by Tom Lodge pointed out at one trial that the distance between two locations could vary between

Transcription

1 POQO AND RURAL RESSTANCE N THE TRANSKE, by Tom Lodge During the eary 1960s there were two reated back poitica strugges in South Africa. n the towns the mainy urban-based nationaist and eft-wing groups had adopted vioent strategies which varied from controed, seective sabotage to schemes for a genera uprising. n the reserves, and in particuar in the Transkei, there had deveoped a deep-rooted antagonism to government institutions and administrative measures as we as towards the Bantustan authorities which impemented them. The ma opposition was sometimes expressed in comparativey we organized and poiticay articuate mass movements, as in Pondoand in But sometimes the uprisings were ess co-ordinated, pots and conspiracies were not inked by one or~zation and the opposition was more fragmentary, with the resut that it has received ess attention from historians. This has been the case with Tembuand during the period Yet the Tembu disturbances are interesting: there was at east one nationaist movement concerned; they provide a good exampe of the inks between rura and urban resistance against authority; there is enow evidence to suggest the socia forces invoved and the reasons for their actions. This paper wi first attempt to put the Tembu revot into its socia and historica context and then, by using materia drawn from tria records and reports, it wi examine the unrest in some detai. The historiography of back South African poitics has often been based on records concerning urban groups which were ed by we educated and poiticay sophisticated men. The strugges of peasants and migrant workers are not so we recorded and their effectiveness can be underestimated. This paper is an attempt to fit the Tembuand resistance into the genera pattern of South African back opposition during the eaxy 1960s. n 1960, the Tembu inhabited the Eiotdae, Mqandui, Umtata and Engcobo districts of the Transkei, and a reated sub-group, the Emigrant Tembu, ived in the Caa and St Marks districts as we as the enjoining Gen Grey, which was administered as part of the Ciskei. The districts form one bock of territory running for 250 mies across the southern portion of the Transkei. Like the rest of the Transkei, it is a hiy and mountainous region; it has been cacuated that ony 11 per cent of the 1 Transkei is fat (1) and the and rises from a narrow coasta bet to highands of between 4,000 and 5,000 feet. As mi&t be expected, communications are poor: it was pointed out at one tria that the distance between two ocations coud vary between eight and fifty mies, depending on whether one used the circuitous road of the shorter but steeper mountain paths. (2) The andscape, which is typicay grass covered, was found in 1966 to be 30 per cent bady eroded and 44 per cent moderatey eroded.

2 The Transkei is densey popuated# in 1960 it had an average of 92 peope per square mie and an overa tota of 1,400,000 inhabitants. Of these, approximatey 160,000 were recruited annuay to work on the mines in industry and in agricuture.(4) n 1960, 61,237 men were empoyed as mineworkers. t seems reasonabe to assume that c.25,000 peope were empoyed in agricuture the 1971 figure of 22,383 was after a decade of reducing the number of back farm workers in the Western cape). (6) The rest woud mainy have been recruited by abour bureaux for industries and services in the urban areas. Francis Wison reports that in per cent of the men recruited worked in the Cape Town area, 18 per cent in the Transvaa, and sma proportions esewhere: the proportions woud not have changed greaty over ten years. (7) Those who worked in the mines were restricted by the compound system, but the men md women who worked in industry were more exposed to urban poitica infuences,and it is therefore worth emphasizing that the majority of this sector were migrants between the Transkei and the Western Cape. With the exception of a sma number of government servants, the popuation (incuding migrant workers, famiies) either depended to a esser or greater extent on wages remitted by migrants or were abe to produce enow food from farms to subsist. Evidence from a survey conducted in the 1970s and cited by nnes and OtMeara suggests that the proportion of the Transkei popuation which never or ony sedom depended on migrant abour is very sma: it is unikey that it woud have been much greater in the 1960s. (8) The government had then ony recenty begun to concentrate hodings so as to create a cass of sef-sufficient peasant farmers. This measure, whie creating a cass that coud prosper without migrant earnings, aso necessitated depriving 113,000 Transkeian famiies of and atogether, making them whoy dependent on the urban abour market. (9) Unti 1955 the Transkei was governed