Crisis reports. Colombia

Transcription

1 UNHCR/ZALMAI

2 Crisis reports Coombia

3 Coombia at a gance The crisis and the response Piar 1 Coombia has the word s second highest number of IDPs: around five miion have been dispaced by confict. 10 Denying the existence of an armed confict, the Coombian government discourages internationa attention and rejects appicabiity of internationa humanitarian aw Piar 5 Piar 2 2 Humanitarian space further diminished in 2009 despite government success retaking territory from insurgents and restoring some services. Presidentia Decree 001 forces humanitarian actors to coordinate activities through Acción Socia, the state IDP agency. FTS figures indicate increased funding to Coombia in 2009 but biatera aid, notaby from the US, remains ess transparent. Piar 4 Piar 3 Coombia A Crisis Average The Coombian government mobiises greater resources to assist IDPs than externa actors, reducing scope for internationa humanitarian advocacy. HRI 2010 scores by piar Piar 1 Responding to needs Piar 2 Prevention, risk reduction and recovery Piar 3 Working with humanitarian partners Piar 4 Protection and internationa aw Piar 5 Learning and accountabiity There is a sense of fatigue among donors and humanitarian actors and ack of consensus on the best way to move forward. Donor performance Donors in Coombia were praised for their capacity for informed decision-making and timeiness of funding. High eve visits by the heads of ECHO and Swiss Deveopment Cooperation and by the UN ERC heped keep some internationa attention on the confict. However, most humanitarians were disappointed by the ERC s faiure to decare the crisis an armed confict or hod the government accountabe. Key chaenges and areas for improvement 140 Donors tend to be reactive, not taking a ong-term approach to the crisis and its root causes. Donors shoud be aware of the risks invoved in the Coombian crisis getting forgotten as the government seeks to convey a perception of stabiity to encourage foreign investment. Donors shoud seek to forge a coherent internationa approach to ensure access to vunerabe popuations. Donors shoud encourage Acción Socia and other actors to systematicay incude affected popuations in panning and decision-making.

4 Coombia A country at a crossroads In August 2010, former Minister of Defence Juan Manue Santos assumed the office of President of Coombia, bringing an end to the eight-year tenure of Ávaro Uribe. Uribe s Seguridad Democrática was a miitary and poitica strategy to recover contro of nationa territory from eftist guerrias, increase economic growth and combat narco-trafficking. Under Uribe, security improved in Coombian cities and economic growth benefitted the midde cass. Uribe s popuarity rests in arge measure on a socia perception fueed by officia patriotism and a compiant mass media (Petrich 2010). He successfuy manipuated discourse around the crisis, exaggerating miitary successes against the two major eftist groups the Fuerzas Armadas Revoucionarias de Coombia (FARC) and the smaer Ejército de Liberación Naciona (ELN) whie shifting attention to the more poiticay expedient agendas of security, antiterrorism, deveopment and trade. However, Uribe s faiure to acknowedge and respond to the consequences of the five-decade ong humanitarian crisis of mass dispacement eaves a tainted egacy. Coombia continues to have the word s second-argest popuation of internay dispaced persons (IDPs). Successive Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) missions have noted the steady erosion of humanitarian space and respect for internationa humanitarian aw and human rights (Hidago 2007 and Espada 2008 & 2009). Amnesty Internationa (2009) contests the state s assertion that the impact of the interna armed confict is abating. FARC is sti a potent armed force, adapting to miitary pressure through guerria warfare tactics, aggressive recruitment among rura popuations, broadened invovement in drug trafficking and aiances with other armed groups and drug-trafficking organisations (Internationa Crisis Group 2010). Human Rights Watch argues that the substantia increase in new dispacement in the ast years of Uribe s presidency is primariy driven by the emergence of successor groups expoiting natura resources, seizing and and targeting human rights defenders, trade unionists and internay dispaced persons (IDPs) who seek to recover property. These proiferating new iega armed groups (NIAGs) are aegedy often toerated by the security forces (Human Rights Watch 2010) and now have armed members in 29 of Coombia s 32 departments (Instituto de Estudios para e Desarroo y a Paz 2010). Santos, the key enforcer of the Seguridad Democrática strategy, seems unikey to depart from the course set by Uribe. The crisis of interna dispacement was amost competey ignored during the 2010 presidentia campaign. The change in eadership may represent the