THE EFFECT OF NATIONALITY AND POLITICAL AFFINITY ON VOTING IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: UNITY IN DIVERSITY?

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1 THE EFFECT OF NATIONALITY AND POLITICAL AFFINITY ON VOTING IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: UNITY IN DIVERSITY? İlke TOYGÜR 1 Key Words: European Union, decision-making, nationality, Turkey, European Parliament ABSTRACT Decision making in the European Union, and the mechanism behind, has been an interesting topic for many political scientists. This paper provides a short theoretical and historical background on the topic and aims to define the level of importance nationality has in decision-making mechanism of a Member of the European Parliament, with a specific case study about the voting in EP about Turkey which also connects the issue to the enlargement process. Our data set, which is derived from the EU Vote Watch data, includes 92 vote rolls between 2004 and 2011 and more than decisions made by MEPs. The work is commenting on the role nationality and ideology play in these decisions, while also introducing the effect of public opinion. Paper presented at the 4th ECPR Graduate Student Conference Jacobs University, Bremen (04-06 Jul. 2012) 1 PhD Candidate, Departament of Political Science and International Relations, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain

2 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS EEC European Economic Community EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community EU European Union EP European Parliament MEP Member of the European Parliament MS Member State EC European Commission EPP European People's Party S&D Socialists & Democrats ALDE Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe ECR European Conservatives and Reformists EFA European Free Alliance GUE European United Left NGL Nordic Green Left EFD Europe of Freedom & Democracy NI Independents PPE-DE European People's Party and European Democrats (6 th European Parliament) PSE Socialist Group (6 th European Parliament)

3 UEN Union for Europe of the Nations Group IND-DEM Independence/Democracy Group

4 LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES Table 1: Distribution of the Seats in the European Parliament ( ) Table 2: Cohesion Rates of the Political Groups in the EP (EP7&EP6) Figure 1: Cohesion Rates of Political Groups in the EP7 A Comparison Figure 2: Cohesion Rates of Political Groups in Votes Related to Turkey (EP7) Figure 3: Cohesion Rates of Political Groups in Votes Related to Turkey (EP6) Table 3: Cohesion Rates of Member States (EP7&EP6) Figure 4: Cohesion Rates of the Member States in the EP7 A Comparison Figure 5: Cohesion Rates of the Member States in Votes Related to Turkey Table 4: Support for Turkish Membership to the EU Figure 6: Public Opinion towards Turkish Accession to the EU (After All Conditions Complied) Table 5: Tendency Austrian MEPs Follow while Voting Table 6: Tendency Luxembourger MEPs Follow while Voting Table 7: Tendency German MEPs Follow while Voting Table 8: Tendency Cypriot MEPs Follow while Voting Table 9: Tendency Greek MEPs Follow while Voting Table 10: Tendency Dutch MEPs Follow while Voting Appendix Table 1: Current Situation in Accession Negotiations (June 2012)

5 Appendix Table 2: List of Votes about Turkey in the Area of Foreign & Security Policy ( ) Appendix Table 3: Voting Decisions of MEPs from EPP (EP7) Appendix Table 4: Voting Decisions of MEPs from Austria (EP7) Appendix Table 5: Voting Decisions of MEPs from S&D (EP6) Appendix Table 6: Voting Decisions of MEPs from Belgium (EP6)

6 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section I: Introduction... 7 Section II: Social Relevance and Theoretical Background....9 II.1. History of Enlargement in the European Union....9 II.2. After Half a Century: Current Situation in the Negotiations with Turkey II.3. Theoretical Background of EU Decision Making II.4. European Parliament A Directly Selected Institution Section III: A Case Study: The Voting in Practice in the European Parliament III.1. Data...20 III.2. Main Findings...22 III.3. Further Research Agenda...32 Section IV: Conclusion Section V: Bibliography Section VI: Appendix....39

7 Section I Introduction In Europe, after all the challenges States have been going through in the 20 th Century, an alternative administrative system was required for building peace through cooperation. There were hot debates on dangers of nationalism, which were proved right after two World Wars. The desperate look for international cooperation following the argument that claims further economic and political integration can decrease the amount of conflicts ended up with experiments. European Union can be named as the one which has evolved the furthest and brought the greatest changes for its citizens (McCormick, 1999). Today 27 countries national authorities and their representatives in Brussels are deciding the destiny of their citizens together. For this reason, understanding the decision making mechanism of the Union is quite important for understanding European policy making. Institutions play a key role in integration of the EU. While they keep on playing their assigned roles, the bargaining process between Member States also continues. There are some studies trying to formulate the logic and balance behind all the intergovernmental bargaining and supranationalism (Arregui & Thomson, 2009; Blom-Hansen & Brandsma, 2009). In this work, we are trying to analyze the decision making process while questioning the specific role of MSs and euro-parties. Börzel claims that the EU relies heavily on hierarchy and looks for the consent of its MSs for the adaption of important decisions (Börzel, 2010). Our work puts a 7

