Maoism versus Hybrid theory - Is the military being

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1 Maoism versus Hybrid theory - Is the military being distracted by this latest doctrinal buzz-word? By Stuart Lyle Mao Zedong, the father of Communist China, led the Red Army to victory against the Chinese Nationalist government in what became the premier illustration of revolutionary warfare for scholars and would-be practitioners alike. 1 Not only did he practice and lead a successful revolution, he also wrote an enduring theory of insurgency warfare that is viewed as the most influential of any work on the subject. His theory of Protracted and Guerrilla war has been the intellectual basis for numerous other revolutionary movements and insurgencies from South America to South East Asia. Such famous revolutionary leaders as Fidel Castro and Ho Chi Minh led insurgency campaigns along the theoretical lines of Mao s teachings. However, despite the fact that Mao s theory of insurgency warfare has dominated the intellectual realm of insurgency theory, there are analysts who challenge its overall relevance to modern irregular warfare. Relevance is more important than yesterday s dominance 2 and many writers have stressed that the character of warfare is in the process of drastic change. One such school of thought that proclaims itself unique from the traditionalist irregular warfare theories is the concept of Hybrid Wars. According to disciples of hybrid war theory, these adversaries are decidedly contemporary and are the fledgling pioneers of a new, unique form of warfare that was born during the 2006 Second Lebanon War between the Lebanese non-state actor Hezbollah and Israel. In that instance hybrid warfare passed from a concept to a reality. 3 At the time, the leader of Hezbollah, Nasarallah, also proclaimed the dawn of a new strategic era in light of his organisation s success. He claimed that Hezbollah was not a regular army but was not a guerrilla in the traditional sense either. It was something in between. This is the new model. 4 This theory has taken Page 1 of 11

2 root within Western strategic doctrine and is influencing future defence planning. The British Army s current counterinsurgency manual includes hybrid threats within the introduction s definition of insurgency. But are Western militaries blindly adhering to the latest buzz-word or theoretical fashion? Some would say yes and there is danger in this. This article will challenge the assertion of hybrid warfare advocates by illustrating that the so-called hybrid adversaries discussed in today s literature are not a new reality. Rather, they are merely the modern manifestations of traditional Maoist insurgency theory that have adapted Mao s teachings to their individual circumstances. Therefore, the relevance today of Maoist insurgency theory will be made apparent. What is Maoism? Mao s theory of people s war was a genuinely modern approach [that] relied on an ability to exploit the surrounding population and harness their manpower. 5 With an enormous rural population this strategy seemed ideal for China at the time. However, originally Mao s was not the strategy chosen by the Chinese Communist Party. Under influence from Soviet advisors, the Party leadership employed the Marxist- Leninist approach of the urban proletariat-led revolution. However, as predicted by Mao, this approach was unsuccessful, with the Red Army suffering several costly setbacks in quick succession. The Party leadership turned to Mao for guidance. Having assessed the demographics of China at that time Mao rightly judged the route to success would be to lead the rural peasants in revolt as he did not view the urban population as substantial or strong enough to seriously challenge the government s power. 6 He also saw the remote rural peasantry as more susceptible to alternative political direction due to their isolation from government infrastructure and influence in contrast with the urban working class. The support of the surrounding population was crucial to the military aspect. The insurgents would live amongst the rural people and hide in plain sight rather than seek refuge in the wilderness like a classic guerrilla Page 2 of 11

3 force. Mao stressed that the importance of the political over the military aspect of his strategy was crucial, writing that political mobilization is the most fundamental condition for winning the war. 7 The Red Army would defeat the enemy s will to fight over time and isolate the government from the population rather than the other way around. Militarily and politically the format of Mao s protracted war was broken into three phases; 1. Strategic Defensive; establishment of political legitimacy and simple survival are the primary goals. As the insurgency is very weak militarily its actions are directed for propaganda purposes and politically oriented violence only against local government representatives. This can include terrorism and assassination. The political leadership of the insurgency would begin to form shadow governments at the most local level. 2. Strategic Stalemate; as the insurgency gains support and increases military capabilities it seeks to make some territorial gains by expanding its operations. It consolidates its strongholds and begins to conduct itself as the de facto local government in isolated areas. Larger military actions, such as raids, are conducted to attrite government forces and steal supplies. They can also be to keep government forces at bay while more regular forces are being trained. 3. Strategic Counter-Offensive; after building up areas of control and more regular forces, the level and intensity of more conventional actions can be increased until a final offensive can be mounted. This decisive campaign will defeat the government forces militarily, but must only be attempted once they have been defeated politically with regards the population and if conventional success is all but guaranteed. Page 3 of 11

