Could Belt and Road be the Last Step in China s Asian Economic Integration?

Transcription

1 Could Belt and Road be the Lat Step in China Aian Economic Integration? Cheng King b, a and Jane Du a a National Univerity of Singapore, Singapore; b Sun Yat-Sen Univerity, China ABSTRACT Thi article aee the role of China Belt and Road initiative (BRI) in the country intended global economic integration. Particular attention i paid to China capital penetration of Aian market, with an empirical aement of the tructure of Aian market from the perpective of foreign trade, foreign direct invetment () and intergovernmental aid. The ucce of China new opening-up initiative will be largely contingent on Aian market recognition of Chinee product and capital: it trade with potential cooperative countrie and it and intergovernmental aid to them fall behind thoe of the developed countrie that are China major cooperative partner in/outide Aia. China ongoing Aian economic trategy thu face competition and will need to integrate the BRI into the current framework of international economic cooperation. Introduction Thi article aee China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and it feaibility in Aia, paying particular attention to Aian market recognition of Chinee capital. The term belt and road refer to the hitorical inland and maritime Silk Road (operating from the Han dynaty in the 2nd century BC to the early Tang dynaty in the 8th century AD, and ince the 8th century repectively) with which China wa mainly involved a a product exporter. By the late Qing period in the late 19th and early 20th century, China major ilk road merchandie, tea and ilk, had gradually lot it competitivene to product from Britih India, Britih Ceylon and Japan, downgrading China trading poition and reducing it involvement in the Aian economy. After uffering long dometic intability and economic backwardne under the Manchu, Republican and Mao government, in the early 1980 Deng Xiaoping proactively reopened China economy and reintegrated it with Aian indutrialiation. With more than three decade of fat economic growth ince the 1980, the belt and road concept wa reintroduced in In the preent context, thi goe far beyond it original form a a mere trading of product. It i a new opening-up trategy for China much greater participation in the global economy, particularly in Aia. 1 In the preliminary tage, China i committed to expanding exiting and exploring the potential for new economic cooperation o that it indutrie can offet the negative impact of declining external demand due to the current weak and uncertain global economy. The ucce of the BRI depend on how uccefully Chinee capital penetrate, in the firt intance, the Aian market. A realitic view of the BRI emphaize ome of the Chinee government urgent demand, generated by it current economic ituation. They are the reult of China CONTACT Cheng King c.king@nu.edu.g 1 Increaed foreign trade and international economic integration lead to higher dometic income and enhance a country overall economic growth. See Bhagwati Jagdih, In Defence of Globalization (Oxford Univerity Pre, 2004), p

2 long-term motivation to grow it economy and it involvement in Aia pot-war indutrialiation, which have crafted the country rapid development over the pat three decade. Some economie in Aia lack ufficient capital invetment for development, and ideally Chinee capital invetment in thee economie can be increaed to fulfil Aian market demand for capital invetment. It may be too optimitic to uppoe that Aia capital-aborptive capacity can aborb a much capital invetment a China can provide through BRI: in fact China itelf i the larget Aian recipient economy, and without China, Aia capital aborptive capacity i largely reduced and concentrated in everal emerging economie which may already have longterm cooperative invetment partner other than China. Thi preent a challenge for China large outpouring of capital to the ret of Aia. 2 Sufficient capacity to aborb capital aide, there i a huge difference between meeting dometic market demand and meeting overea market demand. The overea market may not provide the neceary tability to allow the trading of product acro border eaily 3 or to guarantee return on capital invetment. There are trade and invetment criteria to conider when China chooe recipient countrie for it BRI. Although China i the econd-larget economy in the world, it per capita gro dometic product (GDP) i only that of medium-ranking developing Aian countrie. The upper capacity of BRI invetment i therefore limited by China own economic ability. Once thi reache it upper limit for foreign invetment, a further increae in capital requirement will generate preure on the country dometic ue of capital. The marginal capital requirement at thi point therefore will determine the ucce of the BRI, and China will need to make efficient ue of it limited reource in order to maximize it capital return. A dicued below, when electing partner countrie for cooperation, certain economic criteria need careful conideration: the propoed partner-country level of development compared to China; it exiting economic link with China; and the ize of it population, a rapid population growth can eaily offet per-capita invetment and foreign capital may play a le important role in the propoed partner-country economic development a it doe in China itelf and thi kind of dilution effect i not ideal for China or for the BRI. With uch development and population contraint, China infratructure-focued initial invetment may go to le-populou Aian countrie whoe economic development i inferior to it own. After analying thee criteria, feaibility tudie are neceary. Put imply, the partnercountry capacity to conume the product and to aborb China capital invetment will eventually determine how far China integrate with the Aian economy and how much further it can go. Current Aian trade tructure and China participation in them,, and aid network could be reinvented to help China to adopt it new BRI role. The challenge that it face in penetrating Aian market i largely unknown: Aia may not be able to enure China hare in it trade and invetment market when faced with plenty of invetment option offered by other invetor (i.e., developed economie). China new opening-up initiative will need to conform to Aian growth trajectorie to enure that the recipient countrie make efficient ue of Chinee good and capital, thereby minimiing local uncertaintie for China. 2 Beide China, Vietnam and Thailand rank amongt the top countrie aborbing capital for infratructure contruction. 3 Jame E. Anderon and Eric van Wincoop, Trade cot, Journal of Economic Literature 42(3), (2004), p

