The return to diplomatic normality promised by the new administration is not enough to promote U.S. interests in the Middle East.

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1 CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE FOREIGN POLICY for the Next Presidet December 2008 Sharig the Burde i the Middle East Maria Ottaway Seior Associate, Caregie Edowmet for Iteratioal Peace Summary The retur to diplomatic ormality promised by the ew admiistratio is ot eough to promote U.S. iterests i the Middle East. The Uited States should istead share the burde of peacemakig ad regioal security with Arab coutries. It should support several of the peace iitiatives udertake by Arab coutries ad ecourage them to take more resposibility. It should lear from the Bush admiistratio s failed attempt to build a ati-iraia alliace ad promote broad regioal dialogue o a regioal security arragemet. Sharig the burde is ot a abdicatio of the U.S. great power role, but a better policy to protect U.S. iterests. The Obama admiistratio will face a Middle East where the problems are eormous, U.S. iterests have shifted eastward, ad solutios are elusive. Major coflicts appear deadlocked: the peace process, political recociliatio i Iraq, ad egotiatios with Ira. The situatio i Afghaista ad Pakista is deterioratig rapidly. The ew admiistratio promises to brig to all these issues a welcome chage from its predecessor s attitudes: durig the electio campaig, Presidet-elect Barack Obama made it clear that he would resuscitate the idea that diplomacy, ot force, is the weapo of first resort, ad that diplomatic progress requires a willigess to talk to hostile, eve rogue, regimes. While this promised retur to diplomatic ormality is ecouragig, it will ot be eough. The Uited States caot break the deadlock o most issues without the help of coutries of the regio, sharig with them the burde ad the resposibility. This would ot be abdicatig the Uited States great power role, but rather recogizig chagig realities i the Middle East. The Bush admiistratio approached the Middle East with a iflated view of its power to impose solutios. The outcome has demostrated the limits of U.S. military ad political power. Military power has overthrow Saddam Hussei but ot built a stable Iraq, ad it has istalled a ew regime i Afghaista but ot stymied the resurgece of the Taliba; both coutries still deped heavily o the presece of U.S. troops. Politically, the Bush admiistratio has demostrated that a America decisio caot either democratize the Middle East or coax the peace process ito life.

2 2 POLICY BRIEF Maria Ottaway specializes i democracy ad post-coflict recostructio issues, with special focus o problems of political trasformatio i the Middle East ad recostructio i Iraq, Afghaista, the Balkas, ad Africa coutries. She is the director of the Caregie Middle East Program ad a seior associate i the Democracy ad Rule of Law Program, a research edeavor that aalyzes the state of democracy aroud the world ad the efforts by the Uited States ad other coutries to promote democracy. Before joiig the Edowmet, Ottaway carried out research i Africa ad i the Middle East for may years ad taught at the Uiversity of Addis Ababa, the Uiversity of Zambia, the America Uiversity i Cairo, ad the Uiversity of the Witwatersrad i South Africa. Her extesive research experiece is reflected i her publicatios, which iclude ie authored books ad five edited oes. Her most recet book, Beyod the Façade: Political Reform i the Arab World (edited with Julia Choucair-Vizoso), was published i Jauary While the distorted view of U.S. power i the Middle East was particularly egregious uder Bush, previous admiistratios also saw the Uited States as the key player i the regio, the idispesable atio without whose itervetio problems could ot be solved, as Secretary of State Madeleie Albright claimed. It is this assumptio of U.S. cetrality that the Obama admiistratio eeds to give up, because there are o solutios to ay of the Middle East s problems uless the local players do more themselves. Shiftig U.S. Iterests U.S. security iterests i the Middle East have shifted steadily away from the Levat sice the ed of the Cold War, yet U.S. policy has ot. As log as the major threats came from the Soviet