its NAMA while also receivig fudig from other multilateral, bilateral or volutary market sources for the same activity with political elites i the REDD+ coutry, or project developers, pocketig the duplicated fudig. There is also a risk that permittig REDD+ activities uder NAMAs may udermie efforts to prevet corruptio i REDD+ because, ulike the REDD+ mechaism proposed i the Negotiatig Text, REDD+ activities which take place uder NAMAs are ot subject to ay social or evirometal safeguards. There is a clear eed to esure that the proposed REDD+ mechaism ad REDD+ activities uder NAMAs are coordiated ad subject to the same requiremets for trasparecy ad accoutability i order to avoid givig mixed messages to REDD+ coutries about the importace of addressig corruptio risks Overview of corruptio risks Give that corruptio is widespread i the forestry sectors of most coutries that are likely to participate i REDD+, which ofte have particularly high levels of poor goverace as well, it is ot ureasoable to expect that corruptio may affect REDD+. 79 The World Bak estimates that illegal loggig i developig coutries results i a loss of assets ad reveue i excess of US$ 10 billio aually, with as much as US$5 billio beig lost aually to govermets because of evaded taxes ad royalties. 80 It is aticipated that the corrupt actors who are ivolved i these illegal loggig activities will seek to 76 The Work Pla of the Iterim REDD+ Partership 2010 cotais a proposal to establish a database of REDD+ fiacig, actios ad results (Compoet 1) ad a further proposal for a aalysis of fiacig gaps ad overlaps (Compoet 2). The 2010 work programme is available at 77 Copehage Accord, para These are listed i La Via, A. G. M., (2010) The Future of REDD-Plus: Pathways of Covergece for the UNFCCC Negotiatios ad the Partership, Workig Paper, Foudatio for Iteratioal Evirometal Law ad Developmet, Table For a detailed aalysis of corruptio i the forestry sector, see Bludell, AG., ad Harwell, EE. (2009) Maual: A aalysis of corruptio i the forestry sector, Trasparecy Iteratioal ad Natural Capital Advisors. 80 The World Bak (2006), Stregtheig Forest Law Eforcemet ad Goverace: Addressig a Systemic Costrait to Sustaiable Developmet, Report No GLB, The Iteratioal Bak for Recostructio ad Developmet / The World Bak, p Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

33 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ protect their illegal reveues, ad will look for ew opportuities to egage i corrupt activities uder REDD+. As geeral observatio, it should be oted that because REDD+ is relatively ew ad is ot yet operatioal, it is ot possible to map corruptio risks as accurately or as comprehesively as has bee doe for the forestry sector. 81 The corruptio risks that may affect REDD+ are likely to differ depedig upo the particular phase beig cosidered, amely the readiess phase of REDD+, or the implemetatio phase. The corruptio risks that may affect REDD+ are likely to differ depedig upo the particular phase beig cosidered, amely the readiess phase of REDD+, or the implemetatio phase. For example, the REDD+ readiess phase is more likely to be affected by state capture, effected through grad corruptio ad political corruptio, i which powerful idividuals ad groups, such as politicias, loggig compaies, agribusiess ad possibly the military, might seek to ifluece the desig of a coutry s atioal REDD+ framework i order to beefit their private iterests or to etrech their political power. This ca be a way of legalizig corruptio. 82 While the implemetatio phase of REDD+ may also be affected by grad corruptio ad political corruptio (e.g. large bribes to exclude large areas o f high value timber from REDD+), this phase may also ivolve the additioal risk of petty corruptio, i which the low to mid-level public officials who are resposible for implemetig REDD+ are bribed to igore routie breaches of REDD+ laws (e.g. illegal loggig), or are bribed to create fraudulet lad titles or carbo rights. It should be oted however that such breaches would result i less emissios reductios ad therefore decreasig REDD+ performace paymets. REDD+ as a performace paymet mechaism will ot i the log term reward corrupt practices if these affect emissio reductios ad carbo stock outcomes. I additio to petty corruptio, the implemetatio phase is also more likely to ivolve the risk of embezzlemet as REDD+ reveues begi to flow. All of these risks are summarised i a table i Aex E, ad are covered i more detail below i sectios 3.2 ad Impact of corruptio i REDD+ Corruptio has the potetial to udermie the very beefits that a well desiged REDD+ mechaism may brig, i.e. mitigate emissio, reduce poverty ad improve livelihoods. First, by decreasig cofidece, corruptio i REDD+ ca result i a failure to mitigate emissios. For example, if the distributio of beefits is captured legally or ot by a few elites, or if the level of corruptio is perceived as high, local stakeholders will ot take the risk of forgoig the icome they derive from their curret uses of forest resources. Coversely, doors ad ivestors may grow weary of isecure ivestmet eviromets ad upredictable emissio reductios, ad may be 81 Agai, see, Bludell, AG., et al (2009). 82 UNDP (May 2008) Tacklig corruptio, trasformig lives: Acceleratig Huma Developmet i Asia ad Pacific, Asia-Pacific Huma Developmet Report series, Macmilla Publishers Idia Ltd, at p. vii Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 31

34 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ deterred from ivestig i REDD+. Furthermore, if REDD+ is to adopt a tradig elemet, corruptio which affects emissio reductios will have a double evirometal impact because ot oly will the opportuity to mitigate emissios be lost, but the purported offset (credit) which is geerated will permit a equal volume of greehouse gas emissios to be released elsewhere i the world. Wome i traditioal commuities are also more likely to be disproportioately affected by corruptio i REDD+ because they ofte have weaker claims to customary title, may have little cotrol over how fuds or beefits are maaged, ad geerally have lower literacy rates tha me. Fially, may hold cocers that corruptio i REDD+ may adversely affect the lives of idigeous peoples ad other forest-depedet commuities, with particular impacts o wome. It is estimated that about 60 millio people live i the raiforests of South America, South-East Asia ad Cetral Africa, with a further 350 millio people livig i, or ext to, dese forests, relyig o them for subsistece or icome. 83 Idigeous people are particularly vulerable to corruptio, because they ofte live i remote areas, are poor ad margialised, ad are usually uable to access the system of social ad legal protectio available to other members of society. These characteristics are also more likely to make them targets for corruptio. 84 Wome i traditioal commuities are also more likely to be disproportioately affected by corruptio i REDD+ because they ofte have weaker claims to customary title, may have little cotrol over how fuds or beefits are maaged, ad geerally have lower literacy rates tha me Desig of atioal REDD+ frameworks Corruptio risks i desig This sectio of the paper cosiders the corruptio risks which could arise at coutry level durig the REDD+ readiess phase i which atioal REDD+ frameworks are beig desiged. 86 The corrupt actors i this phase may ivolve high level actors, such as political elites, istitutios, powerful atioal ad iteratioal timber compaies, idustrial scale agribusiesses (e.g. palm oil, sugarcae, soy ad jatropha), multiatioal corporatios (who may aticipate the eed to buy carbo offsets), project developers ad the military. These actors may seek to ifluece the desig of atioal REDD+ frameworks, legislatio ad regulatios i order to maximise their 83 Alema, A., et al (2010), Realisig rights, protectig forests: A alterative visio for Reducig Deforestatio Case studies from the Accra Caucus, Accra Caucus o Forests ad Climate Chage, p Chee, M., (2010) Impact of corruptio o idigeous peoples, U4 Expert Aswer, available at 85 Suderli, From Exclusio to Owership, pp The paper does ot address the corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures which could be adopted at the iteratioal level uder the UNFCCC/COP process. 32 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

35 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ chaces of capturig REDD+ reveues. Some specific examples of particular desig-phase risks are cosidered below. Lad use plaig Uder the proposed iteratioal mechaism for REDD+, REDD+ is iteded to take place as a large scale, plaed ad coordiated atioal activity. This represets a differet approach to that of the Clea Developmet Mechaism (CDM), which adopts a small scale, project-based approach. As part of the REDD+ readiess phase, each REDD+ coutry will eed to udertake a extesive review of its lad use plas (spatial plas) ad forestry plas to idetify those forested areas which are suitable for REDD+, ad those which may be used for other purposes, such as for agriculture or timber productio. Corrupt practices i lad use plaig might iclude: loggig compaies seekig to ifluece the desig of lad use plas by bribig officials to exclude high value timber cocessios from REDD+, while pressig for areas which have already bee degraded (selectively logged) to be icluded; 87 project developers, multiatioal corporatios or powerful agribusiess operators bribig public officials to esure that the lad areas they ow or have a iterest i are allocated to, or excluded from, REDD+. Without adequate oversight, these corrupt practices may cotiue to attract corrupt behaviour after the iitial lad use plas are established because those actors holdig timber cocessios or cotrollig forested areas may seek to bribe public sector officials to rezoe areas (spot rezoig) to either iclude or exclude particular areas from use i REDD+ (see sectio below). Oe meas of esurig that lad use plaig is udertake trasparetly is for atioal frameworks to adopt a set of objective criteria, such as establishig the factors that will be used to guide laduse decisio-makig, such as listig factors to idetify deforestatio risks, soil suitability, carbo sequestratio potetial, ad biodiversity values. 88 It is also essetial that the rules for goverig lad use plaig decisio-makig ad the iitial lad use plas are made publicly available i a accessible format, ad are the subject of multi-stakeholder cosultatios. 87 Taccoi, L., Dows, F., ad Larmour, P., (2009) Ati-corruptio policies i the forest sector ad REDD+, Chapter 13 i Agelse, A with Brockhous, M., Kaie, M., Sills, E., Suderli, W.D., ad Wertz-Kaouikoff, S., (eds), Realisig REDD+: Natioal strategy ad policy optios, CIFOR, Bogor, Idoesia, at p Taccoi et al, (2010), at p Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 33

36 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ Lad ad atural resource teure The maer i which atioal REDD+ frameworks will treat lad ad forest teure will be of particular importace to idigeous peoples ad other forest-depedet commuities. I may REDD+ coutries, customary lad teure ad cotrol over atural resources is weak, ad precautios must be take to esure that REDD+ does ot result i the systematic loss or displacemet of idigeous peoples ad forest-depedet commuities from their customary lad. 89 For example, idigeous ad local commuities are ofte uable to register their customary title because the lad registratio procedures are too costly or cumbersome. Corruptio may ifluece the desig of the rules regardig lad teure ad REDD+ by: failig to recogise competig rights of formal or iformal customary lad teure, particularly i coutries where State owership of forests is already strog, so that political elites ca trump customary teure ad capture REDD+ reveues; ad adoptig a REDD+ framework which appears to respect customary lad teure, e.g. by recogizig registered customary lad titles (where such registratio is possible, such as i the Philippies 90 ) while failig to provide the ecessary admiistrative ad budgetary support to build capacity for the lad registratio process. This might be characterised as corruptio by omissio, ad illustrates the difficulty i distiguishig betwee corruptio ad a lack of capacity. To address this risk, the REDD+ readiess phase should iclude capacity buildig for lad admiistratio istitutios to udertake the task of clarifyig lad teure through the systematic registratio of customary lad titles. 91 Assistace should also be provided to local commuities ad NGOs who ofte play a importat role i assistig idigeous peoples ad other forest-depedet commuities to access complex lad registratio processes. Allocatio of carbo rights Carbo rights 92 are a form of property right that commoditise carbo ad allow it to be traded. They separate the right to carbo from broader rights to forest ad lad. 93 Typically, the holder of the carbo rights will cotrol the carbo resource, which they ca sell or covert ito REDD+ credits (uless a atioal REDD+ framework provides otherwise). Each REDD+ coutry will eed to adopt 89 For a detailed aalysis of the difficulties experieced by idigeous peoples ad other forest-depedet commuities i establishig customary lad teure ad cotrol over forest resources i developig coutries, see Suderli, W.D., Hatcher, J., ad Liddle, M., (2008), From Exclusio to Owership? Challeges ad Opportuities i Advacig Forest Teure Reform, Rights ad Resources Iitiative. 90 The Idigeous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (Philippies) 91 It should ot always be assumed that registratio of customary title is desirable from the perspective of protectig customary teure. For example, i Papua New Guiea, where 97% of lad is held as uregistered customary lad, the act of registerig customary title strips the lad of its statutory protectio thereby allowig it to be mortgaged or sold, ad thus permaetly alieated from the local commuity. I such circumstaces, a atioal REDD legislative framework which imposes a requiremet for lad registratio as a precoditio to REDD might beefit local elites who could capture REDD+ reveues by registerig customary lad: see Tararia, A., et al, (2010), Icorporated lad groups ad the registratio of customary lads: Recet developmets i Papua New Guiea, published i I Defece of Melaesia Customary Lad, Aderso, T., ad Lee, G. (eds), AID/WATCH, Sydey, Australia. 92 Icludig carbo sequestratio rights. 93 Cotula 2009, p 9. For a detailed aalysis of carbo rights i REDD+, see Takacs, D., (2009) Forest Carbo Law + Property Rights, Coservatio Iteratioal, Arligto VA, USA. 34 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

