Keywords Cultural context for welfare; East Asian welfare state; Korea; Japan; Western welfare states; the Confucian welfare state

Transcription

1 East Asian culture? Aspects of the cultural context for policy-making in Japan and Korea and their policy implications from a comparative perspective with the Western welfare state Nam K. Jo SungKongHoe University, South Korea (namk.jo@skhu.ac.kr) Abstract Cultural differences between East Asian and Western societies has been a usual suspect of differing welfare systems found in those two regions, yet rarely examined in empirical terms. This lack of empirical work has fuelled criticisms and scepticisms on cultural approach to the comparative examination of welfare between the Orient and the Occident. For example, Confucianism tradition shared between Asian countries has been pointed out as the foundation for the East Asian Welfare, but it has also been complained as vague in that it is hard to identify which components of Confucianism have affected which dimensions of welfare development in those societies. This paper aims to empirically explore aspects of the cultural context for social policy making in Japan and Korea, in comparison with those of the Western welfare states, drawing upon the recent theoretical and methodological development in the cultural analysis of welfare. By analysing data of all waves of the World Values Survey and the European Values Study (from 1981 to 2008) it is empirically found that Japan and Korea share, in terms of their societal level value characteristics, strong family values, weak Religiosity but strong Social Conservatism and strong Political Oriented-ness but very weak Political Activeness. This combination is distinctive in comparison with Western counterparts, informing us that the cultural context in these two countries would have been directing Korean and Japanese welfare systems to strong emphasis on welfare responsibility within families with weak state welfare outside the family and enabling state and political elites including bureaucrats to overwhelm welfare politics in these countries. Keywords Cultural context for welfare; East Asian welfare state; Korea; Japan; Western welfare states; the Confucian welfare state

2 Introduction Characterising and explaining social welfare system of East Asian countries has been a rising subject within the school of comparative social policy, especially since the 1990s. Firstly it invited attention of researchers as an alternative welfare model (to the Western one) that is more cost-effective with relatively lower level of social expenditure and not-quite-bad outcome in terms of meeting welfare need of people regardless of by whom it is being met. While this highly valuing approach was soon toned down for a representative example, it was argued that the situation of East Asian societies simply reflects an under-developed and immature welfare system that would follow the trajectory of the Western welfare state (Croissant, 2004, p. 520; Hort & Kuhnle, 2000), scholars have been seeking to characterise how and explain why the East Asian welfare system(s) is/are different from those of the established and more matured Western welfare state. What we have heard so far is, if I summarise it very crudely, that the East Asian Welfare shows that: policy-priority has been given to economic development over social policy by political elites including bureaucrats; low level of welfare expenditure (i.e. small government in welfare area) is not linked to large private welfare markets; and instead, families take more welfare responsibilities (e.g. see Holliday & Wilding, 2003; Lee & Ku, 2007). Again very briefly, there have been three different approaches in explaining this set of features: the Confucian welfare state (Goodman & Peng, 1996; Jones, 1990; 1993) by a cultural approach, the productivist welfare capitalism (Aspalter, 2006; Holliday, 2000) or developmental welfare state (Kwon, 2009) from a nation-building and political economy focused approach, and the familialistic welfare regime (Croissant, 2004) from an institution-focused approach. This short paper revisits the cultural explanation of the East Asian Welfare. Although a cultural approach focused on Confucian tradition appears to have already left the stage, culture itself has never been completely out of sight from the list of usual suspects within comparative social policy. Instead, it is coming back to the main stage (van Oorschot, 2007) with different theoretical frameworks and methods (Jo, 2011; Pfau-Effinger, 2004, 2005). This is why we may be able to expect new insight into or further understanding, to any extent, of East Asian Welfare by looking at cultural aspects again. I will firstly discuss this recent development in cultural analysis of welfare. Drawing on it, then, I will present and compare the cultural contexts of the East Asian welfare state (Japan and Korea in this paper) with the Western welfare state based on empirical data. Discussion will follow. Culture as a contextual factor for social policy making In fact, culture has been seen central to welfare since welfare is basically choices about what constitutes the good society and how to achieve it, which is based on consensus of values or the shared answer to the welfare moral question of who should get what and why (Deacon, 2002, p. 1; Marshall, 1972, p. 20; Rustin, 1999, p. 257; Titmuss, 1974, p. 49; van Oorschot, 2000; van Oorschot, Opielka, & Pfau-Effinger, 2008, p. 2). It is natural, from this point of view, that researchers have given their attention to cultural/ideological/religious traditions 1

