Africa s Democracies: Promises, Progress and Prospects

Transcription

1 Africa Democracie: Promie, Progre and Propect Electoral Intitute for Sutainable Democracy in Africa ISBN John Stremlau

2 Africa Democracie: Promie, Progre and Propect Electoral Intitute for Sutainable Democracy in Africa John Stremlau

3 Publihed by EISA 14 Park Rd, Richmond Johanneburg South Africa P O Box 740 Auckland Park 2006 South Africa Tel: Fax: eia@eia.org.za EISA 2016 All right reerved. No part of thi publication may be reproduced, tored in a retrieval ytem, or tranmitted in any form or by any mean, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwie, without the prior permiion of EISA. Firt publihed 2016

4 CONTENTS Prologue 1 Continental and Global Trend Conditioning Democracy in Africa 1 2 Putting Democratic Principle into Practice: EISA Firt Twenty Year, African Renaiance Redux? 55 iv Appendice Appendix 1: Africa Size Relative to that of Other Continent 76 Appendix 2: Africa Demarcated by Ethnic Group 77 Appendix 3: Africa Sovereign State 78 Bibliography 79

5 PROLOGUE Since it inception in 1996 the Electoral Intitute for Sutainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) ha undertaken many democracy-related and upportive experiment in partnerhip with African government and international organiation that invited it aitance. During thi politically tumultuou period Africa ha often featured in global media a a region where armed conflict, humanitarian diater and perpetual poverty predominate. EISA experience paint a brighter, more hopeful picture. Although EISA i baed in South Africa it i led and taffed by a divere group of African democrat from all over the continent and i a thoroughly pan-african nongovernmental organiation whoe effort to build hope for the ake of utainable democracy are not naïve. During the pat half century the majority of Africa people have experimented with democracy within the border of ill-fitting pot-colonial tate, where war and poverty have been debilitating and widepread. Their caue and peritence are complex and beyond the cope of thi booklet. Deadly conflict will preumably continue to threaten the continent democracie, but thee conflict have almot all been within and not between or among African tate and there i evidence that they might be ebbing. The booklet briefly tell three inter-related torie. The firt decribe the emergence of a growing conenu that tate governed democratically are likely to be more peaceful, politically capable and reliable partner in reaching the long-term pan-african goal of regional cooperation and collective action. A a reult, African government are le indifferent to each other dometic governance and human right becaue abue of power locally can generate unwelcome refugee and other rik to regional peace and cooperation. The econd tory highlight EISA cooperation with the African Union, regional economic organiation (REC) and other local and international democratic takeholder. EISA ha helped advance thi growing interet in democratic governance by aiting African inter-governmental organiation to monitor and ae each other democratic election. Although thi booklet, in celebrating EISA 20 th anniverary, honour all of it project and programme, it pay particular attention to the intitute unique role in encouraging and facilitating the intenifying interplay between dometic and regional politic that may prove vital to utaining Africa democracie with economic and ecurity benefit accruing nationally, regionally and even globally. It conider the interplay of dometic and regional condition that have affected democratic experiment in the

6 pat two decade and peculate about the propect for utainable democracy on the continent in the decade ahead. The concluding ection deal with everal major challenge facing Africa government and people that are likely to affect their reolve to work toward utainable democracy. It hold firmly to the aumption that the more tranparent and accountable Africa democratic experiment are, not only to their citizen but in pan-african and ubregional partnerhip, the better will be their propect for peace and properity. Thoughtful critic and cynical autocrat ometime argue that low-income African countrie cannot afford democracy. Africa affliction of poverty and economic inequality are impoible to ignore when more than 50% of it population till relie on ubitence agriculture to urvive and weak intitution make it difficult to check even the mot corrupt and abuive behaviour of mall elite. Yet EISA experience and cloe crutiny of democratic progre offer a more complex picture, one that affirm the diverity and vigour of credible and durable democratic experiment, even within ome of Africa pooret nation. The booklet benefit from being written in South Africa, a democratic experiment whoe launch, barely a quarter-century ago, inpired people acro Africa and around the world. South African were exemplary in their openne to learn democratic leon from other nation, conducting their own remarkably incluive and openminded debate and deciding for themelve how they would undertake and attempt to utain their particular democratic experiment. It ha not been a linear proce democratic experiment never are. South Africa role in Africa feature prominently in the ection that follow, which contain both a broader toryline and a narrower, but no le important one. The broader picture i of the country initial role a a regional leader in the reform of continental intitution, rendering them more upportive of democratic experiment and advancing a more poitive and aertive pro-democracy viion with it advocacy of an African Renaiance, although South Africa role a a regional champion of democracy ha ebbed in recent year and no comparable ucceor ha emerged. The narrower narrative focue on the international politic of Africa democratic election and, more pecifically, on EISA work, which began in South Africa and extended firt into neighbouring countrie and then throughout the continent, depite troubling ign of democratic decline.

7 While thi wa being written South Africa held municipal election, which EISA monitored. Local election are normally conidered to be le conequential than thoe for national office and of little international interet. How intriguing, therefore, are the broader implication of the many incumbent defeated in thoe local election. The unuual degree of regional and global interet in the election may be jutified a early warning ign of more politically potent popular dienchantment with the nature and direction of the country democratic experiment under two decade of the ame national government. Democracy, after all, i an experiment, the goal of which i to keep the experiment running with the purpoe of empowering people to live democratically. Unlike in cience, there are no law to dicover, only law people deign and implement for themelve to reolve conflict peacefully and fairly in determining who get what, when and how. Sutainable democracy promie related reult of ocial and economic development for the betterment of all. EISA ha committed itelf to aiting uch procee and it i hoped that thi booklet will hed light on the condition that were conducive to it miion and thoe that were contraining. In o doing perhap it will inpire and inform other to eek a more democratic Africa and a more democratic world.

8 1 Continental and Global Trend Conditioning Democracy in Africa We, the Member State of the African Union (AU); Inpired by the objective and principle enhrined in the Contitutive Act of the African Union, particularly Article 3 and 4, which emphaie the ignificance of good governance, popular participation, the rule of law and baed on the holding of regular, free, fair and tranparent election conducted by competent, independent and impartial national electoral bodie; [are] Determined to promote and trengthen good governance through the intitutionalization of tranparency, accountability and participatory democracy; [and] Convinced of the need to enhance the election obervation miion in the role they play, particularly a they are an important contributory factor to enuring the regularity, tranparency and credibility of election; African Charter for Democracy, Election and Governance, Preamble, Adopted 30 January 2007 and entered into force 15 February 2012 INTRODUCTION For two decade the Electoral Intitute for Sutainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) ha been a vibrant, vital and viionary pan-african non-governmental organiation baed in Johanneburg. It ha upported democratic ideal and idea exemplified in the African Union document quoted above, which wa adopted unanimouly. All EISA programme are committed to a viion of An African continent where democratic governance, human right and citizen participation are upheld in a peaceful environment. Operationally EISA trive for excellence in the promotion of credible election, citizen participation and trong intitution for utainable democracy in Africa. 1

9 EISA evolved out of an indigenou, community-baed civic initiative, the Independent Mediation Service of South Africa (IMSSA), which took root in the violent 1970 to help ecure a jut and democratic peace in the country depite eemingly intranigent racial oppreion. When, in 1994, South African of all race participated for the firt time a full citizen in a national election, IMSSA engaged in a nationwide voter education programme and wa contracted by the country newly contituted 1993 temporary electoral commiion to recruit, train and deploy counting monitor. What wa evident, however, wa the many adminitrative and operational hortcoming in the conduct of the 1994 election, including inadequate voter education, the inconitent application of common polling principle and practice and the attendant rik of confuion and even conflict, whether out of miundertanding or partian malpractice. Thi experience, however, informed the formation of a much more effective Independent Electoral Commiion. After a careful review and aement of South Africa election experience, and of election held in neighbouring countrie, in 1996 Dren Nupen, Ilona Tip, Bontle Mpakanyane and Mabo Moupye, all women who had worked in the IMSSA balloting department, left IMSSA to form what wa initially called the Electoral Intitute of South Africa, with Nupen at the helm. EISA began modetly, working with South Africa immediate neighbour and building on taff and leaderhip experience in dometic conflict mediation and reolution and election monitoring (Seirli 2008). In the next ix year EISA developed it capacity to provide more extenive electoral aitance than election monitoring, in partnerhip with Southern African Development Community (SADC) government, electoral management bodie, civil ociety organiation and donor. Support for the 14 countrie in SADC developed on two level. 1 Firt, EISA facilitated the etablihment of an all-sadc Electoral Commiion Forum (ECF) and taffed it from 1998 to Among the ECF activitie were an election conflict management programme, the training of trainer for election operation at all level, including national election management body commiioner and taff, for all SADC member. Running parallel with the ECF proce, between 1997 and 2004 EISA alo et up and managed the Election Support Network (ESN) for civil ociety group wihing to acquire the kill to operate dometic oberver miion and other electoral upport activitie in any SADC country. The econd level of SADC engagement wa EISA deployment of it own election oberver miion (EOM), although thee could only be ent to countrie where it 2

10 wa invited and wa aured of ufficient freedom to conduct an impartial and credible deployment of oberver and expert drawn from acro the SADC region. EISA wa launched in Johanneburg at a democratically aupiciou moment, on 28 June A month earlier South Africa Parliament had adopted the country firt democratic Contitution, which ha become a model for the world and the backbone of the nation. Deputy Preident Thabo Mbeki commemorated that act with hi I am an African addre, which Ugandan cholar Mahmood Mamdani rightly decribe a one of the mot remarkable political document of the 20 th century and a Lincolneque (Ndlovu & Strydom (ed) 2016). Hi reference to America great Civil War preident i apt, for Mbeki, no le than Lincoln at Gettyburg, called for governance of, by and for the people a a univeral preventative againt crime againt humanity a evil a South African apartheid and, wore, lavery in the United State. In bearing witne to what happen when one peron ha uperiority of force over another, where the tronger appropriate to themelve the prerogative even to annul the injunction that God created all men and women in hi image, Mbeki univeralied human right, all the while identifying himelf a an African, from a continent from which all homo apien can claim decent and with whom, a an African, he feel an affinity. A year later, another on of Africa, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan alo made a cae for the univerality of human right and democratic value, thi time in a remarkable addre to the 2 June 1997 eion of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Annual Aembly of Head of State and Government in Harare, Zimbabwe. Never before had the OAU heard uch an unqualified appeal from an African peer for all to embrace the primacy of democratic rule, the inviolability of human right, and the imperative of utainable development. He called for an end to a recent period marked by civil war, the tyranny of military rule, and economic tagnation and for eizing the democratic opportunity exemplified by the end of apartheid and the adoption of democracy in South Africa and declared:... the will of the people mut be the bai of governmental authority in Africa... [and]... repect for fundamental human right. Annan rejected the view of ome African leader who dimi democracy and human right a a luxury of the rich countrie for which Africa i not ready [while] other treat it a an impoition, if not a plot, by the indutrialized Wet, adding: 3

11 I find thee thought truly demeaning, demeaning for human dignity that reide in every African heart. Do not African mother weep when their on or daughter are killed or maimed by agent of repreive rule? Are not African father addened when their children are unjutly jailed or tortured? I not Africa a a whole impoverihed when one of it brilliant voice i ilenced? So I ay to you my brother and iter, that human right are African right, and I call upon you to enure that all African are able fully to enjoy them. Annan 1997 Hi paion wa alo pragmatic, preenting human right abue a an early warning of deadly conflict that all hould want to prevent. Apartheid wa primarily a dometic abue of human right, no le than lavery wa for hundred of year in the United State. Yet in the 1860 America dealt with it dometic crime by the only mean available, a war that became the deadliet in hitory at that point. In the cae of apartheid, for the firt time a dometic human right iue wa deemed by the UN Security Council to be a ufficient threat to international peace and ecurity that it merited the impoition of anction, however mild, againt a UN member, South Africa. The outlook of idealim without illuion implied by the UN Secretary-General 1997 remark in Harare reflected EISA value. By 2000 EISA had developed extenive electoral experience. Although thi wa only within thoe SADC countrie conducting open and obervable election, it wa ufficient to begin ditilling ome common characteritic that might yield a lit of bet practice, a et of electoral principle applicable to obervation miion, depite particular difference in democratic regime, a long a condition would permit impartial and unencumbered obervation. In November 2003, after three year of extenive reearch and conultation in the region, EISA, in partnerhip with the ECF, convened a large conference of SADC election official, politician, civil ociety repreentative and cholar to deliberate on, refine and approve a detailed lit of Principle for Election Management, Monitoring and Obervation in the SADC Region, or PEMMO a it became known (International IDEA). Thee election principle were intended to build confidence in the election proce among all takeholder, mot importantly partian faction competing for office, and thereby enhance the propect for peace and tability nationally and regionally. Thi, in turn, hould alo help utain a country larger democratic experiment. Having common principle accepted and followed would further facilitate the haring of leon among countrie, each eeking to improve and utain it particular democratic experiment. 4

12 The proce might even facilitate greater regional cooperation by allowing neighbour acce to the inner working of each other internal political affair in way that would not be contrued a interference, but acknowledging that they could no longer be indifferent to the way each of them wa governed if cooperation and independence were to deepen in mutually advantageou way. With the publication of electoral principle for Southern Africa EISA international reputation and interet grew quickly, both in Africa and within a fledgling global network of international election oberver group alo intereted in PEMMO and in exploring the poibility of etablihing a et of global electoral principle and code of conduct. At the ame time EISA wa encountering difficultie in utaining it own growth and development, relying only on the few SADC countrie holding obervable election once every four or five year. Following the appointment of a new executive director, Deni Kadima, in December 2002, EISA and it taff went through another full review of the intitute operation and option. In 2003, following the recommendation of the taff, the intitute Board of Director approved the tranformation of the organiation reflected in it current name, the Electoral Intitute for Sutainable Democracy in Africa. The change of name reflected five trategic deciion, two of them implicit and three reflected in the word electoral, utainable democracy and Africa. Thee deciion are important to note at the outet becaue they will be referenced repeatedly throughout thi booklet. Firt, EISA board approved a continuation of the intitute central focu providing electoral upport, which till comprie roughly 80% of it work. The cope and nature of thi upport ha changed, a i detailed in the econd ection of thi publication. A econd trategic deciion wa to broaden EISA mandate by linking electoral upport to the achievement of utainable democracy. The reference to utainable democracy may ound overly ambitiou but not if one conider how EISA view democracy. It neither precribe nor follow a particular intitutional formula, rather, all it programme, project and publication reflect the view that democracy i an open-ended proce. Any country declaring itelf to be a democracy, however, commit to an experiment in governance that i incluive and accountable to ordinary people. The exact nature of a democracy hould be determined by thoe who live in it. By adding the term utainable, however, EISA ignal an awarene of the need for a rule- 5

13 bound (contitutional) proce that preclude tate capture by any particular individual or faction, however large and paionate. EISA doe not directly engage in or comment on the nature of political bargain local takeholder believe are eential to meeting their need. But election periodically tet in important way the eparation of power, tranparency, accountability and incluivene of any democratic experiment. The challenge EISA face in helping to enure electoral integrity are a complex, varied, and often unforeeen a the behaviour of the people undertaking them. The third trategic deciion wa to broaden EISA reach to include the entire African continent. While thi allow the intitute more opportunitie to provide electoral upport than it would have if it confined it activitie to the SADC region, it alo create challenge in managing effectively an operation on thi cale. The idea that a mall NGO, till le than a decade old, could tackle the entire continent, even if only with regard to election monitoring, wa, to ay the leat, audaciou. Geographically, our mind eye ha been haped by the ditortion of a Mercator projection which fail to convey the fact that Africa land ma i o vat it could contain the US, China, India and mot of Wetern and Eatern Europe within it boundarie (ee Appendix 1). Africa i alo the world mot ethnically complex region, home to 20 of the world mot divere countrie (ee Appendix 2 and Fiher 2016). And, of coure, thi vat and divere continent i today ub-divided into 54 motly poor but overeign tate (ee Appendix 3), with a majority of it people till engaged in ubitence agriculture. So, in order to leverage it electoral upport expertie better at continental level, EISA took another critical deciion, to enter into partnerhip with African intergovernmental organiation, firt and foremot, the African Union. EISA deciion to upport intergovernmental organiation actively and extenively in their electoral work differentiate it from other non-governmental international electoral group. Since igning a Memorandum of Undertanding with the African Union in 2003 the intitute ha alo provided technical upport to all the electoral miion undertaken by that inter-governmental body and ait everal of the AU eight affiliated regional economic communitie (REC). 2 Today, almot all African tate tage multiparty election every four or five year. Fifteen poll have been planned for The firt half of the year aw election in Benin, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoro, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Niger and Uganda, with election alo lated for the Democratic Republic of the 6

14 Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Ghana, São Tomé and Príncipé, South Africa and Zambia. But have contitution, electoral procee and term limit been repected, or have incumbent tried by all mean neceary to retain the key to State Houe? Thee, which are among the many quetion that will continue to challenge EISA taff and their partner, are dicued below. A final deciion, which wa the eaiet for EISA board, wa to reiterate that the intitute will remain an independent, non-partian, not-for-profit international nongovernmental organiation. Inherent in thi deciion i an important aumption about the nature of any democratic experiment and it utainability, namely, that civil ociety mut be allowed ufficient freedom and acce to reource to enable it to be and remain a vital check on government operation in thi cae regarding the role and integrity of electoral procee and intitution and the eparation of power. Citizen hould be the ultimate beneficiarie of any democratic experiment and they are the mot vulnerable and are often inadequately informed about or protected in exerciing their baic human right. So EISA continue to exemplify and, where poible, upport the role of independent, impartial and credible civil ociety organiation involved in electoral work locally and trannationally. Appropriately for an intitute committed to pan-african electoral and other democracy upport work, EISA ha an all-african taff of 70 drawn from Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, CAR, Côte d Ivoire, DRC, Kenya, Madagacar, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Nigeria, South Africa, Somalia and, previouly, from Leotho and Sudan. Of thee, 34 are baed in Johanneburg and handle a variety of hort-term democracy upport miion. The ret are aigned to the long-term field office in troubled African countrie recovering from conflict or otherwie facing difficult democratic tranition. Countrie hoting EISA field miion either currently or recently include: Angola, Burundi, Chad, Côte d Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Kenya, Madagacar, Mali, Mozambique, Somalia and Zimbabwe. Thi booklet unfold in three ection: The firt provide a brief overview of the way Africa leader choe to interpret democracy promie of greater peace, properity and incluive development. It acknowledge the complex local, regional and global political context that continue, in varying and unpredictable way, to influence EISA programme prioritie and impact in a period of rapid political, economic and ocial change for Africa and the world. Fortunately, EISA roe to prominence in tep with the emergence of a new pan- African conenu on democratic norm. Although the OAU (and now the African 7

