VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNIVERSITY. Andrius Dirmeikis U.S. ROLE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE CASE OF SOUTH CHINA SEA TERRITORIAL DISPUTES.

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1 VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND DIPLOMACY DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE Andrius Dirmeikis U.S. ROLE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE CASE OF SOUTH CHINA SEA TERRITORIAL DISPUTES Master Thesis Diplomacy and International Relations, State Code 621L20004 Political Science Study Field Supervisor Phd Cand. Mindaugas Norkevičius (Research degree, name, surname) Defended Prof. dr. Šarūnas Liekis Kaunas, 2018

2 CONTENTS SUMMARY SANTRAUKA INTRODUCTION NEOREALIST APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Key Tenets of Neorealism Defensive and Offensive Realism Neorealism s Relevance in the 21st Century SOUTH CHINA SEA TERRITORIAL DISPUTES Historical Background Importance of the Region Legal Disputes Claimants US APPROACH TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES Evolution of U.S. Participation in the Disputes U.S. Interests in the South China Sea U.S. Strategies in Resolving the Disputes.. 45 CONCLUSIONS LITERATURE AND SOURCE LIST...54 ANNEXES

3 Dirmeikis, A. U.S. Role in Conflict Resolution: The Case of South China Sea Territorial Disputes: Master Thesis in Political Science / Supervisor PhD Cand. Norkevičius, M.; Vytautas Magnus University, Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy, Department of Political Science. Kaunas, p. SUMMARY The South China Sea maritime disputes are one of the largest, long-standing and most complex territorial disputes in the world, which involves China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. The South China Sea is of utmost importance for the claimants, because it is an area where the strategically crucial sea-lanes for commerce are located at, as well being an area that is rich in natural gas and oil reserves. In this context, the United States plays a special role as a nonclaimant in the attempts to promote peaceful settlement of the disputes. The object of this master thesis is U.S. participation as a non-claimant country in the South China Sea territorial disputes. The goal of this thesis is to analyze the role of U.S. as a mediator in the resolution of South China Sea territorial disputes. The hypothesis is made that U.S. policies in the South China Sea territorial disputes do not lead to neither conflict resolution, nor to conflict escalation. The tasks of this master thesis are: 1. To examine key aspects of neo-realism when it comes to explaining international relations; 2. To review and analyze the territorial disputes between China and ASEAN countries in the South China Sea, in order to assess where U.S. fit in this context; 3. To analyze U.S. role in capacity as a mediator to foster peacemaking process between conflicting parties. For master thesis, the following research methods are used- descriptive-analytical method, comparative method and document analysis method. The conclusion of the thesis is that the U.S. plays a dual role of balancer and mediator in the disputes. By enhancing its military cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam, the U.S. is counterbalancing China s far-reaching ambitions in the South China Sea. Simultaneously, the U.S. plays a role of a mediator and stimulates further developments in the process of peacefully settling the disputes between all the claimants, by promoting international law, diplomacy and not taking sides over the questions of sovereignty in the South China Sea. The hypothesis is partially verified, as U.S. policies in the South China Sea contributes more towards the progress of solving the disputes rather than keeping them unresolved for decades to come. 3

4 Dirmeikis, A. JAV Vaidmuo Konfliktų Sprendime: Pietų Kinijos Jūros Teritorinių Ginčų Atvejis: Politikos mokslų magistro baigiamasis darbas / vadovas dokt. M. Norkevičius; Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas, Politikos mokslų ir diplomatijos fakultetas, Politologijos katedra. Kaunas, p. SANTRAUKA Teritoriniai ginčai Pietų Kinijos jūroje yra vieni iš ilgiausių, didžiausių ir labiausiai komplikuotų ginčų XXI a. Teritorines pretenzijas reiškia 6 valstybės- Kinija, Taivanas, Vietnamas, Filipinai, Malaizija ir Brunėjus. Šioms valstybėms Pietų Kinijos jūra yra labai svarbi dėl keleto priežasčių. Visų pirma, Pietų Kinijos jūra yra labai svarbi vieta žvejybos pramonei, kadangi žuvis yra pagrindinis maisto šaltinis aukščiau išvardytoms valstybėms. Antra, Pietų Kinijos jūra yra vieta kur slypi galimi dideli naftos ir gamtinių dujų rezervai. Be to, Pietų Kinijos jūra yra labai svarbi strategine prasme, kadangi ji randasi svarbių jūrų kelių sankirtoje, per kuriuos yra eksportuojamos prekes ir importuojamos žaliavos į Rytų Azijos valstybes kaip Kinija, Pietų Korėja ir Japonija. Valstybė, kuri kontroliuos šiuos jūrų kelius, įgis svarbų svertą kuris drastiškai pakeis tiek regioninį, tiek tarptautinį, galios balansą. Dėl šių priežasčių, teritoriniai ginčai yra,,užstrigę" ilgam laikui, kadangi teritorijos, į kurias reiškia pretenzijas kiekviena iš aukščiau išvardytų valstybių, sutampa ir persipina su teritorijomis į kurias reiškia pretenzijas kita valstybė. Iš visų valsybių, Kinijos pretenzijos yra pačios didžiausios, kadangi ji priskiria beveik visą Pietų Kinijos jūrą į savo įtakos sferą. Šiame kontekste, Jungtinės Amerikos Valstijos vaidinga ypatingą vaidmenį bandymuose sureguliuoti šiuos ginčus. Apie tai ir yra šis magistro baigiamasis darbas. Šio darbo objektas yra JAV dalyvavimas Pietų Kinijos jūros teritoriniuose ginčuose, kaip valstybės kuri nėra tiesiogiai įsitraukusi į ginčus. Šio darbo tikslas yra išanalizuoti JAV, kaip tarpininko, vaidmenį sprendžiant Pietų Kinijos jūros teritorinius ginčus. Darbe keliama hipotezė, kad JAV vykdoma politika Pietų Kinijos jūros teritorinių ginčų atžvilgiu neskatina ginčų sprendimo, bet ir nepriveda prie ginčų eskalacijos.. Magistro baigiamojo darbo užduotys yra šios: 1. Išnagrinėti pagrindinius neorealizmo teorijos aspektus; 2. Išanalizuoti teritorinius ginčus tarp Kinijos ir ASEAN šalių Pietų Kinijos jūroje; 3. Išanalizuoti JAV, kaip tarpininko, vaidmenį, bandymuose taikiai išspręsti konfliktą. Magistro baigiamajame darbe yra naudojami šie tyrimo metodai: aprašomasis-analitinis, lyginamasis ir dokumentų analizės metodas. Darbe daroma išvada, kad Pietų Kinijos jūros teritoriniuose ginčuose JAV vaidina dvejopą vaidmenį. Visų pirmą, didindama savo karinį bendradarbiavimą su Filipinais ir Vietnamu, JAV atsveria ir balansuoja Kinijos ambicijas Pietų Kinijos jūroje. Tuo pačiu metu JAV vaidina tarpininko vaidmenį ir skatina tolesnę taikių derybų raidą tarp visų konfliktuojančių pusių. Šiam tikslui, JAV 4

5 pasitelkia tarptautinę teisę, diplomatiją ir laikosi neutralumo Pietų Kinijos jūros teritorinių ginčų atžviligiu. Hipotezė yra iš dalies patvirtinta, kadangi JAV vykdoma politika Pietų Kinijos jūroje labiau skatina pažangą ginčų sprendimo procese negu atvirkščiai. 5

6 INTRODUCTION Preface. Throughout the Cold War, the tensions between two superpowers of that period, the U.S. and USSR, inevitably led to numerous indirect conflicts between both sides across various regions of the world, such as the Korean War in East Asia, Arab-Israel Conflict in the Middle East and the Congo Crisis in Africa. Both superpowers armed the opposing sides, which in turn escalated conflicts instead of trying to find a peaceful solution to them. With the end of the Cold War, with ideological hostilities being ended, it would have seemed that the amounts of conflicts were bound to decrease. However, as the post-cold War developments in international politics and economy have shown, there continues to be many wide-ranging conflicts some of which, such as war in Afghanistan, are continuation from the Cold War days, while other conflicts, such as the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Yugoslav wars in the 1990 s, resulted largely from the breakup of communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Furthermore, in the modern twenty first century a number of new, indirect conflicts and threats are on the rise such as terrorism, cyber attacks, information security etc. With U.S. remaining the world s sole superpower, its role in conflict prevention and resolution is of paramount importance. In this context, the ongoing South China Sea territorial disputes are one of the most important issues in the modern international relations, which involve many different actors and interests. This master thesis is about the U.S. role in attempts to peacefully resolve the disputes among the conflicting parties in the South China Sea. Relevance of the topic. The South China Sea is one of the world s most important international sea-lanes. Activities there are numerous and primarily consist of maritime trade, freedom of navigation, resource exploitation and exploration, such as natural gas, oil and fishery. The South China Sea has one of the largest oil and natural gas reserves in the world. The states with a particular interest in the aforementioned natural resources are some of the most important regional and international actors in terms of economic capabilities as well growing military capacity- it involves China, the states of ASEAN, specifically, Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia, as well as Taiwan. Furthermore, international companies from Europe, North America, Oceania, as well as India and Russia, are heavily involved in maritime trade at South China Sea with trade worth being measured in trillions of dollars every year. Any potential conflict in this area would hit various sectors of economy such as commodities, logistics, and insurance. Major container shipping companies from Europe and North America send their vessels through the South China Sea, making all of them vulnerable if China and the U.S. collide with each other in this area. The most obvious and immediate impact may be on global crude 6

7 prices which would change drastically. Equally important is the fact that any potential conflict in the area could disrupt the movement of vital energy resources from and to Southeast Asia, thus curbing overall supply routes. With tension rising in recent years over territorial claims in the South China Sea between China and the countries of ASEAN, the disruption of the movement of vital energy resources, in case of potential conflict, can have severe economic implications for regional and global trade as well as peace and stability. Therefore, the settlement of territorial disputes in the region is of paramount importance for the United States, which has vital economic interests there, as well as for its key allies from ASEAN countries, such as Philippines, which also serve as a counterweight for China in the South China Sea. Research question. Inevitably, the growing maritime territorial ambitions of China in the South China Sea becomes unsettling to the U.S. and its ASEAN allies, and these disputes can undermine the regional stability of the entire East and Southeast Asia. The question of this thesis is whether China and the U.S. can cooperate to peacefully manage and resolve territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Object of the master thesis. U.S. participation as a non-claimant country in the South China Sea territorial disputes. Goal of the thesis. To analyze the role of U.S. as a mediator in the resolution of South China Sea territorial disputes. In order to reach this goal, the following tasks are set: 1. To examine key aspects of neo-realism when it comes to explaining international relations; 2. To review and analyze the territorial disputes between China and ASEAN countries in the South China Sea, in order to assess where U.S. fit in this context; 3. To analyze U.S. role in capacity as a mediator to foster peacemaking process between conflicting parties. Hypothesis. U.S. policies in the South China Sea territorial disputes do not lead to neither conflict resolution, nor to conflict escalation. Methodology. Several methods are used in this master thesis. The descriptive-analytical method allows to analyze China-ASEAN disputes in the South China Sea, outline key interests of both sides as well as trends in mutual relations there. This method also helps to examine the theoretical aspects of the paper. Most importantly, this method allows to analyze and dissect U.S. approach towards the South China Sea territorial disputes, and its policies towards different countries, that have territorial claims there. The comparative method compares various branches of realism, their differences, similarities and how together they help to explain international relations. This method also helps to reveal certain tendencies and future perspectives. The document analysis method is also used in the work. Both, primary sources (international treaties, speeches) and 7

8 secondary sources (research reports, textbooks), are being used. This method is valuable since it provides an opportunity to get acquainted with U.S. approach towards the claimants in the South China Sea territorial disputes and how this approach affects the foreign policy strategies of those countries. Research source base. When analyzing the theoretical aspects of neorealism, the works and ideas of the most influential neo-realists are being used. More specifically, Kenneth N. Waltz and his book Theory of International Politics (1979), John J. Mearsheimer and his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), as well as others, are being used. When analyzing South China Sea territorial disputes and U.S. approach towards it, various articles and monographs from research centers, such as Brookings Institution, House of Commons Library, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), as well as numerous public speeches made by the U.S. Governmental officials, are being used. Structure of the paper. The master thesis will be divided into 3 chapters. The first chapter will be devoted to examining the theoretical framework of conflict between states, with focus being put on neorealism and its key attributes. The second chapter will be dedicated to analyzing the territorial disputes between China and ASEAN countries in South China Sea. The third chapter will focus on analyzing U.S. role in the South China Sea territorial disputes and how it impacts the attempts to solve the disputes in a peaceful manner. 8

9 1. NEOREALIST APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Realism is one of the most well-established theories of international relations. Realism has a long and rich tradition but at the same time, it is a complex theory that has several key branches which differ from one another while also sharing some key similarities. When it comes to explaining international system, relations among states, war and peace, and conflict management, realism has a detailed theoretical base. Although Realist theories, namely neorealism and classical realism, share certain core assumptions, such as the centrality of the state in international relations, there are key divides inside realism. Basically, neorealism tries to explain such aspects of international relations as the possibility of a major war and the chances for cooperation and alliance creation, while classical realism is focused on trying to explain the foreign policy strategies of individual states. 1 Furthermore, inside neorealism, there are disagreements about the implications of anarchic international system, which is the very essence of the debate between the two subdivisions of neorealism- offensive realism and defensive realism. 2 Due to substantial variety of approaches in explaining the conflict side of contemporary international relations, the neorealist approach is the focus of this chapter. The chapter will analyze key aspects of neorealism, various approaches of it, and how it is relevant in the international relations of 21 st century, which is full of great power competition among states Key Tenets of Neorealism Neo-realists, also known as structural realists, share similar views with classical realists regarding the centrality of the state, pursuit of interests. However neo-realists put more attention on the anarchic structure of international relations and the impact that the structure has on the way states behave themselves. The key difference between these two approaches is reflected in the answer to the following question: why do states seek power? For classical realists, like Morgenthau, the answer is human nature, while for neo-realists, human nature has not much to do with why states want power, rather, it is the structure of the international system that forces states to pursue power. 3 In addition, the classical realism focuses on states as actors and analyses international relations in terms 1 Taliaferro, W., J. Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited. International security 2000, p Ibid 3 Mearsheimer, J., J. Structural Realism. In Dunne, T., Kurki, M., Smith, S., eds. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford University Press 2007, p. 72 9