best hope in years to break free from the inertia of the past and engage in diaogue on how to best meet the needs of affected and vunerabe popuations. It remains to be seen whether donors wi take up the chaenge or whether the crisis in Coombia wi remain invisibe and intractabe. Scae of dispacement For decades there has been controversy about the number of IDPs. It is difficut to differentiate economic reasons for migration to cities from those inked directy to confict, vioence and human rights vioations (Abuja & Cebaos 2010). In recent years, increasing numbers have been dispaced not by argescae miitary campaigns, but by NIAGS seeking to cear and for pam oi, ranching or other agropastora enterprises, minera and oi exporation or hydro-eectric instaations. According to the Coombian government in March 2009, there were 2.98 miion IDPs registered in the Registry of the Dispaced Popuation (RUPD) the officia IDP registar. The eading IDP advocacy agency, the Consutoría para os Derechos Humanos y e Despazamiento (CODHES), estimates that in the past 25 years the tota number dispaced is some 4.92 miion of whom 286,000 were dispaced in 2009 (CODHES 2010). IDPs as a proportion of the tota nationa popuation are generay beieved to be between 5.4 percent (Ibáñez & Veásquez 2008) and 8.6 percent (Carrio 2009). Many IDPs are either unaware of their rights, do not seek registration or are turned down. Those who fee miitary operations to eradicate iicit crops or whose iveihoods have been destroyed by aeria spraying are unabe to get registered. It is thought that ony haf the IDP popuation in Bogotá are registered (Abuja & Cebaos 2010). Given the arge number not incuded in the RUPD, some anaysts beieve that one in ten Coombians is internay dispaced. Many organisations interviewed by the HRI team incuding donor government representatives specuated that officia IDP figures were deiberatey downpayed during the end of the Uribe administration so as to paint a positive picture of its post-confict achievements and enhance Santos eection prospects. Crisis reports Coombia 141

5 142 Pight of the dispaced For many IDPs, access to basic services such as heath is irreguar. This particuary affects IDP women who bear more chidren, have ess access to contraception and have rates of sexuay- transmitted infections greater than those of non-dispaced Coombians (Quintero & Cuer 2009). There is a high rate of famiy breakdown in urban paces of refuge as unempoyed IDP men ose their patriarcha roe as famiy providers (Véez & Beo 2010). IDPs are victims of crime in environments on the edges of cities with imited poice presence and active crimina gangs. Residents of host communities sometimes try to cash in on the assistance received by IDPs, robbing them of cash aid or intimidating them into handing over vouchers and food (Carrio 2009). Their ow eve of education, rura iveihood skis together with the fact that a significant number are douby discriminated against as they are Afro- Coombians make it difficut for IDPs to enter the forma urban economy. If they can find casua empoyment, mae IDPs are often construction abourers, porters, vendors or car washers whie women generay work as domestics or street vendors. On average, they earn between a haf and two thirds of the ega minimum wage (Cario 2009). Women, chidren and oder peope often beg. IDPs are generay ineigibe for government pans to egaise informa settements and are forced to ive in high-risk areas such as unstabe hisides or riverbanks. Many IDPs do not have a financia and credit history and cannot get mortgages to enter the forma and and property market. There are numerous conficts between IDPs and the rights of others (Ceis 2009). Centra and oca administrations face the chaenge of striking a baance between providing targeted assistance for IDPs and assisting the genera urban poor, many of whom resent positive discrimination in favour of IDP incomers. Extreme urban poverty resuts in many nondispaced peope caiming IDP status, thus adding to agencies verification burdens. The fact that IDPs are geographicay dispersed, frequenty move and do not generay participate in oca eections either out of apathy or because of intimidation from armed urban non-state actors means that few oca poiticians have any interest in cutivating or supporting them (Ibáñez & Veásquez 2008). State denies humanitarian crisis Previous HRI reports have noted the astuteness with which the Uribe administration sought to render the humanitarian crisis invisibe (Hidago 2007 and Espada 2008 & 2009). The government now asserts that FARC is no onger an organised non-state actor but simpy a remnant band of narcoterrorists. Its post-confict discourse asserts there is no armed confict, ony a security and anti-narcotics situation that the state has the capacity to hande without internationa intervention, attention or scrutiny. The government cites the exampe