37 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ legislatio which clarifies how carbo rights will be created, ad who ca hold them, (although this is ot ecessary if the REDD+ coutry does ot ited to participate i carbo tradig). 94 The rules which are adopted uder a atioal REDD+ framework for allocatig carbo rights has the potetial to deliver widfall gais or profits, ad is thus likely to be a highly cotetious aspect of ay REDD+ legislatio. Examples of areas i which corrupt actors may seek to legalise corruptio is if political elites seek to lik carbo rights to State owership of forests thus excludig ay claims to carbo rights by those holdig or assertig customary teure. Give the prevalece of State owership of forests i may REDD+ coutries 95, this would mea that the lio s share of REDD+ reveues would be paid to the State, thus creatig opportuities for skimmig ad embezzlemet. Aother possibility is that REDD+ legislatio may lik carbo rights to loggig cocessios, thus allowig loggig compaies to covert their cocessios (which may already be taited by corruptio) ito carbo rights. To address these risks, it is essetial that REDD+ atioal proposals to allocate carbo rights be closely aalysed, ad that cosesus o the proposed framework for allocatio of carbo rights ad beefit distributio be pursued through broad-based multi-stakeholder cosultatios. Settig referece emissio levels / referece levels Each coutry that wishes to participate i REDD+ will first eed to set a atioal baselie or referece emissio level/ referece levels ( baselie ) agaist which ay future emissios reductios ad removals ca be measured. 96 The extet to which a coutry reduces its emissios ad icreases its removals agaist its baselie will establish the amout of REDD+ reveue to which that coutry is etitled. Coutries will be likely to have the optios to select the methodologies to determie baselies, icludig future projected baselies. I terms of settig baselies, there is a risk that corruptio may result i: artificially iflatig the baselie i order to icrease the emissios reductios, ad thus the REDD+ reveues, which ca subsequetly be claimed, allowig the excess to be skimmed by corrupt officials at a later date oce the real rate of deforestatio/degradatio becomes apparet, 97 collusio betwee political elites ad the private sector (such as loggig compaies, idustrial platatio owers ad other powerful ecoomic parties) to share the proceeds derivig from: icreasig deforestatio rates i the lead up to the start of REDD+ activities, ad to share the subsequet proceeds UN-REDD Programme ad Terrestrial Carbo Group, Backgroud Aalysis of REDD+ Regulatory Frameworks. 95 See Suderli, WD., Hatcher, J., ad Liddle, M., (2008), From Exclusio to Owership? Challeges ad Opportuities i Advacig Forest Teure Reform, Rights ad Resources Iitiative. 96 SBSTA decisio o Methodological Guidace for REDD+ (UNFCCC, Decisio 4/CP.15. For a aalysis of how referece levels might be set, see Agelse, A., (2008) How do we set the referece levels for REDD+ paymets?, i Movig Ahead with REDD+: Issues, Optios ad Implicatios, Agelse, A. (ed.), CIFOR, Bogor, Idoesia, pp Brow, M.L. (2010), Limitig Corrupt Icetives i a Global REDD Regime, 37 Ecology L.Q. 237., at p Typically, RL/REL calculatio period is set to the average deforestatio rate of the last 10 years, updated every 3 years (as suggested i a early proposals to UNFCCC), although may coutries do ot yet have reliable or cosistet historical deforestatio data. This corruptio risk will be mitigated if coutries coduct the REL/RL measurig as it is suggested i the COP/IPCC. Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 35

38 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ determiig the time for calculatig the Referece level/referece emissio level ad or choosig to icorporate atioal circumstaces i a way that favours certai types of activities (such as platatios) or socio-ecoomic eviromets. Lessos should be leared from the problems experieced by the Clea Developmet Mechaism where it has bee foud that orgaisatios were maipulatig baselies by icreasig their productio of HFC-23, a potet greehouse gas, i order to icrease the Certified Emissio Reductios (carbo credits) which could be geerated for a project uder the Kyoto Protocol. 99 I terms of solutios, the risk of iflated baselies must be addressed at the iteratioal level through the UNFCCC process, with the COP (or the Subsidiary Body for Scietific ad Techological Advice) adoptig clear methodological guidace as to how atioal baselies are to be established ad verified. Desig of beefit distributio systems It is expected that the REDD+ readiess phase will iclude the desig of a beefit distributio system (BDS) (see the example from Viet Nam i Box 8 o page 42). I carryig out this task, there is a risk that the BDS may be uduly iflueced by state capture, epotism ad croyism, which could ifluece desig of the BDS at atioal, provicial ad local levels Proposals to reduce corruptio risks affectig the desig of atioal REDD+ frameworks Idetifyig ad addressig corruptio risks i atioal REDD+ frameworks will be a particularly difficult ad sesitive task. Corruptio risk assessmets It is suggested that as a first step, each REDD+ coutry should idetify the mai types ad the scale of corruptio risks (icludig the actors) posed by REDD+ through a corruptio risk assessmet. This should ot oly give a picture of the overall goverace coditios i the coutry, icludig the forestry sector, but should also idetify the extet to which corruptio is a driver of deforestatio. Towards this goal, the UN-REDD Programme has take some steps to support the coduct of multi stakeholder coutry-led REDD goverace assessmets 100, udertake by a partership betwee govermet ad civil society to help poit to particular istitutios or istitutioal arragemets as the cause of goverace ad corruptio challeges ad provide the basis for evidece-led reform. A risk assessmet tool for social priciples is also beig developed to provide guidace i the developmet of UN-REDD Natioal Programmes (see Box 7). 99 Brow (2010), at p UN-REDD Programme 2010 Scope of work : Multi -stakeholder coutry-led goverace assessmets for REDD+, available at Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

39 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ Box 7: UN-REDD Programme - Risk Assessmet Tool for social priciples To assist with the risk assessmet phase, the UN-REDD Programme is curretly developig a Risk Assessmet Tool for social priciples that will assist i the detectio ad improvemet of program weakesses i of UN-REDD Natioal Programmes ad atioal readiess processes more geerally. Criterio 1 of this tool sets out a detailed decisio-makig tree for esurig that proposed REDD+ activities have addressed corruptio ad fiduciary risks by askig a series of questios, e.g. has the govermet ratified UNCAC or other regioal ati-corruptio istrumets?, ad if so, does the coutry actively eforce the priciples from these covetios?. Criterio 2 sets out a decisio-makig tree for esurig that REDD+ activities are carried out i a accoutable ad trasparet maer, ad Criterio 3 sets out a process for esurig that all stakeholders are able to participate i a meaigful ad effective maer, with special attetio give to most vulerable groups ad idigeous peoples. 101 Ecoomic ad social impact assessmet The ext step at the coutry level should be to coduct a detailed aalysis of the extet to which vested iterests may have iflueced the desig of the atioal REDD+ framework. It is recogised that this is a particularly sesitive task. The aalysis might, for example, take the form of, or be icluded i, a ecoomic ad social impact assessmet, which assesses the likely ecoomic impact of REDD+ activities o curret actors withi the forestry sector (loggig compaies, agribusiess, etc), as well as assessig the potetial impact o the most vulerable people, viz, idigeous peoples, other forest-depedet people, ad wome. 102 The aalysis (ad broader REDD+ readiess phase) should also iclude proposals for addressig the corruptio risks i desig (some of which are covered above), such as how objective lad use plaig guidelies will be established, how the registratio of customary lad teure will be facilitated, ad how carbo rights will be addressed. This type of detailed ecoomic ad social aalysis should be coducted at critical poits i the developmet of atioal REDD+ frameworks. Iitially it should form part of a coutry s atioal REDD+ strategy, which does ot appear to be happeig at preset. 103 A ecoomic ad social impact assessmet should also be doe at the poit whe draft REDD+ legislatio is prepared, which is whe legal rights are established I order for this to happe, the multilateral ad bilateral iitiatives which are supportig the REDD+ readiess phase should be aware of the potetial for corruptio ad vested iterests to uduly ifluece the desig of atioal REDD+ frameworks, 101 A summary of the Social ad Evirometal approach, which cotais a lik to the latest versio of the Risk Assessmet Tool is available at: For example, the FCPF s curret RPP Template (v. 4, 28 Jauary 2010) provides for a (optioal) Social ad Evirometal Impact Assessmet (Aex 2d), ad the FCPF has also issued guidace o how to icorporate social ad evirometal cosideratios ito the REDD readiess process, but these obligatios do ot exted to a ecoomic impact assessmet. These documets are available at: A review i May 2010 of 16 RPPs ad Natioal Programme Documets foud that most of the proposals idetify weak law eforcemet ad uclear lad teure as key goverace challeges for REDD+. However, the depth of aalysis of the uderlyig problems ad potetial solutios is relatively low at this stage. It is ofte ot clear how coutries ited to address these issues through their REDD+ strategies: Davis, C., Goverace i REDD+: Takig stock of goverace issues raised i readiess proposals submitted to the FCPF ad the UN-REDD Programme, prepared for Expert Workshop, 24th-25th May 2010, Chatham House, Lodo, Backgroud Paper Two, p. 2. Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 37