3 Thi work i inpired by tudie that link China new opening-up goal to it economic behaviour. The BRI i a newly-emerged topic and till lack pecific, and little reearch ha addreed it. Several tudie in the field of economic ae the initiative mainly by etimating it potential benefit, an approach that commonly refer to China expanding trade with other Aian countrie, 4 higher capacity for invetment and better external environment. 5 A cot-benefit analyi i routinely conducted a a proxy for any inquiry into return on invetment. The quetion that remain i whether and to what extent Aian countrie can help China to achieve it economic goal. Thi article i intended to help to fill thi gap in the cholarhip. Certain methodological concern that emerged from thi analyi may beyond control. Detail of China BRI invetment plan regarding it cooperation with potential detination countrie are lacking, with only ome element from different route on the belt and road traceable in the Viion and Action on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21t-Century Maritime Silk Road, 6 hereinafter the Action Plan. Thi tudy prefer uing cro-country data to an individual country cae tudy: although the latter could upply comprehenive information about a certain economy, cro-country tudie uing the ame ource and calibre of tatitic can more accurately reflect the overall feaibility of China BRI invetment plan. However, macro data on ome countrie involved in the Action Plan (i.e. Iraq and Myanmar) i lacking due to war and political intability. The data ued in thi work came mainly from official ource uch a China National Bureau of Statitic, the World Bank World Development Indicator, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) databae. Thi reearch tart it obervation from 2004, when the Chinee government encouraged large tate-owned enterprie (SOE) to invet abroad and the country overea invetment tarted to boom. Thi reearch built a dataet baed on China and other Aian economie GDP, population, trade, and intergovernmental aid from 2004 to 2015, and ued macro data (e.g. on GDP and population) to detect Aia current growth trajectorie and which Aian countrie meet the BRI initial criteria of partnerhip uch a the development and population condition. Thi article analye the compoition of trade, invetment and aid in Aian detination countrie to identify China contribution to their local economic development and hence China current competitivene in Aia. The reult how that China economic competitivene in Aia i till weak. China total trade volume with potential BRI partner-countrie fall behind that of developed economie. The cale of Chinee capital available i unlikely to compete with Organiation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and United Nation (UN)-led and aid ytem. In the near future China will face competition and will have to integrate BRI with the framework of the current international economic ytem. Additionally, to purue it own economic growth China will need to identify a good balance between it Aian economic trategy and it global economic cooperation. Section 2 of thi article analye the growth trajectorie of Aian economie from the 1960 to the 2010; ection 3 analye the criteria and contraint that China conider when chooing BRI partner countrie; ection 4 look at China hare in influencing 4 Jutin Lin, One belt and one road and free trade zone: China new opening-up initiative, Frontier of Economic in China 10(4), (2015), p The Economit Intelligence Unit, Propect and challenge on China one belt, one road : a rik aement report, (2015), acceed April 8, 2018, 6 The National Development and Reform Commiion, Minitry of Foreign Affair, and Minitry of Commerce and the State Council, Viion and action on jointly building ilk road economic belt and 21t-century maritime ilk road, March 28, 2015, acceed April 8, 2018http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newreleae/201503/t _ html. 3

4 Aia current growth from the perpective of trade, and intergovernmental aid; and ection 5 preent the concluion drawn. Aia and China Growth Momentum Geographic Diviion and Trajectorie of Aian Growth Geopolitically, Aia can be divided into five ub region: Eat Aia, 7 Central Aia, 8 Wet Aia (alo known a the Middle Eat), 9 Southeat Aia, 10 and South Aia. 11 Compared to Europe, Aia ub region are relatively independent. 12 Within each, geographic, cultural and ethnic factor predominantly form the cloe intraregional relationhip. After World War II, Aia interregional integration emerged from three tructural change: Japan pot-war indutrialiation and ubequent marginal indutrial tranfer; 13 the rapid economic boom in the Middle Eat after the 1970 oil price hock; and the Cold War ideological conflict and tenion experienced by ome Aian countrie. 14 The firt change, Japan pot-war indutrialiation and ubequent diffuion of technology, caued wave of economic growth: from the 1960 to the 1970 it triggered the rie of the Four Aian Tiger (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan), 15 and further, propelled a remarkable economic tranition in China from the 1980 onward. Mot economie that firt benefited from Aia indutrialiation were thoe in Eat Aia, with indutrialiation diffuing outward to their neighbour. The econd change, the boom of reource-rich countrie in Aia a a conequence of the 1970 energy price pike due to the oil crii, raied the income of many Aian 7 Japan, South and North Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia and China. 8 Turkmenitan, Kyrgyztan, Uzbekitan, Tajikitan, Kazakhtan and Afghanitan. Sometime Afghanitan i alo claified a a South Aian country. 9 Wet Aia cover a large number of countrie, mainly in the Middle Eat. Geographically, it include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cypru, Egypt (the Sinai Peninula), Georgia, Iran, Iraq, Irael, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Paletine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirate and Yemen. 10 Southeat Aia mainly conit of Indochina and the Malay Archipelago, covering Vietnam, Lao, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, Malayia, Indoneia, Brunei, the Philippine, Eat Timor and Singapore. 11 The Indian ubcontinent countrie occupy the main South Aian land ma which include India, Pakitan, Bangladeh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and the Maldive. 12 BRI final detination. 13 Kojima Kiyohi, Direct Foreign Invetment: A Japanee Model of Multination Buine Operation (London: Groom Helm, 1978). 14 Thi refer mainly to the political and military tenion between the United State and the former Soviet Union. 15 The Four Aian Tiger are Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. Thee area and countrie regitered exceptionally high performance in rapid indutrialiation and economic growth from the early 1960 to the

