Value Diversity and Specific Political Support: A cross-national analysis

Transcription

1 Value Diversity and Specific Political Support: A cross-national analysis Mebs Kanji and Neil Nevitte Department of Political Science University of Toronto 100 St. George Street Toronto, Ontario, Canada Paper prepared for: The World Values Association Conference, Budapest, Hungary. September 2-5, 2004 * Not to be cited without permission

2 Introduction A variety of studies suggest that citizens in advanced industrial states have become increasingly disillusioned with politics (Norris, 1999, Dalton, 2002, 2004; Nevitte, 2002; Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Nye, Jr., Zelikow and King, 1997), and they supply a variety of explanations to account for this seemingly pervasive trend. This paper has two major objectives. The first is to broaden the inquiry to include societies at different levels of economic development and to examine whether there is a systematic link between modernization and political support. There are reasons to expect that modernization brings with it cultural change which, in turn, may have implications for political support (Inglehart, 1997; Welzel, Inglehart, Klingemann, 2003; Dalton, 2004). The primary focus of our analysis is on specific levels of political support (Easton, 1965; Norris, 1999; Nevitte, 2002) and in particular on the following questions: Are citizens in rich societies less supportive of people in government than those in less developed countries? Are they less confident in government institutions? And, does support for political actors have any impact on support for the broader political system (diffuse support)? The second objective of this paper is to explore an alternative explanation for cross-national variation in specific political support, one that centres on the notion of value diversity the extent to which competing groups differ on fundamental values. There are reasons to suppose that more developed societies may have greater degrees of value diversity and that this may pose additional stress on those political systems, interfere with effective governability and eventually detract from political support (Easton, 1965). The empirical investigation of this part of the analysis asks: Is modernization associated with increased value diversity? And, are higher levels of value diversity linked to lower levels of political support? This paper is divided into four sections. The first section canvasses the available empirical literature on the sources of variation in specific political support. It then turns to develop a perspective on why value diversity may also be related to variations in political support. Part II summarizes the central hypotheses which are tested in Part III. The concluding section evaluates the core findings and points to what might be the most profitable lines of further research. Part I: Explanations of political support Since Huntington and colleagues (1974; Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki, 1975) first expressed their concerns about exuberant democracy and the threat of a pending democratic crisis in postindustrial states, several follow up studies have examined empirically the roots and manifestations of this apparent democratic crisis. The results of those research efforts have not been entirely consistent. Some found that public confidence in government institutions, one dimension of specific support, across several advanced industrial states has declined (Dalton, 1999; 2004). Others showed that there has been no widespread decline in public confidence in institutions particularly in Western Europe (Newton and Norris, 2000; Listhaug and Wiberg, 1995). Similar inconsistencies in research findings also emerged with respect to a second dimension of specific support, trust in politicians. Dalton (1999, 2004) found clear evidence of widespread erosion in support for people in government, while Listhaug s (1995) examination of the European data concluded that there has been no such downward trend. Some of these discrepancies might be attributed to a combination of such methodological factors as the selection of cases for analysis and measurement strategies. Moreover, the general focus of these investigations has been on cross-time trends within a number of advanced industrial states. Expanding the scope of inquiry to include societies at various stages of economic development provides an alternative vantage point from which to examine the links between advanced industrialism and levels of political support. 2

3 The conventional wisdom seems to suggest that deteriorations in certain aspects of specific political support may be more problematic than others. Growing dissatisfaction with people in government, for instance, may be less of a cause for concern than declining confidence in government institutions. As Newton and Norris (2000) explain: An erosion of confidence in major institutions of society, especially those of representative democracy, is a far more serious threat to democracy than a loss of trust in other citizens or politicians. Political leaders come and go with swings of the electoral pendulum, and trust in them may rise and fall with citizens evaluation of their performance in office.thus, loss of confidence in institutions may well be a better indicator of public disaffection with the modern world because they are the basic pillars of society. If they begin to crumble, then there is, indeed, cause for concern (p.53). Certainly, it is reasonable to assume that institutions are crucial because they mediate citizens evaluations of regime support. By the same token, the possibility that negative evaluations of people in government may have a significant impact on diffuse levels of political support is not entirely out of the question. Preliminary analysis of data from eight different societies seems to show that citizens satisfaction with the quality of democratic life may be more affected by citizens evaluations of how people in government are performing than by confidence in governmental institutions (Nevitte and Kanji, 2003). If it is the case that declining support for political actors is systematically linked to the process of modernization and support for political actors does have important consequences for how publics across various societies evaluate their political regimes, then it is useful to consider what factors might be driving this trend. Current theories of declining political support tend to fall into one of two camps: Performancebased theories and cultural change theories. Performance-based theories link declining levels of political support to deteriorations in government performance; citizens withdraw support from government institutions and elected officials because their performance falls short of expectations. But as Dalton (2004) suggests, coincidental unique political crises across a large and diverse set of nations is an improbable explanation of general patterns; it is more likely that some systematic forces are changing the relationship between citizens and the state in advanced industrial democracies (p.4; also see, Nevitte, 2002). Theories of modernization and culture change, alternatively, are more broad-gauged. One prominent variant argues that citizens in advanced industrial societies are likely to be more critical of their politicians and less respectful of political authority (Inglehart, 1997, 1999; Nevitte, 1996; Dalton, 2000, Norris, 1999). Modernization is associated with a growing emphasis on human emancipation and self-expression (Ester, Halman and de Moor, 1993; Welzel, Inglehart, Klingemann, 2003; Welzel and Inglehart, 2005 forthcoming). These lines of argument are complementary and suggest that political support is lower because of transformations in citizens expectations and understanding of politics (Pharr and Putnam, 2000). A second variant of the cultural change argument suggests that in advanced industrial states an inter-generational erosion of inter-personal trust, brought on by fewer citizens actively participating in social and organizational group activities, may also be related to poorer support ratings (Putnam, 1993, 2000, 2002). Trusting citizens in well-connected societies, according to this logic, are more likely to 3