8 special focus on the European Parliament since it is the only directly elected EU institution and expected to reflect the will of European citizens. This paper attempts to give a summary of the decision-making mechanism for some specific areas, provide a historical background of the enlargement of the EU in general, Turkish case in particular and looks for possible answers to its research question, while checking it with a case study of European Parliament. Here the research question is to what extend nationality matters for a Member of the EP? The main hypothesis is in the case of EP, even if nationality matters, so does tendency of the political group. A secondary hypothesis is European decision-making is a balance of intergovernmental bargaining and supranational powers, which is followed by a third hypothesis saying MSs still play an important role in European decision-making. The reasons behind the selection of Turkey as a case study are self-explanatory. With a history of more than half a century, Turkey still stays as one of the most, maybe the most, challenging enlargement EU has ever faced. Her sui generis case created and keeps on creating many problems and discussions, not only between political elites but also for the citizens. In short, there is a long history of relationship which does not have a happy ending, yet, which deserves a special focus. To enhance the reader friendliness, a brief outline of the structure is provided. This paper has been divided into various sections, starting with Section 1, the introduction, which presents the initial information and the structure of the paper. Section 2 presents the social relevance and theoretical background of the research topic. Section 3 provides a case study, the voting in practice in European Parliament related to Turkey then Section 4 is the conclusion, presents the summary of the main findings of this paper. The Section 5 is the Bibliography and Section 6 is the Appendix, that being the last Section of this work. 8

9 Section II Social Relevance and Theoretical Background This paper claims to have an interesting discussion on the decision making mechanism and provides a case study related to the role nationality plays in decisions in the EP. The case study aims to compare the decisions MEPs of different political groups and Member States made in votes related to Turkey. For understanding the rest of the paper better, it is quite beneficial to have a quick look in the history of integration and enlargement of the EU, more than half a century old story of Turkey EU relations and the theoretical background of decision-making of the EU. Those three subsections will follow each other. II.1. History of Integration and Enlargement of the European Union Starting with establishment of Council of Europe in 1949, Europe integrated so fast in 1950s and 1960s with the motivation of post World War II mentality. First the European Coal and Steal Community was established in With the entrance into force of the Treaty of Rome in 1958, European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) were established with six founding countries. These countries were: France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The Customs Union between these countries was accomplished in

10 The success achieved by these countries attracted attention of others as well, which brought the term enlargement into the scene. The enlargement policy of the Union is one of the most important tools which is affecting the future of the EU. Both deepening and widening has changed and will keep changing the Union, in many different dimensions. When we look at the history of enlargement, we can see waves which can be listed as: In 1973, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the European Union. In 1981, Greece became a Member State. In 1986, Spain and Portugal became members. In 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU. In 2004, Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined. It was a historic enlargement which signified the reunification of Europe after decades of division. On 1 January 2007 Romania and Bulgaria also joined, completing this historic process. Today, Croatia has acceding country status while the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Iceland, Serbia and Turkey have candidate status. II.2. After Half a Century: Current Situation in the Negotiations with Turkey In July 31 st, 1959, shortly after the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, Turkey made its first application to join the newly established Community 2. The ensuing 2 For this section Ilgaz & Toygur (2011) has been the main source of reference. For a more detailed analysis please see the referred article. 10

11 negotiations resulted with the signature of the Ankara Agreement on September 12 th, This agreement, which entered into force on December 1 st, 1964, marks the beginning of Turkey s relations with EEC. The Ankara Agreement envisaged a progressive model of integration with Turkey, namely the establishment of a Customs Union (CU). Following this, Turkey-EU relations entered a period of instability lasting from the beginning of 1970s, until the second half of 1980s, due to Turkey s political and economic conditions as well as some shifts in the Atlantic Alliance and global economic downturn that hampered European growth. Following the military coup of September 12 th, 1980 in Turkey, the relations between Turkey and the Community virtually froze. The Commission also mentioned that Turkey's accession was prevented equally by the EC's own situation on the eve of the Single Market's completion which prevented any consideration of further enlargement. Under these circumstances, Turkey chose to give priority to complete the envisaged Customs Union with the Community and further strengthened its efforts. Talks were finalised on 6 th of March with the completion of the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU in industrial and processed agricultural goods by December 31 st, With the Customs Union decision, Turkey-EU relations entered a totally new dimension, due to the fact that the CU constituted one of the most important steps for Turkey`s EU integration objective. Afterwards, the Helsinki European Council Summit held on December 10-11, 1999 marked a breakthrough in Turkey-EU relations. Set against a changing political conjuncture which included factors such as subsiding of terror in Turkey following the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, the adoption of a more inclusive enlargement policy by the EU aimed at stabilization following the Kosovar crisis and the assumption of power by the Social Democrats in Germany, the Helsinki Summit proved to be a crucial turning point. At the 11