of Provincia Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan (where the miitary coordinates and provides security for humanitarian and deveopment activities) to argue its approach is in accordance with internationa norms. The fact that Coombia is a middeincome country with we-functioning pubic institutions, a judicia system that acts as a counter-weight to the administration and a egisative framework acknowedging IDP rights further reinforces the officia position. The effects of the confict are argey fet in rura areas disproportionatey affecting Afro-Coombians, indigenous communities and women and thus, far from the concerns of most urbanites. Though the majority of IDPs are in cities, they often maintain a ow profie. Reativey itte is known about urban IDPs, making it hard for humanitarian organisations to estimate their numbers, assess their assistance and protection needs or understand whether or how their situation differs from that of the urban poor (Howe 2010). Whie the ega status of despazado is a form of positive discrimination (see beow) it is aso a stigma. Long-term residents of urban areas are often unsure whether to regard IDPs as victims, murderers, criminas or accompices of armed groups. Invisibiity whether driven by ow sef-esteem or fear is often their main surviva strategy. As a resut, the humanitarian crisis remains argey invisibe not ony to non-affected Coombians but aso to the dipomatic community in Bogotá. This factor together with Western geo-strategic support for Coombia regarded as a reiabe partner unike such nearby states as Venezuea, Boivia and Ecuador heps expain why in recent years donor governments have been generay reuctant to openy chaenge the government on humanitarian issues. During its mission, the HRI team was tod, with widespread regret, that the needs of IDPs are extremey overooked in mainstream poitica discourse. Interestingy, even representatives of the Agencia Presidencia para a Acción Socia y a Cooperación Internaciona (Acción Socia) the state agency responsibe for IDP registration, compiation of officia statistics and coordination of assistance to despazados amented the ack of pubic interest in dispacement. Government response to dispacement Coombia has a substantia corpus of IDP egisation, a egacy of years of civi society activism and painstaking marshaing of evidence which has ed the Constitutiona Court of Coombia to issue a series of judgements setting out IDP rights and entitements and to assume a roe monitoring state progress in adhering to past court ruings. In 2009, a further Constitutiona Court writ inked dispacement with the extinction of indigenous peopes and urged the government to end pervasive discrimination and excusion. Such judicia activism is not wecomed by many poiticians and civi servants (Ceis 2009). The egisative framework defines three phases of assistance to confict IDPs: prevention, humanitarian assistance and socio-economic stabiisation. Acción Socia is the ead IDP agency but does not have a substantia presence in many areas where confict and dispacement is greatest. Interviewees tod the HRI team that Acción Socia rejects a significant proportion of caimants. Aongside Acción Socia are a wide range of other state actors administering diverse mechanisms for prevention, protection, humanitarian response and stabiisation. The high eve of mistrust and poor cooperation between them

6 paraes the mistrust between state and civi society and IDPs and host communities (Meertens 2010). Loca governments are given responsibiities to assist IDPs but insufficient resources (Ibáñez & Veásquez 2008). Humanitarian assistance is often deayed: it can take up to two years between dispacement and receipt of the first humanitarian aid (Abuja & Cebaos 2010). IDPs are reguary forced to resort to court proceedings to caim entitements (Lari & Teff 2009). A former Constitutiona Court justice has put achievement of the IDP-friendy ega framework in perspective, regretting that permanent migration of the newy dispaced popuation into most of the country s municipaities has provided a significant reminder of the aw s inherent imitations in the face of a compex and protracted armed confict. Regardess of how strongy IDPs constitutiona rights are protected by the country s activist judges, the persistence (and, in some instances, the intensification) of the confict in Coombia wi continue to generate masses of uprooted citizens (Cepeda-Espinosa 2009). The Coombian state in contrast with most nations facing mass dispacement crises accepts the reaity that oca integration in urban environments is IDPs preferred option. However, Uribe aso promoted returns and made efforts to provide socia support to returnees in programmes substantiay funded by the US intended to demonstrate that confict is definitivey ended. There are no accurate overa figures, but it has been estimated that around 30,000 