throw a conciiar system which, as the African Nationa Congress1 activist, Govan Mbeki, pointed out, depended on a degree of popuar participation. The Gen Grey Act had set up the Bun@ system in which 26 district councis sent representatives to a genera counci or Bunga in Umtata. The district councis each had six members: in the districts which had paramount chiefs (which incuded Tembuand and ond do and) two were eected and four were nominees of the chief and the district commissioner. Of the representatives sent to the Bunga, one was eected and the others were nominees. (10) Most Bunga members were chiefs or headmen but over haf of them were eected: chiefs under the Bunga system derived some of their authority from popuar support. (11) The aboition of this system and the introduction in the Transkei of the Bantu Authorities in 1955 reduced the importance of the eected eement in the triba, district, regiona,, and territoria authorities, and increased the powers of the chiefs within the authorities (to which they beonged ex officio) as we as adding to their administrative functions. Chiefs, duties were to incude maintaining the aw, reporting unrest and impementing any government measures. They were aso given increased judicia responsibiities and were aowed to keep part of the revenue raised in fines and fees. (12) Most important of a they were paced in opposition to their peope by being made responsibe for estabishing and rehabiitation measures. These invoved the fencing of and, the consoidation (and hence confiscation) of faxming pots, contour poughing, eaving and faow and stock-cuing. African poitica organizations opposed them from their inception in 1945: they argued that a the measures did was to create a andess peasantry and that the rea causes of African rura poverty ay not in overstocking but in the insufficient area of farming and aocated for African use. The measures were naturay unpopuar with the individua farmer: even if he did not face the threat of being deprived of his and, the stockcuing coud often be arbitrary and inefficient, faing as heaviy on the man with a few cows as the owner of a arge herd. Dipping tanks were disiked as these were sometimes used to enforce cuing and castration as we as a way for the chiefs to coect unofficia evies. (13) Land recamation schemes which insisted on the provision of faow and appeared to be another measure aimed at peasant impoverishment. (14) Rewards were given to chiefs who accepted the system, and in the Transkei Territoria Assemby they resoved to aot themseves each an extra portion of arabe and "to enabe [the chiefb] to provide hospitaityn. ($)

3 However, when describing deveopments in specific regions of the Transkei, it is difficut to generaize about the roe of the chiefs. Mbeki says that by 1955 peope in the Transkei "had deveoped to a stage which discards chieftainship". (16) nnes and O'Meara's tentative anaysis of Transkeian cass formation views chiefs and headmen as a basis of a rich peasantry. To their traditiona function in aocating arabe and was added the opportunity to avai themseves of arger pots hed on a quit rent basis from the state. But this repressive roe was not aws wiingy assumed by the chiefs during the eary 1960s. n May 1961 over 1,000 Tembu chiefs condemned the rehabiitation scheme (the "Native rust^^) at a meeting caed by Sabata Daindyebo, the paramount chief. Tembuand was amost competey free of rehabiitation at that time. (17) Contact mentions in its report "good" chiefs who had dewed imposing the scheme by insisting that they shoud act as their peope required them to. n contrast to this, in the district of St Marks which was under the authority of the Emigrant Tembu Chief and Chairman of the Transkei Territoria Authority, Kaiser Matmima, the scheme was "accepted1 at meetings hed in ocations in The meetings were caed by the District Magistrate and he ater caimed that the proposas were accepted by everybody at the meetings. Rather inconsistenty he aso said that after the proposas had been accepted "100 per centf1 iega meetings began to be hed a over the district and a number of peope beonging to antirehabiitation groups were arrested. (18) He aso made the interesting admission that compensation was not paid to those who had been removed from the and unti the ast person had moved tvountariy". (19) Matamha's district was to incude the site of a arge show-piece irrigation scheme. 