National Oil Companies: Performance and Commercial Frameworks

Transcription

1 National Oil Companies: Performance and Commercial Frameworks Miranda Ferrell Wainberg Dmitry Volkov Dr. Michelle Michot Foss September 17, 2007 Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 1

2 Why Study NOCs? NOCs control access to the majority of resources for future oil/gas production. NOCs increasingly responsible for the required future investments NOC model persists especially in times of resource nationalism Will they be able to deliver the oil/gas supplies demanded by a growing world market? Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 2

3 Top 20 Countries Oil Reserves 2005 (Bil. Bbls) India Azerbaijan Norway Kazakhstan Brazil Algeria Mexico Qatar China US Nigeria Libya Russia Venezuela UAE Kuwait Iraq Iran Canada Saudi Arabia No NOCs NOCs Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2006 Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 3

4 CEE NOC Research Objectives Analyze NOC performance with respect to publicly stated commercial/non-commercial goals. Performance focus on upstream domestic operations Gain insights into the drivers ( commercial frameworks ) of differential NOC performance. Commercial frameworks include country public sector governance, corporate governance, fiscal regimes, commercialization and hydrocarbon regulation. Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 4

5 NOC Selection Pemex (Mexico), PetroChina (China), CNOOC (China), Petrobras (Brazil), Statoil (Norway) Good quality & comparable data U.S. SEC Form 20s Production/reserves audited independently All majority-owned by their states (56%-100%) Wide spectrum of country commercial frameworks Mexico: NOC upstream monopoly China, Brazil: NOCs dominant, limited upstream competition Norway: Significant upstream competition Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 5

6 IOC and NOC Objectives IOCs Commercial goals dominate: maximize return on equity to shareholders. Corporate social responsibility goals playing greater role since 1990 s. Issues re: execution efficiency NOCS Effective development of country s hydrocarbon sector (commercial). Contribute to country social/economic development (noncommercial). Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 6

7 Effective Development of Hydrocarbon Sector Ability to Find and Develop Hydrocarbons Performance Metric Attributes Measured Production Replacement Ratio (PRR) Reserve Replacement Cost (RRC) Capital/project mgmt. effectiveness; technical competence; competitiveness; sustainability. Production and Reserve Growth Rates Competitiveness; sustainability Cash Margin/RRC (BOE) Cash Flow/Capital Expenditures Level of costs relative to cash generated; ability to generate adequate investment capital. Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 7

8 Performance Results Ability to Find and Develop Hydrocarbons Proved Reserve Growth Production Replacement % 120% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 20% 40% Pemex Statoil CNOOC PetroChina Petrobras 200% 150% 100% 50% 0% Pemex Statoil Petrobras PetroChina CNOOC Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 8

9 Ability to Find and Develop Hydrocarbons 3 Yr. Average Reserve Replacement Cost ($/BOE) Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 9

10 Ability to Find and Develop Hydrocarbons 2005 Cash Margin/RRC per BOE 2005 Op. Cash Flow/Capital Exp. Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 10

11 Ability to Find and Develop Hydrocarbons Summary Pemex & Statoil are not replacing domestic production -Statoil: Mature OCS therefore expanding into international and frontier areas -Pemex: Potential resource large but limited access to new technology and capital constraints Pemex RRC ($19.42/boe) is significantly higher than other NOCs ($5.90-$8.66/boe) All NOCs but Pemex can fund capital expenditures from operating cash flow Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 11

12 Effective Development of Hydrocarbon Sector Ability to Produce Hydrocarbons Profitably Performance Metric Earnings Before Taxes & Depreciation (EBTDA) per BOE of Annual Production Earnings After Taxes & Depreciation (EATDA) per BOE of Annual Production EATDA/Long Term Assets Attributes Measured Operating efficiency; competitiveness. Impact of fiscal regime on NOC sustainability. Capital management effectiveness; profitability. Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 12

13 Ability to Produce Hydrocarbons Profitably 2005 Earnings Before/After Taxes and DDA ($/BOE) Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 13

14 Ability to Produce Hydrocarbons Profitably Summary EBTDA/BOE comparable among the 5 companies. Pemex tax regime is punitive at 99% of EBT. Statoil tax burden also high at 77% of EBT; problematic as it moves into frontier and international arenas? Petrobras has best return on assets (38%). Chinese NOCs may be advantaged by leaving administrative costs with former parent companies. Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 14

15 Domestic Social/Economic Development NOC Contributions Performance Metric Attributes Measured Tax, royalty and other payments to the state per BOE; Spending on non-commercial programs Excess Employment (Employees/BOE) Capital formation for development Contribution to social, economic, environmental well-being Contribution to country full employment Domestic Oil/Gas Price Subsidies Provision of affordable energy to citizens Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 15

16 Domestic Social/Economic Development NOC Performance/Contribution $/BOE Pemex Statoil Petrobras CNOOC PetroChina Taxes, Divs., Bonuses Subsidies, Soc. Programs Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 16

17 Domestic Social/Economic Development Summary Pemex and Petrobras are most active with domestic social/economic programs Pemex makes the greatest contribution but results in an unsustainable NOC Statoil s contribution approaches Pemex and produces a financially healthy, sustainable NOC Countries with significant domestic fuel subsidies (Brazil, Mexico, China) lack sufficient refining infrastructure and import refined products Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 17

18 Hydrocarbon Sector Performance 2005 Contribution by Participant ($/BOE) Fund Non-NOC Companies State Direct Interests NOC Mexico Norway w/o Fund Norway w/ Fund Brazil China Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 18

19 Hydrocarbon Sector Organization Summary Norway s competitive and diverse hydrocarbon sector produces the greatest contribution to the state when return on Fund included. Increasing non-noc participation in Brazil and China s hydrocarbon sectors to significant levels should benefit total sector contribution to their countries economies. Non-NOC participation in Mexico could relieve financial pressure on Pemex without substantially diluting the sector s contribution to the state. Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 19

20 Country Commercial Frameworks Evaluation Public Sector Governance (15%) Defined nat l hydrocarbon policy; clear NOC goals; functional separation; full disclosure NOC noncommercial goals; national fund for excess rents Corporate Governance (15%) Independent BOD; Merit personnel policies; audited financials/reserves; strong internal financial and planning oversight Fiscal Regimes (25%) Allows adequate capital investment; good credit availability; predictable/separate NOC budget process; attracts sufficient non-noc capital Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 20

21 Country Commercial Frameworks Evaluation (con td.) Commercialization (30%) Upstream competition; NOC/Non-NOC JVs, alliances; midstream competition; partial NOC privatization Regulation (15%) Limits NOC market power upstream and downstream; provides good quality data to all participants; resolves disputes/conflicts Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 21

22 Country Commercial Frameworks Evaluation 30.00% 25.00% 20.00% 15.00% 10.00% 5.00% Mexico China Brazil Norway 0.00% Pub. Gov. 15% Corp. Gov. 15% Fis. Reg. 25% Comm. 30% Reg. 15% Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 22

23 Country Commercial Frameworks (CFs) Summary There appears to be a link between a high ranking on CFs and good NOC performance (Norway/Statoil). A fair fiscal regime coupled with a competitive, commercialized hydrocarbons sector can lead to improved NOC performance (Petrobras, Statoil) and a greater sector contribution to the state. A fair fiscal regime coupled with a competitive, commercialized hydrocarbons sector can overcome deficiencies in regulation and governance but not vice versa Countries with partially privatized NOCs have better CFs and better performing NOCs (Norway, China, Brazil). Center for Energy Economics, UT-Austin. No reproduction, distribution, or attribution without permission. 23