peope have returned ess than one percent of the IDP popuation (Interna Dispacement Monitoring Centre 2009). The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has isted three, seemingy insuperabe, key chaenges to durabe soutions for IDPs and the severa hundred thousand Coombian refugees in neighbouring states: imperfect registration; faiure to resove and disputes and the need for pubic poicies to recognise the differentiated protection risks and needs of women, men, chidren, youth, indigenous, Afro-Coombians, oder peope and those with disabiities (Peace Brigades Internationa 2010). Strategies to eradicate iicit crops have become toos to support the government s security objectives. The government s poicy of soey viewing coca cutivation as a financia resource for the guerrias has ed to negect of the socia, economic and poitica probems affecting coca-growing communities (Vargas Meza 2009). During the HRI mission, there were frequent assertions that the government does not recognise the humanitarian consequences of anti-narcotics poicies. Acceerated erosion of humanitarian space The security forces counterinsurgency strategy is argey based on the premise that those iving in confict areas are part of the enemy, simpy because of where they ive, abeing whoe communities as sympathetic to guerria forces. The tactics used by the government to achieve recent miitary successes have demonstrated an increasing disrespect for humanitarian principes. The government remains unapoogetic about the Juy 2008 Operation Jaque which freed 15 hostages, incuding former Coombian presidentia candidate Íngrid Betancourt. It succeeded because the Coombian miitary posed as Internationa Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) representatives, using the Red Cross embem on miitary assets in a fagrant vioation of internationa humanitarian aw which puts future access to hostages at risk (Uozumi 2008) and threatens to undo the hard-won reputation for impartiaity which has given the ICRC and the Coombian Red Cross unique access to popuations of concern in confict areas (Geremia 2009). In March 2010, the UN Specia Rapporteur on Extrajudicia Executions presented evidence that security forces have carried out a significant number of premeditated civiian murders and frauduenty presented the civiians as kied in combat, aso regretting that the government provides incentives to individua sodiers for combat kiings (Human Rights Counci 2010). The state s security agenda, despite using the anguage of civiian protection and human rights, has in fact undermined respect for Internationa Humanitarian Law and has faied to reduce eves of forced dispacement and vioence against civiians, (Ehawary 2009). The Coombian government is contributing to increasing dispacement, disguising humanitarian needs and making the crisis more invisibe. UN Photo/Mark Garten Crisis reports Coombia 143

7 144 The Pan de Consoidación a state strategy to restore authority and services in territories iberated from FARC is bostered by Presidentia Directive 001 which essentiay restricts humanitarian access by requiring humanitarian actors to coordinate activities through the miitary and Acción Socia. The UN Committee on Economic, Socia and Cutura Rights has expressed concern that the directive does not aow for genuine consutation with Afro-Coombian and indigenous IDPs (UN Economic and Socia Counci 2010). Despite it progressive rhetoric, the government s poicy converts humanitarian action into an instrument for achieving distinct non-humanitarian objectives, without consideration of the impartiaity, neutraity or independence of humanitarian organisations (Marcos 2009). Most humanitarian agencies interviewed by the HRI team contest the government s assertion of civiian eadership and note that the miitary is ceary in operationa contro. They report that sodiers are often present at heath cinics and other paces where humanitarian or state actors provide services. Many civi society actors are being co-opted by the state and by the armed forces (Marcos 2009), making them acutey vunerabe when the state is unabe to ensure security in newy iberated areas. Once miitary personne withdraw, FARC and other paramiitaries commony enact reprisas against civiians and humanitarian organisations deemed to be coaborators. There is a cimate of mistrust between the state and humanitarian actors. Many organisations interviewed reported instances of intimidation such as theft of sensitive UN and NGO documents, incuding beneficiary ists and contacts for programmes working with youth at risk from forced recruitment to FARC. Many humanitarians have received written threats from paramiitary groups. Severa respondents tod the HRI team that these often contain specific operationa information which coud ony have been provided by Coombian government inteigence sources. The fact that most of the donors active in