2,400 consoidated farming pots were to be produced,and from tria evidence we know that peope were being dispaced from the and from (20) Though the Tembu chiefs seemed in 1962 to have shown enou concern for their popuazity to suggest that they sti had a foowing to ose, this did not inrpy that the Tembu were apathetic poiticay. t is worth remembering that in 1936 the African vote in Tembuand (as a Cape constituency) was the highest in the Cape Province, being one-third of the tota. (21) Organized radica poitica gmups had certainy concentrated their efforts in towns but there was a considerabe amount of poitica activity in the Transkei during the 1940s and 1950s. Tabatats account of the deveopment of the A African t Convention surey overstates the case when he says "During this period the peope [of the ~ranskei] had been fired by the new poicy of the Unity Movement 22), but the nature of the AACs federa structure coud have given it a degree of infuence. The AAC was not a party which one coud join individuay. t was a federation of organizations not a of which were especiay poitica. This rather oose qumbreaf structure was abe to absorb specia and regiona interest groups and yet have a fairy coherent poitica ine. Affiiated to the AAC was the Cape African Teachers' Association which opposed, unti its banning, Bantu Education (23), the Transkei Organised Bodies which organized with the African Nationa Congress eectora boycotts of the Native Representative Counci (24), and the Kongo movement which affiiated itsef to the AAC in 1948 after being started in Pondoand to oppose rehabiitation. (25) The African Nationa Congress was, throughout the 1950s, uninterested in a reserve-based strategy: Mbeki, himsef a Tramkeian, ruefuy noted that it was not unti the Pondoand revot of 1960 that the ANC saw "the vita need for inking up the strugges of the peasants with those of the workers in the urban areas". (26) More information is needed on the various bodies and campaigns Tabata mentions, but their existence indicates a degree of poitica consciousness in the viages of the Transkei (for AAC organizations were often based on viage committees) that was we deveoped before The foowing factors coud have conditioned the vioent Tembu resistance after First, there was the increasing dependence of the Transkeim peasantry on migrant abour earnings. This was couped with their increasing insecurity on the and as the rehabiitation programme empowered chiefs and officias to remove famiies from their hodings. n 1960 in Tembuand proper this was sti just a threat, but the experience of the Rnigrant Tabu woud have reinforced fears and the chiefs' stand against rehabiitation probaby concentrated anti-government feeing. Organized poitica opposition to the and reforms had existed in the Transkei for a coupe of decades, though the extent to which this affected the response in Tembuand after 1960 is difficut to say. Another important factor must have been the eqerience of the migrant workers. As have said, those who were industria workers (and therefore

4 most open to urban poitica infuence) mainy migrated to the Western Cape. The Tembu and Emigrant Tembu were ikey to have been the majority of these: they were geographicay cosest and were inked by rai to Cape Town (a arge proportion of Pondo migrants worked in ~ata). (27) n 1960, the Western Cape and particuary Cape Town saw the most widespread disturbances in the weeks foowing Sbarpevie: a genera strike supported by the African abour force for neary two weeks, and a dramatic march of between fifteen and thirty thousand men from Langa ocation to the centre of Cape Town. What was noticed by commentatom at the time was that migrant workers from 1bacheor1 quarters in the ocations payed a eading roe. During the crisis the Pan-Africanist Congress provided some poitica direction,& again contemporary evidence suggests that it was especiay infuentia in the migrant workers' hostes and aones. With the ANC,the PAC was suppressed but out of its branches deveoped a vioent insurrectionary movement caed m. Poqo_ is a Xhosa word meaning aone or pure. The movement first deveoped in the ocations round Cape Town and smaer towns in the Western Cape and drew most of its support from migrant workers. (28) Though there coud have been other poitica infuences affecting migrant reactions (~ongress-affiiated trade unions were quite active in the Western Cape in the 1950s), it is probabe that PAC/PO~O had the greatest impact on Western Cape Xhosa-speaking migrant workers in the years foowing Sharpevie. n outine, the Tembu disturbances were sporadic and disjointed though, ike the Pondo revot, they were sustained over a surprisingy ong period. t is important to remember that much of the unrest in Tembu areas occurred under the conditions imposed on the Transkei by Procamation 400. This, from 30 November 1960, provided for a sate of Emergency. The reguations incuded detention without tria, the baming of virtuay a meetings and the extension of the powers of chiefs and headmen. Peope who chaenged chiefs? authority coud be fined or imprisoned and have some of their ivestock confiscated. The procamation was pubished in immediate response to the Pondo uprising. Before ooking at the resistance in any