12 Summit, Turkey was officially recognized, without any precondition, as a candidate state on an equal level with other candidate states. The Copenhagen European Council Summit of December 2002 marked another important turning point in EU enlargement process. While the accession of ten candidate states to the EU had been declared, the Copenhagen European Council resolved that the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a recommendation from the European Commission, should decide that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU would open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay. The Presidency Conclusions on Turkey in December 17, 2004 constituted an important and historical landmark. Based on this recommendation at the European Council on December 16-17, 2004, the decisions taken in the 1999 Helsinki and 2002 Copenhagen Summits were reaffirmed, as the Council took note of the resolute steps taken by Turkey in pursuing a comprehensive reform process and decided to open accession negotiations in the framework of the paragraph 23 of the Presidency Conclusions. Accordingly, negotiations started with Turkey on October 3, However both the Commission recommendation to open negotiations and the negotiation framework document include some peculiarities such as the stress on negotiations being an open ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand 3 and the search for methods to fully anchor Turkey in European structures 4. From the outset these measures caused some caution and perceived as signs of discriminatory treatment in the Turkish public. Today, all in all, with the Section lastly opened by Spanish Presidency in 2010, 13 Sections are opened, one is provisionally closed; Council decided not to open 8 Sections and not to

13 provisionally close any Section until Turkey complies with its obligations under the additional protocol. Even if not officially declared, 5 Sections are blocked by France and 6 by Republic of Cyprus at the Council (some of them are overlapping). For the coming Presidency terms, only three Sections are left to be opened (Public Procurement, Competition Policy and Social Policy and Employment) if Turkey complies the opening benchmarks 5. II.3. Theoretical Background of EU Decision Making The discussions of decision-making history of the Union go back to European Economic Community (EEC). Work of Rosenthal (1975) can be counted as the first systematic work on the field. In his work Rosenthal tests three models of decision making: intergovernmentalism, pressure politics and elite networks. According to the writer elite networks-behind the scenes lobbying and elaborate committee work- explained an important part of the decision making in EEC. This way of thinking also creates discussions about power inside the Union, makes us ask who sets the agenda for discussion. First realism and afterwards neo-realism remained as important phenomenon for explaining the decision making process of the European Union. According to both, States are the key actors in world politics. For neo-realists EU decision making is the practice of ordinary diplomacy (Pierson, 1996) and the Union is as powerful as its Member States let it be. Inspired by neo-realism, intergovernmentalists underline that EU strengthen the nation-state, not weaken as claimed (Milward, 1992; Moravcsik, 1994). The main argument behind this way of thinking is that EU provides room for manoeuvre and gives a chance for escaping from 5 For a detailed analysis of the current situation related to Sections please check Appendix Table 1. 13

14 domestic pressure in certain issues. Most of the EU leaders put the blame on the EU in many cases. Intergovernmentalism, one of the most defended and criticized theories of all, claims that states are the initiators, promoters, mediators, legislators and promulgators of (Puchala, 1999) the integration and functioning of the Union. Moravcsik (1991) also argues that the primary source of integration lies in the interests of the states themselves and the relative power each brings to Brussels. Before explaining liberal intergovernmentalism of Moravcsik, it is beneficial to mention the name of Putnam. Rosamond elucidates in his book 6 that Putnam defines a link between domestic politics and international politics. Moravcsik goes one step further defining a three-level game assuming that Member States are rational players and follow a path such as: 1. they formulate preferences in response to functional policy interdependence 2. they engage in interstate bargaining to achieve Pareto-improving solutions and resolve distributional conflicts 3. they delegate or pool sovereignty in international institutions to extend, implement, or enforce those bargains. 7 As we all know, states can have many different interests such as economic, politic or geopolitical. However, it is not wrong to say that economic interests are the ones primarily derived the European integration. In the case of European Union, international cooperation moved one step forward, leading -to some extent- surrender of sovereignty, what is called as supranationalism. Supranationalism can be defined as a process of cooperation that results in a shift of authority to a new level of organization that is autonomous, above the State and has powers of coercion that are 6 Rosamond, B. (2000). Intergovernmental Europe?. Theories of European Integration. p Moravcsik (2008) 14

15 independent of State (McCormick, 1999). European Parliament and European Commission are the two supranational institutions. Treaty of Lisbon tried to empower the Parliament, especially by co-decision procedure. Even if losing power bothers States and limits their determination, European integration requires an increase in the autonomy and authority of the supranational institutions. Thus, from an institutional point of view, the evolution of the union will be towards an entity in which supranational agents respond the demands thanks to the institutions. This approach is changing the position of the Member States which will decrease the autonomy of national governments (Puchala, 1999). Börzel (2010) 8 claims that EU relies on hierarchy in the making of its politics while the scholars of multi-level governance assume that European politics is transferred into a multilevel, non-hierarchical and apolitical governance (Marks, 1992); Hooghe, 1996)). Defenders of multi-level governance propose vertical and horizontal dimensions, which allow decision making at various levels (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). In addition to all theory we have been going through, there is an article which claims that neofunctionalism can be applied to the enlargement process in general, Turkish case in particular 9. Macmillan provides the necessary theoretical background of neofunctionalism and tries to prove its validity for the case of enlargement. It is quite important to keep in mind that, the theoretical background of European integration and theories of governance and decision-making are quite mixed today. There are many dimensions which cannot be explained with a single theory. The theoretical background 8 Börzel has an interesting paper. He claims that governance usually distinguishes three different types of institutionalized rule structures: hierarchy, market (competition systems) and networks (negotiation systems). For further information please see Bibliography. 9 Macmillan (2009) claims that neofunctionalist theory can provide a framework for understanding enlargement in general and for understanding the reasons why Turkey s bid for EU membership has continued to move forward despite opposition from some Member States. 15

