INTER-STATE RELATIONS WITHIN LATIN AMERICA

Transcription

1 CHAPTER 10 INTER-STATE RELATIONS WITHIN LATIN AMERICA Learning outcomes After reading this chapter, you shoud be abe to: Identify the strategic aternatives to US power adopted by Latin American states. Examine how the Cod War shaped the context of internationa reations. Expore the features of the post-cod War era and the impact of gobaization. Anayze key themes shaping reations in the region today. INTRODUCTION This chapter examines the reationships between the countries of Latin America and the main factors that infuence the poicies adopted by governments towards their neighbours. However, any discussion of foreign poicies in Latin America cannot begin without acknowedging the overwheming importance of the US in their evoution. Reations between states in the region have aways been conducted under the umbrea of US predominance (see Chapter 11). A particuary important factor in the recent evoution of those reations was the Cod War, during which Washington aimed to assert its dominance (see Chapter 2). The Cod War greaty restricted Latin America s room for manoeuvre in foreign poicymaking by putting countries under pressure to aign with the US in its strugge with the Soviet Union. Most foreign poicy was considered in terms of how it woud be viewed in Washington and this imited the abiity of states to act autonomousy in internationa arenas. Latin American countries had three options: they coud co-operate with US security priorities; they coud oppose the US, but risk sanctions; or they coud seek isoation (Tuchin and Espach, 2001). As a resut, many often pursued poices that refected an introspective and defensive vision of nationa interests, were preoccupied with sovereignty, and aso viewed each other as either communist or non-communist. Such perspectives suppressed mutua understanding within Latin America, fueing distrust, and they hep to expain both a ack of activity conducted at a regiona eve and competition between riva states. However, the end of the Cod War has greaty expanded the opportunities open to countries to co-operate within the framework 269

2 POLITICS LATIN AMERICA provided by economic integration and gobaization (see Chapter 16). Schoars of internationa reations now seek to deveop a theoretica framework in which to understand the ways in which Latin American states behave in the internationa arena and the toos they can use to further their interests. RESPONSES TO US POWER Latin American foreign poicies have been shaped by the reaity of US power and have adapted in response to changing US priorities (Smith, 2000; see Chapter 11). A centra continuity in internationa reations has been this asymmetry between strong and weak neighbours, athough there have been exampes of interactions between sma Latin American states and their powerfu northern neighbour in which the former have gained the advantage. Pastor (2001) cites the roe payed by Genera Omar Torrijos ( ) in negotiating back contro of the Panama Cana through a treaty signed in September 1977, for exampe, as a watershed in US Latin American reations. Pastor agues that Torrijos demonstrated that Latin Americans coud achieve goas in the US by understanding the ways in which Washington works. Simiary, the administration in Mexico of Caros Sainas de Gortari ( ) empoyed sophisticated obbying to hep persuade a sceptica US Congress to accept the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and secured gains as a resut. Smith (2000) has argued that, over time, Latin America has deveoped distinct strategic aternatives to US power which became avaiabe in differing degrees and combinations at different periods. A number of Latin American poicy aternatives can be identified: The Boivarian notion of unification Appeas to continenta unity have recurred in Latin America and persist in the form of integration projects such as Mercosur (ibid.) (see Boxes 10.6, 14.1). Athough the idea of continenta unity has not taken a fixed institutiona form, it demonstrated its potentia by reinforcing Latin America s insistence on the principes of sef-determination and non-intervention from the 1890s to the 1930s; in the formuation of a widey shared economic phiosophy across the region after the 1940s; and in the settement of the Centra American conficts by Latin American countries themseves in the 1980s. Support and protection from extrahemispheric powers A prominent feature of Latin America s strategic reations has been a baancing strategy to avoid excessive dependence on the US and increase the region s everage vis-à-vis the US within the goba system through the consoidation of increased ties with other powers or regions (Tuchin and Espach, 2001). Some Latin American countries sought cose ties with Great Britain in the nineteenth century (see Chapter 1), with the USSR during the Cod War (see Box 2.3, Chapter 17), and to a more imited extent with Europe and the Asia-Pacific regions in the contemporary era (Smith, 2000; see aso Chapter 12). 270

