明治学院大学機関リポジトリ.

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1 明治学院大学機関リポジトリ The Role of Civil Society Organis Democratic Transition: The Case o Title Democracy Assistance to Domestic Monitoring Organisations (DEMOs) Author(s) VIRGIANITA, Asra Citation Issue Date URL Rights Meiji Gakuin University Institutional Rep

2 The Role of Civil Society Organisations in Democratic Transition: The Case of International Democracy Assistance to Domestic Election Monitoring Organisations (DEMOs) in Indonesia 民主化移行期における市民社会団体の役割 インドネシアの選挙監視団体に対する国際的な民主化支援を事例として Division of International Studies Graduate School of Meiji Gakuin University April, 2014 Asra Virgianita

3 The Role of Civil Society Organisations in Democratic Transition: The Case of International Democracy Assistance to Domestic Election Monitoring Organisations (DEMOs) in Indonesia 民主化移行期における市民社会団体の役割 インドネシアの選挙監視団体に対する国際的な民主化支援を事例として A Dissertation Presented to the Division of International Studies Graduate School of Meiji Gakuin University, for the Degree of Doctor of International Studies Asra Virgianita April, 2014

4 ABSTRACT The Role of Civil Society Organisations in Democratic Transition: The Case of International Democracy Assistance to Domestic Election Monitoring Organisations (DEMOs) in Indonesia Asra Virgianita This thesis examines the international democracy assistance and Domestic Election Monitoring Organisations (DEMOs) during the democratisation process in Indonesia. This thesis highlights that the organisational structure, including networking and historical civil society organisations (CSOs) from both from institutional or individual/member aspects, and the cooperation between donors and CSOs were important elements of successful democracy assistance in Indonesia s shift from the transitional to the consolidation phase. In 1998, the economic crisis caused the decline of Soeharto's authority and, in 1999,a free and fair election was carried out in Indonesia. In this election, and the following 2004 election, DEMOs ensured that the elections were fair, and contributed significantly to the promotion of democracy in Indonesia. However, in the 2009 election, fewer DEMOs were active and the fairness of the election could not be ensured, unlike the previous two elections. Using the case of elections in the transitional period in which Indonesian DEMOs and electoral management bodies (EMBs, such as KPU and BAWASLU) were the main domestic actors and democracy assistance providers (Japan, the US and the EU) as representatives of international actors, this study investigates the roles and dynamic relations between those actors in each phase of democratisation. It is noteworthy that new political actors, such as Indonesian DEMOs, play an important role in democratisation in spite of their inexperience. Why and how could they achieve this success? Was the international democracy assistance effective? Why did the activity of DEMOs decrease in the 2009 elections? The existing studies on international democracy assistance do not always evaluate its effect on democratisation positively. Thus, it is necessary to examine its effect according to the Indonesian case. The categorisation of DEMOs in previous studies cannot be applied to Indonesian DEMOs. Moreover, the changing effectiveness of the DEMOs and the interaction of DEMOs, the government and donors in the 1999 to 2009 elections cannot be explained by existing studies. In this study, the democratisation process was analysed phase by phase as a preliminary step. The following three points were then analysed: 1) The donor countries' assistance policy 2) The organisational characteristics of Indonesian DEMOs 3) The relationship of donors, the domestic government and CSOs. As a result, the following three points are found. Firstly, the donors assistance policies were analysed in Chapter 4. A new analytical framework, combining Thomas Carothers framework (developmental and political approach) and Steven Golub's framework (Big D and small d), revealed that the assistance policy of the US and the EU tried to connect with domestic CSOs, thus providing democracy assistance via these CSOs. On the i

5 other hand, Japanese assistance, which focused on development and linkage with the government, was not effective in terms of democratic assistance. An extreme focus on the government makes Japanese assistance very rigid, as it has less effect on the empowerment of society as one of the main factors in democratisation. Secondly, the organisational characteristics of the DEMOs were analysed in Chapter 5. The role of networking in DEMOs and DOOs was found to be important here. Utilising the categories of DEMOs- networking and stand-alone, as proposed by Sharon Lean (2007) - this study acknowledges other type of DEMOs, referred to here as DOOs (Domestic Observer Organisations),which should be considered in election monitoring activities. Moreover, supported by the DEMOs internal and international donors (democracy aid providers), the Indonesian DEMOs could play significant roles in which the networking of DEMOs is seen as an ideal form. Thirdly, the relationship of the donors, the domestic government and CSOs was analysed in Chapter 6, in which it was shown that the DEMOs activities were limited by governmental control of international assistance. The Paris Declaration in 2005, followed by the Jakarta Commitment in 2009, was the turning point. International assistance was put under the surveillance of the coordination committee, which consists of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Development Planning Board (BAPPENAS) and the Election Commission (KPU). Donors can only allocate assistance to Indonesian DEMOs/NGOs that are endorsed in a coordination meeting. The increase in governmental control and the decline of the standing of Indonesian DEMOs becomes a paradox in the success of the democratisation process in Indonesia. This study concludes that the existence of direct international assistance for domestic CSOs and the autonomous CSOs networks are the two important factors that ensure effective election monitoring and increased democratisation, particularly during the transition period. The control of international assistance by the domestic government takes the edge off civil society and its power for further democratisation. ii

6 民主化移行期における市民社会団体の役割 インドネシアの選挙監視団体に対する国際的な民主化支援を事例として ( アスラ フィルジアニタ ) 論文要旨 本論文は 民主化移行期のインドネシアにおける市民社会団体 (CSOs, Civil Society Organisations) とそれに対する国際的な支援を分析したものである 制度及び個人レベルに至る市民社会団体の構造とネットワークに焦点をあてて分析し 民主化移行期から定着期にかけて インドネシアの市民社会団体 特に選挙監視団体 (DEMOs, Domestic Election Monitoring Organisations) に対して行われた国際社会の支援と協力が 同国の民主化に重要な意味を持ったことを明らかにした 経済危機が原因となって 1998 年にスハルト独裁体制は崩壊し インドネシアでは 1999 年に 44 年ぶりに自由で公正な選挙が実施された この 1999 年選挙と次の 2004 年選挙では インドネシアの多くの市民社会団体が選挙監視団体を組織し 公正な選挙の実現に寄与した しかし 2009 年の選挙では選挙監視を行った市民社会団体は少なく それ以前の二つの選挙に比べて選挙の公正さが完全に保障されたとは言い難い 本論文は 選挙監視におけるインドネシアの主要な国内アクターとして 選挙管理委員会 (KPU, Komisi Pemilihan Umum) や選挙監視庁 (Bawaslu, Badan Pengawas Pemilu) といった政府系の選挙管理組織 (EMBs, Electoral Management Bodies) と 民間の選挙監視団体 ( DEMOs) を分析対象とし また民主化支援の国際アクターとして 日本 米国 欧州連合 ( EU) を分析対象として 民主化の移行 定着段階におけるそれぞれの役割とそれらの関係性のダイナミズムを分析した 民主化後のインドネシアにおける新しい政治アクターとして登場した市民社会団体は 政治経験が乏しかったにもかかわらず 選挙監視団体としてインドネシアの民主化に重要な役割を果たしたことは注目に値する なぜ どのように それは可能となったのであろうか また これらの市民社会団体に対する国際的な支援が効果的に行われたのだとすれば なぜ どのように行われたのだろうか 2009 年の選挙では 1999 年 2004 年の選挙と比べて選挙監視団体の活動が減少したが その背景にはどのような理由があったのだろうか 民主化における国際的な支援や市民社会団体の役割については すでに先行研究が存在するものの 国際的な民主化支援の役割は必ずしも肯定的に評価されているわけではなく インドネシアの事例に即した分析が必要である また 先行研究が提示する選挙監視団体の分類概念は インドネシアの選挙監視団体を分析する上で十分なものではない さらに 1999 年 2004 年 2009 年の選挙ごとに インドネシア政府と国際アクターとの関係性や 国際アクターによるインドネシアの選挙監視団体に対する支援が変化し その結果として選挙監視団体の活動内容にも変化が生じたことについては これまでの研究では明らかにされてこなかった このような問題関心と先行研究の問題点をふまえて 本論文はまず インドネシアの民主化過程を俯瞰したうえで 1 国際アクターである援助供与国の支援方針 2 国内アクターであるインドネシアの市民社会団体及び選挙監視団体の組織的特徴 3 援助供与国 インドネ iii

7 シア政府 市民社会団体の三者関係 について分析を行った その結果 次の三点が明らかになった 第一に 第 4 章で分析を行った援助供与国の支援方針についてである 本論文は トーマス カロザース (Thomas Carothers) の 開発アプローチ と 政治アプローチ の分析枠組みと スティーブン ゴルプ (Steven Golub) の 政府への民主化支援 (Big D) と 草の根レベルでの民主化支援 (small d) の分析枠組みとを統合した新しい分析枠組みを用いた その結果 アメリカと EU の支援は インドネシアの市民社会団体と連携し それらを通じての政治分野における直接的な民主化支援であったのに対して 日本の支援は インドネシア政府を通じた 開発分野の支援が中心であったという差異が明らかになった 日本の支援はインドネシア政府に対象を限定したものであり 民主化において重要となる社会のエンパワーメントにはあまり効果を持たなかった それゆえ インドネシアの民主化に十分な役割を果たしたとは言えないのである 第二に 第 5 章で分析を行った選挙監視団体の組織的特徴についてである シャロン リーン (Sharon Lean) は 2007 年に選挙監視団体を 独立型 と ネットワーク型 という二つのタイプに類型化したが 本論文は選挙監視団体のもう一つのタイプとして 選挙監視活動に携わる オブザーバー団体 (DOOs, Domestic Observer Organisations) を提起した ここで強調したいのは 選挙監視団体とオブザーバー団体との連携とネットワークが選挙監視において重要な役割を果たしたということである さらに国際的な援助供与国の支援を受けることで インドネシアの選挙監視団体やオブザーバー団体は最大限の役割を発揮することが可能となった この意味において ネットワーク型の選挙監視団体は理想的なタイプと見なされるのである さいごに 第 6 章で分析した 援助供与国 インドネシア政府 市民社会団体の三者関係についてである 2005 年の パリ宣言 それに続いた 2009 年の ジャカルタ コミットメント が転機となり 選挙監視団体の活動はインドネシア政府による国際支援の統制強化によって制約を受けるようになった それまで援助供与国からインドネシアの選挙監視団体に対して直接行われていた国際支援は 内務省 国家開発企画庁 選挙管理委員会から成る調整委員会の監督の下に置かれることが義務付けられた その結果 援助供与国は 調整委員会の承認を受けた選挙監視団体や NGO にしか援助を提供することができなくなったのである インドネシア民主化プロセスの成功とは裏腹に 国際的な民主化支援に対するインドネシア政府の統制は強化され 選挙監視団体の立場は後退することになった 以上から 本論文は次にように結論づけることができる 市民社会団体に対する直接的な国際支援と自律的な市民社会団体のネットワークの存在は とりわけ民主化移行期において 効果的な選挙監視を実現するための重要な要因となり 民主化を促進するということである 政府が国際支援を統制することは さらなる民主化のために必要な市民社会の力を削ぐことになろう iv

8 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First and foresmost, I would like to thank to all of the Professor and staff, Graduate School of International Studies, Meijigakuin University, specially to Professor Hideyuki Wakui, Professor Oki Akira, Professor Namioka Shintaro, Professor Nakata-Amiya, Prof. Takeo Takahara for all their support, encouragement and enthusiam. Special thanks also to Professor Chiharu Takenaka who was be my supervisor for three years until she moved to Rikkyo University for her carries. I would like also thank to all of Professor of Institute of Social Sciences and Institute of Oriental Culture University of Tokyo (ISS-IOC UT) who are members of research project between University of Tokyo-Center for Japanese Studies, University of Indonesia. I would like also to thank to JICA that provided scholarship for 3 years of my doctoral programme and Directorate of Higher Education, Ministry of Education, Republic of Indonesia which providing me some support to finish my study. Also, I would like to thank the Matsushita Foundation and Resona Foundation, Hitachi Foundation for providing the grants for my research. Also, special thanks to members and my colleague of Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia for their encouragement and support. Last but not least, I would like to thank to my beloved family for their support and patience. Asra Virgianita April, 2014 v

9 TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract (In English) i Abstract (In Japanese) iii Acknowledgements v List of Charts, Diagram, Figure, Photo and Table x Glossary xiv Chapter 1 Introduction Democracy Assistance and The Emergence of DEMOs in Indonesia: A Background Problems Statement and Research Questions Previous Studies on Democracy assistance and Indonesian DEMOs: Investigating the Unexplored Aspects Significance of the Study Organization of Thesis Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework and Methodology 2.1. Some Theoretical Framework for Analysing Democratisation, Democracy Assistance and Election Monitoring in Indonesia Democratisation: Typology and Phases Democracy Assistance: Approaches and Types The Importance of Election and Domestic Election Monitoring Methodology Primary Data Secondary Data vi

10 Chapter 3 Development of Elections in Indonesia: From Authoritarian to Democratic Elections Elections under Soeharto Authoritarian Regime Regime Type and Electoral Processes ( ) The Decline of Golkar and the Initial Movement of Democratisation The Progress of Democratic Reform in Indonesia Elections under Reform Government The 1999 Transitional Elections: The Phase of Regime Change The 2004 Elections: The Process of Transition to Consolidation The 2009 Elections: Chaos but Consolidated? Chapter 4 From Development Assistance to Democracy Aid: Comparing Japan s Approach to the US and the EU Approaches Japan s Democracy Assistance to Indonesia: Half-Hearted Assistance? Japanese-Indonesian Relations under ODA Scheme Japan s Half-Hearted Approach to Indonesia American Democracy Assistance: A Political Approach US-Indonesian Relations under Soeharto The US Democracy Aid to Indonesia: A Political Approach The EU Democracy Assistance to Indonesia: A Cautious Approach EU-Indonesian Relations EU Democracy Assistance: A Cautious Approach Political Approaches versus Developmental Approaches and Big D versus small d: A Comparison vii

11 Chapter 5 Characteristics of Indonesia DEMOs and Their Roles in Democratisation Elections and Indonesian Domestic Elections Monitoring Organizations (DEMOs) The 1997 Elections: A Struggle Period for the First Indonesian DEMOs The 1999 Elections: A Golden Era for Indonesian DEMOs The 2004 Elections: A Crisis Period for Indonesia DEMOs The 2009 Elections: The End Stage of DEMOs Types and Characteristics of Indonesian DEMOs: Survey Results and Findings Survey Results of Indonesian DEMOs Some Findings of Indonesian DEMOs Assessment of the Evolving Role of Democracy Assistance and Indonesian DEMOs in Democratisation Process The Position of Democracy Assistance in the Process of Democratisation in Indonesia The Role of Indonesian DEMOs: From Transmitter to Advocacy..174 Chapter 6 Analysis of the Dynamics Relationship between International and Domestic Actors: Donors-Government-Indonesian DEMOs Donors-Government-Civil Society Relationships during Soeharto s Era The Period of Development ( ) The Period of the Issues of Conditionality ( ) The Period of Economic Crisis ( ) The Relationship between Indonesian DEMOs-Government (the EMBs)-Donors In Reform Period: Survey Results The Relations among Indonesian DEMOs and between Indonesian DEMOs and EMBs The Relations between Indonesian DEMOs and Donors viii

12 6.3. Direct Observation of Donors-Government-Indonesian DEMOs Relations in the 2009 Elections Data from Direct Observation Data Analysis of Direct Observation The Dynamics Donor-Government-Indonesian DEMOs Relations: The Cases of the 1999, the 2004 and the 2009 Elections The Patterns of Donors-Government-Indonesian DEMOs Relations and the Future of Democratisation in Indonesia Mapping the Relations of Donor-Government-Indonesian DEMOs Democratisation in Indonesia under A New Pattern of Relations between International and Domestic Actors: A Paradox Chapter 7 Conclusions Summary of Findings Contributions of Research Empirical Contributions Theoretical Contributions Policy Recommendations Bibliography Appendix 1 Questionnaire Form Appendix 2 List of Questions for Direct Observation of the 2009 Indonesia General Elections ix

