The North Korean Nuclear Issue. North Korean Society January 26, 2017 Clark W. Sorensen

Transcription

1 The North Korean Nucear Issue North Korean Society January 26, 2017 Cark W. Sorensen

2 Beginning of North Korea s Nucear AmbiFons Nucear ambifons go back to eary DPRK history DPRK asked for and got assistance in nucear technoogy from the Soviet Union starfng in 1956, but the Soviet Union was carefu to keep weapons technoogy out of DPRK hands Soviet Union was aso heping China, but by 1959 Khrushchev reneged on giving China access to nucear weapons, but he nevertheess agreed to estabish a North Korean (civiian) nucear program By 1963 the East Germans were aware that the North Koreans were interested in processing North Korean (ow grade) uranium In 1961 the Soviet Union signed a mutua defense treaty with DPRK, but they were wary of being drawn into an unwanted war by DPRK (as the US was with ROK) DPRK miitary buidup begins in 1962 impying they fet the Soviet commitment was ess than ironcad

3 Sino-Soviet Spit Aong with DestainizaFon, Nikita Khrushchev had inaugurated in 1956 a foreign poicy of peacefu coexistence with capitaism (in ight of the possibiity of nucear war) Before that Lenin and the Bosheviks advocated word revoufon through workers interna revoufons within their own nafons China had a mixed poicy peacefu coexistence and non-support for oca revoufons in Asia (Zhou Enai), but Mao Zedong beieved in inevitabe confict of capitaism and communism (as did Cuba) The Soviet Union reneging on its nucear weapons aid to China combined with its signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty with the US in 1963 in the wake of the 1962 Cuban missie crisis was the straw the broke the came s back and spit the Soviet Union and China At this point North Korea was more sympathefc to China since it never signed onto the doctrine of peacefu coexistence (or DestainizaFon) Desire to acquire nucear weapons was understood then as an aspect of Juche defense

4 China s Nucear Program China rejected the imited test ban treaty and confnued to work on a nucear deterrent First weapons text October 16, 1964 First H-bomb test June 17, 1967 Last nucear test Juy 29, 1996 Recognized as one of five nucear states in the Nucear Non-ProiferaFon Treaty that China raffied in 1992 However, China is thought to have aided Pakistan with its nucear program in the 1980s Signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996

5 DPRK first nucear steps 1965 got a sma reactor from the Soviet Union that was up and running from 1967 Soviet Union was not wiing to do more, so the DPRK made inquiries about nucear technoogy with other communist states without success The 1970s oi shocks made the DPRK even more interested in nucear power In 1974 India expoded its first bomb (and became a de facto nucear state) The Soviet Union insisted that the DPRK sign the NPT before they woud give the DPRK more nucear aid DPRK hed off unf 1985, and didn t put a safeguards program in pace with the IAEA unf 1992 when IAEA inspecfons began

6 Preude to AcceeraFon of DPRK Nucear Program (Armstrong s InterpretaFon) Juy 1986 Gorbachev s Vadivostak speech Whie reiterafng tradifona poicy, he aso noted economic growth in Japan and esewhere, withdrawa of troops from Mongoia, expanding Fes with ASEAN, peacefu reafons with East Asian neighbors and US 1988 Soviet Union renounced Brezhnev Doctrine (use force to retain sociaism in sateites) and began withdrawing troops from Afghanistan September 1990 Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited DPRK to reassure them ajer June 1990 Gorbachev-Roh meefng in SFO Kim Jong I refused to see him, and Kim Yŏngnam gave him a diatribe threatening nuceardeveopment since the Soviet Union was not iving up to its treaty of 1961 (that promised aid in case of mutua amack)

7 Lankov s InterpretaFon of Nukes as Surviva Dipomacy (chapter 5) See nukes as a deterrent to amack Can use nukes for dipomafc backmai (interpretafon of the Agreed Framework) US dipomacy 386 generafon in South KoreaàSunshine poicy By 2008 Myungbak Lee eected in South (conservafve) Disiusion with Sunshine poicy ajer 2006 DPRK nucear test NoFce no cear chronoogy or causa chain, nor menfon of DPRK interest in nucear energy

8 By 1990s US was Concerned about the DPRK program 1993 IAEA inspection reveaed diversion of fue from DPRK s reactors This was reported to the UN Security Counci, and the DPRK threatened to withdraw from the NPT US was thinking about an airstrike when former President Carter personay visited Kim I Sung in P yŏngyang in 1994 and announced a nucear agreement Kim I Sung was supposed to meet with the South Korean President, but he died suddeny shorty after Carter s visit (Carter June 15 th, KIS dies Juy 7 th ) Agreed Framework of 1994 negotiated to keep DPRK in NPT DPRK fuy in compiance with NPT with IAEA inspecting DPRK nucear reactors 24-7 to make sure no putonium diverted specia inspections of non-decared sites In exchange the Korean Peninsua Energy Deveopment Corporation woud buid LWR in North Korea (financed mosty by Japan and South Korea) Assumption diversion of fue from LWRs is more difficut than from conventiona reactors US woud provide fue oi to hep power generation whie LWR being buit