3 INTER- STATE RELATIONS WITHIN LATIN AMERICA Sub-regiona predominance Since Independence, some of the arger Latin American countries have entertained notions of being the dominant power in their vicinity, and Brazi and Mexico had emperors, abeit briefy (see Chapter 1). Argentina and Brazi competed to be the dominant power in the Southern Cone sub-region in the nineteenth century, and during the Cod War buit up their miitary forces and engaged in a race to secure nucear capabiities (see Box 10.1). In recent years, Brazi has sought a high-profie internationa roe in trade negotiations, peacekeeping, arms contro and within the United Nations, and is today emerging as a regiona power. Venezuea has increasingy sought to assert itsef in South America, pioneering its own integration initiatives such as the Aternativa Boivariana para América Latina y e Caribe (ALBA, Boivarian Aternative for the Americas, see Box 17.1), and has often competed with Coombia for sub-regiona pre-eminence. BOX 10.1 CASE STUDY Nucear weapons programmes in the Southern Cone Argentina and Brazi engaged in a race to deveop nucear capabiities during the Cod War despite a regiona initiative to prohibit nucear weaponry under the 1967 Treaty of Tateoco, and ony scaed their programmes back with the inauguration of a new era of co-operation in the 1990s (see Sotomayor Veázquez, 2004). Argentina s nucear programme was aunched in 1949 under President Juan Domingo Perón ( , ) and from an eary stage envisaged a weapons capacity, with Argentina gaining the knowedge to produce the putonium or highy enriched uranium necessary for bombs but not having sufficient raw materia to do so. Argentina was dependent on the US for suppies of enriched uranium for its research programme and, in the 1970s, these were hated by Washington. It continued with pans to deveop nucear submarines, and experts on nucear proiferation became convinced Argentina had the determination and capacity to become a nucear power. With the end of miitary rue in the 1980s, the nucear programme ost direction and the armed forces confirmed that the country had ost the technica capabiity to become a nucear power. The Braziian miitary government that took power in 1964 became worried about the progress Argentina had made in deveoping a nucear capabiity and, in 1971, decided to acquire a nucear reactor from the US. Like Argentina, Brazi needed to import suppies of enriched fue and, as a resut, had to accept the imposition of nucear safeguards by the Internationa Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Brazi s miitary junta then reached a dea with West Germany that it hoped woud finay give the country an advanced nucear capabiity, but US pressure ed to imitations on the project. However, another nucear programme to buid the equipment necessary to enrich uranium bought from China was run in secret and was not covered by nucear safeguards. By 1979 the army had begun digging a huge shaft in the Amazon junge to carry out atomic testing (Abright, 1989; Redick, 1972; Ader, 1987; Krasno, 1994; Sotomayor Veázquez, 2004). A congressiona report pubished in 1990 reveaed that the former miitary ruers had intended to buid an atomic bomb through a programme not known to civiian authorities (see t 271

4 POLITICS LATIN AMERICA Box 10.1 continued Sotomayor Veázquez, 2004). President Fernando Coor de Meo ( ) shut down the programme as soon as it was uncovered. In November 1990 Presidents Caros Menem ( ) of Argentina and Coor de Meo signed an internationa agreement renouncing the deveopment of nucear weapons and creating institutiona verification mechanisms under the auspices of the IAEA. In 1991, under US pressure, Brazi and Argentina paced their nucear faciities under the supervision of the IAEA and committed themseves to peacefu nucear programmes, and in 1997 Brazi signed the Nucear Non-Proiferation Treaty (NPT). These treaties ended the nucear arms race in South America and heraded a new era of co-operation between Argentina and Brazi. However, in 2004 Brazi announced that it intended to buid a uranium enrichment faciity to produce fue for its two nucear power pants and for commercia export. The NPT aows signatory states under IAEA auspices to produce enriched uranium to power nucear reactors, to store spent fue and to reprocess fue. However, the announcement put further pressure on the NPT and generated renewed concern in Washington and among its aies, which fear states such as Iran, which has aso been buiding uranium enrichment faciities, coud use these to produce the putonium needed for bombs. Brazi has the sixth argest uranium reserves in the word and has had the capacity to enrich uranium since In 2003 Brazi s science and technoogy minister, Roberto Amara, aso tod the BBC s Braziian service that his country shoud not rue out acquiring the scientific knowedge necessary to buid an atomic bomb (bbc.co.uk, 2003). Use of internationa aw Latin American states have at times sought to empoy internationa aw or sought the protection of internationa organizations as a strategic aternative to US domination, on the assumption that the principes of internationa aw can protect weaker countries from arbitrary actions by stronger ones. In the eary twentieth century, for exampe, many Latin American countries supported efforts to gain internationa recognition of the Drago Doctrine, named after an Argentine foreign minister, Luis María Drago (b.1859 d.1921), that chaenged the ega right of the great powers, incuding the US, to use force to recover debts. Yet many of these ega principes were in abeyance during the Cod War, or are disregarded by powerfu states. South-South soidarity Latin American states have at times tried to forge inks with other Third Word nations in an effort to fashion an independent foreign poicy, particuary during the Cod War, through affiiation with the Non-Aigned Movement (NAM) or the G77 movement that pressed for changes in internationa trading reations. Such initiatives have had itte success, often because of differences within these movements themseves, athough they have been important in shaping debates and perspectives on goba affairs among their members. A number of Latin American countries beong to the NAM or, ike Brazi, send observers to its meetings. Cuba has been at the forefront of efforts to forge inks 272