13 LIST OF CHART, DIAGRAM, FIGURE, PHOTO AND TABLE List of Chart, Diagram, Figure and Photo Chart 2.1 Model of Analysis of the Roles of Indonesian DEMOs and Their Relationship with. 42 Democracy Assistances in Democratisation of Indonesia Chart 2.2 Methodology of Research Chart 4.1 Japan s Total ODA to Indonesia Post Soeharto ( ) Chart 4.2 Distribution of Japan s ODA to Indonesia (according to type) Chart 4.3 Distributions of US Democracy Assistance by Sector and by Region Chart 5.1 the Number of New Indonesian DEMOs based on Period Chart 5.2 Centre of Activity Chart 5.3 the Number of Organization that operate via the Networking System Chart 5.4 the number of Indonesian DEMOs involved in the 1999, 2004 & 2009 Elections Chart 5.5 Activities conducted by Indonesian DEMOs Chart 5.6 Methods of Monitoring conducted by Indonesian DEMOs Chart 5.7 Funding Sources Chart 5.8 Internal Factors that influence the Performance of Indonesian DEMOs Chart 5.9 External factors that influence the Performance of Indonesian DEMOs Chart 5.10 Strong Points of the Indonesian DEMOs Chart 6.1 DEMOs Views on their Relations with Other DEMOs and EMBs Chart 6.2 DEMOs Opinion regarding the KPU s Support for DEMOs Chart 6.3 DEMOs Perspectives on the view of EMBs towards the existence of DEMOs 190 Chart 6.4 DEMOs views on the changing relations among others DEMOs Chart 6.5 DEMOs view on the Importance of Relations among DEMOs Chart 6.6 DEMOs Experiences of Conflicts with other DEMOs and EMBs Chart 6.7 the views of DEMOs on the Relationship among DEMOs, KPU & BAWASLU 193 Chart 6.8 the number of DEMOs that had/had not experience in working with Donors Chart 6.9 DEMOs Activities funded by Donors x

14 Chart 6.10 Variety of Donors Support to DEMOs Chart 6.11 the Views of DEMOs regarding their Cooperation with Donors Chart 6.12 DEMOs Perspectives regarding Donors Intervention Chart 6.13 The Satisfaction of DEMOs regarding Relations with Donor Chart 6.14 the Views of Indonesian DEMOs concerning the Issues of Dependency on Foreign Support Chart 6.15 the views of DEMOs on the New Mechanism of Donor-Government-DEMOs Relations Chart 6.16 The View of DEMOs regarding the Role of Donors in bridging the relationship between The Government/EMBs - DEMOs Chart 6.17 Government-Donors-DEMOs Relationship Based on the Level of Control Chart 6.18 Government-Donors-DEMOs Relationship Based on the Level of Coordination and Cooperation Diagram 2.1 Mapping of International Democracy Assistance Diagram 4.1 Countries Exporting Coal to Japan Diagram 4.2 Japan s Country Assistance Program for Indonesia Diagram 4.3 EIHDR Projects World Wide by Theme Diagram 4.4 Mapping of International Democracy Assistance to Indonesia Diagram 5.1 Survey Results regarding the types of Indonesian DEMOs Figure 2.1 Regime Changes and Democratisation in Indonesia Figure 5.1 Democratisation and the Role of Indonesian DEMOs Figure 6.1 The Shifting Relations of Government-Donors-Indonesian DEMOs Figure 7.1 Elements of Election Monitoring.227 Figure 7.2 Positive and Negative Impacts of Democratisation (Democratic Elections) Figure 7.3 Contributions of Research and the Limitations thereof List of Photo: Photo 6.1 Situation of the Voting Process at TPS 003, Banta-bantaeng Village, Rappocini Sub District Makassar City, South Sulawesi xi

15 Photo 6.2 Situation of the Ballot Counting Process which is monitored by police, representatives of political parties, Committee of KPPS, TPS 003, Banta-bantaeng Village, Rappocini Sub District, Makassar City, South Sulawesi List of Table Table 1.1 Distribution of Electoral Assistance to Indonesian by Donors Table 1.2 Numbers of Violations in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 Elections Table 2.1 the Political Approach and Developmental Approach towards Democracy Aid.29 Table 2.2 The Distinction between Big D and small d Table 2.3 List Recipient Countries of USAID Democracy Assistance in Asia Table 2.4 List of Interviews Table 2.5 List of Areas of Direct Observation in the 2009 Elections Table 2.6 List of DEMOs Surveyed Table 3.1 Results of the 1999 General Elections Table 3.2 Results of the 2004 General Elections Table 3.3 Results of the 2009 elections Table 3.4 Comparing of Elections under the New Order and the Reform Government Table 4.1 Japan s ODA to Indonesia Table 4.2 Japan s Loans to Indonesia by Sector Table 4.3 Japan s Grant Aid to Indonesia by Sector Table 4.4 GSC Aid from Japan, the US and the EU Table 4.5 Japan s Electoral Assistance to Indonesia Table 4.6 Japanese Aid for Democracy and Governance Programmes in Indonesia Table 4.7 US Economic and Military Assistance to Indonesia ( ) Table 4.8 the USAID Democracy and Governance Sector Programmes in Indonesia ( )..116 Table 4.9 the EU Aid Commitment to Indonesia (in million EUC) Table 4.10 EIDHR Funding and Project to Asian Countries Table 4.11 the Implementation of EIDHR in Indonesia xii

16 Table 5.1 the Number of Volunteers in the 1999 Elections Table 5.2 the Number of violations in the 1999 elections Table 5.3 DEMOs Activities Table 5.4 the Number of Violations in the 2004 Elections Table 5.5 Indonesian DEMOs and Voter Education Activities Table 5.6 Voters in the 2004 Elections Table 5.7 the Number of Violations in the 2009 Elections Table 5.8 Voters in the 2004 and 2009 Elections: A Comparison Table 5.9 Classifications of Indonesian DEMOs in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 Elections.168 Table 5.10 Characteristics of Indonesian DEMOs Table 6.1 Characteristic of Donor-Government-Civil Society Relations under Soeharto Table 6.2 Summary of Direct Observation Results of the 2009 Election Table 6.3 the Patterns of Relations among the Actors in the Democratisation Phase Table 7.1 Empirical Result xiii

17 GLOSSARY ABRI ANFREL BAPPENAS BAWALU CDI CETRO CSOs DEMOs DOOs DPD EIHDR EMBs EMOs FORKIP FPMP GAM Golkar ICW IGGI IMF INFIGHT INGOs INSERT JAMPPI JICA JPPR KIPP KL2SS KOMNAS HAM KOPEL KOPPSS : Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Army) : Asian Network for Free Election : Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional (National Planning and Development Bureau) : Badan Pengawas Pemilu (Election Supervisory Body) : Centre for Democratic Institutions : Centre for Electoral Reform : Civil Society Organizations : Domestic Election Monitoring Organizations : Domestic Observers Organizations : Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Local Representatives Assembly) : European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights : Electoral Management Bodies : Election Monitoring Organizations : Forum Komunikasi : Forum Pemerhati Masalah Perempuan (Women Forum) : Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) : Golongan Karya (Functional Party) : Indonesian Corruption Watch : Inter-Governmental Group for Indonesia : International Monetary Fund : Indonesian Front for the Defence of Human Rights : International Non-Governmental Organizations : Indonesia of Social Economy, Research and Training : Jaringan Masyarakat Pemantau Pemilu Indonesia (Society Networking for Indonesia Election Monitoring) : Japan International Cooperation Agency : Jaringan Pemantau dan Pendidik Rakyat (People s Voter Education Network) : Komite Independent Pemantau Pemilu (Independent Committee for Election Monitoring) : Koalisi Lembaga-Lembaga, Sulawesi Selatan (NGOs Coalition, South Sulawesi) : Komite Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (National Committee on Human Rights) : Komite Pemantau Legislatif (Legislative Monitoring Committee) : Koalisi Organisasi Non Profit Pemantau Pemilu Sulawesi Selatan xiv

18 KPU KPRM KY LBH LKIN LP3ES LSM MAPILU PWI MK MPR NAMFREL NDI NU ODA PANWASLAK PBIP PDD PDI/P PIJAR PKS PPP UNFREL TEPI UNDP (Coalltion for Non Profit Election Monitoring Organizations, South Sulawesi) : Komisi Pemilihan Umum (General Election Commission) : Komite Perjuangan Rakyat Miskin Kota (Committee for People Struggle) : Komisi Yudisial (Judicial Court) : Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Institute) : Lembaga Kontrol Independen Indonesia (Independent Organization for Supervising Indonesia) : Lembaga Penelitian, Pengembangan dan Pengkajian Ekonomi- Sosial (Institute of Reserach and Development for Social- Economics) : Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (Civil Society Organizations/CSOs) : Masyarakat Pemantau Pemilu, Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (Election Monitoring Society, Indonesian Journalist Association) : Mahkamah Konstituti (Constitutional Court) : MajelisPermusyawaratan Rakyat (People s Consultative Assembly) : National Citizens Movement for Free Election : National Democratic Institute : Nadhlatul Ulama (Islamic Organizations) : Official Development Assistance : Panitia Pengawas Pelaksana Pemilu (Organization for Election Supervisory ) : Persatuan Buruh Independen (Independent Labour Association) : Partnership for Democratic Development : Partai Demokrasi Indonesia/ Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party/ Struggle) : Pusat Informasi dan Jaringan Aksi untuk Reformasi (Information Centre and Action Network for Reform) : Partai Kesejahteraan Sosial (Social Welfare Party) : Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party) : University Network for Free and Fair Election : Komite Pemilih Indonesia (Indonesian Voters Committee) : United Nation for Development Program xv

19 Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1. Democracy Assistance and The Emergence of Domestic Election Monitoring Organisations (DEMOs) in Indonesia: A Background The end of the Cold War changed the world s power-political constellation, from bipolar to unipolar, with the US as the sole super-power. Consequently, the US was able to spread unimpeded ideas of capitalism, globalisation, democratisation and human rights. The United States then embraced the enlargement of the democratic community as a key element of the US foreign policy, 1 which also influenced other donor countries policies. European donor countries, as well as Canada, Australia, Japan and others also shifted their orientation towards the democracy aid field as the ideas of democracy, human rights and good governance became the objectives of donor countries when distributing aid. The tendency to incorporate democracy and good governance appeared in Japan s Four Guidelines of ODA formulation in 1992, stressing the importance of democracy and human rights as the preconditions for aid. Further evidence was also confirmed when the members of the European Union (EU) began to impose human rights, participatory democracy and the rule of law as the criteria for the countries receiving aid. In parallel, the rise of democracy movements in Latin America, Africa, Asia and other regions required a positive response, both domestically and internationally. Hence, democracy assistance has 1 Steven W. Hook, Inconsistent U.S Efforts to Promote Democracy Abroad, in Peter J. Schraeder, Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p.5. 1

20 recently become a substantial element of developmental cooperation and a tool for the international community to play a role in the democratisation process of a country. 2 However, each member of the international society has a different perspective regarding democratisation that affects its aid policy. The United States, Japan and certain international institutions, such as the United Nations and the World Bank, have their own concerns with regard to supporting democratisation in Indonesia. The United States policy of democracy formation consists of four specific points: (1) Support the establishment of the electoral process by the aid recipients; (2) Promotes the rule of law within the recipient governments; (3) Emphasises the practice of open and pluralistic decision-making process and effective regulations against government corruption; and (4) Promotes the growth of civil society by funding independent news media, labour unions and professional associations in order to enhance governmental accountability and to encourage broadbased political participation. 3 In the case of Indonesia, the United States (through USAID) is more focused on strengthening the role of civil society as the key to democratic development in that country. On the other hand, the United Nations and other international institutions, such as the World Bank, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank, emphasise improving good governance and reform programmes as the keys to democratisation, which determines the level of assistance in the future. 4 The role of the World Bank and of the IMF in reforming Indonesia is undeniably noteworthy, as is their involvement in resolving Indonesia s economic crisis in Similarly, Japan s policy towards democratisation in Indonesia is quite appealing, because its aid policy regards Indonesia is based on economic development instead of on political development. 2 Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers (eds.), Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 2000), p Op.Cit., p World Bank Support New Assistance Strategy for Indonesia in Time of Transition, available at: ~piPK: ~theSitePK:4607,00.html accessed on July 12,

21 However, the phenomenon of international democracy assistance in the early 1990s and the increase in democracy movements in developing countries, including Indonesia, has had an impact on the Japanese aid policy. The introduction of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter (1992) and the initiative of the Partnership for Democratic Development (PDD) in 1996 upheld changes in Japan s aid policy. In Indonesia, the fall of President Soeharto s regime in 1998, which was sparked by an economic crisis, added to the momentum of the democratic movement. Afterwards, Indonesia s democratic movement generated various significant results, such as the recognition of freedom of speech and association, the abolishment of the dual function of the military and the organisation of democratic elections in 1999, 2004 and In this case, elections are seen as a crucial aspect of the transition phase of Indonesia. Some scholars emphasise that transitional elections will help new actors to emerge, who will rebuild the entire aspect of political life, which had been uncertain in transition period. Therefore, seeing their significance, elections should be conducted freely and fairly. One of the ideas in ensuring free and fair elections is through the involvement of election monitoring organisations (EMOs), both domestic and international, in each stage of the election process. This kind of election monitoring is surely important, because elections are the basis for creating a democratic political system. 5 Election monitoring organisations have contributed to more authentic election processes by encouraging fair campaign practices and a more informed electorate, as well as reducing the possibility of fraud and irregularities on election-day. Moreover, EMOs have motivated citizens to become involved in public affairs and have transformed attitudes regarding citizens participation in politics and governance through education. 6 5 Eric Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Election and Building Democracy, (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington DC, 2004). 6 Ibid. 3

22 In Southeast Asia, domestic election monitoring began in the Philippines in the mid-1980s, with the pioneering experience of the National Citizens Movement for Free elections (NAMFREL). NAMFREL organized a voluntary citizen s movement, dedicated to restoring democracy in the Philippines through free and fair elections. NAMFERL s remarkable success in election monitoring capitalised on the Filipino people s rejection of the regime of martial law regime under Ferdinand Marcos, which inspired the occurrence of similar actions around the world in later years. In Thailand, Pollwatch was set up for the same purpose after the military crackdown in May In addition, regional efforts to support domestic monitoring in Asia, such as the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) have developed in recent years. They have become involved in efforts to support domestic elections by offering technical advice or by sharing their experiences with colleagues elsewhere in the region. Election monitoring is a new phenomenon in the Indonesian political system. During the 32 years of Soeharto s presidency, elections were conducted for the purpose of maintaining the regime; thus, election monitoring has become crucial for conducting a democratic election. Therefore, under domestic and international pressure, Habibie s government formally gave an official opportunity for certified foreign and domestic monitors to observe each stage of the 1999 election. Soon after Habibie s authorised public monitoring of the election, hundreds of domestic election monitors participated. These included the University Network for Free and Fair Election, (UNFREL), the Rectors Forum and the Independent Election Monitoring Committee (Komite Independent Pemantau Pemilu, or KIPP). In the 1999 elections, international donors allocated a great amount of funding to assist with many of the activities of Indonesian DEMOs (see Table 1.1). 7 Human Rights Watch Report, Vol. 8, No.5 (C), available at: accessed on July 15,

23 However, the funding then gradually decreased in the 2004 and 2009 elections, particularly with regard to election monitoring activities. The role of the DEMOs in the 1999 elections was the first election monitoring process in Indonesia. Although at that time the election monitors lacked experience, the enthusiasm of the domestic people was very high. Their role meant that the 1999, 2004 and 2009 transitional elections were significantly different from elections under Soeharto s presidency. Table 1.1 Distribution of Electoral Assistance to Indonesia by Donors (in million US$) Donor Japan The US The EU Na UNDP Na: Not Available Source: General Elections Commission, Republic of Indonesia. However, in the 2004, the DEMOs reached a crisis point, caused by two situations. Firstly, there was less international funding for Indonesian DEMOs, which affected the number of DEMOs. As explained previously, since Indonesia had worked towards a democratic election in 1999, international funding for electoral assistance was reduced. In the 1999 election, the USAID provided financial support to almost two hundred Indonesian NGOs for election monitoring and voter education activities. Specifically, through the Asia Foundation, the fund sponsored the People s Voter Education Network (JPPR), which consisted of fifteen Indonesian organisations, including mass Islamic organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah, enabling them to conduct voter education and election monitoring. Nevertheless, although USAID still distributed aid for DEMO activities in the

24 election, the amount was significantly decreased. Moreover, funding from the Japanese government provided about US$ 270,000 for election monitoring and voter education in the 2004 election, whereas they had provided around US$ 3, 4 billion in In the 2009 election, only $147,878 was distributed for voter education programmes, which were conducted by two Indonesian NGOs. The other situation that was a factor at that time was the new law launched by KPU regarding election-monitoring activities, which was interpreted by Indonesian DEMOs as an attempt by KPU to limit and to weaken the role of Indonesian DEMOs. Unlike the 1999 election in which the DEMOs could participate freely, in the 2004 and 2009 elections, DEMOs that wanted to participate in or monitor the elections process had to be accredited by KPU. This rule was criticised by various DEMOs, who felt that this rule could be viewed as a restriction for civil society when participating in the political process. In 2004, there were certain fundamental changes and developing situations in the election. The first was the implementation of a direct presidential election, whereas Indonesia s president had previously been elected by the partially appointed and partially elected People s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR). Secondly, unlike the 1999 election in which the 53 members of the KPU comprised representatives of each political party (48) and representatives of the government (5), in 2004, 11 members of the KPU were chosen from an open recruitment system, which meant that everyone could apply to be a member of KPU through a selection process conducted by government. Thirdly, in this election, 24 political parties were competing with each other, whereas there were 48 parties in The smaller number of participating political parties was a result of the stringent requirements implemented by the KPU. These strict requirements were again seen as a response by the KPU to some critics that had complained about the large number of political parties that participated in the1999 elections. Although the participation of 48 parties in the1999 election could be seen as respect for the principle of freedom of association, a large number of parties could 6