10 of units called states. 4 Contrary to classical realism, the neorealism puts more attention on the importance of the anarchic international system, and is more versed in the approaches that explain international relations. In a system where great powers are principal actors and there is no firm assurance that one side will not attack another, it is rational then that every state will try to maintain or increase its military and (or) economic power, in order to protect itself from any potential attack. In the words of John J. Mearsheimer, great powers are trapped in an iron cage where they have little choice but to compete with each other for power if they hope to survive. 5 Furthermore, neorealism disregards the differences between the regimes of various states due to the fact that the international setting creates the same motives for all states, especially great powers. For this reason, the neo-realists do not pay much attention to whether a state is authoritarian or democratic, nor do they pay much attention to who manages state s foreign policy, because it does not play a big role in how states act towards the other states. 6 In this regard, the neo-realists claim that all states act similarly, with the major difference being that some states are inherently more powerful than the others. The most influential authors in formulating neorealism, aka structural realism, are Kenneth N. Waltz and his book Theory of International Politics (1979), and John J. Mearsheimer s book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001). Waltz in his book characterizes power more as a means rather than an end in anarchic international system. 7 This is a noticeable contrast to classical realism which states the opposite. Waltz claims that for states "the goal the system encourages them to seek is security. Increased power may or may not serve that end" (Waltz, 1979, as cited in Hensel, 2015, p. 4) 8. Meanwhile, Mearsheimer characterizes international politics as "a ruthless and dangerous business" where the great powers "fear each other and always compete with each other for power" (Mearsheimer, 2001, as cited in Hensel, 2015, p. 4) 9. Neo-realist description as to why states compete with one another for power is based on 5 presumptions about international system. When these 5 presumptions are merged into one, they portray international relations as an incessant competition for power. 4 Steans, J., Pettiford, L., Diez, Th., El-Anis, I. An Introduction to International Relations Theory: Perspectives and Themes (Third edition). Routledge 2013, p Mearsheimer, J., J. Structural Realism. In Dunne, T., Kurki, M., Smith, S., eds. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford University Press 2007, p Ibid 7 Hensel, R., P. Power Politics and Contentious Issues: Realism, Issue Salience, and Conflict Management. Florida State University 2015, p. 4 8 Hensel, R., P. Power Politics and Contentious Issues: Realism, Issue Salience, and Conflict Management. Florida State University 2015, p. 4. Cited from Waltz, K. Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. 1979, p Hensel, R., P. Power Politics and Contentious Issues: Realism, Issue Salience, and Conflict Management. Florida State University 2015, p. 4. Cited from Mearsheimer, J. Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W. W. Norton & Company 2001, p. 2 10

11 The first presumption, which is the main one, is that great powers are principal actors in international system, which is anarchic. 10 Although it may sound confusing at first, the anarchy is not defined by chaos. Rather, anarchy means that there s no centralized and supreme authority that stands above the states. While neo-realism certainly acknowledges the presence of other international actors, such as international institutions and multinational corporations, they re not central actors in international system, the states are. The second presumption is that all states more or less possess some sort of offensive military capability. 11 Basically, this means that every state has a capability to inflict at least some damage to its neighbors. In this regard, power capabilities vary largely, depending on a specific case, and are determined by several key aspects, such as size of the state s population, its military capabilities, economic strength, geography etc. Here, it should be pointed out though, that things like population, economy can change over time either in a bad way (decline in population growth, economic recession) or in a good way (population growth, economic boom). The third presumption is that states can never be certain about the intents of others. 12 In this regard, a crucial goal of the state is to know and be informed if other states are willing to use force and coercion to change the existing balance of power. 13 Those that do in fact want to change it, can be perceived as a revisionist states, while those states that are satisfied with what they have and therefore have no interest whatsoever in changing the existing situation, can be perceived as status quo states. That being said, one key and rather obvious issue is that it is impossible to fully identify what are the intentions of the other states. Contrary to the things like the size of the territory, population, and military capabilities, the aims of the other states cannot be empirically verified. The reason for this is the fact that the aims of the state are inside the minds of the decision-makers, which makes it very complicated to recognize the plans of the state. In this regard, the aims of the state can be partially verified and recognized through the official policy documents that are accessible to everyone as well through public speeches. However an obvious issue here is the fact that policymakers never disclose their actual aims. Rather, they constantly lie and can say one thing in public while hiding their true goals for present and the future. The fourth presumption is inter-related with the third one. Since the state can never be certain about the aims of the other, the crucial goal of the state is to ensure its survival. In this regard, the state's goal is to preserve its territorial integrity and the autonomy of national political structures. 14 Although states could seek various additional interests as well, such as increasing the well-being of 10 Mearsheimer, J., J. Structural Realism. In Dunne, T., Kurki, M., Smith, S., eds. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford University Press 2007, p Ibid 12 Ibid 13 Ibid 14 Ibid, p

12 its citizens by improving their salaries and seeking democratization of the political system, the goal of survival is of utmost importance, therefore, other goals pale in comparison to this one and they must be viewed as secondary. The fifth presumption is inter-related with the fourth one. Since the priorities of the state are focused around the survival, the states are therefore rational actors in the international arena. 15 This means that they have the abilities to create some sort of pragmatic strategies which would increase their chances of survival. However, this does not necessarily mean that states are immune from making mistakes. This leads back to the third presumption which claims that states can never be certain about the aims of the other state. Since the state is never certain about the policy of the other state and therefore function with defective information, the state will have a tendency to make mistakes from time. When all of these 5 presumptions are combined with one another, conditions are created where state s goal will be to increase its power at the cost of another state, in order to ensure its continuous survival. In addition to these 5 presumptions, another key integral part of neorealism, when it comes to explaining how states act in anarchic international system, is balance of power theory, enhanced by the writings of Kenneth Waltz. The basis of Waltz s theory of international politics is found in the penultimate chapter of his 1959 famous book Man, the State, and War, titled Economics, Politics, and History - influenced by the well-known stag hunt allegory used by Rousseau, Waltz emphasizes that to expect each country to formulate an economic policy that happens to work to the advantage of all countries is utopian (Waltz, 1959, as cited in Booth, 2011, pp ). 16 Under anarchic international system, states have 3 options- either to risk perishing, seek domination, or to seek the policy of the balance of power, which basically means not to allow others to achieve dominance by strengthening themselves or by coalition. 17 Although the pursuit of hegemony can still be an option, it would be rather irrational for a state to pursue this kind of policy because it would risk perishing in the process of doing this, since other states would constantly try to resist it, by creating powerful alliances that would balance or remove this kind of threat. In this regard, Waltz points out that for each state its power in relation to other states is ultimately the key to its survival (Waltz, 1959, as cited in Booth, 2011, p. 208). 18 From the 3 assumptions, Waltz s balance-of-power theory points to the second and third option. 19 Basically, he claims that states, which are rational actors, will seek domination and (or) the policy of the balance of power. The 15 Ibid 16 Booth, K. Realism and World Politics. Routledge 2011, pp Cited from Waltz, K. Man, the State, and War. Columbia University Press 1959, p Ibid, p Booth, K. Realism and World Politics. Routledge 2011, p Cited from Waltz, K. Man, the State, and War. Columbia University Press 1959, p Booth, K. Realism and World Politics. Routledge 2011, p

13 anarchic international system forces state leaders to think and function in a way which would prevent one great power from becoming extremely dominant. 20 Consequently, this has a tendency to create balancing policies where large states try to balance one another, either individually or by changing alliances. This is what leads to the balance of power between the big players. In addition, neorealism takes largely materialistic view on virtually all human affairs, not to mention international relations- for Waltz, the international relations and its structure is defined by the distribution of power, particularly the number of major dominant players. 21 According to Waltz, domination is based on such things as the "size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence" (Waltz, 1979, as cited in Booth, 2011, p. 233). 22 In terms of material capabilities, they are measured in relative terms to explain the distribution of power in the international relations and to point out the centers of power, therefore, the international relations are viewed in terms of material polarity in order to describe the centers of domination and the number of dominating states. 23 The main conclusion of neorealism is that in the international anarchic system, states 'balance' rather than 'bandwagon'. 24 The latter occurs in hierarchic political orders where actors have a tendency to jump on the bandwagon of a leading political candidate or the one who recently won an election. By siding with the stronger party, bandwagoners seek to increase their gains and reduce or remove the potential risks and losses in case they oppose the stronger side. Unlike in the anarchic international system, the political players here will not be under the risk of perishing. However, if such an approach is chosen in an anarchic international system, bandwagoning means to meet one s demise, because you enhance the capabilities of someone who later may turn on you. Since in anarchic international system there s no government to turn for protection, there will always be a large threat coming from the major states and powers. In this regard, weak states have no other choice but to hope that timely alignment with the major power and potential victor will bring favorable treatment. Contrary to the weak state, great powers cannot accept such a risk, as it would be irrational. Rather, great powers will balance the opposing side, through military-political alliances as well as by mobilizing all of its resources available to them. Thus, while at first glance, it may seem that classical realism and neorealism appear to have identical views on the centrality of the state in international relations, there is a noticeable difference between these two branches of realism when it comes to explaining why states want power, with the 20 Ibid 21 Ibid, p Booth, K. Realism and World Politics. Routledge 2011, p Cited from Waltz, K. Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. 1979, p Booth, K. Realism and World Politics. Routledge 2011, p Burchill, S., Linklater, A., Devetak, R., Donnelly, J., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit, Ch, True, J. Theories of International Relations (Third edition). Palgrave Macmillan 2005, pp

14 main question being centered on whether power serves as a means or an end in anarchic international system. In this sense, it can be said that both approaches supplement one another and allows to have a better, more versed and in-depth understanding of how states function in an anarchic international stage Defensive and Offensive Realism Within neorealism, there is a divide when it comes to several key questions. That difference is reflected in two subdivisions inside neorealism- defensive realism and offensive realism. Both of these approaches have differing opinions on the question of how much power the state should have and on the implications of anarchy. More specifically, the key point of divide between these approaches lay in the question of how states tend to behave in anarchic international system, that is, whether they seek to maximize security or power, and whether power is a means or an end. 25 For these reasons, both approaches can be regarded as theoretical competitors inside neorealism because they generate different predictions. This section will begin by examining key aspects of defensive realism. To begin with, defensive realists agree that anarchic structure creates the motives to gain more power, however, they claim that it is irrational to pursue hegemony. 26 This would lead to unreasonably large overextension which would be very challenging to preserve. In this regard, they point out that if one side will become too powerful, balancing will inherently happen. Basically, this means that the opposing sides will enhance their military capabilities and will create an alliance, which will lead the state that is seeking domination to the path of destruction or at the very least make it feel far less safe. From historical perspective, these claims are confirmed, because this is exactly what happened to Napoleon's France and Hitler's Nazi Germany, both of which were destroyed by an alliances that contained the major powers of that time. Within this context, the person that unified Germany, Otto Von Bismarck, can be considered as one of the most rational rulers, because he knew that seeking too much power for Germany would inherently lead to its neighbors, France and Great Britain from the West and Russia from the East, creating powerful alliances against Germany. Afterwards, the irrational pursuit of domination is what ultimately lead to an end of German empire after World War Feng, L., Ruizhuang, Z. The Typologies of Realism. Chinese Journal of International Politics 2006, p Mearsheimer, J., J. Structural Realism. In Dunne, T., Kurki, M., Smith, S., eds. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford University Press 2007, p

15 Defensive realists also assert that there is a constant balance of offence-defense, which shows how much it is challenging to conquer certain territory and win against the defender in a combat. 27 Basically, this balance shows whether it is worth to attack a certain thing. Furthermore, they argue that this balance in most cases is in defender's favor. As a result, any state that seeks to gain more power is likely to find itself being involved in a number of costly and losing wars. In other words, the costs will outweigh any potential benefits. Since the states are mostly rational actors, they will identify these drawbacks and will focus instead on the attempts to preserve their status. If the state will indeed choose to attack, it will do it on a limited scale where there is assurance that the benefits outweigh the costs. Aside from this, in most other cases, the attack and potential conquest of other territories are not rational. A potential nationalism of the occupied territories means that the local population of those occupied territories will constantly rise against the state that occupied them. The costly French occupation of Spain during Napoleon's rule in the early 19th century is a good example of this. With these things taken into account, the main point of defensive realism here is that the conquest does not pay and is not worth the costs it takes to conquer. This, relatively basic aspect of anarchic structure is obvious to most (if not all) states that act as rational actors. In the opposite case, the state is putting at risk its own existence. If most of the actors understand this principle, then the power and security competition among the states should not be overly intense. As a whole, there are 4 key assumptions that define defensive realism with the first two of these 4 assumptions pointing out the motives for interstate conflict or cooperation, while the last two assumptions indicate the connection between external forces and the actual foreign policy conduct of separate states. 28 The first assumption, which is a key part of defensive realism and was already analyzed in the previous section as a crucial part of neorealism, is the intractability of the security dilemma. 29 This is hardly controllable aspect of the anarchic international system. Basically, this can be described as a case in which the means by which one state attempts to increase its security, will lead to a decrease in the security of others. 30 Like it was mentioned previously, the anarchic structure produces uncertainty and the states can t be sure regarding the aims of the others and their capabilities, which changes from time to time. Therefore, anarchy creates the incentives for countries to participate in self-help conduct. The second assumption is structural modifiers. Along with the gross distribution of power in the international relations, other material factors, "the structural modifiers," can increase or decrease the chances of conflict. 31 Structural modifiers include the things which were touched upon in the 27 Ibid, p Taliaferro, W., J. Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited. International security 2000, p Ibid 30 Ibid 31 Ibid, pp