5 INTER- STATE RELATIONS WITHIN LATIN AMERICA with other deveoping regions and has been infuentia within the NAM, hosting the organization s summit in 1979 and more recenty in September Cuba has retained an internationaist perspective in a bid to mitigate the attempts of the US to isoate it. In September 2005, for exampe, Cuba announced the creation of an internationa brigade of medics to assist countries hit by natura disasters. Cuba aso provides speciaist heath services for thousands of poor Latin Americans who trave to the isand for free medica treatment. Under an agreement with Panama, for exampe, Cuba promised to provide eye surgery for up to 12,000 Panamanian patients each year in a scheme that greaty heped the two countries improve dipomatic reations. In June 2006 Boivian doctors staged protests against an infux of Cuban medics offering free care in rura and poor areas of the country. Socia revoution The option of revoution represented a strategic aternative to US power during the Cod War, but this coud ony succeed with the protection of an extra-hemispheric power, and so the fate of revoutions became tied to reations between the superpowers (Smith, 2000). Revoutions in Cuba and Nicaragua provoked US hostiity based on a fear of the reationship between the revoutionary regimes and the Soviet Union, athough in both cases Washington s response was probaby counterproductive. The main questions that revoutions posed incuded whether the US pushed these countries coser to its adversaries, or whether they took such a step wiingy for ideoogica reasons (Pastor, 2001). To this ist of the strategic aternatives to US dominance pursued in Latin America there can be added another option: cutura resistance (Smith, 2000). Latin American responses to US power have often taken the form of distinctive ideoogica outooks and anti-americanism with an emphasis on nationa sef-determination and identity (see Box 10.2). BOX 10.2 SOCIETY Anti-Americanism The danger inherent in any discussion of anti-americanism within Latin America, or any other region of the word for that matter, is that this can draw upon and reinforce generaizations and stereotypes that hinder more detaied expanations for hostie sentiments towards the US. It can aso ignore the reaity of anti-latin American sentiment within the US itsef, which has been much in evidence from time to time among both poiticians and the popuation, fueed in particuar by increases in Hispanic immigration (see Box 11.7). Finay, it can overook pro-american sentiments that may exist in Latin America simutaneousy with antipathy towards the US. McPherson (2003) has examined the phenomenon of anti-americanism in inter-american dipomacy and points out that this coexisted with pro-americanism in the region and was a diverse t 273

6 POLITICS LATIN AMERICA Box 10.2 continued and variabe sentiment, depending on the circumstances and country in which it coud be found. McPherson argues that, in norma times, Latin American eaders and even fervent nationaists jugged a variety of positive and negative perceptions of the US simutaneousy. He points out that it has been crises that have tended to intensify these perceptions, highight their incompatibiity and so test cutura and poitica oyaties to the US. In turn, US responses to anti-americanism have tended to dispay a resiient beief that, under the right circumstances, such sentiments can be reversed. Expressions of anti-american sentiment within Latin America are, therefore, highy diverse, dynamic and very difficut to measure, and expanations for them in any given context may combine historica and cutura factors that draw upon a certain interpretation of past circumstances with more immediate poitica and economic factors based upon the reationship between a particuar country and the US at a given moment. It is often impicit in media reports, for exampe, that the position towards the US adopted by a poitica eader is a refection of the posture assumed by the popuation of his or her country as a whoe, but this is highy miseading. The Coombian president Avaro Uribe (2002 ) has maintained friendy reations with Washington and co-operated with its key foreign poicy priorities, for exampe, making Coombia the key US ay in the region (see Box 11.2), whie his neighbour in Venezuea, Hugo Chávez (1999 ), has maintained hostie reations and used strident rhetoric denouncing US poicies (see beow). However, the Coombian eft has ong been an impacabe critic of US imperiaism in Latin America and eements of the Venezuean right have been in cose, mutuay supportive contact with Washington in their efforts to weaken the Chávez regime. Moreover, anti-americanism is a very hard concept to define, and McPherson points out that schoars have used various terms to expain what they mean when they use this term, from an ideoogy, attitude, stance or tendency to a mindset, sense, predisposition, sentiment or type of bias. Where expressions of hostiity have been in evidence, these can often be expained as much by their historica and poitica context as by any deep-seated or residua hatred of North Americans. Expressions of hostiity in Latin America to peope from the North in the pre-independence era often refected mutua antipathy between the Ango-Saxon and Hispanic crowns that was infuenced by reigious differences. Northern coonists inherited the attitudes of Great Britain and revied the Spanish crown and its institutions as an enemy of their vaues, whie Spanish coonists disiked and distrusted the northerners, whom they considered heretica (Smith, 2005). In the nineteenth century, expressions of mutua hostiity grew more common as the young, expansionist US began to assert itsef both in miitary terms and economicay in the hemisphere and gobay (see Chapter 1). Again, however, hostiity to the cutura, poitica or economic infuence of the US in Latin America existed aongside equay potent positive appraisas of the North as a mode of repubican virtue and ibera progress in a these areas. The emergence of nationaist ideoogy and the poarization created by the Cod War gave anti-americanism a more discernibe poitica character during the twentieth century as a component of other ideoogies, often subsuming it under the broader category of anti-imperiaism (see Chapters 11, 13, 14). Anti-American sentiments that persist in the contemporary era are as contingent and variabe as ever, often refecting the poitica differences between an incumbent eader and Washington in much the same way as the 274