25 also be a source of inefficiency and ineffectiveness, both in terms of the budget and the implementation of the election. In the 2009 election, 34 political parties participated and 24 DEMOs were involved in monitoring the election. In this period, the government published a new law concerning electionmonitoring activities 8 which was then followed by the KPU s regulations regarding procedures for monitoring elections 9 (Peraturan KPU No. 45 Tahun 2008). The regulations defined the requirements for DEMOs, such as accreditation by the KPU and having qualifying financial resources. The regulations also stated that monitoring activities could only be implemented outside of the polling stations. These regulations were responded to with cynicism by Indonesian DEMOs. As the leader of Cetro said, the KPU is positioning itself as a super body. 10 Moreover, the rules seemed to limit and to diminish the role of DEMOs. The KPU s rules were considered to be more reactionary than they were in the 1999 elections, when the monitors actually worked in the arena of polling stations. Concerns about the presence of observers disturbing public order were also over-exaggerated. Although the elections had been acknowledged by international community as being free and fair, there were procedural mistakes involving voter privacy, the quality of the ink and the like. In the 2009 election, there had been many problems regarding the election process, for example the procedure of the election, money politics, intimidation and so on. Moreover, referring to Indonesia s Election Supervisory Body, the number of violations increased in the 2004 and 2009 elections, compared to the 1999 election. 8 See UU. Nomor 10 Tahun 2008 Pasal 233 tentang Tindak Pidana Pemilu (Indonesia Law No. 10/2008 Article 233 about Criminal Violations of Elections) available at: accessed on May 09, See Peraturan KPU No. 45 Tahun 2008 tentang Pemantau dan Tata Cara Pemantauan Pemilu (KPU Law No. 45/2008about Observers and Methods of Election Monitoring) available at: accessed on May 09, Interview with Leader of CETRO, March 20,

26 Table 1.2 Numbers of Violations in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 Elections Number of Violations Election Adm Criminal Total Source: Database of Indonesia s Election Supervisory Committee. See also Ramdansyah (2009). In the 2004 election, there were 8,946 cases of administrative violations and 3,153 criminal cases. Only 31, 66% (2,832) of administrative violations were successfully handled by the KPU. On the other hand, only 32% of criminal cases were brought to court. The number of violations was the summary of violations from all stages of the election process, from voter registration, verification of candidates and campaign processes. In the 2009 election, there were 15,341 administrative violations and 6019 criminal cases. This shows that the number of violations increased by almost 100%. 11 Therefore, the 2009 election was judged as being the worst election following Soeharto s presidency, and the legitimacy there of was questionable. 12 In spite of the reforms in election law and the election system that were implemented to improve the quality of the election, there were still many violations in the 2004 and 2009 elections. Moreover, with regard to the 2009 election, Indonesian DEMOs criticised international observers for not making a press release concerning the implementation of the 2009 election as they had done in the previous elections. The coordinator of the Indonesian Voters Committee (Komite 11 Ramdansyah, Sisi GelapPemilu 2009: Potret Aksesoris Demokrasi Indonesia (Dark Side of the 2009 Election: Portrait of the Indonesian Democratic Accessories), Kawah Media Pustaka, Indonesia, 2010, Jakarta. 12 Available at accessed on May 10, See also Pesta Demokrasi Terburuk Sepanjang Sejarah (The Worst of Democratic Festival in the Indonesian History) Jimly Asshiddiqie, Ex-head of the Constitutional Court, Suara Karya, April 11,

27 Pemilih Indonesia, TEPI), Jeirry Sumampow, responded, it might be caused by the poor quality of the 2009 election. 13 The silence of international observers such as the Carter Center, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and ANFREL was an oddity that complemented anomalies during the 2009 electoral process Problem Statement and Research Question Based on the explanations above, the number of DEMOs involved in monitoring the elections decreased gradually. In the 1999 election, 66 groups participated in monitoring the election, while in 2004 there were only 30 DEMOs, and only 24 DEMOs in the 2009 election. This indicates that not only did the number of DEMOs decrease, but the activities and the number of volunteers also diminished in each election. 14 Despite this, Indonesian DEMOs have undoubtedly played a great role in enhancing the quality of the elections, particularly during the transitional elections that were an essential aspect of democratisation in Indonesia. Moreover, although the roots of election monitoring did not originate in Indonesian political culture, the existence of Indonesian DEMOs has been accepted by Indonesian society and has a great influence on the implementation of elections, especially on the 1999 transitional election. As explained previously, international support is one external factor that has influenced the existence of Indonesian DEMOs. Therefore, the existence of the Indonesian DEMOs and the role of donors have influenced the relations of donors, the state and society in the democratisation of Indonesia. Considering these explanations, this study raises some important questions: 1. Why could the Indonesian DEMOs perform such roles despite not having enough experience, 13 Kompas, May 28, Available at: accessed on April 6,

28 resources, or a strong foundation in Indonesian political systems? 2. What was the role of international donors in the democratisation of Indonesia, especially with regard to supporting the Indonesian DEMOs? 3. What was the relationship of donors, the state and society in the democratisation of Indonesia? In order to answer the above questions, this study employs both theoretical and empirical methodologies, as will be elaborated in the next chapter. In short, much of the vital information in this thesis is obtained from the field research conducted in several stages: preliminary research (June 2007), in-depth interviews (December 2008), observation of the general election (April 2009) and surveys (July-November 2009) Previous Studies on Democracy Assistance and Indonesian DEMOs: Investigating The Unexplored Aspects While studies on democracy assistance and DEMOs are not new, this thesis attempts to provide a better understanding of the phenomenon of democracy assistance, the role of Indonesian DEMOs and its relationship with democratisation in Indonesia. Most discussions on democracy assistance have been strongly coloured by debates regarding the positive and negative impacts on democratisation. As Finkel etal. (2005) argue, there are consistent positive impacts of direct USAID democracy assistance on overall levels of democracy in recipient countries 15,while others works stressed the weak relationship between aid and democracy promotion. 16 Meanwhile, discussions on 15 Finkel, Steven E., Aníbel Pérez-Liñán, Mitchell A. Seligson and Dinorah Azpuru, Effects of US Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, World Politics Vol.59. No. 3, 2007, p Other works see Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers (eds.), Op.Cit., Peter Burnell. Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization, London. Frank Cass, Stephen Knack pointed out a weak relation between aid and democratisation. See Stephen Knack, Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy? International Studies Quarterly, Vol.48, Issue 1, 2000, p Work by Deborah Brautigam explored the aid for civil society organizations and concluded that aid not only has a positive impact, it also has negative implications in terms of creating a strong dependency of CSOs on foreign donors. 10

29 DEMOs stress the importance of international actors in supporting election-monitoring activities conducted by international observers and DEMOs. However, most studies agree that domestic actors have several advantages when conducting monitoring. 17 In using Indonesia as the object of this study, this thesis has two aims. The first is to map donor approaches in distributing democracy aid, particularly in Indonesia, and to identify the characteristics of Indonesian DEMOs. The second is to explore and analyse the dynamics of the donorstate-society (Indonesian DEMOs) relationship through an analysis of the 1999, 2004 and 2009elections. This study also explores the relationship among domestic actors, including DEMOs and other election bodies, such as the General Election Committee (Komisi Pemilihan Umum or KPU), as well as the relationship between domestic actors and donors. Overall, this study aims to investigate the factors that affected the role of Indonesian DEMOs and to map the dynamics of the donors, the state and society in the 1999 to 2009 elections. Several works have already touched upon the issues of DEMOs. Most of works explore African and Latin American cases such as those of Chand (1997), Carothers (1997), Nevitte and Canton (1997), Lean (2007) and Makulilo (2011). 18 Very few works explore the Indonesian case, among which are those by Bjornlund (2004) and Yamada (2008). In his work, Bjornlund explored the 1999 elections and stressed the relationship between international and domestic actors in the process of transitional elections in Indonesia. He emphasised the importance of collaboration between international and Indonesian DEMOs. He also stressed the necessity of supporting and working with See Deborah Brautigam, Aid Dependence and Governance, Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell International, Thomas Carothers, The Rise of Election Monitoring: The Observers Observed, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 3. July Vikram K. Chand, Democratisation from the Outside in: NGOs and International efforts to Promote Open Elections, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1997, p , Thomas Carothers, The Rise of Election Monitoring: The Observers Observed, Loc. Cit., Neil Nevitte & Santiago A. Canton, The Rise of Election Monitoring: The Role of Domestic Observer, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 3 July 1997, Sharon Lean, International Democracy Assistance to Domestic Election Monitoring: Conditions for Success, Journal of Democratisation, Vol. 14 No. 2, April 2007, and Alexander B. Makulilo, Watching the Watcher: An Evaluation of Local election Observers in Tanzania, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vo. 49, No. 2, 2011, p

30 Indonesian DEMOs as local actors in order to enhance the quality of the elections. 19 Meanwhile, Yamada, by exploring the first Indonesian DEMOs (KIPP), has stressed the role of international assistance and international networking (INGOs) in the success of Indonesian DEMOs in the 1997 and the 1999 elections in terms of conducting monitoring activities. 20 In general, the academic literature has focused on the positive impact of domestic election monitoring organisations and the importance of international support for them. Moreover, they mainly investigate the practical aspects of Indonesian DEMOs, but focus less on the origin and characteristics of Indonesian DEMOs, which has affected the practical aspects thereof. Moreover, in relation to with democracy assistance, other works have focused on the role of democracy assistance during that period without paying more attention to analysing the dynamic relationship of DEMOs, the state and democracy aid providers (donors). Despite the amount of literature on Indonesian DEMOs and democracy assistance, it is remarkable that there are so few attempts to explore a comprehensive background and the role of Indonesian DEMOs as new actors after the decline of the Soeharto regime. Also, most of the studies have paid less attention to investigating the dynamics of the political aspect, both domestic and international, surrounding the existence of Indonesian DEMOs and the relationship of Indonesian DEMOs, donors and the state. This thesis is an attempt to analyse and explore the unexamined aspects of previous literature Significance of the Study Two important aspects will be explored in this study. The first is to identify the characteristics 19 Bjornlund, 2004, Op.Cit. 20 Mitsuru Yamada, The Role of International NGOs in Democratization Assistance in Southeast Asia: Cooperation with Local NGOs through Election Monitoring Activities, Journal of the Graduate of Toyo Eiwa University, Vol. 4/2008, pp

31 of Indonesian DEMOs and to map donor approaches in distributing aid. The second is to uncover and analyse the dynamics of the donor-state-society relationships in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections. This study also pays attention to exploring the relationship of domestic actors, such as DEMOs and other election bodies like the General Election Committee (Komisi Pemilihan Umum or KPU), as well as the relationship between domestic actors and donors. Overall, this study strives to investigate the factors that affect the role of Indonesian DEMOs and to map the dynamic relationship of donors, the state and society during the elections from 1999 to Therefore, this study is expected to contribute to the literature on democracy assistance and democratisation studies that focus on electoral matters, as well as donor-state-civil society relations. As many works on democracy assistance has paid less attention to the role of DEMOs in transitional countries, this study will enrich the understanding of the phenomena of DEMOs and democracy assistance from the aspect of elections. Moreover, the relationship between international and domestic actors has been explored in many other studies. However, by using Indonesia s case, this study will highlight the relationship between domestic and international actors in the democratisation process, which will give a unique perspective. The domestic actors in this study are Indonesian DEMOs/NGOs and the Indonesian government, while the international actors are the donor countries/institutions. This research emphasises the importance of civil society-state-donor relationships in the democratisation process and the ways in which democracy assistance have a positive impact on supporting domestic actors at different levels, encouraging them to cooperate and involve themselves actively in the democratisation process in Indonesia. In addition, this study is expected to not only enrich the academic discourse on democracy assistance, but also to contribute practically to greater democratic development and to the synergy between international and domestic actors in supporting democratisation. 13

32 1.5. Organisation of the Thesis This thesis consists of seven chapters, including the conclusion. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the study and some initial data and arguments revealing the reasons that conducting this study is important. This chapter highlights the emergence of Indonesian DEMOs (historical aspects) and the importance of analysing the relationship between democracy assistance and Indonesian DEMOs as a new phenomenon in the Indonesian political context after the Soeharto regime. Chapter 2 contains the theoretical framework and methodology that will be used to analyse and explore the questions raised in this study. The purpose of this chapter is to build the framework to analyse the relationship between international and domestic actors in the democratisation process, especially in the case of DEMOs in supporting the electoral democratic process in Indonesia after the Soeharto regime. After constructing the theoretical framework and explaining the methodologies, Chapter 3 explores the development of elections in Indonesia. This chapter will show the shift of election methods from the Soeharto authoritarian regime to the reform period. Moreover, this study emphasises the relationship between the political system and the way in which a regime will conduct elections. Chapter 4 will analyse the donors approach to the implementation of democracy assistance in Indonesia, focusing on electoral assistance. Three influential donors in Indonesia will be explored, namely Japan, the US and the EU. This chapter will be divided into four sections. The first section will explore the implementation of Japanese democracy assistance in Indonesia, followed by the second and third sections that will focus on US and EU democracy aid. The fourth section will map donor approaches in distributing democracy aid to Indonesia. The mapping of donor approaches is one of findings of this study. 14

33 Following the mapping of donor approaches towards democracy assistance, chapters 5 and 6 present analyses of fieldwork results and findings of this study on the Indonesian DEMOs and the dynamic relationship between international and domestic actors in the democratisation of Indonesia. Chapter 5 is divided into four sections, analysing the role of Indonesian DEMOs. This chapter will start with an analysis of the elections under the Soeharto regime and will encompass elections during the post-soeharto regime. The next section will explore the characteristics of Indonesian DEMOs and the development of Indonesian DEMOs from 1997 until The last section will examine the role of Indonesian DEMOs in the democratisation of Indonesia. Chapter 6 will emphasise the analysis of international and domestic actor relations in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections. It contains an analysis of the dynamics of donor-state-society relationships in the democratisation process of Indonesia, as well as in these relationships. This study attempts to identify changes and continuities in donor-state-society relations. Chapter 7 presents the conclusions reached in this study. The findings of this thesis will be summarised in this section. The results conclude that first, the US and the EU frameworks that are linked to CSOs are more effective than is the Japanese framework, which is more focused on the government and less on the CSOs component; second, the network type of the Indonesian DEMOs is the best type. Moreover, network types and DOOs promote democratisation in Indonesia by playing a significant role in enhancing the quality of the electoral process; and last, the Paris Declaration and the positive results on the electoral process have strengthened governmental control of the donors and the society. This means that, in parallel with the positive trend of democratisation, the relationship of donors, the state and society have been negatively affected after the Soeharto regime. 15

34 Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework and Methodology 2.1. Some Theoretical Frameworks for Analysing Democratisation, Democracy Assistance and Election Monitoring in Indonesia Democratisation: Typology and Phases Welzel classified four types of democratisation processes. 21 The first is responsive democratisation, which is claimed to be the dominant type democratisation in the global wave of democratisation. He argues, responsive democratisation is the joint result of objective social conditions, motivational mass tendencies and intentional collective action, triggered by critical events ; 22 therefore, it can create socially-embedded democracy. The second is enlightened democratisation, as can be seen in the cases of Germany, Italy and Japan in the post-world War II era. This type is occurred when elite respect democratic standards even in absence of mass pressure. 23 The next type is imposed democratisation when the process of Democratisation is depending on external power. It happened again in the democratisation of Germany, Japan and Italy after World War II, as well as in the US, which has attempted to install democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq. The fourth type is opportunistic democratisation, which emphasises the role of the international community, particularly donor agencies, in the process of democratisation. 21 Christian Welzel, Theories of Democratization, in Christian W. Haerpher et.al., Democratization, (Oxford University Press, 2009), pp Ibid. 23 Ibid. 16

