MYPLACE (Memory, Youth, Political Legacy And Civic Engagement) Grant agreement no: FP

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1 MYPLACE (Memory, Youth, Political Legacy And Civic Engagement) Grant agreement no: FP WP2: Interpreting the past (The construction and transmission of historical ) Deliverable 2.1: Country based reports on historical discourse production as manifested in sites of (Croatia) Editors Version 2.0 Date Work Package Deliverable Dissemination level WP Leaders Deliverable Date November 2012 Document history Benjamin Perasović, Danijel Vojak WP2: Interpreting the past (The construction and transmission of historical ) Deliverable 2.1: Country based reports on historical discourse production as manifested in sites of (Croatia) PU: Public use Anton Popov (UW) and Dušan Deák (UCM) Version Date Comments Modified by V First draft BP V Final draft BP Page 1 of 66

2 Page Contents 3 1. Introduction Context information Note on methodology Theoretical framework Historiographical outline 9 2. Research findings Memories of the difficult past and the dominant historical narrative Historical discourses of the difficult past and the sites of Young people s experiences of memories about problematic periods of national/regional history Conclusion Bibliography Page 2 of 66

3 1. Introduction 1.1. Context information Since Croatia suffered as a result of the Homeland War after the Second World War, we chose two sites of for our study: the Memorial Museum at the Memorial Site, Jasenovac and the Croatian History Museum, which had an exhibition about the Homeland War at the time this study was conducted. The Memorial Site, Jasenovac is located near Jasenovac, a place that was a concentration camp during WWII and is located about a hundred kilometres from the capital of Croatia, Zagreb. The Croatian History Museum is located in Zagreb. The exhibitions, as well as the socio-political and historical context in which they operate will be further examined in the following parts of this report Note on methodology In accordance with the agreed methodology within the MYPLACE project, we started off by choosing the locations, cooperating with partners and making our first visits to these sites of. We also conducted a thorough analysis of the historiographical literature and other external discourses. During the first period, we observed the sites of and the various forms of spontaneous and organized visits by young people. We conducted five semi-structured interviews with experts three with curators in the Memorial Museum Jasenovac and two with museum experts (a curator and a museology pedagogue) from the Croatian History Museum. Subsequently, in agreement with our partner, we organized four focus groups. Two consisted of visitors to the exhibition The Homeland War and two were composed of visitors to the Memorial Museum Jasenovac. According to the instructions, each location had a group with Page 3 of 66

4 predominantly activism-prone students, and the other included young people who were not overtly interested or might not have come to these sites were it not for the organized visits Theoretical framework This research is based on the assumption that social is not something fixed and given, but rather a process. The use of the term social instead of collective is in accordance with suggestions that were made by Jeffrey Ollick (1999) in a broad discussion on this topic. Considering the relatively recent war that heavily influenced Croatian society, as well as the various interpretations and glorifications of events that occurred during the Second World War, it seems that there is no need to prove that the past has an influence on the present. Discourses of and different narratives are supposed to be examined here, within a concrete interaction that young persons establish with their immediate and broader surroundings. The purpose of the research is not in proving or disproving some approaches to ' studies', which are constantly becoming more popular, but rather an attempt to grasp the reality and experience of young people when it comes to different forms of social. It is also crucial to show the dominant narratives, because we can talk about divided in Croatia when it comes to the difficult and traumatic war periods - a good example of this are the discussions about events from WWII. Within the distinction between individualistic and collectivistic interpretations of the terms of remembering and memories, we believe that a social (therefore collectivist) conditionality of individual discourses is inevitable, but we leave equal space for the activities of individual consciousness and cognitive abilities. We are interested in the interaction and the shaping of the discourse of, which is, of course, as social as man himself. An insistence on a social influence is not advocacy of any determinism (as was the case with class determinism in one part of social theory), but rather points to our focus towards social. Page 4 of 66

5 1.4. Historiographical outline The research on the attitudes that young people have towards the past deals with two historical discourses: the Second World War (including crimes committed in the post-war period) and the Croatian Homeland War, both of which need to be briefly examined within a Croatian, as well as within a global historical context. World War II was a military conflict between fascist countries (Axis Powers or the Tripartite pact), headed by Germany, Italy, Japan and their allies, with the anti-fascist coalition of countries (The Allies), headed by Great Britain, France, USSR, USA and their allies. The war began in September of 1939 and ended in September of 1945 with the defeat of the fascist countries. This military conflict was different from everything that came before it, primarily, because of the sheer number of human causalities (it is estimated that more than 55 million people died in this war). Since 1939, Croatia had a certain autonomous status within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Banovina of Croatia). In early April 1941, the army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia capitulated after a brief military conflict with the Axis Powers and the Kingdom collapsed. Then, with the help and support of the Axis Powers, the pro-fascist movement called Ustashe, led by Ante Pavelić, climbed into power as they declared the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska or NDH) recognized only by the member states of the Tripartite Pact. As this was a dictatorial and authoritarian regime responsible for the cruel racial persecutions of Serbian, Jewish, Roma and other minorities, establishment of concentration camps (Jasenovac) and substantial territory cessions to fascist Italy, a significant portion of the Croatian population started to resist the new government working within the anti-fascist partisan movement led by Communists, with Josip Broz Tito at their helm. It is important to mention that the NDH was militarily and politically divided Page 5 of 66