40 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ ad should ecourage corruptio risk assessmets ad ecoomic ad social impact assessmets throughout the REDD+ readiess phase. For example, these could be icorporated as express topics to be addressed uder the FCPF s RPP template ad be provided as guidace through the preparatio of UN-REDD atioal programme documets. Multi-stakeholder cosultatios Fially, atioal REDD+ frameworks (strategies ad legislatio) should be scrutiised ad assessed through robust, multi-stakeholder cosultatio processes which flush out ay istaces where corruptio has iflueced the policy or legislatio. These cosultatios should be iformed by the iformatio ad aalysis cotaied i the corruptio risk assessmets ad i the ecoomic ad social impact assessmets described above. The multilateral ad bilateral iitiatives which are assistig coutries i REDD+ readiess phase are partly fulfillig this role already. The UN-REDD Programme has already take some steps i this directio, with the multi-stakeholder coutry-led assessmets metioed above as well as through the implemetatio of a extesive programme of work o stakeholder egagemet Implemetatio of REDD Corruptio risks i implemetatio This sectio of the paper cosiders the corruptio risks i the implemetatio phase of REDD I this phase we might expect to see a broader rage of actors tha i the desig phase, therefore icreasig the potetial rage ad diversity of corrupt practices. For example, i additio to highlevel actors (political elites, trasatioal loggig compaies), i terms of the potetial for corrupt behaviour, there is also the potetial for low to mid-level public sector officials, commuity leaders ad elites of idigeous peoples ad local commuities, carbo brokers, military ad para-military groups, ad local ad iteratioal NGOs to egage i corrupt practices. While there is potetial for grad corruptio (large scale bribes) to affect implemetatio, i this phase typical forms of corruptio might also ivolve petty corruptio (or supply-side corruptio) such as officials beig bribed to tur a blid eye to breaches of REDD+ laws, or officials beig bribed to falsify lad titles or carbo rights. I this respect public sector officials may have little icetive to reject bribes ad to esure that emissios reductios are achieved ad ca be verified, because there is o persoal gai for them, ad ideed there may eve be a potetial loss of (illegally-derived) icome. 106 Specific examples of potetial corrupt practices i implemetatio are cosidered below Due to limited space, it has ot bee possible to address all corruptio risks i the implemetatio phase of REDD+. For example, either the moral hazard posed by reversals (o-permaece) ad isurace, or the risks of leakage i ested approaches, have bee covered. For a discussio of moral hazard ad reversals, see Barr, C., Dermawa, A., Puromo, H. Ad Komarudi, H Fiacial goverace ad Idoesia s Reforestatio Fud durig the Soeharto ad post-soeharto periods, : a political ecoomic aalysis of lessos for REDD++. Occasioal paper 52. CIFOR, Bogor, Idoesia, pp ; for iformatio o ested approaches, see Cortez, R., ad others, A Nested Approach to REDD++ - Structurig effective ad trasparet icetive mechaisms for REDD++ implemetatio at multiple scales, published by The Nature Coservacy ad Baker & McKezie, 2010 < iitiatives/climatechage/files/ested_paper_fial_60110.pdf 106 Brow, at p Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

41 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ Lad admiistratio I may REDD+ coutries, effective lad admiistratio is udermied by poor goverace, with poor practices for registerig ad maitaiig statutory ad registered customary lad titles. 107 I REDD+, there is potetial for corruptio to affect lad admiistratio because some actors (e.g. provicial or local level elites, project developers) might seek to obtai lad titles, ad thus a etitlemet to REDD+ reveues: bribig public sector officials to frauduletly create lad titles, bribig to public sector officials to overlook competig customary claims to lad titles, ad bribig to iduce public sector officials to register titles over State lad i the ame of particular idividuals or corporatios. To overcome these risks, REDD+ readiess activities should recogise the particular difficulties affectig lad admiistratio, ad take specific measures to provide for capacity-buildig ad trasparecy i the lad admiistratio sector. Spot rezoig Corrupt practices could also arise where private ladholders or cocessio holders seek oe off chages to the lad use zoig desigatio over a particular parcel of lad, which may be triggered by a fluctuatio i commodity prices (see sectio above o establishig rules for lad use plaig). For example, a loggig compay might bribe a public sector official to iclude a specific parcel of lad i REDD+, with a view to revokig the REDD+ zoig desigatio at a later date, thus allowig the loggig cocessio over the lad to be reactivated. Oe meas of addressig this risk is to require loggig cocessios to be surredered or declared void oce lad is zoed for use i REDD+. It is also essetial that all rezoig applicatios ad decisios be made publicly available i a accessible format ad be subject to a public cosultatio process. Carbo rights If a atioal REDD+ framework permits carbo rights to be decoupled from lad ad forest teure, this is likely to ope ew aveues for corruptio ivolvig bribery ad fraud relatig to the creatio ad sale of carbo rights. 107 See Suderli, W.D., Hatcher, J., ad Liddle, M., (2008), From Exclusio to Owership? Challeges ad Opportuities i Advacig Forest Teure Reform, Rights ad Resources Iitiative, pp. 23, ad Chapter 4 geerally. For a detailed descriptio of the problems of lad admiistratio i Papua New Guiea, see the Natioal Lad Developmet Taskforce Report: Lad Admiistratio, Lad Dispute Settlemet, ad Customary Lad Use Developmet, prepared by the NLDT Committees o Lad Admiistratio, Lad Dispute Settlemet, ad Customary Lad Developmet, published by the Natioal Research Istitute (Papua New Guiea), NRI Moograph 39, February Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 39

42 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ For example, corrupt practices might iclude: project developers, loggig compaies or local elites bribig public officials i the lads departmet to register the carbo rights over particular parcels of lad i the ame of the corrupt actor. The corrupt actor could sell the carbo rights to a third party, ad the abscod with the proceeds. This could occur without the kowledge or coset of the idigeous people or other local commuities who ow, use or occupy the lad, who may discover whe it is too late they have bee defrauded of their carbo rights; the lauderig of moey through the purchase ad sale of carbo rights. Because of the itagible ature of carbo rights (they oly exist o a piece of paper), these risks are particularly difficult risk to maage. Risk maagemet for carbo rights will require capacity buildig withi the lad admiistratio sector to assist the sector to develop ad maage the process for registerig carbo rights, i accordace with adequate safeguards. Carbo measuremet risks REDD+ depeds for its effectiveess o the accurate measuremet, reportig ad verificatio of forest emissios ad sequestratio, ad chages i forest carbo stocks (C-MRV). As REDD+ reveues will deped upo the extet to which a State ca demostrate that it has reduced its emissios ad icreased its removals below its baselie, this creates a opportuity for fraud. Corrupt practice i carbo measuremets might iclude: public sector officials over-estimatig the amout of avoided emissios ad emissio reductios agaist the baselie i order to iflate REDD+ reveues, ad the subsequet skimmig off ad embezzlemet of these additioal reveues geerated by political elites or public sector officials; project developers attemptig to bribe public sector officials to falsify claimed emissios reductios from projects to secure additioal reveues. Such reportig failures may be relatively easy to hide give the techical complexity of measurig chages i carbo stores. 108 Because of the techical complexity of forest carbo measuremet ad moitorig, C-MRV is a area where the lie betwee corruptio ad a lack of techical capacity may easily become blurred. It is also a area where corruptio i public sector appoitmets has real potetial to udermie REDD+ because employees who have bee appoited through patroage, epotism or because of coectios may lack the techical skills ecessary to measure, report ad verify carbo emissios. Multilateral ad bilateral iitiatives must cotiue to focus attetio o developig capacity i REDD+ coutries to udertake the robust ad trasparet measuremet, reportig ad verificatio of carbo chages, which uderpis the effectiveess of REDD Brow (2010), at p, I the cotext of the UN-REDD Programme, this role is udertake by the Food ad Agriculture Orgaisatio (FAO). 40 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

43 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd Admiistratio of reveues ad beefit distributio I order to become REDD+ ready, each coutry should develop a system as to how it will admiister ad distribute REDD+ reveues. 110 The mai corruptio risks i beefit distributio are: the dimiutio or loss of REDD+ reveues through embezzlemet by public sector officials, ad the potetial for REDD+ reveues to be misappropriated by powerful groups, such as loggig compaies, the military, ad project developers. 111 The form i which the iteratioal commuity will make REDD+ reveues available to developig coutries is ot yet clear. It may be based o door fuds made available by developed coutries (fud-based); it may be market-based, which would ivolve the allocatio ad trade of REDD+ carbo credits; or it may be a combiatio of both. 112 Both fud-based ad market-based approaches etail differet corruptio risks, each of which are discussed below. Fud-based approach A fud-based approach would ivolve paymets beig made to atioal govermets for demostrated reductios i emissios. With this approach, there is a risk that fuds may be embezzled by political elites resposible for the maagemet of REDD+ reveues for their ow erichmet, or that fuds will be siphoed off to others to secure political favours or support. The recet move towards decetralisatio i may developig coutries also has implicatios for corruptio i the maagemet of REDD+ reveues because the opportuity for public officials to embezzle REDD+ fuds will icrease with each additioal layer of govermet, effectively leavig local commuities to wait for the trickle dow. 113 Compared to a market-based approach which geerates carbo credits, fud-based paymets may be more susceptible to corruptio due to the difficulty of tracig cash fuds. Careful decisios will eed to be made as to who will admiister REDD+ reveues at the coutry level the Treasury departmet, the miistry of forestry, or a ew stad aloe fud such as a Natioal REDD+ Fud with careful cosideratio beig give to the relative corruptio risks of each, icludig the track 110 Curiously, the obligatio to have i place a BDS is ot listed as a obligatio i the Negotiatig Text o REDD+, which is silet o the issue. Viet Nam is oe of the first coutries to desig a trasparet ad equitable beefit distributio system, which was prepared with support from the UN-REDD Programme ad GTZ: Desig of a REDD+-Compliat Beefit Distributio System for Viet Nam, (2010). Through regioal coordiatio offered by the UN-REDD Programme, it is foresee that other coutries i the regio will beefit from this work. 111 For example, i Idoesia it has bee observed that may large-scale forestry eterprises, pulp ad paper producers ad oil palm compaies have close ties to political elites, ad are therefore well positioed to secure access to REDD+ reveues if distributed by govermet agecies: Barr, C., Dermawa, A., Puromo, H. Ad Komarudi, H Fiacial goverace ad Idoesia s Reforestatio Fud durig the Soeharto ad post-soeharto periods, : a political ecoomic aalysis of lessos for REDD++. Occasioal paper 52. CIFOR, Bogor, Idoesia. 112 UNFCCC draft Neg Text, Optio 2, para 12. It is also ot yet clear whether paymets will be made to atioal-level actors who would the be resposible for disbursig paymets withi their coutry, or whether paymets could also be made directly to sub-atioal actors, such as provicial govermets ad private sector project developers. 113 Cotula 2009: 21. Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 41

44 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ record, of each istitutio. 114 I this regard, it is highly preferable that REDD+ fuds be held off budget ad ot be mixed with cosolidated reveue, as the fuds should be earmarked to reward performace of forest maagers ad commuities. The fiacial mechaism that liks atioal REDD+ fuds to local beeficiaries eeds to be trasparet ad have a goverace structure that icludes all relevat stakeholders who ca moitor the admiistratio ad expediture of REDD+ reveues (see, for example, Box 8 o Beefit Distributio System for REDD+ i Viet Nam). This multi-stakeholder structure could also be used to distribute beefits uder a market-based approach. Box 8: Desig of a REDD+ compliat Beefit distributio i Viet Nam With the assistace of the UN-REDD Programme, Viet Nam has udertake a extesive study to cosider how to desig a Beefit Distributio System for REDD+. It is established that REDD+ could geerate about US$80-$100 millio each year i Viet Nam. Viet Nam proposes to establish a Natioal REDD+ Fud which will receive ad hold the reveues off-budget ad will be resposible for disbursig the fuds. The Fud will be oversee by a broad-based multi-stakeholder goverig body. Provicial REDD+ Fuds will be mirrored o the Natioal model, which is the resposible for deliverig paymets ad beefits to local beeficiaries. 115 Market-based approach The adoptio of a market-based approach which ivolves the geeratio ad sale of REDD+ credits poses differet corruptio risks. 116 O the oe had, carbo credits are easier to track because, ulike fuds, they are give a uique year ad serial umber which allows the chai of custody of the credit to be traced. However for this to work for REDD+ credits, it will require the establishmet of a highly complex admiistrative system ivolvig a atioal registry ad separate atioal accouts to track the issue, purchase, sale ad retiremet of REDD+ credits i a similar maer to the system of maagig Kyoto Uits uder the Kyoto Protocol). 114 See, for example, the report of Barr et al o Idoesia s Reforestatio Fud which otes that Erst & Youg documeted losses from the Fud over a four-year period (1993/4 1997/8) of US$5.2 billio i public fuds, 50% of which occurred after the fuds had etered the Miistry of Forestry s accouts. This triggered a trasfer of resposibility for fud maagemet to the Miistry of Fiace, ad more recetly agai to a specially formed uit, the Forest Developmet Fudig Agecy Public Service Uit. Barr, C., Dermawa, A., Puromo, H. Ad Komarudi, H Fiacial goverace ad Idoesia s Reforestatio Fud durig the Soeharto ad post-soeharto periods, : a political ecoomic aalysis of lessos for REDD+. Occasioal paper 52. CIFOR, Bogor, Idoesia. 115 UN-REDD Programme, (2010) Desig of a REDD-Compliat Beefit Distributio System for Viet Nam, GTZ. Cambodia ad Laos are preparig similar studies. 116 There is curretly a emergig, although relatively small, volutary carbo market for REDD+ i which the private sector is able to geerate credits accordig to various methodological REDD+ stadards. I 2009, the total volume of volutary REDD+ credits which were trasacted was US$41.6 millio, with a weighted price average of US$13.33/tCO2e (Hamilto, K., Chokkaligam, U., ad Bedaa, M., (2010a), State of the Forest Carbo Markets 2009: Takig Root & Brachig Out, Ecosystem Marketplace). 42 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