7 INTER- STATE RELATIONS WITHIN LATIN AMERICA Box 10.2 continued sentiments of antipathy that can be expressed between opposing poitica parties within the same egisature. However, there are aso frequent signs in Latin America of a more traditiona resistance to US infuence that tap into nationaistic sentiments. Vioent anti-american protests were staged at the Summit of the Americas meeting of heads of state in Mar de Pata, Argentina, in November 2005, for exampe. Nationaism (see Chapter 14) remains a potent force in Latin America and has been manifested in recent years by governments in the region questioning the neoibera economic poicies uncriticay promoted by the US (see Chapter 16). The Cuban government has maintained a strident anti-americanism in the internationa arena and aready poor reations between the Cuban regime and the US decined further during the presidency of George W. Bush (2001 ), with the Castro government putting up scores of posters in the capita Havana, for exampe, caricaturing Bush as both a fascist and a vampire. Venezuea s popuist eader Chávez revived nationaist rhetoric that describes the US as a threat to regiona interests and has pursued regiona poicies that directy chaenge US infuence (see Box 17.1). In June 2005 at an Organization of American States (OAS) summit in Forida, Chávez accused the US of seeking to impose a goba dictatorship. On other occasions he characterized Latin American countries that supported US free trade initiatives as apdogs and accused the US of panning to invade his country. Chávez purchased 100,000 Russian assaut rifes with which to arm members of a miion-strong reserve force he promised to create to resist any US invasion. The Venezuean eader aso proposed deveoping nucear power capabiities with the hep of Latin American neighbours ike Brazi (see Box 10.1), and with Iran, whose own nucear programme he vigorousy defended. Angry at what he caimed were persistent destabiization attempts by Washington, he threatened to stop oi suppies to the US and announced in June 2006 that the country woud be repacing its feet of US fighter jets with Russian aircraft. US responses to Chávez s posturing grew angrier over time, and in February 2006 the Defence Secretary Donad Rumsfed ikened the Venezuean eader s rise to power to that of Germany s Nazi eader Adof Hiter. In Apri 2006, Washington accused Venezuean officias of being compicit in an attack in Caracas on the car of the US ambassador to Venezuea. Yet at the same time, both the Cuban and Venezuean governments have tried to reach out to poorer sectors of American society. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, for exampe, Cuba offered to send 1,500 doctors to the US, athough Washington did not respond to the offer. Aongside its strident criticisms, Venezuea has aso courted US pubic opinion, offering hep in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and concessionary fue rates to poorer urban areas in the US. Anti-American feeings when combined with nationaism are remarkaby durabe. Cuban anti-americanism is given force by continuing economic and poitica differences between the two countries that have their origins in the Cod War but aso in a more compex and onger reationship with the US that began during Cuba s nationaist strugge for independence in the ate nineteenth century (see Boxes 2.3, 11.5). In Puerto Rico in mid-2005, the death of Fiiberto Ojeda Rios, a fugitive nationaist, in a shootout with FBI agents provoked protests in San Juan, the capita. Puerto Rico was taken over by the US after its victory against Spain in Cuba in 1898 and is so thoroughy integrated into the poitica system that Puerto Ricans are US citizens. 275

8 POLITICS LATIN AMERICA At the same time, Latin American states aways had the option of aigning themseves with the US in deference to its power or in pursuit of tactica advantage. The Cod War offered Latin American countries the prospect of a cose association with the US, and gave the authoritarian right a strategic opportunity to invoke the cause of anti-communism to justify its caims on power. More recenty, Mexico, Centra American and Caribbean countries, and even those traditionay ess cose to Washington such as Argentina, have pursued this option by seeking an institutionaized reationship with the US through instruments such as NAFTA or even currency parity with the doar. Parity with the doar, or use of the doar itsef, has been adopted by severa Latin American countries in the past. Smith (2000) has argued that such initiatives can suggest a tactica move that coud unrave if it does not generate resuts. The fa of the Berin Wa in 1989 and the end of bi-poar superpower tensions had important consequences for Latin America because it further imited the region s foreign poicy options. Now there was itte way of avoiding the reaity of US power whie the writ of internationa aw and mutiatera organizations remained imited. This has had severa effects. First, without the geopoitica structure imposed by the Cod War, Latin America has received ess attention from the big powers than before (Tuchin and Espach, 2001). The US and Europe both see Latin America as a promising market but not as a strategic priority (ibid.). The US has reegated regiona issues in importance and its foreign poicy priorities since 2001 have focused on the Midde East and the Isamic word. President George W. Bush (2001 ) and Secretary of State Condoeezza Rice eft poicymaking on Latin America to neoconservative ideoogues such as Roger Noriega, the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs unti September 2005, and the former White House aide Otto Reich. In February 2006 it was reported that Robert Zoeick, the US Deputy Secretary of State, had warned Rice of the danger of negecting Latin America (Webb-Vida, 2006). One resut of this negect has been the predominance of miitaryto-miitary ties between the US and Latin American armed forces, often outside the scrutiny of democratic institutions. Diamint has argued that, as a resut, the US Southern Command responsibe for a US miitary activities in Centra America, the Caribbean and South America has acquired a dangerous autonomy resuting in proposas for forms of miitary co-operation that may in fact be unawfu (Diamint, 2004, p. 54). At the same time, Europe has become preoccupied with the tensions within its own integration project and security on its south-eastern borders (see Chapter 12). Latin America has not been a high priority party because it does not pose a threat to the states that dominate word affairs. Nor have Latin American countries been assertive in projecting their power in the goba system, and they are not among the most infuentia payers in internationa affairs (ibid.). Tuchin and Espach (2001) argue that Latin American states were unsure how to take advantage of the new circumstances of the 1990s; have shown itte confidence and a ack of strategic thinking in exporing options for enhanced goba roes; and continue to 276