Coombia aso participate in PRTs in Afghanistan makes it extremey difficut for donor governments to argue for nonintrusion into humanitarian space without appearing hypocritica. It is thus next to impossibe to forge a consensus on how to approach humanitarian advocacy. The European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) reported that they had tried unsuccessfuy for a month to meet with their United States (US) counterparts. Interviewees aso reported that a proposa to estabish a donor working group to discuss the impications of the Pan de Consoidación and essons from the use of PRTs in Afghanistan was not acted upon. Protection concerns As a resut of mistrust between the government and human rights defenders and itte advocacy from the internationa community there is imited diaogue on integrating human rights protection and security in rura areas where the government s eary warning system to prevent human rights vioations is judged to be useess (Internationa Crisis Group 2009) and seriousy underfunded (Human Rights Watch 2010). Kidnappings, disappearances and crimes of sexua vioence often go unreported especiay those perpetrated by armed groups. Survivors of sexua vioence ack confidence in judicia systems infitrated at oca eve by iega armed groups (Lari & Teff 2009). It is highy dangerous to ead an urban IDP association. Donors: fatigued and unsure As a resut of acceptance of the government s campaign to discourage internationa engagement in the dispacement crisis, Coombia does not have a Consoidated Appea Process (CAP). In 2009, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator acknowedged the imited internationa presence on the ground and the need to do more to strengthen the protection of civiians (Moro 2009). Very few of those interviewed by the HRI team mentioned the needs of the chronicay vunerabe dispaced and do not have any ong-term vision of how their needs can be addressed. The fact that many of their counterparts came from poitica affairs or deveopment backgrounds hampered efforts to deveop a common stance towards the Uribe government. In the words of one donor representative, Most of them have itte knowedge or understanding of humanitarian action, making it difficut to engage in meaningfu conversations with my counterparts in other embassies or agencies. The government s discouragement of humanitarian programming means that donors and humanitarian agencies have had to disguise and repackage humanitarian assistance under different programme and budget ines. Much of the funding that, in other contexts, woud be considered humanitarian is packaged in Coombia as post-confcit and deveopment assistance. This has ed to a fragmentation of donor funding and makes it next to impossibe to fuy assess the extent of humanitarian action in Coombia. Figures provided by the Financia Tracking System (FTS) thus present ony a partia picture. Nevertheess, according to reported to FTS, there was an increase in humanitarian funding in 2009 (from US$41.4 miion to US$54.8 miion). There are reativey few humanitarian donors and most have provided consistent ong-term support. ECHO was by far the argest FTS-recorded donor in 2009 (28.5 percent of the tota), foowed by Norway (12.1 percent), Germany (11 percent), the US, Netherands, Canada, Switzerand and Sweden. 9.3 percent came from the Centra Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Both donor representatives and humanitarian agencies interviewed said that it was a constant strugge to get pubicity and funding. Thus, the fact that key donors have maintained support is somewhat of an achievement. High eve visits by the heads of ECHO and the Swiss Agency for Deveopment Cooperation (SDC), as we as a 2009 visit by the UN Emergency Reief Coordinator (ERC) heped to keep some internationa attention on the confict.

8 The US, ike many other donor governments, is not primariy focused on humanitarian needs but rather wider geo-poitica interests. The US is beieved to have spent US$400 miion in 2009 on miitary and poice assistance and US$240 on economic and socia assistance (Center for Internationa Poicy 2010). The US Agency for Internationa Deveopment (USAID) acknowedges a poicy objective to strengthen the credibiity and egitimacy of the Government of Coombia (GOC) in post-confict areas and to increase the wiingness and capacity of communities to cooperate and interact with the GOC (2010). FTS figures indicate that ony US$5.3 miion of US assistance in 2009 was registered as humanitarian assistance (OCHA 2010b). The fact that Coombian government aocations for humanitarian activities are greater than the tota provided by externa donors imits possibiities for everage and advocacy. In 2009, Acción Socia s budget was approximatey US$42.7 miion. The Santos administration has pedged to doube the budget, pushed to do so by a Constitutiona Court ruing (Espada 2009). Switzerand