The Chinese Delegation at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference Reflections for Dr Jin Zhongxia

Transcription

1 The Chinese Delegation at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference Reflections for 2015 Dr Jin Zhongxia July 2015

2 Note on author Dr Jin Zhongxia wrote this paper as Director General of the Research Institute of the People s Bank of China (PBoC). In January 2015 he was appointed Executive Director for China at the International Monetary Fund. Prior to his position at the Research Institute he was the Chief Representative in the PBoC s US office ( ), and then Deputy Director General of the International Department and Deputy Director General of the Monetary Policy Department ( ), having started at the PBoC as a project officer for industrial and agriculture projects financed by domestic and international financial institutions. Jin has also worked as a consultant at the World Bank in Washington ( ), and as a technical assistant in the China Executive Director s Office at the IMF ( ). He has been involved in promoting regional financial co-operation in Asia, and has been a member of working groups under the G20, IMF, and Bank for International Settlements, in areas such as international monetary reform and global liquidity management. He obtained his BA and Master degree in economics from Beijing University and his PhD in economics from University of Hawaii. 2 The Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum

3 CONTENTS Foreword 4 Introduction 5 1. Background to Bretton Woods 7 2. The Chinese delegation 8 3. Conference process and content 9 4. Role and function of the Chinese delegation Biographies Disputes over China s share of quotas Reflections on the Bretton Woods conference 13 3

4 PARALLELS AND CONTRASTS 1944 TO 2015 David Marsh, Managing Director, OMFIF Jin Zhongxia s scholarly paper on the Chinese representation at the 1944 Bretton Wood conference comes at a propitious time. The Chinese economy is at a turning point as it prepares to enter a period of slowdown in which domestically generated growth takes over from export-driven expansion. The renminbi is tracking the dollar higher on the foreign exchanges, causing pain to the export sector but bringing Chinese consumers and corporations considerable terms of trade benefits. The Chinese stock market has been undergoing convulsions partly caused by a reversal of speculative activity as domestic savings seek out more attractive investment destinations abroad under China s policy of managed liberalisation of the capital account. By the end of the year, the International Monetary Fund will conclude its routine review of the Special Drawing Right, a relatively small-scale exercise that does not involve any change in members quota share and voting power, but may result in the incorporation of the renminbi into the IMF s composite currency unit. The direct practical effects would be limited, because the SDR is not a currency. Yet this would be a major symbolic leap forward for the status of the renminbi, and for the Chinese authorities wish to play a more active role in world economic, monetary and financial management. All these issues strike a chord with the challenges facing monetary and financial decisionmakers towards the end of the second world war. Much has changed, but some things remain the same. The biggest difference today is that Germany and Japan, absent from Bretton Woods, and annihilated soon afterwards, have long ago forged their way to the economic vanguard. Yet there are some parallels too. Then as now the US stood astride the world stage, although there was an uneasy belief that its supremacy would come under threat as it proved with the Soviet Union s emergence as an adversary rather than an ally and the beginning of the cold war. Then as now the world was struggling to find a balance between the powers and obligations of creditors and debtors. Then as now Europe, under very different conditions, was trying to maintain a semblance of unity at a taxing time. Then as now the international community was doing its best to avoid a return to the conditions of the Great Depression. There is a surprising amount of policy-making continuity in the position of the Chinese Nationalist government in 1944 compared with that of the Communist leadership now. China sent the second-biggest delegation to the 1944 conference, did its best to gain an adequate quota as the fourth-biggest country in the IMF and was plainly seeking a greater voice, next to the US, in a fast-changing monetary and financial world where it was fighting to find its feet just as is the case today. Jin s paper throws light on the parallels as well as on the contrasts, and OMFIF is very pleased to publish this English translation. 4 The Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum

5 BRETTON WOODS HISTORY RELEVANT TO TODAY Jin Zhongxia, former Director General, Research Institute, PBoC In summer 1944, the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference (commonly known as the Bretton Woods conference) was held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. The conference agreed to create the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, establishing the framework for the post-second world war international economic and financial order. Drawing on the conference reports from the Chinese delegation and other related documents, this paper traces the footsteps of the Chinese delegation and explores the role played by the Chinese delegates at the conference. The contents may be of relevance in the light of discussions in 2015 over issues such as the quota reform at the IMF, possible inclusion of the renminbi in the Special Drawing Right, and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank (BRICS Development Bank). 5