6 between Germany and Italy. In addition, Draža Mihajlović's Chetniks, who considered themselves as representatives of the exiled government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, were active in the same territory. The Catholic Church, led by its Archbishop of Zagreb, Alojzije Stepinac, also had an important and contentious role in the NDH and in their dealings with the Ustasha authorities (Pavličević, 2007: ; Goldstein, 2008: ; Matković, 1998: ). Following severe military defeats in the area of Southeastern Europe, the Axis Powers began withdrawing from NDH territory in the spring of By the beginning of May 1945, a considerable number of Ustasha authorities and military men, but also civilians, were following the withdrawing forces, across Slovenia over to Austria. In mid May 1945, in the small Austrian border town of Bleiburg, the majority of exiled Ustasha authorities and army, as well as civilians, surrendered to British soldiers, who then handed them over to their allies - the Yugoslavian armed forces. One part of the forcibly repatriated soldiers and civilians was killed by the Yugoslav Army units, while others were sent on long marches to other parts of Yugoslavia, during which they were executed, tortured and subjected to starvation. It is estimated that tens of thousands died during these marches and this tragedy was called Križni Put (the Way of the Cross) (Pavličević, 2007: ; Goldstein, 2008: ; Matković, 1998: ). In May 1945, that is, after the fall of the NDH and the creation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (from now on Yugoslavia) Croatia became one of its six republics. The government was soon taken over by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, led by Josip Broz Tito. The political oppression of the totalitarian Communist regime was known for its violent persecutions and assassinations of political opponents (Goldstein, 2008: ; Matković, 1998: ). After the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980, the economic and political crisis Page 6 of 66

7 intensified, followed by a surge of Serbian nationalism under Slobodan Milošević, and resulting, eventually, in the military conflict and aggression against Croatia. The establishment of a multiparty system and the subsequent victory of the Croatian Democratic Union, led by Franjo Tuđman, in the spring elections of 1990, and similar political developments in other parts of the country, led to the breakup of Yugoslavia (Pavličević, 2007: ; Goldstein, 2008: ; Matković, 1998: ; Radelić, 2006: ). In December 1990, the Croatian government drafted a new constitution, and in the month following a major win in the Croatian independence referendum, more precisely, in June 1991, the Constitutional Decision on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Croatia was passed. It was enforced that October by dissolving all state relations with Yugoslavia. In January 1992, Croatia was internationally recognized as an independent country. At that same time, the Serbian population in Croatia started a military rebellion with the help of the Yugoslav People's Army, and assistance from Serbia and Montenegro, with the goal of substantial territorial expansion into Croatian territory. The Serbian rebels were influenced by the propaganda and disinformation about the genocidal nature of Croatian people (by referring to the deaths of their countrymen during WWII in NDH) and the discrimination of Serbs in Croatia. This started the conflict referred to in Croatian historiographyas Domovinski rat (the Homeland War). In the summer of 1991, Serbia and Montenegro got directly engaged in this conflict resulting in the occupation of more than one quarter of Croatian territory by the end of the year. In December 1991, the occupied territory became a part of a self-declared country without international recognition called the Republic of Serbian Krajina (Goldstein, 2008: ; Marijan, 2006: ; Bing, 2006: ). Page 7 of 66

8 With the arrival of the United Nations Protection Forces at the beginning of 1992, a ceasefire came into effect. However, in the period leading up to spring 1995, Croatian military forces managed to recapture parts of the occupied territory through several military operations (Goldstein, 2008: ). After failed negotiations between the Croatian government and the authorities in the occupied territory, a joint military-police operation called Operation Flash (Bljesak) was launched by the Croats in May 1995, liberating a considerable amount of occupied land. Three months later, a second joint operation called Operation Storm (Oluja) liberated the rest of the territory, except for a small part in eastern Slavonia. Following the Erdut Agreement between the Croatian authorities and the local Serb authorities, that remaining part was peacefully reintegrated into Croatia effectively ending the Homeland War. It should be noted that alongside this operation, a military alliance between Croatian and Bosnian military forces managed to liberate a substantial part of Serbian-occupied territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which later, in November 1995, brought about the Dayton Peace Agreement (USA) the treaty according to which the war in these territories ended. According to some estimates, Croatia suffered around 12,000 casualties and 2,000 people were reported missing during the war, as well as significant material and cultural destruction including damage to sacred objects. Furthermore, around 700,000 people were forcibly displaced (Goldstein, 2008: ; Hrvatska enciklopedija, 2001: ). Page 8 of 66