4 The Hybrid challenge It is this theory that formed the bedrock principles for a great many insurgency movements over the latter half of the twentieth century. In recent years, however, advancements in technology coupled with globalisation have led some to think that insurgencies have evolved. Hybrid warfare is one of these schools of thought. In its essence this term attempts to capture the blurring and blending of previously separate categorizations of different modes of conflict. 8 No longer will it be possible to categorise these as regular or irregular warfare, rather they will be multi-modal. 9 The official US doctrinal definition of hybrid conflicts is; Any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a tailored mix of conventional, irregular, terrorism and criminal means or activities in the operational battlespace. Rather than a single entity, a hybrid threat or challenger may be comprised of a combination of state and non-state actors. 10 But what makes them unique from traditional (Maoist) insurgencies? The authors claim that these conflicts have both a physical as well as conceptual dimension; the former, a struggle against an enemy and the latter, a wider struggle for, control and support of the combat zone s indigenous population, the home fronts of the intervening nations, and the international community. 11 The inclusion of criminal activity is viewed as a new feature, the purpose of which is to either further destabilizes local government or abets the insurgent or irregular warrior by providing resources. 12 Likewise is the coordination and simultaneity of the irregular and regular force, state and non-state, in a unified effort separating hybrid insurgencies from compound ones where there is no inter-relation/coordination between irregular and regular actions. There is also a tactical level element that is said to make hybrid wars unique. They are alleged to blend regular and irregular tactics, under a decentralised command structure and featuring both simple and sophisticated technologies in Page 4 of 11

5 innovative ways. 13 Hezbollah utilised advanced anti-tank systems, surface-to-surface anti-ship missiles, and even unmanned aerial vehicles (systems that previously were, certainly collectively, the sole preserve of state militaries) in classic guerrilla-style ambushes and raids. Hoffman, the principle architect of hybrid theory, claims that the West s treatment of recent opponents as traditional irregular enemies has been the reason behind the difficulties faced since 9/11. New reality or false assertions? Is the hybrid challenge a new concept and reality or is this simply another rebranding exercise utilising selective interpretations of selective case-studies in order to appear unique and thus simply further complicating doctrinal debates? As will be seen, an examination of the challenges to hybrid warfare theory will illustrate that the supposed unique characteristics of it are present in Maoist doctrine. As evident by looking at the three stages of Mao s theory the Red Army also simultaneously and adaptively employs a tailored mix of conventional, irregular, terrorism and criminal means or activities as their strategy. The stages were not as prescriptive as they appear on paper. Mao advocated fluidity in campaigning. Mobile [irregular] warfare is primary, but we do not reject positional [conventional] warfare where it is possible and necessary. 14 As the insurgency progressed Mao undertook conventional actions firstly only in certain areas and only when ready. In other areas where the government forces were stronger the Red Army continued in a guerrilla fashion. Therefore, at some stage there were certain to be instances of concurrent conventional and irregular actions in neighbouring operational areas. The shift between stages of the insurgency is not sudden but gradual; in directing operations we should also gradually and consciously reduce such guerrilla characteristics as are no longer required at a higher stage. 15 This also does not exclude the possibility of guerrilla-type actions occurring during the conventional Page 5 of 11