15 Union AU) declined to interfere in the internal affair of it member, there wa a new readine not to be indifferent to dometic conflict that could affect neighbour adverely and/or attract non-african intervention. Toward the end of EISA firt decade, however, democratic advancement appeared to tall, if not decline, in ome African countrie. Although it i hard to generalie about 54 divere overeign member of the AU, the general impreion in the pat decade ha been of democratic decline on the continent. Thi not only affect EISA outlook and planning but alo that of the donor on whom the intitute mut rely. The econd chapter focue on EISA evolving mix of programme and activitie over the pat two decade the what, how and why of providing electoral and other upport for the advancement of democracy in Africa. Approximately 80% of EISA activitie continue to be election related, but the cope of engagement ha lengthened and deepened, epecially in troubled countrie where determining electoral integrity, not merely whether peace prevailed on voting day, i vital and often very difficult. Other apect of democratiation have alo been addreed over the year, including the role of parliament, political partie, civil ociety, local government, intitution that protect human right and the African Peer Review Mechanim (APRM). Thee, too, are briefly noted and aeed. EISA ha alo etablihed field office for longer-term and deeper engagement, epecially in troubled countrie attempting to make the tranition from deadly conflict and/or long bout of autocratic rule. Finally, the chapter note the importance of the pan-african and global network that inform EISA work and generate the growing literature on election and democratiation in Africa through annual conference, with publihed proceeding, book, a journal and other form of reearch, analyi and diemination of reult. The final ection conider the propect for democracy in Africa in the decade ahead. Can democracy become an acceptable and utainable formula for governance in and among the till overeign 54 member of the African Union? Can democracie in Africa be utained, for example, at a time of human-induced climate change, including extreme and unpredictable weather event and the econdary effect on land and water reource, dieae, forced migration and conflict? Sometime related, and alo ubverive to democracy, are the trannational threat of terrorim, human and drug trafficking and other form of criminal activity and the uncertaintie and employment effect of globaliation and technological change. African tate remain weak, highly fragmented and economically poor. Yet democracy continue to flourih in ome of the pooret countrie and EISA continue to make 8

16 progre. But the coming decade i likely to raie new and daunting challenge that deerve concerned attention if democracy i to advance and be utained. AFRICA S DECADE OF ADVANCING DEMOCRACY The regional and global political context in which EISA wa launched and grew during it firt decade wa propitiou. Starting in the 1990 there wa an hitoric opportunity, a former OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim uccinctly ummarie: So the end of the Cold War meant that Africa could aert itelf. The mandate of the OAU inofar a liberation wa concerned wa coming to an end becaue South Africa wa about to become free. In reality, the whole of Africa became free when South Africa attained it liberation and that wa one of the primary objective of the OAU Now that we were free and our countrie, no longer had to deal with the quetion of liberation a uch, what next? Ndlovu & Strydom 2016, p 75 One leader who attempted to anwer Salim quetion and, in the proce, et the tone and context for much of EISA work, wa Thabo Mbeki, South Africa preident from June 1999 until September Seizing the advantage of South Africa pike in oft power, he drew on hi enormou wealth of experience in Africa during hi decade in exile to offer a freh vion for pot-colonial Africa, which he called the African Renaiance, a viion that might one day appeal to and even overturn longrunning autocracie till prevalent in Africa. In conceiving and promoting the African Renaiance, Mbeki ought to remove and deter non-african intervention on the continent, epecially any attempt to engineer regime change, while alo encouraging African government to intitute economic and political reform voluntarily and in way conitent with their prioritie and the need of their citizen. Democratic governance wa alo crucial, he believed, in helping end Africa war and enuring a more peaceful and table regional environment. African-led economic reform and better and more democratic governance, Mbeki urged, would not only benefit Africa people but would provide a more promiing foundation and confidence for more productive partnerhip within Africa and with trategic partner internationally. The latter included major ource of finance, invetment and trade, notably the international financial intitution and major economic power in Europe, Aia and North America. In the African Renaiance viion economic reform and good governance would require African government to become tranparent and accountable, firt and foremot 9

17 to each other, by accepting greater and more intruive overight by and for Africa intergovernmental intitution. Intra-African monitoring and aement of democratic election were key element in thi viion, which opened the way and continue to facilitate a pecial role for EISA. The viion alo required reform of the Organization of African Unity. Thi, in turn, ha encouraged reform and trengthening of the eight affiliated REC. Thee development generated greater demand for EISA technical aitance, with the aim of improving the electoral upport work of the multilateral African bodie, a dicued below. Thi leon wa not lot on South Africa newly elected democratic government a it ought to deign a foreign policy that wa both oppoed to foreign interference in African countrie and ought new way and mean of preventing and ending abue of power within tate that might prove harmful to their citizen and poe threat of pillover effect on their overeign neighbour. Africa leader, even thoe unwilling to allow democracy in their own countrie, took heart from South Africa ucce a a vital counterpoint to the continent chronic marginaliation in world politic and economic affair. Ethiopia late Preident Mele Zenawi decribe Africa global tanding in the 1990: Africa wa een a a baket cae and pundit in the Wet were publihing article in repectable magazine uch a The Economit a to whether the direct recolonization of the continent would be the only option to puh African ocietie toward modernization. The only bright light acro the dark African kie of the 1990 wa the liberation of South Africa. The end of apartheid in South Africa wa the crowning achievement of the truggle againt all form of colonialim. And a uch, every African wa and had every right to be proud. Even with the deolate political landcape in Africa at the time, many African felt that South Africa would be a great ucce and prove to the ret of the world that African are not detined to fail and be the plaything of world power. Ndlovu & Strydom 2016, p 44 In promoting hi African Renaiance, and to help inform and hape hi thinking, Mbeki peronally encouraged African cholar to addre variou practical and moral dimenion of the broad viion. 3 Publicly, he unveiled the viion in an addre on 9 April 1998 entitled The African Renaiance, South Africa and the World, appropriately delivered at the United Nation Univerity in Tokyo (Mbeki 1998). He began by recalling the emergence of proud and ucceful African culture dating back to the firt century of the firt millennium, called for a rebirth of African confidence 10

18 and elf-determination, not led by emperor, holy men, or general, but one that would effectively challenge many throughout the world [who] have the view that a African we are incapable of etablihing and maintaining ytem of good governance. Rejecting military government and ingle-party tate, he noted that one of the principal demand of SA liberation truggle wa imply the people hall govern, adding that thi ame viion had inpired at leat 25 other African countrie to etablih multiparty democracie, each with it own characteritic, preumably negotiated in good faith by it citizen. After outlining the manner in which the OAU and other bodie were beginning to change in way upportive of dometic reform, he ummaried the core trategy: necearily the African Renaiance, in all it part, can only ucceed if it aim and objective are defined by the African themelve, if it programme are deigned by ourelve and if we take reponibility for the ucce or failure of our policie. He then lited the many challenge and obligation South Africa and other African government mut accept a the price of greater freedom and dignity; tandard till being debated, delineated and decided, and that opened the way for work that EISA and other pro-democracy group continue to purue, ometime uccefully, often not. Democratic development i never a linear proce and there have been loe from and addition to Mbeki 1998 lit. From hi South African perpective, however, the ucce of the African Renaiance would require greater pan-african cooperation to help inulate from non-african interference locally negotiated and contitutionally anctioned democratic governance capable of achieving reilient and utainable development, economic, political and ocial. Authoritarian rule would only, in Mbeki view, invite unwanted non-african exploitation, competition and attempt at regime change. With the Cold War over, the threat became unipolar, with leon drawn from America failed adventure in Vietnam and, more recently, Iraq, Libya and, o far, Afghanitan. Acro Africa the picture of widepread interference by former colonial power, including attempt to effect regime change, had done more to abet authoritarianim than to advance democracy. South Africa leader, therefore, would proceed cautiouly, looking firt for African partner who hared the view that African hould take greater control of their international relation, and that the firt priority hould be to try to end Africa ongoing deadly conflict, which often attracted foreign meddling and intervention, a well a the continent large international debt and dependence on Wetern-dominated international financial intitution. 11

19 Kofi Annan gave a ynopi of the conflict that had bedevilled Africa in the year EISA wa founded: Since 1970, more than 30 war have been fought in Africa, the vat majority of them intratate in origin. In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countrie of Africa were afflicted by armed conflict, accounting for more than half of all war-related death worldwide and reulting in more than 8 million refugee, returnee and diplaced peron. The conequence of thoe conflict have eriouly undermined Africa effort to enure long-term tability, properity and peace for it people Preventing uch war i no longer a matter of defending tate or protecting allie. It i a matter of defending humanity itelf. UN 1998 The failure to prevent internal or intra-tate war had become the UN greatet challenge. Between 1990 and 2001 only three of the world major deadly conflict were international, and mot civil war were in Africa (Anyanwu 2004). Meanwhile, the UN Security Council wa no longer paralyed and there were more UN peace operation (47) underway imultaneouly in the late 1990 than had been undertaken in the previou 50 year of thee 24 were in Africa (UN 2013). The era greatet failure to prevent an internal catatrophe wa one that Annan took peronally the Rwandan genocide. That holocaut in 1994 might have been prevented had the warning ign of earlier human right abue and ecalating ethnic tenion been heeded rather than regarded a a dometic matter. The limited mandate of the few UN force already in Rwanda and the unwillingne of the major power to muter an additional mall force of peacekeeper could have foretalled the killing of ome or more civilian, a the UN force commander and many cholar have now documented (Power 2002; Dallaire 2003). For thi horror to have occurred at the very moment that, in South Africa, everal of the heroe of that truggle were being democratically elected to national office added to the poignancy and to the growing recognition that beyond the moral imperative appeal of repect for fundamental univeral human right wa their practical importance in preventing and redreing the caue of deadly conflict. Over the next decade South Africa leader and thoe of other African nation would experiment with new way of reforming prevailing regional norm and intitution in repone to a growing conenu that when member tate howed warning ign of internal tre and conflict thi would not bring interference but it could no longer be treated with indifference. 12

20 A noted below, thi change in attitude eventually found expreion in the replacement of the Organization of African Unity with the African Union, along with the adoption of other intrument of engagement and variou complementary development and reform at the level of regional economic communitie. International electoral upport and obervation, in which EISA played an increaingly important role, firt in Southern Africa and more recently in Africa, wa at the cutting edge of thi tranition. Throughout the OAU firt 35 year national and regional plan for rapid economic growth and development, along with the abence of greater intra-african economic cooperation, were diappointing a Africa fell further behind a booming Aia and recently advancing Latin America. Public debt and increaing dependence on the highly intruive International Monetary Fund (IMF) tipulation and World Bank-funded tructural adjutment programme left many countrie virtual ward of international financial intitution (Brook, Lombardi & Suruma 2014). Sub-Saharan Africa average tock of public debt to gro dometic product (GDP) had rien from le than 50% in the 1970 to over 250% in the 1990, mot of it owed to the IMF, World Bank and African Development Bank. Finally, in 1996, the year EISA wa launched, the international financial intitution alo launched a major initiative to reduce dramatically the unmanageable debt level of 38 developing countrie, known a the heavily indebted poor countrie (HIPC). By the mid-2000 the G-7 wealthy nation had decided to augment the HIPC ubtantially with their own Millennium Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). Both initiative, of coure, entailed many condition that were heavily and deeply intruive, leaving many African to conclude that their dignity had been demeaned and their freedom reduced to the fig leaf of overeign rhetoric. The firt gradual tep toward aerting African claim to greater elf-determination in their crucial financial dealing with the IMF, the World Bank and major bi-lateral lender and donor would depend on African leader demontrating a new willingne to commit to reform that thoe they governed determined for themelve were neceary, and for which they were prepared to be held accountable in a proce that pledged tranparency and became known a the New Partnerhip for Africa Development (Nepad). Thi complemented other politically enitive tep toward demontrating a new pan-african willingne not to be indifferent to the dometic affair of other tate which might affect regional properity a well a ecurity. Nigeria former Preident, Oluegun Obaanjo, decribed the origin of Nepad a a reaction to Wetern diregard for African concern. Obaanjo recall that in 2000, 13

21 when he wa chair of the G77+China, Preident Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria wa chair of the OAU and Thabo Mbeki wa chair of the Non-Aligned Movement, each received a eparate invitation to meet with leader of the G7+Ruia in Tokyo, otenibly to dicu the African overeign debt, a complex and contentiou iue for virtually all 53 OAU member. All three accepted. Once in Tokyo they were, together, uhered into the G-8 for what wa barely 30 minute of perfunctory, if not patroniing tatement from the hot. Although feeling frutrated and demeaned, Obaanjo recount: The three of u went back to our hotel and aid, Look, if they had aked u what i Africa programme we would have had nothing to put on the table. So there and then we decided that we had to do omething tangible and that wa the beginning of Nepad. Ndlovu & Strydom 2016, p 37 The three leader immediately identified expert to begin developing the concept and, according to Obaanjo, agreed that Mbeki hould hot thee expert, and that wa the tart of the proce, which wa intended to come up with a formula that would enhance African confidence and greater elf-reliance, but in way that could facilitate more equal partnerhip with non-african government epecially thoe that dominate the global economy and the international financial intitution while alo finding a politically acceptable way to have African countrie become more open to each other about the way in which they were reforming their economie and, in the proce, be ubject to an African peer review proce. A a leading South African economit, Wieman Nkuhlu, chief executive of Nepad from , later recalled: Afro-peimim wa at it peak around 2000/01. Thi wa oon after The Economit publihed an article that defined Africa a a failed continent. The author argued that Africa wa a hopele continent. Mbeki and Obaanjo were very much aware of that negative tereotype. That wa why Preident Mbeki played a very important role tackling Afro-peimim and the negativity about Africa in forum all over the world Hi meage wa you are wrong, Africa i turning the corner and that the twentyfirt century wa going to be Africa century. Ndlovu & Strydom 2016, p 195 Obaanjo believed that Nepad, along with a peer review proce, if endored by the member tate of the African Union, would be an adequate bae on which Africa could build trategic partnerhip with the international world. 14

22 The proce of getting Nepad launched, along with the APRM, turned out to be more difficult than firt enviioned. The experience then and ince parallel the challenge facing EISA effort to provide effective electoral upport, which entail an often politically enitive and fraught proce of peer review when the African Union and REC end election obervation miion. Wieman Nkuhlu recall the reitance among African leader to the propoal, epecially the more intruive apect of the APRM that would allow expert elected by the Nepad ecretariat to review, ae and comment on each country plan and the progre of both economic and governance reform. According to Nkuhlu, two major obtacle had to be overcome: African cholar and civil ociety were very critical of the propoal becaue they felt it had been cooked up and would be erved without African leader conulting the people; econdly, they were keptical about the commitment to good governance, the commitment to fight corruption, becaue there were leader who were among the mot corrupt on the continent (Ndlovu & Strydom 2016, p 194). A dicued in the next ection, EISA concern about both thee iue prompted the intitute to undertake a pecial project on the APRM. While preident Mbeki and Obaanjo cri-croed Africa in 2001 and 2002, dicuing Nepad and the APRM with African leader, there wa a imultaneou and very important effort underway to reform the Organization of African Unity to allow it to encourage voluntary political and economic reform and allow the inter-governmental body greater overight and engagement in the internal affair of overeign member, epecially if there wa a military eizure of power, ign of a likely deadly conflict, or wore, the threat or tart of another Rwanda-like genocide. Opening countrie up to cloer crutiny of the nature and quality of the governance, mot pecifically the conduct of democratic election, became a front-burner iue a well. According to then OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim, the firt and mot radical propoal to reform the OAU after the end of the Cold War and the fall of apartheid came from Libya Muammar Gaddafi, ahead of the 1999 annual ummit he would hot in Sirte. Hi expert offered a cheme for an African Union of one government, one defence minitry, and o on. The cheme wa, note Salim, very ambitiou. I think that he wa well-meaning but it wa not realitic (Ndlovu & Strydom 2016, p 75). Once again, Mbeki, Obaanjo and Bouteflika worked together drafting what became the Sirte Declaration, which propoed an African Union that would be more modet yet mark a major hift toward howing African leader to be willing to 15

23 addre problem ariing within member tate rather than excluively between or among overeign tate, a had been the cae under the OAU Charter. For the next three year pan-african diplomacy grappled with the complementary propoal for reforming the OAU Charter and it political/ecurity function, plu the le formal political/economic initiative, Nepad, with an APRM. The firt to be accomplihed wa the launch of the African Union in 2002 at the OAU lat ummit, in Durban, South Africa, while Nepad wa adopted the following year. The mot notable reform in the African Union Contitutive Act, which upplanted the OAU Charter, dealt with regional peace and ecurity iue within tate. The AU became the world firt multilateral intrument to anction (Article 4 (h)) the right to intervene, puruant to a deciion by the African Union Aembly in repect of grave circumtance, namely: war crime, genocide and crime againt humanity ( Thi mandate, now commonly referred to a the Reponibility to Protect (Evan & Sahnoun 2001), which aroe in the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide, wa conidered in the cae of the 2015 Burundi crii but i, a yet, unteted. A econd reform i a new objective in the AU Contitutive Act, Article 3(g), which i of greater relevance to the work of EISA. It commit AU member to: promote democratic principle and intitution, popular participation and good governance. It i upported under Principle, Article 4(m), which mandate member to how [r]epect for democratic principle, human right, the rule of law and good governance. Both proviion, plu Article 4(p), the condemnation and rejection of uncontitutional change of government, were adopted eaily and unanimouly becaue they were believed to be increaingly eential to conflict prevention and mitigation within tate and do not ugget an African Union conenu, much le any precription that particular kind of democratic or governance arrangement are appropriate for any particular member tate. Rather, the AU wa endoring general principle and procee related to good governance and the development of peaceful and politically capable tate that could deal more effectively in larger international bodie with plan and propoal for increaed regional cooperation and collective action locally, and thu fend off any unwanted foreign intervention. Negotiation about how bet to put the Contitutive Act Principle and Objective pertaining to the governance of member tate into operation coaleced around what became the African Charter for Democracy, Election and Governance (ACDEG), which wa unanimouly adopted by the African Union Eighth Ordinary Aembly 16

