The New Asianism: Japanese Foreign Policy under the Democratic Party of Japan

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1 asia policy, nmber 12 (jly 2011), The New Asianism: Japanese Foreign Policy nder the Democratic Party of Japan Daniel Sneider daniel sneider is the Associate Director for Research at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University as well as a National Asia Research Associate. He can be reached at <dsneider@stanford.ed>. keywords: japan; democratic party of japan; politics; foreign policy The National Brea of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington

2 asia policy exective smmary This article examines the foreign policy views of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), from the party s fonding throgh its first year in power. main argment In 2009 the DPJ came to power in Japan, ending a half-centry of conservative rle, with the hope of reshaping the post Cold War order by rebalancing Japanese policy with a greater emphasis on Asia, inspired by a new Asianism. Instead, the party s first year in office was marked by foreign policy tensions first with the U.S. over bases in Okinawa, followed by clashes with China in the Senkak Islands. The DPJ has moved painflly along the learning crve from opposition politics to the realities of governance. On both sides of the Pacific, policymakers now believe the rocky transition has led to a restoration of the postwar consenss, particlarly regarding the U.S.-Japan secrity relationship. Bt it wold be wrong to conclde that DPJ policies, shaped dring the party s formative years by key leaders who remain largely in place, have been simply thrown aside. The new Asianism, which shold not be nderstood as a pro- China shift bt rather as an effort to manage the rise of China, remains a core identity of the DPJ. policy implications There is a real danger that relations between Japan and the U.S. cold slide again into a morass. Avoiding that otcome reqires a more serios effort to nderstand the nderlying foreign policy identity of the DPJ and dispel illsions abot the natre of change in Japan. Rather than seeing the new Asianism as only a threat, policymakers shold view it as an opportnity to jointly, and in concert with Soth Korea, reshape the secrity order in Northeast Asia. The DPJ s interest in an East Asian commnity potentially challenges China for leadership of ftre regional strctres. The party s focs on Asia, inclding ties with contries sch as India, Vietnam, Soth Korea, and Astralia, cold create a secrity strctre in Asia that can cope with the rise of China s power. The mechanism and basis for dialoge is weaker than ever in the U.S.- Japan alliance. The relationships bilt p over decades of rle by the Liberal Democratic Party need to be revitalized to adapt to a new era in Japanese politics.

3 sneider the new asianism The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came to power in Agst 2009 with a dramatic mandate for domestic reform. Japanese voters embraced political change in the hope that a fresh force cold restrctre the contry s economy to face the dal challenges of an aging society and intensifying global competition. Instead, the DPJ s first year was dominated by foreign and secrity policy isses. Almost from its first days in office in September 2009, the DPJ government became embroiled in an intractable dispte with the United States over military bases on Okinawa. Prime Minister Ykio Hatoyama s failre to manage that isse contribted significantly to his resignation in early Jne His sccessor, Naoto Kan, fond himself nder fire only a few months later in September for his handling of a clash with China following the arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain in the dispted territory of the Senkak Islands in the East China Sea. Over the corse of the year, the DPJ swng from one foreign policy message to another. In its early months in office, the Hatoyama cabinet raised dobts abot the ongoing vale and prpose of the U.S.-Japan secrity alliance and expressed the desire to rebalance foreign policy with a greater emphasis on Asia. In spring 2010, faced with growing concerns abot an increasingly assertive China, the government seemed to embrace the deterrent vale of the alliance. By the fall, stnned by the Senkak clash and renewed tensions on the Korean Peninsla, the Kan cabinet had almost entirely ended talk of shifting Japan s foreign policy focs to Asia. The trmoil srronding foreign policy dring the first year of DPJ rle has been shaped in significant part by the combination of an ncertainty of prpose and painfl movement of the party along the learning crve from opposition politics to the realities of governance. Both Japanese and foreign observers have tended to emphasize these two factors in explaining the government s foreign policy problems of the past year. They are hopefl that a rocky transition has restored the postwar consenss, particlarly regarding the U.S.-Japan secrity relationship. 1 The restoration of harmony, if not civility, in the alliance after a year of trmoil is certainly palpable, particlarly in the pblic statements of Japanese and U.S. officials. Both sides desire to avoid open conflict and close ranks in response to the ongoing secrity problems in the region. Bt it wold be wrong to conclde that DPJ policies, shaped dring the party s formative years by key leaders who remain largely in place, have simply been replaced 1 See, for example, Michael Green and Nicholas Szechenyi, Green Shoots in the U.S.-Japan Alliance, Center for Strategic and International Stdies (CSIS), Japan Chair Platform, November 9, [ 101 ]