detai, an overa chronoogy is usefu. n 1956, in the &xigrant Tembu districts of Caa and Gen Grey peope tried to prevent the instaation of pro-government chiefs. (29) This foowed the estabishment of the Bantu Authorities system the previous year. n Tembuand itsef there was considerabe opposition to Bantu Authorities. A deegation had been sent to Pretoria to protest against their impementation, and in 1958 four Tabu eaders, incuding an adviser to the Paramount Chief, Sabata, were exied. The Tembuand chiefs? attitude to Bantu Authorities and other government measures was to be infuenced by the rivary between the Pamount and Natam.ima, the regiona chief of the Emigrant Tembu. Matwima had gained government support through his backing of the Bantu Authorities and he was busy expanding the area of his authority. n 1958 the Ciskeian district of Gen Grey was put under his contro. (30) Reay widespread opposition to the government came with the attempt to impose and rehabiitation on the Tembu. As we have seen, iega committees sprang up in. the St Marks district, and these continued to hod their meetings from 1960 unti The St Marks magistrate said that this occurred most often in and, whie there was "a spe of quietnessn in 1962, the meetings were revived in (31) At these meetings rehabiitation measures were denounced; counter-measures decided upon were not aways iega. The men in Wtsi ocation, St Marks, initiay intended to hire an attorney who woud hep them to oppose the fencing; for this they each paid 25 cents. (32) The anti-rehabiitation groups were usuay drawn from a singe ocation. Though the majority of chiefs in Tembuand were at this stage unwiing to enforce government measures, there were exceptions. Patrick Lawrence mentions the kiing of a pro-government chief and eeven other peope, as we as the b dng down of a census buiding on an occasion in (33) More detais woud be usefu, for it is tempting to ink the destruction of the census buiding with the surveys which,

5 from 1956, consoidated aotments and created arge numbers of andess peope. (34) n January 1961 a headman was murdered at Rwantsana near Lady Frere. hrentuay thirty-five men were charged. The murder was preceded by the kiing of three of the headmans sheep. Headmen had recenty been given the power to confiscate ivestock, under Procamation 400, and this was fiercey resented by viagers. (35) t was not considered to be a egitimate right. n the 1950s there deveoped a movement caed the Makuuspan (it was started in the Tsoo district, adjacent to ~mtata) which was formed to combat stock theft. Hammond Tooke caims that its infuence grew when B&u Authorities were imposed and it increasingy threatened chiefs as it became more poiticay orientated. (36) n 1962, the poice were caiming that tribesmen were "taking the aw into their own hands to dea with stock thieves" in the Umtata and Ehgcobo districts. (37) One can specuate that the Makuuspan was being directed against headmen who confiscated ivestock, though there is not enough evidence to prove this. t is surey significant that Poqo was reported as using the Makuuspan movement to "intimidate peope. (38). B. Tabata said in November 1963 that the AAC had "won overw the Makuuspan in the preceding six months. (39) Though this seems unikey as it was not the sort of organization which coud be formay incorporated, both Snymans aegation about Poqo and Makuspan and Tabatafs caim do show that one shoud not regard the sma oca conspiracies against unpopuar individuas in isoation from the more overty poitica opposition. The murder of headmen and chiefs was to be a fairy frequent occurrence during the period. n March 1961 two more headmen were kied in Tembuand (40), and such incidents may have heped to infuence some of the thousand chiefs who opposed rehabiitation schemes at Sabatas paace in Bumbane on May 6. (41) Simiar arge meetings were hed in May the foowing year to condemn the Bantu authorities. (42) As we as the intimidation of chiefs, ocations aso withhed taxes: an eary report of this was in Macibini, Gen Grey, in January 1961, when 100 peope were arrested for non-papnent of the 1960 po tax. (43) Late in 1962 there were three attempts on Matamimats ife. One wi be described in detai beow. A three were Poqo-inspired. The first attack was on October 14, and in the weeks before there were reports of Poqo "preaching race hate" to the peasantry in migrant Tembuand. (44) Trias provide evidence of Poqo organization from 1961 to 1963 in the Ehgcobo district and the Ngqeeni district (on the coast, north of ~qandui) as we as Emigrant Tembuand. Forty-eight men were imprisoned for Poqo activities in Ngqeeni (45), and in Ehgcobo Chief Nkosana Mtirara, a member of the Tembu roya house, was found guity of eading, in coaboration with the oca schoo-teacher, a Poqo ce of thirty-five men. (46) Poqo activities