24 of African Head of State & Government on 30 January It ha ince become the principal ource of authority and legitimacy for pan-african election obervation miion (EOM) deployed by the African Union (AU) and the REC and opened the way for the path-breaking partnerhip between EISA and the AU dicued in the next ection. Implementing the ACDEG required national ratification by 15 member tate, which wa achieved in 2012 and, a of 2016, 23 of the African Union 54 member tate have ratified and are legally obliged to act in accordance with the charter proviion. Thoe tate that have endored but not yet ratified the charter mut at leat weigh up the political and diplomatic cot and benefit of cooperation or defiance. Operationally, the mot prominent and pervaive meaure of the charter facilitation of pan-african collective engagement in the dometic affair of AU member ha been in the monitoring and aement of national democratic election. In the realm of Africa peace and ecurity, the ACDEG can be een a operating in the pirit of Reponibility to Protect, although the AU and REC generally lack the collective capacity and reolve to intervene in the dometic affair of their tillovereign member tate. Collective engagement, a enviioned by the ACDEG, i primarily political, rather than military, and i contingent on local term and condition. The role and importance of local and trannational civil ociety and other non-tate actor a allie and occaional partner in thee multilateral initiative i increaingly evident. A EISA partnerhip demontrate, thi now include effort to advance tranparent and accountable democratic governance. Adoption of the ACDEG at leat ignalled a general conenu that democracy i the generally preferred route to developing politically capable tate that can reolve internal difference peacefully and become reliable and reilient partner with their neighbour, regionally and globally. There are, however, wide and peritent degree of reolve in reponding to the goal and objective of the ACDEG. The mot frequent and widely ued meaure of thi reolve ha been and will continue to be the extent and effectivene of pan-african miion to oberve and ae national election. The dutie of thee miion include publihing finding and recommendation about the credibility of the election and way of improving the proce in the future. A key goal of EISA effort in upport of African inter-governmental organiation conducting election obervation i to encourage them to devote greater attention 17

25 and reource to monitoring and aeing electoral element before and after the actual conduct of voting on election day. The aim i to improve the over-all integrity of the proce and it legitimacy in the eye of the nation and internationally. When it wa launched, the ACDEG wa intended to complement Nepad, which, no le than the ACDEG, reflect the commitment, albeit in varying degree of reolve and capacity, to purue dometic policie that are more tranparent, politically accountable and ubject to the rule of law. Both Nepad and the ACDEG manifet the belief that the uret, afet and mot productive road to utainable political and economic development mut be rooted in a form of democratic governance that, above all, command the voluntary repect, allegiance and upport of it citizen. Nepad wa provided with it own mall ecretariat, a panel of eminent expert, and i overeen by a Head of State & Government Orientation Committee that report to the AU Aembly on the country report and it own team review of each of thee. The ACDEG, on the other hand, i taffed by the AU Commiion (ecretariat) under it Peace and Security Department and report to the AU Aembly and it Committee for Peace and Security. A notable diplomatic innovation in both Nepad and the ACDEG i the APRM, which meaure progre at national level o that partner acquire a better undertanding of each other internal procee, thu providing a more realitic bai for mutual aitance and utainable cooperation and eventual regional integration. Although the 34 member of the looe aociation of highly indutrialied nation, the Organiation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), ha had a peer review economic proce in effect for decade, the AU commitment i broader and precedent etting for the le advanced economie of the Global South and there are ubtantial difference in the cope, nature and impact immediate and long-term of the two procee. By the end of 2015, 35 of the AU 54 member had joined the APRM proce, although only 17 had actually ubjected themelve to country aement by pan- African team of leading economit. In recent year the fall-off of participation and the lack of funding for the APRM ecretariat, including from Wetern donor, ha left the mechanim on what one analyt rightly called life upport, although there have been recent promie of reucitation (Fabriciu 2016; Du Plei 2016). Pan-African peer review procee manifet a trategic conenu and commitment among member of the African Union to eek African olution for African problem 18

26 to deter any further non-african foreign intervention, which ha cured the continent for centurie. More poitively, they alo reflect a commitment to deepen mutual undertanding and cooperation among the AU member and the legitimacy of thee complex and difficult procee. At the ame time, effort anctioned by Nepad and the ACDEG are meant to complement rather than detract from variou attempt to promote peace and ecurity and economic development and cooperation within Africa everal ub-regional economic communitie. RISING DOUBTS ABOUT DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: RHETORICAL OR REAL? Jut when pan-african democratic breeze were helping to accelerate EISA expanion into the ret of Africa, a growing number of African government took tep to retrict the dometic democratic pace. Thi poe new challenge for EISA if the univeral norm of human right and democracy thee government voluntarily embraced when adopting the AU Contitutive Act and the more recent ACDEG are being undermined, or, at leat, ignored. From EISA perpective, if the obligation to become more tranparent and accountable to their citizen extend only to peaceful voting on election day, pathway to utainable democracy won t go beyond the firt baby tep. EISA effort to enure greater electoral integrity and related condition bearing on the development and entrenchment of democracy and good governance are dicued in the econd and third ection, but firt a few highlight of the changing context affecting it work over the pat decade. At the global level there were the many detrimental reverberation of the 11 September 2001 terrorit attack in the United State, followed by the diatrou American invaion that brought regime change in Iraq, led to preading violence in the region and abetted local tenion in Africa, notably the internationally-linked terrorit inurrection in the Horn, Eat, Wet, and Central Africa. There were alo hortfall, beginning in the 1990, in Africa pot-cold War peace dividend. The end of the US-Soviet rivalry, which meant le economic and ecurity aitance for their African client, ha not been replaced or augmented by economic and other upport to foter and utain democratic development. Increaingly, external power, eeing terrorit threat in Africa, acted in way reminicent of the Cold War, rewarding government allied with them in thi campaign with political and economic upport, while overlooking dometic action detrimental to democracy and human right. 19

27 The urge in violence, which appear to have peaked more than a decade after the tart of the global war on terror, typically grew out of local grievance, and what i different thi time i not the number of caualtie (which have approached level not experienced ince the final tage of the Cold War) but that the number of countrie eriouly affected ha o far been quite mall. According to South Africa Intitute for Security Studie, excluding fatalitie from jut five of Africa 54 countrie (Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia and Libya), political violence elewhere ha remained at the low level that prevailed during EISA firt decade, level the Intitute for Security Studie aert are unprecedented by hitorical tandard (Cillier 2015). The 2007/2008 global financial crii with it related cutback in foreign loan, invetment and development aitance redounded around the world, hurting Africa motly tiny economie, which are till reliant on export of primary commoditie. Yet it i alo the cae that the HIPC and MDRI debt-reduction initiative between 1996 and 2006, noted above, did have poitive economic effect, cutting debt-to-gdp ratio in the 36 participating African countrie from over 114% in 1999 to 19% in 2011, with public debt tock reduced to $12 billion from $117 billion (Brook, Lombardi & Suruma 2014, p 4). Since thi debt relief Africa overall economic growth ha been robut, averaging around 5%, although varied and with primary commodity exporting countrie leading at even higher rate. Thi ha led to a urge in new borrowing, with the IMF reporting African overeign debt level at a ten-year high in Another global receion occurred in 2015, le evere than that in 2007/08 but, ironically, having a more evere impact on Africa than the earlier one, primarily becaue of China falling demand for African primary commoditie. What lating impact thi downturn will have on democratic trend in Africa ha yet to be determined, but it doe point to one of the bigget change in Africa political economy during EISA econd decade, which ha been the rapid and pervaive expanion of China preence and influence. To reaure African leader of China commitment to thi partnerhip, China Preident Xi Jinping peronally co-hoted, with South Africa Preident Jacob Zuma, in Johanneburg, the November 2015 Sixth China-Africa Forum, pledging another $60 billion in aitance (Stremlau 2015). Whether Africa ha become China Second Continent, a journalit Howard French argue, or eek a more limited and opportunitic engagement, a cholar Deborah Brautigam carefully document in Will Africa Feed China?, there can be little doubt that China engagement in Africa may well be the mot poitive region-wide development ince de-coloniation (French 2014; Brautigam 2015). 20

28 China political poitioning, epecially with regard to democracy and election, remain ambiguou and problematic. A the world larget country that doe not hold periodic popular election, China ha begun to deploy it own election oberver to at leat ome African election and, in the cae of Madagacar, participated along with EISA and all the other group in briefing the media on it finding, which were very much in line with thoe of the other international group (Global Time 2013). Chinee Africanit often argue that regime legitimacy accrue from rapid growth and normally teer clear of uch political quetion a the role of popular mandate conferred via credible incluive democratic election (Zhang & Song 2012). The argument i not unique to Chinee analyt (Okereke & Agupui 2015). African government and cholar increaingly debate whether economic reform hould precede political reform or, in a line uually attributed to Singapore long-erving autocratic leader, Lee Kuan Yew: Peretroika before Glanot. Whether political condition allow for thi i another matter. I recall viiting South Africa jut before tranformation, when a group of ditinguihed foreign economit proffered uch advice, only to be told by incumbent Preident F W de Klerk and hi ANC challenger, Nelon Mandela, that delay wa politically impoible. Yet the debate continue and, in recent year, ha become known a the Beijing model or the Development State (Mkandawire 2001). The preumption that democracy can only ucceed in economically advanced countrie gained currency among Wetern ocial cientit in the 1950 and today often pae for conventional widom. Yet, a Harvard Profeor Pippa Norri recent reearch ugget, thi i not alway the cae. Norri and her team have been running a large Electoral Integrity Project for the pat four year and her work, particularly the Africa urvey, will be ued in the next ection to gauge the impact of EISA project. In her book Why Electoral Integrity Matter (2014) and a ubequent global aement involving electoral expert in 139 countrie, he ha ought to anwer the quetion of whether the fact that democratic regime have emerged only after countrie have reached a level of properity $8 000 per capita ha become the benchmark mean democracy i till beyond the reach of mot African countrie (Norri 2014). While conceding that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chance that it will utain democracy, he goe on to oberve that if lack of development i the root caue, then electoral malpractice uch a coercion, vote-buying and fraud would be particularly evere and ubiquitou in the pooret ocietie of Africa. But her global 21

29 urvey how thi i not alway the cae. She cored all African countrie according to a complex et of integrity indicator and found that in each country mot recent election ome were terrible for example, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia all failed, with ome of the lowet integrity rating in the world, while other, for example Benin, Mauritiu, Leotho, South Africa and Namibia, all had high integrity rating. She conclude that there i little evidence in Africa, the world pooret region, that wealth and poverty are correlated with level of electoral integrity. Election, Norri write, are the heart of the repreentative proce. Flawed contet damage party competition, democratic governance and fundamental human right. She recommend that rather than abandon upport for African election becaue o many countrie are hotage to autocratic leader who defy or overturn term limit and blatantly rig election international donor and civil ociety group that upport the advancement and utainability of democracy hould re-double their effort. The next ection, which focue on EISA work, trive to jutify Profeor Norri recommendation. In recent year it ha begun to become evident that donor may be loing their appetite for funding election and the work of thoe charged with aeing impartially degree of electoral integrity and therefore political legitimacy. Democracy and Africa expert Nicola van de Walle of Cornell Univerity detect a democracy fatigue among ome Wetern donor (Van de Walle 2016; Moore 2016). David Moore, a profeor of Anthropology and Development Studie at the Univerity of Johanneburg, however, perceive a more ominou trend, what he label in an article for a forthcoming edition of the Socialit Regiter An Arc of Authoritarianim in Africa. There i, according to Moore, a continental cancer that threaten African effort to entrench democratic value and intitution, a wide gap between thoe for whom freedom meant the overeign right for African leader to do what they want, motly phraed within the predictable pattern of antiimperialit poturing, and comopolitan verion of liberalim apiring to retrict that liberty to thoe who do not kill their ubject wantonly. Moore 2016 Thi i, of coure, not a uniquely African problem but one that may be driving up democratic deficit in countrie around the world, a Columbia Univerity political cientit Alexander Cooley argue compellingly in the headline article of an iue of the Journal of Democracy, entitled Authoritarianim Goe Global: Countering Democratic 22

30 Norm (Cooley July 2015). The counter-norm to liberal democracy Cooley analye are congruent with Moore view of Africa: authoritarian rationaliation that privilege tate ecurity, repect for civiliational diverity and traditional value. Thee appeal, while backed by tate power, may alo reonate with the more conervative maledominated ector of ociety, which favour the tability of electoral autocracy and the abrogation of executive term limit that now often confirm the forceful entrenchment of thee regime. Aging autocrat are epecially prominent in Africa, but whether they herald a future or a faltering trend i a yet unclear, jutifying the need for more in-depth reearch, a exemplified by the cae tudie in thi volume. David E Kiwuwa of Princeton Univerity recently publihed a urvey tallying and comparing the age and year in office of all current African head of tate. Several, notably the incumbent in Zimbabwe, Angola, Uganda, Algeria, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, have been in power for decade, and the average age of Africa ten oldet leader i 78.1 year, compared to 52 for leader of the world ten mot-developed economie (Kiwuwa 2015). Paradoxically, thi trend run counter to Africa demographic. The IMF etimate that by 2035 more African will be entering the global labour market than people from the ret of the world combined (IMF 2015). Already Africa i the younget and fatet-growing region, with a population that i projected to grow from 800 million to over 2 billion by mid-century. Many countrie are already howing ign of retivene and frutration, riking political intability, epecially where election are een to be fraudulent, lacking integrity, and reponive to public demand for change of policie and peronnel at all political level. Kiwuwa note that only 21% to 25% of Angolan, Ugandan or Zimbabwean were even born when their leader came to power. Whether the park that will ignite them will be demagogy or democracy i alway the iue in the truggle to overturn the evil of US egregation and South African apartheid it wa the youth who were at the vanguard. Extreme inequality and the denial of ocial and economic right to education, health care, baic houing and fair employment opportunitie are generating preure that may prove impoible to uppre in the abence of more democratic ocial contract. Mot of thee long-erving and entrenched leader hold regular election and have become known among academic a electoral authoritarian. 4 Preidential term limit, which, in the majority of democratic contitution adopted in Africa during the 1990, would not allow incumbent more than two term, have been overturned, ignored or defied in at leat 15 countrie ince Mot credible independent international 23

31 election-monitoring group will not even conider oberving uch election, but, a noted in the next ection, thi ha become an iue of importance for EISA in it dealing with the African Union, which i obliged to end oberver miion to the election of all AU member tate. Further complicating the picture i the ever-immering debate over whether democracy hould be regarded a rooted in univeral value or value more appropriate to particular region and culture. It i a big and complicated debate which cannot be explored here. It doe, however, bear on judgement of electoral integrity and it lie at the heart of Thabo Mbeki viion of an African Renaiance and the way the African Union Contitutive Act and the African Charter addre democracy, good governance and election. Mbeki and the framer of the AU intrument clearly wanted African to apire to and be repected for and held accountable to univeral tandard. And hould thee tandard evolve over time, African view on any emerging global conenu hould be taken into account, no more or le than thoe of the citizen of any other region of the world. The fact that the current UN tructure deny African adequate repreentation and that when a major power, notably the US, appeal to Africa to be more democratic thi rik arouing local anti-democratic force who ee democratiation a a cover for military or other interet, much a wa the cae during the Cold War, when the Wet advocated democracy while allying itelf with dictator like Mobutu or regime a bad a that in apartheid in South Africa. Democracy need and will inevitably acquire local characteritic. Democratic governance i, after all, about finding viable and reilient compromie that allow power to change hand peacefully, regime to evolve in repone to changing circumtance locally and internationally and the tate to become more reilient and a more politically capable partner regionally and globally. The challenge for independent electoral upport organiation, notably EISA, i to reach a fair and full determination of when local characteritic of any avowed democracy violate democracy univeral characteritic. Some fale claim are eay to pot. China pitch for economic growth ahead of democratiation deerve the careful critical conideration of African government facing growing demand for greater tranparency, accountability, and citizen 24

32 empowerment. When leader of the People Republic of China ay their regime i a true democracy with Chinee characteritic few real democrat take the claim eriouly. And when the ageing autocrat and preident for life, Robert Mugabe, ay that Zimbabwean are determining their own future that, too, lack credibility, although thi did not deter the African Union from electing the long-ago freedom fighter to be it chair in Another authoritarian leader, Idri Déby, the long-erving preident of Chad, ucceeded Mugabe a AU chair in The majority of African regime are neither definitely dictatorhip nor definitely democracie, but rather partly free, in the term popularied by Freedom Houe annual democracy index. Thi i an area of profound political ambiguity, jutifying the cholarhip that EISA upport or contribute to in partnerhip with cholar and reearcher at leading African univeritie and think tank. There i alo a growing academic literature on the Africaniation of democracy (Decker & Arrington 2015; Gruzd & Turianhyi (ed) 2015). Reearch, analyi and advocacy focued on non-wetern alternative model of democracy ha gone global. The many complexitie and the cope of thi topic are neatly urveyed and analyed in a new book by Richard Young, The Puzzle of Non-Wetern Democracy (2015). Young i alo perplexed, noting in hi foreword: In my fifteen year working on democracy upport, there have never been o many or uch vociferou call for democracy to be encouraged along path very different from the Wetern model. After hundred of interview with practitioner, activit and analyt around the world he conclude that greater effort mut be made to bridge the work of international democracy promotion and upport and the analytical exploration of the concept of democracy itelf, a mixing of the how and the what of democracy upport, a challenge EISA ha purued ince it inception. In a brief ection on Africa Young rightly tree that the legacy of colonialim weigh heavily on national political configuration a it reinforced ectarian diviion and produced many ui generi and illegitimate intitution that favoured particular egment of the population. He quote a now well-known indictment by Nigerian cholar Claude Ake, publihed in 1996, the year EISA wa founded, that Wetern liberal democracy i not in the leat emancipatory becaue it offer the people right they cannot exercie, voting that never amount to chooing, freedom that i patently puriou, and political equality which ditinguihe highly unequal power relation. Young 2015, p 51 25

