Do you agree with Mearsheimer s conclusion that the Ukraine crisis was the West s fault?

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1 Do you agree with Mearsheimer s conclusion that the Ukraine crisis was the West s fault? Introduction Mearsheimer s (2014) conclusion that most of the responsibility lies with the West overstates the Western role in the Ukraine crisis. While the West is partly liable, a portion of the blame also lies with Russia and Ukraine. In the first part of this essay, the Western role in the crisis is explored. The West sponsored the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) without due consideration of Russia s security concerns (Mearsheimer 2014; Sakwa 2008; p. 260; Karagnov 2014; Trenin 2014: p. 11; Mehrotra 2008: p. 1225). Precedents set by Western interventions allowed President Putin to exploit the inherent tension between the international norms of a right to self-determination and territorial sovereignty to annex Crimea (Putin 2014; Burke-White 2014: p ). The second segment examines the Russian contribution to the Ukraine crisis. The crisis partly resulted because of a Russian overreaction to perceived security threats. While Russia did have legitimate security concerns, it violated international law and norms when it annexed Crimea. Despite Putin s attempt to justify his actions under international law, he significantly stretched the applicability of principles surrounding humanitarian intervention (Burke-White 2014: p. 68). While the West ignored Russian security concerns, it must also be considered that Russia failed to account for the Western outlook. Lastly, the role of the Ukrainian government in the crisis is discussed. By framing the Ukraine crisis as a rivalry between the West and Russia, it ignores the regional element of the conflict. The Ukrainian government has exacerbated tensions between the West and Russia to gain increased economic aid in a return for a more pro-western or pro-russian stance (Karagnov 2014; Trenin 2014: p. 4). In addition to aggravating tensions, the Ukrainian government, both 1

2 under former President Yanukovych and under the interim government, made poor decisions that resulted in the escalation of the conflict. Western Role Though Mearsheimer s (2014) view of the crisis fails to consider the Russian and Ukrainian role, he correctly ascribes eastward expansion of Western institutions as a contributing factor. After the end of the Cold War, NATO remained and enlarged, but the corresponding Soviet structure, the Warsaw Pact, was dissolved (Sakwa 2014: p. 252; Mehrotra 2008: p. 1226; McGwire 1998: p. 1283). As NATO expanded eastward, it had understandable implications for Russian security (McGwire 1998: p. 1298). With the addition of the Baltic States, NATO expanded to the Russian borders. Historical memories of the Cold War along with invasions during both of the World Wars likely exacerbated the Russian sense of insecurity concerning the NATO expansion (Donnelly 2013: p. 38; Mehrotra 2008: p. 1226). With Ukraine, security concerns are particularly crucial because as a border country to Russia, it can act as a buffer zone against a territorial attack (McGwire 1998: p. 1292). Yet the West remained largely indifferent to these legitimate Russian security concerns (Karagnov 2014). The joint United States-NATO missile defense system in Eastern Europe demonstrates the core of the conflict between NATO and Russia. In 2007, the initiative to deploy a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic was launched (Sakwa 2008: p ). Though NATO contended that the missile defense system was aimed to intercept missiles from Iran and North Korea, Russia feared the implementation of the system so close to its borders would also act to lessen the deterrent effect of the Russian nuclear stockpile (Associated Press 18 March 2013; Associated Press 3 May 2012). NATO dismissed these concerns and largely carried on with the initiative as planned, despite offers from Russia to jointly deploy a 2