and Spain were singed out by many humanitarian organisations interviewed for not accepting the government s stance and for expicity framing their humanitarian assistance as a response to armed confict. Other donors preferred not to openy disagree with the government. In the words of one donor representative, What s the point of arguing over the terminoogy? Is this an armed confict or not? At the end of the day, our aim is to meet humanitarian needs, and antagonising the government puts that at risk. So it s better to keep a ow profie rather than jeopardise our programming. This stance is deepy disappointing for the overwheming majority of the humanitarian organisations interviewed. There is a near universa demand for more action from donors. One non-governmenta organisation (NGO) representative summed up the prevaiing mood: we need them to stand up to the government and et them know that Presidentia Directive 001 is unacceptabe as it is compromising our work! The HRI team was tod by UN and internationa non-governmenta organisation (INGO) representatives of great disappointment at the faiure of the ERC during his visit to pubicy decare the crisis an armed confict and to hod the government to account for its roe in continuing it. Donors that were mentioned for taking a stronger advocacy roe incuded Spain, Switzerand and Sweden. ECHO, Canada and Sweden were aso praised by many of their partners for carrying out monitoring visits in the fied and accompanying humanitarian actors and affected popuations. We need them with us in the fied to et the government and miitary know we have poitica support from donor governments, said one NGO representative. It aso heps them to counter-baance the arguments presented by Acción Socia and others. Poor coordination of humanitarian response A the actors interviewed by the HRI team expressed concern about the ack of effective coordination. Government insistence on trying to channe and coordinate humanitarian assistance through Acción Socia and the miitary is the major impediment for coordination. The few humanitarian actors interviewed during the HRI mission who had accepted government conditions were extremey negative about working through Acción Socia and compained of constant poitica interference. The UN Resident Coordinator (RC) is doube-hatted, aso serving as Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). Most organisations interviewed by the HRI team report the RC/HC is far too dipomatic and fais to vigorousy pursue advocacy or coordination opportunities. Others, however, do credit him with some discreet advocacy successes. Given the weak position of OCHA and the disincentives for coordination amongst actors, ECHO attempted to faciitate underground coordination by sponsoring technica roundtabe discussions with their partners on specific programming issues, such as water and sanitation and tried to share information and anaysis. OCHA and other actors, incuding donors, were often invited. This was we appreciated by ECHO s partners. But even ECHO recognised this as an inadequate and improvised mechanism for coordination, and caed for more coordination. UNHCR and the ICRC used briefing meetings with donor government embassies as another informa mechanism for information sharing. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) has aso estabished technica working groups (not custers) in different regions of Coombia. Considering that some actors have had an operationa presence for many years in the case of OCHA and ECHO for over a decade there is surprisingy itte evidence of mid - to ong-term panning or incorporation of essons earned into donor strategies or pans. ECHO s panning and financing is sti done on a one-year cyce, despite the obvious need for continuity in programming in order to meet the recovery needs of the ong-term dispaced. This position is party the resut of EC poicies. To its credit, according to its partners, the ECHO office in Bogotá has tried to maintain maximum fexibiity. Switzerand was one of the few donors reported to have a cear strategy of inking its other programming under a humanitarian umbrea (and not the other way around). It stands out for having a mid-term pan, two to three year funding commitments and pans to deveop exit strategies and to sustainaby buid oca capacity to continue interventions it supports. Switzerand was aso one of the few donors to reference more recent deveopments in programme quaity and humanitarian accountabiity, integrating Do No Harm into its poicies and activey attempting to integrate mid-term reviews and evauations. OCHA has steadiy cemented its position as a foca point for the mutipe UN agencies present in the country. However, OCHA has to wak a deicate tightrope. Most UN agencies work directy with the government on onger-term deveopment programmes. They are with the exception of UNHCR and the UN Chidren s Fund (UNICEF) reuctant to accept OCHA s ead roe in coordination and wary of assertive UN advocacy on humanitarian issues. Crisis reports Coombia 145