9 Breakdown of Agreed Framework Bush AdministraFon was very suspicious of the Agreed Framework Some of its negofators had assumed that DPRK woud coapse, but it hadn t By 2002 US had inteigence that DPRK had a second secret HEU program Inteigence found DPRK contacts with Pakistan had transferred nucear technoogy probaby in exchange for missie technoogy (Pakistan had expoded its own device in 1998 ed by A.Q. Khan making an 8 th de facto nucear state) Ajer US accused DPRK of cheafng in 2002 DPRK ejected IAEA inspectors, and the foowing year withdrew from the NPT The US coud have treated the secret program under the Agreed Framework as an undecared nucear site and negofated for inspecfons, but the Bush administrafon did not want to succumb to what it considered nucear backmai

10 No Contros With the breakdown of the Agreed Framework and DPRK s withdrawa from the NPT in 2003 IAEA inspectors were kicked out and there were no contros on the DPRK nucear program at a DPRK refueed their reactor (which invoved extracfng the spent nucear rods, and presumaby extracfng putonium for further processing) Bush administrafon made strong statements, but now had ime everage China became concerned that the US woud act uniateray in North Korea China s sogan at the Fme was peacefu rise and they wanted stabiity in East Asia so they coud concentrate on economic growth

11 Six Party Taks Six Party Taks began in 2003 hosted by China No progress Proiferation Security Initiative biatera Mutua Shipboarding Pacts aowing mutua expedition of shipboarding requests for ships under those nationa fags designed to fight proiferation October 18, 2004 North Korean Human Rights Act October 9, 2006 first DPRK nucear test UNSC 1718 Joint Statement of goas February 2007 DPRK issues nucear inventory November 2007 US cas inventory incompete and suspends aid pending a compete inventory

12 Probems with Six Party Taks China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and the US a agreed that they didn t want North Korea to go nucear, but beyond that there were serious differences US woud just as soon DPRK woud coapse and wanted to appy maximum pressure Japan insisted the quesfon of cifzens kidnapped to the DPRK be part of the taks Russia mosty on the sideines South Korea had ej-wing government with Sunshine Poicy that sought to reduce tensions through contact and aid China sought a soj anding for North Korea that woud denucearize it without forcing coapse, so they did not fuy cooperafon with US sancfons desires Within the Bush administrafon there was constant infighfng between the hardiners in the NSC (Cheney, Rumsfed, Boton), and those who wanted a negofated semement (mosty in the State Department) James Key 1 st three rounds, Christopher Hi next three

13 North Korean Human Rights Act Signed by President Bush October 18, 2004 Provides humanitarian assistance to North Koreans inside North Korea [mosty food and medicine] Provide grants to private, non-profit organizations to promote human rights, and deveopment of market economy in North Korea Increase avaiabiity of information in North Korea (i.e. broadcasts into North Korea, providing transistor radios, etc.) Provide humanitarian assistance to North Korean refugees, and aowing them to come to the US more easiy Controversia because the avowed aim of the aw is to cause North Korea to coapse because of an outfow of refugees as in East Germany, and because many of the organizations that might be aided are reigious or highy poitica

14 UNSC 1718 (10/06 foowing first DPRK nucear test) North Korea must "not conduct any further nucear test or aunch of a baistic missie", "suspend a activities reated to its baistic missie programme" and "abandon a nucear weapons and existing nucear programmes in a compete, verifiabe and irreversibe manner". The DPRK must aso "return immediatey to the six-party taks without precondition". Shipments of cargo going to and from North Korea may be stopped and inspected for weapons of mass destruction or associated items (however, there is no obigation paced on member states to perform such inspections). A ban is paced on imports and exports of "batte tanks, armoured combat vehices, arge caibre artiery systems, combat aircraft, attack heicopters, warships, missies or missie systems", "reated materie incuding spare parts" and any other items identified by the sanctions committee. UN member states must freeze the overseas assets of individuas and companies invoved with the DPRK's weapons programmes. An internationa trave ban is aso paced on programme empoyees and their famiies. UN members are banned from exporting uxury goods to North Korea.

15 February 13, 2007Joint Statement North Korea wi shut down and sea the Yongbyon nucear faciity, incuding the reprocessing faciity and invite back IAEA personne to conduct a necessary monitoring and verifications In return, the other five parties in the six-party taks wi provide emergency energy assistance to North Korea in the initia phase of 50,000 tons of heavy fue oi, to commence within 60 days. A six parties agree to take positive steps to increase mutua trust, and make joint efforts for asting peace and stabiity in Northeast Asia. Directy reated parties wi negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsua at an appropriate separate forum. A six parties agree on estabishing five working groups - on the denucearization of the Korean Peninsua, normaization of North Korea-U.S. reations, normaization of North Korea- Japan reations, economy and energy cooperation, as we as a joint Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism.