16 previous section. These are the offence-defense balance in military capabilities and technology, geographic proximity, access to raw materials such as oil and gas, international economic pressure or lack thereof, as well as the ease or difficulty with which the state can extract the resources from the conquered territory. 32 Within this context, the structural modifiers allude to the relative allocation of power which allows the separate actors to conduct a certain political and military strategies. Consequently, this influences the seriousness (or lack thereof) of the aforementioned security dilemma between particular states. For this reason, the structural modifiers can be considered as the ones that mediate the effects of systemic imperatives, such as economic constraints, on the behavior of states. The third assumption is the influence of material capabilities on the state's foreign policy. 33 In this regard, it is presumed that in near future the relative allocation of material capabilities is not entirely certain and state rulers frequently deal with contradicting information. As a result, a particular role here is played by state leader's pre-existing belief system, perception of enemies, and the inherent cognitive bias when it comes to the things like intelligence gathering, military preparations and the decision making process in foreign policy. These things, and especially the state leader's perceptions, play a pivotal role when it comes to shaping the state's foreign policy and how the states react to potential conflict and the structural modifiers. The fourth and final assumption is domestic politics. 34 This means that a particular role is also played by the state's domestic politics. Domestic politics influences how the state's foreign policy is being formed. In this regard, the role of domestic politics in the state's foreign policy is important when there is an imminent threat coming from another state. Here, the role of the state s decision makers is crucial. However, in the long term and when there's no imminent threat coming from another state, the decision makers of the state will face more difficulties in trying to mobilize the resources of the state for the foreign policy. Therefore, domestic politics play a rather crucial role only when there's an imminent threat coming from another state, in other cases its role can be considered as secondary. Meanwhile, offensive realists have different perspectives on these things. Although they agree that states tend to balance against those that seek domination, their claim is that balancing is frequently not effective, particularly when it comes to creating balancing alliances, and this lack of effectiveness allows the cunning aggressor to use it for his advantage. 35 In addition, the states that are being threatened frequently conduct a practice of shifting the responsibility for balancing the 32 Ibid 33 Ibid, p Ibid, p Mearsheimer, J., J. Structural Realism. In Dunne, T., Kurki, M., Smith, S., eds. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford University Press 2007, p

17 dangerous foe to other states while unwilling to be directly involved in this process. In turn, this creates the incentives for aggressive moves. In addition to these differences, the offensive realists also disagree with the view of defensive realists that in most cases the defender will have the edge over an attacker and therefore the costs of an attack outweighs the benefits. They support this opposing argument by emphasizing the history, which reveals that those states, which initiated conflict first, achieves victories more frequently instead of loses. The best example of this is the United States, which throughout its history starting from the 19th century, has initiated and joined a number of wars and achieved world hegemony in the process. Despite these differences, both approaches agree that nuclear weapons have little usefulness for offensive goals. 36 The only case where these weapons would be usable, is when only one side has them and the other don't. Aside from this, the nuclear weapons are barely fit for use. The reasoning behind this is obvious- if both sides have an ability to retaliate another with nuclear weapons, which is known as second strike capability, neither side gains a decisive advantage by striking first. An example of this would be the Cold War period where both superpowers, the U.S. and Soviet Union, had an enormous amount of nuclear weapons which deterred both sides from using it against one another, even though there were tense moments, such as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The offensive realists also emphasize that sometimes the benefits of the conquest outweigh the costs that it takes to conquer another side. 37 By conquering another side, the state can exploit the conquered state's economy and resources for their own use. Although nationalism of the conquered territory, as it was pointed out before, can make the occupation a nasty undertaking, the occupied states, depending on the specific case, can sometimes be easy to govern. An example of this is the Nazi German occupation of France during the World War 2. Without any significant resistance and partisan movement, the Germans were able to exploit France's agricultural and industrial resources. Here, the conquest certainly did pay. Last but not least, offensive realism claims that the anarchic international system creates the strong motives for expansion. While all states seek to maximize their power in relation to other states, only great powers can ensure the survival of the small states. 38 Great powers pursue expansionist policies, but since they are rational actors, they pursue this kind of policy in the places where, as it was emphasized before, the benefits of the conquest will certainly outweigh the costs of conquering another side. In this regard, the expansion can be seen as an inherent feature of the anarchic international system, because in the anarchy, the states are under constant threat of being 36 Mearsheimer, J., J. Structural Realism. In Dunne, T., Kurki, M., Smith, S., eds. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford University Press 2007, p Ibid, pp Taliaferro, W., J. Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited. International security 2000, pp

18 attacked by another state. This forces the states to enhance their relative power capabilities through things like military buildups, economic nationalism, and expansion. In turn, this would lead to states seeking hegemony, which would ensure that the threat posed by other states is removed or at least minimized. The differing viewpoints of defensive and offensive realism supplement each other in a sense that when one approach has limitations in explaining certain question, the other approach will provide an extensive answer as to why states pursue one policy or another (such as balancing or seeking expansion) in the anarchic international system and vice versa. As there is no single approach that would provide all the answers, it is most useful to use both subdivisions of neorealism in conjunction with one another, in order to explain various aspects of international relations Neorealism s Relevance in the 21 st Century In the modern 21st century of international relations, neorealism continues to be highly relevant. The reason for this is the fact that states with powerful military capabilities continue to be the main actors, while the inter-state competition continues to prevail. The endless amount of wars, the constant craving for more power and influence are some of the most important things that continue to define the 21st century international relations. While non-state actors, such as the international institutions and corporations, also exist, their role is secondary to that of the state. A good example of this is the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) institutions. In both of these institutions, the states continue to be primary actors. In the UN for example, it is the states that make all the key decisions on important UN resolutions, and not some separate entities or independent institution. The similar case can be observed in WTO, where all the decisions are made by member state governments. Although these kind of organizations have departments, such as the secretariat and various councils, they have no real influence in the decision making process. Furthermore, the resolutions made by the UN are nonbinding, therefore, they have little to no capacity in forcing the states to act based on the decisions that UN has made. Here, a good example is the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. The U.S. invasion had no UN mandate, but the UN couldn't do anything stop the invasion. This shows that the states continue to be primary actors in the international system which continues to be anarchic as there is no greater authority than the states, especially the great powers such as the United States. With states continuing to be the primary actors, the international stage remains to be a selfhelp arena. The limitations of international institutions are further highlighted by the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Nuclear weapons drastically change the balance of power. The NPT forbids its 190 signatories from developing nuclear weapons, but that's not the case with North Korea 18

19 (DPRK). 39 The treaty didn't stop the DPRK from testing several nuclear weapons, which clearly goes against the principles of the NPT. Basically, this means that the treaty is only effective to the extent that the great powers, such as the U.S. and Russia, are willing to support it. Therefore, the limitations are not only applicable to international organizations, but also for this kind of treaties as well. Hence, the great powers are continuing to be the central decision-makers. Since the international system continues to be anarchic and dominated by great powers, the inter-state power competition remains one of the key aspects of anarchy. In this regard, Southeast Asia is a good example of inter-state power competition. Here, China is consistently becoming more and more forceful. Notably, China has made highly controversial maritime claims in the South China Sea, created numerous artificial islands there while also enhancing its military capabilities. From the theoretical standpoint, China s rise can be best explained by both offensive and defensive realism. According to offensive realism, China will follow the U.S. path and will seek the status of hegemon in Asia. 40 Due to China's economic size and its overwhelming superiority in the size of population, a key goal of China will be to maximize the huge gaps in power between itself and its neighbors in the east and southeast, such as Russia, Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. By seeking domination, China would ensure that there is no state in Asia that can pose a threat to it. From Chinese perspective, these aims would be sensible since China would certainly like to see its two large neighbors, Russia and Japan, to be militarily weak, similarly as the U.S. prefers a militarily weak Canada and Mexico on its northern and southern borders respectively. 41 The unpleasant past experiences during World War 2, when China was weak while Japan was powerful and more advanced in military and economic areas, which led to the invasion of China's mainland, adds further incentives for China to seek expansion. Meanwhile, the defensive realism sees China's rise and the security competition revolving around it, not as intense as the offensive realism would. From the standpoint of defensive realism, China should be able to coexist peacefully with its neighbors. 42 There are several reasons for that. To begin with, it is irrational for great power such as China to seek hegemony, because this will lead to its rivals creating a balancing alliance that will frustrate China's plans for domination. Therefore, it is far more rational for China to act like Germany under the rule of Otto Von Bismarck- gradually seek more and more power but not to such an extent that it would lead China's neighbors to create an alliance against it. In this regard, defensive realism does not deny that China will seek more power in 39 Pearson, M., A. Realism and Politics Among States in the 21st Century. Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies 2015, p Mearsheimer, J., J. Structural Realism. In Dunne, T., Kurki, M., Smith, S., eds. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford University Press 2007, p Ibid 42 Ibid, p

20 aims. 43 This approach is further strengthened by the fact that in the era of nuclear weapons, it is very Asia, but the structure of the anarchic system means that it will have a more calculated and limited challenging for any of the large states to expand their power when being confronted by other powers that have nuclear weapons. Countries such as Russia and the U.S. have a large amount of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the U.S. has a significant amount of troops stationed in Japan, which means that in case China will aggressively seek domination in East Asia, U.S. can swiftly reinforce its troops in Japan with nuclear weapons. Due to these reasons, it s likely that China will seek to increase its power with caution and with certain level of restraint. Last but not least, it s hardly rational for China to conquer its Southeast Asian neighbors given the fact that the countries located there are some of China's largest trading partners and which play an important role in China economic growth. Furthermore, if China would conquer those countries, there's a high possibility that China will encounter a strong resistance from the local population which would mean that occupation certainly does not pay. Altogether, there is no firm agreement between offensive and defensive realism about whether China will continue to rise peacefully or not. However, one key point on which both approaches agree with one another is the fact that the anarchic international system leads to the competition between large states for more power. Having taken these things into account, it becomes obvious that anarchy continues to prevail, states with strong military capabilities are still the main actors in the international system, and they continue to compete with each other for more power. This basic trend, which is time-tested, most likely will continue to prevail in the near future as well. 43 Ibid 20

21 2. SOUTH CHINA SEA TERRITORIAL DISPUTES The territorial disputes in the South China Sea are complex and long-standing. They involve 6 countries- Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Between these countries, hundreds of small land features, as well as international law, which is disputed, are being contested. This chapter will analyze key aspects of these disputes, such as historical background, why South China Sea is so important, legal issues and the position of each claimant Historical Background Maritime territorial disputes among the aforementioned 6 countries in the South China Sea, has its roots in the mid-twentieth century but have become more serious in the last several decades. There s various explanation, depending on which side is chosen, as to why this is so. To understand the present situation, it is important to analyze historical background of these disputes which began in the middle of the twentieth century and is continuing to the present day. Basically, the South China Sea territorial disputes started after the end of World War 2 in Asia, with China being the first state to make claims. In accordance with the 1943 Cairo and 1945 Potsdam Declarations, all the Chinese territory stolen by Japan was to be returned to China. 44 In 1946, the Chinese government, led by Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek, dispatched four warships, named Taiping, Yongxing, Zhongjian and Zhongyeto, to the islands to recover the lost territories. 45 In the process, China created sovereignty markers and established a permanent military presence on Taiping Island and on several other objects in the South China Sea. The present and long-standing China s nine-dash line has its roots here. In 1947, China for the first time published a map with a dotted U-shaped line which originally consisted of eleven dashes. The eleven dashes transferred virtually the entire South China Sea to China. The eleven dashes were maintained until 1953 when after the change in the Chinese regime, the new Communist China removed two dashes and transferred them to fellow communist country North Vietnam. Consequently, the original eleven-dash line became a nine-dash line. Since then, this nine-dash line has remained as China s claim over the existing land features of South China Sea. Although two dashes were removed as a concession to North Vietnam, the nine-dash line still assigns the majority (around 80%) of the South China Sea areas to China. From late 1940 s and onwards to the present day, many other key events happened in the South China Sea, which have made the maritime disputes there more complex. After the creation of 44 Shi, X. UNCLOS and China s Claim in the South China Sea. Australian Defence College 2015, p Ibid 21

22 North Vietnam and its widespread recognition in the 1950 s, two countries with different regime emerged- communist North Vietnam and capitalist South Vietnam, although the latter practically remained French colony even though it was declared as a sovereign country. From these two countries, it was the South Vietnam that made formal demands in the South China Sea. With regards to China, when the Communist China was created in 1949, the new regime reasserted the claims made by the previous Kuomintang government, while Taiwan, were Kuomintang and its leader Chiang Kai-shek were located at, in 1956 claimed Taiping Island in the Spratly Islands and stationed permanent troops there. 46 The next important event to motivate new claims started in 1967, when a global initiative began to discuss how countries should handle the continental shelves beyond their national jurisdictions. 47 This negotiation process ended in 1982 and brought promising results- it ended with the signature of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereafter UNCLOS). This agreement was important for the evolution of the South China Sea maritime disputes. The reason for this is the fact that in UNCLOS, suggestions such as the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the possibilities of enlarging the continental shelves to the same extend as the EEZs gained a lot of support from the countries located in the South China Sea. The latter aspect, in combination with the discovery of large oil and natural gas deposits in the South China Sea, further accelerated the disputes in the South China Sea over its land features. In this regard, the first of many claims was made in 1970, when the Philippines claimed the western part of the Spratly Islands by occupying 5 land features there. 48 Consequently, the claims of the Philippines were extended to include many more land features. The Philippines were followed up by South Vietnam which occupied 6 land features and claimed the Spratly Islands as part of Vietnam in 1974, while China took control of the Crescent Group of the Paracel Islands from Vietnam. 49 In 1983, Malaysia also joined the disputes by occupying 3 features in the Spratly Islands and 2 more in Brunei followed up- it claims Louisa Reef for itself. In these regards, it should be emphasized that from China's standpoint, no dispute existed over Chinese sovereignty and maritime rights in the South China Sea until the 1970's, when Southeast Asian countries became eventually aware of potentially vast reserves of natural gas and oil in this area. 51 Until 1970's no country formally protested China's nine-dash line. 46 Rustandi, A., C. The South China Sea Dispute: Opportunities for ASEAN to Enhance its Policies in Order to Achieve Resolution. Australian Defence College 2016, p Poonsiri, P. The Territorial Dispute Over the South China Sea. University of Erfurt 2017, pp Rustandi, A., C. The South China Sea Dispute: Opportunities for ASEAN to Enhance its Policies in Order to Achieve Resolution. Australian Defence College 2016, p Ibid 50 Ibid 51 Zhang, F. Chinese Thinking on the South China Sea and the Future of Regional Security. Political Science Quarterly 2017, p