bloc, Egypt was the most ifluetial coutry i the Middle East, the Suez Caal fully retaied its strategic ad ecoomic importace, ad the Levat was the atural ceter of U.S. security iterests. But the mai U.S. security iterests have sice moved eastward, with the major threats ow comig from Iraq, Ira, ad beyod ito Afghaista ad Pakista. Yet U.S. policy caot fully reflect this shift, because the Uited States remais strogly committed to safeguardig the security of the state of Israel ad thus remais emeshed i all the problems of the area. This poses a real dilemma for America foreig policy. While there is o possibility that the Uited States will reege o its commitmet to Israel ad wash its hads of the Arab Israeli coflict, that commitmet is a drai o U.S. political capital at a time whe Washigto eeds help i facig the threats further east. The Palestiia Israeli coflict cotiues to cosume U.S. diplomatic efforts without a payoff, remais a major irritat i the relatio betwee the Uited States ad Arab coutries, ad is the root cause of ati-americaism i the regio. The cotiuig coflict i Lebao ad Syria, with all its complex ramificatios, keeps the Uited States much more ivolved i the politics of the Levat tha it should be. Washigto has become etagled, repeatedly ad disastrously, i the sectaria politics of Lebao, i the relatios betwee Lebao ad Syria, ad i the rivalry betwee Hamas ad Fatah i Palestie, all issues of lesser importace tha the threats further east. The coflict betwee the eed to refocus o the security challeges further east ad the cotiuig drag of the Levat complicates U.S. policy. The Bush admiistratio made a bold ad ultimately disastrous attempt to break out of the old patter ad tur its attetio eastward i fact, this was explicitly part of Defese Secretary Doald Rumsfeld s strategy. But evetually it was forced to tur back to the Levat ad attempt to relauch the peace process. The assassiatio of former prime miister Rafik Hariri i Lebao i February 2005, the electio victory of Hamas i Palestie i Jauary 2006, ad the war betwee Israel ad Hizbollah i summer 2006 led the Bush admiistratio to re-egage i Lebao ad Syria. It still tried to igore the peace process, but it was forced to give i, reluctatly, i 2007, resultig i the coveig of the Aapolis coferece i November. It had o choice: coflicts were festerig i the regio, ad Arab coutries, whose support the Uited States sought agaist Ira, were makig it clear that they would ot cooperate willigly with the Uited States uless it reactivated the peace process. Sharig the Burde I addressig old ad ew problems, the ext admiistratio ca oly hope to achieve some success if it abados the uilateralism of the Bush admiistratio ad seeks to share the burde with other coutries, i particular, with regioal actors. This is ot a ideological choice, a abstract preferece for the priciple of multilateralism over the projectio of atioal power. It is simply a pragmatic respose to two realities: oe, the complexity ad urgecy of the problems with which the Uited States is faced together with the eces-

3 Sharig the Burde i the Middle East 3 sity of addressig them simultaeously, ad two, the demostrated uwilligess of most U.S. allies to simply follow the U.S. lead i the greater Middle East, eve whe they have similar cocers. U.S. leadership has foud few followers i the regio. Rather tha rallyig aroud U.S. policies, Arab coutries, particularly those i the Gulf, have udertake their ow diplomatic iitiatives ad tried to fid their ow solutios. The ew admiistratio eeds to work with such coutries, rather tha dismissig their efforts as irrelevat or, worse, a hidrace. Dealig With the Peace Process Acceptig a more multilateral approach to the Arab Israeli peace process would mark a sharp departure for U.S. policy. For years, the Uited States has portrayed itself as the oly coutry that ca broker peace i the Middle East because of its supposed leverage over Israel. For its part, Israel has fully supported this claim. U.S. attempts to moopolize the broker s role were uderstadable durig the Cold War, whe the Uited States feared that the participatio of the Soviet Uio o the side of Arabs ad Palestiias would greatly complicate the way to peace. It is much less justifiable ow, because it leads the Uited States to