4 reciprocate on matters of collective action, and to be easier to govern. Correspondingly, they are more likely to express greater confidence in their elected officials and evaluate government institutions more positively than citizens in societies with lower levels of trust and weaker social networks. A third variant of the cultural change perspective may also be worth considering. What we call the value diversity perspective is a theoretical ally of the cleavage-based theory of politics. Cleavage structures (or competing groups) define competing interests and values which in turn shape public demands. Consequently, the possibility exists that an increased degree of value diversity (the extent to which competing groups differ on fundamental values) in a society may potentially make it more difficult for governments to respond to public demands and so lower levels of political support (Easton, 1965). There are several reasons for suspecting that as societies modernize new cleavages contribute to greater degrees of value diversity. Inglehart s (1977, 1990, 1997) theory of postmodern value change, for instance, contends that increased economic prosperity (and economic development) contributes to an intergenerational shift in the value priorities of mass publics. Because younger generations have been socialized during a period of relative affluence, their views toward politics, work, family life, religion and sexual behavior are likely to differ from those of older generations who were raised during periods of greater economic scarcity, and whose priorities, as a result, were focused toward making ends meet as opposed to issues such as environmental protection and the quality of life. The implication is that value orientations in postindustrial societies may be gradually shifting as younger cohorts shaped by their distinctive and more affluent formative years begin to replace older generations. Then, of course, there are interactions between structural change and value change to consider. Changes in family structure, for example, may contribute to intergenerational value change. Today, more children are raised by common-law or single parents and changing family contexts may also affect formative experiences. Moreover, today s youth are significantly better educated than their counterparts from earlier generations, and changing education levels are also associated with a shift in value orientations (Verba, 2003). For all these reasons, then, it is plausible that the generational divide may be a more relevant value cleavage in advanced industrial states than elsewhere. Another potential new value cleavage also linked to the structural and lifestyle changes associated with late industrialism, concerns the gender gap. Some (Norris and Inglehart, 2003; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; also see Inglehart, Norris and Welzel, 2003) make the case that societal modernization and human development (see Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann, 2003; Welzel and Inglehart, 2001) bring with it a rising tide of gender equality in postindustrial societies. According to Inglehart and Norris: Throughout history, women in virtually all societies have had their life options restricted to the roles of wife and mother. Increasingly today, in postindustrial societies, almost any career and almost any lifestyle is opening up to them. These cultural changes have been important for men, but the transformation in the lives of women is far more dramatic, moving them from narrow subordination toward full equality. A radical change is altering women s education, career opportunities, sexual behavior, and worldviews. With this in mind, it is not surprising to find that gender issues constitute such a central component arguably, the most central component of value change in postindustrial societies (Inglehart and Norris, 2003: 159). 4

5 As a consequence of these changes, one line of reasoning supposes that as gender-based differences in educational and occupational opportunities diminish, women s independent value orientations may begin to resemble those of men. But there is also the opposite possibility, proposed by Gilligan (1982) namely, that women today may be better equipped and more inclined to take on and voice values that are different from men. Part II: Hypotheses The literature on value change and structural change yields a number of hypotheses concerning the sources of variation in levels of political support. This paper explores four such hypotheses: H1: Modernization affects political support: Levels of specific political support are lower in more developed societies than in less developed ones. H2: Specific political support affects political support at more diffuse levels: The less satisfied citizens are with people in government, the less likely they are to be satisfied with the workings of democracy. H3: Modernization affects value diversity: The degree of value diversity attributable to new cleavages (such as the gender and generational divides) is higher in more developed societies than in less developed ones. H4: Value diversity affects specific political support: Societies with higher degrees of value diversity will have lower levels of support for people in government. Data To examine these propositions we draw on data from The World Values Surveys (WVS). The WVS have two particular attributes that are useful for this analysis. First, they allow us to identify and track value attributes and cleavages across multiple domains, and second, there are enough countries involved in the project that we can meaningfully undertake an aggregate analysis of societal characteristics. To be sure, not all the countries have identical data sets containing all of the same variables and so there are inevitably instances where some societies may be included in parts of the analysis, but not in others. Our strategy in the following analysis is to try to maximize the full potential of this data source whenever possible. Part III: Analysis Modernization and declining specific political support? Figures 1a and 1b lend support to H1: There is a fairly strong correlation between levels of economic development and specific political support. Citizens in richer societies tend to express less satisfaction with people in government and to have less confidence in government institutions (such as Parliament) than do their counterparts in less developed states. Global findings of this sort can be sensitive of outlying cases. We note, however, that this central finding remains intact even after such outlying cases as Vietnam, Egypt, Luxembourg and the US are removed from the analysis. 5