23 From late 1980 s to the present day, China, of all claimants, has been the most active in asserting its claims with force. In 1988, China launched an assault against Vietnamese troops on Johnson South Reef, while in the 1990 s, China had also involved itself in a maritime dispute with the Philippines when China s troops occupied the Philippines-claimed Mischief Reef and built military installations on it in This was further exacerbated when both sides became engaged in the contest for control of Scarborough Shoal in the ultimate outcome of this competition ended in 2012, when China effectively occupied Scarborough Shoal by deploying maritime law enforcement vessels there on a permanent basis. 53 In addition to these things, China is the only claimant that has undertaken land reclamation activities not only on the existing islands, but also on reefs. 54 In this way, China is creating artificial islands, the constructions of which are not legal according to UNCLOS and this understandably creates legal issues. Given the fact that these disputes have become stuck for several decades now, the current Chinese policy of creating artificial islands further aggravated the attempts to legally settle the disputes. The incidents in the South China Sea, such as the aforementioned China s assault on Johnson South Reef in 1988, and China s occupation and militarization of Mischief Reef in 1994, caused the loss of life. 55 In the wake of the Mischief Reef skirmishes, mistrust had risen in the countries of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) over Chinese behavior and intentions. China s diplomacy, led by its Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, sought to reduce the tensions. The eventual result was that China and the ASEAN member states managed to sign a regional nonbinding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in November this declaration called all the claimants for voluntary restraint on activities that would cause tensions and for consultation and negotiation, instead of using force to resolve disputes. 56 This agreement is a key stepping stone towards future attempts to solve the disputes among the claimants peacefully. However, it should be pointed out that the Philippines and Vietnam were not entirely pleased with the outcome as both sides had pushed for a binding document. 57 In this regard, Vietnamese side requested that the declaration would include a commitment not to build new structures, which was understandably rejected by China. In the midst of the clashes in the South China Sea, ASEAN made an effort to create a favorable environment for peaceful resolution of the disputes by adopting the 1992 ASEAN 52 Rustandi, A., C. The South China Sea Dispute: Opportunities for ASEAN to Enhance its Policies in Order to Achieve Resolution. Australian Defence College 2016, p Ibid 54 Ibid 55 Bader, J., Lieberthal, K., McDevitt, M. Keeping the South China Sea in Perspective. Brookings 2014, p Ibid 57 Emmers, R. Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: Strategic and Diplomatic Status Quo. Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) 2005, p

24 Declaration on the South China Sea which encouraged all parties to exercise self-restraint. 58 Here, a key role was played by Indonesia which maintains neutrality in the disputes. In 1990, Indonesia promoted a dispute resolution process between all the claimants by launching an informal diplomacy initiative through a series of workshops which involved the academics and government officials of all the claimant countries. 59 From 1990 to 2009, Indonesia had organized 19 workshops which involved the representatives of both, ASEAN claimants and China. While the 1992 declaration and numerous workshops were certainly important in making progress towards settling the disputes peacefully, they have one key drawback. That drawback lies in the fact that these things merely serve as a tool for informal exchange rather than serving as a formal mechanism on dispute settlement that legally binds all the claimants and which also involves step by step approach on how to solve the issues. For this reason, the only present confidence-building mechanism for the dispute is the aforementioned Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed by the ASEAN claimants and China in Although the 2002 declaration was being negotiated from the late 1990 s and signed in 2002, this period once again saw a rise in tension. These tensions were highlighted by numerous detentions of fishing vessel crews by all of the claimants, by protests of attempts to drill for oil and gas, and increased number of patrols by China s Navy and its coast guard. 61 Although the promises set out in the declaration of conduct for peaceful negotiations to settle the disputes failed to materialize, the direct military confrontation was avoided. 62 Nonetheless, this period was also highlighted by serious confrontations between the U.S. and China over U.S. Navy reconnaissance activities well outside of China s territorial waters but within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 63 These things will be examined in the third chapter. The constantly renewing skirmishes make it obvious that legally binding agreement on the code of conduct and dispute settlement is a must if the claimants are interested in making any progress towards the peaceful resolution of the disputes. The fact that the 1992 and 2002 declarations are non-binding, serves as a major reason that thwarts any real attempt to settle the disputes with legal methods. The only accomplishment, if any at all, that these declarations have made is that a large-scale military confrontation between the claimants has been avoided with only minor local skirmishes happening from time to time. 58 Rustandi, A., C. The South China Sea Dispute: Opportunities for ASEAN to Enhance its Policies in Order to Achieve Resolution. Australian Defence College 2016, p Ibid 60 Ibid, p Bader, J., Lieberthal, K., McDevitt, M. Keeping the South China Sea in Perspective. Brookings 2014, p Ibid 63 Ibid 24

25 Looking from the historical background, it is obvious that territorial disputes between the claimants have become stuck with no significant progress being made towards legally binding agreement on this issue. Therefore, the tension and security risks in the South China Sea continues to be present. Table 1 below shows the timeline of key events in the South China Sea territorial disputes. Table 1- timeline of key recent events in the South China Sea. YEAR (MONTH) COUNTRIES INVOLVED EVENT 1974 China, South Vietnam Battle of Paracel Islands: China ousts South Vietnam from the Crescent Group; 18 soldiers die on each side China, Vietnam Johnson South Reef Skirmish: China defeats Vietnam s navy, 74 Vietnamese sailors die China, Philippines China occupies Mischief Reef and erects buildings on it, despite the protests by the Philippines Philippines, China The Philippines runs the BRP Sierra Madre aground on the Second Thomas Shoal, protests from China China, United States Hainan Island incident: midair collision between a U.S. intelligence aircraft and a Chinese fighter jet; one Chinese pilot dies ASEAN, China Agreement on the Code of Conduct (COC) within the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea United States At the ASEAN Regional Forum, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declares that the U.S. has a national interest in the South China Sea (February) China, Philippines Chinese frigate fires warning shots at a Philippine fishing boat near Jackson Atoll (May) China, Vietnam Clash between Vietnamese gas survey ship and 3 Chinese patrol vessels. Large-scale anti-china protests in Vietnam. 25

26 2012 China, Philippines Scarborough Shoal standoff: Philippine warship vs. 2 Chinese surveillance vessels Philippines, China The Philippines submits its case versus China over competing South China Sea claims to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) China, United States U.S. destroyer USS Lassen sails close to Chinese-held Subi Reef. Source: Van Ham, P., Montesano, S., F., Van der Putten, P., F. A South China Sea Conflict: Implications for European Security: A Scenario Study. Clingendael Institute 2016, p Importance of the Region The South China Sea region is a semi-enclosed sea which encompasses an area of approximately three and a half million square kilometers. 64 The area is economically and strategically crucial for all the countries involved in the disputes. Due to the number of claimants, the scope and complexity of the claims, and the wide range of interests involved, the South China Sea can be considered as a centerpiece of both land and maritime territorial disputes in the 21 st century. This section examines why the region of South China Sea is so important for the claimants. For the nations that have an access to it, the South China Sea is the number one food source, totaling around 10% of the world's total commercial fishing output. 65 The South China Sea is responsible for feeding several of the most populated nations today, starting from over 190 million people in Pakistan and ending with over 1.3 billion citizens of China. 66 Furthermore, the South China Sea is home to the single largest marine biodiversity, 40% of the world's tuna, and accounts for 22% of the average Asian diet. In terms of resources, South China Sea is one of the most crucial areas in the world. As it was mentioned, the South China Sea amounts for around 10% of the world's annual total commercial fishing output, making it very important to the fishing industries of the surrounding countries. In this regard, the area is one of the world s five leading fishing zones- the fishery alone employs over 3 million people, contributes heavily to the global fish trade, as well as being a key source of protein to 64 Criekemans, D. Towards a solution for the increasing tensions in the South China Sea? University of Antwerp 2017, p Khoury, E. Recent Trends In The South China Sea Disputes. The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS) 2017, p Ibid, p. 2 26

27 millions of people living in the littoral countries that rely on it. 67 Although the area is crucial to the East and Southeast Asian people, it is also negatively affected by overfishing, resource exploitation and land reclamation, which are the product of the activities that littoral states have undertaken there. For these reasons, 40% of the South China Sea's fish stocks have disappeared, while 70% of the coral reefs are classified as being in fair to poor conditions, primarily due to the reclamation works and dredging activities carried out by China and ASEAN claimants. 68 Aside from fishery, the region as a whole is also rich in both oil and gas. According to the United States Air Force officer Captain Adam Greer, the stakes in the South China Sea can be grouped into three P s- politics, petroleum, and proteins (fish). 69 Furthermore, Greer argues that fishery may be most consequential in driving competition in the South China Sea. 70 Meanwhile, the (potential) oil discoveries in the region are vast. Estimates of oil reserves vary from as high as 213 billion barrels (bbl) to as low as 28 billion bbl. 71 However, oil comprises only 30-40% of the total hydrocarbon estimates of the South China Sea. The natural gas reserves comprise the majority of the total hydrocarbon estimates of the South China Sea. Most of the natural gas and oil are located in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. Due to overlapping claims and legal disputes in these areas, the possibilities of conducting an in-depth exploration and analysis to make accurate estimates regarding the natural gas and oil reserves remain limited. Whatever the precise numbers are, the oil and natural gas reserves in the South China Sea has attracted many international companies to this area- at present, over 200 companies are actively engaged in oil and gas exploitation in the South China Sea. 72 For example, Indian and Spanish companies have worked with Vietnam since 2016 for gas and oil exploration in the South China Sea, meanwhile the Philippines, being a U.S. ally, was working in 2012 with U.S.-based oilfield products company "Forum Energy Technologies" (FET) to explore the same things, while British-Dutch oil and gas company "Royal Dutch Shell" has been working extensively with Malaysia. 73 As a result, there is no accurate estimate about the potential reserves of natural gas in the South China Sea. China estimates that the Spratly Islands alone contain 900 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) 67 Criekemans, D. Towards a solution for the increasing tensions in the South China Sea? University of Antwerp 2017, p Khoury, E. Recent Trends In The South China Sea Disputes. The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS) 2017, p Adam Greer, The South China Sea Is Really a Fishery Dispute, The Diplomat, July 20, Ibid 71 Criekemans, D. Towards a solution for the increasing tensions in the South China Sea? University of Antwerp 2017, p Morton, K. China s ambition in the South China Sea: is a legitimate maritime order possible? International Affairs 2016, p "Foreign Countries Chase Oil in South China Sea Without Incident," Voice of America, February 26,

28 of natural gas. 74 If the estimate is accurate, this would mean that the natural gas reserves in the Spratly Islands would be equivalent to China s current reserves, which currently rank 11th in volume and nearly three times that of the U.S. In addition, the shipments of natural gas through the sea-lanes of the South China Sea constitute two-thirds of the world s overall natural gas trade, with more and more countries in the region transitioning to natural gas since it entails less CO2 emissions. 75 In addition to this, gas hydrates, also known as flammable ice, are considered as a key source of future energy, and China has initiated offshore survey for this resource. 76 Inside these gas hydrates there are molecules of methane which is the most crucial element of natural gas- if brought to the surface, one cubic meter of gas hydrate releases an astounding 164 cubic meters of natural gas, which potentially makes gas hydrates as an invaluable part of future energy resources. 77 So far, China is the most active in exploring and drilling the areas that are potentially rich in gas hydrates. In addition to being rich in natural gas and oil, the South China Sea is also the world s busiest international sea-lane, with over 50% of the world s merchant fleet (by tonnage) sailing through the South China Sea annually. 78 Furthermore, over half of the world s oil tanker traffic passes through the sea-lanes of the South China Sea, and over half of the top 10 container shipping ports in the world are located inside or around the South China Sea. 79 For the energy-importing countries of East Asia, such as Japan and the Republic of Korea, the South China Sea is the shortest, cheapest, and therefore main maritime route for vital energy imports and commodity exports. 80 The importance of the South China Sea is further highlighted by China s example. Almost 80% of China s crude oil imports arrive through the South China Sea. 81 In a way, this figure alone can explain why China s claims in the South China Sea are so ambitious- it seeks to protect its imports of oil and natural gas from any potential adversary. Any potential major disruption of these commercial lanes would have an extensive regional and global effect. Regionally, citizens and businesses of the affected littoral states could face dramatic increase in energy prices, driving up costs for practically all sectors of their economy. 82 Globally, this could lead to an extremely costly supply line restructuring for the aforementioned consumers in East Asia. Such restructuring, coupled with the huge rise in transaction costs attached 74 Criekemans, D. Towards a solution for the increasing tensions in the South China Sea? University of Antwerp 2017, p Ibid, pp "China Searches for More Gas Hydrates in South China Sea," The Maritime Executive, February 21, Ibid 78 Rosenberg, D. Governing the South China Sea: From Freedom of the Seas to Ocean Enclosure Movements. Middlebury College 2011, p Ibid 80 Ibid 81 Criekemans, D. Towards a solution for the increasing tensions in the South China Sea? University of Antwerp 2017, p Ibid 28

29 to energy commerce, would drive world prices rapidly upwards. Therefore, the control of the sealanes is of crucial importance for all the claimants. Furthermore, by controlling those sea-lanes, one of the claimants, such as China, can exert a tremendous influence on the regional states and major international companies. The fact that South China Sea is the world s busiest international sea-lane, also means that pirate attacks on merchant shipping are frequent. More than a half of the world s reports of piracy in the last two decades have taken place in or around the South China Sea. 83 Due to frequent pirate attacks and September 11 terrorist attacks, there s been an increased international security of ports and shipping containers. In addition, the countries of the South China Sea have other security issues as well, such as the constant skirmishes between fishing vessels that compete for fish stocks, drug trafficking, refugees etc. 84 Due to numerous security issues in the South China Sea, the countries located there are constantly enhancing their military capabilities, modernizing naval and coast guard forces. What is more, the long-standing and overlapping maritime claims in the South China Sea further exacerbates the situation and relations between the countries- China s military capabilities are constantly growing and in response to this, the Southeast Asian claimants are seeking U.S. military support to oppose the potential threat of China. With stakes being high in the South China Sea and claimants enhancing their military capabilities, the chances of reducing the tensions are limited. Therefore, the tense environment in the South China Sea will continue to prevail Legal Disputes When it comes to the South China Sea territorial disputes, one of the key aspects and biggest issues is the legal status of the maritime features in the South China Sea and the international legal issues raised by the dispute. That is, which country claims which islands and based on what principles or legal rationale? This section will outline and examine key legal issues in the South China Sea territorial disputes. International law is always cited in connection with claims in the South China Sea. However, it raises many key issues which makes the territorial disputes in the South China Sea even more problematic. The main international legal issues raised by the dispute are the following: Sovereignty; 2. Maritime zones; 83 Rosenberg, D. Governing the South China Sea: From Freedom of the Seas to Ocean Enclosure Movements. Middlebury College 2011, p Ibid 85 Lunn, J., Lang, A. The South China Sea dispute: July 2016 update. House of Commons Library 2016, p