16 provided here is just an introductory work. All the related literature in European Studies, Political Science in general, Public Policy in particular, should be covered for a fully detailed theoretical background. II.4. European Parliament A Directly Elected Institution The role of the European Parliament has been discussed deeply throughout the literature (Hix, 2001; Kreppel, 2002; Maurer, 2003 can be counted as interesting examples). Started with Maastricht Treaty, the change of balances between institutions benefited to European Parliament (Wallace, 1996; Duff, 1995). Today, EP is the only EU institution consists of people directly elected by the citizens of the Union. Representing more than 500 million Europeans, the elections is hold every five years, last being in The Parliament is the main law making institution along with the Council. Called the co-decision process, European laws and budget are debated in between the Parliament and the Council. The policies covered by codecision process are defined by the Treaty. Strengthening EP was aimed by the Treaty of Lisbon. EP is also responsible to monitor the work of the European Commission, especially the dimension of democracy. There are seven political groups in the European Parliament. They can be listed as: EPP (Group of the European People's Party) (Christian Democrats) S&D (Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists & Democrats) ALDE/ADLE (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe) ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists Group) Greens/EFA (The Greens & European Free Alliance) 16

17 GUE/NGL (European United Left/Nordic Green Left) EFD (Europe of Freedom & Democracy) In addition, there is an additional group, which consists of the MEPs who are not attached to any political group. They will be defined as NI throughout this work. The nationality and political affiliation of the current Parliament ( ) can be found in the following table. Table 1: Distribution of the Seats in the European Parliament ( ) Political Group EPP S&D ALDE/ADLE ECR Greens/EFA GUE/NGL EFD NI Member State TOTAL Austria Belgium Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Poland Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden United Kingdom TOTAL Source: European Parliament Database 17

18 MEPs group by political affiliation, not by nationality as many of the Europeans still think. The number of MEPs is roughly in proportion with the population of the country which cannot be less than 6 and more than 96 for each Member State. As we also mentioned before in the section related to the Council, favouring smaller States in the vote distribution is an attitude of the Union, for balancing the power inside. 18

19 Section III A Case Study: The Voting in Practice in the European Parliament There are many discussions on the reasoning behind the decision making mechanism of the European Parliamentarians. Some related research show that the voting decisions of the MEPs can follow the national tendency or political tendency, ceteris paribus 10. It is often questioned that if they follow a tendency, take into consideration national dynamics of their country of origin, or vote depending on her/his political tendency, ideology and beliefs. It should be noted that, it is not easy to neither distinguish nor define the motivations behind a voting act. There are many decisions following both tendencies at the same time, if national and political tendency follows the same path. On the contrary, there are others which are rebel to both. So it is quite interesting to see until what extent MEPs can abandon their national tendency or ideological group to follow the other. Another question coming into mind is the famous question about representation. Is EP representing the wills of European citizens? Are members of the EP take into consideration the public opinion? It is almost impossible to answer this question without including different parameters. However, this work tends to include the public opinion towards Turkey for a possible comparison with the voting decisions of MEPs. For this reason, Eurobarometer 10 For further research on voting behavior of the MEPs please visit: 19

20 surveys, questioning Turkey s accession to the EU (EB 64.2 and EB 255 Special Edition will be used as main resource), will provide us the general idea of the citizens. A special focus will be put on MEPs which are coming from countries that have a majority against Turkey s membership. This special focus is aiming to see if such a negative public opinion can affect the tendency of the MEPs, i.e. push them to follow their country majority. This section will be consisting of three subsections which are: Data that contains further explanation on the data set; Main Findings, which is giving a detailed summary of the analyses and finally, Further Research Agenda. III.1. Data This data set is provided by an independent organization called VoteWatch.eu which aims to create debate and promote transparency in decision making 11. This organization is providing data on every single vote in the last two terms of the European Parliament (EP6 and EP7) 12. Our data set consists of 92 different vote rolls about Turkey in area of Foreign and Security Policy between dates and The number of MEPs has been changing between 734 to 790 through years, which is defining the number of observation for every single vote. For EP7, there are decisions made by the MEPs, while there are decisions during the 6th term of the Parliament. For the sake of comparison, votes will be analyzed in two groups, for EP6 and EP7 separately. Since EP7 is elected in 2009, there are fewer votes in that term compared to the previous one. For a detailed list of the votes that are used in this work please see Appendix, Table For further information on the group please visit 12 For the sake of simplicity, the European Parliament will be called EP6, while the other one, , will be called as EP7 throughout this paper. 20