3 missile defense system (Associated Press, 3 May 2012). Part of the initiatives, the deployment of long-range interceptors in Poland, was discontinued in 2013, but the episode illustrates the tension between NATO expansion and Russian security fears (Associated Press 3 May 2012). NATO and EU expansion towards Russia extends beyond territorial implications. Many of the former Soviet republics that were admitted to Western organizations after the collapse of the Soviet Union have hostile memories of the Soviet occupation during the Cold War (Sakwa 2008: p.258). As a result, it is difficult for NATO and EU to appear non-threatening towards Russia, while at the same time, demonstrating solidarity with these nations (Sakwa 2008: p. 258). During 2007, the Estonian government voted to relocate the Bronze Solider, a World War II memorial from the Soviet era (Sakwa 2008: p. 258; Blomfield 2007; Traynor 2007). For the ethnic Russian population in Estonia, the Bronze Solider represents the defeat of Nazi Germany. For the native Estonian population, on the other hand, the Bronze Solider serves as a reminder of the harsh Soviet occupation (Blomfield 2007). As a result of the Estonian government s decision to relocate the statue, there were substantial protests from both the ethnic Russians in Estonia as well as from Russia itself (Traynor 2007). Soon after the removal of the statue, cyber-attacks against Estonia that were linked to Russia began (Traynor 2007). Both the EU and NATO supported its member state during the crisis, including the deployment of NATO cyber-terrorism experts to Estonia (Traynor 2007). While the Bronze Solider incident did not escalate to conflict between Estonia and Russia, it nonetheless demonstrates the potential for conflict between Western institutions and Russia when former Soviet states are involved. Though Mearsheimer (2014) does not articulate this in his article, the West also contributed to the Ukraine crisis through other instances of outside intervention (Karagiannis 2014: p.414). An inherent tension exists between the principle of territorial sovereignty and the 3

4 idea of self-determination by an oppressed population (Burke-White 2014: p. 66). From the inception of the United Nations (UN) and throughout the Cold War, preference was given to the principle of territorial sovereignty (Morris 2013: p. 1268; Karagiannis 2014: p. 414). Since the end of the Cold War, however, a norm of the international community s responsibility to protect oppressed populations within countries began to develop, which eventually was adopted as a principle by the UN in 2005 (Morris 2013: p. 1269). Despite this development, Russia was hesitant to support outside intervention (Charap 2013: p. 36; Allison 2013: p. 795; Morris 2013: p. 1275). On the other hand, individual Western countries or NATO coalitions have undertaken humanitarian interventions in Libya, Iraq, and Kosovo (Charap 2013: p. 36, 38). Putin (2013, 2014) has denounced Western intervention into other countries. In response to NATO s action in Libya, Russia criticized NATO for overextending the UN mandate to facilitate a regime change (Charap 2013: p. 38; Morris 2013: p. 1275). Ironically, that precedent of Western intervention has served as a justification for Russian actions in Crimea. Russian Role Mearsheimer (2014) contends that Russia s action in the Ukraine was a natural reaction to an increased threat from the West, highlighted by NATO and EU expansion. While his claim that the West ignored Russia s security interests is valid, Mearsheimer (2014) does not give proper consideration to the fact that Russia extended the bounds of what is deemed an acceptable international humanitarian intervention in Crimea. As a result of its aggressive actions, Russia undoubtedly contributed to the crisis. Despite the security threat from the West, and the precedent of outside intervention, Russia s annexation of Crimea impinged on Ukraine s sovereignty (Bond et al. 2015). Russia violated several international agreements in its annexation of Crimea (Mankoff 2014). In particular, it breached both the Helsinki Final Act in 4

5 1975 and the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 (Larrabee et al. 2015: p. 1; Pifer 2014). The Helsinki Final Act guaranteed borders in Europe would not be changed via military action, while the Budapest Memorandum secured Ukraine s borders and territorial integrity in exchange for its nuclear weapons being transferred to Russia (Larrabee et al. 2015; Pifer 2014; Council on Foreign Relations 5 December 1994). Putin (2014) used several lines of reasoning to justify Russia s annexation of Crimea under international law, but these fail to withstand scrutiny. Putin (2014) denies Russia s armed forces were in Crimea illegally. While forces may have been able to be stationed in Crimea (Putin 2014), it was still a violation of Ukrainian sovereignty for Russians to use those soldiers to subdue Crimea. At the same time, Russia ambiguously deployed more troops, using unmarked soldiers to infiltrate and secure Crimea (Larrabee et al. 2015: p. 6; Karagiannis 2014: p. 408; Trenin 2014: p. 4; Burke-White 2014: p. 69). No violence may have ensued in Crimea, but the military action of Russia is undeniably illegal under international law. At the same time, Putin (2014) advocated that Russian intervention and annexation was necessary to protect ethnic Russians in Crimea from the oppression of the interim Ukrainian government (Karagiannis 2014: p. 414; Shevtsova 2014: p. 76; Mankoff 2014). Particularly, Putin (2014) cites the precedent of NATO intervention in Kosovo (Karagiannis 2014: p. 410). While NATO did undertake a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo and supported the subsequent separation from Serbia, the parallel between Crimea and Kosovo proves to be weak. In Kosovo, there was both a history of violence and substantial risk of ethnic cleansing to the Albanians from the Serbian government (Roberts 1999: p. 104). In Crimea, the threat of violence or marginalization against ethnic Russians failed to meet the same threshold (Charap and Darden 2014: p. 11; Burke-White 2014: p. 70). While a substantial part of the Crimean population is 5