6 Figure 1a: Satisfaction with people in government (specific support) by GDP-PPP per capita Percentage saying they are "very satisfied" with the way the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs Vietnam Egypt n = 62 societies; r = -.30; p<.05 Bangladesh Jordan Iran Tanzania Peru Brazil Morocco Nigeria Venezuela India S.Africa Chile Uganda P.Ric Norway BosniaChina Philippines Ghana Zimbabwe Uruguay Canada Azerbaijan Croatia Colombia Spain Romania Indonesia Dom.Repub. Mexico ArgentinaS.Korea Australia Switz. Armenia Ukraine Moldova Slovakia Finland Albania Poland Lithuania N.Zealand Slovenia Japan Taiwan Macedonia Georgia Turkey Belarus Bulgaria Latvia Hungary Czech. Sweden Russia Estonia Germany US Luxembourg GDP-PPP per capita 6

7 Figure 1b: Confidence in Parliament (specific support) by GDP-PPP per capita Percentage saying they have "a great deal" of confidence in Parliament Vietnam Ghana Tanzania Bangladesh Uganda China Jordan Egypt Iran n = 74 societies; r = -.42; p<.01 Azerbaijan S.Africa Nigeria India Philippines Turkey Zimbabwe Chile Bosnia Poland Iceland Latvia Ireland ElSavador Morocco Venezuela Mexico Estonia Britain Norway Albania Brazil Bulgaria Belarus Slovenia Spain Sweden Austria Georgia Uruguay Portugal Indonesia Romania Italy Ukraine Croatia Lithuania P.RicHungary Argentina Australia Finland Denmark Greece S.Korea Germany Canada Switz. Moldova Peru Colombia Russia Czech. Taiwan Neth. France Belgium Armenia Macedonia Dom.Repub. Slovakia N.Zealand Japan Luxembourg US GDP-PPP per capita Source: World Values Surveys and The CIA World Factbook, July 1, 2002 Moreover, contrary to findings reported by others (Newton and Norris, 2000), the findings in Figure 2 provide support for H2: Public satisfaction with political actors does seem to be significantly associated with broader outlooks toward democratic life. Support for people in government is powerfully linked to public satisfaction with democracy. In fact, the data seem to suggest that changes in satisfaction with people in government may have a greater impact on diffuse support than does confidence in Parliament. Moreover, the results of a regression analysis (not shown) indicate that when both confidence in Parliament and satisfaction with people in government are examined simultaneously as predictors of satisfaction with democracy, the effect of the former all but washes out. 1 7

8 Figure 2: Satisfaction with democracy by specific political support Tanzania China Bangladesh Egypt Uganda Percentage saying that they are "very satisfied" with the way that democracy is developing in their country Jordan Iran Bangladesh S.Africa Jordan India Zimbabwe Philippines Montenegro Chile Iran Poland Morocco Latvia Morocco Bulgaria Estonia S.Africa Luxembourg P.Ric Mexico Chile India Croatia Hungary US Uganda P.Ric Serbia Slovenia Sweden Belarus Philippines Canada Russia S.Korea Ukraine Zimbabwe Mexico ChinaGermany Canada Lithuania Romania Finland Japan Slovakia S.Korea Argentina SpainW.Germany Indonisia Serbia Bulgaria Japan Croatia Romania Montenegro Spain US E. Germany Poland Slovenia Czech. Hungary Sweden Finland Argentina E. Germany Czech. Latvia Ukraine Slovakia Belarus W.Germany Germany Russia Lithuania Estonia Luxembourg Nigeria Tanzania Nigeria Venezuela Venezuela Satisfaction with people in government: y = x; R Square =.62 Egypt Confidence in Parliament: y = x; R Square = Percentage Note: The analysis between satisfaction with democracy and satisfaction with people in government includes data from 46 societies, and the analysis between satisfaction with democracy and confidence in Parliament includes 58 societies. Source: World Values Surveys. Measuring value diversity Determining whether modernization brings with it increased value diversity requires examining data in several societies at different levels of development and across a variety of value orientations. 2 The immediate challenge is to find a comparable value structure. We began by selecting more than 100 comparable indicators from the WVS and subjecting them to an exploratory factor analysis, combining data from various agrarian, industrial and postindustrial societies. 3 The findings summarized in Appendix A show that people across different societies structure their outlooks toward religion, morals and ethics, economics and technological progress, work, family and postmodern concerns along 17 discernable dimensions. 4 Indicators tapping religious orientations, for instance, cluster into three distinct value patterns. One captures basic outlooks toward religiosity (or religious values) prayer, God, and the importance of religion overall. A second concerns the adequacy of church leadership on a variety of issues (or values toward religious institutions). A third deals with the notion of afterlife including the belief in life after death, and whether people have a soul, and beliefs in hell and heaven (spiritual values). Two dimensions emerge concerning moral and ethical values. The moral permissiveness factor measures personal outlooks toward abortion, divorce, homosexuality, prostitution, euthanasia and suicide, whereas the civil permissiveness dimension captures values about ethical conduct in the public 8