5 oil-producing countrie to thoe of moderately- and highly-developed countrie. 16 After the 2000 the rich reource of thee Aian economie not only acted a a buffer, protecting them from fical trouble, but alo upported their fat economic growth, even in the pot-2008 global receion. <Inert Figure1> The third factor that haped Aia growth pattern wa the tenion caued by the Cold War. Beide it direct occupation of and military intervention in Central Aia, 17 the Soviet Union pread it ideological root into the Eat (i.e. China and North Korea) and to a et of Waraw Pact oberver countrie in Southeat Aia. 18 In South Aia, Socialit ideology dominated India economic policymaking until the However, there are important ditinction between Japanee-led indutrialiation and ideological and reource-led income increae and decreae. The latter two were paively accepted by Aian economie. For example, not even the elite in countrie uch a China and India realized the conequence of accepting the ocialit ideology of central planning economy, which blocked the poibility of growth baed on marketoriented indutrialiation. Small countrie uch a Saudi Arabia and Cambodia had very limited room to develop their own growth path, which were either contrained by their natural endowment or decided by the uperpower. Under the impact of thee three tructural change, Aia had two main trand to it economic momentum. The firt wa recovery and growth in countrie that had gained ideological independence from the Soviet Union. Mot economie that have experienced huge Soviet influence and intervention or have recently drifted away from Cold War ideology have long been economically tagnant, 19 wherea thoe that have broken away (i.e. China and Vietnam) how great potential. The other trand i the geographic extenion of an increae in per capita GDP that pread from Japan and the Middle Eat to their urrounding area. Thi i particularly true of Japan indutrialiation, whoe firt wave led to the Eat Aian Miracle, and the further diffuion of thi phenomenon from thee economie to their neighbour, which i known a the econd wave of Aian indutrialiation. Thi indutrialiation facilitated the interregional integration of economie in Aia, with Southeat Aia currently riding the cret of the third wave. China remarkable economic growth corroborate both trand. Wave of Aian Indutrialiation Compared with the rie of reource-baed economie in Wet and Central Aia, growth in mot Eat and Southeat Aian economie ha benefited from the ame Japanee 16 In the 1970 the world economy encountered two eriou energy crie: the 1973 oil crii and the 1979 energy crii. Both were directly caued by interruption to the export of crude oil from Middle Eatern countrie. In the twelve year from 1970 to 1981, the Brent crude oil price increaed harply from US$2 to $39 per barrel. After more than two decade of fluctuation ince the 1980, on July 15, 2008 the oil price reached a hitorical high at US$147 per barrel. The dramatic rie in the price of crude oil quickly raied Aia oil-producing countrie to high-income tatu, contributing the mot to the pot-war boom in the reource-rich economie (i.e. the Middle Eat). 17 Geographically, Central Aia wa part of the Ruian Empire and later the Soviet Union until it independence in the The Soviet-Afghan War in Central Aia lated from 1979 to Before the collape of the former Soviet Union in 1991, Central Aia wa under retrictive Soviet control and wa alo known a Soviet Central Aia. 18 In Southeat Aia, Vietnam, Lao and Cambodia (a well a Mongolia in Eat Aia) were alo influenced by Soviet ideology, becoming oberver countrie of the Waraw Pact. 19 i.e. Afghanitan and North Korea. 5

6 indutrialiation. Thi growth baed on the extent of the indutrialiation of an economy i firm and olid, and ha been at the root of Aia continued economic expanion. The firt wave of Aian growth in Japan and the Four Aian Tiger (ee the 1960 and 1970 panel in Figure 3) lowed in the late 1980, when thee economie began to tranfer their low-end indutrie to Aia indutrialized economie, triggering labourintenive indutrialiation in economically inferior countrie in Aia throughout 1990 and China economic development largely occurred during the econd wave of Aia indutrial technology diffuion (ee the 1980, 1990 and 2000 panel in Figure 3). It growing integration with the Aian economy ha led to ignificant change in the compoition of trade and regional invetment in Aia. However, ince the 2008 financial crii the world economy ha lowed ignificantly. Second-wave indutrialiing countrie tarted to tranfer their own low-end indutrie to economically inferior countrie. The high energy price did not fall immediately after 2008 but remained relatively high for at leat three year, buffering ome reource-rich Aian countrie (ee Turkmenitan and Mongolia in the 2010 panel in Figure 3). Reource-baed growth and Southeat Aian indutrialiation kick-tarted a third wave of Aian growth (ee e.g. Lao and Cambodia in the 2000 and 2010 panel in Figure 3). Firt- and econd-wave economie would have to capitalie on thee riing ource of growth to utain their economy; China BRI wa launched for much the ame reaon. <Inert Figure 2> Japanee-tyle indutrialization i the mot olid way for Aia to ecape the low- and middle-income trap, and may be the bet way for countrie not endowed with rich reource to achieve a high level of income. Such marginal indutrial tranfer, however, ha particular feature. The firt i that indutrialiation diffue from economie with high labour cot to thoe with low labour cot. Throughout thee wave, leading countrie alway tranfer their low-end indutrie to economically inferior countrie. Indutrial frontier can make dometic low-value-added indutrie high-value-added again when inveting overea. Here a key to the generation of Aia indutrial wave i labour cot, which create an international flow of capital. During thi proce dormant labour in recipient economie i aroued by cro-country capital flow, and in the long term their own labour price appreciate. Uually thi move of indutrie acro countrie i accompanied by large-cale trade and capital flow between the originating and the recipient economy. Mot of Aia indutrial hift involve a retructuring of the production chain, which ee economie that indutrialized earlier reditributing part of their production capacity to neighbouring Aian economie. 20 When uch a reditribution take place, boom in intermediate product flow can be oberved, a happened between Japan and the Four Aian Tiger in the firt wave, and between the Tiger and China in the econd. The Slowing of the Chinee Economy Three decade of rapid growth have tranformed China from a low- to an upper-middleincome economy. From 1980 to 2010, the country real national income increaed Thi could be een a a meaure to counter the border effect or border cot (e.g., Jame E. Anderon and Eric van Wincoop, Gravity with gravita: a olution to the border puzzle, American Economic Review 93(1), (2003), p ) 6