33 Young ummarie what he urmie are four element of the cae for an African form of democracy baed on traditional political intitution: communalim, non-partyim, conenual decentralied deciion-making and chieftaincy. While urging more reearch and engagement, epecially in tate regarded a partly free or in tranition, he make two important, if tentative, obervation. One i that a concept of African democracy that incorporate the four traditional element ret on apparently contradictory argument: African are aid to value conenu over adverary competition, yet are divided by too many ethnic, religiou, linguitic and other primary identitie to forge workable majoritarian rule (Young 2015, p 53). He conclude, however, on a hopeful note: It i difficult to detect a trong trend toward a completely different model of democracy. Afrobarometer and other poll how not only that the demand for democracy i riing acro Africa but alo that ordinary citizen make the ame judgment about what i and what i not democratic a elewhere in the world. Young 2015, p 56 Advocating and adhering to univeral democratic value, including increaingly accepted univeral democratic election tandard rooted in the public international human right law and norm all government endore, i epecially vital in Africa, home to the mot ethnically divere countrie in the world. Identity voting pattern and preference, a noted above, have become a renewed interet among analyt trying to undertand recent political upheaval in Wetern democracie, mot notably the US, Britain and member of the European Union. Yet according to a decade-old global aement of ethnic identitie within tate, the 20 mot ethnically divere countrie in the world are in Africa, with Uganda and Liberia heading the lit (Fiher 2013). By contrat, the mot homogenou are Aian Japan and Korea, while Europe where current anti-immigrant tenion are driving dangerou xenophobia endured centurie of deadly conflict until recently reaching today ituation where mot large ethnic group have a country of their own. Thi i not generally an option for African government, regime or tate. International electoral upport group, including EISA, hould not and cannot dicourage identity voting. The realitie in virtually all democracie, ocial cientit have hown, i that people tend to vote for the candidate and partie they feel to be mot like them. At bet, the challenge of keeping democratic procee alive and 26

34 utainable i enuring that election at leat mediate and manage faction, whether organied according to pecial interet, a particular racial, ethnic, religiou, gender or other identity, or both. The central challenge for local civil ociety and international electoral upport group, including EISA, i to draw attention to the rik of one identity group unfairly dominating other, whether the incumbent leader repreent a majority or a minority group. Of coure, identitie can include categorie greater than ethnicity, a in South Africa or America black/white racial divide, and another that i currently receiving much media attention generation. Generational difference acro Africa are becoming increaingly potent a, demographically, Africa ha the world fatet-growing population, with a potentially exploive youth bulge, large proportion of which are unemployed, poorly prepared and frutrated. At the ame time, Africa youth, more than any prior cohort, i information and communication and ocially networked and that, in the future, could have far-reaching poibilitie for political mobiliation and manipulation. In Africa the peed of the pread of peronal communication device ha been tunning. In 2002 fewer than 1 in 10 African owned a mobile phone, but today, at leat in Nigeria and South Africa, they are a ubiquitou a they are in the US, with mart phone connected to the global internet increaingly common among elite, according to a 2015 Pew Reearch Center urvey of the continent. Socially networked, politically aware young people who have little or no propect of gainful employment are but one of the many challenge facing government all over Africa. In South Africa, then-preident Mbeki wa often quoted by aide referring to the unmet need and apiration of unemployed urban youth epecially young men a hi greatet challenge, one he later conceded he failed even to dent, and that could oon threaten the utainability of the country democracy. Preumably many other leader hare thi apprehenion. Looking ahead the focu of the final ection of thi booklet African government will face not only the familiar problem of unemployment and riing inequality but the unprecedented challenge reulting from climate change and extreme weather event, affecting land ue, food, water and dieae. The recent Ebola epidemic in Wet Africa howed the danger poed to crowded urban area when a powerful viru jump from animal to human and pread rapidly though a vulnerable population. State mot affected in the Mano River Region had 27

35 only recently recovered from devatating civil war and long period of authoritarian rule. Their holding of ucceful national democratic election wa widely een a a vital tep toward development but belied the continued fragility of regime and tate with health ytem too weak to deal with the dieae. Thi i, no doubt, a harbinger of the dire danger ahead, but it did how that international global health network can forge critically important partnerhip that are rightly een to be in everyone interet. To deal with uch contingencie in timely and effective way wa the viion and apiration of the African Renaiance and the reform of the pan-african intitution decribed above and that provided an important context for and condition conducive to EISA expanded role in electoral aitance and other contribution aimed at helping to entrench and utain democracy. It wa hoped that by now African leader would have made a lot more progre in auming a greater and more appropriate role in deigning and advocating their preferred olution to common and hared problem, whether with public health, food ecurity, afe water or a hot of other iue. Thee alo require international partner, but partner who accept that final judgement of the ucce and value of any venture lie not with them but with African people democratically empowered and ecure enough under law to hold their own leader accountable. Unfortunately, ince Preident Mbeki wa recalled in October 2008 no leader of comparable pan-african tanding and viion ha ucceeded him to advance Africa international relation, nor ha there been any cluter of leader able to drive pan- African reform and conenu a did Mbeki, along with preident Obaanjo, Bouteflika and everal other, uch a John Kufuor of Ghana and Mele Zenawi of Ethiopia. The current pan-african leaderhip vacuum i perilou and affect many initiative, including the important work of a mall NGO uch a EISA. The deciion not to award the $5m Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leaderhip in 2015, announced on 16 June 2016 by the chair of the Prize Committee, Salim Ahmed Salim, i ignificant. Salim give hi reaon in an eay that wa widely ditributed through Africa independent media (Salim 2016). They indicate the broader problem of national and pan-african democratic leaderhip, alo reflected in the annual Ibrahim index of African Governance. The 2015 edition i the ninth ince the Sudanee philanthropit and former cellular communication buine leader, Mo Ibrahim, launched the index in The main concluion of thi urvey of 54 African countrie i that overall governance progre in Africa i talling, jut when the 193 United Nation member had unanimouly 28

36 adopted the 2030 utainable development goal, including the imperative for better governance to carry out the other 16 goal with 157 operational objective (Ibrahim Index 2015). The accuracy and fairne of Ibrahim numerical ranking of each country performance in term of the 14 good governance categorie will be endlely debated. What it doe convey to election oberver, whether pan-african or from abroad, i the huge diverity of and variation in governance among the 54 countrie. On a cale of 100, 70 point eparate the bet performing country, Mauritiu, and the wort, Somalia, with the other dipered widely among the political, legal, economic and ocial categorie. The Ibrahim Index provide a ueful reference for planning and etting realitic objective for comprehenive election obervation miion. It alo point to the importance of more in-depth and comprehenive monitoring and aement of the integrity of a country entire electoral proce, a will be addreed in the next ection. Thi opening ection hould allow the reader to locate EISA activitie within the national, regional and global trend and diruption ince 1996 that had an impact on it work, opening unexpected opportunitie and new often daunting challenge to the proviion of impartial ubtantial electoral aitance and upport for countrie truggling to utain democratic governance in difficult, complex and often unpredictable circumtance a vital indicator of democracy, epecially in fragile countrie making the tranition from conflict and authoritarian rule. Shortly before he died in November 1997, political philoopher Sir Iaiah Berlin wa aked to name the bigget challenge that would face humanity in the 21t century. He replied: Cultural elf-determination with a political framework i preciely the iue Unle there i a minimum of hared value that can preerve the peace no decent ocietie can urvive (Gardel (ed) 1995). Berlin comment eem epecially pertinent given Africa denity and diverity of culture too mall to urvive alone yet unwilling to be ubervient. Lending upport to African who eek to develop viable and reilient framework to manage cultural diverity democratically i the eence of EISA miion and the way it ha attempted to do o and with what effect will be conidered in the next ection. 29

37 note 1 The original 14 SADC member were Angola, Botwana, Leotho, Malawi, Mauritiu, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelle, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Madagacar joined everal year later. Impartial external obervation of election in Angola and Swaziland were deemed to be impoible and there were imilar problem at time in other SADC member countrie. 2 The AU recognie eight REC, the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), the Common Market for Eatern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan State (CEN-SAD), the Eat African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African State (ECCAS), the Economic Community of Wet African State (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and SADC. 3 A good example of thi i the collection of 30 eay in Makgoba (ed) Electoral authoritarian are not unique to Africa. See More 2012; LeBa 2016 and Vencovky

38 2 Putting Democratic Principle into Practice eia Firt Twenty Year EISA leader and taff remain firmly committed to pan-africanim and democracy, two ideal difficult to define preciely and even harder for an African trannational non-governmental organiation to fund and purue on a large enough cale and in way that will create poitive practical utainable benefit for Africa people and politic. Thi ection attempt to offer a comprehenive view of both the breadth and depth of EISA democracy-upport work. There i no attempt to report on all it myriad activitie ince 1996 and countrie are cited or lited to illutrate the extent of the intitute reach and prioritie in the main programme area conitent with the emerging pan-african identity of the African Renaiance. The leaderhip and taff of the intitute believe democracy can never be impoed from above. To thrive it mut be home grown. EISA alo believe and work to enure that a countrie experiment with democratic governance the leon they learn for better or for wore hould be hared, for the benefit of other democracie in Africa and beyond. The longet egment of the ection deal with EISA work on election and related political procee. The maintay of thi work i election obervation, which enjoy broad pan-african political legitimacy. Thi allow EISA a cot-effective entry point from which to ae relative democratic commitment and progre in virtually all African countrie. Yet generally country-pecific engagement are brief and only intermittent, taking place once every four or five year. In Chad, Côte d Ivoire, DRC, Egypt, Mozambique and Rwanda, where EISA ha etablihed hort-term field office, it ha implemented programme to upport 31

39 citizen obervation group in etablihing network to trengthen their engagement in the electoral proce, including conducting tatitically-baed evaluation of election reult and aeing multiple tage of an electoral cycle. In other cae, to acquire a deeper undertanding and contribute in more utained way to national democratic experiment, longer-term field office have been etablihed to deal with iue other than thoe pertaining to election, including contitution-building, technical upport to the electoral management bodie, to political partie in poll watching and to civil ociety in civic and voter education and the prevention and reolution of electoral and other ocietal conflict. In 2016 there were nine field office, in the Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Madagacar, Mali, Mozambique, Somalia, and Zambia a well a a ub-regional office in Gabon. The office in Mali and Chad have ince been cloed. An important long-running project that complement EISA electoral monitoring and aement work i it pecial project on the African Peer Review Mechanim (APRM), etablihed in Thi ection conclude with reference to EISA a a learning and globally connected intitute by virtue of it extenive reearch and publication programme, annual conference and forum and leaderhip of a global network of electoral upport group, which meet annually. During it firt decade the global and continental political wind were generally at EISA back a it puhed outward from South Africa to help advance pan-african democracy. In it econd decade the intitute wa buffeted by cro current a democratic progre faltered or talled in many place in Africa and for many reaon. Thoe African leader cited in the previou chapter had left the cene, with ucceor till not in ight. Depite thee etback, EISA ha continued to proper and continue to play an important role in keeping alive the viion of pan-african democracy. EISA took a trategic deciion to adopt a continental approach and to align itelf formally with the inter-governmental bodie of the African Union and the regional economic council (REC). Although the deciion to do o ha been criticied by important civil ociety group and EISA ha battled to maintain it reputation for impartiality and evidence-baed forthright reporting, in aligning itelf with thee organiation it ha been able to maintain it commitment to help advance and utain pan-african democracy. 32

40 Thi ection trie to anwer the quetion of whether EISA take on too much in a bid to be relevant both locally and in a pan-african context, a well a credibly independent. It eek to do o againt the backdrop of the dynamic political context national, continental, and global highlighted in the previou ection. In reviewing and aeing EISA main programme and leon learned it alo eek to inform judgement about whether the intitute can and will continue to flourih in the extremely challenging decade immediately ahead for Africa and the world. One of the intitute mot attractive attribute i that the people who work there and determine the intitutional culture tend to operate a idealit without illuion. It i a label omewhat different from the more familiar one of political realit becaue they mut find way of adhering to enduring democratic principle while adapting to changing political circumtance. The deciion to go continental wa baed on an acceptance of the viion of an African Renaiance, decribed in the firt ection. Or, a Julia Katherine Seirli conclude in her detailed report of EISA firt ten year, the underlying goal of Executive Director Deni Kadima advocacy of continent-wide programming in area of election and democratic governance i to challenge exiting definition of centre and periphery, of what i allowed or uppoed to contitute international and global bet practice (Seirli 2008, p 137). She add a telling quote from Kadima: Why hould we ay anything that come from the United State i global? We want to be een a etting trend, and that what we can do i world cla (Seirli 2008). To make thi point credibly meant that EISA electoral aitance henceforth would encompa all 54 African tate. The only way thi could be managed effectively would be in aociation with the African Union. A Memorandum of Undertanding wa formally igned in 2008 and renewed for another five year at a formal igning in Addi Ababa on 9 June Several imilar agreement have been igned with regional economic communitie. Formal agreement would not have been ought or poible with the AU predeceor, the Organization of African Unity, which wa contrained by it commitment to tricter adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affair of member tate. The AU, while till committed to the principle of non-interference, ha adopted a more nuanced informal norm, which encourage the Union to be not indifferent to condition within member tate, epecially thoe that might threaten regional peace and ecurity. Election obervation, a noted above, ha become a legitimate pan-african intrument for gaining acce to the internal political affair of member tate and, in 33

41 principle, allow for early warning ignal of trouble a well a encouraging acceptance and entrenchment of democratic procee procedure and principle. Gauging the actual integrity of particular election remain an enormou and complex challenge for EISA, epecially where it i operating under the mandate and authority of the AU and/or one of the REC. Independent impartial international election oberver and electoral upport group, uch a The Carter Center, will not and cannot operate without the formal invitation of a hot government and within guideline determined by thoe government and their purportedly impartial national electoral management bodie. A long a EISA operate independently it can evaluate the term offered by hot government, undertake whatever pre-election aement it deem appropriate and neceary and then decide for itelf, contingent alo on donor upport, whether, for how long and how many people it will deploy to oberve a particular African election. EISA ha gambled, o far uccefully in my view, on the African Renaiance ideal the notion that democracy mut be home grown within any ociety. From a practical perpective it correctly aumed, along with the leader who uccefully reformed the AU, that Africa i too culturally divere and territorially fragmented and lack the reource to impoe unity from above, by a ingle leader, faction or excluive coalition. Nor can it be impoed from outide. But the likelihood of utainable democracy can be improved if it i carried out in the unlight of international, credible, impartial external oberver in term of mutually agreed ground rule. Succeful election are today widely accepted a a neceary if inufficient tep toward achieving local democratic governance and developing a more politically capable tate that will be a more reliable regional partner. Thi hould alo erve the wider objective of the reolve for collective action to enhance regional ecurity and properity and to engage the ret of the world more effectively and on a more equal footing. For centurie Africa ha been the victim, rather than the beneficiary, of the two longetrunning attempt to etablih order in an anarchical world prone to chao and deadly conflict. The oldet and mot ubiquitou wa empire, or what, for centurie, were cycle of imperial acendency and collape a inatiable greed and ambition became unutainable. The econd model comprie variation of diplomatically improvied and militarily backed balance of power that aroe in Europe out of the 17 th century ucceful curbing of local religiou war and led to more bounded imperialim, which, in Africa, reulted in the colonial exploitation and fragmentation that i now the continent dyfunctional intertate ytem. 34

42 That ytem wa, of coure, utained during the latter half of the 20 th century by the anomalou US-Soviet bi-polar nuclear-baed balance of power that wrought havoc in pot-colonial Africa. A the world truggle to find a new, better and more lating pathway to peace and properity, the hared viion of the African Renaiance and of EISA i that Africa, for once, will become one of the co-founder of a new order, not one of it exploitable object. Africa, according thi viion, can only thrive a a community of democracie, regionally and globally. Overall, EISA record in the pat decade in contributing to building a more citizenbaed national and regional democratic order ha necearily been mixed. African government continue to be vulnerable to dometic factionalied violence, abue of power by incumbent authoritie, evidence of rampant corruption, ometime perniciou foreign influence of government and multilateral financial intitution and threat of global terrorit and criminal network. Thu far a weakened but till dicernible conenu in upport of pan-african democracy perit and EISA play an important role in helping to utain it through it major programme, which upport Election and Political Procee and it other programme, which focu on helping to utain the African Peer Review Mechanim, aiting African parliament, trengthening civil ociety and political partie and producing reearch into and publication about a wide array of Africa democracy iue and intitution. 11 Elewhere in the world there ha been a diturbing ecalation in ugly political force, nativim and xenophobic nationalim. Thee outbreak, in 2016, dominated world headline a they took place in everal of the world oldet and mot table democracie, a well a among the o-called Big Emerging Market. The leader of Africa generally politically weak and economically poor tate cannot afford confrontation with outider or evere repreion internally o will continue, to varying degree, to endore democratic norm and procee, enuring continuing demand for EISA pro-democracy ervice and upport. ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES EISA ha ent it own election obervation miion to more than 30 African countie, all but one (Egypt) ub-saharan, and everal on multiple occaion ince Since 2014 the intitute technical upport team have been deployed to all AU Election Oberver Miion (EOM). In it firt year the countrie monitored were Algeria, Botwana, Egypt, Guinea Biau, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, São Tomé and Príncipe, South Africa and Tuniia. 35