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7 1 BACKGROUND TO BRETTON WOODS The Great Depression brought substantial damage to western economies. International cooperation had broken down. Countries had common interests, yet were not united. They tended to adopt harmful policies, such as competitive devaluations and high tariffs, seeking their own benefits at the expense of their neighbours. This led to a global crisis which was one of the causes of the war. From the beginning of the conflict, the nations fighting the Axis powers formed a consensus on the necessity of international economic co-operation and regulated economic growth. In January 1942 (well before the establishment of the United Nations as an international body in September 1945), and building on the 1941 US-UK Atlantic Charter, the US, UK, Soviet Union, China and 22 other countries drafted the Declaration by United Nations in Washington. The 26 nations pledged their determination to achieve a complete victory over the Axis powers. In , with the war not yet finished, Franklin Roosevelt, the US president, was already preparing post-war global economic co-operation. In the spring of 1943, the US invited representatives from the United Nations to Washington to attend the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, to discuss the improvement of food production and food distribution. In the winter of the same year, the US held the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Conference, seeking methods of providing assistance to war-stricken areas and of improving people s living conditions. Among issues of international economic co-operation, monetary and financial issues were of the utmost importance. In April 1943, the US and the UK, with a view to stabilising each country s currency and improving international trade, put forward their own proposals, named after their representatives Harry Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes. Soon after that, the US Treasury invited financial experts from different countries, including China, to travel to the US to settle on a common approach. In June, a three-day meeting was held among the experts in Washington. The financial experts agreed that international capital flows could be divided into two types: short-term and long-term. The former are used for international trade, whereas the latter are for international investment. The task of the soon-to-be-created IMF would be to oversee a system of fixed exchange rates and to provide short-term financial assistance to countries experiencing temporary deficits in their balance of payments. Long-term financial assistance would be offered by another organisation. For this, the US Treasury drafted a plan to create the IBRD (World Bank). In April 1944, the US announced a plan to create the IMF, drafted by financial experts from different countries. In June, the US Treasury invited representatives of different countries to attend a two-week preparatory meeting in Atlantic City to discuss and organise planning for the Fund and the Bank. On 1 July, the Bretton Woods conference convened at the Mount Washington hotel, Bretton Woods. A total of 44 countries sent delegations. (The Danish ambassador to the US participated as an individual.) The International Labour Organisation, the Department of Economy and Finance of the United Nations, the Transitional Council of the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration all sent representatives. 7

8 2 THE CHINESE DELEGATION After the US and the UK proposed their respective plans for post-war international financial cooperation, the Chinese government analysed the advantages and the disadvantages of the two plans and sent a group of financial experts to the US in the summer of The financial experts had several rounds of thorough discussions with the US Treasury on the drafting of the proposals for the Fund and the Bank. During this period, Guo Bingwen, the Chinese vice minister of finance, and three other officials attended the preparatory meeting of financial experts in Washington in June Jiang Tingfu, director general of personnel administration of the Executive Yuan (the executive branch), and six others participated in the preparatory meeting in Atlantic City in June On 15 June 1944, the Chinese government appointed as China s chief delegate to the Bretton Woods conference Kong Xiangxi, vice-premier of the Executive Yuan, finance minister, and governor of the Central Bank of China. Kong and other officials departed from China on 19 June and arrived in Washington on 23 June. Upon arrival, they were joined by Chinese diplomats and technical staff already in the US. The Chinese delegation to the Bretton Woods conference contained 32 members, making it bigger than the Soviet and UK delegations, second in size only to that of the US. Apart from Kong Xiangxi, the Chinese delegates included: Hu Shi, former Chinese ambassador to the US Zhang Jianguo, senior adviser at the Executive Yuan Li Ming, chairman of the board of Zhejiang Industrial Bank Wei Tingsheng, member of the Legislative Yuan (the legislature) Jiang Tingfu, director general of personnel administration of the Executive Yuan Guo Bingwen, vice minister of finance Hu Shize, vice minister of foreign affairs Gu Yiqun, vice minister of finance Li Guoqin, adviser at the ministry of finance Xi Demao, representative of the ministry of finance to the US, board member of the Central Bank of China and the Bank of China Bei Zuyi, board member of the Bank of China Song Ziliang, general manager of China Manufacturers Bank, board member of the Central Bank of China, Bank of China, and Bank of Transportation Ji Chaoding, secretary general of the Administration Committee of Foreign Exchange and director of the Economic Research Institute of the Central Bank of China. (He was also the assistant to the chief delegate.) There were also seven technical specialists, two foreign technical advisers and nine assistants. 8 The Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum

9 CONFERENCE PROCESS AND 3 CONTENT The opening plenary session took place at 3pm on 1 July in the Mount Washington Hotel. Some 500 delegates, including every participating country s minister of finance and central bank governor, took part, as well as bankers, economists, assistants and supporting members. More than 70 journalists were present. Henry Morgenthau, the conference s provisional chairman and US Treasury secretary, opened the conference and addressed delegates on behalf of President Roosevelt. After Morgenthau s speech, Kong Xiangxi, chairman of the Chinese delegation, made a speech on behalf of the other 43 participating countries. Representatives of Mexico, Brazil, Canada, and the Soviet Union also spoke. They proposed that Morgenthau be the conference s permanent chairman, a proposal passed by all the participating countries. Morgenthau then delivered an inaugural speech and the opening plenary session ended. At 10am on 3 July, the second plenary session took place. The conference nominated vice chairmen, a directing committee, Commission I, Commission II, Commission III, and the chairs and members of the committees under each Commission. Four vice chairmen were nominated: representatives of the Soviet Union, Brazil, Belgium, and Australia. The US representative was nominated chairman of the directing committee, with its committee members from China (Kong Xiangxi) and nine other countries. Commission I focused on issues of the IMF and was headed by US representative Harry Dexter White. There were four committees under Commission I. Committee 1 discussed the purposes, policies, and quotas of the Fund, with China s Jiang Tingfu as chairman. Committee 2 focused on the operations of the Fund and was chaired by the Soviet representative. Committee 3 took care of the discussion of the organisation and management of the Fund, with the Brazilian representative in the chair. Committee 4 concentrated on the form and status of the Fund and was chaired by the Peruvian representative. Commission II discussed the IBRD. It was led by John Maynard Keynes of the UK and was also divided into four committees, which covered issues such as the Bank s purposes, policies and quotas, its operations, organisation and management, and its form and status. Commission III under Eduardo Suárez of Mexico handled other means of international financial co-operation and took care of temporary proposals such as how to define the status of silver in international currency, how to handle enemy property and property seized by the enemy. After the second plenary session on the afternoon of 3 July, each Commission set out to have meetings to discuss proposals. During the conference, Commission I held nine meetings, its committees meeting 27 times. Commission II met seven times, with 20 committee meetings. Commission III met four times, its committees meeting three times. The conference, scheduled to end on 19 July, was not closed until 22 July because of delays over some disputed issues. At 7pm on 22 July, Morgenthau invited for dinner all the attendees and conference staff, altogether 600 people. Morgenthau first announced the good news from the Soviet representative that the Soviet government had agreed to increase its share in the IBRD from $900m to $1.2bn. Representatives of the US, the UK, the Soviet Union, Canada and France spoke in succession. The participating countries devised the Bretton Woods Agreements Act. Morgenthau delivered the closing address on the radio and expressed his gratitude to participating countries and their representatives. 9