45 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ Corrupt practices i atioal REDD+ carbo markets might iclude: a seller of REDD+ credits bribig a public sector official ot to retire credits whe required to do so, allowig the credit to be resold (or recycled) for a profit; or a multiatioal corporatio, which requires carbo offsets for compliace or volutary purposes, colludig with public sector officials to sell illegally geerated REDD+ credits to the corporatio at a cheap price i retur for a kickback for the official. Coduct such as this o the part of the multiatioal corporatio would probably fall foul of the OECD Ati-Bribery Covetio (see below). The ature of REDD+ credits themselves may make them easy targets for corruptio as they ivolve the creatio of a itagible asset, amely, carbo credits, which exist oly o paper ad which are difficult to verify. 117 It is ot yet clear whether atioal govermets will be permitted to issue REDD+ credits uder a iteratioal REDD+ regime which will be recogised o the iteratioal plae. If permitted, this would preset a sigificat corruptio risk as public sector officials could be bribed to create fraudulet credits which could eter the iteratioal market. A market-based approach presets a icreased opportuity for the private sector to participate i REDD+ (e.g. project developers, multiatioal corporatios, carbo brokers), ad this itroduces ew corruptio risks. Lessos from atural resource extractio idicate the potetial for the private sector to bribe the public sector to provide access to the resource which i REDD+ could apply to carbo. To address the risk that REDD+ fuds may be lost through collusio betwee the public ad private sectors, cosideratio should be give as to how the models which have bee developed to improve trasparecy i atural resource reveues, such as the Extractive Idustries Trasparecy Iitiative (EITI), ca be adapted for use i REDD+ (see Box 9). ad the recet Dodd-Frak Wall Street Reform ad Cosumer Protectio Act passed i the US (see Box 13) Peter Youger from Iterpol has described carbo credits as follows: You re obtaiig ot a physical etity or asset but a piece of paper. He otes that there are eve greater risks for forest carbo offsets, statig I effect, you could be falsifyig owership i somethig you ca see (lad) i order to sell somethig that you ca t (carbo), ad the isertig it ito the carbo markets ad sellig it to people. : Lag., C., 1 October 2010, REDD+ Moitor, Joiig the little REDD+ dots: Stories from the world of carbo tradig Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 43

46 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ Box 9: Liberia, forestry ad the EITI The EITI model requires compaies to disclose what they pay to govermet to access resources, ad for govermet to disclose how much they have received. These amouts are the recociled, with the process beig oversee by a multi-stakeholder group. Aroud 50 of the world s largest oil, gas ad miig compaies support ad actively participate i the EITI process. Liberia is a participat i EITI ad, i additio to agriculture, mierals ad oil, has chose to iclude forestry as a covered sector. 119 Liberia has developed a fiacial reportig template for compaies i the forestry sector, which could easily be adapted for use i REDD Local level beefit distributio Whether REDD+ is fud based or market based, it appears likely that atioal govermet will retai cotrol over how REDD+ beefits are to be distributed (amog provices, districts ad commuities), ad i which form (cash, credits, or i the form of services such as schools or hospitals). I additio to the risk of embezzlemet by provicial or local elites, decisios as to how REDD+ beefits will be distributed at provicial ad local levels are also proe to the demad side corruptio risks of croyism, epotism ad clietelism, which may affect both the desig of provicial ad local level beefit sharig plas ad the implemetatio. These risks apply equally to fud-based ad marketbased approaches to REDD Proposals to reduce corruptio risks i implemetatio Much has already bee writte about the eed for a broad-based ad robust moitorig system which REDD+ coutries ca use to measure, report ad verify ot oly the carbo stored i forests, but for goverace, evirometal ad social safeguards too. Ideed, it is worth otig that the Negotiatig Text requires REDD+ coutries to address these issues i their atioal REDD+ strategies. 121 Some specific solutios for reducig corruptio risks i implemetatio are discussed below ad see also TI Maual: A aalysis of corruptio i the forestry sector, 2009, Appedix 8, at I this regard, the draft Negotiatig Text requires developig coutry Parties, whe developig ad implemetig their atioal strategies or actio pla... to address, iter alia, drivers of deforestatio ad forest degradatio, lad teure issues, forest goverace issues, geder cosideratios ad the safeguards idetified i paragraph 2 [of the text] (para 7). A sigificat body of work o the eed for MRV for goverace has also bee udertake by Chatham House: see Sauders, J., ad Reeve, R., (2010), Moitorig Goverace for Implemetatio of REDD+, prepared for Moitorig Goverace Safeguards i REDD+ Expert Workshop 24th - 25th May 2010, Chatham House, Lodo, UK, Backgroud Paper Oe. 44 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

47 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ Usig UNCAC as a ati-corruptio framework It is suggested that a coutry s REDD+ framework should be desiged usig the provisios of UNCAC as a ati-corruptio framework, or checklist. This should geerally be possible, because of the 49 coutries which are participatig i either or both the UN-REDD Programme ad the FCPF, oly ie have ot ratified UNCAC (see Aex A). Usig UNCAC would ecourage the followig type of aalysis of atioal REDD+ frameworks: Article 5 requires Ati-corruptio policies: does the atioal REDD+ framework recogise corruptio risks ad icorporate effective ati-corruptio policies? Article 6 requires Prevetative ati-corruptio bodies: does the atioal REDD+ framework provide a lik to idepedet ati-corruptio commissios or courts to eable these bodies to ivestigate ad prosecute complaits cocerig corruptio i REDD+? Article 10 requires Public reportig: does the atioal REDD+ framework cotai freedom of iformatio provisios allowig members of the public to obtai iformatio about REDD+, e.g. applicatios for rezoig, grat of REDD+ liceces, beefit distributio, etc Article 13 requires support for civil society: does the atioal REDD+ framework cotai provisios for capacity buildig ad support of NGOs (CSOs) workig o REDD+? Aex D to this paper cotais a more detailed checklist which could be used to assess whether a atioal REDD+ framework is cosistet with the UNCAC framework. 122 Multi-stakeholder approaches Trasparecy ad accoutability i both the developmet ad implemetatio of REDD+ ca be promoted through the use of a multi-stakeholder approach. For example, ot oly ca a multistakeholder structure be used to admiister ad maage REDD+ reveues (see the example from Viet Nam s proposed Beefit Distributio System i Box 8), but they ca also be used more broadly to oversee the desig ad implemetatio of atioal REDD+ frameworks. The establishmet of a multistakeholder Natioal REDD Committee i the Democratic Republic of the Cogo provides a good illustratio of how this might be doe (Box 10). 122 The idea for this table was draw from UNDP Ati-corruptio Guidace Note (2008), p 9, Table 3 which cotais a table settig out UNCAC as a democratic goverace ad developmet framework. This presupposes that the REDD+ coutry is i fact a sigatory to UNCAC: see Aex A for a list of REDD+ coutries ad whether they have ratified UNCAC. Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 45

48 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ Box 10: Multi-stakeholder approach to REDD+ i Democratic Republic of the Cogo O 26 November 2009, the Prime Miister of the Democratic Republic of the Cogo (DRC) adopted a Decree to establish the istitutioal structures for REDD. 123 The Decree establishes a Natioal REDD Committee, which has overall resposibility for REDD, icludig preparig the guidelies for REDD, decidig o the actios to be take, approvig atioal work plas, moitorig ad evaluatig the implemetatio of REDD, ad establishig a atioal fud to maage ad distribute REDD reveues (s 4). Nearly oe third of the members of the Natioal REDD Committee must be draw specifically from civil society ad idigeous peoples orgaisatios. Of the 13 members o the Natioal Committee: 6 are from govermet; four must be represetatives of NGOs, forest commuities ad ative populatios; oe is from the Federatio of Wood Idustries (private sector); oe is from the busiess sector; ad oe from a atioal agricultural research istitute (s 5). This provides a broad rage of stakeholders with a strog supervisory role i the desig, implemetatio ad moitorig of the REDD+ process. The Decree provides that this multi-stakeholder structure is also to be replicated at the provicial level (s 13). Capacity-buildig ad support for NGOs ad ati-corruptio bodies NGOs play a importat role as a corruptio watchdog ad ca assist i idetifyig istaces of systemic or specific corruptio. However, i askig NGOs to play this role, it should be recogised that they are ofte poorly resourced with little capacity to udertake this work. As part of the REDD+ readiess process, support should be provided to build capacity withi NGOs to respod to corruptio risks i REDD+, ad to support local commuities. Care should be take, however, to esure that the maer i which support is provided does ot compromise the idepedece of NGOs, e.g. by providig fudig which is tied to REDD+ activities, ad which may itself may raise corruptio risks. I coutries that have established ati-corruptio commissios or other equivalet bodies, support for these istitutios to develop their capacity o risks related to REDD+ ad receive political commitmet ad fudig will also be key. This may iclude stregtheig their capacity to raise awareess, to develop ad implemet prevetive mechaisms such as system audits ad to ivestigate ad moitor corruptio cases i REDD+. Recourse ad complaits mechaisms Esurig that a idepedet, effective ad accessible recourse ad complaits mechaism is available to the public, icludig to idigeous peoples ad other forest-depedet commuities is a essetial part of maagig corruptio risk i REDD+. I the absece of such mechaism corruptio 123 Decree No of 26/11/2009 Providig for the Creatio, Compositios ad Orgaizatio of the Implemetatio Structure of the Process of Reducig Emissios from Deforestatio ad Forest Degradatio, REDD, text (i Eglish) available i Aex 1a to the DRC Readiess Pla for REDD, 2 March 2010, available at applicatio/pdf/eg_rpp_drc_versio_ pdf. For more iformatio o the DRC 2009 REDD Decree to support REDD, see 46 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