igore ad oppose the efforts of regioal actors who are the oes who have to make peace with Israel. Far from furtherig U.S. iterests ad demostratig U.S. power ad ifluece, moopolizig the peace process puts a huge burde o the Uited States, while allowig Arab coutries to complai edlessly about U.S. iactio, rather tha seekig to do somethig themselves. It also leads to periods of complete stasis whe U.S. attetio is focused elsewhere. The Obama admiistratio eeds to depart radically from the traditioal U.S. stace by welcomig ad workig with peace iitiatives take by regioal actors. Three curret Arab udertakigs could have a beeficial impact o the peace process: the Syria Israeli egotiatios, brokered by Turkey; the recociliatio talks betwee Hamas ad Fatah, i which Egypt is playig the leadig role with the agreemet of other Arab coutries; ad the Arab iitiative that was first proposed by Saudi Arabia i 2002 ad immediately edorsed by the Arab League. It calls upo Israel to retur to the 1967 borders, withdrawig its forces from all the occupied territories, icludig the Gola Heights; to recogize a idepedet Palestiia state with East Jerusalem as its capital; ad to egotiate a just solutio to the Palestiia refugee problem. I exchage, Arab states would establish ormal relatios with Israel ad declare the Arab Israeli coflict over. Properly uderstood ot as a take-it-or-leave-it solutio, but as the opeig gambit i a comprehesive process of egotiatios over territory, refugees, ad mutual acceptace, the Arab iitiative The Uited States caot break the deadlock o most issues without the help of coutries from the regio, sharig with them the burde ad the resposibility. offers more tha the Uited States ca the promise of a comprehesive peace, rather tha years of serial egotiatios with idividual coutries ad orgaizatios. The Arab iitiative remais o the table, ad Arab coutries periodically try to revive it i the weeks sice Obama s electio victory, a umber of Arab officials, icludig Palestiia Presidet Mahmoud Abbas, have urged the presidet-elect to support it. But Arab coutries have ot udertake the sustaied effort ecessary to trasform a geeral idea ito a detailed, workable agreemet. They fially set up a follow-up committee i April 2007, with members from a doze coutries ad the Palestiia Authority. The committee, however, was ot empowered to egotiate with Israel, although cotact through members that recogize the state of Israel was ot ruled out. The positio of the Uited States regardig all of these plas has raged from guarded to egative. The Uited States iitially advised

4 4 POLICY BRIEF Israel agaist egotiatios with Syria uder Turkish auspices. More recetly, the U.S. positio has shifted somewhat: with the egotiatios betwee Fatah ad Israel relauched at Aapolis makig o progress, the possibility of a peace deal with Syria is begiig to look like the oly possible positive developmet. Yet, most America supporters of the Syria optio claim that the Uited States should Rather tha rallyig aroud U.S. policies, Arab coutries, particularly those i the Gulf, have udertake their ow diplomatic iitiatives ad tried to fid their ow solutios. The ew admiistratio eeds to work with such coutries, rather tha dismissig their efforts as irrelevat or, worse, a hidrace. replace Turkey as mediator, usig the old argumet that there is o possibility of success uless the Uited States itervees. Isistig o U.S. mediatio, however, would likely lead to paralysis, because the ew Obama admiistratio could ot immediately ivest a lot i this udertakig ad risk failure. The U.S. positio o the Fatah Hamas recociliatio efforts remais egative. The Uited States cosiders Hamas a terrorist orgaizatio. Furthermore, it assumes that if the orgaizatio were ostracized ad isolated, Palestiias would withdraw their support from it ad tur to Fatah istead. Ufortuately, there is o evidece so far that this is happeig. The Bush admiistratio opposed early recociliatio efforts by Saudi Arabia, which mediated the February 2007 Mecca agreemet, leadig to the formatio of a short-lived govermet of atioal recociliatio. Istead, the Uited States cotiued supportig Fatah ad buildig up its security forces, cotributig to the demise of the govermet of atioal uity ad the fightig betwee the factios i May ad Jue