3 such as liberalism, hierarchism, socialism, Christianity and Confucianism as a foundation for the development of welfare (Castles, 1998, pp ; Jones, 1990, 1993; Lockhart, 2001; Manow & van Kersbergen, 2009; O'Connor & Robinson, 2008; Opielka, 2008; Stjernø, 2008; van Kersbergen, 1995; van Kersbergen & Kremer, 2008). A difficulty of this approach is, however, that conception of culture and conception of the effect of culture as well are broad and comprehensive, and as a result, cultural explanations easily become abstract and the concrete role of culture is not clearly understood (Jo, 2011, p. 6). This is because an approach that conceptualises culture the most comprehensively like the synonym of tradition or society cannot offer many points to empirical analyses (van Oorschot et al., 2008, pp. 9-10) - the analysis of culture cannot be meaningful either when culture is just a passive reflection of social system (e.g. materialistic approach) or when culture determines everything (e.g. idealistic approach). This is exactly what the Confucian welfare state thesis suffers from. Researchers criticise that cultural approach focused on Confucianism was prominent but not helpful in explaining the evolution of East Asian welfare system (e.g. Holliday, 2000: 706). Thus whilst we can nod at a saying that social policy in East Asian societies reflects Confucian agenda, we will immediately ask where we can find any analytic points after hearing that as in the West all the positions reflect an agenda informed by Judeo-Christian values (Rieger & Leibrfied, 2003: 334 in Ku & Jones Finer, 2007, p. 125). It was recently suggested that we need a perspective assuming a certain distance between culture and social structures and institutions, where culture and the social system are interrelated but not decisively determined by each other in order to properly understand the relation between culture and social policy (Pfau-Effinger, 2005; van Oorschot et al., 2008, pp ). When culture, broadly speaking, can be conceptualised at three different levels (for example, the basic and universal human values (Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Schwartz, 1992, 1999), societal values and situational values/attitudes (three different levels of values by Haller, 2002), or in a closer relation to welfare, culture as the basis for policies, as popular values on the welfare state and as attitudes expressed in social discourses (three levels of welfare culture by Pfau-Effinger, 2005, pp. 9-10)), then we can see that the second or in-between level societal values or popular values deeply embedded in society is expected to inform of the cultural context for policy making (Jo, 2011; van Oorschot, 2006). Empirical fruitfulness of this conceptualisation is also shown in Jo s analysis (2011) the cultural context as aggregated forms of societal values is found to affect welfare policy as well as welfare attitudes. It can be expected, therefore, that this approach enables us to examine the cultural context of East Asian Welfare in more concrete terms rather than to point out mere Confucianism, and to empirically reason which aspects of culture would have been affecting which dimensions of welfare in this region rather than to abstractly conjecture. 2