9 INTER- STATE RELATIONS WITHIN LATIN AMERICA fixate on the principe of sovereignty. Whie not being a US priority may have given Latin Americans more room for manoeuvre, Tuchin and Espach argue that the egacy of US power has continued to weigh heaviy upon Latin American countries and these continue to define their strategic options in terms of how best to respond to the US. Smith (2000) agrees that Latin American eaders have itte choice but to foow US poicy prescriptions and seek accommodation with Washington and the advanced industria countries. Second, by encouraging a shift away from anti-communist dictatorships and broadening the ideoogica spectrum of governments with which the US had to do business, the new post-cod War circumstances renewed a need for Washington to empoy dipomacy. The reaxation of Cod War security tensions offered the prospect of a regiona consensus on principes such as free trade and integration. Yet there have been contradictory tendencies in Latin American dipomatic reations. A round of hemispheric summits got underway in the 1990s, offering a new mode of reations between Latin America and the US based on consensus (ibid.). These summits (usuay excuding Cuba) were important because they treated a the region s democracies as equas and depended for their success on the co-ordinated progress of a the participants. By contrast, proposas to estabish NAFTA were perceived as an effort to create an excusive boc that threatened the access of other Latin American states to the US market. The deepening of US Latin American reations was aso sowed down by US domestic issues, with support for further integration waning in Washington and President Bi Cinton ( ) unabe to secure fast-track negotiating power to press ahead with an extension of the free-trade agenda (see Box 16.4). Observers in Latin America saw this as a sign that the US coud be an unreiabe partner in the project of hemispheric integration. Since the fa of the sociaist boc, the watchword of internationa reations in Latin America has been gobaization, the increasingy transnationa nature of capitaist deveopment that refects the emergence of a new internationa order since the end of the Cod War (see Box 16.5). In this new order, the US has enjoyed miitary pre-eminence aongside a new economic mutipoarity based on centres of growth in different regions of the word. The post-cod War word is mutiayered because of the uneven distribution of internationa economic and poitica power (ibid.). Western vaues have been spreading wordwide through democracy, the free market and communications technoogy, and these have been enshrined in emergent supra-nationa ega mechanisms such as the Word Trade Organization (WTO). The arrest in the UK in 1998 of Chie s former dictator Augusto Pinochet ( ) on murder charges at the request of Spain is evidence of an internationa discourse of universa human rights that chaenges the principe of nationa sovereignty (see Farer (ed.), 1996). There is much evidence of the abiity of the internationa community to enforce its power upon nationa governments, yet at the same time there is an inconsistency in the appication of these vaues by goba powers. Washington has, at times, adopted apparenty contradictory positions on human rights towards 277

10 POLITICS LATIN AMERICA China and the Midde East, for exampe. The internationa debate about its incarceration of terrorist suspects at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba has highighted a contingent US approach to the universaity of human rights. Enhanced activity by mutiatera institutions, non-state actors and transnationa corporations, socia movements and NGOs (see Chapter 9) as we as organized crime have aso compicated a picture of internationa reations traditionay based on sovereign-nation states, and thus chaenge traditiona ideas of sovereignty (Smith, 2001). Internationa NGOs and socia networks have demonstrated a capacity to infuence domestic poicies around the word on issues such as human rights and environmentaism. The internationaization of investment has increased the power of mutinationa corporations, and these increasingy infuence the agendas of institutions such as the Word Bank. Growing interest in the concept of economic gobaization is a product of this transformation (see Chapter 16). Options avaiabe in the foreign reations of Latin American states today are aso shaped by widening differences between individua countries and between sub-regions such as the Andes and the Southern Cone. The effects of gobaization have been uneven in Latin America and processes of regiona integration are widening these differences, suggesting each country wi pursue its own interests as it seeks greater insertion into the word economy. For exampe, Ecuador, Costa Rica and other Centra American nations joined forces with the US banana industry in a awsuit at the WTO that had important impications for the industry in reativey cose Caribbean countries (Tuchin and Espach, 2001). An internationa system characterized by increasing gobaization has important impications for domestic poicies. First, economic integration means domestic poicy decisions have internationa impications and so interna disputes can weaken foreign reations. In Brazi in 1999, for exampe, pubic disagreements between Itamar Franco, the governor of Minas Gerais state, and President Fernando Enrique Cardoso ( ) over the repayment of federa oans precipitated Brazi s dramatic currency devauation which contributed to economic recession across the Southern Cone. At the same time, the internationa community can modify domestic decisions. In Venezuea, scepticism among internationa investors forced Chávez to modify pans to cose down Congress and the Supreme Court as part of a commitment to rewriting the constitution. These inks between domestic and foreign poicy have prompted some schoars to deveop the notion of intermestic issues simutaneousy invoving both foreign and domestic actors and decision-making processes (van Kaveren, 2001). POLICY OPTIONS Tuchin and Espach (2001) argue that an institutionaist account of internationa behaviour, by which a country s infuence is party determined by the nature and 278