30 3. Definition of territories; 4. Historical sovereignty claims; 5. Freedom of navigation; 6. Extended continental shelf claims. One of the most important issues in the South China Sea is sovereignty- which country owns which islands? A major reason why this issue is so important is the fact that islands generate sovereignty over the surrounding sea, which is, as it was already mentioned, a crucial fishing zone. In addition, the islands generate sovereignty over the seabed rights and rights to other, more distant, areas as well. Sovereignty is determined by a variety of means under customary international law. For instance, discovery on its own is not enough- there must also be effective occupation (though what counts as effective will vary according to the circumstances). In this regard, China s claims in the South China Sea and the area inside the nine-dash line is highly controversial since it largely relies on historical claims, but with little evidence of exactly what those claims cover. Another key legal issue is maritime zones. Basically, this means that, depending on how an area of sea is classified under international law, different rights arise for coastal states and foreign vessels respectively. 86 As it was outlined in the previous section, fishing and seabed oil and gas rights are the most important of these rights in the South China Sea. The international law of the sea is now largely embodied in the previously mentioned 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The UNCLOS includes all the claimants in the South China Sea with the exception of Taiwan. UNCLOS covers a number of issues with regards to the world s seas, including the rights over the sea-bed, fishery, freedom of navigation and shipping. 87 Even though UNCLOS covers these issues, the multilateral nature of overlapping claims in the South China Sea adds to the complexity- due to the fact that it is a semi-enclosed sea, the maritime zones of the neighboring countries inevitably have areas that overlap each other. 88 What further exacerbates the situation is that all the claimants in this South China Sea claim 200 nautical mile EEZ s and up to 350 nautical mile continental shelves. 89 In this regard, China is not willing to resolve such disputes with the principles outlined in the UNCLOS. Therefore, the maritime zones will continue to remain a contentious issue in the South China Sea disputes. The third major issue in the South China Sea disputes is how to define territories located there. This means whether each land feature, located there, should be considered as an island or a rock. UNCLOS article 121 defines island as a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, 86 Ibid, p Ibid 88 Recent Trends In the South China Sea Disputes. Boston Global Forum 2015, p Ibid 30

31 which is above water at high tide. 90 The article also points out that only this kind of island can generate EEZ, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf and territorial sea. The same article also states that if land features that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf and be considered as rocks. 91 In this regard, China has the most rocks in the South China Sea because it s artificially build islands are not naturally formed. Therefore, under UNCLOS, China cannot have EEZ or continental shelf there. Since China is yet to specify the principles based on which it has historic rights in the South China Sea, the issue of defining the territories in the South China Sea further exacerbates the disputes. The fourth issue is historical sovereignty claims. These kinds of claims in the UNCLOS are generally not accepted. However, UNCLOS article 15 makes one noticeable exception. The article states that Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The above provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance therewith. 92 Aside from this statement, there s no more mentioning in the UNCLOS of using historic rights as a basis for maritime claims. Seeing as China is the only country which bases its claims primarily on historic rights, means that either serious amendments in the UNCLOS will have to be done or China will have to change its historic rights approach if the claimants will want to settle the disputes legally and peacefully. In China s case, it s highly unlikely that historic rights approach will change. Freedom of navigation is the fifth issue. According to UNCLOS article 87, the freedom of navigation shall be exercised by all states which include both coastal and land-locked states. 93 However, in order to assert their sovereignty over the disputed areas, claimants in the South China Sea have been carrying out a number of activities that violate the navigational rights of others. 94 In this regard, the claimants have occupied maritime features, built fortifications and other structures on them. For instance, Malaysia built military structures on Investigator Shoal and on Erica Reef in the Spratly archipelagos, while Vietnam further upgraded its structures on Cornwallis South Reef and 90 United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea, Article Ibid 92 United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea, Article United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea, Article Recent Trends In the South China Sea Disputes. Boston Global Forum 2015, pp

32 Alison Reef in the middle of the Spratly area. 95 Meanwhile China was creating artificial islands from the reefs in the neighboring disputed areas by dredging up millions of tons of rock and sand on the sea floor while also building a sea wall. 96 Furthermore, China unilaterally launched a prohibition on fishing in the disputed area challenging the jurisdiction of other neighboring countries. Within this context, the Philippines brought the dispute concerning freedom of navigation between it and China to an annex VII arbitral tribunal. 97 In 2013 the Philippines brought 15 claims against China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague Understandably, China immediately announced its strong opposition to the Philippines action and denounced the ruling of Arbitral Tribunal that it had jurisdiction to consider the claim of the Philippines in its maritime dispute with China. Although the arbitration tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines, pointing out that China has no historical rights in the South China Sea, the tribunal still has no real influence in solving the disputes in the South China Sea. In this regard, China was factually right that the tribunal has no real jurisdiction to make decisions on the issues of maritime claims in the South China Sea. Similarly as the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, the rulings of the Arbitral Tribunal have no binding force. Therefore, the dispute resolution process in the South China Sea continues to be very problematic. However, it should be pointed out that the Tribunal's ruling was the first time when either International Court or Tribunal has extensively and straightforwardly addressed the status of South China Sea islands under the UNCLOS. 99 The Tribunal's attempt to clarify the status of maritime features in the South China Sea is an important step towards further development in the field of the law of the sea. Last but not least, the extended continental shelf claims is another contentious legal issue when it comes to the South China Sea. According to UNCLOS article 76, coastal states can claim an extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its baselines. 100 In 2012, the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) verified the outer limits of these claims which were set out in UNCLOS article 76, and also provided technical advice to states if requested. 101 However, the CLCS has a major drawback- it does not solve the territorial disputes between the countries, because in case of a dispute, the CLCS will not consider a submission unless an earlier approval is given by all states concerned. 102 A good example of this was in 2009, when Malaysia and Vietnam filed submissions with the CLCS for areas of extended continental shelf 95 Ibid, p Ibid 97 Ibid, pp Gewirtz, P. Limits of Law in the South China Sea. Center for East Asia Policy Studies- Brookings Institution 2016, p Schofield, C. Legal and Geographical Implications of the South China Sea Arbitration. National Library of Australia 2016, p United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea, Article Lunn, J., Lang, A. The South China Sea dispute: July 2016 update. House of Commons Library 2016, p Ibid

33 beyond 200 nautical miles in the South China Sea. 103 Since these submissions included the maritime areas claimed by China, the Chinese side submitted Notes Verbale to the UN Secretary-General objecting to the submissions. 104 Similarly as the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the aforementioned rulings of the Arbitral Tribunal, the CLCS cannot resolve sovereignty disputes, therefore these submissions does not hold much practical weight. As of now, there s little prospect for meaningful negotiations and legally-binding resolution to the dispute. As the experience of the last several decades have shown, a legally binding Code of Conduct is impossible to establish, at least in the near future Claimants The South China Sea territorial disputes involve 6 claimants- Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam- that compete for hundreds of small land features. To clarify the context and ambiguity of claims, this section will address each claimant and what are their main claims on the South China Sea territorial disputes. All the claimants in the South China Sea have rather ambitious claims, but the most ambitious and ambiguous position comes from China. 105 Without China and its defined position, the possibility of peacefully resolving the claims is not possible. China s claim to unspecified historical rights within the nine-dash line (NDL), which assigns the majority of the South China Sea to China, is making the territorial disputes very complicated in the South China Sea. China is yet to clarify its rights that it claims within NDL. Furthermore, China s activities insinuates that it enjoys the rights to resources anywhere within the NDL- For example, the Hainan Provincial Government s Implementation Methods for the China s Fisheries Law followed the NDL. 106 Chinese side says that China enjoys historic rights to resources within the NDL, while privately, they also say that the NDL only outlines the territories within which China claims all of the maritime land features, with associated maritime rights to be determined by applying UNCLOS rules to those land features. 107 With one exception outlined in the previous section, the UNCLOS doesn t allow claims to maritime territories of the kind that China s ambitious NDL suggest. 108 In 2014, China also released a new map that included an additional 10th dash to the east of Taiwan. 109 Because it 103 Ibid, p Ibid 105 Poling, B., G. The South China Sea in Focus: Clarifying the Limits of Maritime Dispute. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2013, p Bader, J., Lieberthal, K., McDevitt, M. Keeping the South China Sea in Perspective. Brookings 2014, p Ibid 108 Ibid 109 Criekemans, D. Towards a solution for the increasing tensions in the South China Sea? University of Antwerp 2017, p

34 predates UNCLOS by several decades, the Nine-Dash Line is unrelated to an EEZ claim. China's NDL encompasses approximately 2,000,000 square kilometers of maritime space, an area equal to about 22 percent of China s land area. 110 The NDL includes three groups of land features within the South China Sea which are the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, and the Scarborough Reef. 111 Notably, a serious clash occurred between China and the Philippines at the Scarborough Shoal in 2012, when Philippine Navy tried to arrest Chinese fishing boats that were caught doing illegal fishing activities there, with the area being located inside the EEZ of the Philippines. 112 China's coast guards intervened to stop the arrests, and this resulted in a lengthy standoff, with the Philippines eventually leaving the Shoal while China occupied the area and strengthened its military installations there. 113 With regards to the South China Sea, Taiwan shares the same claims as China. The U- shaped line, which encloses the majority of the South China Sea, appears on Taiwanese maps as well. Meanwhile, the Philippines maintained the lines established by the 1898 Treaty of Paris and initially regarded them as if they were a claim to territorial waters. 114 But since this kind of claim was possible only within 12 nautical miles of a country s shores, the position was changed later onin 2009, the Philippines passed a landmark baselines law in 2009, which was an important step towards clarifying Philippine claims. 115 The law declared that the Philippines claims a 12-nauticalmile territorial sea and an EEZ of up to 200 nautical miles from straight territorial baselines between coordinates enumerated in the law. 116 Here, it should be pointed out that the Philippines baselines law has not generated accusations of illegality like Vietnamese and Chinese side has. This law made the maritime claims of the Philippines more clear. With China however, the tensions have risen in the recent years over the control of potentially large oil and natural gas reserves. Here, a key area of disputes is the Reed Bank area, a rocky shoal about 93 miles east of the Spratly Islands and 155 miles west of the Philippine island of Palawan. 117 The Philippines claim that Reed Bank is within its 200-nautical-mile EEZ, whereas the Chinese side views it as a part of the Spratly Islands group Limits in the Seas, No. 143 China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea. United States Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs 2014, p Ibid 112 Forsby, B., A. The South China Sea - a Breeding Ground for Geopolitical Rivalry? Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) 2016, p Ibid 114 Poling, B., G. The South China Sea in Focus: Clarifying the Limits of Maritime Dispute. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2013, p Ibid 116 Ibid 117 Muscolino, S., M. Past and Present Resource Disputes in the South China Sea: The Case of Reed Bank. CrossCurrents 2013, p Ibid 34

35 With no real progress being made here to settle the disputes, the tensions between both countries will continue to be present. Aside from China, Vietnam s claims are the most ambitious of the Southeast Asian claimants, with claims going almost as far as the shores of the Philippines. From the late 1980's to 1990's, Vietnam has increased its possessions in the Spratly Islands from 10 to 21 land features by setting up permanent military bases, equipment and facilities. 119 However, Vietnam has taken numerous steps over the last 15 years to clarify its claims in accordance with UNCLOS. It started in 2003, when Vietnam signed an agreement with Indonesia delimiting the continental shelf and EEZ boundaries between the southern portion of Vietnam and the Tudjuh Archipelago. 120 Afterwards, Vietnam signed the treaty with China which delimited their boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin. Another key event in clarifying the claims, which was already mentioned in the previous section, was Vietnam s submission of claims for continental shelf made to the CLCS in In doing so, Vietnam has specified its claims and no longer makes the vast claims as it previously did. This was also reaffirmed by Vietnam s 2012 Law of the Sea, which stated that Vietnam claims an EEZ of 200 nautical miles and a continental shelf of up to 350 nautical miles from its baselines. 122 Malaysia is another important claimant in the South China Sea. A crucial goal of Malaysia is to preserve its claims there. Malaysia claims 11 maritime features in the Spratly Islands and occupies 8 of them, with the other 3 being occupied by Vietnam and the Philippines. 123 Unlike other ASEAN claimants, Malaysia has been much less affected by China s assertiveness, largely due to the fact that its claims lie in the southernmost part of China s NDL. 124 As a result, it is easier to clarify Malaysia s claims. Malaysia has delimited the majority of its maritime boundary with Indonesia s Tudjuh Archipelago as well as with the Philippines. 125 However, there hasn t been much progress in delimiting the boundary between Vietnam s continental shelf and that of mainland Malaysia to the west of its boundaries with the Tudjuh Archipelago- the claim that Malaysia has made on that section of continental shelf in 1979 still stands, but given the fact that this claim is halfway between Vietnam s baselines and the Malaysian coast, it should not be difficult for both sides to reach a resolution on this question However, the only features that actually generate maritime zones, are 119 Vuving, L. A. Vietnam, the United States, and Japan in the South China Sea. Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies 2014, pp Poling, B., G. The South China Sea in Focus: Clarifying the Limits of Maritime Dispute. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2013, p Ibid 122 Ibid 123 Parameswaran, P. Playing It Safe: Malaysia s Approach to the South China Sea and Implications for the United States. Center for a New American Security (CNAS) 2015, p Ibid, p Poling, B., G. The South China Sea in Focus: Clarifying the Limits of Maritime Dispute. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2013, p Ibid 35

36 the following islands, atolls and reefs- Swallow Reef, Amboyna Cay, Barque Canada Reef, and Commodore Reef. 127 These areas are entitled to have a territorial sea, EEZ, and continental shelf, while other areas, claimed by Malaysia, cannot generate maritime zones. Brunei s claim is the only one with a claim to legality in the South China Sea. It is based on three things. 128 First of all, it is based on Brunei s maritime boundaries with Malaysia, as defined in two British Orders in Council in 1958, secondly, the extension of that boundary as an EEZ out to 200 nautical miles, as declared in 1982 and accepted by Malaysia in Thirdly, the extension of those boundaries for an extended continental shelf, approximately 60 nautical miles farther, is based on the official 1988 map. 130 That being said, the status of the boundaries between Malaysia s and Brunei s continental shelf claims is ambiguous. 131 In this regard, both sides have agreed that Brunei is entitled to a 200-nautical-mile EEZ, but Malaysia has never actually recognized Brunei s claims that Brunei is also entitled to an extension of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles- Malaysia s submission of claims for continental shelf made to the CLCS in 2009 shows an unbroken line, implicitly denying Brunei s right to extend its shelf to the same distance. 132 Although this aspect of maritime claims continues to be an issue between the two countries, this problem is still not that serious that it would lead to conflict escalation, as was the case with China and the Philippines. Although in recent years most claimants were able to make their claims in the South China Sea more clarified in accordance with UNCLOS, the ambiguities and overlapping claims to the waters, small land features and economic areas continues to be present. This is further exacerbated by the legal issues of these disputes, which were examined in the previous section. Nonetheless, recent positive developments in clarifying the claims (except China) show that the claimants are going on the right path, towards reaching moral and legal high ground. 127 Roach, A., J. Malaysia and Brunei: An Analysis of their Claims in the South China Sea. Center for Naval Analyses 2014, p Poling, B., G. The South China Sea in Focus: Clarifying the Limits of Maritime Dispute. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2013, pp Ibid 130 Ibid, p Ibid 132 Ibid, pp