As for the Arab iitiative, Washigto by ad large has igored it. The Obama admiistratio eeds to ecourage all three iitiatives. Ecouragig egotiatios betwee Syria ad Israel uder Turkish mediatio would be easy. It would oly require a sigal to all parties ad would ot get the ew admiistratio etagled i a direct effort that might fail. Declarig support for Arab mediatio efforts betwee Hamas ad Fatah would be a more delicate step. It would mark a departure from previous policy ad etail some risk. But it could also have cosiderable beefits if the ew admiistratio liked its support for the Arab iitiative to a broader uderstadig with Arab coutries about the diplomatic efforts eeded i the Middle East. Progress i the peace process has always bee stymied by the reluctace of parties to talk to each other. The Uited States refused to talk to the Palestiia Liberatio Orgaizatio (PLO) util the 1995 Oslo agreemet because the PLO was violet ad did ot recogize the state of Israel; it will ot deal with Hamas ow for the same reaso. Most Arab coutries refuse cotacts with Israel because they do ot recogize its legitimacy hece there has bee o serious follow-up to the Arab iitiative. At the same time, Arab coutries have bee highly critical of the Bush admiistratio for refusig to deal with Hamas ad Ira. Here is a opportuity for the ew admiistratio to break ew groud: if it were to accept the idea that Hamas must be part of ay peace settlemet, support Arab recociliatio efforts betwee Hamas ad Fatah, ad egage with Ira, it could isist that the rule about it beig impossible to make peace without dealig with oe s eemies applies to all. If Arab coutries wat the Uited States to take their iitiative seriously, if they ideed wat peace with Israel, they eed to egotiate directly with Israel. The Uited States ca help, but Arab coutries must take upo themselves the mai burde of movig their iitiative from a idea to a agreemet. There is o guaratee of a successful outcome. But eve tryig a ew approach that puts Arab coutries i the lead with the Uited States i a active supportig role would further the moral iterest of the Uited States i Middle East peace, brig about a

5 Sharig the Burde i the Middle East 5 much-eeded improvemet i the relatioship betwee the Uited States ad the Arab world, ad do so without hurtig the iterests of Israel. Israel eeds peace ad it eeds to preserve its character as a Jewish state. There ca be o peace without the ivolvemet of all Arab coutries, ad the preservatio of Israel s idetity requires a two-state solutio which will vaish as a realistic possibility if it is ot acted o very soo. Protectig U.S. Security: From a Cold War to a Silk Road Model U.S. major security iterests i the Middle East ow ceter o Iraq, Ira, Afghaista, ad Pakista. These security problems fall ito clusters: oe, ceterig o Iraq, Ira, ad the Gulf coutries, has developed as a result of the upsettig of the balace of power betwee Ira ad Iraq by the U.S. ivasio ad its result: the weakeig of both the Iraqi state ad Sui ifluece withi it. The secod cluster, comprisig Afghaista ad Pakista, is related to the rise of radical Islamist groups i both coutries, which U.S. itervetio has so far failed to brig uder cotrol. The Taliba is resurget i Afghaista but also has strog roots i parts of Pakista, where it ad other radical Islamist groups challege the power ad territorial cotrol of the govermet. While the two clusters are related to some extet, this discussio oly addresses the first directly. Sice 2001, the Uited States has tried two approaches to protect its security i this area. The first has bee to rely o its superior military power to elimiate threats. This approach led to quick iitial victories i Afghaista ad Iraq, but has sice left the U.S. military bogged dow i both coutries ad icreasigly ivolved i cross-border icursios ito Pakista. As a result, the military is ow stretched thi. Uder these circumstaces, attemptig a military solutio i Ira ow would ot oly be politically iadvisable but also extremely dagerous, if ot outright impossible. The Uited States has istead resorted to differet approaches toward Ira. It has tried to stop Ira s uraium erichmet program by backig less tha wholeheartedly Europea attempts to egotiate with Tehra ad by seekig broad iteratioal