6 ethnic Russian and likely supported reunification with Russia (McGwire 1998: p. 1292; Mearsheimer 2014), the process by which it was absorbed was largely illegal. Putin attempts to justify his aggressive action under international law, but under scrutiny, the annexation of Crimea fails to meet the international standard of appropriate humanitarian intervention. By ignoring Russia s aggressive action, Mearsheimer (2014) obscures its role in the Ukrainian crisis. Beyond transgressing international law, Russia also contributed to the crisis by failing to appreciate the Western standpoint. Mearsheimer (2014) places the onus on the West to grasp international politics from a realist perspective. Although Mearsheimer (2014) may be biased in this prescription because he adheres to a realist viewpoint himself, his partiality does not totally invalidate his claim. If Russia may have security concerns rising from realpolitik considerations, the West should take those into account. Mearsheimer (2014), however, fails to consider the converse. If the West is approaching NATO and EU expansion from a liberal standpoint, Russia also needs to consider those intentions. Western states argue that the expansion of Western institutions serves as an incentive for more countries within Europe to both democratize as well as to undertake peaceful means to settle conflicts and contribute to peacekeeping missions (McGwire 1998: p. 1283). A failure to understand the Western viewpoint may have led to Russia overreacting to the prospect of Ukraine integrating into the West. Mearsheimer (2014) argues that the West and Russia are operating from different assumptions about the way international politics is conducted. While that may be true, and resulted in different interpretations of the same event, the burden to understand each side s viewpoint should not fall solely on the West. Both Russia and the West need to understand each other s outlook in order to prevent an overreaction by either side. Ukrainian Role 6

7 By framing the Ukraine crisis as a conflict between the West and Russia, Mearsheimer (2014) obscures the role the Ukrainian government played. The Ukraine crisis was initiated in November 2013 when then President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, rejected an agreement with the EU in favor of a Russian economic aid package worth 15 billion US dollars (Karagiannis 2014: p. 407; Mearsheimer 2014; Åslund 2014: p. 70). In response, citizens organized a protest in Kiev, coined the EuroMaidan. Eventually, the EuroMaidan escalated to violence. Over time, both Europe and Russia have tried to attract Ukraine into their respective sphere of influence with the incentive of trade deals and economic packages. The rivalry developed a zero-sum element a Ukrainian agreement with the EU or Russia necessitated the exclusion of the other party (Trenin 2014: p. 4). In an attempt to secure a better economic deal, the Ukrainian government exploited this rivalry (Trenin 2014: p. 4; Karagnov 2014). In the end, however, it only served to exacerbate existing tensions. In addition to raising tensions between the West and Russia, the Ukrainian government made poor decisions both before and during the crisis. Though the protests initially began in response to the rejection of the EU association agreement, they also criticized the corruption of the Yanukovych government (Onuch 2014: p. 47; Putin 2014; Trenin 2014: p. 4; The Economist 14 June 2014). Corruption among Ukrainian government was not limited to the Yanukovych regime, but it flourished under his presidency (The Economist 14 June 2014; Åslund 2014: p. 64; Karagnov 2014). After assuming the presidency in 2010, Yanukovych stripped the Constitution of the 2004 amendments, added after the Orange Revolution, which placed limits upon presidential power (Kudelia 2014: p. 21; Onuch 2014: p. 45). At the same time, Yanukovych used his position to enrich both his business, run by his son Oleksandr, and that of his close associates (Kudelia 2014: p. 26; Åslund 2014: p ; The Economist 14 June 2014; BBC 28 7