21 When there is a vote in the European Parliament there are basically two choices for an MEP: To vote or not to vote. If the MEP decides to vote there are three options: for, against and abstention. For the sake of simplicity, our data set takes all the other options, didn t vote, absent and motivated, as non-voters, as a whole. The agreement index 13 and the cohesion rate 14 are also calculated according to the voters, not according to non-voters. In short, for every single vote there are four options: For, against, abstention and not to vote. All the following analyses will be based on these four options. With all these in mind, we calculate cohesion rates of Member States and cohesion rates of political groups at the European Parliament, for both EP6 and EP7. The agreement index and cohesion rate of Turkey is derived from 92 votes we have mentioned above. For being able to compare the attitude of political groups and countries, we also include the cohesion rates of all policy areas and all foreign & security policy into the analyses. This allows to see if a political group or a country is more united (or less in some cases) when the issue is Turkey. As a summary, the data set derived from the vote rolls in the European Parliament will be used to compare the attitude differences between policy areas, between political groups and countries. For further deepening the analyses public opinion data will be used. This will aim to define the source of tendency, if there is one. 13 For every vote we calculate an Agreement Index for every political group and for every Member State separately. For this calculation Hix-Noury-Roland formula is used, which is Ai=(max(Y,N,A)-(0.5((Y+N+A)- max(y,n,a))))/(y+n+a), where Y = number of votes "FOR", N = number of votes "AGAINST", and A = number of "ABSTAINTIONS". 14 The cohesion rate of a political group or a Member State is the arithmetic average of the Agreement Index in a period of time. 21

22 III.2. Main Findings The analyses given below are aiming to make a simple explanation to the voting behaviour of the MEPs depending on their political group and their nationality. We are testing if MEPs decide in a certain way when the issue is Turkey, if political groups are more united when they vote on a Progress Report is related to Turkey or certain Member States are voting in the same way, even in expense of the political ideology of their MEPs. If we start with the political groups, the following table is showing the cohesion rates of all political groups in the EP, for all policy areas, for foreign & security policy in general and issues related to Turkey in particular 15. Table 2: Cohesion Rates of Political Groups in the EP (EP7 & EP6) EP7 EP6 Political Group Overall - All Policy Areas Foreign & Security Policy Turkey Political Group Overall - All Policy Areas Foreign & Security Policy Turkey EPP 0,93 0,95 0,93 PPE-DE 0,88 0,88 0,64 S&D 0,93 0,94 0,88 PSE 0,91 0,92 0,88 ALDE/ADLE 0,90 0,95 0,89 ALDE/ADLE 0,89 0,88 0,60 ECR 0,87 0,90 0,81 UEN 0,76 0,74 0,56 Greens/EFA 0,95 0,95 0,92 Greens/EFA 0,91 0,90 0,83 GUE/NGL 0,82 0,83 0,92 GUE/NGL 0,85 0,82 0,86 EFD 0,49 0,55 0,64 IND/DEM 0,47 0,48 0,50 NI 0,42 0,44 0,60 NI 0,44 0,45 0,48 Source: Author's Elaboration from Data Set of EU Vote Watch Here we see that EPP is following the same line in cohesion rates in all three areas in EP7. Turkey has the exact same rate with the average of all policy areas, which is 0,02 points lower than the average of 15 The Appendix provides an example of the tables which are used for calculating the cohesion rate for a political group and a Member State (EP7 and EP6). 22

23 foreign & security policy. However, there is not a single vote they are fully united 16. Still, EPP has the highest cohesion rates when we look at all three policy areas. In EP7, Social Democrats are less united when the issue is Turkey, so do ALDE, ECR and Greens/EFA. Figure 1: Cohesion Rates of Political Groups in the EP7 A Comparison Source: Author s Elaboration from Data Set of EU Vote Watch The sharpest difference can be seen in ECR. It has a cohesion rate of 0,81 when the issue is Turkey, while having an average of 0,87 in overall politics. On the contrary, EFD has a higher cohesion rate in the votes related to Turkish enlargement, so does GUE/NGL. EFD has a cohesion rate of 0,64, while the rate is only 0,49 in all policy areas. In addition independents are more united as well when they need to decide on Turkey. As we can see from Figure 2, the group with the highest cohesion rate is EPP when the issue is Turkey, followed by GUE/NGL and Greens/EFA. GUE/NGL is 0,1 point more united (compared to overall rate and 0,09 compared to general foreign & security policy rate) when the vote is about Turkey. EFD is the less united group when we compared to the others (independents kept apart); however, it also has a significantly higher cohesion rate when the issue is Turkey. 16 When the cohesion rate is 1, we assume that the political group is fully united for giving that decision. Here it is beneficial to underline that being fully united is not that easy for a political group since MEPs may choose to follow their country majority depending on the issue. 23