6 stage, so long as they are necessary. Mao also wrote that The concept that guerrilla warfare is an end in itself and that guerrilla activities can be divorced from those of regular forces is incorrect 16, indicating a need to coordinate between the different types of actions. The Strategic Defensive phase can also be said to include terrorism and criminal activities. Assassination of local officials is a disruptive criminal action and the Red Army was known for scavenging weapons and equipment from government troops following clashes. Therefore, the claim that hybrid opponents fuse the irregular with the regular simultaneously, in conjunction with terrorism and criminality, and in coordination with each other is not new. The collusion between state and non-state actors has considerable precedent in the history of Maoism. While Mao had no significant external sponsorship, the eventual Communist Chinese government supported the ethnic Chinese Communists in their insurgency in Malaya and, along with the Soviet Union, the Communist forces in Vietnam. Maoist insurgencies are every bit as multi-modal as hybrid opponents. From a purely doctrinal perspective, hybrid threats and the methods they employ seem at best a subset of irregular warfare 17, i.e. an insurgency in the process of progressing from phase two to phase three of a Maoist protracted war. There is debate over whether the nature of operations at the tactical level such as those approaches employed by Hezbollah constitute a form of warfare unique from conventional and irregular operations. 18 It is argued that since insurgencies reflect their environment, the Maoist prototype was bound to change with the rapid improvement of transport, communications and commercial techniques. 19 These represent tactical level improvements but not an alteration of the fundamental nature of Maoist doctrine. What s more, most insurgencies will utilise whatever weapons they have at their disposal and in innovative ways if necessary. At one point the Red Page 6 of 11

7 Army fielded everything from bows and spears to machineguns. 20 The Vietnamese, another Maoist insurgency, utilised everything from sharpened bamboo canes for booby-traps to surface to air missiles against US forces, much like Hezbollah, illustrating that simply using sophisticated weapons that are normally the preserve of state militaries does not make the latter instantly different. Besides, if state actors are potential hybrid opponents then having the capabilities of a state military is not surprising. Furthermore, conventional state militaries often find innovative uses for systems that result in a tactical or operational advantage. With Blitzkrieg the Germans in WWII found a way to integrate the tank, wireless radios and aircraft into an operational art that confounded the Allies. Why this characteristic is then claimed as a defining feature specific of a hybrid opponent is unclear. Some of the more fundamental aspects of Maoism are just as prevalent in the case of Hezbollah. Mao s theory directs the insurgents to attack for military gains but also for psychological, both against the enemy and for the population. Psychologically, phase one is directed towards the population and to some extent against local government. Phase two is directed against the morale of the government forces and will also continue to target the population for support through propaganda. And finally, phase three will defeat the enemy s will to carry on the struggle. This progressive, slow psychological defeat of the enemy is at the very heart of Mao s protracted war theory. Furthermore, regarding the Second Lebanon War; Those 34 days were but a spike in violence during a conflict that has lasted for years and continues today. 21 It can be argued that a narrow analysis of Hezbollah in this period alone is ignorant to the long history of their struggle against Israel. Founded in 1982 Hezbollah began as a terrorist group, later evolving into a guerrilla force, and finally, over time, developing more sophisticated, conventional capabilities. It did not suddenly appear in 2006 as such a developed political and military force. In this respect it is classically Maoist. Page 7 of 11

8 The similarities between the Red Army and Hezbollah continue. Hezbollah is more than a military force, and therein lies its real strength. It has political, social, diplomatic, and informational components that provide bedrock support for its military organization these other facets of Hezbollah would over time spawn new forces to replace those lost in combat. 22 Hezbollah also engages with communities that the central Lebanese government has not or cannot provide support for and is often seen as the government in Southern Lebanon. This function as the de facto local government mirrors Mao s Communist party with the Chinese peasantry. Mao instructed his soldiers to aid the popular masses help them to gather the harvest or cultivate their land and send our army doctors to prevent their epidemics. 23 They were also to organise entertainment for both soldiers and civilians, pay for any supplies they take or for anything they damage. The importance Mao placed on such activities in order to gain popular support is not only a reflection of Hezbollah but is also regarded as his greatest contribution to insurgency theory. 24 In conclusion, hybrid warfare theory appears to have little or nothing new to offer the subject of insurgency theory. The prominence of the Second Lebanon War and Hezbollah as the historical basis for the theory is intellectually ignorant of the wider history of the region and the protagonists involved. It could also be argued that conceptually it is both unique and not; It is certainly possible that while a hybrid concept may prove un-unique at the operational and strategic levels; its tactics constitute a different kind of fighting. 25 However, the relevance of the tactical level ingenuity of the hybrid threat as its only constructive feature makes this theory flawed as the tactical reality will certainly be different with each case-study. Not all groups will have the same financial and logistical support as Hezbollah. Focusing on the overall theoretical underpinnings of the hybrid war school of thought, the similarities with Mao s protracted guerrilla war theory are startling. By definition, hybrid forces share every characteristic of a Maoist group in the course of the transition from Page 8 of 11