incuded the Bashee bridge murders which took pace on February 5. A white famiy were kied in an attack on their caravan by men who, according to the poice, cane from Mqandui, Cofimvaba, Kentani and Bityi. The men used petro bombs and firearms as we as pangas. (47) t was especiay bruta: when headmen were attacked, athough their kraa woud be destroyed, their famiies were usuay eft unharmed. n 1963 the Engcobo and Umtata districts were said by poice to be the most vioent districts in the Transkei. More Poqo arrests had been made in this area than esewhere. Poice activity was aso very intensive and para-miitary mobie units were created to suppress disturbances. (48) This hi& eve of iega and vioent opposition coincided with the organization of ega poitica opposition to the government and to Matamima, who had become chairman of the Trasskei Territoria Authority in 1961 and was campaigning to be eected as chief minister. He was opposed by Paramount Chief Victor Poto of West Pondoand, who was supported by Sabata Daindyebo. Sabatas officia candidates in the eection formed the basis of the Democratic Party. t has been suggested that the Democratic Party represented a petty bourgeoisie of shopkeepers, owners of services, teachers and bureaucrats who were argey concentrated in the sma urban centres. (49) This seems a bit tendentious: the amost compete victory of Sabata candidates throuout Tembuand was surey a symptom of the consciousy poitica character of the unrest that affected the whoe rura popuation. Another poitica group which payed some part in heping to organize the ega Tembu opposition to Matanzima was the mutiracia Libera Party. On the whoe, they worked through chiefs and other prominent figures in the comity: they did not attempt to buid a branch membership in the Transkei. (50)

6 1963 seems to have been the peak of peasant unrest and Poqo activity in Tembuand. n 1961 the much better organized Pondo strugge had been suppressed by ruthess poice action, and by 1964 conditions were ess favourabe for revot: previousy sympathetic chiefs were being intimidated or induced by Wtamima to switch sides, and a drou&t began that year, which was to ast unti 1969 and which was to force 35,000 Transkeians off the and and ki 20 per cent of the catte. (51) This must have contributed to the demoraisation of popuar resistance, though there were sti occasiona outbreaks: in 1964 a chief who had recenty decided to support Matamima was kied in Gcaeka (52), and in 1965 there was Poqo activity in Mqandui as we as Pondoa.nd. By now, however, the Poqo men seem to have been ess concerned with acting on oca issues: rather, they were trying to create base areas for a guerria movement which was going to be sustained from Lesotho, where the PACs externa eadership coud provide some sort of training. (53) 1 Before making amy generaizations about the unrest, a coser ook at two of the incidents heps to give a cearer understanding of what was happening in the Tembu districts. The first is the Poqo attempt to assassinate Matanzima, and the second a much more ocaized incident concerning the murder of a viage headman. On 12 December 1962, a group of between twenty and thirty Poqo members traveed by train from Cape Town to the Trmskei, with the intention of assembing with other pups near W t a and aunching a co-ordinated attack on Christmas Day on Matanzimas paace. According to the tria evidence, simiar groups had aready eft. (54) Most of the -twenty men ater put on tria had been Poqo members since eary 1961, but though there had been severa meetings in the previous months the immediate preparations for the attack were ony discussed at a meeting in Langa township on December 10. At this and subsequent meetings members were tod to contribute 66 for the raiway ticket and coect weapons. The attack was going to incorporate the freeing of prisoners in Qamata jai who had been captured in earier attempts on Matanzimafs ife. On the night before their departure a herbaist doctored the men by making incisions on their foreheads and rubbing in herbs. (55) Their weapons, which incuded a revover carried by the cefs eader, were aso treated. Thus prepared, the men entrained the foowing morning. Most of them had not had the chance to give their empoyers any excuse for eaving their jobs and so, as we as forfeiting their pa~r packets, had come away without getting their pass books signed. Their trains arrived at Queenstown at 7.00 p.m. on the 13th. Here it was obvious that the poice had been warned because they ordered everybody off the train and made them ine up on the patfom,where they began searching the passengers for weapons. On their discovery of a panga, the Poqo men made a concerted attack on the poice, kiing one of them and wounding severa others. After a few minutes of fighting, poice reinforcements arrived and