24 Figure 2: Cohesion Rates of Political Groups in Votes Related to Turkey (EP7) Source: Author s Elaboration from Data Set of EU Vote Watch When we look at the situation in EP6, we see that Socialist Group is the one with the highest cohesion rate when the issue is Turkey, followed by GUE/NGL and Greens/EFA. Christian Democrats of the 6 th Parliament has a rate of 0,64 which is 0,24 points lower than their average in overall politics and foreign & security policy. It is quite beneficial to keep in mind that there are 77 votes in our data set for the term EP6 while there are only 15 votes in EP7. Figure 3: Cohesion Rates of Political Groups in Votes Related to Turkey (EP6) Source: Author s Elaboration from Data Set of EU Vote Watch As another important point, is the term when the Turkish enlargement was a big topic in European politics. After 2009, problems in the negotiation process added to internal problems of the EU, important decisions are always postponed. 24

25 The other side of the coin is related to the Member States. Comparison of cohesion rates of the countries will show us if they become more united when the issue is Turkey. It is quite beneficial to keep in mind that, an MEP s political group and country majority can be following the same direction, which makes him loyal to both sides. In other words there may be an intersection set of being loyal to both, or being rebel to both. Table 3: Cohesion Rates of Member States (EP7 & EP6) EP7 EP6 Member State Overall - All Policy Areas Foreign & Security Policy Turkey Overall - All Policy Areas Foreign & Security Policy Turkey Austria 0,62 0,63 0,49 0,69 0,70 0,59 Belgium 0,69 0,69 0,57 0,66 0,67 0,56 Bulgaria* 0,75 0,70 0,82 0,73 0,68 0,74 Cyprus 0,65 0,61 0,92 0,65 0,68 0,67 Czech Republic 0,55 0,54 0,46 0,60 0,61 0,58 Denmark 0,66 0,60 0,56 0,66 0,61 0,67 Estonia 0,80 0,72 0,82 0,79 0,69 0,61 Finland 0,72 0,75 0,64 0,71 0,63 0,67 France 0,68 0,69 0,52 0,66 0,64 0,49 Germany 0,70 0,73 0,65 0,70 0,70 0,61 Greece 0,69 0,63 0,78 0,70 0,71 0,72 Hungary 0,76 0,70 0,73 0,80 0,74 0,61 Ireland 0,75 0,71 0,74 0,74 0,73 0,67 Italy 0,74 0,79 0,71 0,66 0,64 0,58 Latvia 0,64 0,54 0,45 0,74 0,66 0,58 Lithuania 0,68 0,65 0,54 0,79 0,78 0,52 Luxembourg 0,75 0,67 0,74 0,73 0,68 0,70 Malta 0,80 0,74 0,88 0,77 0,69 0,82 Netherlands 0,59 0,63 0,48 0,63 0,64 0,59 Poland 0,76 0,75 0,66 0,69 0,68 0,49 Portugal 0,67 0,66 0,59 0,74 0,74 0,73 Romania* 0,78 0,80 0,80 0,75 0,75 0,68 Slovakia 0,76 0,81 0,74 0,74 0,75 0,53 Slovenia 0,79 0,72 0,86 0,80 0,69 0,65 Spain 0,76 0,80 0,74 0,75 0,77 0,78 Sweden 0,70 0,73 0,57 0,61 0,62 0,65 United Kingdom 0,51 0,54 0,41 0,56 0,60 0,59 Source: Author's Elaboration from Data Set of EU Vote Watch * Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU on 1 January For this reason their statistics are including the votes after that date. The table given below shows the cohesion rates of the countries with the same logic applied to political groups: A comparison between all policy areas, foreign & security policy and Turkey. 25

26 When we look at EP7, the case of Cyprus is the one deserves the first comment. There is a significant difference between the cohesion rates of overall policy, foreign & security policy and Turkey in EP7. When the issue is Turkey, Greek Cypriots 17 are becoming way more united compared to the other issues on the table. As we can see from the following figure, Cyprus has a 0,27 coherence difference with the overall, while have a 0,31 difference with foreign & security policy. Here we would like to underline that Cyprus is represented with 6 MEPs in the European Parliament. Figure 4: Cohesion Rates of the Member States in the EP7 A Comparison Source: Author s Elaboration from Data Set of EU Vote Watch After Cyprus, Greece is also more united when the issue is Turkey, in addition to Bulgaria, Estonia, Malta, Romania and Slovenia. In the case Hungary, Ireland and Luxembourg, the coherence rate of Turkey is higher than foreign & security policy while it is lower than all policy areas. Both France and Germany, whose leaders are the most heard voices of these days when the topic is Turkish enlargement, is less united when there is a vote about Turkey. In 17 Turkish State contends that since a legitimate government representing the whole island does not exist in Cyprus, Turkey does not recognise the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus (GASC), which is referred to as the Republic of Cyprus. 26