35 Another approach in explaining the democratisation process entails dividing the process into three stages: liberalisation, transition and consolidation. 24 In the liberalisation phase, the elite in power abolish old rules and introduce new ones- often civil rights for individuals and groups- in order to overcome a crisis of legitimacy within the autocratic system. Liberalisation is a gradual process in which the authoritarian system disintegrates as a result of the redefinition and enlargement of political rights and the expansion of the societal space for political manoeuvring. The second phase is the transition period, which includes the period between the breakdown of the old regime to the formal establishment of a new government. During this phase, the new rules of the political game are defined. As Linz and Stepan noted, 25 A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure. Linz and Stepan emphasised the role of the elite in democratic transition and simplified the process of democratic transition. The transition period is an important step for democratisation, as it creates the possibility for both consolidation and for liberalisation. In addition, O Donnell and Schmitter mention that the result can either be the installation of a political democracy or the restoration of a new, and possibly more severe, form of authoritarian rule. Therefore, in this period, not only do the elite play a vital role, but so do social groups or social movements that have influence over the state in leading the ways of political reform. 24 Hans Peter Schmitz and Katrin Sell, International Factors in the Process of Political Democratization in Jean Grugel (ed.), Democracy without Borders: Transnationalization and Conditionality in New Democracies, (London & New York: Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science, 1999), p. 25, see also O Donnell and Schmitter, Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1986), pp Juan Linz and Stepan, A (eds.), Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1996), p.1. 17

36 The next phase is defined as the consolidation period, in which the new political regime shows that it is established, institutionalised and legitimised in order to ensure the continuance of democracy and its resistance to crisis. In this phase, democracy is extended beyond its formal aspects (mainly free elections) to become more meaningful for the majority of citizens and in terms of specific national characteristics. 26 On the other hand, Clear, who wrote about democracy and donors in Indonesia, has comprehensively explained the shifting positions of the actors during the process of democracy. She argues that the actors in the democratisation process can be classified according to three approaches. 27 Firstly, state-oriented approaches (state reformer strategy) explain the state s responsibilities in order to ensure there are sufficient channels and opportunities for people to participate and as the supreme guarantor of the democratic process. The second approach is called the societally-oriented approach (grassroots mobiliser strategy) and is defined as an approach that focuses on either the behavioural aspect of the institutions or on the institutions generated by societal initiatives. This approach stresses the importance of civil society in the democratic process. The third approach is the state-society interactive approach (mediator strategy), which emphases the linkages and interactions between the state and the society in the democratic process and which has coloured the recent theories of democratisation. Looking at the history of democratic movements in developing countries, the 1990s became a significant period in the struggle for democracy in the developing world, starting with People Power in the Philippines in 1986, student demonstrations in China in 1989 and Pro-Democracy demonstrations in Thailand in These actions instigated the democracy movement in Indonesia that started to grow after the 1980s, originating in the politics of openness (Politik Keterbukaan) that were was 26 Schmitz and Sell, Op.Cit. 27 Annette Marie Clear, Democracy and Donors in Indonesia, Dissertation, Columbia University, 2002, pp Also see her works on International Donors and Indonesian Democracy, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume IX, No. 1, Spring 2002, pp

37 introduced under Soeharto s regime. Public demands for a political opening-up continued and democratisation has been a public issue since that time. On the other hand, since the end of Cold War, the US has embraced the enlargement of the democratic community as a key element of US foreign policy. 28 Soon, the idea of democracy, human rights and good governance became the objectives of aid from donor countries. This study believes that this international factor has also influenced the rise of democratic development in Indonesia through aid conditionality at government level and democracy aid promotion that targets the grassroots level. Furthermore, the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 affected not only on economic and social dimensions, but also on the political situation, especially the demand for political reform that ended with the fall of the Soeharto regime. The economic crisis also forced international actors such as the IMF, the World Bank, the United States and Japan to play a role by emphasising economic and political reform. Therefore, the period of the mid-1980s-1997 under Soeharto s government could be categorised as a pre-liberalisation period. As O Donnell and Schmitter 29 argue, when the authoritarian leaders begin to modify their own rules in the direction of providing secure guarantees for the rights of individuals and groups, it means the transition (has) already started. Moreover, Hadiwinata and Schuck also argue that, when the protests in the 1980s and early 1990s against the autocratic style of the Soeharto regime began, it was obvious that liberalisation had begun and called this phase instrumentalized liberalisation. 30 However, this study prefers to define this as compulsive liberalisation, which means that liberalisation has been introduced without really being motivated by the regime s enthusiasm for 28 Hook, Op.Cit. 29 O Donnell and Schmitter, Op.Cit., p Bob S. Hadiwinata and Christopher Schuck (eds.), Democracy in Indonesia: The Challenge of Consolidation, Aufl-Nomos, 2007, p

38 introducing it. It was a response to pressure from people, both domestic and international, who urged the government to create opportunities for political activities that were wider than they were before. Moreover, after the Cold War, the international community, especially donor countries and organisations, emphasised democratisation as one of the prominent requirements for assistance. Political aid conditionality became a tool for promoting democracy on the part of the donors. Therefore, referring to the typology of democratisation, this study reveals that Indonesia s case can be characterised as the result of a combination of two typologies, namely opportunistic and responsive democratisation. The beginning of the democratic movement in Indonesia under Soeharto s regime was more of an opportunistic typology than responsive democratisation. Nevertheless, after Soeharto s regime, the process that was prompted by mass pressure was responsive democratisation, rather than opportunistic democratisation. The decline of Soeharto s regime in 1998, initially caused by an economic crisis, was a significant factor in the great movement towards democratisation in Indonesia. Therefore, the rise of Habibie s government could be considered to be a period of liberalisation, as indicated by political instability and a significant increase in the people s participation in political activities. Habibie also introduced new rules and laws, such as freedom of the press and association, a new election law and a decentralisation law. The 1999 transitional elections under Habibie indicated the end of the liberalisation period, while the rise of Abdurahman Wahid as president was the initial step of the transition period (see figure 2.1). This study argues that, after Soeharto s regime, although Indonesia has a new political regime and has already implemented three democratic elections, Indonesia is still in the transition phase of democratisation. This study classifies the transition period into two processes: the initial process that is signalled by the organisation of transitional elections, and the deepening process before entering the consolidation phase that is indicated by the process of formulating new laws or rules and allowing 20

39 people to be involved in the political process. Therefore, the consolidation phase means that not have only the procedural processess of democratisation (freee and fair elections) been implemented and a new and legitimised government has been established (procedural democracy), but important aspects of the hardware and software of democracy is ready to be installed democracy). 31 in the political system (substantive Figure 2. 1 Regime Changes and Democratisat tion in Indonesia Note: Chart created by the author. In the transition period, the role of civil society is important in guaranteeing and keeping the process of democratisation on the right track. However, since civil society often operates independently, it needs support from both the domestic and the international community. Hanz Peter 31 For procedural democracy, seee Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, (Routledge, London and New York, 2003). For substantive democracy, see Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999) ). 21

40 Schmitz and Katrin Sell contributed the analysis of the phenomenon of international factors in democratisation. 32 They state that: Democratisation..is the result of a complex interaction of international and domestic factors where initially competitive claims about the better social order are exchanged, and significant pro-democratic actors appear International factors can provide varying and specific support for democratic change. In the periods of liberalization and transition, it is important to understand why representatives of once dominant elite suddenly feel uncertainty about their own future and concern about the capabilities of the opposition. One of the reasons may be that international factors support domestic forces for change. 33 Although international factors play a role, it should be noted that domestic factors are still the predominant role in democratisation. The case of Indonesia shows the phenomenon of domestic and international factors in the democratisation process and concludes that democratisation in Indonesia was a result of domestic factors that were supported by international factors. As mentioned above, this study argues that the process of democratisation in Indonesia is still in the transitional process. This means that elections are still an important step for Indonesia when entering the consolidation phase. Therefore, the quality of the elections should be guaranteed through monitoring activities, voter education and the like, whereby international actors can play a role in the process of democratisation in Indonesia Democracy Assistance: Approaches and Types The phenomenon of democracy assistance began in the mid-1980s and was sponsored by the US government. Ottaway and Carothers stated that the rise of democracy assistance has been influenced by two main factors: the global democratic trend itself and the end of the Cold War. 34 Since 32 Hanz Peter Schmitz, Op. Cit., p Ibid. 34 Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, The Burgeoning World of Civil Society Aid, in Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers (eds.), 2000, Op.Cit. 22

41 the implementation of democracy assistance, it was followed by the rise of debates regarding the legality, necessity and effectiveness of democracy assistance in supporting democratic reform in a non-democratic country. The concept of democracy assistance has been understood in various ways. Some scholars generalise democracy assistance as foreign aid, while others see democracy assistance as a specific concept and argue that there are different strategies and approaches in the implementation of democracy assistance in comparison with other forms of foreign aid. Foreign aid is defined as the transfer of capital, commodities and expertise from developed countries to developing or late developing countries, which can be distributed through bilateral and multilateral organisations. The era of foreign aid can be divided into two periods. The first was during the Cold War (1950s-1990) and the second after the end of the Cold War. In the first period, the conflict between the US and the USSR coloured the motives of foreign aid at that time. Political and national security could be seen as the main motivation of donor countries in the early era. After the end of the Cold War, the US became a hegemonic power, and democratisation, human rights and environmental considerations became important issues when distributing donor aid. In fact, donors had been avoiding using foreign aid for political development goals for many years, because it could be seen as a kind of intervention. However, since the 1990s, this goal was explicitly formulated with the argument that a democratic form of government and good governance promote economic development, and that respect for human rights is an integrated part of poverty orientation. 35 As a result, political aid conditionality, democracy promotion and democracy assistance have emerged as conditions of international development. For example, the World Bank has formulated good governance as a developmental goal and the US emphasises democratic government as part of the major goal of US aid. 35 John Degnbol-Martinussen and Poul Engberg-Pedersen, Aid: Understanding International Development Cooperation, (London: Zed Books, 2003), p

42 However, Bearce and Tirone noted that each donor has its own strategic goal. 36 For example, US aid has been driven by the goal of developing military relationships, while British and French aid has been directed towards maintaining political influence vis a vis former colonies. Japanese and German aid has been motivated by the goal of increasing their economic and commercial power. 37 The philosophy/framework of aid of each donor country, which translates into the distribution of aid, can be used to investigate the goal of each donor. For example, Japan s developmental aid has been formulated as economic cooperation (keizaikyoryoku). Consequently, economic intentions can be seen as being at the core of Japanese aid. With regard to the relationship between aid and democracy, Finkel argued, there are consistent positive impacts of direct USAID democracy assistance on overall levels of democracy in recipient countries, as measured by the Freedom House and Polity IV indices over time. 38 However, some scholars have found a negative impact, or no correlation, between democracy and aid. For example, Stephen Knack states, no evidence is found that aid promotes democracy. Furthermore, he argues that improving education and increasing per capita income is more conducive to democratisation than are technical assistance (such as elections, strengthening legislatures and judiciaries) and aid conditionality. 39 Grossman also argues that aid can become a source of political coups and political instability, because donors have occasionally tended to support the government that has control over the political situation in recipient countries. 40 Another work by Frederick Brown and Marina Ottaway, which examined the 1993 election in Cambodia and the 1992 election in Angola, found a negative impact caused by the involvement of 36 David H. Bearce and Daniel C. Tirone, Foreign Aid Effectiveness and the Strategic Goals of Donor Governments, the Journal of Politics, Vol. 72, No. 3, July 2010, p Ibid. 38 Finkel, Steven E., et.al., Loc.Cit. 39 Knack, 2004, Loc.Cit. 40 H.I. Grossman, Foreign Aid and Insurrection, Defence Economics, Vol.3, No. 4, p

43 democracy aid. 41 Other scholars have stressed the role of democracy aid providers as being instrumental in bringing about democratic reform and in preventing the continuity of the democratic process in one country. 42 In his work on Foreign Aid and Democracy promotion: Lessons from Africa, Stephen Brown argues that although positive relationships between foreign aid and democracy can be found in some cases, other factors could affect democracy promotion programmes in sub-saharan Africa. Structural conditions, such the level of poverty, and donors paying little attention to the goals of the recipient countries utilising the aid are two obstacles that he identified as having the potential to limit the effectiveness of aid. In other aspects, Dietrich and Wright pointed out that democracy and governance aid has a positive effect on democratic consolidation, while economic aid has little effect. 43 Furthermore, they explained that in order to support the transition to democracy, donor aid could be channelled via two frameworks: bottom-up assistance (targeted at civil society) and government-led democratisation (targeted at opposition). However, they noted that the transitional process is dependent on the behaviour of the incumbent regime. If the incumbent regime could predict a positive result of transition for the incumbent in terms of the power position, foreign aid could play a role in this process. As they wrote...we argue that...foreign aid can buy transitions to democracy when the costs of these political concessions to the incumbent are relatively low Frederick Brown, Cambodia's Rocky Venture in Democracy and Marina Ottaway Angola's Failed Elections in Krishna Kumar (ed.), Post-conflict Elections, Democratization, and International Assistance, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). 42 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, International Linkage and Democratization Journal of Democracy, Vol.16 No.3, 2005, pp See also Susan Hyde, Experimenting in Democracy Promotion: International Observers and the 2004 Presidential Elections in Indonesia, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 8 No. 2, p Simon Dietrich and Stephen Wright, Foreign Aid Delivery and Democratic Consolidation in Africa, April 4, 2012, p. 11. Available at accessed on August 28, Ibid. 25

44 Despite the debates regarding negative or insignificant relationships between aid and democracy, democracy assistance is still distributed by donors via various strategies and approaches. Peter Burnell emphasises three conditions that should be considered before democracy assistance is defined as follows: First, democratic advance must be a primary objective of democracy assistance. Second, the methods of democracy assistance must be peaceful. Third, democracy assistance is negotiated on a not for-profit basis (a commercial market transaction). Consequently, democracy assistance should be funded on a grant basis. 45 In addition, Schoofs and Zeeuw stressed that there are two main entry points for external actors when promoting democracy: one is to focus on the civil society and the other is to focus on the state. When the international community is serious about helping countries to become more democratic, both entry points should be used. 46 It is important to support civil society, because it is believed that with education and support, people will prefer democracy, while governments are targeted because of the assumption that governments conduct institutional reforms. The roles of the actors are believed to lead to transition. 47 Democracy assistance has become one of the international factors in democratisation. This assistance is defined as support (in the form of funds or technical assistance) for efforts that are aimed at bringing democratic structures to the developing world. 48 Another scholar describes democracy assistance as a variety of programmes initiated by the international community to strengthen democratic institutions and processes in less developed or other countries, which involve different 45 Peter Burnell (ed.), Op.Cit., p Steven Schoofsand Jeroen de Zeeuw, The Future of Democracy Assistance, Seminar Report, the Netherlands Institute of International Studies, Nairobi, April 2005, available at: accessed on March 28, Ibid. 48 JICA Study Report, Sanka-gata Kaihatsu to Yoi Touchi:Bun ya Betsu Enjo Kenkyuu Kaihoukokusho (Participatory Development and Good Governance), Published by JICA,

45 issues such as political participation, governance and human rights. 49 Carothers and Ottaway defined democracy assistance as aid programs [that] are specifically designed either to help non democratic countries become democratic or to help countries that have initiated a democratic transition consolidate their democratic system. Thus, this study defines democracy assistance as aid programmes provided by the international community via bilateral or multilateral organisations, with the aim of assisting nondemocratic countries to become democratic countries and to strengthen them, by using peaceful, direct or indirect methods, channelled at both the governmental and the community level, based on a nonprofit orientation (grant basis) and the country s needs. With regard to the areas of democracy assistance, electoral support is one of the oldest and most widely accepted forms. In both political and financial terms, support for elections has probably been the most prominent sector for democracy assistance. Human rights came second and significantly less attention was given to the media sectors. 50 However, the focus of donor democracy aid on elections has been criticised by many scholars. They argue that it is better and more valuable for donor countries to support long-term projects for democratisation. Similarly, Carothers recognised that any effort to strengthen democracy must necessarily be long term, if the intention is to produce discernible results. 51 In line with the above view, this study stresses that democracy involves more than simply having a democratic election, although elections are a necessary condition at the start of the process of political reform. Organising free and fair elections during the democratisation process, specifically in the transition phase, is needed in order to create a clean government that is elected by the majority. Elklit and Svensson emphasised that: 49 Quigley, Kevin F.F. Democracy Assistance in Southeast Asia: Long History/Unfinished Business, in Peter Burnell, Op.Cit., p Schoofs and Zeeuw, Loc. Cit. 51 Thomas Carothers, 1997, Loc.Cit. 27