49 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ activities ca cotiue uchalleged or uchecked, thus cotiuig to udermie REDD+. Natioal REDD+ frameworks should esure that a effective recourse ad complaits mechaism is available, ad that it is accessible to idigeous peoples ad local commuities. Box 11: UN-REDD, Free Prior ad Iformed Coset, ad recourse mechaisms The UN-REDD Programme has recetly held a roud of cosultatios with idigeous peoples represetatives ad CSOs i Haoi (Jue 2010) ad i Paama (October 2010) to facilitate the developmet of geeric guidace o Free, Prior ad Iformed Coset (FPIC) ad Recourse Mechaisms which ca be used to guide atioal UN-REDD activities aroud the world. 124 A third regioal cosultatio will take place i Africa i Jauary Sharig resposibility for maagig corruptio risk While much focus is ofte placed o the eed for developig coutries to proactively address corruptio risks, developed coutries should recogise that they too have a resposibility to reduce corruptio risks i REDD+, as well as i adaptatio. Developed coutries are i a positio to cotrol the supply side risks of corruptio, also referred to as active bribery 125 which occurs whe the door coutry or a private sector ivestor (i the case of REDD+, from a developed coutry) egages i corruptio by bribig or coercig public sector officials i developig coutries i retur for favourable treatmet. Actios which ca be take by developed coutries to share resposibility for corruptio risk iclude: Ratifyig ad fully implemetig the 1997 OECD Ati-Bribery Covetio of Foreig Officials i Iteratioal Busiess Trasactios, ad specifically eforcig it i the cotext of REDD+ ad adaptatio. 126 This Covetio requires sigatory States to make it a crimial offece uder domestic law for ay perso or compay to bribe a foreig public official (legislative, admiistrative or judicial) i order to obtai or retai iteratioal busiess. 124 For more iformatio o the UN-REDD roud of cosultatios o FPIC ad Recourse mechaisms i the Asia-Pacific regio, see ; ad i Lati America / Caribbea, see UNODC (2004), The Global Programme Agaist Corruptio: UN Ati-Corruptio Toolkit, 3rd ed, VieaChapter All Aex 1 coutries have ratified the OECD Ati-Bribery Covetio except Belarus, Croatia, Latvia, Liechtestei, Lithuaia, Moaco, Romaia, Russia Federatio ad Ukraie. Three REDD+ coutries have ratified the Covetio: Argetia, Brazil ad Chile. Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 47

50 3 corruptio risks ad ati-corruptio measures i redd+ Box 12: Bribery Act 2010, UK A example of the implemetatio of UNCAC is the Uited Kigdom s Bribery Act 2010, which is scheduled to come ito force i April The Act makes it a crimial offece for a perso or corporatio icorporated i the UK, or a compay that carries o ay part of its busiess i the UK, to bribe ay public foreig official who holds a legislative, admiistrative or judicial positio of ay kid. 128 Itroducig legislatio which requires corporatios ivolved i accessig REDD+ reveues (by receivig fuds or REDD+ credits) to disclose ay paymet they make to developig coutry govermets to access their carbo. Box 13: Dodd-Frak Wall Street Reform ad Cosumer Protectio Act A example of legislatio which requires atural resource reveue trasparecy is the Dodd-Frak Wall Street Reform ad Cosumer Protectio Act which was passed by the US Cogress i July Sectio 1504 of the Act requires all U.S. ad foreig compaies registered with the US Securities ad Exchage Commissio (SEC) to disclose i their aual reports how much they pay foreig govermets for access to their oil, atural gas ad mierals The UK Bribery Act 2010 supplemets the provisios of the UK s Ati-terrorism, Crime ad Security Act 2001, which was oly ever iteded to be a temporary measure to implemet the OECD Ati-Bribery Covetio. 128 UK Bribery Act 2010, s For more detail o this legislatio, see disclosure-paymets-resource-extractio-issuers. 48 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

51 4 coclusios ad key recommedatios The prospect of icreased iteratioal fudig for adaptatio ad mitigatio activities for developig coutries creates may opportuities. However, it also presets a wide rage of corruptio risks. Give the urgecy of both mitigatio ad adaptatio, it is imperative to develop ways to address these risks i order to egage i effective actio o climate chage, ad so as to cotiue progress towards the realisatio of the MDGs. There is much that ca be doe to reduce the corruptio risks of climate chage i facig adaptatio ad REDD+. With the desig phase for both adaptatio ad atioal REDD+ frameworks curretly uderway, there is ow a uique widow of opportuity to build o the existig work detailed i this paper to address corruptio risks. The key overarchig recommedatios of this paper, that apply to both adaptatio ad REDD+, are as follows: Risk assessmets should be developed ad udertake i partership with local stakeholders i order to ascertai the coditio of the geeral goverace framework i the coutry cocered, ad to tailor ati-corruptio measures; to the coutry circumstaces; UNCAC should be used as a guide to develop a comprehesive ati-corruptio framework for adaptatio ad REDD+ activities, ad for the small umber of coutries who have ot yet ratified UNCAC, assistace should be provided to them to do so; Multi-stakeholder mechaisms should be established as tools to improve trasparecy ad accoutability which ca guide the developmet of ad moitor the implemetatio of adaptatio ad REDD+ activities; Support should be provided to improve the capacity of developig coutries to admiister the fuds aticipated to arrive for adaptatio ad REDD+, ad to stregthe their systems for public fiacial maagemet ad procuremet; Support should be provided to facilitate participatio of civil society ad to assist civil society orgaisatios them to play a watch dog role; Idepedet recourse ad complaits mechaisms should be established to improve trasparecy ad accoutability at all levels; Support should be provided to ati-corruptio bodies to build their capacity to raise awareess, to develop ad implemet prevetive mechaisms such as system audits ad to ivestigate ad moitor corruptio cases related to adaptatio ad REDD+ activities; ad Support should be provided to trasparecy ad accoutability i local goverace istitutios ad systems. Fially, it must be recogised that the resposibility to mitigate corruptio risks i adaptatio ad REDD+ does ot lie solely with developig coutries. Both developed ad developig coutries must take actio to mitigate corruptio risks i adaptatio ad REDD+ to maximise the effectiveess of such activities for developig coutries. Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 49

52 refereces Treaties, covetios, COP decisios Uited Natios Framework Covetio o Climate Chage 1992 Bali Actio Pla, UNFCCC Decisio 1/CP.13; ad Decisio 2/CP.13. UNFCCC Decisio 2/CP.15 otig the Copehage Accord SBSTA decisio 4/CP.15 o Methodological guidace for activities relatig to reducig emissios from deforestatio ad forest degradatio ad the role of coservatio, sustaiable maagemet of forests ad ehacemet of forest carbo stocks i developig coutries, 11 December 2009, FCCC/SBSTA/2009/L.19/Add.1 Advace Versio, Negotiatig Text, of the Ad Hoc Workig Group o Log-term Cooperative Actio uder the Covetio, 13 August 2010, (FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/14). OECD Covetio o Combatig Bribery of Foreig Public Officials i Iteratioal Busiess Trasactios 1997 Uited Natios Covetio agaist Corruptio CAC/idex.html Regioal treaties Iter-America Covetio Agaist Corruptio 1996 Africa Covetio o Corruptio Prevetio 2003 Natioal legislatio Bribery Act 2010 (UK) Dodd-Frak Wall Street Reform ad Cosumer Protectio Act (US) Idigeous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (Philippies) UN/UNDP/UN-REDD resources IPCC (2007) Fourth Assessmet report of the Itergovermetal Pael o Climate Chage IPCC (2008) IPCC Techical Paper VI: Climate chage ad water IPCC UNDP (December 2008) Corruptio ad Developmet: Ati-corruptio Itervetios for Poverty Reductio, Realizatio of the MDGs ad Promotig Sustaiable Developmet, Primer o Corruptio ad Developmet, New York, USA Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

53 refereces UNDP (2007/2008) Fightig climate chage: Huma solidarity i a divided world Huma Developmet Report, UNDP (May 2008) Tacklig corruptio, trasformig lives: Acceleratig Huma Developmet i Asia ad Pacific, Asia-Pacific Huma Developmet Report series, Macmilla Publishers Idia Ltd, at UNDP (December 2008) Maistreamig Ati-Corruptio i Developmet: Ati-corruptio practice ote, at UNDP (2008), Thematic Programme o Ati-Corruptio for Developmet Effectiveess (PACDE), Project Documet UNDP (2010), What will it take to achieve the Milleium Developmet Goals? A iteratioal assessmet, U.S., UNEP (2008) Public Fiace Mechaisms to mobilize ivestmet i climate chage mitigatio, UNEP, Default.aspx UNDP (2008) Climate Chage at UNDP: Scalig Up to Meet the Challege, New York, UNDP Eviromet ad Eergy Group, UNDP (2010) Advacig Climate Chage Adaptatio i Developig Coutries: A Overview of the UNDP-GEF Portfolio, New York, UNDP Bureau for Developmet Policy, documets/publicatios/efs_adaptatio.pdf UNESCO (2009) The 3rd Uited Natios World Water Developmet Report: Water i a Chagig World, UNESCO, UNFCCC (2010) Adaptatio Assessmet, Plaig ad Practice: A overview of the Nairobi Work Programme o Impacts, Vulerability ad Adaptatio to Climate Chage, ufccc.it/resource/docs/ publicatios/10_wp_adap_assess_e.pdf UNFCCC (2007) Climate Chage: Impacts, Vulerabilities ad Adaptatio i Developig Coutries, Bo, Germay (hard copy versio dated 2008) impacts.pdf UNFCCC (2009) Iformatio o fiacial support provided by the Global Eviromet Facility for the preparatio of atioal commuicatios from Parties ot icluded i Aex I to the Covetio, FCCC/ SBI/2009/INF.5 UNFCCC (2009) Least Developed Coutries uder the UNFCCC, Bo, Germay, ufccc.it/resource/ docs/publicatios/ldc_brochure2009.pdf Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 51

54 refereces UNFCCC (2010) Views ad iformatio o the effectiveess of the Nairobi work programme o impacts, vulerability ad adaptatio to climate chage i fulfillig its objective, expected outcome, scope of work ad modalities, FCCC/SBSTA/2010/Misc.8 September 21, ufccc.it/resource/ docs/covkp/coveg.pdf UNODC (2004), The Global Programme Agaist Corruptio: UN Ati-Corruptio Toolkit, 3rd ed, Viea, at UN-REDD Programme (Nov 2009), Egagig Civil Society i REDD Best Practice i the Democratic Republic of Cogo, at laguage/e-us/default.aspx UN-REDD Programme, (2010) Desig of a REDD-Compliat Beefit Distributio System for Viet Nam, GTZ, at UN-REDD Programme 2010 Scope of work : Multi -stakeholder coutry-led goverace assessmets for REDD+, draft available at docma&task=doc_dowload&gid=3677&itemid=53 Articles, books Alema, A., et al (2010), Realisig rights, protectig forests: A alterative visio for Reducig Deforestatio Case studies from the Accra Caucus, Accra Caucus o Forests ad Climate Chage. Agelse, A., (2008) How do we set the referece levels for REDD paymets?, i Movig Ahead with REDD: Issues, Optios ad Implicatios, Agelse, A. (ed.), CIFOR, Bogor, Idoesia. Agelse, A., Brow, S., Loisel, C., Peskett, L., Streck, C., Zari, D., (2009), Reducig Emissios from Deforestatio ad Forest Degradatio (REDD): A Optios Assessmet Report, prepared for the Govermet of Norway, Meridia Istitute, available at Agelse, A., with Brockhaus, M., Kaie, M., Sills, E., Suderli., W.D. ad Wertz-Kaouikoff, S. (eds)(2009), Realisig REDD+: Natioal strategy ad policy optios. CIFOR, Bogor, Idoesia. Bappeas (Departmet of Plaig, Idoesia), Draft Natioal Strategy REDD+ (3 Sept 2010), Govermet of Idoesia, DRAFT1_Eg.pdf Backgroud Aalysis of REDD Regulatory Frameworks, UN-REDD Programme ad Terrestrial Carbo Group, May 2009, prepared by Covigto & Burlig LLP ad Baker & McKezie, available at Barr, C., Dermawa, A., Puromo, H. Ad Komarudi, H Fiacial goverace ad Idoesia s Reforestatio Fud durig the Soeharto ad post-soeharto periods, : a political ecoomic aalysis of lessos for REDD+. Occasioal paper 52. CIFOR, Bogor, Idoesia. 52 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