4 Japan and Korea, as a cluster of the East Asian welfare state Do welfare democracies in East Asia have distinctive cultural context? This is the question to which I am trying to find an answer here drawing on the recent development of cultural analysis of welfare in the above. I will especially focus on South Korea and Japan. Japan and Korea (with Taiwan) are expected to represent a cluster of the East Asian welfare state. Researchers have observed that there can be two or three distinct sub-sets in this region: for example, social insurance centred welfare states (Japan, Korea, Taiwan and possibly China) and provident funds centred welfare states (Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong) (Kwon, 2009, p. s14) or facilitative (Hong Kong), developmental-universalist (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) and developmental-particularist (Singapore) productive welfare capitalism (Holliday, 2000: 707). In any classification, we are able to see, Japan and Korea (with Taiwan) share more welfare features in common than other East Asian countries. Culturally as well, both (with Taiwan again) countries are of a stronger Confucian tradition than other societies in the region such as Muslim (Malaysia, Indonesia), Buddhist (Thailand) or Catholic (the Philippines) dominant societies (Croissant, 2004, p. 505). In this we may need to separately approach to each possible cluster and, Korea and Japan would be the very set of the Confucian welfare state, if there is any. Also, both countries have been of the world leading economies for over four or two decades respectively and we may be able to expect that not only social discourses on welfare but also welfare politics should be more matured than other countries in the region. Practicality was considered too. Since investigating how stable values are over time is critical in order to extract societal values (Jo, 2011), we need data in multiple time points. Both Japan and Korea are the few East Asian countries that have continuously participated in the international survey programme on values (i.e. the European Values Study and its off-europe version, the World Values Survey) and have data available for the last three decades (in four time points). Returning to my question, the aim of this paper is examining cultural aspects of two East Asian societies in more empirical terms, especially in comparison with the Western welfare democracies in order to seek a better (or more concrete) cultural account of the East Asian welfare than an abstract explanation of the cultural foundation approach like Confucianism thesis. Researchers have agreed that the East Asian cultural traditions such as Buddhist teachings and Confucian traditions cannot be overlooked (Esping-Andersen, 1997, p. 181), but questioned its fruitfulness in that it does not tell about, for example, why Confucianism need be damaging to working-class mobilization (Holliday, 2000: 719). In this it is an attempt of one-step-further into the East Asian culture in relation to its welfare system, in order to say not only culture matters but also this and that of value-characteristics of East Asia do matter. Data & Method It was attempted to extract societal values from the European Values Study and the World Values Survey data. These international survey programmes are designed to enable researchers to expand object countries by integrating data from both surveys. From 1981 to 3

5 2009 the EVS was conducted four times (wave 1 ~ 4) while the WVS proceeded until wave 5. However, data could be arranged into four time points as a whole. I followed Jo s method (2011) that groups variables, extracts underlying factors at the individual level pooled data, iteratively compares and examines the factoring structure across time, country and level (individual and country levels), tests stability of factors in aggregated (to country level) forms in terms of how strongly differences in those factors between societies have been maintained, and, whenever necessary, discards some input variables and repeats the process. For this process firstly it needs to confine the range of data. I selected 34 OECD member countries that have more often participated in those surveys, that would give us a little more confidence in the sample quality as more industrialised countries (Larsen, 2006, p. 27), that would more share not only a comparable level of wealth but also a common conception of social welfare (Arts & Gelissen, 2002), and also that cover all countries of our interest here - Japan, Korea and the Western welfare state for the comparing reference. The pooled data set consists of 159,635 cases from 34 countries at four time points (see appendix), which forms Table 1 Six societal values extracted from the EVS-WVS data (1981 to 2009) for 34 OECD countries Societal Values Religiosity Social Conservatism Political Activeness Social Morality Political Oriented-ness Traditional Family Values Items -How important is God in your life (1~10) -Religious person or not -How often attend religious services (1~7) -Confidence in churches (1~4) -Religious faith is an important child quality -Justifiable: abortion (1~10) -Justifiable: divorce (1~10) -Justifiable: euthanasia (1~10) -Justifiable: homosexuality (1~10) -Justifiable: suicide (1~10) -Political action: joining unofficial strikes (1~3) -Political action: attending lawful/peaceful demonstration (1~3) -Political action: occupying buildings or factories (1~3) -Justifiable: cheating on taxes (1~10) -Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe (1~10) -Justifiable: claiming non entitled government benefits (1~10) -Interest in politics (1~4) -How often discuss political matters with friends (1~3) -A woman has to have children to be fulfilled -Child needs a home with father and mother 4