46 Without election there is no easy way to evaluate whether the interim government is or is not actually representing the majority. Without elections, actors who did not play a central role in eliminating the old regime will find it very difficult to emerge and assert that they have a democratic mandate. Without elections, the full array of institutions that constitute a new democratic political society-such as legislatures, constituent assemblies, and competitive political parties-simply cannot develop sufficient autonomy, legality, and legitimacy. Therefore, the concept free and fair election must be clearly defined and must be translated into specific criteria that can be used to evaluate election. 52 In the case of Indonesia, democracy assistance was also directed towards democratic elections in the early stages of political reform. Elections became an important factor in the process of changing regimes. Therefore, there was great support from donor countries for the 1999 transitional election. Almost sixty million US dollars was provided by donor countries, including Japan, the US and the EU, to support the first Indonesian democratic election during the reform period. A variety of programmes had a direct or an indirect impact on the development of democracy in Southeast Asia. However, the distribution of aid for the development of democracy is less than is that for economic and military assistance. Carothers discusses out whether an emphasis on political development should have preceded the emphasis on economic development. The question is important in deciding where best to focus the donors resources. 53 With regard to the approach towards democracy assistance, Carothers, in his work that focuses on US and EU democracy aid, pointed out two distinct, overall approaches to assisting democracy, namely the political approach and the developmental approach. 54 He argued that international democracy assistance has reached maturity to some extent; consequently, the process of the diversification of democracy aid cannot be avoided. The strategy of one-size fits-all has been abandoned, and democracy aid providers are exploring various strategies as a response to the diversity of the political contexts across the world. The process of differentiation is signalled by the emergence 52 Jorgen Elklit and Palle Svensson, The Rise of Election Monitoring: What Makes Elections Free and Fair? Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8 No. 3 July 1997, p Carothers, Loc. Cit. 54 Thomas Carothers, Democracy Assistance: Political Vs Developmental? Journal of Democracy, Vol. 20, No. 1, January

47 of both approaches to assisting democracy. Carothers compared the two approaches by using several dimensions, summarised as follows: Table 2.1 The Political Approach and the Developmental Approach towards Democracy Aid Dimension Political Approach Developmental Approach Value of democracy Concept of democracy Concept of Democratisation Method of supporting democracy Believe that the advance of democracy in a country will contribute to social and economic development (the socioeconomic aspect is secondary) The importance of genuine, competitive elections and sufficient respect for political and civil rights to ensure that citizens can participate meaningfully in the democratic political process. Democratisation as a process of political struggle in which political actors who can be clearly identified as democrats contend with nondemocratic forces. Directly through assistance (training, advice, moral, support or funding) to the political actors themselves. Indirectly through support to key institutions- an independent media, an independent judiciary and so on. Believe in supporting democracy based on the conviction that basic features of democratic governance- transparency, accountability, and responsivenesscontribute to more equitable socioeconomic development. This approach values democracy as a contributing factor in the larger process of national development. Looks beyond an exclusively political definition of democracy to a broader conception that incorporates socioeconomic concerns and tends to see economic and social rights as being no less important than political and civil rights. This approach conceives of democratisation as a slow, iterative process, measured in decades and marked by the gradual accumulation of small gains. They hold that it is better to achieve a certain basic level of social and economic development, including an effective state and the rule of law, before proceeding with democratisation This approach always stresses the importance of partnership with the host government and inclines towards indirect methods of assisting democracy. Source: Carothers, (2009: 6-9) 29

48 In addition, Sugiura Koichi who wrote about Japanese Foreign Diplomacy on Democratisation, divided the approaches towards international democracy assistance into three categories, namely coercion, persuasion and consensus. 55 Coercion is the approach of donor countries when demanding political reform in the recipient country through aid conditionality, sometimes by suspending aid, or by applying economic or diplomatic sanctions. Furthermore, donor countries sometimes implement military action and have also strongly supported pro-democracy groups in order to support democratic movements in the recipient countries. On other hand, donor approaches that are based on partnership with the government of the recipient countries and which focus on requests from the government could be categorised as persuasion and consensus approaches. In these approaches, the donors and the host governments have to cooperate under an economic development scheme, which is believed indirectly affect the process of democratisation. Koichi argued that the Japanese approach to promoting democracy is based on persuasion and consensus. 56 Other scholars, including Stephen J. Golub in his work Democracy and Development, use US aid for democracy and governance as a case study, dividing democracy aid into two categories, namely democracy with a Big D and democracy with a small d (the D or d means democracy). 57 The assistance, which is directed at formal systems of governance such as elections, judiciaries, legislatures, political parties and other core democratic institutions, could be categorised as democracy with a Big D. 55 Sugiura Koichi, Nihon no Minsyuka Gaikou: 1990 Ikou no Nihon no Minsyuka Shien Katsudou (Japanese Diplomacy on Democratisation Issues-Japanese Democracy Assistance Activities After 1990), Gendai Syakai Kenkyuu Kyoto Joushi Daigaku Gendai Shakai Gakubu (Contemporary Social Research, the Women s University of Kyoto, 9 (12), pp For further details regarding his opinion of democracy assistance, see also Sugiura Koichi, Minsyuka Shien: 21seki no kokusai kankei to demokurasi no kousan (Democracy Assistance: The Relations between International Relations and Democracy in 21 Century), Houritsu Bunka Sha: Japan, Ibid., p Steven J. Golub, Democracy as Development: A Case for Civil Society Assistance in Asia, in Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers (eds.), Op.Cit., pp

49 In contrast, assistance that is distributed with a focus on democracy with a small d aims in part at socio-economic progress for disadvantaged people, aspiring to have an impact on specific policies, practices and populations. The disadvantaged people here are defined as citizens who have limited participation in governance and who derive little benefit from development. Golub considers the importance of the role of civil society organisations whose primary focus is on socio-economic development to achieve both development and democratisation. Therefore, democracy aid should support small d over Big D initiatives. Table 2.2 The Distinction between Big D and small d Dimension Big D small d Core Activities Aims Democratic political systems/democratic institution reform such as elections, judiciaries, legislature and so on Progress on democracy and the rule of law on the national level Socio-economic development, for example, civic education and advocacy Aimed at having impact on specific policies, practices and populations, especially to achieve socioeconomic progress for disadvantaged people Focus of entry point State level Community level Method of assisting democracy Direct Indirect Source: Golub (2000: ) In light of the above explanations, this study combines the two approaches to distinguish the form of democracy assistance given by aid providers. A possible framework for mapping the approach of democracy aid providers can be described as follows. 31

50 Diagram 2.1 Mapping of International Democracy Assistance Big D 3 1 Developmental Approach Political Approach 4 2 small d Note: Chart created by the author The donor countries approach can be categorised as a political approach with Big D (area 1), a political approach with small d (area 2), a developmental approach with Big D (area 3) and a developmental approach with small d (area 4). If they focus on programmes that support activities which have a direct impact or a direct connection to promoting democratic reform in the political system/institution, such as an election or citizens political participation, the political approach of this kind of country can be categorized as being Big D (area 1). On the other hand, a country that has same focus issue as Area 1, but which focuses its activities more on the community level and the collaboration with civil society (CSO or NGOs), is classified as having a political approach with a small d (Area2). Furthermore, a country that focuses its programmes on promoting socio-economic development, such as poverty reduction, population, and human rights, and which channels its aid through the government is defined as a donor country that focuses on Area 3. Conversely, a donor country that creates programs for promoting socio-economic development, but which is more focused on civil society or community level activities, should be placed in Area 4. This area is proposed by 32

51 Golub as the ideal area, which should be the centre of attention for democracy aid providers. 58 The chart is important for understanding how each donor country has formulated its approach towards promoting democracy. In the early years of Indonesian political reform, vast amounts of democracy assistance were distributed by the international community, including great support for the 1999 transitional election. A fund of almost sixty million dollars was provided by donor countries through UNDP, including the US, the EU and Japan, which gave the largest donation. This is quite interesting because this was the first time that Japan was willing to support the elections, an area that was obviously political and which they had avoided for a long time. Clear, when examining three donor strategies (Dutch, Japanese and American) in the 1999 Indonesian parliamentary elections, pointed out that the Japanese strategy was very much state focused, while the Dutch and American strategies were more focussed on civil society. However, she identified certain weaknesses of both state-oriented and society-oriented approaches. Based on the analysis of the weakness of state-oriented and society-oriented donor strategies, she concluded that a state-society interactive strategy is necessary in cases of late democratisers such Indonesia. 59 Azpuru et.al pointed out interesting data regarding US democracy assistance to Indonesia. Although she did not analyse US democracy assistance to Indonesia specifically, she demonstrated data that explain why Indonesia has received US democracy assistance since It is an interesting fact that Indonesia had already received democracy assistance when it was governed under Soeharto s authoritarian regime. Moreover, based on Azpuru s work, Indonesia has become the largest recipient of US assistance when compared to other Asian countries (see the data below). 58 Golub, Ibid., p Clear, Op.Cit. 60 Dinorah Azpuru, et.al., Trends in Democracy Assistance: What Has the United States been Doing? Journal of Democracy, Vol. 19, No. 2, April

52 Table 2.3 List of Recipient Countries of USAID Democracy Assistance in Asia Country Years of DG Aid Total DG Aid (Million US $) Afghanistan Bangladesh Cambodia China East Timor India Indonesia Korea, Republic of Malaysia Mongolia Myanmar (Burma) Nepal Pakistan Philippines Sri Lanka Thailand Vietnam Source: Dinorah Azpuru, et.al., Trends in Democracy Assistance: What Has the United States been Doing? Journal of Democracy, April 2008, Vol. 19, Number 2, Supplementary Graphics, available at: journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/seligsongraphics-19-2.pdf Similarly, Aspinall pointed out that US democracy assistance to Indonesia was already being channelled to Indonesian NGOs since However, he stressed that foreign donors did not play an important role in the year that Soeharto stepped down, but that their role was significant after he transition period. He wrote as follows: Donor assistance and the civil society groups that the donors supported did not contribute to the 1998 regime change directly. Instead, the regime fell as a result of a combination of factors: the impact of a massive financial crisis, the ossification and inflexibility of its own political structures, and a wave of protests led by students. Nevertheless, donor assistance did play an important role by supporting organisations that put notions of human rights and democratic reform on the political agenda, preparing the ground for democratic transition when the regime finally collapsed Edward Aspinall, Assessing Democracy Assistance to Indonesia, Project Report, FRIDE, May 2010, p Ibid. 34

53 Civil society is a target of US democracy aid. In the early stages of the transition period, civil society found it easy to get funding from the US. This was described as pump[ing] money into NGOs. 63 As explained in Chapter 1, this study also notes that, in the beginning stages of democratisation, donors distributed greater funding to support the 1999 transitional election. The election-monitoring sector, which consisted of domestic organisations, was the largest recipient of funding at that time. However, the funding gradually decreased in the 2004 and the 2009 elections, whereas this study argues that considering the limitation of domestic election monitoring organisations and the increase of fraud in both elections, donor support has a significant impact on DEMOs activities The Importance of Election and Domestic Election Monitoring In order to establish a new government the in transition phase, elections are crucial because, without them, there is no easy way to evaluate whether or not the interim government is actually representing the majority. As Elklit and Svensson wrote: Without elections, actors who did not play a central role in eliminating the old regime will find it very difficult to emerge and assert that they have a democratic mandate. Without elections the full array of institutions that constitute a new democratic political society-such as legislatures, constituent assemblies, and competitive political parties-simply cannot develop sufficient autonomy, legality, and legitimacy 64 Similarly, Neil and Santiago noted that elections are seen as a crucial aspect of the transition phase. 65 Transitional elections will help new actors to emerge and to rebuild the all aspects of political life that become uncertain in transition period. They state: 63 Ibid., p Jorgen Elklit and Palle Svensson, Loc.Cit., p Neil and Santiago, Loc.Cit. 35

54 Because the importance of election in transition period, free and fair elections attract international attention for combination of good reason: they not only constitute a litmus test of regime s devotion to variety of democratic values and procedural forms, but also provided critical opportunities for voters to weaken or break the grip of authoritarian governments. 66 Moreover, Bjornlund also stressed, the transitional elections are not the ends but they mean catalysts for the longer term process of building democratic practices, values and institutions. 67 Therefore, the concept of a free and fair election must be clearly defined and must be translated into specific criteria that can be used to evaluate elections. In order to ensure free and fair (Jujur dan Adil) 68 transitional elections Indonesia has to consider certain conditions. These conditions include elections that are supported by rules and laws as guidelines in organising free and fair elections, the independence of mass media in an effort to provide neutral information, the involvement of independent of election committees and election observations by both domestic and international organisations at each stage of the election process. An election observation is a new phenomenon in the political system of Indonesia, as this was never allowed under Soeharto s regime. The idea of election observation, like that of development aid, is also a largely Western invention, which resulted in election observation organisations (EMOs), both domestic and international, being involved since the 1999 transitional election. Election monitoring contributes to more authentic election process by encouraging fair campaign practices and a more informed electorate, as well as by reducing the possibility of fraud and irregularities on election day. Moreover, EMOs have motivated citizens to become involved in public affairs and have transformed attitudes regarding participation in politics and governance through 66 Ibid. 67 Bjornlund, Op.Cit., p Indonesia also has a concept of free and fair elections called Pemilu yang Langsung, umum, bebas dan rahasia (luber) and Jujur dan adil (jurdil). Luber means directly, open for public, freedom and confidence. Jurdil means integrity and fairness. The concept of Luber has been used from beginning of the Soeharto period, while Jurdil has been used since 1992 based on requests from other parties (PPP and PDI). See also, Tempo Interaktif, Analisa dan Peristiwa, Interview with Letjen. Purn.Rudini, Edisi 28/01-07 Sept/

55 education. 69 This means that election monitoring plays an essential role in ensuring the quality of elections through technical and substantive programmes. Election monitoring itself can be divided into three types. 70 The first is international monitoring, which is conducted by missions sent by governments, multilateral organisations or international NGOs. The second, domestic monitoring, is implemented by national organisations, particularly by non-partisan NGOs and civic groups. The third type, international supervision, is organised by the intergovernmental organisation of post- conflict elections and other selfdetermination exercises. For the purposes of this paper, the analysis focuses on domestic election monitoring groups. With regard to the effectiveness of EMOs, Carothers argues that domestic observers have several important advantages over international observers. 71 For instance, domestic observers are more familiar with the country and its political environment, they are in a better position to observe the electoral process on a long-term basis and they can follow up on their findings by pressing for needed reforms. Domestic groups can also involve a large number of citizens in the election process in ways that international groups cannot. International observers, on the other hand, are better situated to inform the international community about developments in the electoral process, and to mobilise international support for domestic actors if necessary. In practical terms, international observers should be viewed as supplementing the work of domestic observers. 72 Similarity, Hermawan Sulistyo, Director of the Research Institute for Democracy and Peace, also expressed an opinion of the effectiveness of international observers in terms of the limited duration their work, saying that there were two motives for international observers in monitoring the 69 Neil and Santiago, Loc. Cit. 70 Bjornlund, Op.Cit., p Thomas Carothers,1997, Loc. Cit. 72 See Nevitte and Santiago, Loc.Cit., p. 49. See also Peter M. Manikas, Cooperation with NGOs for Promotion of Free Elections: Political Participation Making Democracy Work, Proceedings, JICA International Symposium: The Roles of ODA and NGOs in Supporting and Strengthening Democratic Institutions in Developing Countries, December 6-7, 2000, Tokyo, and Sharon Lean, 2007, Loc. Cit. 37

56 1999 election. The first was philanthropic; in their view, it was an important time for Indonesia to take the necessary steps toward democracy. The other motive might include financial aspects, or even a sense of adventure: Foreign observers are an additional force and an effective one on the domestic counterpart. Lacking expertise on election monitoring many, if not most domestic and local organizations warmly received these more experienced foreign observers. But there were also some negative aspects to their presence here...they came, stayed for a while (sometimes even a week), watched the elections, enjoyed luxurious trips and told us whether the elections had been performed properly or not. Now, some of these "political tourists" have returned home, or probably gone to another monitoring project in another country, while we still have to deal with demands for re-elections in some constituencies. 73 In addition, with regard to the effectiveness of international observers, a Japanese international observer, Kuroda Kazuyoshi, noted that the short time span was a problem for the work, due to the lack of knowledge regarding the local situation and the limited time to build relationships with the local people or NGOs. 74 Another critic, Sharon Bessel, from the Centre for Democratic Institutions (CDIs) wrote that: In case of the Indonesian elections, the practical role of international monitors my have been less important than that of domestic monitors. The significance of international monitors tended to be symbolic and may be of importance in terms of relaying an impression of the election to audiences at home. 75 Considering the importance of domestic monitoring in enhancing the quality of elections, this study focuses on the analysis of the importance of democracy aid providers in supporting these kinds of groups. However, much less attention has been paid to the role of domestic election monitoring organisations, especially in Indonesia. Some works have focused on the role of international election 73 Hermawan Sulistyo, Foreign Observer or Tourist, the Jakarta Post, June 18, Kuroda Kazuyoshi, Report of JICA International Election Monitoring, (in Japanese, official document), Sharon Bessel, Monitoring the Indonesian Elections, Jakarta June 3-9, 1999, Report, Centre for Democratic Institutions. 38