37 3. U.S. APPROACH TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES The United States has a long history of engagement with East and Southeast Asia, where South China Sea is located at. It can be traced back to 1898 Spanish-American war, during which the United States acquired the rights to the ownership of the Philippines from Spain. The subsequent 20 th century events, such as World War 2, the Korean and Vietnam wars, are one of many examples which shaped U.S. engagement with this region. The South China Sea, with its crucial sea lanes for U.S. Navy, its Asia-Pacific allies, for maritime trade etc., plays a crucial role in U.S. strategic considerations. Therefore, the U.S. is highly interested in solving the South China Sea territorial disputes. This chapter will analyze U.S. participation as a non-claimant in attempts to manage and solve these disputes Evolution of U.S. Participation in the Disputes Ever since the beginning of the Cold War and especially during the Vietnam war, the U.S. involvement in the military, political and economic matters of the South China Sea gradually increased. However, the U.S. made a more institutionalized approach towards these matters after the end of Cold War and especially in the 21 st century, coinciding not by accident with the rising tensions in the region. This section will outline and analyze key aspects in the evolution of U.S. approach towards the South China Sea territorial disputes from the end of the Cold War to the present day. By analyzing the U.S. approach towards the East and Southeast Asian matters in the 1990 s and 2000 s, inconsistency and lack of institutionalized approach stands out. The period of U.S. presidential administration of Bill Clinton in the 1990 s was highlighted by the fact that administration favored bilateral treaties and alliances as the basis for maintaining the U.S. influence in the Southeast Asia while containing any potential adversaries. This kind of approach in U.S. foreign policy is no surprising as U.S. gets far more leverage and benefit in bilateral negotiations rather than multilateral. Bilateral defense treaties, such as the ones with the Philippines and Thailand, remained the basis of U.S. engagement in the matters of Southeast Asia. A coherent set of principles, based on which the U.S. would approach the South China Sea maritime disputes and the region as a whole, were absent. Once George W. Bush became the new U.S. president, the United States participation in the Southeast Asian matters increased. However, by analyzing the context, it became understandable that 37

38 greater U.S. involvement was primarily based on the anti-terrorism campaign which dominated U.S. agenda due to 9/11 terrorist attacks. Nonetheless, the traditional U.S. alliances with countries such as the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore where strengthened while closer military cooperation were promoted with Indonesia and former Cold War nemesis Vietnam. As a result, the U.S. helped the aforementioned maritime nations to increase the security of maritime trade routes, which does not go well with China and its nine-dash line approach towards the maritime disputes in the South China Sea. While U.S. approach towards the East and Southeast Asia in the first two decades after the Cold War is highlighted by inconsistency and lack of coherent principles, the U.S. approach towards South China Sea maritime disputes is far more consistent and clear. The first time that the United States has taken an official stance on the South China Sea maritime disputes was in 1995 when China occupied Mischief Reef and erected building on it, despite the protests from the Philippines. In reaction to China s activities there, the U.S. Department of State issued its first comprehensive policy statement through its spokesman on May 10, From that statement, key aspects of U.S. stance on the South China Sea disputes can be outlined. First of all, the U.S. is seeking a peaceful resolution of maritime disputes. In that briefing, the spokesman of U.S. Department of State said that the United States is concerned that a pattern of unilateral actions and reactions in the South China Sea has increased tensions in that region. The United States strongly opposes the use or threat of force to resolve competing claims and urges all claimants to exercise restraint and to avoid destabilizing actions. 133 Secondly, the U.S. seeks peace and stability in the South China Sea. The United States has an abiding interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea. The United States calls upon claimants to intensify diplomatic efforts which address issues related to the competing claims, taking into account the interests of all parties, and which contribute to peace and prosperity in the region. The United States is willing assist in any way that the claimants deem helpful. The United States reaffirms its welcome of the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea. 134 Third key aspect of U.S. position on the South China Sea is maintaining the freedom of navigation. Maintaining freedom of navigation is a fundamental interest of the United States. Unhindered navigation by all ships and aircraft in the South China Sea is essential for the peace and prosperity of the entire Asia-Pacific region, including the United States U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, May 10, Ibid 135 Ibid 38

39 The fourth and final U.S. statement regarding this issue is not taking sides with any of the claimant while respecting international law. The United States takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims to sovereignty over the various island, reefs, atolls, and cays in the South China Sea. The United States would, however, view with serious concern any maritime claim or restriction on maritime activity in the South China Sea that was not consistent with international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 136 Afterwards, when China and the ASEAN member states began negotiating and then finally signed the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct in the South China Sea, the U.S. official position on the South China Sea remained the same as the one outlined in the 1995 statement. The U.S. position on these matters was further enhanced once Barack Obama became the new U.S. President in As part of his pivot to Asia policy, the South China Sea also gathered more attention. In addition to Obama declaring U.S. pivot to Asia, there were several other reasons why the U.S. began paying more attention to this area. First of all, China s threats to the United States oil companies that operated off the coast of Vietnam in 2008, highlighted the first time ever that China had openly and directly challenged U.S. commercial and shipping interests in the South China Sea. 137 Secondly, China has notoriously harassed United States Naval Ship Impeccable and other U.S. naval survey vessels which renewed concerns regarding China s approach to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. 138 A key stepping stone in enhancing U.S. position in the South China Sea was made at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on July 23, In that forum, the U.S. side was represented by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Clinton made a speech in which not only she reasserted the key aspects of U.S. approach on the South China Sea disputes, as outlined in the 1995 statement, but also introduced several new elements. First of all, a new position was outlined, that Consistent with customary international law, legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features. 139 Secondly, Clinton pointed out that the United States supports a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various territorial disputes without coercion. 140 Finally, Clinton highlighted that the U.S. supports the 2002 ASEAN-China declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea. We encourage the parties to reach agreement on a full code of conduct. The U.S. is prepared to facilitate initiatives and confidence building measures consistent with the declaration. Because it is in the interest of all 136 Ibid 137 Fravel, T., M. U.S. Policy Towards the Disputes in the South China Sea Since S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies 2014, p Ibid 139 Remarks At Press Availability, Secretary Clinton July 23, Ibid 39

40 claimants and the broader international community for unimpeded commerce to proceed under lawful conditions. 141 Although China was never directly mentioned in Clinton s speech, the first new element of U.S. approach in the South China Sea, mentioned above, is clearly directed towards China, because the claims in the South China Sea should be based solely on legitimate claims to land features. In this regard, the U.S. clearly opposes any of the Chinese claims based on nine-dash line, while reaffirming its support for UNCLOS. With regards to the second new element, the collaborative diplomatic process, the U.S. clearly refers to promoting multilateral negotiations among all the claimants which does not go well with China since it prefers to deal bilaterally with ASEAN claimants on these issues without outside intervention. Finally, by supporting the 2002 ASEAN- China declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea and willing to create conditions and facilitate the initiatives, based on which the peaceful negotiations on dispute settlement among all the claimants would begin, the United States have increased its involvement in the South China Sea while maintaining neutrality and promoting international law in the disputes. Ever since Clinton s speech at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum, the U.S. has taken steps to enhance its military ties with the countries in the region. Noticeably, in that same year, the U.S. had finally terminated the ban on ties with the Indonesian Special Forces group called Kopassus. 142 The ban was introduced by the U.S. in 1997 which prohibited the United States to from having any relations with foreign military groups that had a history of violating human rights. 143 In reaction to this, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natelagawa rejected China s position that the U.S. should not become involved in the maritime disputes of South China Sea- such a move from Indonesian side was risky given the fact that it has close economic ties with China. 144 In addition to these steps, the U.S. also continues to strengthen its military cooperation with its long-standing ally in the Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and the emerging partner in the South China Sea disputes, Vietnam. These aspects will be examined in another section. During the second term of Obama Presidency, the U.S. position on the South China Sea remained the same. The new U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry reiterated the long-standing U.S. position on the South China Sea disputes. At the 2013 U.S.-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kerry said that As a Pacific nation, and the resident power, the United States has a national interest in the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, unimpeded lawful commerce, and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. As we have said many times before, while we do not 141 Ibid 142 Buszynski, L. The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2012, p Ibid 144 Ibid 40

41 take a position on a competing territorial claim over land features, we have a strong interest in the manner in which the disputes of the South China Sea are addressed and in the conduct of the parties. We very much hope to see progress soon on a substantive code of conduct in order to help ensure stability in this vital region. 145 Once Donald Trump became the new and acting U.S. President, it would have seemed initially that the U.S. position in the Southeast Asia and South China Sea, which was enhanced during both presidential terms of Barack Obama, may decline. The reason for that was the fact that in his presidential campaign, Donald Trump emphasized that once he would become the new U.S. President, the U.S. would withdraw from one of the key agreements that tied the U.S. with East and Southeast Asia- the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. Instead, Trump favored bilateral approach when it came to Asia-Pacific, which is a contrast to what previous two presidential administrations of the U.S. President Barack Obama were doing. Although Trump, as promised, withdrew the U.S. from TPP, the U.S. stance on the South China Sea maritime disputes remained the same. The newly elected Trump administration have made clear that when it comes to the South China Sea, it intends to continue pursuing the policy that was advocated by 2 previous administrations. Regarding the South China Sea maritime disputes, the newly elected (now former) U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said that The United States will uphold freedom of navigation and overflight by continuing to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows. 146 With regards to the China building artificial islands, Tillerson said that China cannot be allowed to use its artificial islands to coerce its neighbors or limit freedom of navigation or overflight in the South China Sea. 147 This kind of statement is similar to many other statements, which were made during the term of 2 previous U.S. presidential administrations. Furthermore, the Trump administration continued to uphold the U.S. position of asserting the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. In February 2017, when Trump just began his presidential term, the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson was deployed to the maritime areas of the South China Sea as part of routine operations. 148 A week earlier, the USS Coronado, a littoral combat vessel temporarily based for a time in Singapore, conducted training operations in these areas as well. 149 On May 24, 2017, the U.S. conducted most recent freedom of navigation operation by deploying navy destroyer USS Dewey, and challenging the existence of an illegal territorial sea, with obvious hint being at China John Kerry. Remarks at the U.S.-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Brunei, July 1, Johnson, Jesse. Behind the scenes, Tillerson tones down rhetoric on South China Sea, Japan Times, 7 February Ibid 148 McCormick, M., J. American Domestic Politics, Public Opinion, and the South China Sea Disputes. Iowa State University 2017, pp Ibid 150 Freund, E. Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea: A Practical Guide. Harvard Kennedy School 2017, p

42 Therefore, despite the statements made by Trump during the presidential election, in which he emphasized that U.S. will be dealing bilaterally in the matters of Asia-Pacific, the U.S. approach towards the South China Sea territorial disputes has remained consistent, in line with the policy pursued by previous U.S. Presidents. This means that all key aspects of U.S. position on these matters, as outlined in 1995 and 2010 statements will continue to be upheld U.S. Interests in the South China Sea For economic, military, diplomatic and historic reasons, the United States has many key interests in the South China Sea. Some of these interests are already outlined in the 1995 and 2010 U.S. statements regarding its position on the South China Sea disputes, while other interests lie in the obvious geographical and economic reasons. All things taken into account, the U.S. interests in the South China Sea can be grouped into the following areas: (1) economic interests; (2) maintaining the freedom of navigation and unimpeded commerce; (3) promoting international law and rules-based approach; and (4) strengthening military cooperation with U.S. allies in the South China Sea. Below each of these interests will be analyzed. The first significant interest that the United States has in the South China Sea is economic. Annually, over 5.3 trillion dollars worth of trade passes through the South China Sea, with U.S. trade accounting for 1.2 trillion dollars of this total. 151 In case of a crisis, the damage to U.S. economy would be measured in trillions of dollars, not to mention the costs of redirecting the cargo ships to other sea routes that are longer and far more costly. Here it is important to point out that that the United States has the rights for commercial shipping and to exploit the natural resources of the high seas, the boundaries of which are outlined in UNCLOS. 152 According to the reports of U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), one-third of global crude oil and over half of global LNG trade pass through the South China Sea, making it one of the most important economic areas and maritime trade routes in the world. 153 In addition, like it was mentioned before, the South China Sea has vast (potential) resources of natural gas and oil. Although the estimates of it vary, it is clear that the energy resources located there increases the significance of the South China Sea in economic and energetic calculations of the U.S. However, one possible drawback here is the fact that the U.S. is yet to ratify UNCLOS. The main reason why the U.S. is yet to ratify UNCLOS, lies in the Part XI of this convention, covering exploitation of the deep seabed. The U.S. objects those provisions because 151 Glaser, S., B. Armed Clash in the South China Sea. Council on Foreign Relations 2012, p Bouchat, J., C. The Paracel Islands and U.S. Interests and Approaches in the South China Sea. Strategic Studies Institute 2014, p The South China Sea is an important world energy trade route, U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), April 4,

