For his pessimistic view about human nature, his emphasis on power, and his

Transcription

1 The Log, the Paper, and the Lighting of the Match The Implications of International Politics in a World of Ideals Amber Heyman-Valchanov Paper Topic #1 International Relations November 10, 2005 For his pessimistic view about human nature, his emphasis on power, and his recognition that morality has little place in inter-state relations, Thucydides explanation of the Peloponnesian War serves as a prelude to political realism. In the view of realism principal actors in the international stage are city-states, who are concerned with their own security and act in pursuit of their national interests. Thucydides makes a distinction between the immediate and underlying causes that advocate this view in his documentation of the Peloponnesian War. He isolates the real cause of the war in the changing distribution of power between the two main players of Greek city-states, Athens and Sparta. According to Thucydides, the growth of Athenian power made the Spartans afraid for their security, and thus compelled them into war. 1 1 Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, (Penguin Books: London, 1954) p. 49 1

2 Thucydides argument correlates strongly with neorealist sentiments, such as Joseph Nye, on how the anarchic structure of the international system effect the behavior of states. By looking the city-states of ancient Greece and how they interacted with each other at the onset of the Peloponessian War, Nye draws on parallels of modern nation-states, to theorize the causes of World War I. Nye states that, security dilemmas are related to the essential characteristic of international politics, anarchic organization: the absence of a higher government. 2 An increase in security in one nation-state causes an increase of security in another, making both nation-states more insecure. Thus, Thucydides and Nye both concur, that it was not the idiosyncrasies of the many small states of ancient Greece that caused the war, it was the increase in power of major city-states that caused the Peloponnesian War. Nye goes on to assert that the same governing factors in dealing with a shift of power in Europe, was the lighting of the fire that ultimately led to the First World War. The realist perspective finds the absence of a ruler as the defining element of international politics and primary factor of political outcomes. The lack of common rule places responsibility on individual state to define its own power interests and its means for survival. In the words of the Athenians, if there is no international government, 2 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, Pearson Education Inc.,(New York: 2005)p. 16 2

3 international anarchy leads thus to the overriding role of power in inter-state relations and causes all states to be motivated by fear and mutual distrust. To maintain security, states increase their relative power and engage in a form of power balancing for the purpose of deterring potential power threats. One does not only defend oneself against a superior power when one is attacked; one takes measures in advance to prevent the attack from materializing. And it is not possible for us to calculate, like housekeepers, exactly how much empire we want to have. The fact is that we have reached a stage where we are forced to plan new conquests and forced to hold on to what we have got, because there is a danger that we ourselves may fall under the power of others unless they are in our power. 3 Some wars are fought to prevent competing nations from becoming stronger. The negative side of this emphasis on power is the realist skepticism regarding enforced order, so that by conquering you we shall increase not only in size but the security of our empire. 4 Although, realism is not implied by the Athenians, they do make reference to three motives that have led them to obtain and keep their empire: fear, honor, and self-interest. All of which are referenced to Hobbesian realism. 3 Thucydides p Thucydides p

4 The Melians took the moral argument based on ideology. They do not wish to lose their freedom, and dispite the fact that they are militarily weaker than the Athenians, they are compelled to defend themselves. If such hazards are taken by you to keep your empire and by your subjects to escape from it, we who are still free would show ourselves great cowards and weaklings if we failed to face everything that comes rather than submit to slavery. 5 They base their arguments on an appeal to justice and assume it as a universal moral principle. They associate justice with fairness and regard the Athenians as acting unjust. Hence, one can identify elements of the idealistic view as the belief that nations have the right to exercise political independence, states have mutual obligations to one another that they will carry out, and a war of aggression is unjust. The Athenian response is based on such key realist concepts as security and power, and is informed not by what the world should be but what it is. Lafore's central thesis is that a lot of things might have caused the First World War, but the proximate cause was the conflict between Serbian nationalism and the Austro-Hungarian Empire that depended on keeping the lid on nationalism. Of the Great Powers, Austria-Hungary was the only one that was under threat of breakdown in a time when nationalism bore the signature of unification and stability within ethnic ties. 4

5 The fear of an imperial breakdown, much like Athens, fear of losing what they had, was the lighting of the fire. Nationalism posed a problem for Austria-Hungary and the Balkans, an area comprised of many conflicting national groups. The Austro-Hungarian leaders ignored the principle of nationalism in favor of attempting to preserve the peace. The ardent Pan-slavism of Serbia and Russia's willingness to support its Slavic brother conflicted with Austria-Hungary's Pan-Germanism. The parallels of nationalism resemble the Delian League and the Peloponnesian League with Sparta and Athens. These internal oddities had drastic effects on external behavior. Because of the uniqueness of the state, Austria-Hungary could not act as a nation state; and it was impossible for its neighbors, they themselves affected by its particular composition, to act toward it as they could toward other nation states. It was this situation that brought about the outbreak of the First World War. 6 This leaves us to the question, was war inevitable? By looking at Nye s assertion that the most remote causes of war are deep-rooted causes, then come the intermediate causes, and those immediately before the event are the precipitating causes. By using the analogy of a building fire, we can breakdown the causes of war in a realistic tone. The logs are the deep cause, the kindling and the paper are the 5 Thucydides, p Laurence Lafore, The Long Fuse, An Interpretation of the Causes of World War I, Waveland press, Inc.(Illinois: 1971)p.57 5

6 intermediate cause and the actual striking of the match is the precipitating cause. 7 When you believe that war is inevitable according to Nye, you are very close to the last move. The actual act of declaring war, realistically is the actual cause of war. There is a time during the escalation of tension that allows for mediation, when nation-states can come to an understanding of the ultimate cost of war through examination ideology, principle, realism. However, in the cases of the Peloponnesian and First World War, had all parties involved made a clear assessment of the situation and included all implications, there is a possibility that the match would not have been lit. Athens when faced with fear, honor, and self-interest, decided that they could not afford to trust the Corinthians or the Spartans. It was better to have to have the Corcyraean navy on their side than against them when it looked like the last move in the game. What made Europe so dangerous at the time prior to World War I, was each nation sate was fearful of the others power. The original encircling of France after the Franco-Prussian War to the untimely encircling of Germany by France, Britain, and Russia. All nation states were fearful of war, and the unsettling fear led to war as an impulsive reaction. The fear that drove the nation states of Europe into the entangling alliances, was also the fear that led to the inflexibility of those alliances. The increased nationalism spreading across Europe allowed for the alliance between Germany and 7 Nye p. 74 6

7 Austria-Hungary. The reassurance treaty promised German neutrality towards Russia as long as no one attacked Austria under Bismarck. This concern between alliances and diplomacy between nation states tends to collapse at the change of individual power. Leaving the treaty null and void once the leader is out of office. The treaty was therefore only between leaders and not countries. But this is a discussion for another day. 7