DPI-403 Class 4 Policy advocacy. 15 September

Transcription

1 DPI-403 Class 4 Policy advocacy 15 September

2 Structure I. Context of the debate II. III. IV. Does democratic governance bring a peace dividend? Theoretical arguments No: Why the initial transition to democracy generates belligerent nationalism and war Mansfield and Snyder Yes: Why power-sharing democracies reduce conflict in divided societies Center for Systemic Peace - trends Norris Driving Democracy Ch 5 Conclusions What are the best reasons for advocating democratic governance? 15 September

3 I. Recap debate

4 Impact of democratic governance 1.Economic growth 2. Social welfare Yes Yes Rodrik et al Siegle et al No Przeworski et al No Ross 3. Peace Yes Norris/CSP No Mansfield & Snyder

5 Why both sides in the debate? Effective advocacy means an awareness of the arguments of critics; not blind propaganda Genuine uncertainty exists in the research literature; no consensus Different indicators, data, concepts, methods, and dependent variables Eg slippery notions of good governance (World Bank), democracy (International IDEA), liberal democracy (Freedom House), democratic governance (UNDP) Need to judge for yourself why you would or would not favor democratic governance e 15 September

6 Key debates Several distinct claims: True or false? Strongest universal claim: No democracies have ever fought a war against each other. Probabilistic claim: Does democratic governance generally reduce the risks of war between states? Conditional claim: Is the transitional process from autocracy to democracy one of increased risks of war? Conditional claim: Do power-sharing democracies reduce internal conflict? 15 September

7 Democratic peace arguments 1. Informational arguments Democratic institutions facilitate signals, allowing democracies to resolve disputes with lower hostilities (eg Iranian intentions?) 2. Normative constraints Democracies have norms of tolerance and negotiation, which help resolve crisis. Autocracies have norms of coercion. 3. Preferences A state s foreign policy is shaped by domestic institutions; democracies share similar foreign policy preferences 4. Electoral constraints Public opinion limits elites 15 September

8 President Bush, 2 nd inaugural address Jan 2006 The United States Is Committed To The Advance Of Freedom And Democracy As The Great Alternatives To Repression And Radicalism. The most powerful weapon in the struggle against extremism is the universal appeal of freedom. Freedom is the best way to unleash the creativity and economic potential of a nation, the only ordering of a society that leads to justice, and the only way to achieve human rights. Expanding Freedom Is More Than A Moral Imperative - It Is The Only Realistic Way To Protect Our People. The 9/11 attacks were evidence of an international movement of violent Islamic extremists that threatens free people everywhere. Nations that commit to freedom for their people will not support extremists; they will join in defeating them.

9 U.S. State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Supporting democracy not only promotes such fundamental American values as religious freedom and worker rights, but also helps create a more secure, stable, and prosperous global arena in which the United States can advance its national interests. In addition, democracy is the one national interest that helps to secure all the others. Democratically governed nations are more likely to secure the peace, deter aggression, expand open markets, promote economic development, protect American citizens, combat international terrorism and crime, uphold human and worker rights, avoid humanitarian crises and refugee flows, improve the global environment, and protect human health.

10 Problems of resolving evidence Definitions and measures of democracy and autocracy Continuous (Polity IV) Categories (Freedom House) Dichotomies (Cheibub and Gandhi) Definitions and measures of militarized conflict, internal (civil wars) and external (inter-state) PRIO/Uppsala conflict database COW Correlates of War CSP/MAR University of Maryland Underlying reasons behind correlations Case studies of process 15 September

11 II: Evidence against 15 September

12 Mansfield-Snyder Edwards D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder Electing to Fight. MIT Press. Mansfield and Snyder Democratization and the danger of war, IS 1995 Well-institutionalised democracies virtually never fight wars against each other. In the transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war prone Incentives for elites to exploit power, populist nationalist rhetoric, especially in elections, leading them eventually to jettison democracy. Ruling elites haphazardly accountable to electors Yugoslavia/Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russia/Georgia 15 September

13 Mansfield-Snyder Evidence Democracy-autocracy Polity IV (Gurr) Open executive recruitment, executive constraints, competitive participation Correlates of War (COW) Military conflict with at least 1000 battle fatalities , one, five and ten year periods Conclusions: Democratizing states two-thirds more likely to go to war than states with no regime change. More war prone, not less Why? Democratization brings widening political spectrum, inflexible interests, competitive mobilization, weakening state 15 September

14 Pros and Cons of Mansfield and Snyder? Suggest other cases of transitional t a regimes going to war with democracies? Suggest contrary cases? Japan/Germany? Classification confuses electoral autocracies and electoral democracies? Data ends 1980; subsequent changes? Examples not included in dataset. What of civil wars/internal conflict? Lack controls in analysis 15 September