9 2. Research findings 2.1. Memories of the difficult past and the dominant historical narrative Within Croatian society and its scientific community, there are various interpretations regarding the events of WWII and the Homeland War. It is important to note that the principal controversies revolve around the question of civilian causalities, especially Serbian, Jewish and Roma casualties in Ustashas concentration camps (Jasenovac, Stara Gradiška, Jadovno, etc.). Another particularly problematic issue is determining the number of casualties, with estimates varying from several thousands to over a million. Ascertaining the relationship between the Catholic Church, led by its Archbishop, Alojzije Stepinac and the Ustasha regime, i.e., the Church s role in the killings of Serbian, Jewish, Roma and other minority peoples is a contentious endeavour. Some historians and other public figures in Croatia criticize Archbishop Stepinac and the Catholic clergy, by trying to implicate them as accomplices and patrons of Ustasha crimes (Fumić, 2009). As a kind of a counterpart to Jasenovac, the suffering of Croatian refugees in Bleiburg and during Križni put (the Way of the cross) has been presented to the Croatian public. This issue was, up until 1990s, repressively glossed over and considered a taboo and then it was readdressed with the opening up of democratic processes in Croatia (Pavlaković, 2009: ). When writing about commemorations in Jasenovac and Bleiburg, Pavlaković concludes that... Jasenovac and Bleiburg serve as antipodal public rituals, in which political Page 9 of 66

10 opponents denigrate each other annually, over the issue of the interpretation of the Second World War... (Pavlaković, 2009: 189). Even in this case, the controversy revolves around determining the number and circumstances of the deaths. This issue is closely tied to how one relates to Josip Broz Tito, specifically, to him as a leader of the anti-fascist partisan movement and to him as the life-time president of Yugoslavia. Even today, Croatian society is still divided over him some point out that he won the war and facilitated peace (especially as one of the leaders of the Non- Aligned Movement), while others perceive him as a criminal responsible for the killings of captured soldiers and civilians at Bleiberg and Križni Put, and for the prosecutions of political and other dissenters (Najbar Agičić, 2006: ; Goldstein, 2006: 59-73). Within this context, the deaths and resettling of Italian and German citizens, during and after the WWII, need to be addressed. A great number of German and Italian citizens moved away during that period, while some were imprisoned and killed by the Yugoslav Communist government. This is yet another issue that is no longer taboo in Croatian (Yugoslav) historiography, since the introduction of democratic changes in This issue was brought back into public focus, in the first half of 2007, during a public and political controversy between the Croatian President, Stjepan Mesić, and the Italian president, Giorgio Napolitano. Napolitano condemned Communist crimes against the Italian population, during and after WWII, calling them ethnic cleansing and one of the barbarities of the past century, while Mesić emphasized numerous Italian fascist crimes committed against Croats and other peoples, before and during WWII. This dispute ended several months later with a conciliatory joint statement (Dota, 2010: ; Geiger, 2006: ; Pavelić, 2010: ). In a certain way, the background of these contentious issues can be seen through an array of attitudes that the Croatian society and its government express towards anti-fascism and Page 10 of 66

11 fascism. It should be noted that anti-fascism is referred to in the basic state documents, such as in the historical foundations of the first Croatian Constitution from 1990, as well as in the Declaration on Anti-fascism adopted by the Croatian Parliament in Some believe that, at the beginning of the 1990s, besides the political system change and democratic transition coupled with aggression against Croatia, there was a certain suppression (neglect) of anti-fascism but an accentuation of the "Fascist Ustasha regime". This led to equating Partisans, who committed atrocities in WWII, with the rebel Serbs (the aggressors) in the Homeland War. (Cipek, 2009: ). Responsibility for pushing forward the above mentioned idea is often attributed to the Croatian authorities, led by Franjo Tuđman, due to their tolerance towards outbursts of Neo-Ustashism and their attempts to defend genocide and other mass crimes committed by the Ustasha authorities (Goldstein, 1995: 42). The consequences of this kind of public discourse became visible in the destruction of numerous anti-fascist monuments. Various streets and squares named after prominent anti-fascist were renamed; few of them were even renamed after prominent members of the pro-fascist Ustasha movement. Monuments were also built in honour of those people (for example: Mile Budak, Minister of Education in the NDH; Jure Francetić, the commander of the Ustasha military group Black Legion). According to some sources, around 3,000 anti-fascist monuments and memorials were destroyed in Croatia (Goldstein, Hutinec, 2007: 196; Cipek, 2009: ). The renaming of streets and squares and the removal of monuments began even before the end of WWII, when such practices were implemented by the Croatian authorities in Yugoslavia. The best example of such a practice is the case of Ban Josip Jelačić s monument, erected in 1866 at the main square in Zagreb, which first carried his name in The monument was erected primarily because of Jelačić s prominent military and political role in the development of the Croatian nation in the first half of Page 11 of 66