55 refereces Bludell, A. G., ad Harwell, EE. (2009) Maual: A aalysis of corruptio i the forestry sector, Trasparecy Iteratioal ad Natural Capital Advisors, at LLC at uploads/forestsectorcorruptiotoolsov09final.pdf Brow, M.L. (2010), Limitig Corrupt Icetives i a Global REDD Regime, 37 Ecology L.Q Brucker, T. ad Etie,J. The America Eterprise Istitute (2010) The UN s World Food Program claims that allegatios of a scadal i Somalia are overblow ad isolated, 11 April, The Govermet Moitor, Chee, M., Impact of corruptio o idigeous peoples, (2010) U4 Expert Aswer ( Chetwyd, Eric, B Chetwyd ad B Spector (2003) Corruptio ad Poverty: A Review of Recet Literature, Paul Costace (2005) Are Cooperatives a better way to solve Lati America s water problems? IDB America, Cortez, R., Saies, R., Griscom, B., Marti, M., De Deo, D., Fishbei, G., Kerkerig, K., ad Marsh, D., (2010), A Nested Approach to REDD+ - Structurig effective ad trasparet icetive mechaisms for REDD+ implemetatio at multiple scales, published by The Nature Coservacy ad Baker & McKezie, 2010 < fial_60110.pdf Cotula, L., ad Mayers, J., (2009) Teure i REDD Start-poit or afterthought? Natural Resources Issues No 15. Iteratioal Istitute for Eviromet ad Developmet. Lodo, UK. Davis, C., Goverace i REDD+: Takig stock of goverace issues raised i readiess proposals submitted to the FCPF ad the UN-REDD Programme, prepared for Expert Workshop, 24th-25th May 2010, Chatham House, Lodo, Backgroud Paper Two, available at Evets/Catham_House_Workshop/tabid/4522/Default.aspx FIELD (2010), The Iterim REDD+ Partership: Briefig Note, (October 2010), Foudatio for Iteratioal Evirometal Law ad Developmet, available at < Fritz, V., ad Kolstad, I., Kolstad (2008) Corruptio ad aid modalities, Berge, Norway: U4. GEF (2009) Fiacig Adaptatio Actio, GEF, Glemarec, Y., Waissbei, O., ad Bayraktar, H., (2010), Huma Developmet i a Chagig Climate: A Framework for Climate Fiace Discussio Paper, New York, UNDP eglish/professioal/publicatios/v.php?id=15710 Groewold, N., Climate Chage, Deforestatio ad Corruptio Combie to Drow a Regio, The New York Times, 13 October, 2010, at < Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 53

56 refereces Hamilto, K., Chokkaligam, U., ad Bedaa, M., (2010a), State of the Forest Carbo Markets 2009: Takig Root & Brachig Out, Ecosystem Marketplace, at pages/dyamic/resources.library.page.php?page_id=7525&sectio=our_publicatios&eod=1 Helm, D., (2007), Climate chage: Sustaiable growth, markets, ad istitutios, i UNDP (2008) Fightig climate chage: Huma solidarity i a divided world Huma Developmet Report hdr.udp.org/e/reports/global/hdr / Isema, P., ad Shakow, A., (2010) Door Schizophreia ad Aid Effectiveess: The role of Global Fuds, Istitute of Developmet Studies, Practice Paper 5, Uiversity of Sussex, Brighto, UK, at Jacobso, Maria ad Haka Tropp (2010) Addressig corruptio i climate chage water adaptatio 9 Review of Evirometal Sciece ad Biotechology 81 cotet/153567m15k17074w/ Kolstad, I.,, Fritz, V., ad O Neil, T., (2008), Corruptio, Ati-corruptio Efforts ad Aid: Do Doors Have the Right Approach? Lodo: Overseas Developmet Istitute politics_ad_goverace/publicatios/gapwp3.pdf La Via, A. G. M., (2010) The Future of REDD-Plus: Pathways of Covergece for the UNFCCC Negotiatios ad the Partership, Workig Paper, Foudatio for Iteratioal Evirometal Law ad Developmet, at Layde, M., (2010) U4 Expert Aswer: The status of iformatio o corruptio i the forestry sector, No 227, U4 Ati-Corruptio Resource Cetre, Trasparecy Iteratioal at Leeso, P. T., ad Sobel, R.S., (2008), Weatherig Corruptio, 51 The Joural of Law ad Ecoomics 667, pp Natioal Lad Developmet Taskforce Report: Lad Admiistratio, Lad Dispute Settlemet, ad Customary Lad Use Developmet, prepared by the NLDT Committees o Lad Admiistratio, Lad Dispute Settlemet, ad Customary Lad Developmet, published by the Natioal Research Istitute (PNG), NRI Moograph 39, February NOAA (2010) State of the Climate 2009, NOAA, OECD Developmet Cooperatio Report (2010), Report by Eckhard Deutscher, Chair of the Developmet Assistace Committee, at fulltext/ e.pdf?expires= &id=0000&accame=guest&checksum= d3 BFAD28EE1C37CAF934F08 Oxfam (2010) Rightig two wrogs: Makig a ew Global Climate Fud work for poor people, Briefig Note October 6, 54 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

57 refereces Report of the Iformal Workig Group o Iterim Fiace for REDD, 2009 Sauders, J., ad Reeve, R., Moitorig Goverace Safeguards i REDD+, Expert Workshop, 24th- 25th May 2010, Chatham House, Lodo, Backgroud Paper Oe, available at org/evets/catham_house_workshop/tabid/4522/default.aspx Ster, Nicholas (2007) Ster Review: The Ecoomics of Climate Chage, Office of Climate Chage, Suderli, WD., Hatcher, J., ad Liddle, M., (2008), From Exclusio to Owership? Challeges ad Opportuities i Advacig Forest Teure Reform, Rights ad Resources Iitiative, available at Swedish Water House (2006) Corruptio i the Water Sector: Causes, Cosequeces ad Potetial Reform, Swedish Water House Policy Brief No. 4, SIWI, Taccoi, L., Dows, F., ad Larmour, P., (2009) Ati-corruptio policies i the forest sector ad REDD+, Chapter 13 i Agelse, A with Brockhous, M., Kaie, M., Sills, E., Suderli, W.D., ad Wertz- Kaouikoff, S., (eds), Realisig REDD+: Natioal strategy ad policy optios, CIFOR, Bogor, Idoesia Takacs, D., (2009) Forest Carbo Law + Property Rights, Coservatio Iteratioal, Arligto VA, USA. Tararia, A., ad Ogle, L., (2010) Icorporated lad groups ad the registratio of customary lads: Recet developmets i PNG, published i I Defece of Melaesia Customary Lad, Aderso, T., ad Lee, G. (eds), published by AID/WATCH, Sydey, Australia, available at: < au/publicatios/publicatio-i-defece-of-melaesia-customary-lad> The World Bak (2006), Stregtheig Forest Law Eforcemet ad Goverace: Addressig a Systemic Costrait to Sustaiable Developmet, Report No GLB, The Iteratioal Bak for Recostructio ad Developmet / The World Bak. Thorpe, A (2009) Fast start fudig for adaptatio to climate chage i Small Islad Developig States EDO Briefig ote, December 11 Trasparecy Iteratioal (2007) Poverty, Aid ad Corruptio TI Policy Positio #01/ Trasparecy Iteratioal (2008) Global Corruptio Report 2008: Corruptio i the Water Sector, Berli, Germay Trasparecy Iteratioal (2009) Cotrollig Corporate Lobbyig ad Fiacig of Political Activities TI Policy Positio #06/ positios/pp_6_2009_corp_lobbyig Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 55

58 refereces Trasparecy Iteratioal (2009) Global Corruptio Report 2009: Corruptio ad the Private Sector, Cambridge Uiversity Press, Trasparecy Iteratioal (2009) The Ati-Corruptio Plai Laguage Guide, Vidal, Joh (2010) Climate aid threat to coutries that refuse to back Copehage accord The Observer, Suday 11 April 2010, climate-aid-threats-copehage-accord vo Scheliha, S., Hecht, B., ad Christopherse, T., (2009), Biodiversity ad Livelihoods: REDD Beefits, Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Techische Zusammearbeit (GTZ) ad CBD, at publicatios/for-redd-e.pdf Water Itegrity Network (2010) WIN Expert Cosultatio o Water, Corruptio ad Climate Chage, Water Itegrity Network, WHO (2010) Good Goverace for Medicies, WHO, idex.html WHO (2010) Medicies: Corruptio ad Pharmaceuticals, WHO Factsheet, mediacetre/factsheets/fs335/e/idex.html World Bak (1997), Helpig Coutries Combat Corruptio: The Role of the World Bak, Poverty Reductio ad Ecoomic Maagemet, corrupt/coridx.htm World Bak ad Iteratioal Bak for Recostructio ad Developmet (2010) World Developmet Report 2010, WB ad IBRD, page=product_ifo&cpath=0&products_id= Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

59 Aex A: List of developig coutries participatig i the UN-REDD Programme ad the FCPF Africa Potetial REDD+ coutry UN-REDD Programme World Bak FCPF UNCAC Democratic Republic of the Cogo Yes- Pilot 132 Yes No Cameroo Yes 2006 Iter-America Covetio Agaist Corruptio 130 Africa Covetio o Prevetig ad Combatig Corruptio 131 Ratificatio, acceptace, approval, accessio, successio Siged 2003, but ot ratified Siged 2008, but ot ratified Cetral Africa Republic Yes Yes 2006 No Equatorial Guiea Yes No Siged 2005, but ot ratified Ethiopia Yes Gabo Yes Yes Ghaa Yes Keya Yes Yes Liberia Yes Madagascar Yes Mozambique Yes Nigeria Yes Republic of Cogo Yes Yes Suda Yes No. Siged i 2005, but ot ratified Siged 2008, but ot ratified Ugada Yes Uited Republic of Tazaia Yes- Pilot Yes Zambia Yes- Pilot Sub-total = Not ratified: 3 Not ratified: Source: accessed o 22 October Source: accessed o 22October 2010, list dated 6 August Pilot meas that the coutry i oe of the 9 iitial pilot coutries eligible to receive fudig uder the UN-REDD Programme to develop ad implemet a atioal REDD+ strategy. Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 57

60 Aex A: List of developig coutries participatig i the UN-REDD Programme ad the FCPF Asia - Pacific Potetial REDD+ coutry UN-REDD Programme World Bak FCPF UNCAC Bagladesh Yes 2007 Bhuta Yes Iter-America Covetio Agaist Corruptio 130 Africa Covetio o Prevetig ad Combatig Corruptio 131 Ratificatio, acceptace, approval, accessio, successio Siged (2005) but ot ratified Cambodia Yes Yes 2007 Idoesia Yes - Pilot Yes 2006 Lao People s Democratic Republic Yes 2009 Nepal Yes Yes No. Siged i 2003, but ot ratified. Papua New Guiea Yes- Pilot Yes 2007 Philippies Yes 2006 Solomo Islads Yes No Sri Laka Yes 2004 Thailad Yes No. Siged i 2003, but ot ratified. Vauatu Yes No Viet Nam Yes- Pilot Yes 2009 Sub-total = Not ratified: 5 Lati America - Caribbea Argetia Yes Yes Bolivia Yes- Pilot Yes Chile Yes Colombia Yes Yes Costa Rica Yes Yes Ecuador Yes El Salvador Yes Guatemala Yes Yes Guyaa Yes Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

61 Aex A: List of developig coutries participatig i the UN-REDD Programme ad the FCPF Potetial REDD+ coutry UN-REDD Programme World Bak FCPF UNCAC Iter-America Covetio Agaist Corruptio 130 Hoduras Yes Mexico Yes Yes Nicaragua Yes Paama Yes- Pilot Yes Paraguay Yes- Pilot Yes Peru Yes Suriame Yes No 2002 Sub-total = Total coutries = Africa Covetio o Prevetig ad Combatig Corruptio 131 Ratificatio, acceptace, approval, accessio, successio Not ratified = 1 Not ratified = 0 Not ratified = 9 N/A N/A Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 59