27 addition, Spain and United Kingdom are also less united, the case of UK being sharper, when they are deciding on Turkey. When we look at EP6, general tendency is quite similar. However, the sharp attitude of Cypriot MEPs cannot be observed here. They follow a similar tendency in cohesion rates in all three areas. This is also true for Greece. Here it is not wrong to conclude that both countries MEPs are more united internally in EP7 compared to EP6. Figure 5 given below is showing the cohesion rates of Member States only in votes related to Turkey. As we also mentioned before Cyprus is in the sharpest position, followed by Malta. It is important to remember here that Cyprus has six and Malta has only five MEPs representing their citizens in European Parliament. For this reason, it is easier for them to agree on something compared to other MSs, i.e. Germany or France. Figure 5: Cohesion Rates of the Member States in Votes Related to Turkey Source: Author s Elaboration from Data Set of EU Vote Watch Cohesion rate comparison and analyses related to political groups and Member States become more meaningful if we can also see the percentage of MEPs who follow one tendency while abandoning the other, i.e. rebel to his/her political group while following the national tendency. 27

28 This will give us a clue related to the importance of country of origin in the decision making process in the EP. Before we continue with the mentioned analyses, we would like to introduce the public opinion of the Member States towards Turkish enlargement. It will be useful to see if there is public pressure on the shoulders of the MEPs which is pressuring them to follow their national tendency instead of their ideology. Table 4: Support for Turkish Membership to the EU Country In Favor Opposed Don't Know In Favor Opposed Don't Know Belgium 34% 61% 5% 43% 55% 2% Bulgaria 45% 32% 23% 47% 26% 27% Czech Republic 30% 63% 7% 32% 60% 8% Denmark 26% 66% 7% 51% 44% 5% Germany 16% 78% 6% 27% 68% 4% Estonia 26% 56% 18% 35% 49% 16% Ireland 29% 46% 25% 40% 32% 28% Greece 24% 75% 1% 33% 67% 0% Spain 35% 36% 30% 47% 23% 30% France 22% 69% 9% 39% 54% 7% Italy 25% 60% 15% 36% 49% 15% Cyprus 19% 74% 6% 26% 68% 6% Latvia 32% 52% 16% 35% 47% 18% Lithuania 35% 45% 20% 33% 42% 25% Luxembourg 17% 77% 6% 24% 69% 7% Hungary 39% 47% 14% 44% 46% 10% Malta 30% 46% 24% 35% 31% 34% Netherlands 36% 57% 8% 55% 42% 3% Austria 5% 87% 7% 13% 81% 6% Poland 40% 42% 17% 51% 31% 18% Portugal 40% 39% 20% 37% 30% 33% Romania 61% 17% 22% 66% 7% 27% Slovenia 43% 53% 4% 53% 41% 5% Slovakia 33% 57% 10% 33% 55% 12% Finland 24% 71% 5% 42% 55% 3% Sweden 46% 42% 11% 60% 33% 7% United Kingdom 30% 52% 18% 42% 39% 19% Source: Author's Elaboration from Eurobarometer Data (EB 66.1 & 65.2) There are two different Eurobarometer results in the Table given above. Both surveys are carried out in 2006 and targeted the same. The main difference between them is the way of 28

29 asking the question. The data given on the left hand side of the table are the responses of European citizens to the question: For each of the following countries, would you be in favour or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future? Turkey On the other hand, data given on the right hand side of the table is derived from the answers to the question: Once each of the following countries complies with all conditions set by the European Union, would you be strongly in favour, fairly in favour, fairly opposed or strongly opposed to the accession of each of them to the European Union? Turkey For the sake of simplicity and for an opportunity of comparison, answers strongly in favour and fairly in favour are combined as in favour ; while strongly opposed and fairly opposed are united in opposed. Both questions are included in the paper, since the answers to the second question are even more puzzling since it includes the precondition of completion of all the necessary conditions. Figure 6: Public Opinion towards Turkish Accession to the EU (After All Conditions Complied) Source: Author's Elaboration from Eurobarometer Data (EB 66.1 & 65.2) 29

30 When we look at Figure 6, we see that, even if Turkey complies all the conditions given by the EU, there is a huge majority of European citizens opposing the membership. Austria is the country who has the highest opposition rate (81%), followed by Luxembourg, Germany, Cyprus and Greece. On the contrary, Romania is the country favouring Turkish membership the most, followed by Sweden, Netherlands and Denmark. As we mentioned above, it is quite interesting to see if MEPs of opposing countries are following their national majority in the cost of their political group. When we look at it in a normal form payoff matrix, we can see that in how many percentages of the decisions follow the specified tendency. Table 5: Tendency Austrian MEPs Follow while Voting Country Austria % Loyal Rebel Political Loyal Group Rebel 12 7 Source: Author s Elaboration As we can see from the Table, 65% of the decisions of Austrian MEPs are royal to both their political group and to their country; while, on the contrary, in 7% of them rebel to both. 12% of their decisions are following their country majority in the cost of their political group, while this number is 16% in the reverse case. Luxembourgers are loyal to both their countries and to their political groups in 72% of the cases. They are following their country majority in cost of the political group in 8% of the decisions, as we can see from Table 5. Table 6: Tendency Luxembourger MEPs Follow while Voting Country Luxembourg % Loyal Rebel Political Loyal Group Rebel 8 4 Source: Author s Elaboration When we look at the German MEPs we see that they generally follow both their country and their political group at the same time. 67% of the decisions they made are following both. If 30