12 the 19 th century. Immediately after WWII, the Croatian anti-fascist authorities physically fenced it off first and then entirely removed it (in 1947). They renamed the square as Republic Square in Due to considerable public support and the newly elected democratic government, the monument was in 1990 restored to its place and the square received its old name back (Kukić, 2012; Marjanović, 2007: ). An example of a renamed square is a central square in Zagreb, the Victims of Fascism Square, which was renamed into the Square of Croatian Greats, in December This led to numerous protests, mostly from anti-fascist groups and civil society organizations. However, regardless of these protests, the square s original name was restored a decade later (Pavlaković, 2011: ). Apart from this example, it is worth noting that the Marshall Tito Square in Zagreb is still a source of controversy. Citizens from a group called Circle for the Square (Krug za Trg), are actively advocating to change the name of this square, especially because they consider that Tito was a Communist dictator, guilty of crimes against the Croatian people. If we compare the historical discourses related to WWII and the Homeland War, we can see that there are significantly less contentious issues related to the Homeland War. Namely, professionals and the general public share the perception of this war as a defensive war fought against Serbian aggressors, in pursuit of liberty. The most disputed issue is the question of Serbian casualties who died after the Croatian liberating military operations. Thus, the Croatian military - police operation Storm is interpreted differently by the Croatian and Serbian scientific and general public. Within the Croatian political and historiographic discourse, the operation Storm is featured as one of the key events in Croatia's recent history; some even call it the founding state myth on the creation of the Croatian nation. At the same time, prominent Serbian politicians strongly criticize this operation because of Croatian crimes against the Page 12 of 66

13 Serbian population (Banjeglav, 2012: , 148). Within this context, the controversial issue of what kind of role the Republic of Croatia and its military played in armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina easily arises. Some mention an internal agreement between the president of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman and the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević related to division of the territory. Others repudiate the notion of a territory division pact in Bosnia and Herzegovina, noting that Croatian politics and its armed forces performed a significant role in ending this war (Đurić, 2012; Jurčević, 2009). One aspect of this debate was played out in the field of the Croatian educational system, when the Croatian Ministry of Education initiated a process of creating a special Appendix to history textbooks for students of Serbian nationality in the Danube Region. It should be noted that in accordance with the Erdut Agreement, signed 4 August 1997, which directly is in relations to the reintegration of the Danube Region, the government of Croatia issued a Declaration of recognizing the Right to Education for Minorities in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem. It included, among other things, the introduction of a moratorium on teaching history related to the former Yugoslavia and its constituent republics, for the period of in schools in the Danube region. The moratorium was supposed to last 5 years, but then the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports made a Decision on the moratorium regarding the teaching of historical events related to the former Yugoslavia, which referred to schools, in the Danube Region, where there are classes with lectures in the Serbian language (Stančić, 2004: ; Vokić, 2007: 128). With the end of the moratorium, the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports commissioned the creation of an Appendix to textbooks regarding recent history. This was supposed to be used as teaching material until a textbook in the Serbian language and script was Page 13 of 66

14 written for schools in the Danube Region. A special committee was established for this purpose, and the committee decided that this appendix should be used as a textbook in all the schools in Croatia. Tvrtko Jakovina and Snježana Koren from the University of Zagreb, Department of History, as well as Magdalena Najbar-Agičić, who is the author of several history textbooks for elementary and high-schools, were hired to write this appendix. A year later, the completed text was sent to various scientific institutions and individuals for reviews; they were mostly negative. During the review process, the Appendix was leaked to the public, resulting in numerous discussions within scientific circles and the general public. A specially controversial part of the Appendix dealt with events during operation Storm. The text stated that, during the operation, Croatian soldiers committed numerous crimes against the Serbian population and that they banished people from their homes. A group of Croatian intellectuals voiced their disapproval in the form of an open letter to the government and the public and demanded that the Appendix be discarded. The authors of the Appendix were criticized for not using relevant literature and for their lack of emphasis on the Serbian-Montenegro aggression and occupations of Croatian territory. Further criticism was related to their failure to mention certain events (e.g., the murders of Croatian police officers in Borovo Selo in May 1991), and use of inappropriate comparisons (such as comparing the columns of non-serbian refugees in 1991 to the columns of Serbian refugees in 1995). Disapproval was also voiced because they failed to accentuate the importance of Croatian military operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Overall the authors were labelled as generally incompetent and as authors attempting to counterfeit history, lacking objectivity, non methodical in approach and failing to include multiple perspectives. Finally, it was said that they wrote a conventional historiography to disperse the responsibility for the war (Skenderović, Jareb, Artuković, 2008: 13 22; Artuković, 2009: ; Špehar, 2008: 23 29). The Page 14 of 66