9 146 Lessons earnt and recommendations for the future Coombian government strategies are contributing to increasing dispacement, disguising humanitarian needs and making the crisis more invisibe and harder to resove. There is a papabe sense of fatigue and resignation among donors and humanitarian actors and division about how to chaenge the government agenda. For many, it is easier to acquiesce without regard to the needs of vunerabe popuations. The end resut is that there is no coherent internationa approach to ensuring access to vunerabe popuations and addressing the root causes of the crisis. There is an urgent need for: 1 Diaogue: A actors, incuding the Coombian government, need to reach agreement to aow humanitarian space and recognise the rights of those affected confict and dispacement. 2 Focus on IDPs: It coud be argued there is too much detaied anaysis on the nature of the confict, counter-terrorism strategy and the drugs trade, yet not enough understanding of the needs and concerns of the dispaced. Their voices and perspectives are missing from the discourse of amost a actors. 3 Accountabiity: Coombia seems isoated from deveopment of good practice esewhere. There is itte concern around accountabiity to beneficiaries. Internationa actors must redoube efforts to encourage Acción Socia and other Coombian actors to systematicay incude affected popuations in panning and decision-making. 4 Learning from experience: It is disturbing that after decades of humanitarian response in a context where there has been reativey ow staff turnover compared to most crises that there have been so few essons earned and such continued shortterm focus. 5 Long-term strategies: Most panning and interventions seem to be reactive, with itte ong-term anaysis or investment in deveopmentfocused programmes to provide durabe soutions for IDPs. The new patterns of confict and dispacement have created further protection and assistance chaenges. The Coombian government, donors and humanitarian actors need to work together to understand and address them. 6 Coordination: The UN and donor governments must assume eadership and create a unified form to bring humanitarian issues to the forefront of poitica ife. Coordination must meaningfuy engage with government agencies such as Acción Socia, but on the basis of respect for humanitarian principes. References Abuja, S. & Cebaos, M. (2010). Urban dispacement and migration in Coombia, Forced Migration Review, No 34. Avaiabe from: [Accessed 1 October 2010) Amnesty Internationa (2009) Everything Left Behind: Interna Dispacement in Coombia. Avaiabe from: ibrary/info/amr23/015/2009/en [Accessed 2 October 2010] Carrio, A. (2009), Interna dispacement in Coombia: humanitarian, economic and socia consequences in urban settings and current chaenges, Internationa Review of the Red Cross, vo. 91, no 875. Avaiabe from: org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htma/ review-875-p527/$fie/irrc-875- carrio.pdf [Accessed 1 October 2010] Center for Internationa Poicy (2010). Just the Facts: U.S. Aid to Coombia, A Programs, Avaiabe from: y=coombia&year1=2006&year2=20 11 Ceis, A (2009). Dispacement and return in Coombia. Humanitarian Exchange, Number 45, December Avaiabe from: odihpn.org/report.asp?id=3045 Cepeda-Espinosa. M. (2009). The Constitutiona Protection of IDPs in Coombia, chapter 1 in Rodofo Arango Rivadeneira (ed), Judicia Protection of Internay Dispaced Persons: The Coombian Experience., Brookings Bern Project. Avaiabe from: Fies/rc/papers/2009/11_judicia_ protection_arango/chapter_1.pdf [Accessed 1 October 2010] CODHES (2010). Boetín informativo de a Consutoría para os Derechos Humanos y e Despazamiento, Número 76, January Avaiabe from: codhes.org/images/stories/pdf/codhes informa fina nº 76.pdf [Accessed 1 October 2010] Ehawary, S. (2009). Protecting civiians and enhancing security in Coombia: what s the difference?, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Issue 45. Avaiabe from: odihpn.org/report.asp?id=3043 Espada, F. (2009). Coombia. True Lies, Disappeared Reaities. In DARA The Humanitarian Response Index 2009: Whose Crisis? Carifying Donor s Priorities. Hampshire, UK: Pagrave Macmian. Espada, F (2008). Coombia: The Dispaced and the Forgotten. In DARA The Humanitarian Response Index 2008: Donor Accountabiity in Humanitarian Action. Hampshire, UK: Pagrave Macmian. Geremia, M. (2009). Neutraity, impartiaity and independence in Coombia: an ICRC Humanitarian Practice Network (2009). Humanitarian Exchange, Number 45, December. Avaiabe from: odihpn.org/documents/ humanitarianexchange045a.pdf Hidago, S. (2007). Coombia: A Crisis Conceaed. In DARA The Humanitarian Response Index 2007: Measuring Commitment to Best Practice. Hampshire, UK: Pagrave Macmian.