43 In 2016 it ha aited African Union EOM (AUEOM) to Benin, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Comoro, Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Niger and Uganda and plan to go to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (if election are held), Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia (depite a deciion by the Economic Community of Wet African State not to do o), Ghana, São Tomé and Príncipe and Zambia. EISA upport typically include technical advice to each miion co-ordination team, facilitating oberver briefing and orientation eion, upporting the ue of better information technologie, uch a tablet, to peed up and render more comprehenive report of voter condition and contributing to drafting key AUEOM tatement, report and the handling of public relation ( In 2016 EISA, on it own, mounted a miion to the Ugandan preidential and parliamentary election and a limited obervation team to the volatile South African municipal election and to the 11 Augut Zambian preidential election. EISA upport AU and REC EOM, motly operating according to the term agreed to under memorandum of undertanding (MoU) with each of thee organiation. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African REC with which EISA ha had the longet and mot extenive partnerhip, i not covered by a MoU. In 2015 EISA opened and continue to taff a liaion office in Gabon for one of the weaket of the REC, the Economic Community of Central African State (ECCAS). Other MoU are operative with the Eat African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eatern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and, for over a decade, EISA taff have worked cloely with SADC Secretariat in Botwana, including the Directorate of it Organ on Politic, Defence and Security. In addition to it inter-governmental pan-african work EISA ha alo called attention to the importance of empowering dometic civil ociety group in all countrie in which it operate, noting that: Political conideration remain a challenge, a they continue to hamper the ability of thee regional and continental bodie to effectively confront the ill of electoral procee. EISA believe that electoral procee on the continent tand a better chance of credibility and improvement if they are cloely monitored by the people of the countrie in which they take place. To achieve thi, EISA ha placed emphai on upporting civil ociety organiation in their effort to conduct dometic election obervation. 36

44 The intitute doe not need to rely on it own criteria and precription for conducting peaceful, open and incluive democratic election. A noted above, EISA wa one of the original contributor to and endorer of the Declaration of Principle for International Election Obervation (DoP), launched in October 2005 at the United Nation headquarter in New York, a ceremony at which EISA wa preent, a well a the Declaration of Global Principle for Non-Partian Election Obervation (GNDEM) commemorated in April 2012 alo at the United Nation Headquarter in New York. Since then the DoP ha been endored by 52 organiation and the GNDEM by more than 200 election-monitoring group in more than 100 countrie. In addition to applying the DoP, which EISA document refer to a a Global benchmark, the intitute relie on everal African benchmark, including: OAU/AU Declaration on Principle Governing Democratic Election in Africa, African Union, 2002; EAC Principle for Election Obervation and Evaluation (Guideline for EAC Election Obervation Miion; Code of Conduct for Election Oberver), November 2012; Economic Community of Wet African State (ECOWAS) Protocol A/SP1/12/o1 on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol relating to the Mechanim for Conflict Prevention, Management, Reolution, Peacekeeping and Security, Dakar, December 2001; International Conference on the Great Lake Region (ICGLR), Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, 1 December 2006; SADC, Principle and Guideline Governing Democratic Election (Revied 2015), Adopted by the Miniterial Committee of the Organ (MCO) on Politic, Defence and Security Cooperation on 20 July 2015; SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, 17 Augut 2008; SADC Parliamentary Forum Norm and Standard for Election in SADC Region, Adopted by the SADC Parliamentary Forum Plenary Aembly on 25 March 2001; 3 and The Principle for Election Management, Monitoring and Obervation in the SADC region ( AU and REC miion have uually reached conenu with other non-governmental and non-african inter-governmental group monitoring voting practice in member countrie. Agreement among variou oberver group hould encourage greater confidence in any regime legitimacy at home and abroad. At the ame time there mut be greater 37

45 clarity about and mutual undertanding of the prioritie and interet different NGO and intergovernmental oberver group bring to complex and often volatile local politic that could topple or utain a regime, including the outbreak and ecalation of deadly conflict. Conflict management mechanim An area of innovation i the introduction of the EISA Conflict Management Panel (CMP), an alternative dipute reolution mechanim to manage and reolve electionrelated conflict. In 1998 EISA conducted a urvey on reolving election-related conflict. Repondent, who included election takeholder in the region and member of all 14 SADC election management bodie (EMB), identified the need to conider an alternative dipute reolution mechanim. EISA deigned and developed an election conflict management programme entitled Democracy, Election and Conflict Management and conducted training together with the EMB in each SADC country, training trainer, who, in turn, trained mediator in alternative dipute reolution. In 1999 EISA, in partnerhip with South Africa Independent Electoral Commiion (IEC), introduced conflict management panel. Mediator were elected from among the takeholder and were trained and deployed to ait the IEC in reponding to election related conflict. Thi model ha ince been replicated in everal countrie, including the Democratic Republic of Congo (where mediator were on the ground in 2005 and 2006), Leotho, Malawi and Zambia. In thi way facilitation and problem-olving ha become part of the repertoire of conflict handling kill for key election takeholder and mediation ha been ued a a peedy tool to reolve certain kind of electoral conflict. In ome countrie, among them South Africa, the reolution of conflict by mediation or conciliation i part of the electoral law. Electoral bet practice EISA ha been at the forefront of the development of a et of criteria to guide electoral practice and foter a ound enabling environment in which election can take place. A mentioned in the previou ection, an initiative between the intitute and the Electoral Commiion Forum of SADC countrie (ECF), the Principle for Election Management, Monitoring and Obervation in the SADC region (PEMMO) wa adopted on 6 November Drawing together more than 100 participant from government, electoral commiion, political partie, civil ociety, reearch intitution and electoral and political expert from the SADC region, PEMMO wa a collective and conultative proce offering a guide to bet electoral management practice. 38

46 PEMMO ha been ued by variou intitution and organiation, apart from EISA and the ECF, in their election obervation aement. EISA ha alo joined the international community in providing a framework for a ytematic and profeional aement of credible election and, a tated above, i a ignatory to the Declaration of Principle for International Election Obervation. EISA continue to remain a trong contributor to the quet for improved and better electoral practice on the continent. ELECTORAL INTEGRITY: ELUSIVE AND ESSENTIAL Determining the integrity of an entire electoral proce poe challenge in identifying and evaluating allegation and evidence of fraud and abue of power. Thoe mot reponible, at leat initially, for uch abue are uually the incumbent authoritie with privileged acce to tate financial, ecurity and patronage reource leader and interet with the mot to loe in an upcoming election, epecially in tate where the rule of law and repect for contitutional contraint are weak and ineffective. Khabele Matloa, Gilbert M Khadiagala and Victor Shale, however, note in their introduction to When Elephant Fight, a collection of eay on election violence, that: While in ome countrie the integrity of the electoral proce ha enured the poitive contribution of election to democracy, peace and development, in other election are ued a a hield for authoritarian governance. The fact that election can be ued both to promote and to undermine democratic governance i a paradox which ha given rie to a lot of quetion about the value and meaning of election in Africa. Matloa, Khadiagala & Shale 2010 Suan D Hyde (2011) explore thi paradox at greater length, noting that election obervation ha become uch an international norm that undemocratic leader rik international legitimacy and acce to many benefit if they do not welcome international oberver. The preumption i that if they were the democratic leader they claim to be there would be nothing to hide. So the game become one of deception with the rik of dicovery. Hence the challenge and importance of more comprehenive informed electoral obervation, epecially by the AU and REC. Non-partian election oberver, including thoe from the AU and the REC, can gain valuable information about previou and comparable election behaviour by acceing at leat two data et on the conduct of hundred of election around the world. Each ha been organied within a common and comprehenive electoral proce framework that allow comparion of current electoral conduct with previou election in a particular country a well a election in other countrie, both African and non-african. 39

47 The older and le precriptively ambitiou of thee date back to 1998 under the aupice of a conortium of international oberver group, including EISA, known a the Adminitration and Cot of Election Project (ACE). The ACE Electoral Knowledge Network i an online knowledge repoitory that provide comprehenive information and cutomied advice on electoral procee, plu global tatitic and data and an encyclopaedia on election. 4 The other i the more recent and ambitiou Electoral Integrity Project (EIP), launched in 2012 and now jointly run by Harvard Univerity Kennedy School of Government and the Univerity of Sydney Department of Government and International Relation under the overall direction of Profeor Pippa Norri ( On 15 June 2015 the EIP iued it firt regional report, baed on urvey conducted in 28 African countrie from the econd half of 2012 to the end of 2014 (EIP 2015). The country aement comprie urvey of expert in all phae of the country electoral proce. Quetionnaire were ent to expert (about 40 per country), with a repone rate of 23%. The element aeed were: Electoral law; Electoral procedure; Boundarie of voting ditrict; Voter regitration; Party and candidate regitration; Campaign media; Campaign finance; Voting proce; Vote count; Reult; and Electoral authoritie Reult in each category were a varied a the countrie holding election. Regarding the key element of an electoral proce mot vulnerable to fraud and abue, and/or deciive in rendering overall judgment about the integrity of an African election, EIP leader would only conclude that thi depended on condition in each of the countrie. 40

48 Among other general concluion of the report were: The degree of threat to electoral integrity i more evere in Africa than in the ret of the world; The type of problem in Africa are imilar to thoe found in the ret of the world; Election can fail long before election day, o attention hould be paid to the electoral dynamic and intitutional quality over the entire election cycle; State reource for election are important but not determinant; Difficultie in regulating campaign finance extend acro the continent; The vote count i conitently the highet-rated part of the election cycle; Countrie with good overall electoral integrity may till perform poorly in certain dimenion [and] low overall performer may excel in certain dimenion; and Cae tudie of two countrie with imilar level of economic development can reveal vatly different level of electoral integrity. A hould be evident from thi thumbnail ummary, the EIP can erve a a general guide for oberver miion to African election. If guideline for more in-depth reporting are to be developed and accepted, much more work i needed on each element in a particular ituation and thi will take time. Meanwhile new EOM group dometic and international a well a inter-governmental and non-governmental are being helped by expanding and tronger and betterconnected network of international oberver group in Africa and globally. To addre iue relating to the integrity of an election beyond the actual voting there are new attempt to develop and make eaily acceible a et of democratic election tandard to cover all ten element in the EIP electoral proce. Thee tandard are rooted in public international humanitarian law and covenant mot government have already vowed to repect and, in many cae, have endored formally and, when appropriate, ratified. Together with more pecifically electionrelated intrument uch a proviion in the AU Contitutive Act and the ACDEG, thee commitment or obligation could provide a legitimate template with which to ae the overall integrity of an electoral proce. 5 Twenty attribute againt which oberver of the full election cycle could ae a hot government performance are familiar democratic right and freedom which few, if any, government ever fully atify. And degree of performance under each require 41

49 careful informed judgement by election oberver, with reult that are bound to be omewhat ubjective and often park local controvery and ometime diagreement among variou oberver group, foreign and dometic. The 20 attribute are: Right and opportunity to vote; Right and opportunity to be elected; Right and opportunity to participate in public affair; Freedom of aociation; Freedom of aembly; Freedom of movement; Freedom of opinion and expreion; Tranparency and acce to information; Right to ecurity of the peron; Freedom from dicrimination and equality before the law; Equality between men and women; Right to a fair and public hearing; Right to an effective remedy; Univeral uffrage; Equal uffrage; Secret ballot; Periodic election; Prevention of corruption; State mut take neceary tep to give effect to right; Rule of law. Readily available and widely applied election principle and code of conduct for EOM, along with the continued development and acceptance of democratic election tandard and the EIP hould contribute to better, more in-depth reporting, not jut on voting but on the overall integrity of the electoral proce. Tenion between EOM and hot government are varied and frequent. International NGO are le contrained politically than their inter-governmental counterpart and ometime iue the mot critical aement, baed on their evidence of fraud, intimidation, and other action that call into eriou quetion the credibility of official reult. Report and recommendation iued by inter-governmental EOM, however, preumably carry greater weight with the hot government, which may be a member of that organiation. When providing technical aitance to AU and REC miion, EISA taff ometime have to tand by while the finding iued by thoe miion are le critical of the conduct of a particular election than EISA would have been. 42

50 To improve it work with the AU and REC election obervation miion EISA i to publih a book on electoral integrity, which include even country cae tudie and conclude with recommendation for improving the credibility and effectivene of thee inter-governmental miion. EISA recommend that inter-governmental EOM cooperate and coordinate more cloely to allow the more capable partner, mot often the AU, to help trengthen the ub-regional bodie and, where poible, work out a mutually atifactory diviion of labour for fuller coverage of all electoral element. EISA alo recommend attempting to forge conenu finding and recommendation for improvement in future election. To do o rik withholding critical finding and judgement, but holding EOM to internationally accepted principle and tandard hould help. EISA ee a a poitive development the rapidly growing and increaingly profeional network of graroot organiation within African countrie which are cloer to the problem of local voter regitration, boundary delimitation, the role of local police, abue of incumbency advantage and many other iue. Citizen election obervation group are alo often well connected through cellular communication, which can provide early warning function and alert foreign EOM to pattern of abue. In many African countrie thee group have, or will oon acquire, the capacity to produce their own independent parallel vote tabulation. EISA recommend cloer communication among thee group and the intergovernmental EOM to dicourage public confuion and poible unret becaue of the releae of information ahead of official reult, but alo a a ueful check and the poible ource of quetion about the validity of official reult. Regular conultation with civil ociety repreentative and involving major group in inter-eom informationharing and, where poible, iuing joint tatement, can add to the overall credibility and validate the integrity of the proce. Electronic tablet provide EOM and local civil ociety organiation oberver with an important tool for aeing graroot electoral behaviour quickly and comprehenively and relaying information, including any gap between the behaviour of key takeholder and previouly agreed national and local rule, a well a applicable regional and international treatie, covenant or formal declaration. EISA began exploring the ue of thi technology in the field in 2011 and devoted it annual ympoium that year to the role and potential of information and communication technologie in electoral procee. 43

51 In 2013 EISA launched open ource free oftware for computer, tablet and cellphone, which it named Popola, a Zulu term meaning to examine or to look cloely, firt teting it in Malawi that year. Since 2014 Popola ha been ued by more than ten AUEOM and in EISA own EOM to the 2016 Uganda election. Beyond more rapid and detailed reporting of fact, Popola can alo acce more than 200 international legal intrument that may be relevant to the broader determination of electoral integrity. The information, compiled by the Carter Center Democratic Election Standard project i organied and cro-referenced in term of 21 categorie of baic right and take account of all ten tage of an electoral cycle ( Acce to thi information allow oberver to quetion and evaluate government electoral policie and behaviour, not in term of ome formula devied by the oberver, their donor, or in accordance with a preferred ideology, but trictly in term of that government own deciion to adhere to thee principle, tandard and obligation. The role of impartial oberver become one of eeking clarity and an explanation for any apparent gap between them and a country behaviour, and thi information can then be ued to judge electoral integrity beyond the day of actual voting. EISA i alo lobbying for the AU and REC EOM to ration their reource better by etting annual election prioritie, with longer-term and more robut miion to countrie that are recovering from civil war or authoritarian rule or are under apparent internal tre and are prone to violence for other reaon. Member tate with more table and reilient democracie and an etablihed record of ucceful national election require only minimal external monitoring. In countrie with a hitory of partian violence or where trong early warning ign of conflict are evident, mediation by the AU or REC could have a poitive effect, but uch mediation hould not be linked to the tak of election monitoring and aement. Finally, EISIA i encouraging AU and REC EOM to produce, publih and dieminate report on each miion a quickly a poible. Thee allow member government, civil ociety, political partie and other election takeholder to learn important leon from each other and to develop local and regional bet practice. In mandating member to hold regular election ubject to external obervation by EOM compried of citizen from neighbouring countrie and other member tate, the AU and REC are encouraging a peer review proce intended to reveal potential danger to the democratic proce. IN-COUNTRY DEMOCRATIC PARTNERS In the pat 20 year EISA ha forged a variety of trut-baed partnerhip that complement and advance it core trategy of providing upport for democratic 44

52 election and political procee. Thee partnerhip aim both to help the country that i directly benefiting and to yield leon that may be applied elewhere. The main partnerhip categorie are: electoral management bodie (EMB), political partie, parliament and other legilative bodie, CSO and local government. In thoe countrie in which it etablihe long-term field office EISA doe it mot extenive and in-depth work with graroot civil ociety, political partie and political intitution. It alo advance the role and influence of women. The ten countrie in which EISA ha concentrated uch effort are all under evere internal political tre, either becaue of a hitory of internal conflict, current threat to fragile tability and/ or autocratic rule. They are widely dipered geographically and are culturally divere and EISA concluded that each alo ha the potential to contribute to democratic development. Somalia, which poe ecurity challenge for EISA taff, i probably the mot politically difficult terrain in which it work. The Somali government and civil ociety are extremely weak, but EISA field office ha been able to work with fledgling civil ociety group, undertake citizen education programme and ait fragile political partie and Parliament. Other notable project it hare with political partie and parliament are in Kenya, Mozambique and Madagacar. And while helping advance gender equality i a priority for all field office, upport for women right and greater role in politic have been epecially trenuou and utained in Madagacar. EISA ha worked with CSO in other African countrie a well, training citizen oberver, enabling them to ae electoral procee in credible and profeional way and often contributing to electoral reform effort. In Côte d Ivoire thi entailed training political party poll watcher ahead of the 2015 preidential election, in which 10 candidate competed. In the democratically troubled tate of Rwanda EISA helped launch or utain CSO electoral upport network, while a looer proce prevail in Egypt, with EISA haring it recommendation with CSO to ait them in trengthening their obervation procee and encouraging greater coordination among citizen oberver. Voter education programme have been a focu in South Africa, where EISA i an active member of the South African civil ociety obervation and voter education network. CSO oberver are not alway trained in their own countrie. For example, in 2009 EISA held a eion in South Africa for repreentative of CSO involved in citizen 45

53 obervation in Algeria, Botwana, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. A econd training eion wa held in Dakar, Senegal, that year for CSO repreentative from Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo (Republic), Côte d Ivoire, the DRC, Gabon, Madagacar, Niger, Senegal and Togo. Thee eion are not only important for the training of individual but help to create network of prodemocracy colleague pread out acro communitie all over Africa but who remain ocially and profeionally networked and able to continue haring electoral leon and experience. Among Africa eight REC, EISA ha the longet and mot extenive experience in contributing to building the capacity of CSO in the SADC countrie. A national network have gained kill and confidence not only in poll-watching but in running civic and voter education programme they have increaingly come to tandardie good practice acro the region, in accordance with PEMMO. When one or more countrie lag in applying PEMMO and other election principle, they come under peer preure to reform. For the mot part thi ha had poitive effect, enuring that the benchmark et in PEMMO influence new law poitively. EISA rightly believe that electoral procee tand a better chance of credibility and improvement if they are cloely monitored by citizen of the countrie in which they take place. Related to it work in upport of CSO, EISA ha, ince 2007, become concerned with trengthening parliament and political partie, particularly in countrie uch a the DRC, Madagacar and Kenya, where it ha field office. It activitie in thi regard include: Strengthening the capacity of member of parliament to play a more effective role in legilative, repreentation and overight function, epecially with regard to electoral procee at national, provincial and local level; Aiting parliament and national civil ociety organiation to develop effective mechanim for allowing civil ociety participation in legilative procee; and Sharing bet practice among African parliament, through exchange and helping the Pan African Parliament to become a more effective partner of national legilature. 46