9 setting. These include outlooks toward such behaviours as claiming government benefits to which people are not entitled, avoiding a fare on public transport, accepting a bribe and cheating on taxes. A third cluster of orientations has to do with values toward economic and technological progress. One dimension captures values toward the core principles of market economics orientations toward competition and privatization. A second (science and technology) combines orientations toward technology development and scientific advancement. Indicators measuring orientations toward work cluster into four separate factors. One concerns outlooks toward the importance of various workplace conditions (work hours, vacation time, pay). The second concerns outlooks toward worker participation (following instructions at work, employee involvement in workplace decision-making). A third dimension workplace motivations considers the importance attached to the ability to use personal initiative. And the fourth dimension taps values toward money and work more generally. Three specific value patterns that emerge in the domain of family values: views about women and work, orientations toward teaching children independence, and views about single parenting. Three dimensions also emerge on what might be called postmodern values orientations toward environmental protection, friends and leisure, and postmaterialist orientations. The first captures people s willingness to contribute to the environmental cause (i.e. environmental values), the second measures the overall importance of friends and leisure in people s lives (quality of life values) and the third uses Inglehart s now standard four item battery to distinguish between materialists and postmaterialists (potmaterialist values). The next step was to mine these 17 dimensions for significant generational and gender differences across several societies at different stages of development. Only countries which have comparable data on all 17 dimensions were examined. The objective was twofold: (1) to determine to what extent the values of competing groups (younger generations vs. older generations; men vs. working women) differ across societies with different levels of economic development, and (2), to determine the average magnitude of those discrepancies. The overall degree of value diversity for each society was then measured by summing the product of its significant value discrepancies and the average magnitude of those differences, for each respective cleavage. The first point to note is that results are not always consistent: more developed societies do not always exhibit greater degrees of value diversity on each and every dimension tested. This finding is not surprising given that value change is a slow and heterogeneous process, including both a pluralization of value orientations and value synthesis. Few people, van Deth and Scarbrough (1995) argue, adopt a new value orientation with its coherent and integrated set of values in its entirety, but take up parts of available orientations (p ). Even so, there are clear instances where increased value diversity does correspond to varying levels of economic development. As Figure 3 shows, the proportion of significant generational value gaps (between post-1960s generations and the pre-1945 generations) on outlooks toward religiosity (the first of our 17 value dimensions) in postindustrial societies greatly outnumbers those found among publics in agrarian societies. The value discrepancies between younger and older generations toward religion diverge and so does the magnitude of those discrepancies in more advanced industrial states. Younger generations tend to place much less emphasis on religion than older generations. Figure 3: Examples of value diversity by new cleavages 9

10 Proportion of significant generational value gaps - outlooks toward religiosity Proportion of significant gender value gaps (working women vs. men) - orientations toward women and work Percentage Percentage Agrarian Industrial Postindustrial 0 Agrarian Industrial Postindustrial Type of society Type of society Magnitude of significant generational value gaps - orientations toward religiosity Magnitude of significant gender value gaps (working women vs. men) - orientations toward women and work Percentage Percentage Agrarian Industrial Postindustrial 0 Agrarian Industrial Postindustrial Type of society Type of society Note: The analysis of generational values gaps includes 37 societies (15 postindustrial, 16 industrial and 6 agrarian). The analysis of gender value gaps includes 39 societies (15 postindustrial, 18 industrial and 6 agrarian). Source: World Values Surveys A similar pattern emerges with respect to the proportion of significant value gaps between working women and men when it comes to orientations toward women and work. Working women in postindustrial societies are more likely to support women working and their orientations toward women working are more likely to differ significantly from men s in advanced industrial states than elsewhere. Moreover, the magnitude of these discrepancies is also higher in wealthier societies. Compared to generational differences, however, the trends based on gender differences across societies at different levels of affluence are less consistent. One interpretation of that finding might be that the generational cleavage is more salient in postindustrial societies than the gender gap. On the whole, however, when the comparable data from 34 different societies, across all 17 different value dimensions are considered, there seems to be empirical support for H3: On average, the degree of value diversity based on new cleavages, such as the gender and generational divides, tends to be larger in more developed societies than in less developed ones. The findings presented in Figure 4 10