8 February 2014). Against this backdrop of corruption, the economic situation in Ukraine plummeted (Kudelia 2014: p. 26; Åslund 2014: p. 66). The failure of the Ukrainian government to combat corruption or alleviate economic suffering gave protestors a legitimate grievance at the advent of the EuroMaidan protests. After those protests had begun, the Yanukovych government escalated the conflict by attempting to forcibly remove protestors. Protestors were beaten, or even killed, by government officials (Kudelia 2014: p. 29). While both sides were guilty of violence, the decision by the government to use force not only increased the level of dissent within Ukraine, but also likely made it impossible for Yanukovych to sustain power (Kudelia 2014: p. 28; Onuch 2014: p. 45; Charap and Darden 2014: p. 8; Larrabee et al. 2015: p. 5). Yanukovych was forced out of office, which Russia regarded as an illegal coup (Putin 2014; Karagnov 2014). Yanukovych s removal prompted the Russian invasion of Crimea (Kudelia 2014: p. 19). Poor strategic decisions, however, were not limited to the Yanukovych government. Shortly after taking power, the interim government proposed a law to remove Russian as a national language (Burke-White 2014: p. 70; Arel 2014). While not an overtly violent act against ethnic Russians, it provided them with a legitimate grievance. Particularly, Russia points to that action as one sign of the new government s intent to oppress and endanger ethnic Russians (Burke-White 2014: p. 70; Arel 2014; Putin 2014) Conclusion Mearsheimer s (2014) conclusion about the origins of the Ukraine crisis is not so much wrong as it is incomplete. While the West did contribute to the conflict, it still would not have unfolded unless Russia and Ukraine had taken certain actions. Not only did the West create a precedent of humanitarian intervention, but it also incited Russian security concerns by the 8

9 expansion of NATO and the EU. As the EU was poised to move Ukraine, which borders Russia, into its sphere of influence, Russia felt threatened enough to act. While Russia may have felt threatened, it flaunted international law in its annexation of Crimea. It also failed to understand NATO and EU expansion from the Western, liberal point of view, which is substantially less threatening to Russian security. Lastly, the role of Ukraine cannot be ignored. The Ukrainian government exacerbated tensions between the West and Russia in order to gain a better economic deal. At the same time, Ukrainian actions against its own people further escalated the conflict within its own country. Mearsheimer s (2014) estimation that the Ukraine crisis resulted from the West obscures the contributions that came from every party within the conflict. Actions of the three governments must be viewed in conjunction with one another, or the nuances of the cause of the crisis will be lost. The West has set a precedent for when a responsibility to protect minorities outweighs territorial sovereignty. At the same time, the interim Ukraine government attempted to pass an ill-advised law to remove Russian as an official language of Ukraine. Russia utilized both of those factors to justify its actions. However, it stretched that precedent of responsibility to protect to make a case that intervention in Crimea was for the benefit of ethnic Russians in the area. To understand the root of the Ukraine crisis, one must view the contributions from all three governments. In his conclusion that the Ukraine crisis is solely the West s fault, Mearsheimer (2014) fails to consider all the factors. Word Count: 2,738 9

