Stopping Wars and Making Peace:

Transcription

1 sub i-iarridurg A/ Stopping Wars and Making Peace: Studies in International Intervention Edited by Kristen Eichensehr and W. Michael Reisman M A RTI N U S NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS LEIDEN BOSTON 2009

2 Table of Contents Acknowledgments Notes on Contributors xi xiii xv Chapter i War-StoppingTechniquesintheFalklands i Christina Parajon I. II. III. IV. V. VI. History of the Conflict The War War-Stopping Techniques A. U.S. Shuttle Diplomacy i. London Round One 2. Buenos Aires Round One 3. London Round Two 4. Buenos Aires Round Two The Peruvian Mediation The Secretary-General's Good Offices Appraisal of War-Stopping Measures A. Disputants' Domestic Constraints The Haig Mediation: Problems of Timing, Credibility, Process, and Mixed Messages 1. Timing: Overcoming Optimism Bias 2. Credibility and Authority 3. Process: The Shuttling War-Stopper 4. Mixing Messages Belaunde's Mediation: Problems of Interest and Process 1. Interests of the Mediator 2. Process: Detachment D. UN Involvement 1. Timing: The Inflection Point 2. Credibility: The Taint of Past Failures 3. Credibility: The Secretary-General with Only His Good Offices 4. Process: Mixing Enforcement and Mediation Conclusion and Lessons Learned i 3i

3 vi Table of Contents Chapter 2 Nagorno Karabakh: A War without Peace 43 Nicholas W. Miller I. 43 II. Background 43 III. The History of Nagorno Karabakh 44 A. The Russian Empire 45 World War I and Caucasian Independence 46 IV. A Century of Conflict 47 A. The Soviet Period 47 The Road to War 48 Collapse of Soviet Power and the Period of Open Warfare 50 V. Failed War-Stopping ( ) 54 A. Yeltsin-Nazarbayev Mediation (1991) 54 Turkish and Iranian Mediation Efforts (1992) 56 CSCE/OSCE Mediation Efforts Begin (1992) 58 D. Competition between Russia and the CSCE ( ) 60 E CSCE/OSCE Peace Plan 62 F. Renewed Russian Mediation (Summer 1993) 63 VI. War-Stopping without Peace ( ) 64 A. Competitive Russian and CSCE Mediation Efforts (1994) 65 Cooperation between CSCE/OSCE and Russia ( ) 67 France, Russia, and the United States Take Over Mediation (1997-Present) 68 D. A Decade without Progress ( ) 69 VII. Analysis and Conclusions 70 Chapter 3 War and Peace in Rwanda 77 Tom Dannenbaum I. JJ II. A Brief History of Rwanda Prior to the Conflict 78 A. Rwanda under Colonial Rule 79 Tutsi Exodus and the Rise of a New Leadership in Exile 81 Postcolonial Rwanda 83 III. The War between the RPF and the Government of Rwanda, A. Early Skirmishes 86 Early Efforts to Stop the War 87 The Inefficacy of the Regional Efforts at War- Stopping 87

4 Table of Contents vii D. Explaining the Failure of the Regional War- Stopping Efforts in E. Democratization, Political Fragmentation, and Radicalization in Kigali 91 F. The Internationally Mediated Arusha Peace Process 93 IV. Stalling, Nonimplementation, and Genocide 101 A. Stalling and Nonimplementation 101 The Assassination of Habyarimana, Genocide, and the Withdrawal of Peacekeepers 104 RPF Victory and the Displacement of the War 106 V. Why Did Arusha Fail and What Could Have Been Done Differently? 108 VI. Conclusion Lessons for Peacemakers and War- Stoppers 117 Chapter 4 War-Stopping and Peacemaking during the Malayan Emergency ( ) 121 Colby E. Barrett I. II. III. IV. Early History and Geography of the Malayan Peninsula (3 ' ) A. Geography and Settlement European Occupation The Foundations of Communism and World War II ( ) A. D. E. The Rise of the MCP British Defeat Japanese Occupation Malayan Resistance and Lai Tek The Postwar Era Early British Failures and Innovations ( ) A. The World Setting MCP Strategy and Tactics British Strategy and Operations D. British Tactics E. The Briggs Plan V. Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Victory ( ) A. The Arrival of General Sir Gerald Templer Politics Military Doctrine and Operations D. Police, Intelligence, and Information Services E. Negotiations and Independence VI. Aftermath and Evaluation ( ) VII. Conclusion

5 viii Table of Contents Chapter 5 Separatist Insurgency in Southern Thailand: An Approach to Peacemaking 147 Jonathan Ross-Harrington I. 147 II. Conflict History 148 A. From Annexation to Organized Insurgency ( ) 149 The Height of Organized Resistance ( ) 151 A New Approach: Government Intervention, Simmering Tensions, and Insurgent Fragmentation ( ) 153 D. Enter Thaksin: A Breakdown of Relative Stability ( ) I 54 III. Current Phase: 2004-Present 156 A. Critical Events 156 Key Trends 159 Insurgent Groups and Violent Actors Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN- C) Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and New-PULO Paramilitaries and Militias Foreign Elements 164 D. Ideology, Objectives, and Strategy of the Insurgents 164 IV. A Framework for Understanding Violence and Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand 166 A. Conflict Drivers: Identity, Behavior, and Structure Identity Behavior Structure 169 The Evolving Role of Religion as an Independent Conflict Driver 169 The Dynamic Interaction of Conflict Drivers 172 V. Past Approaches to War-Stopping and Peacemaking in Southern Thailand 172 A. The General Phibun Model 173 The General Prem Model 174 The Thaksin Model 175 VI. Peacemaking Strategies in Southern Thailand 176 A. Challenges to a Lasting Peace 177 Elements of a Comprehensive Peacemaking Strategy in Southern Thailand Draining the Bathwater: Addressing Longstanding Grievances of the General Population 178

6 Table of Contents ix 2. A New Approach to Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations Relieving Intercommunal Tensions: Locating Middle-Range and Grassroots Agents of Peace Malaysian Cooperation 182 VII. Conclusion 183 Chapter 6 War-Stopping and Peacemaking in Mozambique 185 Caroline A. Gross I. II. III. IV. V. VI. Colonial History and Independence, A. Portuguese Presence The Struggle x for Independence Mozambican Civil War, A. Causes and Parties 1. Frelimo 2. Renamo Cold War Effects War Operations 1. Renamo Tactics and Goals 2. Frelimo's Response: Too Little, Too Late Negotiating an End to War, A. Failed Negotiations 1. Nkomati Accord 2. Pretoria Declaration The Road to Rome Rome From War-Stopping to Peacemaking, 1992 Onward A. ONUMOZ Postelection Period Factors that Helped Maintain the Peace 1. Lack of Precious Resources 2. Demobilization First, Elections Second 3. Incentives for Renamo to Stay Out of the Bush 4. Remarkable Economic Development and Optimism 5. Lack of an Ethnic Element to the Conflict 6. Support and Exhaustion of the Population Conclusion Index 213