57 monitoring in the case of African countries (Abbink, 2000; Lissa, 2002), 76 the case of Indonesia (Hyde, 2005) 77 and others. In her work, Susan Hyde concludes, The presence of observers caused increases in total votes cast for the incumbent, Megawati Sukarnoputri, who went on to lose the election and peacefully transfer power to her competitor. These results suggest that even in a relatively clean election, observers can change election day behaviour in a manner that can disproportionately benefit some candidates. 78 However, this study finds that all works on international election monitoring agree that international election monitoring should be supplementary to the work of domestic monitoring groups. In other words, election-monitoring activities are better conducted by domestic actors rather than by international observers. This framework positions domestic election monitoring organisations as the most important actors in enhancing the quality of elections, both technically and substantially. In cases of domestic election monitoring, Sharon Lean, who wrote International Democracy Assistance to Domestic Election Monitoring: Conditions for Success emphasises the importance of DEMOs as civil society groups that play a substantial role in democratisation or in terms of the democratizing potential of civil society, in line with what Putnam called social capital. 79 Furthermore, Lean, using the Latin American case, investigates conditions for successful democracy assistance to civic actors through a comparative study of six domestic election-monitoring organisations in the Americas. She argues that both the international and the domestic context can be used as a tool to analyse the best domestic election-monitoring organisation to be supported. As a result, she finds that a history of soft power (diplomatic, normative) intervention and low, internal polarisation create relatively favourable conditions for democracy assistance to civic actors. While the 76 See Jon Abbink and Gerti Hesseling (eds.), Election Observation and Democratisation in Africa, (New York: St. Martin s Press, 2000), p See also Lisa Laakso, The Politics of International Election Observation: The Case of Zimbabwe in 2000, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 40 No. 3, 2002, p Susan Hyde, Randomizing International Election Observation: The 2004 Presidential Elections in Indonesia, October 2008, available at: accessed on Oct 12, Ibid. 79 Lean, Loc.Cit., p

58 history of hard power intervention, such as use of force or economic sanctions, and high political polarisation, intervening variables, such as the multilateral provision of democracy assistance and pluralistic structures and behaviours on the part of aid recipients, can surmount unfavourable conditions for international democracy assistance. 80 She also classified two basic models of organisation for DEMOs. The first model is a discrete organisation created for the specific purpose of monitoring elections, called a stand-alone DEMO. A second model is a network or coalition of previously existing organisations that combine efforts and create a staff infrastructure to participate jointly as election observers (Network DEMOs). In case of Indonesia, Bjornlund, in his work Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy used the 1999 Indonesian election (see Chapters 12-13) to criticise the poor advice and the ineffective coordination between international organisations and donors. He also analyses how well the international support of domestic election monitoring performed. 81 However, he does not analyse the approach of each donor which, as this study points out, is important aspect for understanding the behaviour of each donor in formulating their democracy aid policy. In addition, Bjornlund divides DEMOs according to two types of purposes. 82 The first group argue that monitoring can contribute to better elections. This kind of group will focus on a short-term agenda by emphasising maximising the number of poll watchers on election day. The second group understands that monitoring not guarantees and enhances the quality of elections, but more also builds networks and learn lessons for the future, such as creating democratic habits. Both Lean s model and Bjornlund s type of DEMO can be found in the case of Indonesian DEMOs. However, this study will analyse the kind of DEMOs that exist in Indonesia and the characteristics of Indonesian DEMOs in more detail. 80 Ibid.,p Bjornlund, Op.Cit.,p Ibid., pp

59 With regard to the above explanations of democratisation, democracy assistance and election monitoring organisations that are conducted by domestic actors/civil society, this study designed a model of analysis, which will become the framework for this thesis (see Chart 2.3). This chart investigates the roles of Indonesian DEMOs and two factors behind the success of Indonesian DEMOs. The roles of Indonesian DEMOs are different at each phase of the democratisation process Indonesia and are influenced by international and domestic factors. Referring to Chart 1.3, the assumption of this study is that the fall of Soeharto s regime provided the momentum for democratisation, which created the potential for the formal role of Indonesian DEMOs and democracy assistance. This study s hypotheses are as follows: 1. International and domestic factors, such as democracy assistance, the spread idea of EMOs, characteristics of Indonesian DEMOs and government policy, have affected the roles of Indonesian DEMOs. 2. The roles of Indonesian DEMOs reached their peak during the transition period. 3. The dynamic relationships of donors, the state and Indonesian DEMOs have been influenced by the democratisation progress itself (domestic situations) and the international environment. 41

60 Chart 2.1 Model of the Analysis of the Roles of Indonesian DEMOs and their Relationship with Democracy Assistance in the Democratisation of Indonesia The First DEMOs The Fall of Soeharto s Regime Pre- Liberalization Phase: 1997 Election Transmitter the Idea of DEMOs International Factors: Democracy Assistance to Indonesia The Idea of EMOs The interactions between donors-state-indonesia Democratisation Transitional Elections: Transitional (Initial) Phase: The 1999 Elections (Habibie and Wahid Period) Agent of Legitimation Transitional (Deepening) Phase: The 2004 & 2009 Elections (Megawati-SBY Period) Educationand Monitoring Domestic Factors: - The Characteristics of Indonesian DEMOs - Government policy The Role of Indonesian DEMOs Consolidation: Advocacy Note: This chart is created by the author. 42

61 2.2. Methodology This study uses a qualitative approach by combining qualitative and quantitative data sources. Primary qualitative data will be collected through official documents, interviews and direct observation of the 2009 election. Official documents will be collected from Indonesian government institutions, donors and Indonesian DEMOs. Interviews will be conducted with people that are associated with this research topic, such as the KPU, leaders of Indonesian DEMOs, a key person on the donors side and other Indonesian government officials. With regard to the direct observation of the 2009 election, this will be used to gain an understanding of the situation surrounding the election process, particularly the process of direct monitoring. The questionnaire is one of the quantitative data sources that will be used in this research. The purpose of using a questionnaire is to uncover the characteristics of Indonesian DEMOs by collecting information from Indonesian DEMOs that are involved in the central and local areas and obtaining their perspectives regarding donor-demos/ngos-state relations. The region of Makassar has been selected for various reasons: firstly, geographically, Makassar is a representative of the East Indonesian region. Second, politically, Makassar is a base for Golkar. Third, socially, Makassar is a big city; thus, the population is varied in terms of ethnicity and economic status. The secondary data will be collected through literature studies including books, reports, journals, magazines, newspapers and documentary surveys. The literature studies will focus on democratisation, democracy assistance, elections, election monitoring in general and domestic election monitoring in particular. Some works concerning the Indonesian elections, reports on the Indonesian election by donor countries/agencies and the Indonesian government and Indonesian DEMOs/NGOs will be used to obtain a broader perspective of the election processes. The process of data gathering can be explained as follows: 43

62 Chart 2.2 Methodology of Research Data Collection Primary (Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Data Sources) In depth Interviews Direct Oberservation Surveys Archival Records Qualitative Research Secondary Library Research Data Analysis: Inductive Actors: Donors, DEMOs Programmes: Democracy Assistance Process: Elections Primary Data - Interviews (in-depth interviews) This study conducts interviews with some major donor countries/institutions, Indonesian government institutions in both the central and local areas, NGOs that were involved in election monitoring activities (DEMOs) during the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections and some academicians/scholars in Indonesia and in Japan. In Indonesia, the fieldwork was conducted in three stages: July 16-31, 2007 (preliminary research), Dec 13, Jan 12, 2009 and March 12 April 11, In addition, this study interviewed some academics from the University of Indonesia (Sept 15, 2012) and the JICA Indonesian office (Oct 10, 2012) and some DEMOs that had received funding from donor countries/institutions, such as Cetro, JPPR, JAMPPI, PBIP and KIPP. With regard to representatives of donor countries/organisations, this study interviewed people from the Japanese embassy, the US Embassy (USAID), UNDP and the European Union. Each donor country/institution has its own characteristics in terms of distributing support for the democratisation of Indonesia. Therefore, the exploration of the democracy aid policy of each donor country is important. 44

63 Table 2.4 List of Interviews No. Category Name of Institutions 1. Indonesian Government 1) Bappenas, RI 2) BAWASLU 3) KPU (Provincial and Local Levels 2. Donors 1) USAID 2) EU 3) UNDP 4) Japanese Embassy 5) JICA Jakarta Office 3. DEMOs 1) LP3ES 2) Rector Forum 3) KIPP 4) JPPR 5) MAPILU 6) JAMPPI 7) CETRO 8) KL2SS 9) FPMP 10) FORKIP 11) PBIP 4. Academics 1) Japanese Academics (two people) 2) Indonesian Academics (three people) - Direct Observation of the 2009 Elections This study conducted a direct observation of the Indonesian General Election on April 9, 2009 as one of the data sources. The observation covered various polling stations in the Jakarta area (South, East, West, North and Central), Depok (West Java) and Makassar (South Sulawesi). This study focuses on the observations at Depok. However, in order to collect comprehensive information at the polling stations, this study employed people to cover the observations on the election day in Jakarta and Makassar. The assistants for each site in Jakarta (West, East, South and Central) included Depok, Bekasi and Makassar. These areas were chosen for various reasons: 1. Jakarta is the capital city of Indonesia. Most people that live there are from different backgrounds (social and economic), and the city is the centre of t e political power struggle. 45

64 2. Depok and Bekasi are suburban areas. Depok has become the base for one of the religious political parties (PKS), while Bekasi is characterised by a population that is temporary and consists of people who come from other areas. 3. Makassar is representative of the eastern Indonesia area and is the easiest area to observe. Moreover, politically, Makassar is the base for Golkar. Table 2.5 List of Areas of Direct Observation in the 2009 Elections No. Location Number of Polling Stations (Observed) 1. West Jakarta 2 2. North Jakarta 2 3. Central Jakarta 3 4. East Jakarta 2 5. Depok, West Java 3 6. Bekasi, West Java 3 7. Makassar, South Sulawesi 4 For the purpose of the observation, this study designed a guideline for conducting the observation of the election process and highlighted the aspects that should be of concern (see appendix 1). This study also asked the assistants to write reports on their observations. The purpose of these observations was not to conduct election monitoring, but to observe the situation at polling stations, the participation of DEMOs and people around the polling stations monitoring the election. Furthermore, this study also observed the process of the vote count that was conducted by KPU at the Centre for National Election Tabulation at the Borobudur Hotel, Jakarta. 46

65 - Surveys of Domestic Election Monitoring Organisations (DEMOs) The purpose of the surveys was to uncover the characteristics of Indonesian DEMOs, a description on how they work and the DEMOs perspective on foreign support for elections, particularly those related to DEMOs activities. The surveys were conducted from August-December 2009 (after the 2009 Election). The target was DEMOs that had worked at both a central and at a provincial level. When conducting the surveys, this study employed research assistants to deliver the questionnaires. Surveys were conducted via , face-to-face and via telephone. For the purposes of this study, 40 (forty) questionnaires were distributed; however, only 30 questionnaires were returned, of which only 22 were valid (12 for DEMOs with offices in Jakarta and 10 questionnaires for local NGOs in Makassar). Table 2.6 List of DEMOs Surveyed. No. Name of NGOs/DEMOs Location 1. Forum Pemerhati Masalah Perempuan, Sulawesi Selatan (FPMP-SS) Local 2. Masagena Centre Local 3. Komite Perjuangan Rakyat Miskin Kota (KPRM) Local 4. Koalisi Organisasi Non Profit Pemantau Pemilu Sulawesi Selatan (KOPPSS) Local 5. MASIKA ICMI Local 6. Yayasan Swadaya Mitra Bangsa (YASMIB) Local 7. Total Survey Indonesia Local 8. Lembaga Kontrol Independen Indonesia (LKIN) Local 9. Komite Pemantau Legislatif (KOPEL) Local 10. Indonesian Social Economy, Research and Training (INSERT Institute) Local 11. Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), Jakarta Central 47

66 12. Yayasan Pengembangan Swadaya Masyarakat, Jakarta Pusat Central 13. LP3ES Central 14. YAPPIKA Central 15. Migrant care Central 16. CETRO Central 17. LP3ES Central 18. PBIP Central 19. JPPR Central 20. MAPILU-PWI Central 21. KIPP Central 22. JAMPPI Central - Archival Records The archival records are necessary not only to support the analysis ofcertain issues, such as political development in Indonesia, but also as a main resource for analysis; for example, the KPU archival records of the general elections during the Soeharto period. These data sources are important for enriching and improving the quality and originality of this study Secondary Data Secondary data are collected through secondary resources such as books, magazines, newspapers, data from journals and other resources. 48

67 Chapter 3 Development of Elections in Indonesia: From Authoritarian to Democratic Elections Elections under Soeharto s Authoritarian Regime Regime Type and Electoral Processes ( ) In the history of Indonesian politics, democratic elections that are indicated by the multiparty system were implemented at the beginning of the elections in the initial period of Indonesian independence in Participants consisted of electoral political parties and individuals, as well as more than 30 contestants. However, since the political changes that occurred in Indonesia under Suharto's rule, the elections "slowly but steadily" became a tool to maintain the legitimacy of the Soeharto government. Elections under Soeharto had a high degree of citizen participation and the landslide victory of the government party, Golkar, was always predictable. Elections that were organised by the New Order did not meet the requirements of democratic elections for various reasons. Firstly, there was no real competition or fair elections among the participants. This is evidenced by the legislation that limited the number of parties contesting the elections. Secondly, there was no liberty or freedom for voters to consider and determine their choices. The New Order government systematically exploited bureaucracy in order to win elections. Thirdly, the electoral management was a governmental apparatus. This leads to the question of the principle of neutrality and the impartiality of the organisers. State dominance of society was a major characteristic of Soeharto s New Order Government. Soeharto s authority was very powerful, which limited political participation by the people. In 49

68 addition, the New Order government believed that economic development would be achieved if there were political stability, as a result of suppressing people s political participation. As Takashi Shiraishi noted, Soeharto s New Order regime was built on one assumption and two operating principles..in early days of the New Order.Gen Ali Murtopo, who played a crucial role in fashioning the regime.made a remark to the following effect: the people are like the tiger. The Hungry tiger should not be left free. It is best to cage and feed him.caging the tiger meant using state power politically to demobilize the population and to control their participation in the political process..the regime was run on two principles. The first was what we may call the politics of stability and development..the second was the family principle. 83 As a result of these principles, Soeharto used three actors in his political system (the military, the bureaucracy and the political party/functional Party Golongan Karya/Golkar) as the backbone of his regime. In the New Order, the military s role was not only defence and security, but also extended to social and political functions the so-called dual function. 84 Similarity, bureaucracy was weak at that time and it became one of the players supporting the Soeharto regime. At the same time, the political party, or Golkar, was a government party from the beginning and advanced the government s interests in its campaigns. Soeharto, by setting up this political system, became very powerful. He positioned himself not only as the head of the executive, but also as the Supreme Commander of the military and the leader of Golkar, which was rife with corruption, collusion, nepotism and the violation of human rights. In the beginning, Soeharto s government was fairly open but, within a few years, he became concerned that political party manoeuvring, criticism from the press and friction among various societal groups would interfere with the pace of economic growth. In fact, the principle was successful 83 Takashi Shiraishi, Under Wahid, Indonesia must Show Real Change available at: accessed on June 27, Jun Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia,(London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p

69 in pushing economic development in Indonesia. Indonesia advanced to the stage of industrialisation due to foreign capital investment. However, due to the implementation of such principles in Soeharto s regime, many scholars categorised his regime as authoritarian, specifically as bureaucratically authoritarian. 85 O Donnell and Schmitter defined bureaucratic-authoritarianism as having systems [that] are excluding and emphatically non-democratic. Central actors in the dominant coalition included-high level technocrats-military and civilian, within and outside the state working in close association with foreign capital. This new elite eliminates electoral competition and severely controls the political participation of the popular sector. Public policy is centrally concerned with promoting advanced industrialization. 86 Similarity, Collier defines bureaucratic authoritarianism as: a form of bureaucratic, technocratic military rule that seeks to curtail popular mobilization and is built on a political coalition and policy orientation that entail strong ties to international economic actors. 87 Both definitions emphasise economic issues as driving forces of the rise of bureaucratic authoritarianism. In the case of Indonesia, however, an Indonesian scholar, Mochtar Mas oed pointed out that the political crisis was a dominant factor in the rise of the bureaucratic authoritarian regime by arguing that, at the beginning of the Soeharto regime, increasing industrialisation and a vertical 85 Various terms have been proposed by scholars to describe Soeharto s regime, such as a patrimonial regime (Anderson 1972 and Corouch 1979), a repressive developmentalist regime (Feith 1979), a bureaucratic polity (Jackson 1978), personal rule (Liddle 1983) and atechnocratic state (McDougall 1986). See also Masuhara Ayako, Transformation and the Golkar Party under Soeharto and Political Change in Indonesia: Political Transition and Type of Personal Rulership ( スハルト体制下における与党ゴルカルの変容とインドネシアの政治変動 翼賛型個人支配とその政治的移行 ), Dissertation, Tokyo University, O Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, Op.Cit. 87 David Collier, Overview of the Bureaucratic Authoritarian Model in David Collier, The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), p.26. See also David Collier, Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, at Joel Krieger (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World: Second edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Available at SSRN: accessed on October 12,