54 Over the year EISA taff have undertaken fact-finding miion to many African countrie to gain a better undertanding of the different role played by parliament and epecially their trategic plan and power relative to other government branche. Here too, EISA ha been able, informally, to encourage peer learning among parliament. EISA broader interet in national governance beyond electoral upport prompted ome experimentation in it firt decade, but, in 2010, it decided to wind down work with local government in South and Southern Africa, a well a project on national democracy protection intitution uch a human right commiion. Priority would be accorded intead to expanding work on political partie, initially, and till concentrating mot in-country work in South Africa, Botwana, Leotho and, to a leer extent, Swaziland. With the expanion of it field office around the continent EISA repreentative have been reponive to requet for aitance for political partie, provided thi can be effected on a non-partian bai. Working with political partie i alway a highly enitive proce and EISA taff adopt an adaptive, flexible and reponive approach to requet for aitance that reflect local political particularitie rooted in different contitutional proviion, intitutional arrangement and degree of democratic development. An area where EISA ha found frequent interet and upport i in helping partie to include young voter and women. It ha alo had notable repeated ucce in building on it electoral work by aiting political partie to enhance their ability to monitor the electoral proce. Wherever the main contending partie in an election are able to deploy their own truted and profeionally trained poll watcher to report accurately and quickly to their party headquarter, along with the reporting that i being tabulated officially and, in more and more cae, by ocially networked CSO, the likelihood of claim of fraud and abue can be addreed more rapidly and effectively according to evidence-baed reporting from truted ource. EISA pan-african effort to ait political partie brought party repreentative from all over the continent to Johanneburg for a conference in 2010 for the purpoe of debating, refining and taking home a et of benchmark for elf and peer review purpoe. Thi document, or check-lit of ome 124 item, i organied in two broad categorie. The Political Sytem cover the rule, right and reponibilitie of partie and the Political Party Intitutional and Organiational Focu deal with tructural iue. The aim of the benchmark ha been to enhance the capacity of partie in Africa to be effective, accountable, reponive, tranparent and internally democratic. Whether or not thi ha occurred in pecific intance may eventually become evident hould the APRM function a originally enviioned. 47

55 APRM When the New Partnerhip for African Development (Nepad) wa etablihed in 2003, agreeing to reciprocal acce to election wa an important tart, but in order to build more olid regional peace, tability and cooperation, more extenive peer review of governance wa recognied a important, a wa the APRM, which wa etablihed in the ame year. In July 2008 Nepad wa incorporated into the AU. EISA began to develop a new programme interet in the APRM in Playing to it trength, it began engaging national APRM procee in ix countrie it already knew well and that were among the firt to ign up for peer review. Thee were Kenya, Mauritiu, South Africa, Mozambique and Malawi. It focu in each cae wa to capacitate and empower civil ociety to engage with national government and the official APRM tructure on a continuou and mutually beneficial bai ( eia.org.za/index.php/african-peer-review-mechanim-upport-program). The peer review proce promied to cover area of good governance that might have a bearing on electoral integrity and EISA emerging trategy to help utain democracy on the continent. However, there wa ome doubt about whether African government igning up to Nepad and the APRM were really committed to addreing iue of governance. The proce would take place excluively among government and, initially, little or no account would be taken of the view, interet and democratic apiration of Africa civil ociety group or of public opinion. The leader and taff of EISA were naturally concerned. The intitute, having itelf emerged out of a dometic pro-democracy civil ociety organiation, wa well aware of the crucial role international civil ociety had played in monitoring African election and in encouraging greater involvement by civil ociety EOM. The number of countrie igning up for peer review grew lowly and, by 2016, 35 of the AU 54 member had acceded to it. The reult of Nepad incorporation into the AU wa that the APRM wa left on it own to the extent of having it own tructure, budget and operation. Thee include: At the highet level, the APR Forum, a Committee of the Head of State and Government of thoe countrie voluntarily participating in the APRM; A panel of even eminent peron with expertie in area of political governance, macro-economic management, public financial management and corporate governance who are appointed by the forum and whoe primary tak i conider and review each country report and to make recommendation to the forum; 48

56 Thee finding are baed on the work of an APR Country Review Team appointed by the APR Panel and propoe tep that the Panel and ultimately the Head of State APR Forum could recommend the country under review take until the next country report wa iued; and An APR Secretariat baed in South Africa, which coordinate the work of the other and with the national tructure reponible for generating the data, analyi and drafting the country report. In the early year of the APRM everal countrie, tarting with Ghana, completed elf-review and received feedback from the forum. By 2008, when the APRM wa cut looe from Nepad, the proce wa faltering badly. EISA APRM project had helped countrie to prepare their report and believe it played an important role in drawing civil ociety group into the proce. Thi entailed peruading government of the need to have greater civil ociety input into the review and, more importantly, to improve policie, gain public acceptance and advance better governance. Simultaneouly, EISA alo played an important role in convincing civil ociety leader that the APRM hould not be dimied a mere window dreing for impoing International Monetary Fund/World Bank programme on African countrie. Several country report generated critically poitive review both locally and internationally. By 2008, however, the bigget proponent of Nepad, preident Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Oluegun Obaanjo of Nigeria, had both left office. The APRM Secretariat faltered and then wa without a leader for everal year. For a time Ethiopia Mele Zenawi chaired the forum, but he wa no democrat and then died uddenly while till in office. Liberia Ellen Johnon Sirleaf ucceeded him and eemed keen to revitalie the proce but became preoccupied with dealing with her country Ebola epidemic. Meanwhile, term of APRM panel member expired and were not renewed, the ecretariat wa without an executive director and fund were running low and not being replenihed a African government appeared to loe interet and failed to pay their bill. Ironically, until recently the mot vocal advocate for continuing and for trengthening the APRM were not government champion but rather former ceptic from civil ociety group. However, ince Preident Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya wa elected chair of the APRM in 2015 he ha become a champion of it revival, poibly hoping to be remembered a a leader committed to Thabo Mbeki earlier viion of an Africa able to take care 49

57 of itelf without foreign interference and to offer the ret of the world partnerhip opportunitie baed on mutual repect, interet and hared democratic value. Whatever Kenyatta reaon, the APRM appear to be undergoing it own verion of an African Renaiance, with a revitalied panel ably chaired by Algerian cientit Mutapha Mekideche and a dynamic new executive director, Profeor Eddy Maloka of South Africa. Four miion were undertaken in the firt half of 2016, to Liberia, Chad, Senegal and Côte d Ivoire, and other are planned to Sudan, South Africa and Uganda. For everal countrie, notably South Africa and Senegal, which have already been reviewed, there will be baeline available for comparion, to ee whether any of the initial recommendation have been adopted. SHARING ANALYSES OF AFRICA S DEMOCRATIC IDEAS AND INNOVATIONS EISA ha devoted ubtantial amount of time and intitutional reource to being more than an operational pan-african NGO. It alo i an important centre of learning and teaching about democracy, election and governance. If it i to retain it leaderhip in offering and providing electoral upport, the philoophical and practical analytical underpinning, backed by eriou reearch, will alway be eential. Every country committed to finding it own democratic path forward ha to compromie among competing faction that are reflected in flawed contitution, intitution that are le than ideal and regulatory loophole. The more thought and analyi independent impartial group and individual uch a the taff and aociate of EISA can bring to thee political experiment, including haring comparative leon acro countrie and region, the better. With the introduction in 2006 of an annual continental ympoium, opportunitie have been created for EISA partner, donor, academic, political partie and key electoral takeholder, including EMB and civil ociety, to interrogate pertinent iue of democracy, election and governance. Each ympoium conider a broad theme of importance to the advancement and utainability of democracy. Pat ympoia have addreed, among other topic, contitutional reform, gender equality in politic, the caue and conequence of political party alliance, the leon learned from decade of election obervation on the continent, the role of new technologie in electoral procee, preventing and managing violent election-related conflict and trengthening democratic governance through 50

58 the APRM. All thee ympoia have reulted in publication that are dieminated acro the continent and beyond. EISA robut publication programme include much more than thee book conference proceeding, occaional paper, reearch report and the factual and technical report of electoral miion. EISA Journal of African Election (JAE), firt publihed in 2002 and the only African accredited journal on the ubject of election, i widely ditributed. The JAE typically deal with a pertinent theme and attract contributor from African univeritie, think tank and civil ociety organiation, who hare their reearch, experience and inight. Although taff are expected to produce their own article, edit book on work-related topic and even, occaionally, write a book, the time for uch intellectual puruit i everely contrained. A a reult, informal partnerhip and collaborative link to univeritie in South Africa and elewhere have emerged over the year, to mutual advantage. EISA recruit and ue to great advantage tudent intern from nearby univeritie and, in 2016, introduced an eay competition for young learner entitled Youth Perpective of the Future of Democracy in Africa. EISA taff have occaionally offered eminar on their experience and have lately begun to experiment with new coure in international politic and the comparative politic of African democratic election. However, they face the contant preure of electoral miion deadline and adminitrative dutie that pre-empt time for writing, reearch and engaging cholar and tudent intereted in learning more about democracy at home and in Africa. DONORS EISA operate on an annual budget of between R75 million and R100 million, depending on the current mix of project and programme activitie. All thi money mut be raied from foreign donor. There are normally about 12 or 15 contributor, the larget being the democratic Nordic government Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden with the Swedih international development agency (Sida) the mot generou over the year. Subtantial aitance ha alo been received from the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), the Swi Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the European Commiion. The State Department of the United State and the Open Society Intitute for Southern Africa (OSISA) have made contribution. 51

59 So far EISA ha been very ucceful in funding fully it growing array of democracy upport activitie acro Africa. There are, however, at leat three looming iue that might make it difficult to meet funding goal in the future. One i that European donor are facing new demand on their budget that could lead to major reduction in foreign aitance. The huge influx of refugee from the Middle Eat and immigrant from Africa i one caue, which may have econdary political effect if right-wing nationalit and iolationit politician come to power. The United Kingdom recent deciion to leave the European Union ha already caued a harp drop in the value of the Britih pound, with indication of a major economic receion ahead. A econd contraint reult from deciion by everal African countrie to impoe new retriction on CSO and on foreign donor wihing to upport them. Even if thee deciion are not directed at EISA, partnering with African CSO, providing them with capacity-building aitance and collaboration and upporting their effort to contribute to APRM report and other effort to advance good governance may be contrained. 6 A third iue i that Africa may face an array of challenge in the coming decade, many ariing from the effect of climate change, rapid population growth, globaliation and threat from trannational terror and criminal network that will make EISA work ever more difficult and cotly. The next and final ection of thi booklet peculate on the cope and nature of thee development and how EISA might begin to plan for ome of the more likely contingencie that could have an impact on the propect for utainable democracy in Africa. IN RETROSPECT EISA may be one of the world mot modetly audaciou non-governmental organiation. It ha played an important upporting role in advancing the African Union deciion obliging all member to hold periodic credible national election and to allow AU electoral obervation miion to monitor the voting. Degree of electoral integrity vary a widely a the ize, nature and cultural diverity of the AU member tate, yet EISA pree on, confident in and determined to help enure the long-term goal of utainable democracy throughout Africa a the only viable way of gradually accreting regional integration. EISA will hot three event a part of it October th Anniverary celebration, all forward looking. One will be it 11 th Annual Sympoium, on the topic: Current Democratic Realitie in Africa: Where Are We Headed Beyond the Vote? Hundred of African democrat from more than 20 countrie are expected to attend, including 52

60 uch key democratic takeholder a election management bodie, CSO, the AU and REC, member of parliament, leader of political partie, international NGO, aid agencie and cholar working on democracy iue. They will analye and debate paper aeing the force that are pulling African tate cloer to democratic conolidation a well a the countervailing one puhing democratic decent. Several of the iue raied in thi booklet will be dicued at the ympoium, among them, the entrenchment of incumbent leader who remove or defy contitutional retraint; incluivene v marginaliation of identity group in a national electorate; tenion between national ecurity and human right tated goal in light of actual policie; eparation of power and enuring the independence of electoral management bodie in countrie where executive power defie intended contitutional contraint; the role of partian money in African political campaign and citizen acce to information, including unencumbered ocial media network amid real or purported national ecurity concern. Among the ympoium objective the mot important i to [o]ffer propect for the utenance of democratic conolidation in Africa. EISA will alo hot a econd event, the eleventh annual meeting of election obervation group from around the world. Only two of thee annual gathering have been held in Africa. The previou one, in 2008, wa alo hoted by EISA and met in Maputo, Mozambique. Of the 52 organiation that have endored the Declaration of Principle for international Election Obervation and Code of Conduct, about half are expected to attend. Although thi gathering i le formal than the ympoium, the theme to be dicued thi year will be complementary and include: The growing trend of entrenched incumbency ; Support to civil ociety group working in cloed ocietie ; Conflict and electoral violence ; Diability and other incluivity iue ; Money in politic and abue of tate reource. The third event i EISA firt youth eay competition, giving African democrat under the age of 25 an opportunity to think, write about, and be recognied for their view on the theme, Democracy in Africa today and the future I ee. In ponoring thi competition EISA i not only encouraging a new generation of democrat but i alo pledging to dieminate the reult though it inter-governmental and other network o that the perpective of young African can contribute to dicuion of thee iue acro the continent. 7 53

61 The importance of EISA continuing to provide electoral upport eem clear, although prioritie and programme may need to be adapted in repone to changing circumtance, including among EISA African inter-governmental and donor partner. EISA ha forged increaingly fruitful partnerhip with regional economic communitie. Although thee REC are a varied a the tate compriing them, they are the potential building block for a new and more democratic pan-african continental community. note 1 EISA ha produced more than 300 publication. A lit of thee, along with decription of all programme and activitie, can be found on it webite, 2 Countrie to which EISA ha ent election obervation miion are: Angola, Benin, Botwana, Burkina Fao, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, DRC, Ghana, Guinea-Biau, Leotho, Liberia, Madagacar, Malawi, Mauritiu, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Seychelle, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zanzibar, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 3 Full text available at the webite of each REC. 4 ACE i a collaborative effort among nine organiation: International Intitute for Democracy and Electoral Aitance, EISA, Election Canada, the National Electoral Intitute of Mexico, the International Foundation for Electoral Sytem, The Carter Center, the United Nation Department of Economic and Social Affair, the United Nation Development Programme and the UN Electoral Aitance Diviion. 5 The Carter Center ha reviewed cloe to 200 human right treatie, covenant and other intrument relevant to election and ha developed an eaily earchable Election Obligation and Standard Databae (ee ee 6 Thi problem i not unique to Africa, but, according to Thoma Carother, democracy expert at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, reflect a much wider trend, with China, India and Ruia prominently curtailing CSO (Carother 2015). 7 Preliminary propoal have been received from 21 tudent in Burundi, CAR, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, Madagacar, Mauritiu, Mozambique, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. 54

62 3 African Renaiance Redux? The focu of thi concluding ection i on the decade ahead. It offer two et of cenario ditilled from the data et and analyi of reearch intitution, one focued on global trend, the other on alternative future for Africa, with particular attention paid to the impact on the continent of climate change, to inform our thinking about the propect for utainable democracy. Africa leader have endored a viion for utaining democracy in Africa over the next 50 year a a key element of the African Union (AU) Agenda 2063, an apirational plan for incremental integration unanimouly adopted at the union 2013 Summit, commemorating the 50th anniverary of the founding of the Organization of African Unity in 1963 ( EISA remain committed to helping to enure ufficient electoral integrity to utain democratic experiment in a many AU member a poible. Thu far the mot energetic, diplomatically engaged and effective national advocate for an African Union capable of upporting and willing to upport utainable democracy in Africa ha been South Africa econd preident, Thabo Mbeki. A noted in the firt ection, Mbeki international effort were conitent and complementary with the viion he advanced o eloquently in hi I am an African peech (Mbeki 1996). In that peech he carefully identified and praied every major identity group. Extending thi vital civic principle of univeral democratic incluion to the ret of Africa wa at the heart of Mbeki propoal and plan for the African Renaiance. It wa propoed a a way for all the people of Africa regardle of their ethnic, religiou, national or other identity, eventually to gain dignity and elf-repect a African and human being inherently equal to all other. The advancement of utainable democracy a deirable for all African nation, regardle of circumtance, he argued, would alo etablih the bai for more equitable and reilient partnerhip with non-african partner. 55

63 Mbeki viion faltered after he wa removed and amid other countervailing force noted in the previou ection. Yet the eential idea of the African Renaiance are now embedded in the Contitutive Act and other binding intrument of the African Union. A central iue raied in thi ection about the utainability of democracy in Africa i whether, how and to what effect the democratic pirit of the African Renaiance can be revived. 1 For a it wa initially propoed and gained political currency it appeared to have the potential both to inpire a deeply hopeful viion of Africa future and to recognie the enormity of the continent many economic, political, cultural and pychological challenge. Inpiring greater cooperation and collective action involving not only government but civil ociety, political partie, the private buine ector, labour, media, academe and all other democracy takeholder i a tall order, for it i a familiar need made ever more urgent by proliferating global preure and local vulnerabilitie, many beyond the power of government to regulate or control. In conidering what might be required to rekindle the African Renaiance there are a few key ingredient to keep in mind. Democracy can eem to be a myteriou proce but in conidering it utainability in Africa amid the force cited in the three cenario below, the following element provide a framework: Champion, another term for the vital role played by leaderhip, an ingredient currently lacking in Africa international relation and at the national level in too many countrie, not only in Africa; Contitutional, a rule-bound proce accepted by all, mot importantly by our greatet champion, who, a Nelon Mandela demontrated when erving a preident of South Africa, are never above the law; Comprehenive, a ynonym for both pluralim and incluivity; Continual, which acknowledge that the goal of any democratic experiment i to keep the experiment going and the alway difficult challenge of ettling for compromie that ow eed of future deadly conflict like that which ha carred o many democratic experiment, among them that of the United State; and Citizen conent, the final arbiter and judge in utaining democracie in Africa and abroad and the ultimate object and ubject of the other four element. 56