7 fold, with real per capita GDP increaing 12-fold. 21 Neverthele, after a real average growth rate of 10.4% throughout the 2000, the Chinee State Council Report on the Work of the Chinee Government in early 2012 howed that the country wa keenly aware of it lowing economic growth, 22 with it real GDP growth rate falling quickly to 7.9% over two year and further to The invetment boom led to chronic overupply in many Chinee indutrie. The growth of GDP and urban fixed aet invetment continued to low down in 2015, while indutrial employment progreively declined by 0.3% and and 2015 repectively (Figure 3). Such economic data indicate that China indutrial capacity i more than ufficient to meet it dometic need, allowing for ignificant amount of indutrial capacity to be allocated overea. 23 Unlike the cae of Japan and the Four Aian Tiger, the lowing down of China economy came earlier than expected and before the country had completed it overall indutrialiation. The growth rate i crucial to the Chinee government and it 1.4 billion people, who largely expect the country economic growth to improve their living tandard. In the current economic ituation the Chinee government face two major challenge: finding market for it indutrial overcapacity, and finding new ource of economic growth. <Inert Figure 3> Contraint to BRI A common feature of the Aian development model i that indutrialiation-baed growth pattern require proper capital (and technology diffuion with capital flow) and good flow to facilitate indutry upgrade at each tage. China de facto labour cot have increaed more than 30-fold in the pat three decade, and China can now be expected to move it marginal indutrie overea in earch of lower labour input that will give rie to large-cale capital and good outflow. Although the financing of the BRI i backed by the Aian Infratructure Invetment Bank (AIIB), China, a the bigget beneficiary country of the 57 founder member, 24 i expected to bear the bulk of the cot a a major power. Like all overea invetment, even though China ha trongly advanced it economic tatu in Aia it total capital invetment i largely contrained by it own economic capabilitie. Low- and middleincome Aian indutrialiing countrie are therefore better potential partner for China BRI, a their labour cot are lower and their economie better integrated with Aia regional economic network, making their growth even more table than that of thoe that have not yet tarted their indutrialiation. Developmental and Population Contraint The entire BRI invetment plan currently lack pecific. What i certain i that China view [infratructural] facilitie connectivity a a priority area for the implementation of BRI, a indicated by the officially-releaed Action Plan. 21 A the yearly official GDP deflator i unknown, a fixed-bae cumulative conumer price index (1978=100) wa ued here a a deflator to calculate the year-on-year real GDP growth rate. 22 The State Council Report of the Work of the Chinee Government, delivered at the Fifth Seion of the Eleventh National People Congre, March 5, 2012, acceed April 8, 2018http://en.people.cn/90785/ html. 23 Thi overupply alo force enterprie to cut price to maintain their market hare, further exacerbating the average profit performance of the local indutry. 24 A total of 57 nation have been approved a founder member of AIIB, including China. 7

8 Infratructure matter, a it trigger economic growth; however, a country infratructure i largely determined by it level of indutry. When China became the larget economy in Aia it per capita GDP wa till a fraction of that of the large economie. According to World Bank data, China remain a medium-ranking developing economy amongt all Aian economie (ee Figure 4). With uch developmental contraint, China firt effort at inveting in infratructure are thu mot likely to be made in Aian countrie that are economically inferior to itelf (haded in grey in Figure 4), ruling out 21 countrie in Aia. <Inert Figure 4> <Inert Figure 5> There are rik to uch invetment, a fat population growth can eaily offet per capita invetment, a mentioned. Thu populou countrie require large-cale invetment from China to fill the gap in their per-capita infratructural requirement. A the BRI neceitate China etting aide a certain um for loan to developing countrie, it i unlikely that China will concentrate it invetment on a mall number of particularly populou countrie. Even if it ha the capacity to provide ufficient capital for infratructural invetment in the four mot populou countrie in South and Southeat Aia Bangladeh, Pakitan, Indoneia and India (ee Figure 5) a it ha in Pakitan, 25 the outcome of BRI invetment in thee countrie can be expected to be limited. BRI Partnerhip Growth and population contraint vary widely amongt Aian countrie, with the lepopulou developing countrie generally enjoying ound per-capita growth, followed by populou countrie (ee Figure 4 and 5). Thee le-populou developing countrie have largely committed to BRI initial objective of helping to contruct China neighbouring countrie infratructure. The BRI cover mot countrie in Central, South, Southeat and Wet Aia. Taking into account the economic factor development level and ize of population around 22 countrie, mainly low- and middle-income developing economie in Aia, 26 are the likely partner at the initial tage. 27 However if the crii in Iran, Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic continue, the intability may pread to Jordan, leaving 18 BRI countrie, a indicated on the map (Figure 6). <Inert Figure 6> 25 Since the 1965 Indo-Pakitani War the country ha received a huge amount of invetment from China. 26 The BRI 22 countrie are Nepal, Yemen, the Philippine, Sri Lanka, Lao PDR, Thailand, Uzbekitan, Vietnam, Iran, the Ilamic Rep., the Kyrgyz Republic, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikitan, Georgia, Jordan, Cambodia, Bhutan, Myanmar, Armenia, Mongolia, the Maldive, Afghanitan and Iraq. BRI 18 countrie exclude Iran, Iraq, Syria and Jordan a indicated in Figure Taking into account population growth, the initial tage exclude Bangladeh, Pakitan, Indoneia and India. However, a Pakitan i long-term cooperative country with China baed on political reaon, it incluion will hardly be influenced by BRI. Thu with the exception of Pakitan, the current population growth rate in Bangladeh, Indoneia and India may poe a great challenge to the Chinee government fical ituation if China intend to change thee countrie current infratructure condition through BRI. Populou countrie are thu excluded from the calculation for a more accurate etimation of BRI propect. 8