10 4 ROLE AND FUNCTION OF THE CHINESE DELEGATION The Chinese delegation s guidelines were as follows: Maintain China s international standing; promote international economic co-operation; improve friendship with other countries; enhance technical standards. The Chinese delegates participated in meetings of different levels and were actively involved in different discussions. Kong Xiangxi, as the chief delegate, was in charge of conference planning. He served as the chairman of the conference s committee of rules and regulations and organised meetings for reviewing these issues. He worked with the representatives from the other nine countries in the directing committee of the conference. Between 4 and 12 July Jiang Tingfu chaired six meetings of Committee 1, the most important committee under Commission I. Moreover, Chinese delegates participated in the discussions of other committees. Some of them joined the special committee and drafting committee under Commission I and II, involving themselves in discussions of important issues of the Fund and the Bank, as well as in the revision of the articles of the agreements of the two institutions. As recorded, from the opening of the conference on 1 July to its closure on 22 July, Kong Xiangxi organised preliminary meetings among Chinese delegates every morning at 9am. Each delegate reported on the meetings that they had attended. While Kong was the chief spokesman for China at plenary sessions, it was decided that there should also be a Chinese representative to speak and vote at each smaller meeting. To draw on collective wisdom and absorb all useful ideas, the delegation encouraged other delegates financial advisers, representatives, assistants, technical experts, and technical advisers to attend any meeting at the conference and to offer advice. The Chinese delegation adhered to their principle Do not give up our rights; do not evade our duties, seeking to demonstrate the Chinese people s spirit of international teamwork. For example, in the discussion about countries shares in the IBRD, most countries were reluctant to buy shares, for there was no direct connection between a country s share and the amount of the loan that it could borrow in the future from the IBRD. China, fearing that the conference would be held in vain, voluntarily offered to increase its share by $50m. This offer made other countries rethink their decisions and, to a great extent, led to the Soviet decision of increasing its share in the IBRD. In this way, China helped pave the way to a satisfactory conclusion. The Chinese delegation made significant technical contributions. For instance, in the draft for the articles of agreement of the IMF, each country needed to decide on the value of its currency upon joining the Fund. But this rule was difficult for a country that had been invaded (by Japan). The Chinese delegation mentioned the problem and the conference added an extra rule, allowing invaded countries to decide the value of their own currencies. Furthermore, during the drafting of the articles for the Fund and the Bank, one of the contentious issues was the selection procedure for the director of the two bodies. China played a moderator role, proposing a solution acceptable to each party that the conference eventually adopted. On the evening of 7 July, the Chinese delegation held a memorial for the Marco Polo Bridge Incident at the hotel. 1 Hu Shi and Kong Xiangxi delivered speeches, emphasising China s contribution to the war and the important role China played in promoting international cooperation. Delegates from many countries attended the memorial and were deeply moved by the speeches. 1 The Marco Polo Bridge Incident, also known as the Lugouqiao Incident or the 7 July Incident, was a battle in 1937 between the Republic of China s National Revolutionary Army and the Imperial Japanese Army, often used as the marker for the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War ( ). 10 The Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum

11 5 BIOGRAPHIES Kong Xiangxi (also known as H.H. Kung and Kung Hsiang-hsi), vice-premier of the Executive Yuan, finance minister, and governor of the Central Bank of China, was a banker and businessman who was a major figure in the Chinese Nationalist government between 1928 and After returning to China from his studies at Yale University he became a friend of the Nationalist revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen (Sun Yixian), and helped promote Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) to be leader of Sun s Nationalist Party. In 1928 Kong became minister of industry and commerce in the new Nationalist government. Five years later he succeeded his brother-in-law T.V. Soong (Song Ziwen) as minister of finance and soon took China s money off the silver standard and thus tied the Chinese economy to the international monetary system. That reform enabled China to survive the initial phase of the Sino-Japanese War ( ) without serious economic consequences. Kong succeeded Chiang Kai-shek briefly as president of the government in 1938, when Chiang resigned to devote all his time to prosecuting the war with Japan. Jiang Tingfu, director general of personnel administration of the Executive Yuan, was a well-known historian and diplomat who had taken his Ph.D. at Columbia University. After returning to China from his studies, he was appointed Dean of the Department of History at Nan Kai University and later at Tsinghua University. Not a Kuomintang (Nationalist) Party member, he joined the Chinese government as a scholar in December Before the Bretton Woods conference, Jiang was the leader of the Chinese delegation at the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation conference and at the preliminary meeting of the Bretton Woods conference in Atlantic City. Ji Chaoding, assistant to the chief delegate, was an underground Communist party member. He joined the Communist party as early as In 1941, after returning to China from the US, he was sent to work as an economist for the Chinese government. Ji gained his Ph.D. in economics from Columbia University in the 1930s and was invited to give lectures at a number of American universities. Within the Communist party, Ji had the reputation of being a Three Old Hands : an old hand with the English, an old hand with the US, and an old hand with the Kuomintang. Abroad, he was regarded as China s most competent economist. Soon after China s liberation in 1949, Nan Hanchen, the first governor of the People s Bank of China, set up a research department within the Bank and invited Ji to be its head. In 1956, this department became the Research Institute of Finance of the People s Bank. In his later years, Ji was appointed vice chairman of the board of the Bank of China and vice chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade. 11