64 Scenario-writing could give u a better ene of the poibilitie of and propect for utainable democracy in Africa and the interplay of thee five element. But thi require large data et and the capacity for the type of ituation-relevant analyi that ha been done in the more indutrialied and intitutionalied democracie. Globally, a broad et of cenario with a 20-year horizon i produced and made publicly available every four year by the US National Intelligence Council (www. dni.gov). It provide a context for Africa and in thi ection I will briefly ummarie the main trend it focue on ahead of a more detailed decription of a pioneering Afrocentric effort undertaken by a South African think tank, the Intitute for Security Studie (ISS) (Cillier & Hedden 2014). Thi will be followed by mention of ome of the bigget and leat undertood challenge ahead for African democracie, the mot important of which i adapting to the effect of global climate change. GLOBAL TRENDS Democratic trend in Africa will invariably be influenced by global force, even if the cliché all politic are local continue to be a central truth about the nature of any genuine democracy. At the time of writing, the United State, Great Britain and everal European democracie are in political crii, eentially of their own making, and the reult of deep democratic deficit in their tructure and procee of governance (ee, eg, Hirh 2016; The Economit 2014). The reurgence of racim, nativim and iolationim in Britain, America and elewhere in the indutrial world are beyond the cope of thi report, although thee development will no doubt add to the richne of the debate about the future of democracy in Africa. 2 Under thee and other circumtance identity politic are proving yet again to be ubiquitou, whatever variation they aume and whether the effect advance or impede democratic development. 3 Although African nation are not the only one facing fear and diruption reulting from globaliation, demographic dynamic, technological change and inequalitie, they alo have to adapt to trend they neither caued nor poe the power and reource to mitigate. Global Trend 2012 ( identified four mega-trend that provided the bai for developing it main cenario looking forward to The council current chair, Dr Greg Treverton, indicated in recent public remark (Stremlau 2016) that he doe not expect the fundamental trend to be any different when he releae the next edition. The trend are: 57

65 Individual empowerment, due to uch factor a a worldwide decline in poverty, with a rapid rie in the middle cla in China, India and in African and many other countrie, widepread availability of information and communication technologie and a troubling rie of powerful new non-tate actor that individually and in looe network find expreion in the terrorit attack that account for o much of the current violence in Nigeria, Central Africa, the Horn of Africa and Kenya. Diffuion of power within and among countrie a emerging market expand, rich countrie age and growth low, exemplified by the rie of the BRICS (Brazil, Ruia, India, China and South Africa). Demographic change brought about by urbaniation, forced migration, youth bulge and longer life expectancy. The firt three are well known to government in Africa and are factor of major importance in any Africa-pecific future cenario. Severe train on vital reource uch a acce to food, energy and water a population grow and conumption increae and exacerbated by climate change, with growing danger of conflict. The trend evident acro Africa do not take place in iolation, they caue powerful ynergie that could, in varying way, everely tet the utainability of democracy. For example, rapid urbaniation, the world fatet-growing population, including a large unemployed youth bulge, and migration are training already carce reource of food, energy and water. Le obviou, but alo of concern to Africa, are the trend toward individual empowerment in the north and in newly affluent countrie. There i alo a trend of further diffuion of power within and among countrie. Thee exacerbate partianhip, protectionim and excluive patriotim, epecially in the mot powerful and properou countrie. The detrimental effect on African countrie are likely to be further exacerbated by oppoition to the overdue reform of multilateral intitution and greater collective action to overcome widening inequitie. Thee global trend are all topic of foreign affair debate acro Africa and the diffuion of power, epecially if it contrain US adventurim, i regarded a poitive. More intriguing at the time of writing i the upheaval in US dometic politic, a reminder that no democracy i ever ecure from the poibility of a populit urge that could empower a verified a racit, exit, untruthful, and politically inexperienced leader a Donald Trump (Stremlau 2016). 58

66 Trump election would be further evidence that a profound trend in world politic, an openly xenophobic nationalim, i in the acendant (Hirh 2016), wherea the election of Hillary Clinton would ignal a continuation of the fundamental hift in American politic toward great equality among it divere identity group, and perhap le emphai on individual equality. Their public tatement o far ugget a Clinton adminitration would be a more reliable and contructive partner internationally than a Trump preidency, on uch vital iue for Africa a climate change, trade, multilateralim and repect for the large number of African living in the United State, reminder of the complex implication of national politic for Africa democracie. Up to now little modelling ha been done of alternative future by and pecifically for African and much of Africa lack the advanced reearch and kill capacitie required to develop and analye large and complex data et for dicerning the underlying mega-trend. Thi i tarting to change, however, and, in South Africa, the Intitute for Security Studie (ISS) ha recently done ome path-breaking modelling of alternative future for Africa, primarily drawing on conflict data et but alo highlighting the role played by economic development and governance. ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA ISS releaed cenario for Africa in November 2014, with a 49-year time horizon to conform with the ambitiou apiration of the African Union Agenda 2063 (Cillier & Heddon 2014). A the paper dealt primarily with Africa long-term trend in political violence the main data et ued wa compiled by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, whoe concluion generally upport the thei that our world ha entered a period of peace unprecedented in modern hitory (Pinker 2011). Cillier and Hedden find thi to be the cae in Africa, too, noting that the uptick in violence ince 2010 ha been motly in five countrie Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan, Central African Republic and Somalia, which, together, accounted in 2014 for 75% of all conflict-related death on the continent. In coming up with long-term cenario for future tability, the author ought to undertand the underlying driver of conflict, which drew them to the broader forecating ytem of International Future (If) at the Univerity of Denver. And by incorporating economic, ocial, political and other factor pertaining to governance, they have generated reult pertinent to EISA concern about the long-term utainability of democracy in Africa. 59

67 The ISS tudy offer three poible future for Africa. The Bae Cae foreee continued economic growth in a growing number of countrie and i cautiouly optimitic: Thing improve acro all dimenion of development, but poverty level come down lowly Average GDP growth per annum until 2063 i forecat at 6.2%, although the rate vary coniderably over uch a long time horizon, peaking at over 7.5% in 2039 before declining again. Africa i alo unable to reduce inequality in any ignificant way over time from it current high level Africa very high population growth momentum offet improvement in development and the large youth bulge, while a ource of labour i alo a ource of intability if youth are unemployed. Although ervice improve for the vat majority of people, pocket of poverty, hunger and intability remain. Peace and ecurity improve but intability remain in a number of long-term fragile tate Thi cenario unfold againt a backdrop of global flux power i more diffue within and between countrie Africa benefit from attention a the lat large potential conumer market and low-wage manufacturing detination, attracting interet from China, India, the US and the EU [but] global growth i ignificantly le baed on reource than in previou centurie and Africa effort toward beneficiation of the continent reource bounty a a driver of future growth have limited ucce. Politic of the Belly, the wort cae cenario, would be a democrat nightmare, with the majority of African government failing to mitigate the effect of negative external development, including climate change, on their economie, with many ruling partie favouring authoritarian rule, exploiting power for peronal gain, limiting economic development and exacerbating intability, poverty and inequality. An African Renaiance, by contrat, offer the bet-cae cenario for Firt, among the good ingredient i the rie of a league of forward-looking leader, democratically elected in everal key tate and capable of driving Africa regeneration, a proce that began with the founding of the African Union but ha talled during a period that ha coincided with EISA econd decade. It i a grand viion, with the larger countrie Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, Ethiopia, and Kenya gaining influence by improved management of their economie, combatting corruption and eeking to advance incluive growth. Among the three African cenario, unquetionably the third, a revival and realiation of the viion of the African Renaiance, i the mot deirable. But i it feaible? The author of everal recent book have argued that Africa long-term future i much 60

68 more poitive than daily crii headline about civil trife, terror, and famine ugget (ee, eg, Olopade 2014; Jerven 2015; Thakkar 2015; Bright & Hruby 2015). 4 More immediately, what practical tep are required to rekindle the proce that began with the etablihment of the African Union and the adoption of a normative framework, including the African Charter for Democracy, Election and Governance? Thi framework wa, after all, intended to guide a gradual, incremental proce of pan-african democratiation, economic development and integration. The ISS paper conclude that in all three cenario governance i the key, and that evere democratic deficit have afflicted all of Africa mot conflicted countrie. Yet there i alo evidence that conflict and poverty may not jut be a function of the abence of democracy. Authoritarian government are capable of providing tability and of directing reource to the mot needy, a they wih. Rather, the more frequently troubled tate are thoe with mixed ytem of governance, neither entrenched democratic nor authoritarian regime, what the ISS and other have decribed a anocracie. 5 CONTINENTAL NORMS The African Union encompae all regime, even a it founder choe to identify incluive, non-ectarian, democratic governance a the mot promiing route forward. Some might have aumed that, in the abence of any ideological alternative in the aftermath of the Cold War, there wa no realitic alternative for building a regional, table and properou pan-african community. Some might alo have hared the view of the ISS, EISA and other African pro-democracy civil ociety organiation that along with riing level of education, income, and popular awarene of baic human right, African citizen will drive democratiation in more and more countrie. The countervailing force that thwart democratiation will perit and preent pecial challenge for any and all African regime. A quick lit include: difficultie dealing with mae of unemployed youth, peritent poverty and evere inequality, the lack of credible uncorrupt democratic leader, diruption of land ue, food ecurity, adequate potable water and the eruption and rapid pread of virulent new and old virue, all related in variou way to climate change African did not caue, cannot mitigate and mut find way to accommodate. African government that are affected and aware that other national faction are relatively better off, are gaining acce to information and demanding redre, whether by democratic mean or, more likely, in repone to thoe advocating more extreme action. Reviving the African Renaiance viion and it reliance on incremental, bottomup change, adapting to local circumtance while adhering to by now well-known 61

69 AU principle, preent EISA with familiar yet ever more daunting challenge. Thi concluding ection conider the propect for building upon the pat two decade of accomplihment. One broad option for EISA to conider while continuing to focu on providing electoral and democracy upport i to link it programme activitie more explicitly and actively to the revival of the African Renaiance a part of a long-term goal of helping to enure that thi bet-cae viion for the continent prevail. The internal dynamic of the African Renaiance hould be imilar to democratiation nationally. For it, too, i no more than an experiment, the ole goal of which, i to keep the experiment going, albeit by innovative diplomacy till to be teted. The democratic interplay i not among dometic faction competing within an agreed framework intended to keep the proce peaceful and progreive. Among till-overeign member of ub-regional and continental organiation the proce i necearily le tructured and le binding, but doe take place within agreed norm for which member hould hold each other accountable. Thee include how each government treat it own citizen and manage it internal competition. Since the AU launch in 2002 the main way in which it and the regional economic communitie have been able to how they are not-indifferent to each other dometic affair ha been to take limited collective action, including diplomatic preure, upenion of AU memberhip and other political anction in ituation of uncontitutional regime change and/or ecalating civil trife, and, in rare cae, to undertake peace enforcement and peacekeeping operation. A far le intruive and now commonplace engagement ha been electoral obervation and upport, which, a noted above, ha gained political upport and legitimacy a a conflict-prevention meaure. AU and REC continue to hold member to their commitment to hold regular election and to invite and accept their election oberver miion. There are no ign that the African inter-governmental organiation will conider abandoning thi commitment, depite recent ign of reurgent authoritarianim in ome African countrie. The warning ign of greater trouble ahead, a noted above, include overturning contitutional proviion for preidential term limit, curtailing civil ociety, limiting the free flow of information in traditional and ocial media and other tep toward greater authoritarianim and the entrenchment of incumbent. It i important for EISA to continue making one of it highet prioritie aiting AU and REC election obervation miion. Although EISA ha, thu far, carried out it 62

70 effort to upport the inter-governmental EOM in a low-key fahion appropriate to it role a a provider of technical aitance, it hould conider giving the role thee organiation are playing greater prominence in it publication and global electoral upport network. The bodie have well-known hortcoming. They are tarved for money and many member fail to pay even the minimum fee. They alo till tend to accord undue prominence to ome of the wort autocrat among their member. The recent and current AU chair, Zimbabwe Preident Robert Mugabe and Chad Preident Idri Déby are prime example. But to call for the AU to be dibanded, a prominent Ghanaian economit and preident of the Free Africa Foundation in Wahington, DC, Profeor George B N Ayittey, did recently in the influential US journal Foreign Policy, i wrong (Ayittey 2016). Pegging hi argument to the UK Brexit referendum, he argue that the AU i a poor imitation of the brainchild of Libyan trongman Muammar al-qaddafi, that it coddle other dictator, accomplihe very little and i a wate of money. He call intead for a looer tyle of confederacy, which i, in fact, what the AU really i, but ignore both it normative importance and it mall but important effort to promote regional peace and ecurity and the politic of conflict prevention. EISA record, and a core argument of thi booklet, i that the poibility of and potential for an African Renaiance, the bet-cae cenario decribed above, require not the abandonment but the development of the political conenu and pan-african framework of the African Union Contitutive Act and upplementary intrument. ELECTORAL INTEGRITY For EISA, a more limited but alo long-term trategic challenge i whether and how to provide electoral and democracy upport to countrie further along in and till committed to experimenting with contitutional democracy. Thee are countrie that could demontrate and provide the leaderhip for the incremental pread and utainability of democratic governance within a revival of the African Renaiance. Conducting credible election regularly and in conformity with national contitutional proviion and international principle and tandard i only one ingredient of developing a politically capable tate. But it will alway be a neceary ingredient. Today, virtually all adult perhap a many a 98% globally can vote, 6 whether or not thee vote really count and whether the overall electoral proce in a country ha integrity. Electoral integrity i the topic of a volume of electoral cae tudie to 63

71 be publihed by EISA that were developed by local team of country expert in all region of the continent and vetted by a committee of electoral expert (Zoubir 2016). The concluding chapter include 14 pecific recommendation to the AU and REC electoral office for practical improvement in the duration, compoition, cale and outreach of their EOM. EISA taff will circulate thee recommendation and dicu them with AU and REC official to acertain the likelihood of their being adopted, a well a any reaon for deferment or rejection. Thi will be an important indication of how far and how quickly the intitute and it partner can identify countrie that are receptive to improving the tranparency and credibility of their electoral procee and eliminating rik of miundertanding and grievance among political faction. Since Africa i by far the world larget and mot ethnically divere continent, improving the propect and actual progre of utainable democracy raie the critical iue of momentum. How much democratic development, in how many countrie, would be of ufficient cumulative effect to keep the collective democratic experiment at the core of a revived African Renaiance going? Thi will require ome cloe analyi by EISA and like-minded NGO and government/inter-governmental official committed to the viion of an African Renaiance. Thoe countrie that might be the mot ucceful democracie and example to other a well the nucleu of the pan-african experiment may not be among the larger countrie, the o-called big five: Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Egypt and Kenya. In fact, everal might be quite mall and impoverihed. In recent year attempt have been made to reucitate the argument that democracy i only viable in countrie that have achieved ufficient economic growth to afford any reditributive cot neceary to building viable democratic conenu. Politically, echoe of the o-called Aian model of authoritarian capitalim can be heard in everal African capital where trongmen have purued relatively ucceful economic trategie. But Profeor Pippa Norri challenge the view that utainable democracy i poible only in rich countrie (Norri 2016). Between 1 July 2012 and 31 December 2015 EIP urveyed over electoral expert in 139 countrie to compile the latet electoral integrity index. In Africa it found that countrie like Burundi, Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia had ome of the world lowet rating for electoral integrity, while other uch a Benin, Mauritiu, Leotho, South Africa and Namibia had high integrity rating. EIP concluded that there i little evidence that wealth and poverty are correlated with level of electoral integrity. 64

72 Becaue election are at the heart of the repreentative proce, and flawed election o detrimental to peaceful political competition, democratic development and human right, EIP recommend that donor double their invetment in electoral upport and, a an example to the ret of the region, do o epecially in thoe African countrie that are uccefully conolidating democracy. Were thi to happen, EISA could work with thi more ucceful experiment even in everal of the mallet, leat developed, leat influential AU member, to enlarge the coalition of democracie at the heart of a revived African Renaiance movement. Another recent urvey focued on African democracie wa undertaken by Afrobarometer and i a departure from it uual reporting. Senior advier Michael Bratton and executive director E Gyimah-Boadi led a project mining 15 year worth of public opinion data for elected African countrie looking for ign and pattern of changing attitude among the thouand of repondent that might have erved a early warning ign of civil unret and udden democratic decline (Bratton & Gyimah- Boadi 2015). Afrobarometer deploy a three level of rik framework for mining urvey data. In acending order are threat to the incumbent government, the regime and wort cae, rik to the tate (Bratton & Gyimah-Boadi 2015). Rik to the government: Diapprove of the job performance of the incumbent national preident over the previou year; diapprove of the job performance of the repondent parliamentary repreentative over the previou year; diapprove of the job performance of the repondent local government repreentative over the previou year. Rik to the regime: the proportion of all urvey repondent who are diatified with the way democracy work in their country and conider that their country i or i not a democracy with major problem. Rik to the tate: the proportion of all urvey repondent who do not agree that the court have the right to make binding deciion; do not agree that the police alway have the right to make people obey the law and do not agree that the tax authoritie alway have the right to make people pay taxe. In the cae of Mali internationally admired democratic experiment, Afrobarometer review of pat urvey data revealed trong graroot warning ign long before the 65

73 2012 crii of political diilluionment with the incumbent government and then the regime. In Ghana urvey how a harp rie in graroot diatifaction with the incumbent authoritie which, if not channelled through etablihed contitutional mean, could, a in Kenya, erupt in intability that conventional political analyi might not foreee. The author note that their finding are preliminary and need to be informed by a lot more reearch and analyi. Diaffection with ruling partie elewhere, of coure, i commonplace and Pew Reearch data in the US reveal that jut 19% of the American public ay they trut the federal government to do what i right alway, or mot of the time ( African tate, of coure, have experienced more frequent and larger outbreak of violence than the US, and Afrobarometer doe how promie in thi regard and could provide EISA with ueful inight into the changing attitude of citizen in key democratiing African nation that will be major tet for the utainability of democracy. SELF-DETERMINATION The APRM offer another way to inform aement of democratic utainability, and a multi-year joint project conducted by EISA with the South African Intitute of International Affair ha yielded important inight. AU member willing to be reviewed hould, in the coming decade, yield ueful comparative and trend-line data from the lengthening lit of comprehenive elf-aement by government of their performance and plan, epecially in the critical area of good governance, economic development and regional cooperation. It will not be eay to ync public urvey data with the elaborate and often delayed preparation of APRM analyi and planning acro complex national ector but if EISA could commiion uch experimental work it might provide leon for expanded reearch and analyi of democratic utainability. Depite the revival of the APRM, evidence of preading threat to democratic utainability mut be factored into any trategic reaement of utainable democracy in Africa. One uch threat i the recent curtailment of civil ociety activitie in a many a 20 countrie, a proce EISA taff lament complicate and curtail their democracy upport work. They believe it wa inpired by policie launched by Ethiopia late Preident Zenawi againt foreign funding for CSO project and programme, epecially thoe that deal with what the government regard a human right or prodemocracy advocacy. 66