the Poqo men retreated and tried to escape to a nearby hiside. Most were captured within the next day or two. Another group who had journeyed from Cape Town a few days earier had succeeded in reaching Ntonze mountain, near Cofinnraba, the raying-point for the attackers (56), but by now arge impis and poice units were searching the his and the attack was not made. The conspirators were a migrant workers; most of them did unskied work in the construction industry or in various factories. They were mainy Emigrant Tembu and their home viages or districts incuded Gen Grey, Aice, Caa, St Marks, Qamata and Tsomo. Their wives and famiies were mentioned in the evidence as iving in those paces. t is cear that they regarded the Transkei as their home, and the evidence describing the various Poqo meetings in Langa indicates that they shared the same anxieties and preoccupations as the rura Tembu popuation. One was arrested with a etter from his mother in his pocket which contained a reference to his and being taken away (57); this was a predominating theme at meetings in Langa: The first thing he [Matanzima] did was to in.tmduce fencing and now he is moving huts and kraa~ to some

7 other pace. t appears that he has sod the pots where the kraas were to the Europeans because there are huts there." Now he is assauting us... (58) Chief Phtanzima has sod our and; we are going to ki him. (59) The fencing and the activities of the Native (~ehabiitation) Trust in St Marks began to be discussed at Langa Poqo meetings in Juy That the Poqo men were cosey in touch with oca reaities is borne. out by the second incident,which again arose out of conditions in the St Marks district. As we have seen, discontent with and rehabiitation had ed to the formation of secret viage committees. n the midde of February 1963 the authorities tried to suppress these groups. n Qitsi the oca headman was provided with some poice from Qamata, and with these and other men he raided the kraas of eading critics of the and measures. Their houses were destroyed and some of their stock was taken. (60) However, the anti-trust men had aready eft Qitsi and found sheter in a kraa in Quugu, Engcobo district, eight mies away across the his. Quite apart from the headmans action, there was considerabe anger in Qitsi because Matanzima had sent a arge impi which incuded fifty poicemen to search the area (possiby for Poqo men) and the ocation had had to provide food for them. There had aso been removas. Though the headman was known to be rather reuctant to do so, he had had to organize the fencing: he had thus become "the man who informs the peope about the reguations". (61) The bitterness of the feeing against him can be judged from the fact that among the men who kied him were two nephews and a man known to be "a very great friend" of the headman. (62) These men decided to ki the headman when they were at Wugu. Rather inexpicaby, they sent him a threatening etter which resuted in him being given a bodyguard and a revover. The group at Quugu were first treated by a herbaist who made incisions on their arms, foreheads and cheek-bones. Then, on the night of the 26th, they marched to Qitsi, overpowered the bodyguards, dragged the headman out of his kraa and kied him. His famiy were aowed to eave the hut, which was then burned down. There had been no attempt at secrecy (the bodyguards were aowed to get am) and shorty afterwards the conspirators were arrested. There is a consistency in the detais of these and other incidents during the Tembu unrest. Both conspiracies invoved men who were, or had been, migrant workers (the Q,itsi men were, with one exception, over thirty, and some of them had spent ong periods in Cape own). n both events there was a certain amount of traditiona ritua used in the preparations. n both, the poiticay inspired Poqo men and the apoitica Qitsi group, the men fet threatened by the and rehabiitation scheme. The invovement of Poqo in Tembu unrest is an indication of how oca discontent coud become consciousy poitica. Poqo was not a movement that was brought into the Transkei by outsiders: its chief foowing was among migrant workers. t coud be adapted to oca traditions, beiefs and institutions. One man said at his tria that he had joined Poqo and "its sort of church, Q,amata' in 1961: Qamata is mentioned by Phiip Ma,yer as a high god or ruer of the spirits that was commony a feature of Red (trsiditionaist) Xhosa reigious beief. (63) Nationaist poitics had not previousy gained much of a foowing among Red Xhosa migrants. The report that Poqo was inked to the Ma?suuspan and the existence of a Poqo soup which was ed by an Eqpobo chief are further indications of the considerabe degree of support it *S the Europeans were experts who were there to construct a dam as part of the &amata irrigation scheme (see p. 3).