16 February 2007 Joint Statement (2) The working groups wi form specific pans for impemenfng the September 19 statement in their respecfve areas. A parfes agree that a working groups wi meet within the next 30 days Detais of assistance wi be determined through consutafons and appropriate assessments in the working group on economic and energy cooperafon. Once the inifa acfons are impemented, the six parfes wi prompty hod a ministeria meefng to confirm impementafon of the joint document and expore ways and means for promofng security cooperafon in Northeast Asia. The sixth round of six-party taks wi take pace on March 19, This wi be to hear reports of the working groups and discuss acfons for the next phase.[33]

17 DisconFnuaFon of taks DPRK issues report of inventory to US in November 2007 DPRK said they had compied with the taks and demanded a resumpfon of fue aid US responded that the inventory was incompete, and unf such Fme as a compete inventory was forwarded it woud suspend aid Athough numerous meefngs were hed between US and DPRK in Beijing this impasse was never overcome

18 ConFnued Deveopment in TransiFon to Obama AdministraFon October 2008 DPRK orders IAEA inspectors away from site Note timing just before November Presidentia eection Apri 5, 2009 Sateite aunch (probaby test of Taep odong mutistage rocket, though the test faied) US responded with new UN Sanctions Apri 13 th DPRK caed sanctions unbearabe and on Apri 25 th announced reactivation of their nucear sites May 25, 2009 second nucear test UNSC Resoution 1874 (authorizes inspection of DPRK ships, prevents financia services) November 2010 Siegfried Hecker (of Stanford s Center for Internationa Security and Cooperation) visits North Korea and is shown an operationa HEU pant

19 UNSC1874 Authorizing member states to inspect, "in accordance with their nationa authorities and egisation, and consistent with internationa aw," North Korean cargo on and, sea, and air, and to destroy any goods suspected of being connected to the DPRK's nucear programme.[2] Requiring the North Korean government to return immediatey to the six-party taks and renounce its announcement of withdrawa from the Nucear Non-Proiferation Treaty.[3] Preventing financia services that coud contribute to the nucear or baistic missie reated programmes.[4] Instructing member states not to provide financia assistance to the DPRK nucear programme, or enter into oans with the country, except for humanitarian or deveopmenta reasons.[4] Extending the arms embargo on North Korea by banning a weapons exports from the country and most imports, with an exception to sma arms, ight weapons and reated materia though member states must notify the Security Counci five days prior to seing the weapons.[5] [6] Demanding that North Korea hat its nucear weapons program and conduct no further nucear or missie tests.[5] Asking member states to notify the Counci of steps they are taking to impement the sanctions within 45 days.[7] Affirming the Security Counci's commitment to a peacefu, dipomatic resoution to the situation.[7]

20 Subsequent Tests Third Nucear Test February 12, Kim Jong-un announces capacity for H-bomb Fourth Nucear Test January 6, 2016 Announced as H-bomb (but not corroborated, and considered unikey because of the sma size of the exposion) DPRK has made progress in weaponizafon, though re-entry mechanisms are not yet thought to be deveoped Fijh Nucear Test September 9, 2016 (caimed test of nucear warhead)

21 North Korea Missie Program Eary 1990s North Korea reverse engineered Scud-B designed from Egypt and/ or China Nodong Missie with range of mies (can reach South Korea and Japan) Difficut to counter T aepongdong 1 & 2 T aep odong 1 3 stage rocket tested 1998 to aunch Kwangmyŏngsŏng sateite (faied) T aep ogdong 2 2/3 stages, tested 2006 and faied Ŭnha rocket 2009 test faied, but in 2012 abe to aunch a sateite, 2016 successfu aunch

22 In VioaFon of UNSC 1718? UNSC 1718 prohibits baisfc missie tests DPRK caims Ŭnha tests are sateite aunches that are aowed Probem for US, Japan, and South Korea is that this is dua use technoogy Possibe submarine aunch of missie in Apri 2016

23 What s the Probem? Surgica Strike not fuy possibe, and woud ikey ead to fu-scae war with casuafes comparabe to the Korean War Seou 25 miion peope within range of North Korean arfery and missies so DPRK coud ki tens of thousands in minutes (aso chemica weapons) US everage is imited because DPRK has imited contacts with the rest of the word SancFons hurt the DPRK, but they are hard to administer over the ong run because DPRK is aways coming up with new ways to get around them, and because maintaining internafona coaifons over the ong hau is difficut Forging a foreign poicy consensus over the DPRK is amost impossibe in the US No negofafon has considered a treaty because passing a treaty through the US Senate is considered impossibe

24 North Korean Missie Ranges