9 Strategic Stalemate to Strategic Offensive. The fact that they have not fully evolved into the Strategic Offensive phase, to the standard necessary to completely defeat the Israeli military, is perhaps the reason why Hezbollah was not able to maintain the momentum of their victory and advance into Israeli territory. Regardless, the assertion by the likes of Hoffman that future conflict will be multi-modal or multivariant rather than simple black or white characterization of one form of warfare 26 is accurate in one respect. Future wars will be multi-modal, but this is only a continuation of insurgency history since Mao, rather than a recent development. They will not be simply black or white but fluid, just as Mao wrote in the first half of the last century. Hybrid Warfare theory is not new and whether those so-called hybrid opponents, and the academics who study them, realise it or not they are simply the modern patrons of Mao s insurgency theory, a theory that still holds tremendous relevance today as the dominant insurgent theory. As such, military professionals and defence leaders would be better advised to return to Mao s classic texts rather than be misdirected by the hybrid concept. Such an examination of the original works would yield a far more effective understanding of the true character of the most prominent insurgencies around the globe, thus preventing one from being lost amongst the latest doctrinal buzz-words that offer little true value. What s more, to base one s defence planning on a doctrine that is the result of selective analysis is both foolish and dangerous. Rather than trying to adapt to this new enemy the military would be wise to re-examine the lessons to be learned from other Maoist insurgencies such as Malaya and Vietnam and apply them to defence planning strategies. Whilst the individual characteristics of each conflict would undoubtedly be unique, the fundamentals are consistent throughout and are ultimately of far greater importance. Page 9 of 11

10 About the author Stuart Lyle is currently a post-graduate student studying a full-time Master in Strategy and International Security at the University of Hull (UK) and has previously completed an undergraduate BA in War and Security Studies at the same institution. Prior to this was a short period of service as an officer in the British armed forces. Stuart has had work published previously regarding terrorism/counter-terrorism and his particular areas of interest are terrorism, counter-insurgency, military/naval history and maritime strategy. Disclaimer The views of authors are their own. The UK Defence Forum holds no corporate view on the opinions expressed in papers or at meetings. The Forum exists to enable politicians, industrialists, members of the armed forces, academics and others with an interest in defence and security issues to exchange information and views on the future needs of Britain s defence. It is operated by a non-partisan, not for profit company. UK Defence Forum papers are archived at - the last three years being accessible only to members and subscribers. Prior to that they are in the public domain subject to usual conventions. Members wishing to comment on papers can access a noticeboard via the members area of the website December Marks, T. Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam, (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1996), p. 1 2 Mattis, J. & Hoffman, F. Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Proceedings, (November 2005), p Hoffman, F. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue. 52, 1 ST Quarter, (2009), p Quoted in Hoffman, F. Further Thoughts on Hybrid Threats, Small Wars Journal, (2009), (accessed on 17 December, 2010), (emphasis added) 5 MacKinlay, J. The Insurgent Archipelago: From Mao to bin Laden, (London: C. Hurst and Co., 2009), p Ibid, p Quoted in Hammes, T. The Sling and the Stone, p Hoffman, F. Hybrid Treats: Neither Omnipotent Nor Unbeatable, ORBIS, Vol. 588, (Summer 2010), p. 1 9 Hoffman, F. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, p Cited in Glenn, R. Thoughts on Hybrid Conflicts, Small Wars Journal, (2009), (accessed on 08 November, 2010) 11 McCuen, J. Hybrid Wars, Military Review, (March-April 2008), (accessed on 29 January, 2011) Page 10 of 11

11 12 Hoffman, F. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, p Ibid, p Mao, in Chailand, G. (ed.) The Art of War in World History: From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age, (London: University of California Press, 1994), p Ibid, p Quoted in Hammes, T. The Sling and the Stone, p Glenn, R. Thoughts on Hybrid Conflicts 18 Ibid 19 MacKinlay, J. The Insurgent Archipelago, p Griffith, S. B., in Sun Tzu, The Art of War, (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p Glenn, R. Thoughts on Hybrid Conflicts 22 Ibid 23 Quoted in MacKinlay, J. The Insurgent Archipelago, p Ibid, p Glenn, R. Thoughts on Hybrid Conflicts 26 Hoffman, F. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, p. 35 Page 11 of 11