11 INTER- STATE RELATIONS WITHIN LATIN AMERICA extent of its invovement in internationa institutions, is suitabe for assessing Latin American poicy options in the context of gobaization (see Box 10.3). Institutionaist theory suggests that internationa institutions benefit ess powerfu states in two ways: they offer ess powerfu states a more equa forum for the expression and pursuit of their interests; and the commitment of powerfu countries to these institutions restrains these from acting uniateray and gives them incentives to pursue their interests through mutiatera initiatives (ibid.). BOX 10.3 THEORIES AND DEBATES Institutionaism and reaism Institutionaist perspectives in internationa reations offer an aternative position to infuentia reaist perspectives that assume the existence of an internationa arena without order characterized by inter-state confict and the sef-interested pursuit of power by sovereign nation-states (Tuchin and Espach, 2001). Reaists beieve that, in the absence of a framework within which this pursuit of power can be managed such as that provided by the Cod War rivary between the US and Soviet Union the word is dangerous and contentious. They argue that internationa institutions and aiances such as the United Nations or the North Atantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are vaued by dominant parties pragmaticay ony to the extent that they are usefu to them. Institutionaist perspectives, by contrast, point to growing interdependence and shared interests and vaues among states, which increasingy pursue their interests through internationa institutions based on rues and norms of conduct. Institutions are changing the reations between states and their behaviour and strategies, and the presence of institutions raises the stakes for states that come into confict and provides incentives for the peacefu resoution of disputes. Power is defined not just by miitary might but by economic competitiveness, skis and high-technoogy capacity, and the abiity to assert infuence abroad. Tuchin and Espach (2001) suggest that for countries in Latin America that have itte power in the reaist sense, participation in internationa institutions offers ways of enhancing their infuence. Critics of the institutionaist perspective argue that the patterns of behaviour to which it draws attention wi function so ong as these benefit the powerfu countries that dominate institutions, set the rues and pressure weaker countries to foow them in order to maintain their dominant position. However, effective insertion into the internationa system is not a one-way process. On the one hand, it can impy the opening up of poitics to foreign scrutiny in the quest for greater internationa egitimacy. The internationa monitoring of eections has grown consideraby in Latin America, with countries such as Mexico overturning generations of tradition by opening up its pos to foreign observers in 1994, and the OAS and UN monitoring a string of eections in troubed countries 279

12 POLITICS LATIN AMERICA such as E Savador, Guatemaa, Paraguay and Haiti. The OAS operates a Unit for the Promotion of Democracy which has observed eections in a majority of its member states and supports efforts to decentraize governments, modernize parties, strengthen egisatures and consoidate democratic vaues. On the other hand, effective insertion into the internationa system can impy even further poitica change. Chie, for exampe, embraced the rues of the emerging internationa system and enjoyed infuence in the 1990s as a mode of neoibera reform and democratic transition, but this did not exempt it from further interventions by the internationa community regarding its human rights egacy and judicia processes foowing the arrest of Pinochet. Internationa egitimacy requires more than rhetorica adherence to the vaues and objectives of the internationa community, and countries that do not measure up to internationa standards in punishing human rights vioations are at particuar risk of condemnation (Tuchin and Espach, 2001). Five key themes emerge in the anaysis of Latin American internationa reations today: sovereignty, mutiateraism, regionaism, security and democracy. Sovereignty One product of the new internationa context has been the redefinition by Latin American governments of a traditiona understanding of sovereignty that rejected any interference in the domestic affairs of a nation-state by an outside power. This traditiona interpretation of sovereignty has ong been a defining characteristic of internationa reations in Latin America and was embedded in Artice 18 of the Charter of the OAS which prohibits member states from interference for any reason in the interna or externa affairs of any state (Pastor, 2001). Acute Latin American sensitivities about sovereignty have often derived from memories of past interventions. Mexico and Nicaragua, for exampe, have both jeaousy defended their sovereignty to prevent the US from interfering in their affairs (ibid.). In October 2005, for exampe, Nicaraguan poiticians condemned comments by Robert Zoeick about a former president, Arnodo Aemán (see Box 5.3), as an effort to interfere in the country s poitica process. In Apri 2006, the US State Department reportedy caed on Nicaraguans not to vote for the former Sandinista eader, Danie Ortega, in presidentia eections schedued for November and Washington s ambassador to Nicaragua hed taks with rightwing Nicaraguan poiticians aimed at fostering an aiance to oppose Ortega. However, the impact of gobaization has chaenged this traditiona understanding of sovereignty and has made it more reative. Economic interdependence, the extension of the discourse of human rights, the desire for egitimacy in internationa arenas, the emergence of transnationa corporations, NGOs and socia movements, and shared concerns about environmenta degradation have a reduced the sovereignty once enjoyed by nation-states. Universa human rights, for exampe, impy that individua human beings have rights that can be sustained against the sovereignty of the state in which they ive, and vioations of these rights are increasingy being met 280

13 INTER- STATE RELATIONS WITHIN LATIN AMERICA with co-ordinated poitica action by severa states at once (van Kaveren, 2001). Whie sti controversia, internationa intervention on behaf of democracy is aso ceary no onger restrained by the principe of non-intervention (ibid.; see Chapter 4). In 1990, the government of Mexico began to redefine its traditiona position on sovereignty when President Sainas abandoned the economic nationaism of the past and proposed free trade with the US (Pastor, 2001). The Mexican president argued that the best defence of a country s poitica and economic system is to open it up to free economic exchanges and commerce (ibid.). Reations with the US have since been strengthened in many other areas, and disagreements surrounding poicies concerning the US Mexican border have increasingy been addressed through biatera institutions of iaison and co-ordination (see Box 11.6). In Nicaragua in 1990, the nationaistic Sandinista government redefined poitica sovereignty by inviting the UN, OAS and Carter Centre to observe its eections thereby inking sovereignty with democratic egitimacy (ibid.). In June 2005 at an OAS summit in Forida, Condoeezza Rice highighted US concerns about poitica crises in Boivia, Ecuador and Haiti and caed for greater OAS intervention in promoting democracy in Latin America. Nonetheess, eements of the traditiona state system endure and are resistant to these processes. Many countries are reuctant to accept compusory jurisdiction from the Internationa Court of Justice, and the principe of sovereignty in interstate affairs remains strong in Latin America. Latin American poiticians routiney compain that the US acks respect for their sovereignty whie demanding that its own sovereign rights be uphed, and there are many exampes of continuing tensions deriving from a traditiona defence of sovereignty. In 2004, for exampe, the US Embassy compained to the Mexican government about actions inconsistent with dipomatic protoco after Mexican troops had interrupted the funera of a US Marine who had died in Iraq and was being buried in the town of his birth, Guanajuato. At a meeting of the OAS in 2005 the US circuated a proposa caing for an institutionaized mechanism to monitor democratic trends in the Americas which was criticized by a number of countries as an invitation to poitica interference in their affairs. OAS secretary genera José Migue Insuza said he thought such a mechanism woud exceed the OAS charter. Disputes over sovereignty aso occur between Latin American states. In November 2005, the Boivian government attacked what it considered to be interference in its interna affairs foowing critica comments by Venezuea s acting ambassador to the country about the rightwing candidate in the foowing month s presidentia eections. Reations between Venezuea and Peru aso suffered foowing derogatory exchanges between the Venezuean eader Hugo Chávez and the candidate who went on to win Peru s Apri 2006 presidentia eections, the former president Aan García ( , 2006 ). Chávez had made no secret of his preference for the nationaist candidate Oanta Humaa in the po (see Box 14.2). Peru responded by recaing its ambassador from Venezuea, accusing Chávez of trying to interfere in its eections and prompting Venezuea to respond in the same 281