9 Recognition of Chinee Capital in Aia China puruit of BRI invetment face evere limitation, due not only to it own outward invetment capability but alo to the Aian detination economie capacity for capital aborption. In particular, Chinee invetment in the 22 target countrie will inevitably encounter fierce competition from other countrie with a long hitory of invetment in Aia. The hare of Aia capital-aborptive capacity that China mut acquire to accommodate BRI invetment i unknown and difficult to predict at the initial tage. China may be forced to crowd out exiting invetor if it targeted developing Aian economie cannot increae their capital aborption capacity quickly in the near future. Alternatively China will have to reort to channelling it fat-expanding indutrial overcapacity, which i almot certain to outtrip dometic need in the coming year, into exiting trade and invetment channel (e.g. the OECD) to reolve it overcapacity problem. Either way, being a ignificant individual invetor or a major player in exiting international channel would facilitate China integration of Aia low- and middleincome developing countrie with the China-led Aian economic circle. China BRI invetment in targeted countrie in Aia will have to be in the form of trade, and intergovernmental aid, the three channel traditionally adopted by developing Aian countrie. The ucce of the initiative i thu highly dependent on China market hare of product and capital in Aia, and particularly in Aia developing economie. International Trade The total trade volume of China import and export ha increaed rapidly ince the Hu-Wen era which encouraged Chinee firm to expand trade and economic cooperation overea from the mid-2000 to the early The four-trillion timulu package ha further booted China indutrial production and foreign trade. According to it National Bureau of Statitic, China total trade volume tripled from US$1,154.6 billion in 2004 to $3,953.0 billion in 2015, of which trade in Aia repreented 53.0%. However, China foreign trade in Aia i largely concentrated in Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, which accounted for 27.5% of the country total volume of global trade. <Inert Table 1> The BRI 22 countrie hare of China total foreign trade ha rien teadily in the pat two decade (ee Table 1). The group wa China fifth-larget trading partner before In 2014 and 2015 it roe teadily to econd, with about 3.5% le trade than the US, in China total trade volume. Optimitically, if all twenty-two countrie continue to grow baed on the average of their own top three record in the pat ten year, their combined GDP i expected to reach a much a US$4,500 billion by In the event that the crii in Iraq, Iran and Syria continue and pread to neighbouring Jordan, the left eighteen countrie could till have a chance of achieving a combined GDP of US$3,000 billion by

10 Furthermore, in term of a bilateral foreign trade multiplier, 28 the total volume of trade between China and low- and middle-income Aian economie will be higher than that of Sino-Korean trade in A a group, Aia developing countrie have outperformed other developing countrie by a wide margin in term of trade. <Inert Figure 7> The ranking of the BRI 22 group in China total trade volume ha rien quickly (ee Table 1), meaning that thee countrie have the potential to aborb China ongoing indutrial overcapacity. However, China hare in each individual country trade vary ignificantly. It trade with Kyrgyztan, Myanmar, Mongolia and Tajikitan ha been ignificant, accounting for about 50% of their trade volume in Thee countrie are contiguou with China and hence convenient for trade; China trade with them i motly aociated with energy and mineral reource, particularly in the cae of Kyrgyztan and Mongolia (ee Figure 7). <Inert Figure 8> The larget proportion of Aia developing-economy trade i carried out with developed economie. In the pat ten year the trade between developing Aia and advanced economie ha remained at about 60% of Aia total trade volume. Of the total trade volume between developing Aia and other developing economie, a quarter i energy-baed. Non-fuel trade accounted for 30% of developing Aia total trade in 2014 (ee Figure 8). Thi 30clude ome non-reource-originating developing countrie with trade potential comparable to China, uch a India. On the aumption that trade dependence very much hinge on the importing country population and i relatively table in the hort term, China non-fuel trade with Aia low- and middleincome developing economie i very limited. The development of Aia foreign trade remain focued on advanced economie and reource-originating countrie. Between , while Aian developing countrie import of non-fuel product increaed 3.5-fold, the growth rate of fuel product import increaed by 5.7 time. Thi how that developing Aia ha le potential for non-fuel import from other developing economie compared with fuel trade. A the BRI i to help China explore new overea market to offet the negative impact of declining external demand, developing Aia capacity to aborb China ongoing indutrial overupply, motly of non-fuel indutrial product, may not be very atifactory. Outward Foreign Direct Invetment Strong growth in outward foreign direct invetment (O) in recent year ugget that China ha the capacity to provide ufficient fund to lead initial BRI invetment in Aia. After the mid-2000, when the government encouraged large SOE to invet 28 To etimate the bilateral trade volume between China and each of the BRI 22 target countrie by 2025, the average value of the foreign trade multiplier between China and each country ince the 2008 financial crii wa ued. Unlike other economic indicator, foreign trade volume in the hort term (ay, ten year) i relatively table. 29 The ame method wa applied to etimate Sino-Korean trade uing etimated GDP (the average over ten year) with the average foreign trade multiplier calculated from the data. Thiarticle included only the BRI 18 countrie to exclude reource trade between China and the four gulf countrie. 10

