Managing the U.S.-China Foreign Economic Dialogue: Building Greater Coordination and New Habits of Consultation

Size: px

Start display at page:

Download "Managing the U.S.-China Foreign Economic Dialogue: Building Greater Coordination and New Habits of Consultation"

Matilda Martin
5 years ago
Views:

1 asia policy, nmber 4 (jly 2007), policy analysis Managing the U.S.-China Foreign Economic Dialoge: Bilding Greater Coordination and New Habits of Consltation Jean A. Garrison Jean A. Garrison is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, at the University of Wyoming. She is a specialist in U.S. foreign policy and U.S.- China relations. Her recent book, Making China Policy: From Nixon to G.W. Bsh (2005), examines the breacratic competition over how policy toward China is framed and formed in the U.S. government. She may be reached at <garrison@wyo.ed>. Note The athor wold like to thank the Concil on Foreign Relations, which throgh its International Affairs Fellowship Program provided her with the opportnity and means to serve in the Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs in the U.S. State Department in This formative experience provided an important basis for the argment presented in this article. keywords:.s.-china relations; strategic economic dialoge;.s. domestic politics; trade; foreign economic policy The National Brea of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington

2 asia policy This essay attempts both to explain the sorces and conseqences of parochialism in U.S. foreign economic policymaking and to identify new bilateral dialoges with China that are creating deeper habits of consltation that may promote greater stability in the U.S.-China relationship. main argment U.S. foreign economic policymaking in general and toward China specifically has been haphazard and ncoordinated, often reflecting competing policy efforts within the exective branch and between the president and Congress. Becase varios components of the U.S. bilateral dialoge with China are led by different breacracies, the parochial interests of these grops can create a policy shaped by narrow interests rather than one reflecting the overall needs of the economic relationship. New dialoges at the senior level, however sch as the Treasry Department s Strategic Economic Dialoge and the State Department s Senior Dialoge offer a broader strategic focs nder which to coordinate mid- and lower-level dialoges. This, in trn, may both provide a sefl strctre to coordinate U.S. policy interests and help shape China s development, encoraging China to become a responsible stakeholder in regional and global affairs. policy implications exective smmary If U.S. breacracies operate independently in varios bilateral dialoges, withot overall policy coordination, breacratic infighting rather than strategic imperatives will shape U.S. foreign policy priorities. In sch an environment presidential prerogative in the making of foreign economic policy becomes more vlnerable to congressional and domestic critics. If reglarized high- and low-level dialoges that focs on strategic isses rather than on specific deliverables are maintained, then these new habits of consltation can promote greater cooperation with China by providing a way to bring China to the table on sensitive sbjects. Frthermore, placing crrent controversial dialoges within a broader framework brings policy framers and implementers from both sides to the table. If the State Department s emerging role as coordinator and framer of foreign economic policy is maintained, then the U.S. government can make se of its ready expertise and broad orientation, which provides a strategic focs that links U.S. economic interests to other cross-ctting isses, as well as coordinate with the U.S. Embassy and conslates to facilitate implementation of U.S. policy goals within mainland China.

3 garrison managing the.s.-china foreign economic dialoge In the absence of a shared Soviet threat to cement the Sino-U.S. strategic relationship, the integration of China into the global economic system has become an important post Cold War priority and the new basis for engagement with China. Epitomizing this position is the promotion of free trade with China by former presidents George H.W. Bsh (in the face of sanctions pressres from Congress) and Bill Clinton (after de-linking trade from hman rights). Similarly, President George W. Bsh has spported not only free trade generally bt also related policies sch as China s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Althogh integrating China into the global system has become an important national priority, this position has generated mch controversy across all three administrations. The making of policy toward China remains a fractios process both becase of competing instittional views and becase the intermestic natre of economic isses pits the policy athority of the exective branch against the athority of Congress. Sharing policy responsibility, these two instittions often work at cross prposes on foreign economic policies that straddle the domestic and international divide. For example, the crrent Bsh administration s engagement of China has srvived despite domestic criticism on a host of isses sch as China s nfair trade practices, contined intellectal property rights (IPR) violations, and crrency maniplation. 2 This sitation illstrates that policymakers are challenged by the two-level game natre of the China problem in which exective branch policymakers mst bild broad policy coalitions in order to balance strategic foreign policy imperatives with domestic limitations. Missing from this two-level game discssion is the additional post Cold War reality that as the variety of new isses and problems with China expands so does the relevance of mltiple policy actors within the exective branch. The plethora of actors representing both different policy calclations and different means to prse the bilateral relationship diffse Intermestic isses refer to international isses sch as trade and the environment that force the president to coordinate with members of Congress and other domestic interests. See, for example, Bayless Manning, The Congress, the Exective, and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals, Foreign Affairs 55 (1977): See, for example, Michael A. Needham and Tim Kane, Political Protectionism Threatens U.S.- China Dialoge: An Election-Season Legislative Mistake, National Review Online, September 28, In the discipline of international relations most are familiar with Robert Ptnam s characterization of the two-level game where decisionmakers mst balance domestic considerations with international imperatives when making policy choices. See Robert Ptnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games, in Doble-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, ed. Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Ptnam (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992), [ 167 ]