62 aex b: map of corruptio risks i climate chage adaptatio at the coutry level Activity Actors ivolved Corruptio threat Demad side Supply side Plaig ad Settig Priorities for Adaptatio Corrupt practice Risk assessmet Cosultatio with stakeholders Political elite Officials Ladowers Cosultats Egieers Suppliers NGOs State capture Extortio, solicitatio ad clietelism by officials, e.g. Vested iterests give ufair access to decisio-makers Medium - High risk Iformatio released selectively Bribery, fraud ad collusio by groups seekig favourable treatmet, e.g. Promotig adoptio of particular techologies or methods Seekig preferece for particular properties or regios Idetificatio ad prioritisatio of adaptatio actios Officials Miisters Political elite Ladowers Officials Cosultats Egieers Suppliers NGOs State capture leadig to poor plaig, reducig capacity to respod to climate chage ad build resiliece to future impacts Bribery, patroage, epotism ad clietelism, e.g. Selectio of projects, properties ad techologies favourig vested iterests Abuse of discretio to prioritise activities that maximise potetial for ret-seekig, e.g. Medium risk Capital-itesive ifrastructure projects over ecosystem-based adaptatio ad commuity-based maagemet Complex licesig ad regulatory systems 60 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

63 aex b: map of corruptio risks i climate chage adaptatio at the coutry level Activity Actors ivolved Corruptio threat Demad side Supply side Implemetatio of Adaptatio Programmes ad Projects Project, programme ad regulatory desig Miisters Political elite Officials Ladowers Egieers, costructio ad other cosultats State capture, abuse of discretio Iefficiet use of resources, failure to build resiliece, maladaptatio Corrupt practice Bribery, epotism, clietelism ad croyism, e.g. Preferece to adaptatio activities favorig vested iterests, rather tha areas of greater vulerability Weak eforcemet of evirometal impact assessmet procedures ad other regulatory requiremets Abuse of discretio to develop rules that will eable ret-seekig i the implemetatio of fuds, e.g. Complex projects ad regulatory systems with high levels of discretio that may be used to seek kickbacks from cotractors or to sipho fuds for other purposes Fraud, theft ad collusio, e.g. Seekig fudig for idetical results through differet adaptatio programmes/projects Corporate iterests seekig adoptio of particular techologies Risk assessmet Medium - High risk Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 61

64 aex b: map of corruptio risks i climate chage adaptatio at the coutry level Activity Actors ivolved Corruptio threat Demad side Supply side Procuremet Miisters Political Elite Officials Cotractors ad Cosultats Egieers Costructio Cosultats Poor quality, icomplete projects, iefficiet use of resources, failure to build resiliece, maladaptatio Corrupt practice Bribery, solicitatio, epotism, clietelism ad croyism, e.g. Tailorig of project requiremets to suit particular bidders Over-statig project requiremets Iadequate advertisig, short biddig times to eable officials to solicit bribes for iformatio ad cotract awards Withholdig iformatio/ access to teder process, chargig for iformatio/ access Weak eforcemet of cotract requiremets, evirometal impact assessmet ad regulatory requiremets Collusio betwee idustry stakeholders, particularly egieerig ad costructio firms, e.g. Pre-agreemet o prices, cotract coditios Theft, fraud ad embezzlemet, e.g. O-sellig of equipmet Risk assessmet Medium risk Over-billig Siphoig of project fuds Cocealig substadard work Providig sub-stadard equipmet, drugs, food ad water Appoitmet of staff ad committee members Political Elite Officials Idustry Miisters Political Elite Officials Reduced capacity to respod to adaptatio eeds ad build resiliece Favouritism, epotism, clietelism ad croyism, e.g. Officials grat favourable roles to their frieds, families ad busiess associates High risk Bribery ad solicitatio, e.g. Buyig ad sellig certai roles with high ret-seekig potetial 62 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

65 aex b: map of corruptio risks i climate chage adaptatio at the coutry level Activity Actors ivolved Corruptio threat Demad side Supply side Service delivery Officials Cotractors Trasporters Idustry Households Irrigators Petty corruptio iflatig the cost ad reducig the quality ad accessibility of services Corrupt practice Bribery, extortio ad solicitatio, e.g. Extra-legal charges for coectios, services, deliveries, expeditig repairs ad processig licece applicatios Over-billig to eable officials to obtai bribes to revise bills Theft ad fraud, e.g. Illegal o-sellig of food, medicies ad other equipmet Illegal coectios to supplies Risk assessmet High risk Diversio of maiteace fudig Bribery, epotism ad clietelism, e.g. Weak eforcemet of regulatios ad allocatios Preferetial treatmet i licesig ad allocatios for certai idustries or regios Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 63

66 aex c: ucac as a ati-corruptio framework for adaptatio The table below provide a example of UNCAC might be used as a ati-corruptio framework to guide aticorruptio measures i adaptatio. 133 UNCAC Article Obligatio o State Chapter II - Prevetive measures Article 5: Ati-corruptio policies To develop, implemet ad maitai effective ad coordiated ati-corruptio policies that promote participatio, trasparecy ad accoutability Implicatios for adaptatio plaig Is the coutry a party to UNCAC ad if it is a dualist coutry has it implemeted ati-corruptio legislatio? Does adaptatio plaig cosider the coutry s ati-corruptio legislatio, policies ad guidelies? Does adaptatio plaig at the atioal ad local level ivolve participatio of climate chage affected commuities? Article 6: Prevetive aticorruptio bodies Article 7: Public sector To establish a idepedet body or bodies (eg corruptio commissios, Corruptio Court) to implemet ati-corruptio policies ad to dissemiate kowledge o corruptio prevetio To adopt, maitai ad stregthe systems for the recruitmet, hirig, retetio promotio ad retiremet of civil servats... that iclude traiig of idividuals for public positios cosidered especially vulerable to corruptio to ehace their awareess of the risks of corruptio. Is the adaptatio plaig process trasparet ad is it doe by a rage of govermet bodies or departmets (eg water, fisheries, plaig, coastal, health departmets)? Is there a cetral body that reviews atioal adaptatio plas before they are set out to the UNFCCC? Ca local commuities review or commet o govermet decisios at each of the adaptatio plaig stages? How is adaptatio fiacig ad ODA admiistered by the govermet ad are there ati-corruptio policies dealig with this? Which govermet departmet is held accoutable to iteratioal fudig bodies for use of the adaptatio fuds? Is there a idepedet corruptio body established? If so, do adaptatio plaig activities ad adaptatio fiacig fall withi the remit of relevat corruptio bodies? Do these bodies cosider that climate chage adaptatio is a area that could be ripe for corruptio i such coutry ad are they aware of the risks? Ca the corruptio bodies review the admiistratio of adaptatio plaig ad fiacig by the relevat govermet bodies? Are civil servats that udertake adaptatio assessmet ad plaig required to udergo traiig ad does this traiig iclude aticorruptio traiig? Are there ay civil servats curretly ivolved i adaptatio plaig that have a history of corrupt activities? Are civil servats experieced i the admiistratio of ODA? 133 The idea for this table was draw from UNDP Ati-corruptio Guidace Note (2008), p 9, Table 3 which cotais a table settig out UNCAC as a democratic goverace ad developmet framework. 64 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

67 aex c: ucac as a ati-corruptio framework for adaptatio UNCAC Article Article 8: Codes of coduct for public officials Article 9: Public procuremet ad maagemet of public fiace Article 10: Public reportig Article 11: Judiciary ad prosecutio services Article 12: Private sector Obligatio o State To apply codes or stadards of coduct to ecourage the proper performace of public fuctios, to facilitate reportig by public officials of acts of corruptio, ad to require public officials to declare coflicts of iterest To take steps to establish appropriate systems of procuremet, based o trasparecy, competitio ad objective criteria. To take measure to promote trasparecy ad accoutability i the maagemet of public fiaces. To take measures to adopt procedures or regulatios allowig members of the public to obtai iformatio o the orgaizatio, fuctioig ad decisio-makig processes of public admiistratio. Publishig iformatio o the risks of corruptio i public admiistratio. To take measures to stregthe itegrity ad to prevet opportuities for corruptio amog members of the judiciary, e.g. through rules of coduct To take measures to prevet corruptio ivolvig the private sector. Implicatios for adaptatio plaig Does the coutry have ay codes or legislatio i place dealig with corruptio? Is there whistle-blowig legislatio i place or a culture of whistle-blowig for acts of corruptio? Are there ay coflicts of iterest betwee public officials private iterests (eg compay shareholdigs, family busiesses) ad the public adaptatio plaig? Further, is there traiig o coflicts of iterest ad procedures i place for dealig with coflicts of iterest whe they arise? Is there a process i place to deal with the procuremet of cotracts for ifrastructure projects ad delivery of public services? Is there a trasparet biddig process for ifrastructure projects ad delivery of public services? Are the public able to review decisios made for procuremet ad are state fiaces audited ad available for public review ad commet? Are adaptatio plaig processes trasparet, allowig local commuities to participate ad raise cocers at relevat stages of the decisio-makig process (eg coastal adaptatio plaig should cosult coastal commuities)? Ca commuities obtai public iformatio o adaptatio plaig ad are they provided with iformatio ad educatio regardig the process (icludig i o-iteret based formats as may poor commuities may ot have iteret access)? Are ay publicatios o the risks of corruptio i the public sector provided to local commuities? Is there corruptio withi the judiciary ad are there possible coflicts of iterest betwee members of the judiciary ad adaptatio plaig projects (eg where a member of the judiciary may have busiesses/ cotacts i adaptatio ifrastructure projects)? Are adaptatio plaig decisios subject to judicial review ad if so, are there guidelies for review? Are the judiciary educated about the corruptio risks ivolved with adaptatio plaig? Are there codes ad/or legislatio developed to esure adaptatio plaig is ot subject to corrupt practices at both the iteratioal, atioal ad local levels? Do compaies ad cotractors operatig withi the coutry have iteral codes of coduct that prevet corrupt practices ad if so, are these codes eforced? Are foreig compaies ad cotractors that may be ivolved i adaptatio activities (e.g. istalmet of ifrastructure) parties to UNCAC ad do they have adequate ad eforceable codes ad/or legislatio? Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 65

68 aex c: ucac as a ati-corruptio framework for adaptatio UNCAC Article Article 13: Civil society Obligatio o State To promote the active participatio of idividuals ad groups outside the public sector, such as civil society, ogovermetal orgaizatios ad commuity-based orgaizatios, i the prevetio of ad fight agaist corruptio, e.g. by esurig that the public has effective access to iformatio. Chapter III Crimializatio ad law eforcemet Article 15: Bribery of atioal public officials Article 16: Bribery of foreig public officials ad officials of public iteratioal orgaisatios Article 17: Embezzlemet, misappropriatio of property by public official To adopt legislatio makig it a crimial offece to bribe a public official to iduce the official to act or refrai from actig i the exercise of his or her official duties. To adopt legislatio makig it a crimial offece to bribe to bribe a foreig public official or a official of a public iteratioal orgaizatio to iduce the official to act or refrai from actig i accordace with their duties. To adopt legislatio establishig as crimial offeces, the embezzlemet, misappropriatio or other diversio by a public official for his or her ow beefit of property or fuds etrusted to the public official. Implicatios for adaptatio plaig Ca the public freely participate i adaptatio plaig decisios ad is there capacity-buildig for NGOs? Are NGOs ad the press able to freely voice cocers over ay adaptatio plaig decisios? Is there adequate, accurate ad timely iformatio regardig adaptatio plaig dissemiated to the public ad the press? Are NGOs ad commuity-based orgaizatios free from corruptio? Is there atioal legislatio that makes bribery or such iducemet of a public official illegal? If so, is such legislatio adequately moitored ad eforced? Is there atioal legislatio that makes bribery or such iducemet of a foreig public official or public iteratioal orgaizatio illegal? If so, is such legislatio adequately moitored ad eforced? Is there atioal legislatio that makes it illegal for public officials to embezzle or misappropriate public fuds? Also, is it clear that ay adaptatio fudig is public fudig ad hece subject to this legislatio? 66 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