11 abroad, China O grew more than eight-fold from US$5.5 billion in 2004 to US$145.7 billion in 2015 (ee Figure 9). Since 2012 it ha ranked a the world thirdlarget ource country for O. <Inert Figure 9> The importance of the BRI 22 countrie in China total O cannot be overrated. In 2014, all twenty-two together accounted for only 4.6% of China total O, dropping to (ee Figure 9). 30 Even including the developing countrie in the Aociation of Southeat Aian Nation (ASEAN), a bloc with which China ha perhap the very cloe economic cooperation in Aia, the country O flow decreaed by 20.6% from 2013 to 2015 after the BRI trategy wa announced. Thi contrat with the 39.7creae in China combined O to the US, Autralia and Europe in the ame period. In 2015 Aia continued to be the world top -recipient region, accounting for nearly 39.8% of global, according to the UN Conference on Trade and Development. 31 Total net to Aian developing countrie amounted to US$541 billion in 2015, 15.6% higher than in 2014 and 25.5% higher than in The global lump in around 2012 did not eem to affect the lure of inveting in the Aian market. 32 <Inert Figure 10> China O ha expanded rapidly ince the early 2000, and the plummeting global aet price during the 2008 financial crii booted it further (ee Figure 10). According to the 2015 Statitical Bulletin of China Outward Foreign Direct Invetment, the country non-financial outflow to Aia approximated US$108.4 billion in 2015, 15.4% of total received in Aia in that year. However, China O in Aia i largely concentrated on Hong Kong, which receive US$89.8 billion of Aia US$108.4 billion (2015). Part of China O to Hong Kong include the Chinee government benefit of corporate tax reduction for overea invetor when their Hong Kong ubidiarie invet back in mainland China, while the other ignificant part i for tax avoidance purpoe or to channel money out of China to third detination through Hong Kong. Excluding Hong Kong, according to the 2015 Statitical Bulletin of China Outward Foreign Direct Invetment 33 the ret of Aia hare in China total O outflow dropped harply from 74.4% (Figure 11a) to 12.8% (Figure 11b): higher than Europe 4.9%, but lightly lower than the combined ize of North and Latin America from China at 16.1%. 30 According to the 2014 Statitical Bulletin of China Outward Foreign Direct Invetment, China O to the twenty-two BRI target countrie totalled US$5.5 billion, 4.6% of it entire O in United Nation Conference on Trade and Development, World Invetment Report 2016: Invetor Nationality: Policy Challenge, June 22, 2016, acceed April 8, 2018, 32 Global had declined from US$1,500 billion in 2011 to US$1,350 billion in 2012, an 18% drop. 33 Minitry of Commerce, Zhongguo Duiwai Zhijie Touzi Tongji Gongbao [Statitical Bulletin of China Outward Foreign Direct Invetment] (Beijing: China Statitical Pre, 2016). 11

12 <Inert Figure 11> Of the total Chinee to Aia excluding Hong Kong, more than 30% went to a few developed economie including Singapore (56.1%), South Korea (7.1%) and Japan (1.3%). China O to Aia developing countrie only accounted for 5.8% of it total nominal O in Thi figure include ome upper-middle-income developing countrie with a per-capita GDP comparable to that of China uch a Iran, Kazakhtan and Thailand. Dicounting thee from the calculation, China overea invetment in Aia low- and middle-income developing economie amounted to only US$9.0 billion, % of it total O in 2015 and 1.3% of the total of that Aia received in the ame year (ee Table 2). <Inert Table 2> 34 According to the 2015 Statitical Bulletin of China Outward Foreign Direct Invetment, the amount of Chinee to the 22 BRI Aian developing economie totalled US$2.7 billion. 12

13 From 2010 to 2015, while total to Aia increaed by 17.8%, China hare of invetment in the twenty-two BRI countrie remained at below 1% (of Aia total ), howing that China competitivene in all the initial BRI target countrie together i table but low. However, a Aia developing economie vary ignificantly in ize, China O in ome pecific low- and middle-income countrie i till of particular importance. Figure 12 how that the amount of China in Nepal, Timor and Tajikitan exceeded half of thee countrie net in 2015, and thoe in North Korea, Lao, Pakitan and Cambodia by a quarter. <Inert Figure 12> Chinee invetment in Lao and Cambodia ha alway been generou, a the two countrie link China to Southeat Aia and port along the maritime route connecting China with Wet Aia. It invetment in Tajikitan i generally reource-baed (oil, natural ga and mineral tone) and market-eeking (indutrial product). Depite an encouraging record, China 2.7% effective invetment hare of Aia total (excluding Hong Kong) how that it face great competitive preure and ha a long way to go before it can fully compete with other countrie inveting in the region. Official Developmental Aitance Although government-led invetment will take the lead in infratructure contruction to increae the aborption capacity of the hot economie and pur non-government, foreign aid i another important ource of capital, epecially in low- and middleincome Aian countrie. China hare of bilateral aid to each country remain unknown becaue it available aid data doe not reflect recipient countrie individually. According to the World Bank World Development Indicator, aid flowing to Aia in totalled US$883.5 billion. Since 2005 Aia aid ha come from three major ource: direct bilateral intergovernmental aid from Development Aitance Committee (DAC) member; 35 Official Developmental Aitance (ODA), donated mainly by advanced economie; and development aitance from major UN donor agencie (ee Figure 13). <Inert Figure 13> From 2005 to 2014, direct bilateral aid from DAC member outtripped all other ource, contributing 60.3% of aid flow to Aia. 36 In the ame period, ODA for developing Aia totalled US$340.9 billion, $191.4 billion le than direct bilateral aid. Aid from UN agencie, the third-larget ource, wa worth US$10.2 billion, or 1.2% of total aid to Aia in thi period (ee Figure 13). Among the 29 current DAC member 37 only two Aian countrie, Japan and South Korea, participate a foreign aid donor. A 35 DAC i an international committee acting under the aupice of the OECD. All DAC member come under the OECD, but not all OECD member are DAC member. 36 From 2005 to 2014, net bilateral aid flow from DAC donor to Aia developing countrie totalled US$532 billion. 37 DAC currently ha 29 member: Autralia, Greece, Poland, Autria, Iceland, Portugal, Belgium, Ireland, Slovak Republic, Canada, Italy, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Japan, Spain, Denmark, South Korea, Sweden, the European Union, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Finland, the Netherland, the United Kingdom, France, New Zealand, the United State, Germany and Norway. 13