support for more oerous sactios. It has also tried to build a Cold War like alliace with Ira s eighbors. So far, either policy has succeeded. Tryig a ew approach that puts Arab coutries i the lead with the Uited States i a active supportig role would further the moral iterest of the Uited States i Middle East peace. The alliace policy has failed because Ira s Arab eighbors, though fearful of Ira s power, do ot wat cofrotatio with it. I Iraq, the predomiatly Shi i govermet of Prime Miister Nouri al-maliki is supported by Ira as well as by the Uited States. Members of the Gulf Cooperatio Coucil (GCC) ad other Arab states are ervous about Iraia power ad the possibility that Tehra might fomet or at least ispire their ow Shi i populatios to demad more equal rights. But o matter how much they fear Ira, they do ot wat to side opely with the Uited States. Eve Bahrai, Qatar, ad Kuwait, which allow U.S. bases o their soil, have demurred. I the Uited States made its most ope attempt to build a ati-iraia alliace with the GCC coutries, Egypt, ad Jorda the so-called GCC+2. Despite umerous attempts by Secretary of State Codoleezza Rice ad other high officials, the coutries ivolved resisted. Iterestigly, the coutry that was most willig to side with the Uited States ad take a opely ati-iraia positio was Egypt, the most distat ad least vulerable. GCC coutries took the opposite tack of buildig up their ties to Ira, ivitig Iraia officials to atted GCC ad other regioal meetigs, ad makig it clear that they saw Ira as a itegral part of ay regioal se-

6 6 POLICY BRIEF curity arragemets. At the same time, GCC coutries cotiued to bolster their armamets ad overall defese capability, although relyig ot just o the Uited States but o other suppliers, icludig Frace ad Russia. The alliace policy has failed because Ira s Arab eighbors, though fearful of Ira s power, do ot wat cofrotatio with it. The Uited States has o choice but to cotiue diplomatic efforts to halt the Iraia uclear program, egagig directly with that coutry. It already seems a foregoe coclusio that the Obama admiistratio iteds to do this. At the same time, the ew admiistratio eeds to abado the Cold War like strategy of buildig a ati-iraia alliace achored, cotrolled, ad give its military stregth by the Uited States. Although Arab coutries have show great ethusiasm about Obama s electio, the chagig of the guard i Washigto does ot alter the fact that the Gulf coutries remai extremely vulerable to attack by Ira ad have o iterest i provokig oe they are i the same positio as Filad durig the Cold War. A more promisig alterative is to ecourage Arab efforts to iclude Ira i a regioal project, takig a page from the so-called Silk Road approach followed by the Shaghai Cooperatio Orgaizatio (SCO). The SCO, which icludes Chia, Russia, ad the Cetral Asia republics, was set up to avoid a struggle for ifluece over Cetral Asia betwee Chia ad Russia, promotig istead cooperative regio-wide relatios, ot oly political but ecoomic hece the Silk Road referece. Ira ad its eighbors could also beefit from Box 1 Ira ad the GCC Coutries: A Sample of Recet News Growig Ecoomic Ties Trade betwee Ira ad the GCC coutries icreased five-fold i the period. The UAE accouts for over 70 percet of the total (Middle East Times, November 24, 2008). Bahrai Prime Miister calls for icreased cooperatio with Ira i oil ad gas (Bahrai Tribue, November 24, 2008). Guarded Political Support GCC secretary geeral visits Tehra ad declares, We support Ira s uclear program, which is completely peaceful. The meetig also discussed the possibility of settig up a joit Ira GCC security orgaizatio (Asia Times, November 4, 2008). UAE ad Ira sig a memoradum of uderstadig to set up a joit committee to discuss bilateral relatios (Kahleji Times, October 30, 2008). But Some Bilateral Tesios Outrage i Bahrai followig a editorial i the Iraia press by Hussei Shariatmadari, adviser to Ali Kahmaei, statig that Bahrai is a Iraia provice ad that its people wat to retur to the motherlad (Middle East Now, July 12, 2007). Natural gas exports from Ira to the UAE halted because of a dispute over cotract (www. UPI.com, November 7, 2008). UAE challeges Ira o cotrol of Abu Musa ad other islads (Iteratioal Herald Tribue, November 2, 2008).