10 Howe, K. (2010). Confict transformation and the urban dispaced in Coombia. In Humanitarian Exchange, Number 45, December London: Overseas Deveopment Institute. humanitarianexchange045a.pdf Human Rights Counci (2010). Report of the Specia Rapporteur on extrajudicia, summary or arbitrary executions, Phiip Aston. Mission to Coombia. Avaiabe from: appication/media/14 HRC Mission to Coombia (A.HRC Add.2_ en).pdf Human Rights Watch (2010). Paramiitaries Heirs: The New Face of Vioence in Coombia. Avaiabe from: [Accessed 2 October 2010] Ibáñez, A. & Veásquez, A. (2008). Pubic Poicies to Assist Internay Dispaced Persons: The Roe of Municipa Authorities. Avaiabe from: media/fies/rc/reports/2008/1203_ coombia_ibanez/1203_coombia_ ibanez.pdf [Accessed 14 October 2010] Internationa Crisis Group (2010). Improving Security Poicy in Coombia. Avaiabe from: (Onine) Avaiabe at: en/regions/atin-america-caribbean/ andes/coombia/b23-improvingsecurity-poicy-in-coombia.aspx Lari, A. & Teff. M. (2009). Coombia: Dispaced Women Demand Their Rights. Refugees Internationa Fied Report. Avaiabe from: refint.org/poicy/fied-report/ coombia-dispaced-women-demandtheir-rights [Accessed 30 September 2010] Marcos, R. (2009). Miitary participation in humanitarian action: refections on the Coombia case. Humanitarian Exchange, Number 45. Avaiabe from: humanitarianexchange045a.pdf Meertens. D. (2010). Forced dispacement and women s security in Coombia, Disasters, vo. 32. Avaiabe from: wiey.com/journa/ / abstract?cretry=1&sretry=0 Quintero, A. & Cuer, T. (2009). IDP heath in Coombia: needs and chaenges, Forced Migration Review. No. 33. Avaiabe from: FMR33/70-71.pdf [Accessed 2 October 2010] UN Economic and Socia Counci (2010). Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under Artices 16 and 17 of the Covenant. 21 May Avaiabe from: www2.ohchr.org/engish/bodies/ cescr/docs/co/e.c.12.col.co.5_ AUV.doc Accessed 2 October 2010] Uozumi, E. (2008). Does The End Justify The Means? The Misuse of the ICRC Embem By Coombian Inteigence In Its Hostage Rescue Mission. Avaiabe from: USAID (2010). Transition Initiatives: Coombia Avaiabe from: initiatives/country/coombia2/index. htm [Accessed 14 October 2010] Crisis reports Coombia Instituto de Estudios para e Desarroo y a Paz (2010). Resumen de Cuarto Informe Sobre Grupos Narcoparamiitares. Avaiabe from: attachments/497_resumen - Cuarto informe de grupos narcoparamiitares 2010 fina.pdf [Accessed 30 September 2010] Interna Dispacement Monitoring Centre (Juy 2009), Coombia: New dispacement continues, response sti ineffective, Avaiabe from:. org/ f004be3b1/(httpinfo Fies)/5BCA28006BFAA8ADC125 75E8005CBF23/$fie/Coombia+- +Juy+2009.pdf [Accessed 2 October 2010] Moro, B. (2009). Impementing humanitarian reform in Coombia. Humanitarian Exchange, Number 45, December Avaiabe from: asp?id=3055 [Accessed 30 September 2010] Peace Brigades Internationa (2010), Forced dispacement in Coombia: a crime and a humanitarian tragedy. Avaiabe from: reiefweb.int/rw/rwfies2010. nsf/fiesbyrwdocunidfiename/ VVOS-83CSWM-fu_report. pdf/$fie/fu_report.pdf [Accessed 30 September 2010] Petrich, B. (2010). Coombia: Uribe s seguridad democrática strategy a matter of socia perception. La Jornada. 6 August Avaiabe from: coombia-uribes-strategy/ [Accessed 30 September 2010] Vargas Meza, R. (2009). Drug-trafficking, anti-narcotics poicy and security: another humanitarian cost of the Coombian confict. Humanitairan Exchange, Number 45. Avaiabe from: Véez, O. & Beo, A. (2010), Summary Report Famiy breakdown in Bogotá, Forced Migration Review, no. 34. Avaiabe from: fmreview.org/urban-dispacement/ FMR34/69-70.pdf [Accessed 2 October 2010] Information based on fied interviews with key humanitarian agencies in Coombia from 2 to 8 May 2010, and 87 questionnaires on donor performance (incuding 77 OECD/ DAC donors). The HRI team, composed of Eva Cervantes, Iñaki Martín-Eresta, Ana Martiningui and Phiip Tamminga (Team eader), contributed to this report. They express their gratitude to a those interviewed in Coombia. 147