14 China i not a DAC member it intergovernmental aid i not categoried with DAC aid (the firt ource in Figure 13); in addition, it i not eay to for China aid capital to flow through the ODA ytem, the econd larget ource of foreign aitance to Aia, a it ha mainly been dominated by developed countrie. <Inert Table 3> China intergovernmental aid tatu ha rien rapidly in recent year. It hovered below 17th place until In 2012 and 2013 it roe quickly to ixth place, 38 although not a DAC member (Table 3). <Inert Table 4> Statitic how that in the Chinee government contributed US$14 billion to the development of developing countrie, 39 an average of US$4.8 billion each year. In 2013 there wa a harp increae to US$7.5 billion, and in the near future China i expected to further increae it um to catch up with the only Aian country among the top five DAC donor: Japan (Table 3 and 4). Chinee foreign aid doe not go olely to Aia. The latet white paper China Foreign Aid (2014) reported that Africa received 52% (US$7.5 billion) of China foreign aid. During China aid to Aia (US$4.4 billion) made up jut 31% of it total aid (ee Figure 14a). <Inert Figure 14> A China larget aid competitor in Aia, in Japan granted a total amount of US$16.3 billion to Aian developing countrie, approximately two-third of it total global ODA (Figure 14b). China contribution pattern wa the oppoite; although it aid capacity and ranking ha een dramatic growth, it competitivene in the Aian aid market ha fallen far behind that of Japan. Even if the new opening-up initiative can uccefully etablih a new official aid ytem between China and the ret of Aia, China total development aid i unlikely to catch up with that of the EU and the US in the near future (e.g. the OECD DAC); even in Aia, it will be difficult to crowd out Japan importance in Aia official intergovernmental aid ytem. Concluion In 2011, after three decade of fat economic growth, the ize of China economy exceeded that of Japan. A the larget economy in Aia, China ha teadily progreed in it effort to broaden economic cooperation in developing Aia. Exce indutrial invetment capacity and a lowing economy have puhed the country to take a proactive tance in order to etablih a China-led economic circle in thi region in the form of the BRI. If implemented uccefully, the initiative will help China to expand it overea market and find new ource to upport it future economic growth. Fundamentally, however, the ucce of China BRI initiative i largely contingent on Aian market recognition of Chinee product and capital. 38 Naohiro Kitano and Yukinori Harada, Etimating China Foreign Aid , Journal of International Development 28(7), (2016), p Information Office of the State Council of the People Republic of China, China Foreign Aid 2014, Chinee Government White Paper, July 10, 2014, acceed April 8, 2018, 14

15 The two larget trading group with developing Aia are advanced economie and reource-originating countrie. Developing Aia capacity to aborb China ongoing indutrial overupply may not be a atifactory a expected. Further, China invetment i concentrated on everal neighbouring countrie (e.g. Lao and Cambodia). China O or intergovernmental aid to low- and middle-income Aia remain low. To change thi, China need a fating expanding buine/fical capacity to increae it hare of and aid to developing countrie in Aia, and thi i unlikely to happen within a hort period. In BRI countrie where long-term cooperative relation with other invetor countrie and donor organiation (e.g. OECD and UN agencie) have long exited, China may have to compete in term of the amount of aid that it provide to crowd out competitor. It may alo need to conduct a tudy of the profitability of uch effort, given that the volume of trade between China and the twenty-two BRI countrie i uually le than it trade with the EU or the US. China invetment capacity i unlikely to compete with and aid from the OECD- and UN-led ytem. Even in Aia, China face immene difficulty crowding out Japan exiting importance. China BRI i thu fraught with obtacle. It face cooperation-baed competition and will need to integrate the BRI into the current framework of international economic cooperation. Intenifying it competition for invetment in Aia may affect it partnerhip with competitor in other market. While China new opening-up BRI initiative ha been launched with a loud fanfare, the path ahead i largely unknown and unpredictable. Aia, a the firt top along the belt and the road, i vital to China ucce. China will need to maintain a realitic balance between it ambitiou Aian economic trategy and it global economic cooperation. Acknowledgment The author would like to thank John Wong of National Univerity of Singapore, Singapore, for hi comment on an early draft of thi work. Note on Contributor Cheng King, Sun Yat-Sen Univerity and Eat Aian Intitute, National Univerity of Singapore. Hi major reearch foci include fical management in China between the eventeenth and nineteenth centurie and the proce of pot-war economic catch-up in Eat and Southeat Aia. Jane Du, Eat Aian Intitute, National Univerity of Singapore. Du ha pecialied on the economic of Chinee agriculture, and ectoral relation between indutry and agriculture and their evolution. 15