11 show that there is a powerful correlation (r =.44; p<.01) between GDP-PPP per capita and value diversity: the wealthier a society is, the greater is the degree of value diversity. Figure 4: Degree of value diversity due to new cleavages by GDP-PPP per capita Degree of value diversity due to gender and generational value gaps (number of significant value gaps X the magnitude of value discrepancies) Uganda India Philippines Lithuania Belarus Ukraine Russia Croatia P.Ric Zimbabwe Bangladesh Vietnam Bulgaria Latvia Mexico Chile S.Africa Hungary Estonia Argentina Portugal Spain Ireland Italy Finland Britain France Japan Germany Canada Neth. Belgium Iceland n = 34 societies; r =.44; p <.01 US 2000 World Values Surveys GDP-PPP per capita Source: Clearly, the relationship between levels of affluence and value diversity, however, is not entirely linear and the relationship between value diversity and affluence is undoubtedly mediated by other factors. Cultural heritage (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart, Norris and Welzel, 2003), may also have a role in determining the extent to which cultural changes actually take place. Some societies may be more resistant to developing new cleavages and accommodating value diversity than others. Deeply divided societies, for instance, may be less resistant to accommodating new cleavages than traditionally homogeneous societies. Indeed, some evidence shows that the degree of value diversity in societies that is attributable to new cleavages corresponds directly with the degree of value diversity that is attributable to such traditional cleavages as class, religion and levels of urbanization (r =.60; p<.01; n = 18 societies). Moreover, the results of a multivariate analysis confirm that both modernization and cultural heritage play a significant role in determining the degree of value diversity that is generated by new cleavages. Together, these two factors alone account for more than two-thirds of the variation in the value diversity attributable to new cleavages. 5 Value diversity and political support Citizens perceptions of people in government might vary for a variety of reasons. If economic performance falls short of public expectations, for example, we might think that specific support for political authorities will suffer as a consequence (Dalton, 2004: 63). Moreover, if such a trend were 11

12 sustained over a long period, then it is also conceivable that public dissatisfaction may have an impact on diffuse levels of regime support and that too may have important consequences. Likewise, Putnam s (1993, 1995a, 1995b, 2000, 2002) theory of declining social capital suggests that an erosion of civic engagement has resulted in declining levels of interpersonal trust, which in turn breeds democratic discontent. And modernization theorists contend that declining levels of public satisfaction with government officials are attributable to a growing body of critical citizens (Inglehart, 1997). Table 1: Regression Analysis The determinants of satisfaction with people in government Predictors Orientations toward the democratic political system (negative) Financial Satisfaction (high) Interpersonal trust (high) Respect for authority (bad) Degree of value diversity (large) Very satisfied with people in government * -.39* -.55** Constant R Square.56 Note: the results reported are Beta coefficients; for operationalization and coding, see Appendix B. * significant at p<.05; ** significant at p<.01; Source: 1990, 1995/97 and 2000 World Values Survey The evidence based on a cross-national analysis of 29 societies reported in Table 1 suggests that many of these explanations provide plausible accounts for the differences in levels of support for people in government. But some are more plausible than others. Performance-based arguments, at least those that are captured by measures of financial satisfaction do not seem to account for much. Neither orientations toward the democratic political system (diffuse political support) nor average levels of financial satisfaction have statistically significant effects. Conversely, both interpersonal trust and average levels of respect for authority do seem to have significant effects. The higher the level of interpersonal trust in a society, the more likely citizens are to express satisfaction with people in government. And the lower the average level of respect for authority 12