70 integration policy had not occurred. Moreover, Indonesia was still in the early stages of economic recovery at that time. 88 Dwight King stressed that Soeharto s regime was mainly characterised by bureaucratic authoritarianism. 89 He highlighted certain characteristics of the bureaucratic authoritarian regime that are relevant to the Soeharto regime. Firstly, power is held by an oligarchy, a group of people or institutions; in this regard, it was the military as an institution. Secondly, the regime is designs the environment in such a way that creates an apathetic society. In the case of the Soeharto regime, this condition was implemented through "the depolization-, de partynization, floating mass and view of non Golkar activity as unprofessional and archaic". Finally, repression, co-optation and a network of corporatist organisations were used to control the opposition. 90 Other scholars, such as Chandra and Kammen (2002), have divided the typical Soeharto regime into three periods, as follows: the first period is from , typified by a hierarchical military regime. The second period is from and is typified by bureaucratic authoritarianism, while the last decade was designated as a sultanistic regime ( ). 91 These categories are interesting and this study agrees with the first of two categorisations, but disputes the last type. Considering that 88 He proposed three factors for the rise of bureaucratic authoritarianism in Indonesia. Firstly, the political structure left by the Soeharto regime had a tendency to give excessive power to the government. Moreover, at that time, the New Order was trying to rapidly gain political legitimacy, because Sukarno still had significant influence and supporters. Moreover, the fact that the economy had almost collapsed required a rapid response. Secondly, the internal coalition of the New Order was forced to immediately undertake a radical restructuring of the economy. Thirdly, the New Order implemented the outward-looking economic orientation that defined it since in the late 1960s and which continued into the 1970s. See Mochtar Mas oed, Ekonomi dan Struktur Politik Orde Baru: (Economy and Political Structure of the New Order: ), LP3ES, 1989, pp For further analysis of the political situation under Soeharto, see Jeffrey Winters, Dosa-Dosa Politik Order Baru (The Political Sins of New Order), (Jakarta: Djambatan), Dwight Y. King, Indonesia in New Order as a Bureaucratic Polity, a Neopatrimonial or a Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regime: What Difference Does Make It?, in Benedict Anderson and Audrey Khan (eds.) Interpreting Indonesian Politics: The Thirteen Contributions to the Debates, (Equinox Publishing, Singapore, Renewed, 2010/First edition 1982), p Ibid. 91 Chandra, Siddharth and Douglas Kammen (2002) Generating Reforms and Reforming Generations:Military Politics in Indonesia s Democratic Transition and Consolidation, World Politics, No. 55, October2002, pp Meanwhile, Aspinall (2005) pointed out that Soeharto s regime is a combination of Sultanism and Authoritarianism. See Edward Aspinall, Opposing Soeharto: Compromise, Resistance and regime Change in Indonesia, Stanford University Press, 2005, p

71 sultanistic regimes are based on traditional legitimacy, while the Soeharto regime at that time was based on legal authority with support from the consensus of the military and bureaucratic elite, the last type should be reconsidered. Moreover, Shuck argues that the Soeharto regime differed from a sultanistic regime for two reasons; firstly, in the New Order, the ideology of Pancasila placed more importance on the nation than on the rule (Soeharto). 92 The rule of the New Order was legitimised through Pancasila. Secondly, sultanistic regimes tend to have low levels of institutionalisation and organisation. Conversely, Indonesia was a highly institutionalised and organised regime under Soeharto. Furthermore, according to O Donnell and Schmitter, an authoritarian regime will need some form of electoral legitimacy and a certain freedom to make it acceptable to the moderate section of the domestic opposition and to international public opinion. 93 Therefore, Soeharto organised the elections using Free and Fair Elections as a slogan (or just as mere rhetoric), in order to legitimise and make his regime acceptable to the domestic and international community. The elections were then conducted periodically and regularly. Another of Soeharto s strategies to legitimise his regime was through the formulation of the term Pancasila Democracy. 94 Soeharto noted, Democracy that we practice is Pancasila Democracy of which the basic principles and legal basis are laid down in the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia. Pancasila Democracy calls for decision making through deliberations, or musyawarah, to reach consensus, or mufakat. It is a democracy that lives up to the principles of Pancasila. This implies that the democratic right must always be exercised with a deep sense of responsibility towards others. Thus, Pancasila Democracy means democracy based on the people s sovereignty, which is inspired by and 92 Hadiwinata and Shuck, Op.Cit., p O Donnel and Schimitter, Op.Cit., p Pancasila consists of two Sanskrit words, panca meaning five and sila, meaning principle. It comprises five inseparable and interrelated principles: belief in the one and only god, just and civilised humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives and social justice for all the people of Indonesia. 53

72 integrated with other principles of Pancasila. In the first elections under Soeharto, ten parties contested the 1971 parliamentary elections. They included nine opposition parties left over from the Sukarno days and a new government party, called the Functional Group Party or Golongan Karya (Golkar). However, in 1973, Soeharto forced the nine opposition parties to merge into two groups. Four Islamic based parties were fused into the United Development Party (PPP) and five secular parties were forced to become the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). The 1973 party reorganisation (UU No.3 tahun 1975) forced the existing political parties into three artificial coalitions: Golkar, PPP and PDI. 95 Golkar then became the ruling party during Soeharto s regime. The law limited popular participation in the political process. According to Takashi Shiraishi, Soeharto believed that limiting popular political participation was the key to controlling the Indonesian political situation. From that point, the 1975 law could be interpreted as a tool for Soeharto to demobilise the population and to control their participation in the political process. By using the 1975 law, Soeharto tried to expand and maintain his power. Soeharto also successfully maintained his power through controlling all the bureaucracies and organs of government. This gave birth to various concepts and jokes regarding the elite s bureaucratic attitudes, such as'as Long As the Boss is Happy'(Asal Bapak Senang or ABS) and attend (datang), sit-down (duduk), silent (diam) and money (duit). 96 This also shows how the bureaucracy was manipulated, designed and controlled by the Soeharto regime. Although Soeharto s regime had used the political machine Golkar to win the elections in every period and to always have landslide victories, from the 1992 elections onwards, the number of Golkar s voters started to be decrease. In the 1992 elections, the total votes for Golkar decreased 95 Edward Masters, Indonesia s 1999 Elections: A Second Chance for Democracy, Asia Society Publications, available at: accessed on January 23, Ichlasul Amal, The Dilemmas of Decentralization and Democratization, in David Bourchier and John Legge (eds.), Democracy in Indonesia 1950s and 19902, (Australia Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, 1994), p

73 compared to the results of the 1987 elections. In 1987, Golkar had 73.16% of the total votes but, in 1992, this decreased to 68.10%. On the other hand, the total number of vote for the PDI increased in all areas The Decline of Golkar and the Initial Movement towards Democratisation The decline of the number of Golkar s voters in the 1992 elections could be seen as the impact of the politics of openness (Politik Keterbukaan) in the mid-1980s. This policy was seen as an opportunity to increase the demand for democracy. The pro-democracy movements and human rights NGOs, such as the Indonesian Front for the Defence of Human Rights (INFIGHT), the Information Centre and the Action Network for Reform (Pusat Informasi dan Jaringan Aksi untuk Reformasi/PIJAR), the Free Women s Foundation and the Legal Aid Institute (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum-LBH Nusantara) emerged. Demands for a political opening-up continued and democratisation became a public issue. Many scholars argued that, besides the effects of economic development and the improvement of levels of education, demands for political participation were also strengthened by international pressure through aid conditionality. 98 According to Indonesian Political Scientist, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, In the era of the Cold War there is a common interest between the U.S. and Indonesian governments, civil society only play a minuscule role. Now the situation is changing, government is forced by pressure groups. They could lobby the IMF and IGGI not to distribute funds to the Indonesian government. So this forced the government to make changes. And when the change is not quickly carried out there, the government will collapse Data available at: accessed on June 12, Whitehead (1986) proposed four forms of international factors for democratisation: contagion, control, consent and conditionality. See Laurence Whitehead, International Aspects of Democratization O Donnell, G., Schmitter, P., Whitehead, L. (eds.), Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospect for Democracy (John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 1986, p Interview with Professor Dewi Fortuna Anwar (Deputy Chairman, Social Sciences and Humanities, LIPI), Jakarta, July 25,

74 The 1990s also became a significant period in the struggle for democracy in the developing world, starting with People Power in the Philippines in 1986, student demonstrations in China in 1989, Pro-Democracy demonstrations in Thailand in 1992 and so on. These movements had a great influence on the democracy movement in Indonesia, which began to expand from the end of the 1980s. Uhlin (1997) asserted that democratic movements in some countries have been a lesson learned for Indonesia. He categorised this process as a transnational diffusion of democratic ideas. 100 Similarly, Grugel pointed out:...civil society organisations imitate or learn tactics from neighbouring countries or even further afield, and external agencies frequently apply recipes or best practice formulate that are regional in their assumptions and prescriptions. 101 However, aware that the politics of openness would become a threat to his regime, Soeharto soon tried to stop the emerging political openness by the banning of three major political magazines (Tempo, Editor and DeTik) and the arrest and trials of NGO activists and labour unionists. 102 According to Hadiwinata and Schuck, this era is classified as the initial period of political transition in Indonesia and they called this phase instrumentalized liberalisation. 103 However, considering that the liberalisation process undertaken by the government was more a response to domestic and international situations, rather than government s own desire to change, this study prefers to call it forced liberalisation. Thus, in the 1997 elections, the total number of votes for Golkar was 74, 51%, while the PDI s total number of votes dropped to 11, 84%, due to internal conflict. Internal conflict in the PDI resulted in the formation of two groups, PDI-Soerjadi and PDI-Megawati. This conflict was the result of 100 Andres Uhlin, Indonesia and the Third Wave of Democratization: the Indonesian Pro-democracy Movement in a Changing World, Curzon Press, 1999, p Grugel, 1999, Op.Cit., p Baskara T. Wardaya etal., Menguak Misteri Kekuasaan Soeharto (Reveals the Mystery of Soeharto s Power), Galang Press, Yogyakarta, 2007, pp Hadiwinata and Schuck, Op.Cit., p

75 intervention by the government at the PDI congress of Soeharto was able to position Soerjadi as chairman of the party in order to eliminate Megawati s position. The intervention showed the extent of Soeharto s power at the time. However, although Soeharto had strong power at the time, he could not resist the emergence of the first election--monitoring organisation in Indonesia which, was established in 1996 and which started to monitor the 1997 elections (the Indonesian DEMOs will be discussed in Chapter 5). Efforts by Soeharto s government to legitimise his rule by recognising the existence of opposition parties and implementing competitive elections mirror tactics used in other authoritarian countries such as those in Latin America, Africa and Asia. This phenomenon then led to new categories of regime type, such as electoral authoritarianism (Diamond, 2002), competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way, 2002) and semi-authoritarianism (Ottaway, 2003). Furthermore, research by Geddes showed that the elections that were conducted by the authoritarian regime were not only motivated by an effort to legitimise Soeharto s rule, but also as a strategy of regime survival. She pointed out that elections serve to deter rivals in the same way that party-mobilized mass demonstrations do, but at lower risk. Dictators hold regular elections because they reduce the risk and unpredictability involved in the kinds of mass support demonstrations Elections are relatively peaceful, routinized, and orderly demonstrations of apparent popular support for the regime and current leader 105 Although various strategies were adopted by the Suharto government, they could not sustain the Suharto regime in the face of the economic crisis that began with the financial crisis in Thailand. The economic crisis had an impact not only on economic and social dimensions as the value of the rupiah on the international market plummeted and the prices of many basic goods soared, but also had an impact on the political situation, particularly with regard to the fall of Soeharto s regime. The 104 Ibid. p Barbara Geddes, Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes? A paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC, 2005, p

76 economic crisis forced the international actors, including the IMF, the World Bank, the United States and Japan, to play a role in overcoming the crisis by emphasising economic and political reform. With reference to the involvement of international actors, some scholars accused the US of having used the IMF as a "bulldozer" to reform the political and economic order in Indonesia. 106 As a result of the monetary crisis, social unrest continued to grow, and anti-chinese riots became more frequent. Protests, especially from university students, against the hike in food prices and basic commodities were the major factors behind the disturbances. Demonstrations were staged demanding that the government introduce both economic and political reforms. Protesters also demanded that Soeharto step down. A tragedy occurred on May the 12 th when a clash between students and security forces took place. Four students of Trisakti University were shot dead. On May the 13th, rioting had broken out against Indonesian Chinese in many parts of Jakarta. In addition, most of the shopping centres, shops, shop houses, private homes and vehicles that were attacked, looted and burned during the riots belonged to ethnic Chinese. Nearly 1,200 people were killed during the riots.40 shopping centres, 2,479 shop/houses and 1,604 shops were attacked, looted and burned, along with 1,119 vehicles, 1,026 private homes and 383 offices. 107 Demonstrations and riots occurred nationwide. On the 17 th of May, Amien Rais, a Muslim activist and leader of Muhamadiyyah (the second largest Muslim association in Indonesia), announced that he would organise a demonstration on national Awakening Day. On May the 18th, Harmoko, a Soeharto loyalist who was the speaker of the House (DPR/MPR) and a Leader of Golkar, shocked the country when he demanded that Soeharto step down. In the next day, Soeharto invited nine moderate/conservative Islamic leaders to offer their support. Soeharto promised reforms to address the country s ills and to hold new general elections within one 106 D&R, Tujuan Utama IMF Menyingkirkan Soeharto (The Main Purposes of the IMF to Overthrow Soeharto), Interview with Steve Hanke (the Financial Advisor of Soeharto), Detektif and Romantika (D&R) Magazine, July 18, See also Leo Suryadinata, Elections and Politics in Indonesia, (ISEAS: Singapore, 2002), p The Straits Times, July 16,

77 and a half years. However, this was too late. On May the 20th, it was reported that his ministers had asked him to resign and Wiranto, the Chief of Staff, also advised him not continue. 108 Moreover, the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, in a speech given on May the 20th, said of Soeharto: Now he has the opportunity for an historic acts of statesmanship-one that will preserve his legacy as a man who not only led his country, but who provided for its democratic transition. 109 This statement was widely seen as call for Soeharto to resign. Considering that the military, the cabinet and the US no longer supported his position, together with the strong pressure from student protests, Soeharto finally decided to step down and appointed his vice president, B.J. Habibie, as President. Besides facing considerable pressure from the domestic and international arenas that were calling for political reform, Habibie also had to overcome their distrust of his image as a crony of Soeharto. This caused him to lose domestic and international trust and called into doubt the prospect of Indonesian reform. Susan Berfield and Jose Manual Tesoro, senior writers at Asia Week, reported the doubt of the domestic and international community regarding Habibie's government as follows: Habibie is the President, but he is also a pawn. He has little power of his own, he will buffeted by economic and political forces he cannot control. Military leaders and most technocrats tolerate him, but don t respect him. 110 Considering his image as a crony of Soeharto, which caused his administration to lose domestic and international trust, Habibie s policies seemed very open to domestic and international participation in the political development of Indonesia. He was aware that he needed to boost his image at home 108 Leo Suryadinata, Interpreting Indonesian Politics, Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998, p John Bresnan, The United States, the IMF and the Indonesian Financial Crisis, in Adam Schwarz and J. Paris (eds.), The Politics of Post Soeharto Indonesia, NY: A Council on Foreign Relations Books Press, 1999, pp Habibie, a 61-year old German-trained aeronautical engineer, was one of Suharto s closest confidantes. When Suharto was a junior military officer in Sulawesi, he had a very close friendship with Habibie s family. After Habibie s father died, Suharto treated Habibie more like a son than like an ally. Habibie also served as Minister of Research and Technology from1978. He has earned a reputation for tirelessly promoting state investment in sophisticated industries. See Susan Berfield and Jose Manual Teroso, As Suharto points to a Vice-President, Asiaweek, January 30, 1998 and A Nation Asserts Itself, Asiaweek, June 5,

78 and abroad, and to face international pressure and the widespread domestic demands for democratic reform. Indonesia under Habibie, the new president, experienced enormous political changes. He pushed through rapid political liberalisation soon after taking office, making decisions to allow the people to regain political rights, such as freedom of speech and association The Progress of Democratic Reform in Indonesia Habibie immediately called a general election and allowed international and domestic observers to monitor each stage thereof. He also agreed to release political prisoners and removed restrictions on the press. Habibie also reviewed rules related to the president s role by limiting the presidential terms to just two periods. Furthermore, Habibie revoked MPR Decree No. 5/1998, which gave extraordinary powers to the president. However, he was also under pressure to change the military function known as dwifungsi, or the dual function of the military under the Soeharto regime. Habibie also paid more attention to the issues of East Timor and Aceh. The conflict in East Timor and Aceh attracted international attention to the violation of human rights and issues of decentralisation. These conflicts had been occurring since Indonesia was under Soeharto s regime. With regard to the East Timor, the Dili Incident in November 1991 caught the attention of the international community. Indonesian military forces, using American-supplied M-16 assault rifles,fired on a crowd of peaceful Timorese demonstrators. The Indonesian government announced that 50 peoplewere killed, while Amnesty International estimated that killed. As a result, the CGGI froze aid to Indonesia. The Indonesian government conducted an investigation with unusual rapidity, announced the result, and dismissed two military commanders. In addition, the East Timor issue thus forced the Soeharto government to react to international repercussions. Following the Dili 60