15 authors of the Appendix rejected these criticsms and called it a malicious attack against an author s freedom of expression, or an incorrect interpretation of the Appendix (Najbar-Agičić, 2007: 84 89; Koren, 2007a: ). One of the results of this debate was a decision made in May 2005, by the representative of the Serbian minority, to use the existing textbooks in Serbian language and script, while three months later, the Ministry decided not to publish the Appendix (Uredništvo Documente, 2007: VIII X; Stančić, 2007: ; Koren, 2007a: ). Shortly thereafter, a study was conducted with the goal of finding out how the Homeland War was represented in elementary and high-school history textbooks. Research results showed that there were no substantial differences and discrepancies in portraying the war in different textbooks, and that the war was covered in a fairly proper manner (Barunčić, Križe, 2006: ). However, in the spring of 2007, this question arose again after the decision of the Ministry to allow the use of five different history textbooks in schools, three of which mention the suffering of the Serbian population after Operation Storm (two of those textbooks were returned to the authors for revision ). Among other public outbursts and controversies, it is important to mention an open letter that was sent by 20 members of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Art and 18 historians to the Croatian government, the President, and the President of the Croatian Parliament. The authors of the letter resented that the authors of the three contested textbooks failed to accentuate the liberating character of the operations Storm and Flash and their importance for Croatian society; that they mildly (and briefly) depicted Serbian crimes and the departure (exile) of the Serbian population after these operations, while exaggerating Croatian crimes against the Serbian population (Ašperger, Babić H., Babić, S., et al., 2007: 5 10). The authors of the three textbooks received support from 14 historians in the History Department, University of Zagreb, in the form of an open letter, where they stress the Page 15 of 66

16 need for...an open discussion related to the teaching of history that protects the science of history and history as a school subject from being abused in everyday political agendas... (Agičić, Budak, Hutinec, et al., 2007: 11). This case indicates, among other things, that there are problems within the educational system, especially regarding history. Some teachers indicated that the curriculum and program for teaching history in elementary and high-school was old-fashioned and rigid, resulting in an improper education when it comes to history, aggravated by inappropriate materials (such as textbooks). Some historians state that the history of the Croatian people in these textbooks is portrayed as a history of Croatian suffering ( its own martyrdom ) (Agičić, 2007: 61 70; Petrungaro, 2009: 163; Koren, 2009: ). Some historians identified the meddling of political authorities into Croatian historiography after 1990 as the root of this problem, considering all the disputed historical events were incorporated in different political party platforms. Some saw this as an attempt to create an authentic historical truth, or as... a means for spreading ideology and aggressive nationalism..., or as a way of...promoting the idea of a national state and the ideology of ethnic nationalism... (Agičić, 2007: 61; Matković, 2011: ; Goldstein, Hutinec, 2007: 190; Koren, 1999/2000: 117; Petrungaro, 2009: 93). At this point, we should mention some specific actions taken by Croatia's Presidents Stjepan Mesić and Ivo Josipović, who have on several occasions, apologized for the crimes of the Ustashas and crimes during WWII, as well as for crimes committed against the Serbian population during the Homeland War and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. President Mesić made an apology for Ustasha crimes during his visit to Israel, in October 2001, and he also apologized for crimes committed against the Serbs during the Homeland War, in Belgrade, in September Likewise, Josipović apologized for Ustasha crimes when he was in Israel, in Page 16 of 66

17 February 2012, and in Sarajevo, in April 2010, for Croatian crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His final apology, for crimes against the Serbs during the Homeland War, was given in November 2011, while visiting Paulin Dvor (Pavelić, 2010: 59-61, ; Josipović, 2012a; Josipović, 2010; web portal Jutarnji.hr, Prusina, Patković: 2011). Croatian authorities have made numerous special declarations regarding specific historic issues under the influence of internal and international political circumstances. The Croatian Parliament tried to define, by issuing these special parliamentary Acts (Declarations), its official stance towards specific (divisive) questions arising from the country s past. This resulted in Parliament trying to historically define the roles that specific individuals played in Croatia's past (i.e, the role of Archbishop of Zagreb, Alojzije Stepinac in the Declaration of condemnation of the political process and verdict against Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac in 1992; or the role of Andrija Hebrang in the Declaration of condemnation of the arrest and murder of Andrija Hebrang, also issued in 1992). They also tried to do the same thing with specific historical events (the Homeland War, as defined in the Declaration about the Croatian War of Independence from 2000, or the military operation Storm as defined in the Declaration on Operation Storm from 2006), the systems of governments (condemning the crimes committed by the Communist government in the Declaration of Condemnation of the Crimes Committed During the Totalitarian Communist Regime in Croatia in the Years , issued in 2006) and other events (accentuating antifascism as the core value of the Republic of Croatia in the Declaration on Anti-Fascism from 2005). A number of historians criticized these acts, as they believed that making such declarations was an attempt to violate the science and teaching of history (Koren, 2011: ; Deklaracija o osudi političkog procesa, 1992; Deklaracija o osudi uhićenja, 1992: Deklaracija o Domovinskom ratu, 2000; Deklaracija o antifašizmu, 2005; Deklaracija o Oluji, Page 17 of 66