13 within a society, the less likely citizens are to express high levels of satisfaction with people in government. This preliminary analysis also seems to suggest that the degree of value diversity within a society may have an independent impact on levels of satisfaction, or rather dissatisfaction with people in government. The results in Table 1 provide support for H4: societies where there are higher levels of value diversity generally experience lower levels of political support. Part IV: Conclusions Evidence from this analysis indicates that there is an association between affluence and levels of political support. Citizens in more developed societies tend to be less supportive of people in government and less confident in their political institutions than those in less developed ones. Furthermore, support for people in government does seem to have an effect on satisfaction with democracy. That citizens in less affluent countries express higher levels of specific political support than those in wealthier ones, may seem somewhat counterintuitive. But citizens in postindustrial societies are less deferential, more critical, and less trusting of one another. In advanced industrial states, the value gaps between younger and older generations are greater than those found in less developed states. Similarly, as more women experience higher levels of formal education and enter the paid workforce in greater numbers, their values do tend to become more distinct from those of men, although the results for this cleavage are less consistent. Even so, the bulk of the aggregate evidence across several societies and covering 17 different value dimensions indicates that on average, the degree of value diversity in developed societies tends to be greater than that found in less developed societies. Thus, to the extent that people s political demands are shaped by their values, value diversity may also make it more difficult for governments in more affluent states to satisfy publics that have more diverse preferences. All of these factors may help to explain cross-national variations in specific political support. These results are part of a work in progress. They are preliminary and there are several important unanswered questions that remain to be considered. One such question is: Are differences across some cleavages more crucial than others when it comes to their relative impact? For instance, are income/class differences more vital in less developed countries than elsewhere? A second set of questions concerns the methodological aspects of measuring value diversity. In this particular exploration the measures of diversity have focused on value gaps along two primary dimensions gender and generation. These two particular dimensions, arguably, are more important in advanced industrial states than elsewhere. What remains to be determined is whether similar findings emerge when a more comprehensive set of cleavages are incorporated into the analysis. Furthermore, some values, undoubtedly, may consistently be more divisive than others and so be more consequential for public support. And there is also a collateral question to explore: what implications does value diversity have for social, economic and political engagement? It seems to us that this is a research direction that is challenging from both methodological and conceptual perspective. But it is nonetheless an important one to pursue. Notes 1 Tolerance coefficients indicate that multicolinearity is not a concern. 2 Currently, there is no consensus among scholars as to how to define and measure values however, the assumption is that people s value orientations serve as an underlying mechanism for structuring 13

14 attitudes, behaviour and beliefs across various contexts (van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995). Because values are generally assumed to be embedded in what people say, in how they think and in how they act, values need to be treated analytically as hypothetical constructs and used heuristically (van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995). To the extent that values structure attitudes, it follows that a set of patterned or constrained attitudes may be taken as a proxy for value orientations. 3 By default, only countries with data on all indicators examined are included in the factor analysis. These include: Spain, the United States, Canada, Mexico, South Africa, Argentina, Chile, Zimbabwe, Philippines, Tanzania, Uganda, Serbia and Montenegro. 4 The internal consistency of the value patterns uncovered is not uniformly strong, but that is not surprising given that these are individual level attitudinal data and in some cases, the number of indicators available are limited. The essential point is that the patterns that do emerge are remarkably consistent; they appear time and time again over repeated trials, across different groups of societies agrarian, industrial and postindustrial. 5 Table 1: Regression Analysis The determinants of value diversity due to new cleavages Predictors Degree of value diversity due to new cleavages (large) Modernization: GDP-PPP per capita (high).52* Cultural heritage: Degree of value diversity due to old cleavages (large).59** Constant Note: the results reported are Beta coefficients. * significant at p<.05; ** significant at p<.01 Source: 1990, 1995/97 and 2000 World Values Survey 14

15 References Crozier, M., S. Huntington and J. Watanuki (1975). The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission. NewYork: New York University Press. Dalton, R. (1999). Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies, in P. Norris (ed.) Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dalton, R. (2000). Value Change and Democracy, in S. J. Pharr and R. D. Putnam (eds.) Disaffected Democracies. What s Troubling the Trilateral Countries? Princeton: Princeton University Press. Dalton, R. (2002). Citizen Politics. Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Third Edition). New York: Chatham House Publishers. Dalton, R (2004). Democratic Challenges Democratic Choices. The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Easton, D. (1965). A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley. Ester, P., L. Halman and R. de Moor (1993). The Individualizing Society: Value Change in Europe and North America. Tilberg: Tilberg University Press. Huntington, S. (1974). Post-Industrial Politics: How Benign Will It Be? Comparative Politics, 6: Inglehart, R. (1977). The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, R. (1990). Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, R. (1999). Postmodernization Erodes Respect for Authority, but Increases Support for Democracy, in P. Norris (ed.) Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Inglehart, R. and P. Norris (2003). Rising Tide. Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Inglehart, R., P. Norris and C. Welzel. (2003). Gender Equality and Democracy, Comparative Sociology 1 (3), Inglehart, R., and W. Baker (2000). Modernization, Cultural Change and the Persistence of Traditional Values, American Sociological Review, Feb:

16 Lazarsfeld, P., B. Berelson and H. Gaudet (1948). The People s Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign. New York: Columbia University Press. Listhaug, O (1995). The Dynamics of Trust in Politicians, in H. D. Klingemann and D. Fuchs (eds.) Citizens and the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Listhaug, O and M. Wiberg (1995). Confidence in Political and Private Institutions, in H. D. Klingemann and D. Fuchs (eds.) Citizens and the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nevitte, N. (1996). The Decline of Deference: Canadian Value Change in Cross-National Perspective. Peterborough: Broadview Press. Nevitte, N. (2002). Value Change and Governance in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Nevitte, N. and M. Kanji (2003). Authority Orientations and Political Support: A Cross-national Analysis of Satisfaction with Governments and Democracy, in R. Inglehart (ed.) Human Values and Social Change. Findings from the Values Surveys. Leiden: Brill. Newton, K. and P. Norris (2000). Confidence in Public Institutions: Faith, Culture, or Performance?, in S. Pharr and R. Putnam Disaffected Democracies: What s Troubling the Trilateral Countries? Princeton: Princeton University Press. Norris, P. (1999). Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Norris, P., and R. Inglehart. (2003). Gendering Social Capital: Bowling in Women s Leagues, paper prepared for the conference on Gender and Social Capital, St. John s College, University of Manitoba, May 2-3. Nye, Jr., J., P. Zelikow and D. King (1997). Why People Don t Trust Government. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Pharr, S., and R. Putnam (2000). Disaffected Democracies: What s Troubling the Trilateral Countries? Princeton: Princeton University Press. Putnam, R. (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Putnam, R (1995a). Bowling Alone: America s Declining Social Capital, Journal of Democracy 6: 1: Putnam, R. (1995b). Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America, Political Science and Politics XXVIII: 4: Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster. 16