10 Works Cited Arel, D. (2014), Double Talk: Why Ukrainians Fight Over Language, Foreign Affairs, [Online], 18 th March, Available from: [Accessed on: 27 th April 2015] Åslund, A. (2014), Oligarchs, Corruption, and European Integration, Journal of Democracy, 25(3), p Bond, I., Corboy, D., Courtney, W.H., Haltzel, M. and Kauzlarich, R. (2015), Ukraine Crisis is a Geopolitical Game Changer, RAND Corporation, [Online], 17 th April, Available from: [Accessed on: 25 th April 2015] Blomfield, A. (2007), War of words over the bronze solider, The Telegraph, [Online], 5 th February, Available from: [Accessed on: 25 th April 2015] Burke-White, W. (2014), Crimea and the international legal order, Survival, 56(2), p Charap, S. (2013), Russia, Syria and the Doctrine of Intervention, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 55(1), p Charap, S. and Darden, K. (2014), Russia and Ukraine, Survival, 56(2), p Donnelly, J. (2013), Realism, IN: Burchill, S., Linklater, A., Devetak, R., Donnelly, J., Nardin, T., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit, C., and True, J. (eds.), Theories of International Relations, p Karagiannis, E. (2014), The Russian interventions in South Ossetia and Crimea compared: military performance, legitimacy and goals, Contemporary Security Policy, 35(5), p Karagnov, S. (2014), Time to end the Cold War in Europe, Russia in Global Affairs, [Online], 28 th April, Available from: Europe-16599, [Accessed on: 15 th April 2015] Kudelia, S. (2014), The House that Yanukovych Built. Journal of Democracy, 25(3), p Larrabee, F.S., Wilson, P.A., and Gordon, J. (2015), The Ukraine Crisis and European Security: Implications for the United States and the US Army, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation Mankoff, J. (2014), Russia s latest land grab: how Putin won Crimea and lost Ukraine, Foreign Affairs, 93(3), p McGwire, M. (1998), NATO Expansion: a policy error of historic importance, Review of International Studies, 10

11 Mearsheimer, J.J. (2014), Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West s fault: the liberal delusions that provoked Putin, Foreign Affairs, 93, p Mehrotra, O.N. (2008), NATO eastward expansion and Russia security, Strategic Analysis, 22(8), p Morris, J. (2013), Libya and Syria: R2P and the specter of the swinging pendulum, International Affairs, 89(5), p No Author (1994), Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances, 1994, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 th December, [Online], Available from: [Accessed on: 26 th April 2015] No author (2014), Ostrich zoo and vintage cars: the curse of corruption in Ukraine, The Economist, [Online], 12 th June, [Available from: [Accessed on: 26 th April 2015] No author (2014), Profile: Ukraine s ousted President Viktor Yanukovych, BBC News, [Online], Available from: [Accessed on: 26 th April 2015] Onuch, O. (2014), Who Were the Protestors? Journal of Democracy, 25(3), p Pifer, S. (2014), The Budapest Memorandum and U.S. Obligations, Brookings Institution, [Online], 4 th December, Available from: [Accessed on: 26 th April 2015] Putin, V. (2013), A Plea for caution from Russia. What Putin has to say to Americans about Syria, The New York Times, [Online], 11 th September, Available from: [Accessed: 19 th February 2015] Putin, V. (2014), Address by President of the Russian Federation, IN: Official Internet Resources of the President of Russia, [Online], 18 th March, Available from: news/20603, [Accessed on: 15 th April 2015] Roberts, A. (1999), NATO s Humanitarian War over Kosovo, Survival, 41(3), p Shevtsova, L. (2014), The Russia Factor, Journal of Democracy, 25(3), p

12 Traynor, I. (2007), Russia accused of unleashing cyber war to destabilize Estonia, The Guardian, [Online], 17 th May, Available from: [Accessed on: 25 th April 2015] Trenin, D. (2014), The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great-power Rivalry, Moscow Carnegie Centre, [Online], July, p. 1-28, Available from: _great_power_ rivalry2014.pdf, [Accessed on: 15 th April 2015] Walker, S. (2014), Viktor Yanukovych boasted of Ukraine corruption, says Mikheil Saakashvili, The Guardian, [Online], 25 th February, Available from: /viktor-yanukovych-ukraine-corruption-mikheilsaakashvili., [Accessed on: 26 th April 2015] 12

NATO Background Guide

NATO Background Guide As members of NATO you will be responsible for examining the Ukrainian crisis. NATO The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an international organization composed of 28 member