18 2006.; Deklaracija o osudi zločina, 2006.). As a consequence, history as a school subject and Croatia's historiography have become a kind of a political battleground of conflicting discourses (Koren, 2007b: 248). It is also important to remember that the Communist Yugoslav government used history to legitimize their actions, and defined its authority as a sort of payback, paying the proper respect to the dead Partisan soldiers ( Partisans = untouchable saints ), while using history to justify their silence when it came to certain taboo topics (such as Bleiburg and Križni Put) (Cipek, 2009: ). Similar questions regarding education opened up a wider discussion in Croatia, especially in the scientific community when it came to dealing with sensitive and controversial topics related to WWII and the Homeland War. Some scientists emphasized that there were a number of historians and other scientists who used a revisionist approach when dealing with sensitive historical topics, especially topics concerning certain events and individuals from WWII. They believe that Croatian revisionism emerged by the end of the 1980s as a historiographic retardation and a socio-political anomaly tolerated by the Croatian authorities, and that it emerged as a consequence of disclosing (discovering) taboo topics such as the Communist crimes (e.g., Bleiburg and Križni put), under the influence of the policy of reconciliation between Ustashas and Partisans, and finally, as a response to a similar Serbian historiographical revisionism (Goldstein, Hutinec, 2007: ). Tihomir Cipek points out that with the political regime change and the democratic transition of 1990, the Fascist-Ustasha discourse was allowed to enter the public domain, and because of the Serbian aggression, it was interpreted as (self)-defensive vehement Croatianhood (Cipek, 2009: 159). In this context, an attempt has been made to explain the actions of Franjo Tuđman as a historiographical revisionist considering his policy of reconciliation between Ustashas and Partisans, with the single goal of Page 18 of 66

19 creating an independent country of Croatia. This thesis is sometimes backed up by Tuđman's statement at a political rally in 1990, when he said that the NDH was not just a fascist state, but also... an expression of the centuries-old desire of the Croatian people for an independent state... (Goldstein I., Hutinec, 2007: 195; Petrungaro, 2009: ; Pavlaković, 2009: 168; Goldstein S., 1993: 13 18). It needs to be noted that Tuđman was not only a distinguished political figure, but he also had a PhD in history, specializing in the field of 20 th century Croatian history (Banjeglav, 2012: 93, 107). Ivo Goldstein and Goran Hutinec named several Croatian scientists as revisionists Josip Pečarić, Josip Jurčević, Marijan Cote, Jere Jareb, Hrvoje Matković and Jure Krište, mostly due to their revisionist explanation of the statehood of NDH, and a lack of criticism against the genocidal and criminal policies of Ustasha authorities (Goldstein, Hutinec, 2007: ). In October 2012, in a news interview with Stjepan Razum, a Croatian historian and Head of the Diocese Archives in Zagreb, touched upon the question of Jasenovac and created a widespread and harsh debate in Croatia. Razum, among other things, stated that the Ustasha movement and the army of NDH were in favour of an independent Croatia, that Jasenovac was not a concentration and death camp ( an area of systematic destruction ) but rather a place of work and a temporary (transitional) camp, and after WWII it became a camp for the victims of Communism. Some of his opinions were defined as a revisionist attempt to analyse certain events of WWII, which were especially criticized by President Ivo Josipović (Černivec, 2012; Razum, 2012: ; Josipović, 2012b; Bešker, 2012). Except for the historiographical discussions about the relationship between anti-fascism and fascism, this is directly related to the question of the (inter)relationship towards the crimes of the Ustasha regime during WWII and the crimes of the anti-fascist and Communist authorities during and after WWII. The Catholic Church in Croatia joined the discussion, and during the Page 19 of 66

20 Croatian Conference of Bishops Iustitia et pax repeatedly pointed out the need to investigate, admit and process the crimes of Communism, at the same time condemning all the hiding and denying of the existence of Communist crimes during and after WWII, considering this to be... an intentionally overlooked event in Croatia's history..., and blamed a lack of political desire for the absence of changes in such a situation (Košić, 2009: 29; Košić, 2010: 27). In a statement Iustitia et pax in 2012 point out that they... have a problem with the public abatement of the symbolic worth of Bleiburg as a symbol of suffering of the Croatian people from Communist terror during and after WWII. These actions confuse the Croatian public... (Košić, 2012: 5). Croatian historian, Vladimir Geiger commented, upon publication of a work dealing with research on the crimes of the Yugoslav Communist regime during and after WWII in Croatia, that the... NOB [National Liberation War] is indisputable when it comes to the fight against occupation, but it still does not negate, and even less explains the crimes committed by the Partisans by the end of the war and after it. There is no scale on which we might put all the positive and negative things so that we might see where it leans. Partisans fought against a monstrous racist ideology, against occupation and crime. In the end, they are the recognized victors of WWII, a part of the Allies' Anti-Fascist Coalition. They returned to Croatia stolen, in other words, the occupied territories. On the other hand, they brought along a distorted regime, which also committed crimes and oppressed people who were not on their side and anyone who they considered a potential threat to their regime... (Vurušić, 2008). Josip Jurčević compared the crimes of the Communist regime during and after WWII with the crimes of the Ustasha s Fascist regime during the war, pointing out that these crimes were similar inasmuch as both were committed under a totalitarian system, but the crimes of the Communist regime were greater since their regime lasted much longer (Karabeg, 2007). Some of Croatia's historians oppose such Page 20 of 66