69 aex d: ucac as a ati-corruptio framework for redd+ The table below provide a example of UNCAC might be used as a ati-corruptio framework to guide aticorruptio measures i atioal REDD+ strategies. 134 UNCAC Article Chapter II - Prevetive measures Article 5: Ati-corruptio policies Article 6: Prevetive aticorruptio bodies Article 7: Public sector Article 8: Codes of coduct for public officials Article 9: Public procuremet ad maagemet of public fiace Article 10: Public reportig Obligatio o State To develop, implemet ad maitai effective ad coordiated ati-corruptio policies that promote participatio, trasparecy ad accoutability To establish a idepedet body or bodies (eg corruptio commissios, Corruptio Court) to implemet ati-corruptio policies ad to dissemiate kowledge o corruptio prevetio To adopt, maitai ad stregthe systems for the recruitmet, hirig, retetio promotio ad retiremet of civil servats... that iclude traiig of idividuals for public positios cosidered especially vulerable to corruptio to ehace their awareess of the risks of corruptio. To apply codes or stadards of coduct to ecourage the proper performace of public fuctios, to facilitate reportig by public officials of acts of corruptio, ad to require public officials to declare coflicts of iterest To take steps to establish appropriate systems of procuremet based o trasparecy, competitio ad objective criteria. To take measure to promote trasparecy ad accoutability i the maagemet of public fiaces. To take measures to adopt procedures or regulatios allowig members of the public to obtai iformatio o the orgaizatio, fuctioig ad decisio-makig processes of public admiistratio. Publishig iformatio o the risks of corruptio i public admiistratio. Implicatios for atioal REDD++ strategies Natioal REDD+ strategy should address the legal framework, strategies ad processes which will be used to address corruptio i REDD+. Does the atioal REDD+ strategy make provisio to lik REDD+ to the coutry s ati-corruptio bodies? Are the ati-corruptio bodies iformed about REDD+ ad prepared to implemet ati-corruptio measures ad to take eforcemet actio if idicatios of corruptio emerge i REDD+ activities? Does the atioal REDD+ strategy address the eed for civil service capacity buildig i the istitutios who will be resposible for implemetig REDD+ (Treasury, fiace, departmet of Forestry, departmet of Lads/ Plaig, etc)? Does the strategy iclude traiig for staff o the specific risks of corruptio i REDD+? Does the atioal REDD+ strategy idetify whether the istitutios resposible for implemetig REDD+ have codes of coduct which are suitable for REDD+? If ot, the strategy should idetify the eed to develop codes of coduct. Does the atioal REDD+ strategy idetify how REDD+ reveues will be admiistered i a maer that is trasparet ad accoutable? Does the atioal REDD+ strategy iclude freedom of iformatio provisios regardig decisio makig processes uder REDD+, e.g. i relatio to zoig decisios, applicatios for rezoig, REDD+ approvals, beefit distributio systems, eforcemet actio 134 The idea for this table was draw from UNDP Ati-corruptio Guidace Note (2008), p 9, Table 3 which cotais a table settig out UNCAC as a democratic goverace ad developmet framework. Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 67

70 aex d: ucac as a ati-corruptio framework for redd+ UNCAC Article Article 11: Judiciary ad prosecutio services Article 12: Private sector Article 13: Civil society Obligatio o State To take measures to stregthe itegrity ad to prevet opportuities for corruptio amog members of the judiciary, e.g. through rules of coduct To take measures to prevet corruptio ivolvig the private sector. To promote the active participatio of idividuals ad groups outside the public sector, such as civil society, o-govermetal orgaizatios ad commuity-based orgaizatios, i the prevetio of ad fight agaist corruptio, e.g. by esurig that the public has effective access to iformatio. Chapter III Crimializatio ad law eforcemet Article 15: Bribery of atioal public officials Article 16: Bribery of foreig public officials ad officials of public iteratioal orgaisatios Article 17: Embezzlemet, misappropriatio of property by public official To adopt legislatio makig it a crimial offece to bribe a public official to iduce the official to act or refrai from actig i the exercise of his or her official duties. To adopt legislatio makig it a crimial offece to bribe to bribe a foreig public official or a official of a public iteratioal orgaizatio to iduce the official to act or refrai from actig i accordace with their duties. To adopt legislatio establishig as crimial offeces, the embezzlemet, misappropriatio or other diversio by a public official for his or her ow beefit of property or fuds etrusted to the public official. Implicatios for atioal REDD++ strategies Does the atioal REDD+ strategy idetify the corruptio risk ivolvig the judiciary? Does the strategy iclude prosecutio guidelies? Does the strategy provide opportuities for judicial educatio o REDD+? Does the atioal REDD+ strategy address the risk of corruptio from the private sector i REDD+? Does atioal legislatio make it a crimial offece for private sector actors to egage i corrupt practices? Does the atioal REDD+ strategy provide for capacity buildig of NGOs egaged with REDD+? Does the strategy make provisio for access to iformatio? Does the atioal REDD+ strategy idetify whether such legislatio is i place, ad if ot, recommed that such legislatio be adopted as part of the REDD+ readiess process? Does the atioal REDD+ strategy idetify whether such legislatio is i place, ad if ot, recommed that such legislatio be adopted as part of the REDD+ readiess process? Does the atioal REDD+ strategy idetify whether such legislatio is i place, ad if ot, recommed that such legislatio be adopted as part of the REDD+ readiess process? 68 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

71 aex e: summary of potetial corruptio risks associated with redd+ 135 REGULATORY (establishig the rules) Actors Ivolved Corruptio Threat Corrupt Practice Ati-Corruptio measure/s Natioal Provicial Local Desig of atioal REDD+ framework geerally Parliametarias, political elites, iteratioal ad atioal loggig compaies, idustrial scale agribusiess (palm oil, sugarcae, soy, jatropha), multiatioal corporatios, project developers, military State capture allowig udue ifluece to affect desig of REDD+ strategy Political corruptio Grad corruptio Udue ifluece by political elite, loggig compaies, agribusiess, etc to prepare a weak atioal REDD+ framework, or to prepare a framework that will beefit powerful iterests Corruptio risk assessmet, followed by a detailed ad through aalysis of proposed framework, possibly uder a ecoomic ad social impact assessmet Multi-stakeholders cosultatios at all stages of developmet of atioal REDD+ framework (icludig atioal strategy, legislatio ad regulatios) Preparatio of iitial lad use plas for REDD+ (spatial plaig) Miistry/ Departmet of Plaig Miistry/ Departmet of Forestry Goverors ad provicial level lad use plaers Local govermet plaers State capture, political corruptio, grad corruptio ifluecig REDD+ lad use plas, resultig i failure to respect rights of idigeous peoples ad other forest-depedet commuities Udue ifluece or bribes to exclude high value timber cocessios from REDD+, while pressig for other areas which have already bee degraded (selectively logged) to be icluded i REDD+ lad use plas. Establish objective criteria to guide lad use plaig decisios (e.g. at risk factors to idetify forests to be covered, soil suitability, carbo sequestratio potetial, biodiversity values). All decisio makig rules ad idividual decisios to be made publicly available i a accessible format. 135 This Table is adapted from Trasparecy Iteratioal s maual aalysig corruptio i the forestry sector: see Bludell, AG. ad Harwell, EE. (2009) Maual: A aalysis of corruptio i the forestry sector, Trasparecy Iteratioal ad Natural Capital Advisors, LLC, at p 20 (Table 6), ad pp (Appedix 3) which cotais a geeric map of corrupt practices i the forestry sector, available at ifo/uploads/forestsectorcorruptiotoolsov09final.pdf Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 69

72 aex e: summary of potetial corruptio risks associated with redd+ 135 Actors Ivolved Corruptio Threat Corrupt Practice Ati-Corruptio measure/s Natioal Provicial Local Lad ad atural resource teure Parliamet, political elite, departmets of plaig ad forestry State capture ad political corruptio resultig i a failure to recogise customary lad teure Udue ifluece or bribery to resultig i failure to recogise competig rights of customary lad teure, so that political elites ca trump customary claims ad capture REDD reveues Capacity buildig for lad admiistratio sector. Assistace to NGOs who ofte assist customary commuities with lad registratio process. Allocatio of carbo rights Parliamet, political elites, powerful loggig compaies, project developers State capture, political corruptio or grad corruptio resultig i a iequitable allocatio of carbo rights uder legal REDD+ framework Udue ifluece to lik carbo rights to State ower lad titles or loggig cocessios, thus excludig customary commuities from cotrol of carbo resources (ad possibly REDD reveues) Udue ifluece to artificially iflate baselie so that excess ca be skimmed by corrupt officials at a later date; or to set timelie ad atioal circumstaces Close aalysis through multistakeholder cosultatios of proposed carbo rights allocatio rules Settig referece levels / emissio referece levels Miistry/ departmet of Forestry Political elites Powerful loggig or agribusiess compaies State capture, political corruptio, grad corruptio resultig i a over estimatio of atioal referece levels Collusio Clear guidace o establishig baselies to be give by SBSTA, with third party verificatio of omiated baselie Desig of beefit distributio systems (BDS) Miistry of Forestry, Miistry of Fiace, Political elites Political elites Political elites State capture, favouritism, epotism, croyism resultig i weak desig of fiacial maagemet system Udue ifluece o BDS which iflueces who receives REDD+ reveues ad beefits Improvemet of public fiacial maagemet Public fiacial reportig, multistakeholder body to oversee desig ad implemetatio of BDS 70 Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage

73 aex e: summary of potetial corruptio risks associated with redd+ 135 IMPLEMENTATION OF REDD+ Actors Ivolved Corruptio Threat Corrupt Practice Ati-Corruptio measure/s Natioal Provicial Local Lad admiistratio Lad admiistratio officials Lad admiistratio officials Bribery by multiatioal corporatios, project developers Bribery of lad admiistratio officials to overlook competig customary claims to lad title, or to create fraudulet lad titles Capacity buildig ad trasparecy i lad admiistratio sector Recourse mechaisms Spot rezoig of lad to permit (or exclude) REDD+ activities i specific areas Loggig operators Carbo brokers Local level public officials, loggig operators, carbo brokers Bribery Bribery of public sector officials to chage the zoig of a area to allow or exclude REDD+ Public otificatio ad call for public submissios for all rezoig applicatios ad rezoig decisios Carbo rights Plaig officials Project developers Local level plaig officials Bribery by corrupt actors of public officials resultig i the loss of carbo rights for idigeous peoples ad other forest-depedet commuities Bribery to overlooks competig claims to carbo rights or to frauduletly create or register carbo rights Capacity buildig for lad admiistratio sector All applicatios to register carbo rights ad decisio to register rights to be made publicly available Recourse mechaisms Carbo measuremet risks Public sector officials i forestry sector Local level public sector officials Petty bribery by project developer or at sub-atioal level Public sector officials overestimatig the amout of carbo emissio reductios or carbo sequestered C-MRV procedures Stayig o Track Tacklig Corruptio Risks i Climate Chage 71

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