8 must have had in Tembuand and the smunding districts.* The Tembu Listurbances acked the coherence, unity and dramatic quaity of the Pondo revot. Unike the Pondo, they evoved no ceax strategy nor did they fonrmate a series of demds that went beyond the immediate causes of their hardships. Though one shoud not overestimate the part payed in the events by Poqo, this weakness was very much its own: it was an insurrectionary movement which saw poitics in the apocayptic terms of a genera uprising. This contrasts with.the Pondo store boycott which discriminated between those traders reckoned to be sympathetic and those who openy sided.with the government. (64) One point shoud be made about the migrant workers. These men were not ybt fuy proetasiauized: they were not competey "freen of access to the means of production. Consciousy they sti fet that and, rehabiitation measures were a threat to their iveihood. Though the men who set out from Cape Town to attack Matamima woud probaby have been destined to spend most of their working ives in the Langa hostes, nevertheess they were going to ki Matwima because he was taking away their and. t has been suggested that different experience of oppression for the worker, on the one hand, and his famiy in the reserve, on the other, introduces "a structura division in the heart of the proetariat". The worker woud focus his opposition on the reations of production in the towns, whie rura peope woud attack chiefs and headmen. (65) But in the 1960s this was not the case; migrants, then, were not so detached from rura consciousness. Tod. things mi&t be different: when peope are forced off the and competey so that their entire subsistence depends on mig~ant wages, and when the migrant worker does not have the remotest prospect of ceasing to work in the towns and returning to his catte and and, then perhaps he has become a member of an urban proetariat. n the eary 1960s his situation was a transitiona one. 1% is in this context that his poitica reactions shoud be ooked at. At a time when the stay-away from work was the chief weapon of the nationaist movement, migrant workers hitherto had been considered apathetic poiticay, and the scae of their response to the Pan-Africanist Congress pass campaign in 1960 surprised witnesses in Cape Town. Eere they were responding to the frustrations of urban conditions: ow wages, infux contro, sepaxation from their famiies and poice raids. They coud aso be concerned about agricutura conditions: drought, rain, catte sickness and the state of the fieds. (66) This divided response coud have been capitaized on by a we organized poitica movement. Poqo was not that; it was an expression of a genera desperation fet both in the reserves and in the ocations, not a vanguard organization. Thou& it was inspired by the Pan-Africdst eadership, it did not deveop an organizationa structure: this was scarcey surprising for in some ocations whoe barracks woud join en boc. (67) There was therefore no centra eadership which coud be sensitive to oca conditions and base a ong-term strategy on them. As we as the state of transition that the migrant worker found himsef in during the 1960~~ the roe of the chiefs was aso changing and this ambivaence in their position contributed to the conditions for revot. The popuarity of certain chiefs in Tabuand, the participation of one of their number in Poqo, even the Qitsi headman's ack of enthusiasm for impementing rehabiitation, show that the ++E thou& a iega PAC groups were caed Poqo ces, those in the Transvaa seem to have been rather different. They did not have the same depee of participation by migrant workers ( have found no reports of Poqo activities in other antu us tans) and they were far more cosey controed by the externa eadership. They were neither as numerous nor as active.

9 transformation from consensus gatherer to government functionary was not ams undertaken wiingy. Certainy their change in function seems to have deprived them of some egitimacy: their actions were an offence against tradition and custom. The use of ritua and traditiona beiefs by the Poqo movement and the Wtsi viagers was significant. The Tembu disturbances arose out of specific historica circumstances. t woud be a mistake to make any dogmatic assertions from them about the roe of peasants and migrants in the iberation strugge; their situation is not a static one. The disturbances, though bruta, were sma scae; revot was intermittent and disorganized$ such opposition was easiy crushed. For a that, they are worth recording, for they were part of a generaized resistance to authority which usuay appears ony incidentay in the histories of forma organizations and in the biographies of poitica eaders. There is the dasger that the history of the African opposition in those years mi&t become merey the story of saboteurs, guerrias and exied poiticians. The very ack of such gamorous quaities in the Tembu disturbances is what makes them interesting: they were spontaneous and popum. As such, they indicate a susceptibiity to revot in rura areas which must be seen as a ost opportunity for the African nationaist eadership. Notes (1) Randoph Vigne, The Transkei - a South African Tragedy (The Africa Bureau, n.d.) P* 5. (2) State v. Nomapoisa Me ji and 22 others. Transcript. utterwo worth) , p. 8. (3) Vigne, op. cit. (4) Govan Mbeki, The Peasants 1 Revot (~amondsworth, 1964)~ p. 19. (5)?cancis Wison, Mimt Labour in South Africa (Johannesburg, 1972), p. 96. (6) bid., p. 18. (7) bid., P. 96. (8) nnes and OWeara, Cass Formation and deoogy: the Transkei Regionf1, Review of African Poitica Econow, Sept.-Dec. 1976, p. 72. (9) Mbeki, op. cit., p. 76. nnes and O'Meara, op. cit., p. 74. (10) For a fu description of the system, see Mbekifs account in The Peasants Revot, pp (11) Patrick Lawrence, The Transkei (Johannesburg, 1976), p. 31. (12) Mbeki, op. cit., p (13). B. Tabata, The Awakeniw of a Peo-oe (~ottingham, 1974), p. 45. (14) Mbeki, op. cit., p. 96. (15) bid., P. 75. (16) bid., p. 47. (17) Contact, , p. 5. (18) State v. Nomapoisa Me ji, p. 74. (19) bid., p. 70. (20) Barbara Rogers, The f Bantu Homeands 1 (~efence and Aid, 1973), p. 28.