43 it considers them to be statist and not oriented towards free-market approach. 154 Furthermore, even if the U.S. would ratify UNCLOS, the maritime disputes would continue to persist. This is further highlighted by the fact that ever since UNCLOS was signed in 1982, no country or major shipping company was successful in commercially mining for high seas mineral resources in the South China Sea without some sort of disruption or limitations. 155 For this reason, it s not a major issue for the U.S. if it has ratified UNCLOS or not. However, by ratifying UNCLOS, the U.S. would certainly make an important formal step towards increasing the possibilities of exploiting the resources in the South China Sea. The second key interest of the United States in the South China Sea is maintaining the freedom of navigation and unimpeded commerce. These interests were highlighted in both 1995 and 2010 U.S. statements regarding the South China Sea maritime disputes. The South China Sea is a place where two of the world's most heavily traveled sea-lanes are located at. The east-west route connects the Indian and Pacific Oceans, while the north-south route connects Oceania to East Asia. 156 Therefore, these sea-lanes are of crucial importance when it comes to transferring U.S. troops from the Western Pacific to the Persian Gulf, from which the U.S troops stationed in the Middle East can be reinforced. 157 By maintaining the freedom of navigation here, the U.S. Navy can swiftly move its troops and equipment from one region to another if a potential crisis may occur. With regards to unimpeded commerce, the issue for the U.S. is that China objects to U.S. surveillance activities in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 158 The views of both sides differ when it comes to the question what military activities are allowed in the EEZ of China. The U.S. side argues that UNCLOS allows the countries to exercise high seas freedoms in the EEZs of coastal states, which then means the right to conduct peaceful military activities that also include surveillance and military surveys. 159 Here, China disagrees, claiming that these U.S. activities are hostile. The disagreements have led to 2 serious incidents: the 2001 mid-air collision between a U.S. Navy surveillance aircraft and an intercepting Chinese navy fighter, and the already mentioned 2009 episode in which China s paramilitary ships and fishermen have harassed United States Naval Ship Impeccable, which was conducting undersea surveillance. 160 With no real progress being made in this regard between China and the U.S., the issue of preserving unimpeded commerce in the South 154 Bouchat, J., C. The Paracel Islands and U.S. Interests and Approaches in the South China Sea. Strategic Studies Institute 2014, p Ibid 156 Sokolsky, R., Rabasa, A., Neu, R., C. The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy Toward China. RAND Corporation 2000, p Ibid, p McDevitt, M. The South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy and Options for the Future. Center for Naval Analyses 2014, p Ibid 160 Ibid 43

44 China Sea will remain to be one of the key U.S. interests there, in conjunction with maintaining the freedom of navigation. The third key U.S. interest in the South China Sea maritime disputes is promoting international law and rules-based approach. This U.S. interest was legitimized by in the previously mentioned statement of Hillary Clinton at the ASEAN Regional Forum, in which she said that Consistent with customary international law, legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features. 161 This policy was further enhanced during the second term of Barack Obama s presidency. The U.S. Secretary of State during Obama s second term, John Kerry, emphasized the rules-based U.S. approach. In his 2014 speech at Honolulu, Hawaii, Kerry said that Important opportunities can and should be realized through a rules-based regional order, a stable regional order on common rules and norms of behavior that are reinforced by institutions. And that s what holds the greatest potential for all of us for making progress. We support this approach, frankly, because it encourages cooperative behavior. It fosters regional integration. It ensures that all countries, big and small and the small part is really important that they have a say in how we work together on shared challenges. I want you to know that the United States is deeply committed to realizing this vision. 162 In this regard, the stance of the current U.S. presidential administration of Donald Trump remains unchanged. Last but certainly not least, the U.S. seeks to strengthen military cooperation with its allies in the South China Sea, namely, the Philippines. The ambitious Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea, outlined by nine-dash line, have led the U.S. to seeking ways how to balance China. One of the most effective ways to do it is by supporting other claimants in the disputes. In this regard, the U.S. has a long time historic military ally in the South China Sea- the Philippines. In addition, the military ties with the other ASEAN claimants, namely, Vietnam and Malaysia, are being enhanced. In the wider scope of Asia-Pacific, the U.S. has expanded and signed multiple defense treaties with the countries that are located in the neighborhood of South China Sea, such as Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Brunei, Australia and New Zealand, with Singapore being the latest country with which the United States have entered an agreement that allows the U.S. to base its warships in Singapore. 163 Both sides, the U.S. and ASEAN claimants, need one another- by enhancing military cooperation with the Philippines and the newly emerging partners in the South China Sea, the United States creates a counterbalance for China s ambitions there, while the ASEAN states, whose military 161 Remarks At Press Availability, Secretary Clinton July 23, John Kerry. U.S. Vision for Asia-Pacific Engagement. Hawaii, August 13, Ring, H., A. A U.S. South China Sea Perspective: Just Over the Horizon. Harvard University 2012, p

45 strength pale in comparison to China, need the U.S. to ensure the stability in the South China Sea and oppose the one-sided Chinese domination there. In this regard, it is a win-win situation for both sides. Furthermore, the U.S. military presence in the South China Sea can be considered as a must if a peaceful and legally binding dispute settlement mechanism, which is free from coercion and intimidation, will be created by all the claimants. The South China Sea, with its crucial sea-lanes and trade routes, vast energetic resources and key allies there, is of utmost importance for the U.S. and its national interests. Naturally, these interests also entail a number of important legal, military and diplomatic issues which are not likely to be solved in the near future. These issues require a sensible and active diplomatic strategy. With stakes being high, the South China Sea will continue to play a crucial role in strategic considerations of the U.S U.S. Strategies in Resolving the Disputes While analyzing the U.S. approach towards the South China Sea territorial disputes and the various aspects of it, a crucial aspect must be underlined. Namely, the U.S. strategy toward these disputes is rational and well-balanced. The reason for this is the fact that by using diplomacy and encouraging all the claimants to use the rules of the international law to solve the conflicting claims, the U.S. does not take side in the disputes and therefore serves as balancer in this conflict. This kind of strategy means that the U.S. does not use force or coercion to persuade the claimants to take certain steps which they may not like, such as China. At the same time, the U.S. uses military muscle to a modest extent in order to ensure that its presence in the South China Sea territorial disputes is felt, and especially if there s a need to temporarily balance the territorial ambitions of China. Thus, the continuous and present U.S. approach in resolving the disputes is a mixture of using diplomacy (primarily) and military power to moderate extent, such as enhancing the cooperation with long-term U.S. ally in the South China Sea, the Philippines, as well as developing military ties with Vietnam, which in turn allows the U.S. Navy to access the South China Sea. These approaches mean that U.S. presence in this region stabilizes the situation- from one side, China s ambitions in the South China Sea are deterred and checked by U.S. military presence there, while from the other, the U.S. calls for all the parties in the dispute to adhere to the international rules which means that U.S. approach is not based on choosing sides, but rather, it is based on principles. At the same time, by applying primarily diplomatic tools to solve the disputes, the U.S. makes sure that these disputes do not undermine its relations with China as a whole. Given the fact 45

46 that China already is the largest U.S. trade partner 164, the United States have little interest in wanting to see its largest trade partner engage in direct military conflict with its Southeast Asian ally, the Philippines, and the emerging partner in Vietnam and Malaysia. Similarly, if U.S. would not fulfill its commitment to defend these allies and partners, the U.S. credibility as a reliable security partner would be greatly undermined. In this regard, the U.S. is aware that although members of ASEAN expect the U.S. to play key a role in strengthening security in the South China Sea, ASEAN claimants are also not willing to see an increased tensions in the U.S. and China's relations. 165 For this reason, the role of U.S. military is rather moderate, because increased U.S. military involvement in the South China Sea disputes is more or less a no-win situation for all sides. Also, in this area, a key objective of U.S. strategy is to improve the cooperation with China on risk reduction, which would lower the number of naval and aerial collisions between both sides. 166 This would serve as an expansion of the previous agreements, signed in 2014 and 2015, that have focused on rules of behavior for the military forces of both sides. 167 As a result, the U.S. policy in the South China Sea faces certain dilemmas. That is, how to maintain and find the equilibrium between the role of a balancer, which deters any potential aggressive move from one of the claimant, and peacemaker, which means preserving good political and economic relations with all of the claimants while also fostering peaceful resolution of the disputes based on international rules. In this regard, U.S. role in these disputes can be considered as delicate and unique because of these peculiarities. With regards to these dilemmas, the U.S. is making a successful effort of maintaining both roles simultaneously. While encouraging all sides to use international law to solve the disputes, the U.S. Government also criticizes China s policy in the South China Sea to a moderate extent from time to time. In this regard, the term moderate means that while U.S. criticizes China s policy there, it does not go overboard with the criticism to an extent that it would affect overall U.S.-China economic and diplomatic relations. Such carefulness is understandable because good relations between these great powers are vital to regional and global peace. In addition, the continuous U.S. cooperation with its allies and partners in Southeast Asia serve as checks and balances so to speak, against any potential aggressive moves from China in the South China Sea. All in all, the U.S. is following a versatile strategy which seeks for peaceful conflict resolution while also balancing China s aggressive stance in the South China Sea and urging it to be 164 Ken Roberts. Top 10 U.S. Trade Partners In 2017 Can Be Broken Into 3 Tiers. Forbes, February 18, Hideshi, U. The Problems in the South China Sea. Review of Island Studies 2013, p Wuthnow, J. Beyond Imposing Costs: Recalibrating U.S. Strategy in the South China Sea. Asia Policy 2017, p Ibid 46

47 less confrontational. These strategies involves the following aspects: 168 (1) criticizing China for its coercive approach; (2) endorsing legal dispute settlement mechanisms; (3) increasing U.S. military presence in the region; (4) strengthening the capabilities of U.S. allies in the region; and (5) supporting multilateral frameworks for dispute resolution while urging Southeast Asian claimants to work jointly in solving the disputes. Below each of these aspects will be analyzed separately. During the two presidential terms of U.S. President Barack Obama, the U.S. administration has consistently issued a tougher position on China, due to its policy in the South China Sea. Criticizing China s policy there has become one of the bases of U.S. approach in these disputes. In reaction to China creating a new air defense identification zone in the South China Sea, then U.S. State Secretary John Kerry, in a meeting with Philippines official, said the following: Today, I raised our deep concerns about China s announcement of an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. I told the foreign secretary that the United States does not recognize that zone and does not accept it. The zone should not be implemented, and China should refrain from taking similar unilateral actions elsewhere in the region, and particularly over the South China Sea. 169 With regards to China s policy in the South China Sea, observers characterized it as a salami-slicing strategy that utilizes a series of incremental actions, none of which serves by itself as a reason for provoking war. 170 Rather, this kind of approach changes the whole situation gradually, step by step, in China s favor. From China s side, another term is used, the cabbage strategy which means gradually increasing the control over the islands in the South China Sea by enclosing them militarily, like the leaves of cabbage, which are used in consecutive manner until China has full control of all the islands. 171 In response to these ongoing salami-slicing or cabbage strategies, the new U.S. President Donald Trump had reiterated the position of his predecessor while also presenting some new approaches- to counter China s policies of taking over the entire South China Sea, Trump emphasized a usage of behind the scenes talks. During his November 2017 visit to Vietnam, China s coercive approach in the South China Sea, was on Trump s agenda for discussion in a meeting with Vietnamese colleagues. 172 In those meetings, Trump voiced U.S. concern about the militarization of features in the South China Sea. 173 In addition, Trump called on regional states to avoid escalatory actions, the militarization of disputed features, and unlawful restrictions on 168 Hiebert, M., Nguyen, P. Poling, B., G. Perspectives on the South China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal and Security Dimensions of the Dispute. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2014, p John Kerry. Remarks With Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario. Philippines, December 17, O'Rourke, R. Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service (CRS) 2017, p Ibid 172 Bill Gertz, Trump Courts Vietnam to Ward Off Beijing in South China Sea, Asia Times, November 14, Ibid 47

48 freedom of the seas. 174 Although no particular country was specified in this speech, the aforementioned description makes it obvious that this speech is directed clearly towards China s activities in the South China Sea. This example shows that consistent U.S. approach of criticizing China s activities in the South China Sea will not change under the new U.S. President Donald Trump, and will continue to remain an effective diplomatic tool. The second aspect of U.S. strategy in the South China Sea is promoting legal dispute settlement mechanisms. This aspect, which was outlined in the previous section, is arguably the primary U.S. tool when it comes to approaching South China Sea disputes. The basis in U.S. approach for using international law, such as principle of freedom of seas and usage of exclusive economic zone in accordance with customary international law of the sea, to solve the disputes, was created during the presidency of Barack Obama during both of his presidential terms. In the midst of China versus Philippines arbitration case, the U.S. supported the Philippines by promoting and reaffirming their position that all claimants should follow the principles that were set out in the UNCLOS. On March , after the Philippines submitted a memorial to the tribunal, in the arbitration case against China, the U.S. Department of State press statement outlined that the United States reaffirms its support for the exercise of peaceful means to resolve maritime disputes without fear of any form of retaliation, including intimidation or coercion. All countries should respect the right of any States Party, including the Republic of the Philippines, to avail themselves of the dispute resolution mechanisms provided for under the Law of the Sea Convention. We hope that this case serves to provide greater legal certainty and compliance with the international law of the sea. 175 With regards to this second U.S. approach however, there is a possible pitfall. The potential limitation lies in the fact that the U.S. is yet to ratify the UNCLOS, even though it respects and complies with the principles set out there. Provided that United States will ratify the UNCLOS, its positions regarding the territorial disputes in the South China Sea will be far stronger, as it will have even more legal basis on which to operate and purse its strategy in the South China Sea. The third U.S. strategy in these disputes is increasing its military presence in the South China Sea and Southeast Asia. Ever since the China-Philippines arbitration case, the U.S. has consistently strengthened its military presence in the region. The basis for that is outlined in the 2015 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy prepared by the U.S. Department of Defense. To begin with, the reasons for enhancing U.S. military presence in the region are essentially the same ones with the basic principles on which U.S. approach in the disputes are based on- that is, preserving the freedom of navigation, deterring any potential conflict and the use of force, and promoting international law 174 Ibid 175 U.S. Department of State, Philippines: South China Sea Arbitration Case Filing, press statement. March 30,

49 based approach in the South China Sea. As far as enhancing military capabilities, the U.S. Department of Defense is strengthening U.S. capabilities across 3 key areas- in the air, sea and under the water. For this, the U.S. is deploying one of the most advanced surface ships, the USS Ronald Reagan, and sending newest air operations-oriented amphibious assault ship, the USS America, to Southeast Asia by As of 2015, the U.S. has 368,000 personnel in the Asia-Pacific region. 177 While the number of personnel will continue to gradually increase, the more important aspect that highlights the U.S. intention to bolster its military presence in the South China Sea, lies in the fact that by 2020, the U.S. Navy will increase the number of ships allocated to Pacific Fleet outside of U.S. territory by 30 percent, which is a significant percentage given the fact that the number of U.S. personnel present in the Asia-Pacific is already large. 178 Furthermore, by 2020, 60% of U.S. naval and overseas air assets will be home-ported in the Pacific region. 179 Among the multi-faceted U.S. strategies in the South China Sea, this strategy- enhancing U.S. military presence in the region- is certainly among the strongest and the most feasible, which also balances China s military power in the region. The fourth U.S. strategy in these disputes is inter-related with the third one. While enhancing U.S. military presence in the region, the U.S. at the same time also strengthens the military capabilities of its allies and partners in the South China Sea. This is also being emphasized in U.S. Department of Defense statements- the statement says that we are working together with our allies and partners from Northeast Asia to the Indian Ocean to build their maritime capacity. We are building greater interoperability, updating our combined exercises, developing more integrated operations, and cooperatively developing partner maritime domain awareness and maritime security capabilities, which will ensure a strong collective capacity to employ our maritime capabilities most effectively. 180 At the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), then U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said that "the United States also remains committed to building the capacity of allies and partners in the region through as many as 130 exercises and engagements, and approximately 700 port visits annually. And across the Asia-Pacific region, as part of the rebalance, the United States is planning to increase Foreign Military Financing by 35%, and military education and training by 40% by 2016." 181 With regards to the allies, the U.S. mutual defense treaty with the Philippines continues to be a primary guarantee of security assurance. Philippines, being the most important U.S. ally in the South China Sea, is being significantly enhanced in military capabilities by U.S. support. In late 176 Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, August 2015, p Ibid 178 Ibid, p Ibid 180 Ibid, p Chuck Hagel, remarks at Shangri-La Dialogue, May 31,