4 asia policy foreign policymaking athority to inclde important players across mltiple breacracies. For example, the players involved may range from the Defense and State Departments on the strategic side to the Treasry Department, Commerce Department, and U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) within the Exective Office of the President, among others, on the economic side. These circmstances and China s increasing importance have empowered a new set of breacratic players in the U.S. government that increasingly have a voice in the overall bilateral agenda. As this essay will show, this sitation leads to breacratic infighting in some circmstances and to greater coordination of the bilateral economic agenda in others. This essay attempts to explain the sorces and conseqences of parochialism in U.S. foreign economic policymaking, arging that the fractios parochial fights over the broader U.S.-China bilateral dialoge also affect the eqation of economic policymaking. Completing this analysis, this essay compares the policymaking process of the George W. Bsh administration (hereafter the Bsh administration) to those of the previos two administrations. First, like preceding administrations, the Bsh administration has learned that greater coordination is a key factor in promoting greater policy coherence. While Clinton created the National Economic Concil (NEC), the Bsh administration has made efforts both to develop high-level strategic dialoges with broad exective-branch participation and to expand discssions at the working level in order to coordinate the broad range of the isses that compromise the bilateral economic relationship. Second, many of Bsh s new and elevated dialoges have had a medim- or long-term focs arond areas of common interest, rather than simply a short-term focs on specific deliverables (a focs that creates a wide-ranging habit of consltation). Third, having emerged to serve a coordinating role, the State Department is now a hidden bt essential partner for the sccess of U.S. bilateral efforts. This essay draws in part on data from the athor s personal experience working on foreign economic policy isses in the State Department s Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs in The essay also draws on frther information the athor gathered throgh sbseqent backgrond interviews with U.S. government personnel and experts knowledgeable abot U.S.-China economic relations. These interviews were condcted on an ongoing basis from April 2005 throgh December Data from varios U.S. government pblications and docments available throgh the National Secrity Archives project China and the United States: From Hostility to Engagement, 1960 [ 168 ]

5 garrison managing the.s.-china foreign economic dialoge 1998 and at the George H.W. Bsh Presidential Library, as well as scholarly analyses and Western and Chinese media sorces, spplement this work. 4 This essay is divided into three sections: pp overviews the origins of the responsible stakeholder policy within the Bsh administration and compares it with the policy approaches of the previos two presidents pp explores varios recent and ongoing U.S.-China bilateral dialoges that argably represent central U.S. efforts to integrate China into the global economic system pp presents conclsions on the advantages and disadvantages of the crrent bilateral economic dialoges as well as the reslting policy implications recent calclations of china as a responsible stakeholder Robert Zoellick speaking as depty secretary of state before the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations in September 2005 articlated a pragmatic engagement policy for the administration that cemented the basis for cooperative U.S.-China relations. Noting China s embrace of globalization and market reform, Zoellick arged that neither the Cold War analogy nor the nineteenth centry Eropean balance-of-power model of politics poplar with Defense Secretary Donald Rmsfeld, Depty Secretary Pal Wolfowitz, and Vice President Dick Cheney early in the first Bsh administration applied to China now. Zoellick called on China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system: [the United States] welcomes a confident, peacefl, and prosperos China, one that appreciates that its growth and development depends on constrctive connections with the rest of the world. Indeed, we hope to intensify work with a China that not only adjsts to the international rles developed over the last centry, bt also joins s and others to address the challenges of the new centry. 5 4 In order to protect sorces, the athor has agreed to maintain their anonymity and ths refers to them generally in the text. 5 Robert Zoellick, Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility, remarks to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, November 25, 2005, U.S. Department of State state.gov. See also Michael Rice, Bridging the Gap, Beijing Review 49, no. 3 (Janary 19, 2006): See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Media Note, December 8, 2005, Robert B. Zoellick, Statement on Conclsion of the Second U.S.-China Senior Dialoge seol.sembassy.gov/china html. [ 169 ]

The New Asianism: Japanese Foreign Policy under the Democratic Party of Japan

asia policy, nmber 12 (jly 2011), 99 129 http://asiapolicy.nbr.org The New Asianism: Japanese Foreign Policy nder the Democratic Party of Japan Daniel Sneider daniel sneider is the Associate Director for