21 ideas, claiming that the crimes in Bleiburg cannot be excused (or hidden away) by the crimes committed in Jasenovac. In that context, Slavko and Ivo Goldstein claim that... Jasenovac was primarily genocide, a mass murder of civilians while Bleiburg was a case of mass murder of captured and defeated enemy soldiers... Bleiburg did not have an influence on Jasenovac, but Jasenovac did cause Bleiburg... (Karabeg, 2007; Goldstein, S., Goldstein, I.: 2011: 11). Within this context of opposing public and scientific discourses, it is possible to examine Tuđman's idea from 1996 about turning Jasenovac into a place of Croatian national reconciliation, that is, into a place where all the victims from WWII and the Homeland War could be commemorated, which was called, by some, the policy of mixing bones. However, due to criticism from representatives of Croatian anti-fascist organizations and Jewish organizations, as well as the international community, this idea was abandoned. Still, some distinguished Croatian politicians often incorporated the narrative of the Homeland War into commemorations and events marking WWII. The statements of Ivo Sanader (Croatian Prime Minister, in a speech at a commemoration of Jasenovac in 2005, and Bleiburg 2006), or those of Andrija Hebrang (a Member of Parliament, in a speech at a commemoration at Bleiburg in 2011) expose an obvious tendency of equating the victims of fascism and anti-fascism with the victims of the Homeland War. A similar statement was made by Vlado Košić, in 2009, while speaking on behalf of the Croatian Conference of Bishops Iustitia et pax, where he said that... the recent defensive war showed that the denial of the existence of crimes committed against Croatians during and after WWII, repeated itself during the Homeland War. That is why it is possible that we deny war crimes and crimes against humanity... (Košić, 2009: 29; Banjeglav, 2012: ; , 119; Barić, 2007: 214; Radonić, 2010: 55; Pavlaković, 2009: 169, ). Ljiljana Radonić notes that such equating leads to the labelling of Croats as the new Page 21 of 66

22 Jews and Serbs as the new fascists, while Pavlaković believes it to be a certain perception of a continuity of Serbian violence against Croatia (Radonić, 2010: 55 56; Pavlaković, 2009: ). It is worth noting that a significant number of monuments were dedicated to the victims of more than one war, that is, to the victims of WWII and the Homeland War (Banjeglav, 2012: ). These examples clearly show that the debates over certain events that occurred in WWII and the Croatian War of Independence are still going on. It is obvious that the prevailing debates are connected with certain sensitive or controversial issues from WWII and the period immediately following it. These discourses have partially imprinted themselves onto the historical discourse related to the Croatian War of Independence Historical discourses of the difficult past and the sites of For the purposes of this study, the memorial sites of Jasenovac and the Croatian History Museum have been chosen as sites of and a place of interaction between young people and certain historical narratives. It is necessary to point out that the memorial site of Jasenovac and the Memorial Museum were founded back in 1968 as a place of remembrance for all the victims of the Ustasha regime. Namely, for all those who died in the concentration camps, Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška, as well as for the soldiers of the anti-fascist movement (The National Liberation Army). It was created to gather, process and present information about the Ustasha concentration camp Jasenovac, and to... show value in respecting the differences among people by hearing the truth about the Jasenovac camps and its victims... (Jasenovac Memorial Site, 2012). The Memorial Page 22 of 66

23 Museum in Jasenovac was opened in 1968 and in 1988 the permanent exhibition was renewed. During the Homeland War, the area was occupied by Serbian forces, who took some of the exhibits and documents to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and later on to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. After an agreement was reached, the documents and exhibits were returned to Jasenovac in The new exhibition in the Memorial Museum of Jasenovac was opened with a ceremony in 2006, when it was announced that a database with the names of all the victims of the concentration camp, Jasenovac from 1941 to 1945 would be established (Jasenovac Memorial Site, 2012.). The Croatian History Museum developed from what was once the National Museum, which opened in Zagreb in Until 1991, it was known as the Historic Museum of Croatia, when it merged with the Museum of the National Revolution into what is now known as the Croatian History Museum. Due to its limited space, even to this day, this museum has never had a permanent exhibition on display. Its task, however, is... to educate through public work, children, young people and citizens in general about the history of their people... (The Croatian History Museum, 2012). From December 2011 until the end of October 2012, the Croatian History Museum held an exhibition under the title The Croatian Homeland War. Jasenovac and the Croatian History Museum are some of the most important museums and sites of remembrance in Croatia. It is interesting to point out how these two institutions are connected; experts from the Croatian History Museum participated in the organization of the current exhibition in the Memorial Museum of Jasenovac and are a part of the museum's steering committee. This is mentioned by experts from Jasenovac in the interviews who commend Nataša Mataušić from the Croatian History Museum, as the author of the historical part of the permanent exhibition in Jasenovac (CRE1; CRE3). Both of these institutions have, as their primary goal, the Page 23 of 66