12 6 DISPUTES OVER CHINA S SHARE OF QUOTAS It is worth mentioning the disputes at the conference over China s IMF quota. Each country s Fund quota is directly related to its borrowing quota and its voting power. Therefore, the size of quotas became the focus of attention. In 1943, when the US Treasury invited financial experts to travel to the US to discuss the proposal of creating the Fund, negotiations on quotas had already begun. At the time, the US promised the Chinese delegates that the starting capital could be $8bn and China s quota would be between $500m and $600m, ranking No.4 after the US, UK and Soviet Union. This US proposal made its way into the media in China and abroad. At the Bretton Woods conference, Commission I appointed a special committee to discuss quotas, chaired by the US representative. Since both the UK and the Soviet Union requested firmly that their quotas be increased, the US decided to increase the starting capital to $8.8bn. As a result, the Chinese delegates contended that China s quota should be no less than $600m. Yet, after several rounds of negotiation, the US insisted that China s quota should be $500m, which would still make it No.4 in the Fund, with a difference of $50m compared with the No.5 (France). Kong Xiangxi told Morgenthau that China had been supporting the US at the conference from the beginning. Yet, on the quotas question, China would have to stand firm, for a country s share of quotas reflected its international standing. If the US did not agree to raise China s share, Chinese delegates would not accept the IMF s articles of agreement. The US offered a compromise afterwards, increasing China s share to $550m. However, the Chinese delegation insisted that the US had not kept its earlier promise and decided to raise objections against the Fund agreement. Other counties, as well as China, had problems that prevented them from reaching an accord. At Commission I s seventh meeting, the US representative reported each participating country s share of quotas: the US, the UK, the USSR, China, and France were the top five, with shares of $2.75bn, $1.3bn, $1.2bn, $550m and $450m respectively. However, nearly 10 countries including China had reservations over the allocation of quotas. After Commission I s ninth meeting, all the IMF s articles of agreement had been discussed. On the afternoon of 20 July, Commission I held an executive meeting chaired by Morgenthau. The Canadian representative reported the procedure for drafting the Agreement. Keynes, the UK representative, stated that the agreement would not take effect until participating countries approved all its articles. He further suggested that the delegates withdraw their reservations and objections to demonstrate the co-operative spirit of the conference. Fred Vinson, one of the US representatives (and a future Treasury secretary as Morgenthau s successor), stood up to register agreement, stressing the importance of international cooperation. Under these circumstances, Kong Xiangxi, speaking after Vinson, expressed China s willingness to withdraw its reservations for the good of international co-operation. Other countries delegates changed their attitudes as well. Delegates from France, India, Egypt, the Netherlands and the Soviet Union gave speeches successively, withdrawing their reservations. All the articles of the IMF agreement were passed to delegates applause. 12 The Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum

13 REFLECTIONS ON THE BRETTON 7 WOODS CONFERENCE In many years of research on the Bretton Woods conference, historians of the international monetary system have tended to focus only on the western countries such as the US and the UK. Little attention has been given to the other participants, let alone China, in Bretton Woods. From the recently discovered archives, which had been gathering dust for 70 years, we are able to reconstruct the Chinese delegation s passage to the conference in a relatively complete and clear manner. The narrative is of course from the perspective of the Kuomintang (Nationalist) government and there could be some inflated elements; some content requires further research and verification. Yet the archives do offer a rather clear and complete outline of the Chinese delegation s participation. As the person who rediscovered and reorganised the archives, I would like to express some of my own thoughts on the event. Many details of the Chinese delegation s participation in the conference demonstrate that the Chinese government contributed actively to the conference and to co-operation between China and the US. During the war, compared with the US, the UK and the Soviet Union, China was the weakest country in terms of infrastructure, yet also the country (together with the Soviet Union) bearing the greatest losses. Yet, in comparison to some other countries that had been fully occupied by the Axis powers, China had not lost its territory completely. Therefore, China, among the Allies, still had a strong voice on the international stage. The US and the UK led discussion of the main strategic issues of the conference, while China participated more at the professional and technical level. The conference took place at the most difficult moment of the Anti-Japanese war. Yet the Chinese government took the conference seriously, dispatching a strong delegation. Among the Chinese delegates were the country s most professional and experienced economists, bankers and diplomats. The Chinese delegation offered the US important support and assistance. At the inaugural plenary session, after Morgenthau s speech, Kong Xiangxi made an address on behalf of the other participating countries, reflecting China s high standing among the Allied powers. Towards the end of the conference, China and some other countries held reservations on the allocation of IMF quotas. Yet, considering the overall situation and other countries interests, China was the first to withdraw its reservations, thereby helping the conference to a successful conclusion. China also made some significant achievements as a participant. China s share of quotas in the IMF was $550m, with 5,750 votes, 5.8% of total voting power and ranking fourth among participant countries. In December 1945, when the Soviet union announced its withdrawal from the Bretton Woods system, China s quota and voting shares rose to thirdlargest among IMF member countries. The Chinese delegation to Bretton Woods contained some Chinese Communist party members. The delegation, to a certain extent, was a product of the co-operation between the Kuomintang (Nationalist) and the Communist party. As a prime example, Ji Chaoding, assistant to the chief delegate, was an underground Communist party member. In the context of the Bretton Woods conference, Chinese Communist party members used their intelligence and talents and co-operated quietly with the Chinese government, with a view to safeguarding and enhancing China s international standing. This was also the common goal of the Chinese people. The archives indicate that it is highly possible that Ji Chaoding participated in the work of Drafting Committee, one of the most important committees of the conference. The Bretton Woods conference resulted in a combination of the state intervention policies proposed by then socialist countries and the free market policies proposed by western countries. 13

14 According to different sources, Harry Dexter White, one of the US representatives, showed strong interest in the socialist course of the Soviet Union, so much so that some Americans claimed that he was a Soviet spy. For that reason, he failed to be appointed as the first managing director of the IMF. Furthermore, John Maynard Keynes inclusion of state intervention in his capitalist theory demonstrates that he, too, had assimilated into his works some thoughts of the socialist system s planned economy and, to a certain extent, had deviated from capitalism s classic free market policy. The Bretton Woods conference agreements, with inter-governmental co-operation as their framework and exchange rate intervention as their base, embody a mixture of the thoughts of both the socialist and capitalist economies. It was an important trial and a form of rehearsal for countries of different social systems to learn from one another and to seek common ground while preserving differences in the name of peace and co-operation. Almost all the delegates of the Bretton Woods conference have now passed away. Just as the ancient lyric goes: All gallant deeds are now dispelled by wind and rain. 2 The Bretton Woods system was dissolved in , more than 40 years ago. The cold war ended with the dissolution of the USSR. The world economy has not yet fully recovered from the worst crisis since the second world war. The US remains the leading world power, yet China has risen to second place. The topics currently discussed among the leading countries are not significantly different from those debated at the Bretton Woods conference. Those who open up and learn from the dusty archives of Bretton Woods may perhaps gain insights into many other issues relevant today. 2 The line is from the famous Song Dynasty poet Xin Qiji s poem Joy of Eternal Union (AD 1205). 14 The Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum

15 Background to report Jin Zhongxia s paper on Chinese policies towards the Bretton Woods conference underlines continuity in international monetary policies between the Nationalist and Communist governments, separated by 71 years. It is the latest in a series of OMFIF reports on China s in transition as Beijing faces challenges from economic slowdown, renminbi internationalisation, managed liberalisation of savings, investment and capital flows, and disruptive trends on stock markets that could yet pose a threat to economic stability. Note on sources This article was originally published in the bi-monthly journal China Finance on 15 September The archive of documents relating to this text is now in the Research Institute of PBoC and not open to the public. The documents were left by the old Central Bank of China under the Nationalist government and acquired by the Communist government in

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