10 (21) Mbeki, 09. cit., p. 21. (22). B. Tabata, mperiaist Conspiracy in Africa (~usaka, 1974), p. 17. (23) Tabata, The Awakeniw of a Peope, p. 75. (24) bid., p. 70. (25) Baruch Hirson, "Rura Revot in South African in Ooected Seminar Papers on The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th & 20th Centuries, Voume 8 (CS, CSP No. 22. (26) Mbeki, op. cit., p (27) Nata sugar estates were important abour recruiters. See Wison, op. cit., p.18. (28) have described this more fuy in a paper shorty to appear in Coected Papers, University of York, Vo. 111, eds. Hi and Akeroyd. (29) Lawrence, op. cit., p. 36. (30) Mbeki, op. cit., p. 36. (31) State v. Nomapoisa Me ji, p. 74. (32) bid., P. 44. (33) Lawrence, op. cit., p. 37. (34) Govan Mbeki, "The Transkei Tragedyft, Liberation, September 1956, p. 10. (36) Hammond-Tooke, Command or Consensus. The Deveoment of Transkei Loca Government, p. 106, quoted by Lawrence, op. cit., p. 36. (37) Cape Arm, 10 September (38) Commission Report on Events on November 1962 at Paar (~qmaa ~eport), pma Tabata, mperiaist Conspiracy in Africa, p. 37. Contact, 9 W ch 1961, p. 5. bid., 8 MW 1961, p. 5. Lawrence, op. cit., p. 64. Contact, 25 February bid., 1 November Cape Times, 17 September Cape Arms, 28 August M. Rorre (ed), Survey of Race Reations (~ohannesburg, 1963), p. 19. Cape A~P'u~, 10 August (49) nnes and OtMeara, 0x1. cit., p. 79. (50) Patrick Duncan Papers (~niversity of ~ork), "Report on Journey Round South Africa, 29 Juy-20 August 196OW, 8.39., and "Diary of a Journey to Transkei, Apri 1962", Duncan did not join the PAC unti he eft South Africa. The South African authorities accused him and other Liberas of encoumging Poqo activities in the Transkei, but this seems highy unikey. (51) Vigne, op. cit., p. 21. (52) Lawrence, 013. cit., p. 73. (53) State v. Aex Nikeo and Mamfengu Fhoisa, Grahamstown, 14 June (54) State v. Ngoongoo and 19 others, CC 9/63, p (55) bid., P* 581- (56) Cape Times, 9 November (57) State v. Ngcongoo, p (58) bid., P (59) bid., P (60) State v. Nomapoisa Me ji, p. 20.

11 (61) bid., p. 68. (62) bid., p, 27. (63) Phiip and ona Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen (cape Town, 1974), p (64) Anon., "The Mpondo Revot 196OV, seminar paper, nod., p. 26. (65) nnes and OtMeara, op. cit., p. 82. (66) Monica Wison and Archie Mafe je, Laws (cape Town, 1963), p. 18. (67) See Snyman Report for reference to events in Paar, where a whoe barrack was abe to be isoated as Poqo members. A tria (state v. Fundee Eison Maseku, EC 5/66) in Hmdorp in 1966 concerned the formation of a Poqo branch in the sma Eastern Province town of Steynsburg. Out of an African mae popuation of 200, 60 were said to be Poqo members. A tria transcripts are from the Centre for Southern African Studies Documentation Project coection hed at the University of York Library.