Electoral Engineering & Turnout

Transcription

1 Electoral Engineering & Turnout Pippa Norris ~ UNDP Democratic Governance Details:

2 Electoral engineering 2 Structure I. Theoretical framework: Multilevel model of electoral turnout II. III. Research design & evidence: Macro-level data worldwide - International IDEA Micro-level CSES Module 1 Conclusions: Rules matter for turnout, with direct and indirect effects Important for public policy reforms Yet their impact is constrained by levels of societal modernization, the role of mobilizing agencies, cultural attitudes, and structural resources

3 I. Theoretical framework

4 Electoral engineering 4 Context: why of interest? Renewed interest in the limits and capacities of electoral engineering and rule design For transitional and consolidating democracies For established democracies debating electoral reform Major revision Eg NZ, UK, Italy, Israel, Japan, Venezuela etc. Modifications of procedures Eg e-voting, voter registration procedures, etc. But can electoral engineering boost turnout in the shortterm?

5 Electoral engineering 5 Context: why of interest? Increased popular concern about turnout as an indicator of the health of representative democracy Yet no consistent fall in turnout across all established democracies since 1945 (Democratic Phoenix) Turnout has eroded modestly in established democracy during the last decade: reasons unclear Alternative types of activism have expanded (demonstrations, consumer politics, petitions etc)

6 II: Research design & evidence

7 Electoral engineering 7 Research design Classify constitutions, laws, procedures Analyze aggregate data and cross-national election surveys Compare formal rules Role of political actors Compare behavior of citizens Party campaigns, candidate strategies, electoral appeals, party organizations and members

8 Electoral engineering 8 Evidence Macro-level turnout worldwide: International IDEA database Voter Turnout Since Micro-level: CSES dataset: surveys of 32 nations in Module 1 ( ) Countries in the CSES Module 1 Excluded (159) Included (32)

9 Electoral engineering 9 Electoral Systems Worldwide Nation States 191 Majoritarian 91 Combined 29 PR 64 No direct elections 7 Majority 26 Plurality 65 Independent 21 Dependent 8 STV 2 Party List 62 AV 2 2nd Ballot 24 FPTP 54 Block Vote 9 SNTV 2 Dual-ballot Preference-ballot Party-ballot 35 Preference-ballot 27 Candidate-Ballot Candidate-ballot Candidate-ballot Party-Ballot or Preference-ballot Preference-ballot

10 Electoral engineering 10 CSES Elections (37) Majoritarian electoral systems (14 elections) Legislative Australia (1996) Britain (1997) Canada (1997) United States (1996) Presidential larus (2001) Chile (1999) Israel (1996) (i) Lithuania (1997) Mexico (2000) Peru (2000) Romania (1996) Russia (2000) Taiwan (1996) United States (1996) Combined electoral systems (10 elections) Germany (1998) (l,c) Hungary (1998) (l,c) Japan (1996) (l,c) Korea, Republic of (2000) (c) Mexico (1997) (c) New Zealand (1996) (l,c) Russia (1999) (l) Taiwan (1996) (c) Thailand (2001) (c) Ukraine (1998) (l) Proportional electoral systems (15 elections) Belgium (1999) Czech Republic (1996) Denmark (1998) Iceland (1999) Israel (1996) Netherlands, The (1998) Norway (1997) Peru (2000) Poland (1997) Portugal (2002) Romania (1996) Slovenia (1996) Spain (1996, 2000) Sweden (1998) Switzerland (1999).

11 Electoral engineering 11 Voting Turnout, 1990s Ic e la n d 8 8 Is r a e l 8 3 S w e d e n 8 3 C z e c h R e p 8 3 B e lg iu m 8 2 D e n m a r k 8 2 C h ile 8 2 A u s t r a lia 8 1 N e w Z e a la n d 8 0 K o r e a, R e p 7 9 S p a in 7 9 R o m a n ia 7 8 S lo v e n ia 7 6 P o r t u g a l 7 6 N o r w a y 7 6 N e t h e r la n d s 7 5 G e r m a n y 7 3 T a iw a n 7 2 U k r a in e 7 2 U k r a in e 6 7 L it h u a n ia 6 6 B e la r u s 6 4 S w R u s s ia P e r u J a p a n C a n a d a M e x ic o H u n g a r y T h a ila n d P o la n d U S it z e r la n d Note: Mean Vote/VAP is measured as the number of valid votes as a proportion of the Voting Age Population in parliamentary elections during the 1990s held in the 32 nations in the CSES dataset under comparison. Source: International IDEA database Voter Turnout from 1945 to

12 III: Results

13 Electoral engineering 13 Electoral systems Source: Calculated from International IDEA database Voter Turnout from 1945 to Type of Electoral System Mean Vote/VAP 1990s Mean Vote/Reg 1990s N. MAJORITARIAN Alternative Vote nd Ballot First-Past-The-Post Single Non-Transferable Vote Block Vote All majoritarian COMBINED Combined-Dependent Combined-Independent All combined PROPORTIONAL List PR Single Transferable Vote All PR Systems All

14 Electoral engineering 14 Compulsory Voting Mean Vote/VAP Mean Vote/Reg N. Of Nations Older democracies Compulsory Non-Compulsory Difference Newer democracies Compulsory Non-Compulsory Difference Semi-democracies Compulsory Non-Compulsory Difference Non-democracies Compulsory Non-Compulsory Difference All Compulsory Non-Compulsory Difference

15 Electoral engineering 15 Party Competition Mean Vote/Reg % Turnout Mean Vote/VAP 50 L ess than 29.9% 30 to 39.9% 40 to 49.9% 50 to 59.9% M ore than 60% % Vote Share Winning Party

16 Electoral engineering 16 Social characteristics of turnout All 77 Managerial & Prof Lower prof Skilled white collar Skilled manual Unskilled manual Highest income High Moderate Low Lowest income Older Middle aged Younger Men Women University Technical Secondary Primary Union member 83 Urban Suburbs Small town Rural Never attend church Attend service weekly Strong Party id Moderate party id Weak party id

17 Electoral engineering 17 Age % Voted by Age Group

18 Electoral engineering 18 Voter participation in legislative elections Source: CSES Module Pooled N.24,413 b S ig. SOCIETAL MODERNIZATION Hum an developm ent 4.59 *** IN S T IT U T IO N A L C O N T E X T Electoral system (1=M aj, 2=Com b,3=pr).493 *** District size *** Parliam entary executive 1.96 *** Frequency of national elections n/s Use of any com pulsory voting 1.50 *** Party com petition (% vote party 1 st ).094 n/s P arty fractio n alizatio n (E N P P ).124 *** SOCIAL STRUCTURE Logged Age 2.12 *** Gender (m ale=1).003 n/s Education.294 *** In c o m e *** MOBILIZING AGENCIES Union membership.188 *** R e lig io sity *** CULTURAL ATTITUDES L eft-rig h t id eo lo gy.019 ** P arty identification.929 *** E xtern al p o litical efficacy.154 *** C o n stan t -5.9 % C o rre c tly p re d ic te d Nagelkerke R2.198

19 IV: Conclusions

20 Electoral engineering 20 Conclusions 1. Rules matter: voting participation is maximized in elections: Using proportional representation, With small electoral districts, With regular but relatively infrequent national contests, With competitive party systems, and In presidential contests. 2. Important for public policy and electoral design 3. Yet the effect of rules is conditioned by other factors, including levels of human development, mobilizing agencies, and the resources and cultural attitudes of citizens. 4. Therefore limits to the capacity of electoral reform to engineer short-term improvements in turnout