4 asia policy by a reversion to the stance of previos conservative governments in Japan. Thogh there are clearly important areas of continity in policy, the evidence sggests that the DPJ leadership, gided by a strong sense of pragmatism, has been compelled to learn how to apply its views to the messier challenges of governance. Even if the perception of a retrn to realism is somewhat exaggerated, the crrent atmosphere creates an opportnity for both Japanese and U.S. policymakers to engage in a serios dialoge on foreign and secrity policy. If they fail to seize this moment, there is a danger that relations cold slide into an even greater morass. Bt the sccess of dialoge depends on nderstanding the nderlying foreign and secrity policy identity of the DPJ. The goal of this article is to lift a bit of the veil of ignorance regarding the DPJ s foreign policy from its early days throgh its early governance both at the level of its core leadership and parliamentary delegation and among the expert and policy circles that advise the party. 2 pp examine the formation of the DPJ in , inclding the views of the party s fonders on key foreign and secrity policy isses pp explore the DPJ s broad embrace of the new Asianism and this idea s roots in and continity with earlier debates on Japan s strategic orientation pp then examine how the DPJ deals with the two key isses in Japanese foreign policy: the emergence of China as a great power and the condct of U.S.-Japan relations pp conclde with a brief discssion of what lies ahead the origins and early days of the dpj The DPJ emerged from the political trmoil in the late 1980s and early 1990s that led to the formation of the short-lived coalition government led by Morihiro Hosokawa in According to one of the party s fonders, the process of forming the DPJ began in Febrary 1995 after the disappointing fall of the Hosokawa government and the retrn of the Liberal Democratic 2 The athor condcted interviews with leading DPJ figres, inclding then party president Ichiro Ozawa, in March The interviews fond a remarkable degree of cohesion in foreign policy views and anticipated all the isses that sbseqently emerged in the U.S.-Japan relationship. These findings were presented in a lectre at the Woodrow Wilson International Center on Jly 21, 2009, and pblished in A Japan that Can Say Maybe: The DPJ s Foreign Policy, along with an accompanying interview with Ozawa, in the Jne 2009 isse of the Oriental Economist. The athor condcted frther interviews in September 2010 with key DPJ figres both inside and otside the Diet, inclding former prime minister Ykio Hatoyama. [ 102 ]

5 sneider the new asianism Party (LDP) to power in a coalition with the Socialist Party. 3 Discssions occrred between Ykio Hatoyama, who had broken away from the LDP to form the New Party Sakigake in 1993, and Takahiro Yokomichi, who was finishing his third term as the Socialist governor of Hokkaido. Hatoyama represented a strand of liberal conservatism, whereas Yokomichi was widely seen as the leader of a more moderate, pragmatic wing of the Socialist Party. The two men opposed the idea circlating in the Japanese media that a two-party system shold be formed ot of old and new conservatives. Instead they favored a party strctre that offered a clear choice between conservative and liberal views. Hatoyama and Yokomichi formed a core grop that also inclded Banri Kaieda, elected to the Diet as a member of Hosokawa s Japan New Party; Yoshito Sengok, a Socialist Diet member; Hajime Takano, a progressive jornalist and commentator; and Naoto Kan, who had been a member of Hatoyama s party. 4 The grop met reglarly and secretly late at night in a large site at the Prince Hotel Akasaka, near the Diet bilding. Kan, who had joined the cabinet in a coalition with the LDP, did not participate at first bt was kept informed. Over time, others joined, inclding Hatoyama s brother, Knio (who remains an LDP member even now). Those deliberations took place within a specific strategic context. With the end of the Cold War, the Japanese Left had come to accept the legitimacy and necessity of the U.S.-Japan secrity treaty. At the same time, some conservatives qestioned the need to maintain Cold War levels of U.S. global force deployments, not only in Japan bt also in Erope. In Japan, that discssion took on a sense of rgency after several American servicemen brtally raped a Japanese pre-teen in Okinawa in We were very shocked by that incident and we felt we had to begin to gradally redce the presence of U.S. forces, Takano reconted. The old Socialists were for no Anpo [the U.S.-Japan secrity treaty] bt the DPJ was for gradally redcing nnecessary U.S. bases, one by one. Yokomichi, with the spport of both Hatoyamas, went frther. He set a goal of maintaining an alliance withot permanent stationing of U.S. forces in Japan: Japanese forces wold be responsible for self-defense and U.S. forces wold se bases and storage facilities in emergencies, sch as dring a conflict on the Korean Peninsla. Despite the Taiwan Strait crisis of 3 This accont of the early period of the DPJ s formation was provided to the athor by Hajime Takano, one of the participants, in an extended interview condcted on September 2, 2010, and spplemented by interviews. 4 Kaieda is crrently the economics minister in the Kan cabinet, and Sengok is Kan s chief cabinet secretary. [ 103 ]

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