6 116 societal level cases (data of a country at a time point). After extraction, societal values (as the cultural context) of two East Asian countries are compared with the Western welfare state that are commonly classified into four welfare regimes (Arts & Gelissen, 2002; Esping- Andersen, 1990). Thus 12 out of 34 OECD countries, that have not been included in conventional welfare regime classification (because either they are not matured welfare states or their welfare features are not clearly conforming to one welfare regime) are not compared here those are Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland and Turkey. Korea and Japan what do they share distinctively from the Western welfare state Before presenting and discussing findings from my analysis, it may need to be noted that societal values as the cultural context here are not exhaustive. Methodologically they are only some examples of societal values that are limited by which data is being analysed. Here a long process of analysis produced six underlying factors (examples of societal values) which can be found from data of any time point, any country and any country at a time point (i.e. comparable across time and place), which can be extracted from the individual level as well as country level data (i.e. cross-level equivalent), and which are not static but only gradually change and stable over time in terms of their differences between societies (i.e. dynamically stable) within the EVS-WVS whole data for three decades (Jo, 2011). Those are Religiosity, Social Conservatism, Political Activeness, Social Morality, Political Oriented-ness, and Traditional Family Values (Table 1). From these six societal values it is found that Japan and Korea are, roughly speaking, very familialistic, secular-conservative and politically passive societies (as presented in all figures below). These features and this set of features are interesting and an interesting combination, Figure 1 Strength of Traditional Family Values as the average level of three decades (1981 ~ 2009) across 22 countries and different welfare regimes Traditional Family Values 5

7 which are not found in anywhere within the Western welfare societies. First of all, strong family values in these two East Asian societies (Figure 1) would not be surprising family has been the most prominent concept in explaining East Asian Welfare regardless of which approach scholars are taking (e.g. Aspalter, 2006; Croissant, 2004; Goodman & Peng, 1996; Holliday, 2000; Holliday & Wilding, 2003; Hort & Kuhnle, 2000; Jones, 1993; Kim & Choi, 2010; Kwon, 2009; Lee & Ku, 2007). Here, however, it is noteworthy that the degree of family values in Japan and Korea is not distinctively high, although it is still the strongest (except Greece) within 22 societies. This observation supports Esping-Andersen (1997: 186) who saw indifferent traditional familialism although the background philosophical rationales are different as Confucianism and Catholicism behind the similar emphasis on the traditional familial welfare function across Japan and Continental, especially Southern, Europe. Then it also questions why only Confucian tradition in two countries negatively operates providing a strong basis of political rhetoric opposed to introducing certain social programmes, whilst in Germany, for example, pro-family policies were relatively more developed (Kwon, 1997: ). We may be able to seek further explanation from other aspects of the cultural context of these East Asian societies. As we see in Figure 2, Japan and Korea are the only cases of the most secular (weak Religiosity), and at the same time, the most conservative ethical view dominant (strong Social Conservatism) societies. This is a very unique phenomenon, if compared with the Western countries. Between Catholic oriented Western societies stronger Social Conservatism, that is closely linked to Catholic teachings, is found where stronger Religiosity exists. The relationship of Religiosity with welfare is not quite clear whilst it was found that more religious people tend to be more solidaristic with the needy (van Oorschot, 2006), it was also reported that Religiosity of a society is correlated with stronger individual-blaming poverty perception (Jo, 2011) and weaker tax morale (Alm & Torgler, 2006) which is closely related to Social Morality in this analysis (Figure 2) - of the public. A possible interpretation of these findings would be that more religious society (i.e. society of stronger Religiosity) are individually more ready to help the needy by religious teachings (e.g. through voluntary and charity organisations) but ultimately tends to more emphasise the selfhelp (for individual salvation) than collective responsibility of and programmatic approach to social problems. Meanwhile, Social Conservatism (or traditional ethical values) is, in relation to welfare, possibly linked to applying stricter criteria of deservingness to the needy. Attitudes of the needy affect how deserving the general public see they are by influencing answers of the public to questions of deservingness criteria, such as Why are you needy? and Are you one of us? (van Oorschot, 2000). Given that Social Conservative values would lead to a more stringent view on socially acceptable attitudes, societies of stronger Social Conservatism can be more conditional in providing institutionalised solidarity (i.e. state welfare). In this, the similar direction of implication for welfare by these two societal values is understandable, while a positive correlation between Religiosity and Social Conservatism found between Western welfare states (see Figure 2) is also not surprising - such traditional ethical values were mainly originated from Catholic teachings. 6