16 Figure and Table 16

17 Per Capita GDP (2010 US$) 0 3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 10,561 4,294 Eat Aia Southeat Aia South Aia Central Aia Middle Eat Figure 1. Per capita GDP in the five main ub region of Aia, Source: World Bank, World Development Indicator, available at: 1,617 3,121 10,452 45% 30% 1960S 15% 0% >7% Oman Iran Japan Irael Hong Kong Singapore Korea, S. Thailand Pakitan Malayia Saudi Ara Georgia Turkey Philippine Sri Lanka India Bangladeh Indoneia Iraq Myanmar Nepal China 17

18 15% 10% 5% 0% 30% 5% 20% 45% 15% 5% 5% 15% 15% 10% 5% 0% 13% 6% 1% 8% Figure 2. Decade-on-decade growth of Aian economie, Source: World Bank, World Development Indicator, available at: S >7% Jordan Arab Emi Cypru Saudi Ara Brunei Iraq Korea, S. Singapore Hong Kong Malayia Indoneia Thailand Georgia China Philippine Irael Oman Turkey Japan Myanmar Sri Lanka Pakitan Iran India Nepal Bangladeh 1980S >7% Oman China Bhutan Korea, S. Macao Thailand Singapore Hong Kong Pakitan Kyrgyz Cypru Indoneia Uzbekitan Mongolia Malayia India Turkey Nepal Japan Vietnam Lao PDR Sri Lanka Bangladeh Irael Turkmenit Tajikitan Jordan Philippine Georgia Bahrain Myanmar Iran Iraq Arab Emi Saudi Ara Brunei Lebanon 1990S >7% China Vietnam Lebanon Cambodia Kuwait Singapore Malayia Myanmar Korea, S. Lao PDR India Irael Yemen, Rep. Bahrain Jordan Sri Lanka Nepal Bhutan Bangladeh Oman Thailand Cypru Indoneia Arab Emi Pakitan Iraq Hong Kong Turkey Iran Philippine Saudi Ara Macao Brunei Japan Mongolia Uzbekitan Turkmenit Armenia Kazakhtan Kyrgyz Azerbaijan Georgia Tajikitan 2000S Azerbaijan Qatar Myanmar Macao China Afghanitan Armenia Kazakhtan Tajikitan Bhutan Cambodia Turkmenit Maldive India Lao PDR Uzbekitan Jordan Vietnam Mongolia Georgia Bangladeh Bahrain Lebanon Kuwait Saudi Ara Indoneia Iran Sri Lanka Singapore Kyrgyz Pakitan Philippine Malayia Thailand Korea, S. Arab Emi Yemen Nepal Hong Kong Turkey Cypru Oman Irael Iraq Brunei Japan >7% 2010S Turkmenit Mongolia Uzbekitan Lao PDR China Myanmar Cambodia Tajikitan India Bangladeh Iraq Sri Lanka Qatar Vietnam Philippine Indoneia Bhutan Malayia Saudi Ara Maldive Georgia Afghanitan Kyrgyz Arab Emi Kazakhtan Turkey Armenia Nepal Oman Pakitan Singapore Kuwait Bahrain Irael Macao Korea, S. Hong Kong Thailand Jordan Azerbaijan Lebanon Japan Brunei Iran Cypru Yemen >7% 18

19 Year on year Growth Rate (%) Invetment GDP Employment 4000 B. timulu package BRI Real GDP Fixed Aet Invetment, Urban Employment, Indutry Figure 3. Invetment, employment and GDP growth rate in China, Source: National Bureau of Statitic of China, available at: 19

20 Per Capita GDP, 2015 (2010 US$, Thouand) Qatar Macao Singapore Japan Arab Emi Hong Kong Kuwait Irael Brunei Korea, S. Bahrain Saudi Ara Cypru Oman Turkey Malayia Kazakhtan Maldive Lebanon Turkmenitan China Azerbaijan Thailand Iraq Georgia Jordan Mongolia Indoneia Armenia Sri Lanka Bhutan Philippine Uzbekitan India Vietnam Lao PDR Myanmar Pakitan Cambodia Kyrgyztan Bangladeh Tajikitan Yemen Nepal Afghanitan Iran Korea, N. Syrian Arab Figure 4. Per capita GDP among Aian countrie/economie, Source: World Bank, World Development Indicator, available at: 20

21 Population, 2015 Total (Million Peron) ,050 1,400 China India Indoneia Pakitan Bangladeh Japan Philippine Vietnam Iran Turkey Thailand Myanmar Korea, S. Iraq Afghanitan Saudi Arabia Uzbekitan Malayia Nepal Yemen Korea, N. Sri Lanka Syrian Arab Kazakhtan Cambodia Azerbaijan Arab Emi Tajikitan Irael Jordan Hong Kong Lao PDR Kyrgyztan Lebanon Singapore Turkmenitan Oman Kuwait Georgia Armenia Mongolia Qatar Bahrain Cypru Bhutan Macao Brunei Maldive Figure 5. Population of Aian countrie/economie, Source: World Bank, World Development Indicator, available at: 21

22 Figure 6. Ditribution of BRI 18 and BRI 22 countrie in Aia. Source: Illutrated by the author uing the reult of Figure 4 and 5. 22

23 % of China in total trade of partner 61% 51% 51% 45% 28% 26% 25% 24% 20% 19% 19% 15% 12% 11% 10% 8% 5% 4% 3% 0% Kyrgyztan Myanmar 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% Mongolia Tajikitan Vietnam Lao PDR Philippine Malayia Iraq Cambodia Yemen Thailand Uzbekitan Sri Lanka Jordan Nepal Georgia Armenia Afghanitan Bhutan China partner country bilateral trade Total trade volume in partner countrie Figure 7. China hare in partner countrie total trade volume, Source: World Bank, World Development Indicator, available at: 23