14 POLITICS LATIN AMERICA way. García ater decared that his eection victory represented a bow to Chávez, but aso sought to repair the strained reationship with Venezuea. Mutiateraism In the 1990s there was a shift in favour of mutiateraism, an approach to issues in which states act co-operativey and by consensus based on shared interests. Domínguez (2000) argues that the growth of mutiatera approaches in Latin America resuted from four factors. First, the end of the Cod War freed the US from previous poicy options in the region, aowing Latin Americans, in turn, to consider the US as an ay and seek its support for poicy soutions. Second, the coapse of communism was accompanied by democratization in Latin America, which seemed more effective when promoted mutiateray. Third, it was mutiatera institutions that fostered the consensus in favour of free trade after the economic crises of the 1980s (see Chapter 16). Fourth, the US itsef has come to rey on mutiatera agencies as a substitute for its own economic aid to Latin American countries, which have turned to these institutions to cope with their own financia instabiity. Domínguez identifies severa types of mutiatera activity: Commercia mutiateraism Trade agreements are becoming important because of the growth in intra-regiona exports, and this commercia mutiateraism has buit upon inter-american institutions such as the IADB and CEPAL. Poitica mutiateraism Mutiateraism has taken a poitica form in support of democratization in Latin America, and democracy defence causes pedging to safeguard constitutiona government have been written into a host of regiona decarations by bodies such as the OAS (see Box 10.4). BOX 10.4 INSTITUTIONS The Organization of American States The idea of inter-american co-operation dates to the Independence era and first gained institutiona form in 1890 when the Commercia Bureau of American Repubics was formed by countries in the region. This evoved into the Pan-American Union and ater into the OAS, which was created in 1948 when 21 countries in the hemisphere signed the OAS Charter outining shared goas and mutua respect for sovereignty and adopted the American Decaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. The OAS expanded to incude the nations of the Engish-speaking Caribbean and Canada after 1967, and a 35 independent countries of North, Centra and South America and the Caribbean now beong to the organization and have ratified its charter. It is based in Washington and has four officia anguages: Engish, Spanish, Portuguese and French. In 1962, the government of Cuba was excuded from participation in OAS affairs, athough the country remains a member of the organization. Once a year OAS member states agree 282

15 INTER- STATE RELATIONS WITHIN LATIN AMERICA Box 10.4 continued goas and poicies through its Genera Assemby comprising the foreign ministers of countries in the hemisphere. A Permanent Counci made up of ambassadors appointed to the OAS by member states meets reguary. The OAS acts mutiateray to strengthen co-operation, and estabished from its inception a commitment to democracy, good governance, human rights, peace and security. Since the end of the Cod War, member states have intensified their co-operation and, at the andmark First Summit of the Americas in Miami in 1994, the region s democraticay eected eaders agreed broad poitica, economic and deveopment objectives. Key areas of activity in which the OAS has a prominent roe incude scrutinizing human rights and strengthening democracy. In 1959, it created the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which is based in Washington, and in 1969 members agreed the American Convention on Human Rights which ed to the estabishment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights based in Costa Rica. In June 1991, the OAS Genera Assemby approved the Santiago Commitment containing resoutions on democracy, which mandated an immediate meeting of the OAS Permanent Counci foowing the rupture of democratic rue in any country of the Americas and the adoption of procedures to promote and defend democracy regardess of the internationa repercussions (van Kaveren, 2001). In September 2001, member states of the OAS adopted the Inter-American Democratic Charter aying down the essentia eements of democracy and estabishing guideines for responding when it is considered at risk in the region. The OAS aso works to enhance security co-operation and free trade, and to counter drug-trafficking and corruption. Its Inter-American Counci for Integra Deveopment (CIDI) promotes economic deveopment, and the Inter-American Agency for Co-Operation and Deveopment (IACD/AICD) was formed in 2000 to promote new and more effective forms of cooperation to fight poverty. Athough the OAS has often been derided as a vehice of US domination, Latin American countries have gained an increasingy infuentia hod over its affairs. In May 2005, the Chiean sociaist interior minister José Migue Insuza was eected as secretary genera of the OAS after gaining the support of a number of eftwing governments against a riva candidate from Mexico who was backed by the US. Insuza s eection exposed divisions within the organization, which has traditionay chosen a candidate that has US support. Most of South America and the Caribbean supported the Chiean, whie North and Centra America supported the Mexican. Security mutiateraism Mutiateraism has aso spread to security areas. The UN and OAS payed an important roe in ending the Centra American civi wars of the 1980s and 1990s, for exampe. Some countries have taken a more proactive position in security poicy: under Caros Menem, Argentina became an active participant in UN peacekeeping efforts and sent forces to the Persian Guf aongside the US. Brazi, Argentina, Chie, Peru, Uruguay, Guatemaa, Ecuador and Boivia a contributed sodiers or poice to the UN peacekeeping force in Haiti in 2004, the first time a UN force has been estabished with South American troops in a cear majority and with South Americans eading the poitica and miitary sides of the operation. Latin American countries have aso supported mutiatera approaches to tacking internationa crime (see Domínguez, 2000). 283