15 III: Evidence in favor 15 September

16 Background Trends in Peace & Conflict Ted Robert Gurr, Monty Marshall and Deepa Khosla Center for Systemic Peace Annual trends in episodes of violent conflict Inter-state (between independent nation-states) Societal (civil wars, armed repression, etc) Rates 160 countries on their capacity for peace-building: Avoid recent armed conflicts Manage movements for self determination Maintain stable democratic institutions Substantial material resources Free of serious threats from external environment Source: Center for Systemic Peace/MAR Global Conflict Trends University of Maryland

17 MAJOR EPISODES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE, Begin End Type Mag States Directly Brief Description Deaths Involved CV 1 Guinea Parrot's Beak clashes CV 1 Liberia Civil violence (attacks by LURD guerillas) CW 2 Ivory Coast Civil war (north, south, and west divisions) * EV 1 Indonesia Communal (Dayaks vs Madurese immigrants) * EW 1 Rwanda Ethnic war (attacks by Hutu guerillas) * IV 2 United States Al Qaeda attacks on New York/Washington CV 1 Central African Rep. Civil violence (attacks by Bozize loyalists; coup) EV 3 Nigeria Ethnic violence (Christian-Muslim; Plateau, Kano regions) IW 3 Afghanistan Ouster of Taliban; Hunt for al Qaeda CV 1 India Maoist insurgency (People's War Group; Maoist Communist Centre; People's 1500 Liberation Guerrilla Army) EV 1 Pakistan Sectarian violence: Sunnis, Shi'ites, and Ahmadis CV 1 Congo-Brazzaville Civil violence (Ninja militants in Pool region) * CV 1 Thailand Anti-Drug Traffiking Campaign IW 6 Iraq Ouster of Hussein-Ba'athist regime and subsequent sectarian strife: Sunnis, Shias, Kurds, and foreign al Qaeda IW 2 US/UK Invasion of Iraq and military occupation CV 1 Saudi Arabia Islamic Militants EV 5 Sudan Communal-separatist violence in Darfur CV 1 Yemen Followers of al-huthi in Sadaa CV 1 Haiti General unrest surrounding ouster of President Aristide and his Lavalas 2000 Family ruling party EV 1 Pakistan Pashtuns in Federally Administered Tribal Areas, mainly South Waziristan, 1500 and North-West Frontier Province EV 1 Thailand Malay-Muslims in southern border region (Narathiwat, Pattani, Songkhla, and 2500 Yala provinces) EV 1 Turkey Kurds in the southeast EV 1 Pakistan Rebellion in Baluchistan CW 1 Chad United Front for Democratic Change (FUC) rebels EW 2 Central African APRD (northwest) and UFDR (northeast) rebels 1500 Republic EV 2 Chad Communal fighting between Toroboro ("black" sedentary farmer) and Janjawid ("arab" pastoralist) militias * IV 2 Israel Israel vs Hezbollah 1500 Lebanon EV 1 Lebanon Palestinian/Islamist militants EW 1 Ethiopia Somalis and Oromo militants in Ogaden September EV 1 Kenya Communal violence following disputed presidential election Source: Center for Systemic Peace/MAR Global Conflict Trends University of Maryland

18 Current situation (2007) In late , 24 states were directly affected by ongoing conflict. Of these, 12 are protracted wars (10+ years). Afghanistan (30 years), Colombia (24), D.R.Congo (16), India (56), Iraq (28), Israel (43), Myanmar (60), Nigeria (11), Philippines (36), Somalia (20), Sri Lanka (25), Sudan (25), Turkey (24), and Uganda (37). 15 September

19 Source: Center for Systemic Peace/MAR Global Conflict Trends University of Maryland

20 Source: Center for Systemic Peace/MAR Global Conflict Trends University of Maryland 15 September

21 Trends in violent conflict Total magnitude of violent conflict and of ethnic conflict rose then fell during the 1990s Number and magnitude of armed conflict within and among states have lessened since the early 1990s by nearly half. Conflicts over self-determination are being settled with increasing frequency. Yet African exceptionalism: Little international effort Democratic transitions failed Pervasive poverty Center for Systemic Peace/MAR Global Conflict Trends

22 Trends in terrorism Terrorism is defined by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of the cause. Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are designed d to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take. International Terrorism: "Incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike their targets, select domestic targets associated with a foreign state, or create an international incident by attacking airline passengers, personnel or equipment." RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base ( 15 September

23 15 September 2009 RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base ( 23

24 RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base ( 15 September

25 III: Evidence in favor 15 September

26 Do institutions matter? Lijphart s theory of consociationalism: o a s Power-sharing rules essential for divided societies Power-concentrating regimes may work in homogeneous societies Key features: Executive power-sharing, minority veto, PR, cultural autonomy Operationalize modern power-sharing democracies Electoral systems Type of executive Decentralized states Media systems

27 Consociational theory Figure 5.1: The core sequential steps in consociational theory Plural societies contain distinct ethnic communities Proportional electoral systems with low thresholds Positive action mechanisms for minorities: boundary delimination, communal rolls, and reserved seats Facilitates the election of representatives and parties drawn from minority communities Community leaders have incentives to cooperate within legislatures and coalition governments, building trust at elite level Generates support for democracy among community members Strengthens democratic consolidation and reduced ethnic conflict