74 The ame government that are becoming tough on civil libertie are alo more willing to dirupt or upend national internet acce and ocial networking during election campaign, a EISA experienced when oberving the 2016 Ugandan election, and which occurred during the Ethiopian election. Thee retriction have not, however, dicouraged another trannational NGO, Global Financial Integrity, from invetigating and reporting on illicit financial flow from Africa, which have now engaged the interet of the UN Economic Commiion for Africa. If ucceful, thi work could generate urgently needed fund that might contribute to democratic utainability. Thabo Mbeki, who chair a high-level panel that i tudying thi problem, ha concluded that between $50 billion and $80 billion, motly in hidden corporate profit, remove a huge ource of potential tax revenue by the mipricing of export and import (ECA 2016). 7 Illicit financial flow and much of the reporting under the APRM raie familiar concern in any trategic aement of whether Africa democracie can be utained. What i new i the acceleration and potency of the effect on Africa of global climate change; effect that will everely tet the utainability of democratic governance. Although EISA lack the capacity and reource to deal directly with the cience of climate change, both it caue and it likely effect, it hould conider monitoring and aeing the political effect, at leat in thoe countrie where it ha an extended field preence. If uch monitoring and evaluation were feaible it would certainly be welcomed by the global community of climatologit and their mall but vital African contingent. 8 THE ADDED BURDENS OF CLIMATE CHANGE The 2015 global climate change conference in Pari, COP-21, wa heralded a a major tep forward in global governance (Bradlow 2015). Thi wa explained not in term of any formal treatie reached but in the willingne of all the world government to commit to benchmark for reducing greenhoue gae, developing and uing clean renewable reource and a hot of other meaure. Cynic ugget thee benchmark were little more than expreion of hope. Supporter acknowledge that they are non-binding commitment, but, becaue the nature of the problem i beyond the capacity of government alone to olve, the guideline apply to the private ector buine, labour and finance, civil ociety, local and provincial communitie and citizen whoe collective behavioural change will ultimately determine whether the goal are reached. The COP-21 proce may well mark a new variety of global governance but within Africa it eem rather imilar to 67

75 the viion and le formal and more incluive conenu-building proce that produced the African Renaiance and the APRM. Commitment in both are le binding than formal treatie but alo include politically difficult dometic target deemed important in advancing international cooperation. Government, both international and pan-african, eentially provide the normative framework for and, in principle, agree to be the main monitor and arbiter of progre, uing their public and juridical reource when neceary to enure that national target are met. So far, however, there i little indication that many African government are inveting in the reearch and then the policie for adapting to climate induced change. The lit of poible climate change effect epecially famine and drought, forced migration, vulnerability to lethal viral epidemic and related deadly conflict are much dicued but motly unaddreed, nationally or regionally. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which produced the eential reearch and analyi informing the COP-21 deliberation, ha iued periodic report, pecifically on the impact climate change ha had and may yet have on Africa and IPCC global report on Human Security include ubtantial material on rik to utainable democracy in Africa (Adger, Pulhin, Barnett, Dabelko, Hovelrud, Levy, Spring & Vogel 2014). For Africa there i the added urgency that global climate change not only place train on already carce arable land and potable water, it alo raie new rik of rapidly preading dieae. And for already hard-preed government there are alo the danger of civic unret and deadly conflict that tudie ugget may be linked to global warming extreme effect in area of Africa (Burke 2009). More locally-focued reearch on Nigeria reinforce thi concern and link climate change to the violent clahe that enue when migrating nomadic herding communitie are forced by preading deert to encroach on more ettled farming communitie further outh (Oguamanam 2016). Nigerian conflict analyt and reolution cholar Chukwuma Onyia (2015) call for greater government and private ector effort to addre challenge poed by global climatic change, a a meaure to temming the tide of youth radicalization and rie of terrorit group like Boko Haram. The drought-plagued and conflict-prone weak tate of the Sahel are alo experiencing evere effect of climate change, which may affect local propect for utainable democracy, peace and development. A broad urvey of the Sahel in 2010 found that although there wa no generalieable and direct impact of climate change on ecurity, each country wa particularly enitive to climate variability and in need of improved water management a and more efficient management of food inecurity (Heinrig 2010). 68

76 The ituation in Mali ha been of pecial ongoing concern to EISA. A cae tudy by Adebayo Adeyemi and Muhmoud Mua (2014) of the Tuareg communitie in Northern Mali deem climate change to be a threat multiplier in exacerbating conflict and, a a recent update conclude, the relationhip between drought and violence in Mali cannot rely on traditional crii repone (Rozen & De Carvalho 2016). Sutainable democracy in Mali and acro the Sahel can only be enviioned with a foundation of political tability and, although climate change i epecially challenging there, it alo preent many practical problem in other ub-region, including Southern Africa. A comprehenive report, Climate Change: Briefing from Southern Africa (Schole, Schole & Luca 2015) point out the varied and complex effect of global warming in the area, which i twice a high a the global mean. Thi will poe epecially hard choice for African government, a yet not well taffed or informed about the policy implication of recent cientific finding about climate change. New effort are being made to build African capacity in policy-relevant interdiciplinary cience. A coalition of South African univeritie, in partnerhip with the world leading international intitute of applied ytem analyi, have created the Southern African Sytem Analyi Centre (SASAC) ( aac/about.html) and it i expected that more than 150 African PhD will graduate and career cientit will be offered retraining ( Page/default.apx). It i hoped that evidence-baed reearch into environmental problem that poe eriou rik of creating conflict and training governance, often acro ub-region, will provide incentive for cloer inter-governmental cooperation in the pirit of the African Renaiance. Succeful adaptation to environmental threat and diruption will alo require greater willingne among citizen to change their behaviour and contribute to new collective effort that will be ucceful and utainable within a democratic contitutional framework that enjoy popular legitimacy (Stremlau 2016). Until now an eential miing link ha been connecting uch evidence-baed reearch with Africa political leader and other important takeholder, including civil ociety organiation and the African buine community. Africa REC are epecially important becaue the effect of global warming diregard tate boundarie but typically vary ignificantly acro thee ub-region. If REC ecretariat could have even a few credible cientit, epecially with the interdiciplinary kill typical of climatologit, they could provide policy input regionally and 69

77 to member national government. Given the carcity of indigenou cientific expertie, rationaliing talent regionally would be advantageou and, with modern information and communication technologie already available, quite feaible. Political leader, even in cientifically advanced countrie uch a the US, may prefer to deny cientific evidence of climate change to avoid politically difficult and cotly change of policy. Peruading leader of international organiation and influential civil ociety group of the veracity of the evidence can ometime generate ufficient preure to move government. Perhap thi i an area in which EISA could help. Drawing on the reearch and analyi of climate cientit to reach ub-regional and continental accord for adapting more effectively to the rik of climate change will require broad public upport, not jut formal multilateral agreement. The proce may prove analogou to the pread of evidence-baed and principle-guided electoral obervation and aement that gradually gained pan-african authority and legitimacy. In any event, EISA work on utainable democracy hould be informed about new force, epecially the effect of climate change, that could ignificantly alter or even derail the democratic development of African countrie. At preent African government naturally feel it i more urgent to deal with the politic of their next election than with the effect of climate change, but they might not have thi freedom for much longer. Conenu ha emerged among the world leading climate cientit that humanity ha embarked on a new epoch, the Anthropocene, defined by human domination of earth phyical and natural environment (Catree 2016). More contentiou till i what many earth cientit refer to a the Great Acceleration, the period between 1950 and 2050 when the cumulative effect of human behaviour on the natural environment ince the tart of the indutrial revolution have uddenly and rapidly accelerated and are now teting the limit of the planet geopherebiophere (Revkin 2015). Several year ago the International Geophere-Biophere Programme (IGBP) in Stockholm, a conortium of natural cientit, devied a erie of dahboard with eaily undertood empirical graph howing a dozen accelerating ocio-economic trend reulting from the udden huge rie in global production and population and a dozen earth ytem trend, including level of greenhoue gae, urface temperature and ocean acidification (Steffen, Broadgate, Deutch, Gaffney & Ludwig 2015). 70

78 In 2015 the IGBP dibanded and wa recontituted a a 10-year initiative, Future Earth, a wider global network including ocial cientit that apire to become more policy relevant a it monitor climate change and develop evidence-baed aement of the accelerating interplay of human and natural environment ( The accuracy and implication of climate monitoring and aement, not jut of warming but of the range of action and policie affecting climate change and it impact on people, i, and will remain, controverial (Revkin 2015). An analogy with evidence-baed election obervation and the more complex aement of electoral integrity doe not eem overdrawn. Engaging African government individually and collectively will, in both cae, be critical, a i the role of civil ociety, cholarly reearch, the private ector and citizen. For EISA the link between electoral procee and experiment in democratic governance will be central. At the ame time, keeping abreat of the interplay between African and other expert in relation to climate change and it local effect and government reponible for dealing with thee iue could prove to be a important a utaining the governance-related project on the APRM. A Jedediah Purdy conclude about humanity domination of nature in the critical decade ahead, in After Nature: A Politic for the Anthropocene (2015) [e]ither the Anthropocene will be democratic or it will be horrible. Purdy and other draw attention to the increaing danger that authoritarianim and/or a reurgent identitydriven excluive and militant nationalim will derail democratic experiment in Africa and elewhere, poibly including the US and European countrie. Driving much of thi popular militancy and diilluionment with democracy eem to be extreme economic inequalitie within tate, rich and poor. Riing conflict are more evident within tate, although African hare a collective claim againt an international economic ytem that everely diadvantage them. A global economy in which le than 20% of the world population in the 20 richet countrie generate at leat 75% of global gro dometic product, i one of the primary driver of the global climate change that further and unfairly diadvantage African. How to counter thi, collectively, democratically and with informed paion about the extent of injutice to Africa firt require African to come together willingly, a proce that will be greatly facilitated by a hared viion, value, hard evidence of need and more willingne to accept greater mutual tranparency and accountability a the bai for utainable mutually beneficial regional and international partnerhip. 71

79 A revival of the viion and founding principle of the African Renaiance ha been a theme of thi booklet. The promie of democratic principle and procee prevailing locally, nationally and internationally in Africa are till motly apirational, but the econd ection of thi reflection on EISA progre i not only a credit to the intitute but ha inpired and hould inpire other to embark on complementary puruit. EISA i and will remain primarily an operating NGO, not a think tank. Yet there ha alway been an important allocation of taff time and reource to the reearch and analyi that are o vital for effective operation. A EISA look to the future it might well conider the feaibility and value of leading a cenario development and drafting exercie on the propect for utainable democracy in Africa in the next two or three decade. Thi could be done in partnerhip with local and other African univeritie, opinion reearch centre uch a Afrobarometer, and think tank, notably the Intitute for Security Studie, which already have experience in developing African cenario. EISA leaderhip would be rooted in it two decade of experience upporting democratic development in Africa. In addition to it extenive electoral aitance, EISA field office could provide important reality check. Other work, notably on the APRM proce, could be upplemented by report providing evidence-baed inight into peritent poverty, the effect of climate change and other force a well a the realitie and danger of evere economic inequalitie. Pan-African reearch into uch threat a riing trannational crime, human and drug trafficking, and terrorim would provide other important inight into the many complex threat facing Africa leader and citizen in their effort to conolidate and utain democracy. CONCLUSION Two decade of democratic experiment in Africa have given rie to hope for a more right-baed future for the continent. EISA experience acro Africa, and it developing partnerhip with everal fledgling regional economic communitie and the African Union, provide many inight into the opportunitie and challenge at local, national and international level. EISA net aement of Africa democracie remain poitive depite all the qualification thi booklet ha tried not to ignore. Periodic aement of the continent progre by uch foreign oberver a the journalit who work for The Economit veer from the optimim of Africa riing, a 2011 cover tory, to the more cautiou tone of an Augut 2016 cover, Africa fragile democracie. 72

80 Amid the ebb and flow of current event, thi booklet ha ought to highlight what the author believe are becoming entrenched pan-african norm conducive to democratic utainability within and among member of the African Union. In contrat to le democratically inclined region of the world, the African Union trategic commitment to democracy i notable and important, along with that of everal of the REC and their member tate. Thi booklet ha alo been broadly inpired by the apiration and attraction of the African Renaiance and the idea that African people will be better dipoed to learning leon from one another democratic experiment in informal and cultural way than from relying only on inter-tate cooperation to advance a greater ene of hared identity and purpoe. Now might be the time to rekindle the African Renaiance. Much will depend on the pending election of new leaderhip for the AU, and the revival of national interet in the project, a South Africa, Nigeria and other demontrated in the formative and early year of the AU. Complementary activim by the new UN Secretary-General next year, in preing government to implement the climate commitment agreed to in Pari lat year, and the UN 17 Sutainable Development Goal, would hold pecial promie for Africa, including potential ynergy with the AU Agenda 2063, in area of good governance. Neither EISA nor anyone ele can forecat what pecific compromie might be poible or might be derailed in Africa divere array of 54 tate, or their eparate and cumulative effect on the realiation of Agenda 2063 viion for eventual regional cooperation and democratic integration. Of the five element cited above a crucial to the ucce of any democratic experiment it i citizen conent that will remain the mot important and ultimate tet of whether democracy i utainable in Africa. The democratic ideal of informed citizen conent will face ome of it toughet tet in Africa. Today, citizen of all countrie, however wealthy and technologically advanced, can barely grap the volume and complexity of information neceary to make informed deciion about contentiou iue of climate change, globaliation and a hot of other complex concern. The many ign of popular dicontent and diilluionment, and the allure of quick arbitrary olution, ugget that many citizen in Wetern democracie appear to have topped trying. Doe thi mean citizen in Africa fledgling democracie will top trying too? 73

81 Citizen facing udden dilocation have often ought afety in blind loyalty to an ethnic, religiou, racial or other reauring identity, ometime cloaked in ideology, with the added appeal of a charimatic authoritarian leader. Pot-colonial Africa bad experience in thi regard may help counter new temptation. In thi booklet I have ought to portray the politic of Africa a receptive to a democratic alternative that offer citizen a way to reach deciion about which faction and leader deerve their conent to rule when policie are too complex and obcure for the ordinary peron to grap. Such an alternative i, however, morally challenging. What evidence i there of a candidate repect for baic contitutional limit, notably the eparation of power and public protection againt abue of the office? Undertanding the fundamental of contitutional retraint i an obligation of citizenhip that require judgement made more on principle than police. Thi can be facilitated through elementary civic education programme, a EISA and other have demontrated, including at time when contitutional reform are ubject to public debate. Democracy i more demanding than le incluive regime a it relie more on the trength of hope than the weakne of fear; a pirit of generoity and empathy rather than pite purred by the greed and reentment typical of authoritarian alternative. Adhering to enduring principle while adjuting to changing time i critical to utainable democracy and i a hallmark of EISA programme throughout Africa. In the decade ahead thoe African leader eriouly trying to adapt to the uncertain effect of climate change will need more than the conent of their citizen, they will alo need their active help and cooperation. If thee complexitie and hared reponibilitie can be handled contitutionally, according to agreed principle and procee citizen undertand and upport, propect for utainable democracy will improve. EISA ha ought to abet utainable democracy in Africa at a time when it i becoming apparent that the world ha entered a new age, the Anthropocene, in which human behaviour predominate over the law of nature. If Purdy prediction i correct, that the Anthropocene will be democratic or horrible, utainable democracy offer the lat bet promie for the urvival of our pecie. Thi could be the ultimate democratic experiment in the human adventure that wa tarted by African who can and mut play a vital role in how it proceed. 74

82 note 1 For an eloquent eay on the importance of political mythology inpiring needed political innovation, nationally and globally, ee Evan The two lead topic of the July 2016 iue of the Journal of Democracy, publihed in the US by the National Endowment for Democracy, are perhap indicative: The Danger of Deconolidation, preenting two article on the decline of democracy in Europe and the US, followed by three article under the heading The Struggle Over Term Limit in Africa. 3 For an important new tudy on the reurgence of identity politic in the United State, ee Achen & Bartel For an earlier and precient aement of Africa future ee Hunter-Gault Cillier & Hedden (2014) rely for their analyi of thi iue on the work of the Polity Project of the Center for Sytemic Peace in the US, which ha for many year gathered data about tate durability around the world, delineating trend and comparing a et of weighted variable ( 6 A reprint of a urvey publihed in The Guardian, 20 April 2015 tallying thoe precluded from voting in a handful of mini-tate (Brunei, Qatar, the UAE, the Vatican) plu other till emerging from conflict (eg, South Sudan), women in Saudi Arabia, variou prion and felon population, and ome non-reident, for a total of only 80 million adult globally. 7 An excellent video ummary of how thi proce work and the role of the Mbeki ECA High- Level Panel on illicit financial flow ha been produced by the UN Economic Commiion for Africa, 8 African government, depite their evident vulnerabilitie to bio- and geophere change affecting the wellbeing of their citizen and tability of their communitie, have been unable or unwilling to invet in cience and technology, to inform their policie and help olve many conequential problem. Although Africa account for 12% of the world population it generate le than 1% of the world reearch output, according to one report ( mgafrica.com/article/ tartling-fact-about-the-tate-of-cience-and-reearch-in-africa) 75

83 APPENDIX 1 Africa Size Relative to that of Other Continent 76

84 APPENDIX 2 Africa Demarcated by Ethnic Group Source: McGowan & Nel (ed) 2002, p