8 Figure 2 Strength of Religiosity, Social Conservatism and Social Morality as the average level of three decades (1981 ~ 2009) across 22 countries and different welfare regimes Religiosity Social Conservatism Social Morality 7

9 An interesting point is, when we turn back to two East Asian countries, both societies are very strict in terms of traditional (conservative) ethical values, although they are, unlike Western societies of stronger Social Conservatism, not strongly religious. Put aside where this phenomenon came from, here we see a possible explanation why in Japan and Korea neither strong state welfare nor well developed voluntary organisations are found (e.g. Kwon, 1997: 478). An account of another main feature of East Asian Welfare, the overwhelming role of the state and the bureaucrats in welfare politics, can also be found in other aspects of the cultural context (see Figure 3). Two East Asian countries form, again, a distinctive set of features from the Western welfare state strong or at least not weak Political Oriented-ness with very low level of Political Activeness. It appears that Koreans and Japanese have much Figure 3 Strength of Political Activeness and Political Oriented-ness as the average level of three decades (1981 ~ 2009) across 22 countries and different welfare regimes Political Activeness Political Orientedness 8

10 interest in politics, but are not active at all in political bargaining. This enables us to reason that Japanese and Koreans very much authorise their political elites including bureaucrats, that the labour politics or class-struggle approach would not well work here (Goodman & Peng, 1996, p. 210), and that political and social agenda set by power elites (e.g. boosting national economy first ) would have easily mobilised the public because of their strong political interest anyway. Given that there is no particular reason for us to think that Korean and Japanese have been much satisfied with their politics and political elites (easily with examples of the recent unstable Japanese politics and the social movement for democracy in Korea until the early 1990s), their much entrusting of their elites is hard to explain without cultural dimensions such as patriarchal or hierarchical tradition that has often been pointed out as filial piety, seniority culture and conflict avoidance and so on, originated from Confucian teachings (Goodman & Peng, 1996, pp ) although they are not found as examples of societal values in this analysis. Interestingly, Southern European welfare states roughly show the opposite pattern (except Greece) not much strong interest in politics but active in political bargaining. What this feature of the cultural context is making would be, however, beyond the aim and scope of this paper. Discussions Values and cultures have always been on the list of possible explanatory factors for the East Asian Welfare (Ku & Jones Finer, 2007, p. 125), but cultural accounts have mostly been around the Confucianism and rarely been equipped with empirical data. Drawing on a recent development of cultural analysis of welfare, this paper attempted to empirically examine more concrete aspects of the cultural context for welfare of Japan and Korea as a cluster of East Asian welfare states. My analysis showed that, if comparing with Western welfare states, Korea and Japan are distinctive in terms of their cultural context (i.e. a combination of some societal values deeply embedded in society): strong traditional (or modern) family values, weak Religiosity coexisting with strong Social Conservatism and strong Political Orientedness coexisting with very weak Political Activeness. It informed us of the reason, at least partly, why in these two East Asian welfare states welfare responsibilities within family members are emphasised but not well supported by state welfare programmes outside the family and why social welfare programmes have been utilised by political elites (including authoritarian governments in Korea) in times of political crisis (e.g. Ramesh, 2004, p. 325). Although we examined merely a few concrete aspects of the East Asian culture, it is quite clear that the Confucian tradition informed Japanese and Korean welfare societies. Needless to say, their emphasis on family and family responsibility is originated from Confucian teachings just as that of Continental Europe is from Catholic teachings. Their strong conservative ethical view is neither linked to Religiosity nor oriented from Catholicism, but appears to have come from the deeply embedded Confucian ethics. Korean and Japanese exceptional reluctance to political bargain also strongly appears to be very closely related to 9