28 Impact on conflict The type of institutions matter, especially in divided societies Electoral systems, types of executives, federalism/decentralization, independent media Power-sharing arrangements associated with consolidation of democracy and reduced conflict Power-concentrating regimes less stable democracies and greater conflict 15 September

29 Classify and compare institutions: Electoral systems Types of executives Federalism and decentralization ti Media systems

30 Figure 5.2: Classification of contemporary electoral systems, worldwide 2004 Nation States 191 Majoritarian 75 Combined 39 PR 68 No direct elections 9 Majority 26 Plurality 49 Independent 30 Dependent 9 STV 2 Party List 66 AV 4 2nd Ballot 22 FPTP 36 Bloc Vote 9 SNTV 4 Closed 35 Open 31 Adversarial Democracy and Government Accountability Consensual democracy and Parliamentary Inclusiveness Notes: FPTP First Past the Post; 2 nd Ballot; Block Vote; AV Alternative Vote; SNTV Single Non-Transferable Vote; STV Single Transferable Vote. Systems are classified in May 1997 based on Appendix A in Andrew Reynolds and Ben Reilly. Eds. The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. For more details see Pippa Norris Electoral Engineering. New York: Cambridge University Press.

31 Table 5.2: Electoral systems and democracy, all societies worldwide Liberal democracy Freedom House Constitutional democracy Polity IV INSTITUTIONAL RULES b (pcse) p b (pcse) p Majoritarian (.454) *** (.949) *** Proportional representation.904 (.619) N/s 3.85 (.561) *** Positive action strategies (.466) *** (.777) *** CONTROLS Log GDP/Capita (.832) *** (1.01) *** Ex-British colony (.962) *** (1.36) *** Middle East (1.16) *** (1.40) *** Regional diffusion.632 (.036) ***.883 (.049) *** Ethnic fractionalization (.878) *** (1.56) N/s Population size.001 (.001) N/s.000 (.001) *** Area size.001 (.001) ***.001 (.001) *** Constant N. observations N. of countries Adjusted R Note: Entries for Liberal Democracy, Constitutional Democracy and Participatory Democracy 100- point scales are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their panel corrected standard errors) and the significance (p) of the coefficients for the pooled time-series cross-national analysis obtained using Stata s xtpcse command. The entries for Contested Democracy are logistic regression. For the measures of democracy, see Chapter 2. For the classification of the type of electoral system, see Figure 5.1. The default (comparison) is mixed electoral systems. For details of all the variables, see Technical Appendix A. Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, and *** the 0.01 level.

32 Table 5.3: Electoral systems and democracy, plural societies only Liberal democracy Constitutional democracy Freedom House Polity IV INSTITUTIONAL RULES b (pcse) p b (pcse) p Majoritarian (.625) *** (1.16) *** Proportional representation 4.81 (.966) *** (.915) *** Positive action strategies.424 (.676) N/s (1.52) *** CONTROLS Log GDP/Capita (.519) *** 7.26 (1.21) *** Ex-British colony 8.35 (.744) *** 8.20 (1.10) *** Middle East (.974) *** (3.13) *** Regional diffusion.739 (.027) *** 1.04 (.055) *** Ethnic fractionalization (3.18) *** (4.27) *** Population size (.000) *** (.001) *** Area size.001 (.001) ***.001 (.001) *** Constant t N. observations N. of countries Adjusted R Note: Entries for Liberal Democracy, Constitutional Democracy and Participatory Democracy 100- point scales are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their panel corrected standard errors) and the significance (p) of the coefficients for the pooled time-series cross-national analysis obtained using Stata s xtpcse command. The entries for Contested Democracy are logistic regression. For the measures of democracy, see Chapter 2. For the classification of the type of electoral system, see Figure 5.1. The default (comparison) is mixed electoral systems. For details of all the variables, see Technical Appendix A. Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, and *** the 0.01 level.

33 Figure 5.4: Contemporary levels of democracy by type of electoral system in heterogeneous and homogeneous society, 2000 Lo ow << Democra acy >> High FH Polity FH Polity Homogeneous Heterogeneous Majoritarian Combined PR Note: For the classification of electoral systems, see Figure 5.3.The types of heterogeneous or homogeneous society are classified by the dichotomized Alesina index of ethnic fractionalization.

34 Conclusions What are the best reasons for advocating democratic governance? Instrumental Consequences of democracy for Intrinsic Value for itself 15 September

35 Potential criticisms Constructivist theories Posner: Social identities shaped by political institutions, not fixed Incentive theory among elites Horowitz: Incentives for community cooperation or for rivalry? Trade-off values in failed states Snyder: Stable, strong and effective states needed in post-conflict societies more than power-sharing arrangements Direction of causality? Institutional endogeneity and path dependency? Eg Cheibub: Military regimes are more likely to select presidential executives

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