7 Sharig the Burde i the Middle East 7 a iitiative that seeks to avoid iflamig differeces ad istead explores areas where cooperatio is possible. The iitial goal should ot be to establish a formal orgaizatio like the SCO. Rather, it should be to covee meetigs of Ira ad its eighbors to explore commo iterests ad areas of disagreemet. This caot be a U.S. iitiative ad it does ot eed to be. Several Gulf states, icludig Saudi Arabia ad Qatar, have already take steps to brig Ira ito regioal meetigs, ad they have also tried to play a importat peacemakig role i the regio. Saudi Arabia led the efforts at recociliatio betwee Hamas ad Fatah util the resposibility was trasferred to Egypt by a Arab League decisio. More recetly, Saudi Arabia has started lookig beyod Ira, seekig to ope a dialogue with some members of the Taliba. Qatar egotiated a solutio to the stadoff i Lebao betwee the two rival political coalitios ad has give sigs of aspirig to play the role of peacemaker o a larger scale. U.S. ecouragemet of a regioal iitiative would simply push o a ope door. The Silk Road optio would ot be a substitute for the Uited States ow diplomatic cotacts with Ira, or obviate the eed to maitai pressure o that coutry to stop its developmet of uclear weapos if this ca still be doe. Nor would it represet a attempt to reach a improbable grad bargai o all outstadig issues. Rather, it would be a meas to decrease tesios i the area ad the dager of cofrotatio i the Gulf at a time the Uited States ca ill afford aother coflict there. Rather tha takig upo itself the burde of defedig members of a ati-iraia alliace agaist their much more powerful eighbor, the Uited States should ecourage the coutries directly affected by the rise of Iraia power to mobilize their ow efforts. The ew admiistratio s capacity to further U.S. iterests i the Middle East ad to advace the peace process will deped to a large extet o its willigess to share the burde with the coutries of the regio. U.S. isistece o beig at the ceter of every peace iitiative ad achorig every security arragemet is ot servig it well it has led Washigto to suffer repeated diplomatic defeats i the peace process, makig it more difficult to protect U.S. security iterests. Nor does a policy isistig o U.S. cetrality serve the cause of peace i the Middle East. The peace process has become a itermittet A more promisig alterative is to ecourage Arab efforts to iclude Ira i a regioal project, takig a page from the so-called Silk Road approach followed by the Shaghai Cooperatio Orgaizatio (SCO). affair that proceeds or halts depedig o the U.S. political cycle ad thus o the presidet s availability for a high-profile iitiative. Arab coutries complai edlessly about U.S. iactio while doig little themselves. Israel baks o Washigto s support to avoid takig steps that will be ievitable i the log ru. The ew admiistratio eeds to rethik the U.S. role i the politics of the Middle East, abado the assumptio that it must be at the ceter of every iitiative, build o what the regioal coutries are tryig to do, ad, i the process, ecourage them to take more resposibility. At a time whe America solutios appear deadlocked ad the ew presidet will have to cocetrate his attetio o the ecoomy, sharig the burde provides a way forward. The Caregie Edowmet ormally does ot take istitutioal positios o public policy issues; the views preseted here do ot ecessarily reflect the views of the Edowmet, its officers, staff, or trustees Caregie Edowmet for Iteratioal Peace. All rights reserved.

8 RESOURCES The Caregie Edowmet for Iteratioal Peace is a private, oprofit orgaizatio dedicated to advacig cooperatio betwee atios ad promotig active iteratioal egagemet by the Uited States. Fouded i 1910, Caregie is opartisa ad dedicated to achievig practical results. Buildig o the successful establishmet of the Caregie Moscow Ceter, the Edowmet has added operatios i Beijig, Beirut, ad Brussels to its existig offices i Washigto ad Moscow. Visit for these ad other publicatios. The New Middle East, Maria Ottaway, Natha J. Brow, Amr Hamzawy, Karim Sadjadpour, ad Paul Salem (Caregie Edowmet for Iteratioal Peace, 2008), The New Arab Diplomacy: Not With the U.S. ad Not Agaist the U.S., Maria Ottaway ad Mohammed Herzallah, Caregie Paper o. 94 (Caregie Edowmet for Iteratioal Peace, 2008), Suset for the Two-State Solutio, Natha J. Brow, Policy Brief o. 58 (Caregie Edowmet for Iteratioal Peace, 2008), pb58_brow_suset_fial.pdf. Syria Israeli Peace: A Possible Key to Regioal Chage, Paul Salem, Policy Brief o. 70 (Caregie Edowmet for Iteratioal Peace, 2008). Ira: Is Productive Egagemet Possible? Karim Sadjadpour, Policy Brief o. 65 (Caregie Edowmet for Iteratioal Peace, 2008), org/files/us_ira_policy.pdf Massachusetts Aveue, NW Washigto, DC Cert o. SW-COC FOREIGN POLICY for the Next Presidet