16 POLITICS LATIN AMERICA Integration and regionaism Integration has ong been an aspiration of Latin American poitica eites. A first wave of integration initiatives began in the 1960s as an effort to boost industriaization under the aegis of the Comisión Económica para América Latina (CEPAL, Economic Commission for Latin America, ECLA) and were inspired by the Treaty of Rome that had ed to the creation of the European Economic Community in 1958 (see Chapter 2). CEPAL saw the aboition of barriers to exports and imports within Latin America itsef as a way of promoting the deveopment of a market for industria goods and reducing the impact of externa shocks on the region (see Box 15.4). The first integration effort was the creation of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio (ALALC, Latin American Free Trade Association, LAFTA) through the Treaty of Montevideo in 1960, which eventuay incorporated 10 South American countries and Mexico. LAFTA had imited success and did not achieve its aim of aboishing intra-regiona tariffs. The Treaty of Montevideo expired in 1980 and LAFTA was repaced by the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI, Latin American Integration Association, LAIA), but this was bady affected by the debt crisis that began in 1982, athough it has since gained a new ease of ife. In 1960 the Mercado Común Centroamericano (MCCA, Centra American Common Market, CACM) was formed by Guatemaa, Honduras, E Savador and Nicaragua as a means of nurturing industry. It coapsed in 1969 because of tensions between member countries, but was revived in 1991 and is generay considered to have generated net benefits to its members, athough these have been uneven. In 1969, frustrated by imited progress under ALALC, Andean countries formed the Grupo Andino (Andean Pact, AP) whose origina members were Boivia, Chie, Coombia, Ecuador and Peru, with Venezuea joining in The AP aso had imited success at estabishing a common tariff and Chie withdrew in 1976 when its own economic poicies proved incompatibe with continued membership. AP has survived as the Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN, Andean Community of Nations), athough Venezuea was in the process of eaving in These initia efforts at integration encountered considerabe economic and poitica probems, and by the mid-1970s they had ost momentum even though intraregiona trade itsef continued to increase. There had hitherto been itte harmonization of economic poicies in the region, where there existed great economic disparities between different countries; ony certain countries tended to dominate trade, which was aso sensitive to internationa cyces; expectations for greater trade put much emphasis on the private sector, which in fact had a imited abiity to expand; and states disagreed about removing protection for their individua industries. Latin American countries participating in these eary integration experiments aso acked the poitica commitment to coser co-operation that their European counterparts had deveoped as a resut of two word wars, and were weakened by their differences. Within the AP, for exampe, poitica differences between Chie s rightwing 284

17 INTER- STATE RELATIONS WITHIN LATIN AMERICA regime under Genera Augusto Pinochet ( ) and eft-eaning governments in other states such as Peru exacerbated the pressure that ed to Chie s withdrawa in With the end of the Cod War a new spirit of pan-americanism based on regiona integration was evident in the hemisphere (see Bumer-Thomas (ed.), 2001). The argest regiona integration initiative, ALADI, incorporates 12 member states from Mexico to Argentina and today serves as an institutiona umbrea organization promoting coser regiona economic integration with the ambition of creating a common market. Trade has driven the integration process, and in the 1990s Latin America became the fastest-growing market in the word for US goods. In 1994 NAFTA came into force and the Miami Summit aunched the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) project (see Box 16.4). Athough it has fuctuated and has been hit by sub-regiona downturns, intra-regiona trade within Latin America, particuary trade between the Mercosur countries, has grown rapidy since the mid-1990s and is vigorous (see Tabe 10.1). Large infrastructure and media projects that transcend nationa borders are aso driving co-operation, such as the energy pipeines inking Argentina and Chie; a proposed $10 biion, 6,000-mie network of pipeines to pump Venezuea s natura gas across South America; and regiona media initiatives such as Teesur (see Box 14.3). The private sector is aso paying an important roe in forging economic ties. Regiona integration initiatives have had important poitica impications in Latin America, contributing to the strengthening of stabe, democratic governance. Poitica forums such as the Paratino in Brazi have become infuentia voices in regiona affairs (see Box 10.5). Tabe 10.1 Latin American intra-regiona merchandise trade, Vaue ($bn) Share of word trade (%) Exports Exports Imports * *Unike previous years, which denote Latin America, the 2004 reference denotes South and Centra America. Sources: WTO (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005). 285