17 Putnam, R (2002). Democracies in Flux. The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Van Deth, J., and E. Scarbrough (1995). The Impact of Values. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Verba. S. (2003). Would the Dream of Political Equality Turn out to Be a Nightmare?, Perspectives on Politics 1: 4: Welzel, C., R. Inglehart and H. Klingemann (2003). The theory of human development: A crosscultural analysis, European Journal of Political Research 42: Welzel, C and R. Inglehart. (2001). Human Development and the 'Explosion' of Democracy: Variations of Regime Change Across 60 Societies, Discussion Paper for Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). Berlin. Welzel, C and R. Inglehart (2005 forthcoming). Liberalism, Postmaterialism and the Growth of Freedom: The Human Development Perspective, International Review of Sociology. Appendix A: Factor Analysis a The cross-national structure of value orientations 17

18 Values, dimensions and indicators (variable names) b Factor Communalities loadings Religious values 1. Outlooks toward religiosity (V199) Frequency of prayer outside of religious services c (V198) Takes moments for prayer, meditation, contemplation (V197) Derives comfort and strength from religion (V9) Importance of religion in life (V196) Importance of God (V22) Encouraging children to learn about religious faith Eigenvalue: 3.47; variance explained: 6.54%; Cronbach s alpha: Orientations toward church leadership (V188) Churches give adequate answers to family problems (V187) Churches give adequate answers to moral problems (V190) Churches give adequate answers to social problems (V189) Churches give adequate answers to spiritual needs Eigenvalue: 2.68; variance explained: 5.05%; Cronbach s alpha: Orientations toward afterlife (V194) Belief in hell (V192) Belief in life after death (V195) Belief in heaven (V193) Believe that people have a soul Eigenvalue: 2.49; variance explained: 4.70%; Cronbach s alpha:.85 Moral and ethical values 4. Moral permissiveness (V210) Abortion is justifiable (V211) Divorce is justifiable (V209) Prostitution is justifiable (V208) Homosexuality is justifiable (V212) Euthanasia is justifiable (V213) Suicide is justifiable Eigenvalue: 3.16; variance explained: 5.96%; Cronbach s alpha: Civil permissiveness (V205) Avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable (V206) Cheating on taxes is justifiable (V207) Accepting a bribe on duty is justifiable (V204) Claiming unentitled government benefits is justifiable Eigenvalue: 1.98; variance explained: 3.74%; Cronbach s alpha:.59 Values toward economic and technological progress 18

19 6. Orientations toward market economics (V142) Private ownership vs. government ownership (V144) Competition is good vs. competition is harmful Eigenvalue: 1.28; variance explained: 2.41%; Cronbach s alpha: Orientations toward technology and scientific advancements (V132) Scientific advancements will help mankind (V129) More emphasis on technology development is good Eigenvalue: 1.23; variance explained: 2.32%; Cronbach s alpha:.37 Values toward work 8. Workplace conditions (V90) Good hours important aspect of a job (V92) Generous holidays important aspect of a job (V87) Not too much pressure important aspect of a job (V86) Good pay important aspect of a job Eigenvalue: 1.83; variance explained: 3.46%; Cronbach s alpha: Workplace participation (V105) Following instructions at work must be convinced first (V104) Employees should be involved in decision-making Eigenvalue: 1.19; variance explained: 2.24%; Cronbach s alpha: Workplace motivations (V91) Using initiative important aspect of a job (V93) Feeling achievement important aspect of a job (V94) Responsibility important aspect of a job (V96) Using abilities important aspect of a job Eigenvalue: 1.91; variance explained: 3.61%; Cronbach s alpha: Orientations toward money and work (V127) Less importance placed on money is a good thing (V128) Less importance placed on work is a good thing Eigenvalue: 1.34; variance explained: 2.52%; Cronbach s alpha:.36 Family values 12. Orientations toward women and work (V117) Both spouses should contribute to family income (V115) A working mom can establish relations with kids Eigenvalue: 1.15; variance explained: 2.18%; Cronbach s alpha: Orientations toward teaching children independence (V15) Teaching children about independence is important