24 preservation and presentation of certain historical memories, and they are funded in this endeavour by both the local and state authorities. The Jasenovac Memorial Site had a permanent exhibition until 1968, which showed the suffering and deaths of people in the concentration camp. The concept of the exhibition was changed several times, and in 1988, at the initiative of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art, emphasis was placed on the brutality and the barbaric nature of the crimes (CRE3; CRE2). A museum expert from Jasenovac commented on this issue, stating that... the old exhibition gave a graphic portrayal of violence, the crimes and the killings that happened in the camp, and I believe that the authors goal was to provoke a shock effect... (CRE1). In contrast to such an approach, the new 2006 exhibition was characterized as humanizing and focusing on the individuality of every victim (CRE2). The expert states that the new exhibition in Jasenovac was conceived in a way whereby... the author s idea was to represent that period of history and the Camp s history itself through narratives from survivors... and there was no intention of approaching the victims as a nameless mass that was sent there, as was the case in previous exhibitions with numerous documents and exhibits in which a nameless mass was the focus. Whereas here, the approach was directed more towards the quality and not the quantity of the items that were exhibited... (CRE1). Unlike Jasenovac, the Croatian History Museum cannot display a permanent exhibition due to its spatial limitations, therefore their activities, within this context, can be analyzed through the exhibition The Homeland War. Three curators set up the exhibition in a small space of 200 square metres, dividing it into three key areas: humanitarian, political and military. This Page 24 of 66

25 exhibition covered the time period of political struggle, from the 1970s to 1998, that is, until the end of the Homeland War. The curators set up the exhibition with the aim to commemorate the anniversary of 1991, 20 years after the open aggression against the Republic of Croatia started, with an emphasis on Vukovar, as a symbol of destruction and suffering, as one of the curators stated (CRE4). In both of these exhibitions, the curators were faced with problems related to the sensitive nature of both WWII and the Homeland War. The curators from the Croatian History Museum stated that they did not avoid sensitive issues. They presented these issues through selected key areas, such as the lack of information on people who went missing during the war, the role of Croatia during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the issue of judicial proceedings connected to war crimes and the exodus of the Serbian population after the military-police operation Storm (CRE4). The authors of the exhibition approached sensitive issues in a way that... did not leave room for any kind of personal comments or curatorial influences there are photographs that can be very suggestive on their own, and documents from the Croatian Memorial-Documentation Centre of the Homeland War, which depict very clearly what happened... (CRE4). Another curator from the same museum stated a similar thing...we decided on this approach because we believed that it would be wrong to present the events in a dry and cold manner we wanted the visitors to, in a way, relive the lives of certain individuals, to hear what this event, the chronology of it all, meant in someone s life. This is, we believe, the only way to truly, not only personalize it but to understand such a difficult past... (CRE5). Page 25 of 66

26 At the same time, their colleagues in Jasenovac pointed out that they also touched upon sensitive issues in their permanent exhibition, through events related to WWII. In this case, they were not the authors of the exhibition the authors were curators from other Croatian museums and institutions (CRE2; CRE3). One of the museum experts from Jasenovac described the role of the curators and staff in Jasenovac as a... certain kind of service, or rather help needed in order to fulfil certain tasks and goals that would be displayed in the exhibition. Among other things, this meant recording the survivors testimonies. That meant that our employees, curators here at that time, were on a mission to find the Jasenovac survivors, record their testimonies, and then create something from the hours of recorded material, so that it could be presented and exhibited in a way that matches the concept of the exhibition and the author s vision (CRE3). Regarding the museum's approach to sensitive issues, one of the experts states that... the idea was to exclusively present verified facts, and not some constructs, due to the fact that Jasenovac is a very controversial topic that influenced the Homeland War, and still emerges as a contested issue in politics. The authors tried to distance themselves from that and just display pure facts, inasmuch as that is possible. That s why the events that happened in the concentration camp are told solely in the words of the former captives themselves. Other exhibits include authentic objects from the camp - there is not even one replica or reconstruction in the Museum. Photographs and documents from the era of the NDH are also exhibited... (CRE2). This approach of describing the history of the suffering and deaths that happened in Jasenovac was one way of humanizing and individualizing victims and Page 26 of 66

27 ...the authors of the exhibition wanted to remind visitors that prisoners were people with first names and surnames, who were born and died in a certain place, and whenever it was possible and verifiable, a personal item was exhibited, so that at least something could be said about the victim, why someone was sent there and whether one survived (CRE2). The question of dealing with sensitive issues from the past is intertwined with the question of how politics influence museums, especially when museums give retrospective displays of certain historical events. All interviewed museum experts noted that the political authorities do wield some influence on their work and their presentations of certain sensitive historical topics. Experts from Jasenovac pointed out that the museum's exhibition changed in conjunction with changes in the government in Croatia in the 1990s. Certain topics (i.e., the role of the Partisans) were no longer on display in the permanent exhibition and the authorities even suggested which other topics should be presented (i.e., depictions of Communist crimes in Jasenovac after WWII, or making Jasenovac a place of reconciliation of the Croatian people ), and there were even attempts by those in power to influence certain museum projects, such as determining the number of casualties (CRE1; CRE2; CRE3). An expert from the Croatian History Museum made similar comments about the influence of the authorities in power on her work in the museum stating that... the interpretations displayed by the museum could not go against the prevailing interpretations of the events..., but she concludes that... there are less and less attempts of political meddling in museums. I believe that this is a good thing, of course. In other words, I believe that museums should not be influenced by whoever is in power at any given moment, or by whatever ideology is prevailing at the Page 27 of 66