50 2013, then U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry had announced a 40 million dollar military aid to the Philippines. 182 In addition to this, another 32 million dollars were provided to the Southeast Asian nations to help them protect their territorial waters. Of these 32 million dollars, 18 million dollars were allocated to one of the South China Sea claimants- Vietnam. 183 While U.S. military ties with claimant countries, such as Vietnam and Malaysia, are expanding, the strongest U.S. military link in the South China Sea continues to be the Philippines. In 2015 alone, the U.S. conducted over 400 military exercises with the Philippines, including the joint exercise Balikatan which was the largest joint military exercise ever between both countries. 184 In addition to this, the U.S. Department of Defense provides the Philippines with state of the art coastal radar systems, assists in strengthening naval maintenance capacity while also providing modern interdiction vessels, naval fleet upgrades and communications equipment. 185 The aforementioned financial U.S. assistance to Vietnam, also creates incentives to further develop U.S. military ties with this emerging and strategically important partner, when it comes countering China s influence in the South China Sea. Last but not least, the U.S. approach on the South China Sea maritime disputes is also based on calling the Southeast Asian claimants to work jointly in resolving the disputes through multilateral frameworks and regional organizations. In recent years, the U.S. has increased its participation in various regional organizations of Southeast Asia while at the same time supporting them as one of the primary mechanisms through which the disputes can be solved peacefully. In this regard, key stepping stone was in 2009 when the U.S. finally signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which serves a prerequisite if an outside nation wants to actively participate in the regional matters of Southeast Asia. In the process, the U.S. also became a full-time member of East Asia Summit (EAS) forum which brings together all the nations in Asia-Pacific while maintaining an important role in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Through these kinds of multilateral forums and institutions, the U.S. approach of peacefully resolving the South China Sea maritime disputes, based on international rules, can be further enhanced. The importance of regional organizations and multilateral approach is also emphasized in U.S. Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy. In it, the U.S. Department of Defense outlines that Finally, we are working to strengthen regional security institutions and encourage the development of an open and effective regional security architecture. Many of the most prevalent maritime challenges we face require a coordinated multilateral response. As such, the Department is enhancing our engagement in ASEAN-based institutions such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus 182 US Pledges $40 Million in Military Aid to Philippines, Voice of America, December 13, Ibid 184 Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, August 2015, p Ibid, p

51 (ADMM-Plus), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF), as well as through wider forums like the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), which provide platforms for candid and transparent discussion of maritime concerns. 186 For this reason, the promotion of multilateral framework for solving the maritime disputes in the South China Sea has become one of the key U.S. strategies as well. In addition, the U.S. is putting its efforts in trying to create more momentum for progress on establishing a legally binding code of conduct on these disputes. 187 This is an issue that has thwarted any realistic possibilities for solving the disputes. While Southeast Asian claimants and China have resumed the talks on this issue, no real and tangible progress has been made. In this question, the U.S. expects that a potential code of conduct will not only be legally binding, but will also have dispute settlement mechanisms. 188 To solve these issues, the various aforementioned multilateral institutions and forums, which U.S. firmly supports, would be the most sensible place where those issues can be addressed and solved. That being said, the U.S. role in establishing the code of conduct on the South China Sea would be rather limited because the U.S. is not a claimant country that is directly participating in the negotiations, even though it plays a major role as a non-claimant country. The South China Sea maritime disputes with its various aspects present key challenges for the United States. Namely, the U.S. ability to balance China s ambitions in the South China Sea while seeking and promoting peaceful conflict resolution among the claimants is a challenging task. Given the current developments, the U.S. manages to maintain equilibrium in both of these challenges. The reason for this is the fact that U.S. approach is cautious and calculated, meaning that the U.S. is not willing to get itself heavily involved into large-scale confrontations that will threaten vital U.S. economic relations with China. At the same time, the U.S. seeks to counter China s salami-slicing strategy by maintaining and strengthening the U.S. military and security relations with its allies and partners in the South China Sea, while constantly emphasizing diplomacy and international law as the tools that will help to solve the disputes. 186 Ibid, p Hiebert, M., Nguyen, P. Poling, B., G. Perspectives on the South China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal and Security Dimensions of the Dispute. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2014, p Ibid 51

52 CONCLUSIONS 1. Neorealism, with its two subdivisions, the defensive and offensive realism, continues to be a relevant theory when it comes to explaining the contemporary international relations, especially between the great powers. The neo-realist factors of the state s strategic and vital interest, which is security, and relative power capabilities, perform especially well with regards to foreseeing the competition between great powers for more influence. The competition between great powers inherently leads to them creating balancing alliances against one another, in order prevent the domination of one side. Thus, anarchy continues to prevail with states, especially great powers, continuing to be primary actors on international stage, while international institutions, such as the UN, has little power in decision-making process because their resolutions are non-binding. This is the case in the South China Sea where China s ambitions to dominate the entire maritime area is balanced by the U.S., which creates military alliances with China s neighbors in order to deter China from any further aggressive movements while the resolutions of the UN has no real effect on China s activities there; 2. The South China Sea maritime disputes are complex, long-standing and hardly solvable given the present realities there. The South China Sea with its vast resources of natural gas and oil, strategically crucial sea-lanes for trade and economically important fishing industry, is of utmost importance for the claimants there. All the claimants want to increase the strength and the legality of their claims, which overlap with one another, by occupying islands, reefs, atolls and building military fortifications inside the South China Sea. The disputes are further exacerbated by a number of legal issues which revolve around the legal status of maritime features there and the principles based on which the claims are made there. China s maritime claims are, bar none, the most ambitions of all the claimants, as it assigns virtually the entire South China Sea to China. As a result, other claimants seek military cooperation with the U.S. as a counterweight to China s military power and its ambitions in the South China Sea; 3. U.S. policy regarding the South China Sea maritime disputes has been consistent and longstanding. The U.S. urges all the claimants to follow international law, namely the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which is the key to peacefully settling the disputes. In this regard, the U.S. plays a delicate role of a balancer and conciliator. By criticizing China from time to time and enhancing its military cooperation with the claimants in the South China Sea, such as the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia, the U.S. balances and deters any potential aggressive moves from China in the disputed areas. Although increased U.S. military involvement in this area periodically provokes a negative reaction from China, the U.S. involvement is not to such an extent 52

53 that it would make the U.S. directly involved in the disputes and further escalate the tensions. At the same time, by promoting international law, diplomacy and maintaining strict neutrality over the questions of sovereignty in the South China Sea, the U.S. plays a role of conciliator. As a result, the U.S. also facilitates further developments in the process of peacefully settling the disputes between all the claimants. Therefore, the hypothesis is partially verified, as U.S. policies in the South China Sea contributes more towards the progress of solving the disputes rather than keeping them unresolved for decades to come. 53

54 LITERATURE AND SOURCE LIST 1. Literature List Monographs: 1. Booth, K. Realism and World Politics. Routledge 2011; 2. Bouchat, J., C. The Paracel Islands and U.S. Interests and Approaches in the South China Sea. Strategic Studies Institute 2014; 3. Burchill, S., Linklater, A., Devetak, R., Donnelly, J., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit, Ch, True, J. Theories of International Relations (Third edition). Palgrave Macmillan 2005; 4. Dunne, T., Kurki, M., Smith, S., eds. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford University Press 2007; 5. Steans, J., Pettiford, L., Diez, Th., El-Anis, I. An Introduction to International Relations Theory: Perspectives and Themes (Third edition). Routledge 2013; Books and Article Collections: 6. Hiebert, M., Nguyen, P. Poling, B., G. Perspectives on the South China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal and Security Dimensions of the Dispute. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2014; 7. McDevitt, M. The South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy and Options for the Future. Center for Naval Analyses 2014; 8. O'Rourke, R. Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service (CRS) 2017; 9. Roach, A., J. Malaysia and Brunei: An Analysis of their Claims in the South China Sea. Center for Naval Analyses 2014; 10. Sokolsky, R., Rabasa, A., Neu, R., C. The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy Toward China. RAND Corporation 2000; Articles in Periodic Scientific Journals: 11. Buszynski, L. The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2012; 12. Feng, L., Ruizhuang, Z. The Typologies of Realism. Chinese Journal of International Politics 2006; 54

55 13. Fravel, T., M. U.S. Policy Towards the Disputes in the South China Sea Since S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies 2014; 14. Glaser, S., B. Armed Clash in the South China Sea. Council on Foreign Relations 2012; 15. Hideshi, U. The Problems in the South China Sea. Review of Island Studies 2013; 16. Morton, K. China s ambition in the South China Sea: is a legitimate maritime order possible? International Affairs 2016; 17. Muscolino, S., M. Past and Present Resource Disputes in the South China Sea: The Case of Reed Bank. CrossCurrents 2013; 18. Parameswaran, P. Playing It Safe: Malaysia s Approach to the South China Sea and Implications for the United States. Center for a New American Security (CNAS) 2015; 19. Rosenberg, D. Governing the South China Sea: From Freedom of the Seas to Ocean Enclosure Movements. Middlebury College 2011; 20. Taliaferro, W., J. Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited. International security 2000; 21. Wuthnow, J. Beyond Imposing Costs: Recalibrating U.S. Strategy in the South China Sea. Asia Policy 2017; 22. Zhang, F. Chinese Thinking on the South China Sea and the Future of Regional Security. Political Science Quarterly 2017; Articles in Other Scientific Publications: 23. Bader, J., Lieberthal, K., McDevitt, M. Keeping the South China Sea in Perspective. Brookings 2014; 24. Emmers, R. Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: Strategic and Diplomatic Status Quo. Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) 2005; 25. Forsby, B., A. The South China Sea - a Breeding Ground for Geopolitical Rivalry? Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) 2016; 26. Freund, E. Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea: A Practical Guide. Harvard Kennedy School 2017; 27. Gewirtz, P. Limits of Law in the South China Sea. Center for East Asia Policy Studies- Brookings Institution 2016; 28. Hensel, R., P. Power Politics and Contentious Issues: Realism, Issue Salience, and Conflict Management. Florida State University 2015; 29. Khoury, E. Recent Trends In The South China Sea Disputes. The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS) 2017; 55

56 30. Lunn, J., Lang, A. The South China Sea dispute: July 2016 update. House of Commons Library 2016; 31. McCormick, M., J. American Domestic Politics, Public Opinion, and the South China Sea Disputes. Iowa State University 2017; 32. Pearson, M., A. Realism and Politics Among States in the 21st Century. Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies 2015; 33. Poonsiri, P. The Territorial Dispute Over the South China Sea. University of Erfurt 2017; 34. Poling, B., G. The South China Sea in Focus: Clarifying the Limits of Maritime Dispute. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2013; 35. Ring, H., A. A U.S. South China Sea Perspective: Just Over the Horizon. Harvard University 2012; 36. Rustandi, A., C. The South China Sea Dispute: Opportunities for ASEAN to Enhance its Policies in Order to Achieve Resolution. Australian Defence College 2016; 37. Schofield, C. Legal and Geographical Implications of the South China Sea Arbitration. National Library of Australia 2016; 38. Shi, X. UNCLOS and China s Claim in the South China Sea. Australian Defence College 2015; 39. Van Ham, P., Montesano, S., F., Van der Putten, P., F. A South China Sea Conflict: Implications for European Security: A Scenario Study. Clingendael Institute 2016; 40. Vuving, L. A. Vietnam, the United States, and Japan in the South China Sea. Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies 2014; 41. Limits in the Seas, No. 143 China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea. United States Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs 2014; Articles in Conference Material Compendiums: 42. Recent Trends In the South China Sea Disputes. Boston Global Forum 2015; Other Literature: 43. Criekemans, D. Towards a solution for the increasing tensions in the South China Sea? University of Antwerp 2017; 56

57 2. Sources Legal Acts: 44. Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, August FINALFORMAT.PDF 45. United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS. United Nations Official Website. Electronic Media: 46. Adam Greer, The South China Sea Is Really a Fishery Dispute, The Diplomat, July 20, Bill Gertz, Trump Courts Vietnam to Ward Off Beijing in South China Sea, Asia Times, November 14, Johnson, Jesse. Behind the scenes, Tillerson tones down rhetoric on South China Sea, Japan Times, 7 February Challenging Beijing in the South China Sea, Voice of America, July 31, "China Searches for More Gas Hydrates in South China Sea," The Maritime Executive, February 21, "Foreign Countries Chase Oil in South China Sea Without Incident," Voice of America, February 26, The Philippine military buildup amid China tensions, Navarra Center for International Development (NCID), February 8, The South China Sea is an important world energy trade route, U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), April 4,

58 54. US Pledges $40 Million in Military Aid to Philippines, Voice of America, December 13, Reports: 55. U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, May 10, U.S. Department of State, Philippines: South China Sea Arbitration Case Filing, press statement. March 30, Other Sources: 57. Chuck Hagel. Remarks at Shangri-La Dialogue. Singapore, May 31, John Kerry. Remarks at the U.S.-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Brunei, July 1, John Kerry. U.S. Vision for Asia-Pacific Engagement. Hawaii, August 13, John Kerry. Remarks With Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario. Philippines, December 17, Remarks At Press Availability, Secretary Clinton. Vietnam, July 23,

59 ANNEXES Annex No. 1: Territorial Claims in the South China Sea Source: Challenging Beijing in the South China Sea, Voice of America, July 31,

60 Annex No. 2: Military strength of the claimants in the South China Sea Source: The Philippine military buildup amid China tensions, Navarra Center for International Development (NCID), February 8,