31 they need to choose between two tendencies, in 21% they choose to be loyal to their political groups while only in 7% to just nationality. Table 7: Tendency German MEPs Follow while Voting Country Germany % Loyal Rebel Political Loyal Group Rebel 7 5 Source: Author s Elaboration In the case of Cypriots and Greeks there is a significant difference. As we mentioned above, the attitude of Cyprus and Greece became even sharper after Cypriot MEPs follow both their country and political group majorities in 52% of the cases. Table 8: Tendency Cypriot MEPs Follow while Voting Country Cyprus % Loyal Rebel Political Loyal 52 8 Group Rebel 31 8 Source: Author s Elaboration However, in 31% of the decisions they made Greek Cypriots chose to stay loyal to their country majority while being rebel to their political group. While the reverse case, being loyal to political group and rebel to country majority, occurred just 8% of the decisions made. Table 9: Tendency Greek MEPs Follow while Voting Country Greece % Loyal Rebel Political Loyal Group Rebel 28 4 Source: Author s Elaboration Greek MEPs share a similar history with their Cypriot colleagues. In 28% of the cases Greek MEPs followed their country majority in the cost of their political group. In addition, they have been faithful just to their political group in 15% of the cases. 31

32 As a summary when we look at these five countries, whose public opinion is highly opposed to Turkish enlargement, only two, Cyprus and Greece show a significant preference of country majority over political group, when they need to choose between them. In all five cases when they need to be royal to only one majority, either political group or country, the percentage they choose the country over political group is always higher. Table 10: Tendency Dutch MEPs Follow while Voting Country Netherlands % Loyal Rebel Political Loyal Group Rebel 5 8 Source: Author s Elaboration Netherlands can be given as another example. We see that, when Dutch MEPs need to choose between country majority and group tendency, in 19% of the cases they chose to be rebel to their country, while in only 5% of the cases they chose to be rebel to their political group 18. As a summary, it can be concluded that we need additional variables and data to significantly prove the relationship between the public opinion and voting behaviour of MEPs. However, it is not wrong to say that, the negative public opinion towards Turkey s accession to the EU creates an incentive towards supporting country majority. III.3. Further Research Agenda This work is a starting point for a further, more detailed analysis of decision-making in European Union in general, voting behaviour of the MEPs, in particular. It provides an introductory case study with Turkey with creation of the related data set. We should keep in 18 The Tables related to other Member States can be provided upon request. 32

33 mind that it is an important step for starting and once it is done, many questions can be asked and answered. As we mentioned before, there are only 92 vote rolls related to Turkey, which defines the size of the data set. Since there are more votes when we calculate the cohesion rates of overall policy or foreign & security policy, the comparison is somehow unbalanced. However, vote rolls still mean more than decisions made by MEPs from different political groups and Member States. For a possible discrimination analysis between countries, Croatia can be used as another case study. Since these two countries started the negotiation process together, it has a quite similar data case which can be compared with Turkey. The literature related to Turkey often claims that there is a negative discrimination towards Turkey because of various reasons. A comparison study with Croatia can look for answers to this question. The theoretical background provided here is also just an introductory work. All the related literature in European Studies and Political Science should be covered for a fully detailed theoretical background, which requires more time. Further information related to political groups, their historical backgrounds, change of attitudes, mergers and divisions between different groups etc. should be covered more in detail for a better understanding. Even specific MEPs, who played a key role in the process, should be distinguished from the others for deeper analysis. All these research agenda is aimed to be followed during my time as a PhD candidate. 33

34 Section IV Conclusion Europe, after all challenges States have been going through in the 20 th century, has been looking for a new administrative system. European Union ended up being this unique, sui generis, supranational organization, which is taken as the alternative that is required for building peace through cooperation. It has been going through an integration process since then, in which institutions played an important role. In this introductory work, we explored the history of integration and enlargement in the EU and its relations with Turkey after fifty years. After short theoretical background, we analyzed the EP with a special reference to the role of nationality. However, the most interesting part of the paper, at least for the writer, is the case study of Turkey in the European Parliament. For this work, we took 92 vote rolls in time interval that are directly related to Turkey in the area of Foreign & Security policy. These votes are analyzed as single decisions of MEPs which contains more than individual decisions. According to this data set, agreement indexes of political groups and Member States are calculated which are leading to the cohesion rates. These rates are compared to other cohesion rates coming from even bigger data sets, for all policy areas and foreign & security policy. In addition, we introduce public opinion towards Turkish accession to the EU for commenting on the origin of voting behaviour of the MEPs. 34

35 As a conclusion, we saw that even if nationality matters in some specific cases, Cyprus and Greece are the best examples, MEPs significantly follow the tendency of their political groups. Especially EPP in EP7 has a quite high cohesion rate, even in the topics related to Turkey. While analyzing these results, it is important to check the area in which the MEP needs to make a choice, when its political group and country follows a different tendency. All the necessary tables are given in the Appendix. This is an introductory work of decision-making in the European Union. Not only European Parliament, but also the other EU institutions deserve further analysis for their voting behaviour. 35

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