20 (V24) Teaching children about obedience is not important Eigenvalue: 1.25; variance explained: 2.37%; Cronbach s alpha: Orientations toward single parenting (V109) A child needs a home with both parents to be happy (V112) Approval of women seeking to be single parents Eigenvalue: 1.36; variance explained: 2.57%; Cronbach s alpha:.25 Postmodern values 15. Orientations toward environmental protection (V34) Increase taxes to prevent environmental pollution (V33) Spend income to prevent environmental pollution (V35) Government should reduce environmental pollution Eignevalue: 1.77; variance explained: 3.35%; Cronbach s alpha: Orientations toward friends and leisure (V6) Importance of leisure (V5) Importance of friends Eigenvalue: 1.27; variance explained: 2.39%; Cronbach s alpha: Postmaterialist orientations (based in Inglehart s 4-item battery) (V123) Second most important aim for the next ten years (V122) Most important aim of the country (next 10 years) Eigenvalue: 1.18; variance explained: 2.22%; Cronbach s alpha:.23 a The preceding results are based on a Principal Component Analysis with Varimax rotation. b For operationalization and coding, see Appendix B. c For exact question wording, see the World Values Questionnaire at: Source: World Values Surveys (merged). Appendix B: Operationalization and coding Specific political support Satisfaction with people in government: Question: How satisfied are you with the way the people now in the federal government are handling the country s affairs? Would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied or very dissatisfied? (societal scores = percentage very satisfied) Confidence in Parliament: 20

21 Question: I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? (societal scores = percentage saying a great deal of confidence) Diffuse political support Satisfaction with democracy: Question: On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way that democracy is developing in our country? (societal scores = percentage very satisfied) Value dimensions: Religious values 1. Outlooks toward religiosity Frequency of prayer outside of religious services (1=everyday; 7=never) Importance of God (1=very important; 10=not at all important) Derives comfort and strength from religion (0=yes; 1=no) Importance of religion in life (1=very important; 4=not at all important) Takes moments for prayer, meditation, contemplation (0=yes; 1=no) Encouraging children to learn about religious faith (0=important; 1=not mentioned) Outlooks toward religiosity reports the percentage of respondents who: frequently pray outside of church services; view God as being important in their lives; derive comfort and strength from religion; see religion as being important in their lives; take moments for prayer, meditation or contemplation and feel that children ought to be encouraged to learn about religion at home. 2. Orientations toward church leadership Churches give adequate answers to family problems (0=yes; 1=no) Churches give adequate answers to moral problems (0=yes; 1=no) Churches give adequate answers to social problems (0=yes; 1=no) Churches give adequate answers to spiritual needs (0=yes; 1=no) Orientations toward church leadership reports the percentage of respondents who feel that churches give adequate answers to family problems, moral problems, social problems and spiritual problems. 3. Orientations toward afterlife Belief in life after death (0=yes; 1=no) Believe that people have a soul (0=yes; 1=no) Belief in hell (0=yes; 1=no) Belief in heaven (0=yes; 1=no) Belief in afterlife reports the percentage of respondents who believe: in life after death, that people have a soul, in hell and in heaven. 21

22 Moral and ethical values 4. Moral permissiveness Abortion is justifiable (1=never justifiable; 10=always justifiable) Divorce is justifiable (1=never justifiable; 10=always justifiable) Homosexuality is justifiable (1=never justifiable; 10=always justifiable) Prostitution is justifiable (1=never justifiable; 10=always justifiable) Euthanasia is justifiable (1=never justifiable; 10=always justifiable) Suicide is justifiable (1=never justifiable; 10=always justifiable) Moral permissiveness reports the percentage of respondents who indicate that one or more of the following is justifiable: abortion, divorce, homosexuality, prostitution, euthanasia and suicide. 5. Civil permissiveness Claiming unentitled government benefits is justifiable (1=never justifiable; 10=always justifiable) Avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable (1=never justifiable; 10=always justifiable) Accepting a bribe on duty is justifiable (1=never justifiable; 10=always justifiable) Cheating on taxes is justifiable (1=never justifiable; 10=always justifiable) Civil permissiveness reports the percentage of respondents who feel that one or more of the following is justifiable: claiming unentitled government benefits, avoiding a fare on public transport, accepting a bribe on duty and cheating on taxes. Values toward economic and technological progress 6. Orientations toward market economics Competition is good vs. competition is harmful (1=competition is good; 10=competition is harmful) Private ownership vs. government ownership (1=private ownership of business and industry should be increased; 10=government ownership of business and industry should be increased) Orientations toward market economics reports the percentage of respondents who favour private ownership of business and industry over government ownership, and feel that competition is good as opposed to harmful. 7. Orientations toward technology and scientific advancements More emphasis on technology development is good (1=bad; 2=don t mind; 3=good) Scientific advancements will help mankind (1=harm; 3=help) Orientations toward technology and scientific advancements reports the percentage of respondants who strongly support placing more emphasis on the development of technology, and feel that scientific advances will help mankind. 22