11 their Confucian values. Out of quite a few possible further discussion points two would be closer to the issue of the Confucian welfare state seemingly re-found in this analysis. First, we need to examine the cultural contexts of other East Asian (that is, South-East Asian) countries where Confucian tradition is relatively weak, but in a broader view, similar welfare features have been found. Second, given that the cultural approach should not be limited to offer an account of welfare but should also be able to provide policy implications, we may need to ask here, what the Confucian context will inform the welfare in these two countries in the (near) future? While this must also be a task necessitating further studies, our immediate conjecture from findings above would be that the elite-leading welfare politics without much fierce bargaining processes will last. Data European and World Values Surveys four-wave integrated data file, , v , File Producers: ASEP/JDS, Madrid, Spain and Tilburg University, Tilburg, the Netherlands. File Distributors: ASEP/JDS and GESIS, Cologne, Germany. EVS (2010) European Values Study 2008, 4th wave, Integrated Dataset. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, Germany, ZA4800 Data File Version ( ) DOI: / World Values Survey Official Aggregate v , World Values Survey Association ( File Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid. References Alm, J., & Torgler, B. (2006). Culture differences and tax morale in the United States and in Europe. Journal of Economic Psychology, 27, Arts, W., & Gelissen, J. (2002). Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism or More? A state-of-theart report. Journal of European Social Policy, 12(2), Aspalter, C. (2006). The East Asian welfare model. International Journal of Social Welfare, 15, Castles, F. G. (1998). Comparative Public Policy: Patterns of Post-war Transformation. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Croissant, A. (2004). Changing Welfare Regimes in East and Southeast Asia: Crisis, Change and Challenge. Social Policy & Administration, 38(5), Deacon, A. (2002). Perspectives on Welfare: Ideas, Ideologies and Policy Debates. Buckingham: Open University Press. Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. Esping-Andersen, G. (1997). Hybrid or Unique?: the Japanese Welfare State between Europe and America. Journal of European Social Policy, 7(3), Goodman, R., & Peng, I. (1996). The East Asian Welfare States: Peripatetic Learning, Adaptive Change, and Nation-Building. In G. Esping-Andersen (Ed.), Welfare States in Transition (pp ). London: Sage. Haller, M. (2002). Theory and Method in the Comparative Study of Values: Critique and Alternative to Inglehart. European Sociological Review, 18(2),

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14 Appendix Data composition of 34 OECD countries (participated survey year, name and the number of cases) Country Time point 1 Time point 2 Time Point 3 Time point 4 N N of Societal level Australia 1981 WVS1: WVS3: WVS5: Austria 1990 EVS2: EVS3: EVS4: Belgium 1981 EVS1: EVS2: EVS3: EVS4: Canada 1982 EVS1: EVS2: WVS4: WVS5: Chile 1990 WVS2: WVS4: WVS5: Czech Rep 1991 EVS2: EVS3: EVS4: Denmark 1981 EVS1: EVS2: EVS3: EVS4: Estonia 1990 EVS2: EVS3: EVS4: Finland 1981 WVS1: EVS2: EVS3: EVS4: France 1981 EVS1: EVS2: EVS3: EVS4: Germany 1981 EVS1: EVS2: EVS3: EVS4: Greece 1999 EVS3: EVS4: Hungary 1982 WVS1: EVS2: EVS3: EVS4: Iceland 1984 EVS1: EVS2: EVS3: EVS4: Ireland 1981 EVS1: EVS2: EVS3: EVS4: Israel 2001 WVS4: Italy 1981 EVS1: EVS2: EVS3: EVS4: Japan 1981 WVS1: WVS2: WVS4: WVS5: South Korea 1982 WVS1: WVS2: WVS4: WVS5: Luxembourg 1999 EVS3: EVS4: Mexico 1981 WVS1: WVS2: WVS4: WVS5: Netherlands 1981 EVS1: EVS2: EVS3: EVS4: New Zealand 1998 WVS3: WVS5: Norway 1982 EVS1: EVS2: WVS3: EVS4: Poland 1990 EVS2: EVS3: EVS4: Portugal 1990 EVS2: EVS3: EVS4: Slovakia 1991 EVS2: EVS3: EVS4: Slovenia 1992 EVS2: EVS3: EVS4: Spain 1981 EVS1: EVS2: EVS3: EVS4: Sweden 1982 EVS1: EVS2: EVS3: EVS4: Switzerland 1989 WVS2: WVS3: EVS4: Turkey 1990 WVS2: EVS3: EVS4: Great Britain 1981 EVS1: EVS2: EVS3: EVS4: United States 1982 EVS1: EVS2: WVS4: WVS5: Total