79 Incident, the government established a National Committee on Human Rights (KOMNAS HAM) in 1993 in order to placate international opinion. 111 In fact, East Timor became part of the UN agenda in 1960 when the UN General Assembly added the territory to its list of non-self-governing territories. At that time, East Timor was administered by Portugal. East Timor had been widely ignored since Indonesians came there in Although The UN condemned the integration of East Timor into Indonesia that followed in 1976, few major powers, particularly the United States, were ready for a showdown over the decision. 112 Aceh s problems were similar to those of East Timor, in that the independence movement GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or Free Aceh Movement) demanded independence for Aceh. This movement, headed by Hasan Di Tiro, was started in Aceh, the province that provides 15% of natural liquid gas and petroleum to Indonesia s export market, demanded independence because of the unfair distribution of economic benefits (both local and central). However, as many sources wrote that in the late 1970s Indonesian authorities conducted mass arrests of Aceh Merdeka members and shut down their activities until In early 1990, responding to an attack by GAM, the military launched a counter-insurgency campaign code-named Red Net. This operation led to the deaths or disappearances of many civilians. 113 In 1991, Indonesia designated Aceh a military operations area giving the army free rein to crush the separatist in what became known as DOM (Daerah Operasi Militer/ Military Operation Area) Period. Amnesty international reported that, between 1989 and 1992, about 2,000 people were killed in military operations in Aceh. 114 The report drew international attention, especially from the United States, as a spark for the idea of democracy and human rights. The United States pushed Soeharto s regime to find a solution 111 Yuri Sato, Democratizing Indonesia: Reformasi Period in Historical Perspective, IDE Research Paper, No.1. August 2003, p Geoffrey C.Gunn, East Timor and the United Nations: The Case for Intervention. Asmara Eritrea: the Red Sea Press Inc., 1997, p Ashok Swan (ed.), Islam and Violent Separatism: New Democracies in Southeast Asia, p Yuri Sato, Op. Cit. See also Political History of Aceh: accessed on March 25,

80 for Aceh. In contrast, Japan s response as the biggest donor to Indonesia differed substantially from the approach taken by others countries. According to official comments from the Japanese foreign ministry, as noted in Kyodo, December 3, 1991, when discussing the link with the Japanese decision regarding future economic aid to Indonesia, Taizo Watanabe told foreign correspondents That is something I do not deny the possibility of at this moment. However, he also hastened to add the he did not want his remarks to be taken by Indonesia as a warning. 115 In fact, Japanese assistance to Indonesia for next year did not decrease, but increased from billion yen to billion yen in However, the Aceh conflict is continuing because, for Indonesia, the only choice for GAM is integration within the Indonesian territory. On the other hand, the unsolved Aceh conflict and East Timor have been productive not only in the domestic arena (the military and the bureaucracy) in terms of arms sales, but also in other countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, which are the biggest exporters of arms to Indonesia. The interest of both countries in arms sales sometimes caused them to implement double standards in pushing Soeharto s regime towards democratisation and respect for human rights. After Soeharto s resignation, Habibie surprised everyone by announcing during a British Broadcasting Corporation television interview in early June 1998 that he was willing to consider giving a special status to East Timor. Since then, various proposals have been put forward regarding the form of this special status. Indonesia is considering giving autonomy to East Timor, whereby the central government will only be responsible for the foreign policy, external defence and monetary matters. However, the East Timorese refused to accept this special status. Finally, Habibie offered a choice between autonomy within Indonesia or independence. The choice was made as part of a consultation process and was the product of an agreement between the Indonesian government and accessed on June 13,

81 Portugal, negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations. In contrast, the Indonesian government has not considered independence (or a referendum) for Aceh. Aceh remains parts of the Indonesian heartland and its loss would be a far greater national trauma than would the loss of East Timor. The proposed solution offered to Aceh is called special autonomy. In June 2001, a regional autonomy package was proposed that would allow the Province of Aceh (now renamed Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, or NAD) to retain 70% of provincial revenues from January 1, 2002, and to implement aspects of Syariah law. 116 In fact, Habibie s policy of offering autonomy for both areas was also affected by international perspectives related to the democratic movement in Indonesia. According to Charles E. Costello, Director of the Democracy Programme of Carter Centre, said that I hope Indonesia will soon entering new democracy based on the result of general elections with consider the implementation the concepts of decentralization or autonomy.this system will maintain the unity of Indonesia. 117 Many scholars have argued that decentralisation in the Habibie period took a great step forward by the enactment of the law on regional government administration (Law no.22/1999) and the law on balanced budgets between central and regional government (Law No. 25/1999). 118 The decentralisation policy has reduced the authority of the central government and extended the authority of provincial and local governments. Provincial and local governments will be able to initiate policies and give their people a better life than they experienced under Soeharto s regime. It is expected that the central government will have more time and energy to deal with globalisation, to observe and creatively promote the interest in maintaining national integration, and to guide, supervise and control the implementation of the decentralisation policy. It is clear that the implementation of decentralisation accessed on April 10, Pemilu Indonesia menurut Carter Center (Indonesian General Election from the Carter Center View) see at: accessed on April 11, As a result of the policy, Indonesia now has 32 provinces, compared to having only 27 provinces previously. 63

82 needs a clear vision, strong leadership and effective supervision, as well as political authority on the part of the side of central government. 119 However, formulating effective supervision by the central government while avoiding the command from the central position as occurred in the past, and avoiding the disintegration and deepening of the economic gap among regions as a result of each region having different natural resources, are still problematic. In addition, decentralisation in Indonesia faces two endowment problems. First, from the central government s side, is the slow progress of central government in preparing the regulations and technical guidelines, and the reluctance of some ministries to share and decentralise their authorities. This makes the central government sometimes appear unsupportive, half-hearted and inconsistent in implementing its policy. Secondly, the problem from the regional and local government side is the lack of qualified human resources in the bureaucracy, the low capacity of regional and local legislative members and the lack of funding sources to support their development projects. Most of them are still dependent on central subsidies. 120 Therefore, it has to be noted that, in order to allow decentralization to have a positive impact on, apart from the role of the government, it is necessary to provide institutional support from local actors and continuity in policies, as well as strengthening grassroots organisations and support for local democracy. This means that the participation of local citizens is necessary, especially in choosing their local leaders and providing input for the local government. Through the people s participation, the practice of democratic principles at the grassroots level can be fostered and national unity can be promoted. At the same time, the accountability and transparency of local governments are preconditions to achieving the purpose of decentralisation. Moreover, decentralisation requires a fundamental change in the cultural behaviour of local and central government officials. The virtue of 119 M. Ryaas Rasyid, The Policy of Decentralization in Indonesia, GSU Conference: Can Decentralization Help Rebuild Indonesia? Paper for GSU Conference, Atlanta, Georgia, May 1, p Ibid. p

83 decentralisation is not only the transfer of power from higher to lower levels of authority, but also from the government to the people. In summary, the major achievement in the Habibie period was political liberalisation. Moreover, considering the situations that occurred before and after Soeharto stepped down, this study concludes that international and domestic factors have influenced the initial process of democracy in Indonesia simultaneously. However, the case of Indonesia has shown that democratisation in Indonesia was the result of domestic actors, who were supported by international actors. Considering the explanation above (see also Chapter 2), the rise of Habibie could be categorized as a liberalisation period, indicated by political instability and the increase of people s participation in political activities. Habibie also introduced new rules and laws, for example freedom of the press and of association, the formulation of a new election law, a decentralisation law and preparations for an election. The liberalization period ends when the country organising a democratic election and a new government has legitimacy because the government is elected in a free and fair election. The 1999 transitional elections under Habibie indicated the end of liberalisation period, while Abdurahman Wahid being elected as President meant that the transition period had begun. Referring to other countries, such as those in Latin America, Southern Europe and Africa that experienced transition, it can be seen that the duration of the transition period was very varied; Indonesia s democratic transition is not an exceptional case. The length of the transition periodfor Indonesia also depends on how the government and the society prepare the conditions for entering the consolidation phase, thus achieving the aim of an embedded democracy. Since Abdurahman Wahid was widely known as an inspiring political leader who stressed the values of tolerance and pluralism, there was great hope for a democratic transition process in Indonesia. However, the Indonesian democratic transition under Abdurahman Wahid (also known as Gus Dur) was not conducted smoothly. His failure was not only in dealing successfully with religious 65

84 and ethnic conflict (Ambon, Poso and Kalimantan), but also with separatist movements in Aceh and Papua. Moreover, various corruption scandals, including the US$4.1 million scandal at the State Logistics Agency(Buloggate), the unpredictable behaviour, the slow pace of economic reform and nepotism issues have caused the democratic transition under his government to be categorized as democratic stagnation. Wahid s government finally ended in impeachment. Wahid was then replaced by Megawati as President of Indonesia. The Megawati government was perceived as moving towards a consolidated democracy. 121 However, referring to the results of the survey on the performance of the two years of Megawati s government that was conducted by an independent research organisation (LP3ES), the results concluded that law enforcement was the biggest issue that was neglected by Megawati s government, in addition to the problems of corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN). Other issues, such as disintegration issues, the separatist movement in Papua and the problems of terrorism were also not resolved. The survey concluded that Megawati s government was not able to overcome the problems it faced. Considering this, Megawati s government should not be classified as a government that successfully brought Indonesia to full democracy. In 2004, Indonesia conducted a direct presidential election and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) was elected as President, with Jusuf Kalla from Golkar as vice president. It was believed that the SBY government would get the Indonesian democratic process on the right track. However, in addition to the economic problems, other problems such as law enforcement, the KKN scandal (involving the political elite), the problem of disintegration and the separatist movement in Papua and Ambon and terrorism, has failed to be overcome by the SBY government. Therefore, the direction and continuity of democratic transition processes are still questionable. In addition, another important factor that could become an obstacle to democratic transition in 121 Hadiwinata and Schuck,Op.Cit., p

85 Indonesia is the survival of Golkar. Although there was no dominant party in the 1999 and 2004 elections, Golkar, Soeharto s political party, still received a significant number of votes in both elections. 122 In 1999, Golkarwas positioned as the second largest party with 22, 4% votes, following Megawati s Party (PDI-P), which was the largest party (33.7%). However, in 2004, Golkar was positioned as the largest party, with 21, 6% votes. This shows that Golkar still survived in the Indonesia political system as it had a significant number of votes; in other words, Golkar still has the power to influence the government s policies. This could become an obstacle to achieving a full democratic consolidation, because some of the KKN issues in which Soeharto and his cronies were involved still cannot be investigated. The next section will discuss the implementation and development of the elections after the Suharto government. The decline of Soeharto regime was gladly accepted as an initial step towards political reform. After the fall of Soeharto, Indonesia has entering a period of transition from an authoritarian system to a democratic system. Therefore, domestic and international actors have agreed that elections are an important step towards the transitional period in Indonesia. Transitional elections are needed as a democratic mechanism to replace the elite of the old regime with new elite that is more credible and accountable, through democratic elections Elections under the Reform Government The 1999 Transitional Elections: The Phase of Regime Change Soon after being appointed as president, Habibie made two important moves. The first was ensuring the freedom of speech and he freedom of association, while the second was organising free 122 Aris Ananta, et.al., Emerging Democracy in Indonesia, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, ISEAS, Singapore,

86 and fair general elections in June Soon after these announcements, many mass media companies and political parties were established. In a short time, political parties grew from three to 141. However, only 48 political parties qualified to participate in the 1999 elections. Moreover, election monitoring, conducted by both domestic and international organisations, was allowed. This was the first time the phenomenon of election monitoring in Indonesian elections was formally recognised by the government. The presence of election monitors was necessary to give legitimacy to the elections in the transitional period. In this election, it was also the first time that Indonesia received foreign aid for running elections in terms of electoral assistance (See Chapters 4 and 5). In January 1999, the KPU launched a new election law (The Elections Law No 3, 1999), which was a vast improvement on the previous law. Electoral management bodies (EMBs), such as general election commissions (KPU) and supervisory election bodies were changed. Under Soeharto, EMBs (then called LPU) were controlled by and consisted of government agents (the Ministry of Domestic Affairs). Since the 1999 elections, KPU members have been a mixture of political parties representatives (48 persons) and five government representatives. With regard to the new supervisory election body (SPE), members consisted of community leaders, representative of universities, scholars, intellectuals and humanists. Before the 1999 elections, SPE (then called PANWASLAK) had been established in the 1982 elections as a response by the government to the number of violations and the manipulation of the vote count conducted by election officials in the 1977 and 1971 elections. The membership of SPE consisted of the Attorney General as head of SPE and another five members, who were officials from the Ministry of Domestic Affairs, the military and two representatives of political parties (PPP and PDI-P). 123 The establishment of PANWASLAK was seen as part of Soeharto s efforts to create the impression that the elections were conducted in accordance with the international standards for 123 Santoso and Supriyanto, Mengawasi Pemilu Mengawal Demokrasi (Supervising Elections, Guarding Democracy), Jakarta, 2004, pp See also accessed on October 10,

87 democratic elections. However, the members of LPU and PANWASLAK consisted of government officers, raising the question of the neutrality of both organisations. Other improvements to the new election laws were that civil service and military members were banned from playing active roles in the campaign. Civil servants are no longer automatically members of Golkar; therefore, they do not have to pay monthly dues to Golkar as they did previously and they are free to vote for any party. This rule has undoubtedly weakened Golkar. Golkar should adaptto the new environment that demanded reform. Moreover, the military, which was the dominant during Soeharto s regime, left Golkar. Golkar became gradually dominated by the civilian bureaucracy and business groups that were influenced by the presence of Jusuf Kalla, who has a background in business. 124 With regard to the military aspects, military members who join political parties are required to resign from their positions. The military was considered to be an important actor that had a substantial influence on the progress of transition in Indonesia. Civilian political leaders, intellectuals and the public banded together to put collective pressure on the military leadership (General Wiranto was Commander of the military at the time). Moreover, the freedom of press granted by Habibie produced immediate results, prompting reports on the military s past violations of human rights, particularly in Aceh. In response, Wiranto started military reform with the slogans of dialogue and moderation 125 and promised to reduce the number of troops deployed in East Timor, Irian Jaya and Aceh. The military is now under heavy pressure to disclose various repressive acts that were committed in the past and to bring those responsible to justice. In the face of public criticism of dwifungsi, or the dual function of the military, General Wiranto then decided to accept a reduction 124 Some other military leaders had established new parties like Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan/PKP (Unity and Justice Party), established by General Edi Sudrajat. Leo Suryadinata, The Decline of the Hegemonic Party System in Indonesia: Golkar after the Fall of Soeharto, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2007), pp For further details regarding Soeharto-Golkar, see also Ayako Masuhara, 2007, Op.Cit. 125 Jun Honna, The Military in Transition: Between Reform and Power Struggle, in Yuri Sato (ed.), Indonesia Entering A New Era: Abdurrahman Wahid Government and Its Challenge, IDE-JETRO Spot Survey, No. 17, 2000, pp See also Jun Honna, 2003, Op.Cit. 69

88 in the appointed seats for the military faction in the House of Representatives (DPR) from 75 to 38, and declared that the military would no longer support the ruling governmental party, Golkar. 126 This means that the military would no longer be a leading actor in Indonesia s national politics. Another important development was the emergence of new parties that are strongly coloured by an ideological spirit, such as Nationalists, Islamists and Christians. This seemed to revive the flavour of the 1995 elections. The number of new Islamic parties was the highest in this period (approximately 17 parties). The large number of political parties that participated in the 1999 elections was an added burden for Golkar in retaining a significant position in the 1999 elections. Moreover, under the new election laws, the composition of MPR, DPR and DPRD were changed. In the 1997 elections, the total number of MPR seats was 1,000; half of the seats were for DPR members that were elected, while the others seats were for the military and other groups (regional representatives and professional groups) that were appointed and designated by the President. Under the election law, the number of MPR seats was 700 of all seats (the DPR had 500 seats, the regional representatives 135 seats and there were 65 seats for representatives of organisations), which must consisted of the people that were elected, with the exception of 38 seats for 126 The military also used the slogan Paradigma Baru ABRI or A New Paradigm of the Military, which consisted of four aspects: the military s retreat from the forefront of politics, a shift from the role of control to the role of influence, a shift from direct commitment to indirect commitment to politics, and role-sharing with civilians. The Ministry of Defense RI, ABRI Abad XX1: Redefinisi, Reposisi dan Reaktualisasi Peran ABRI dalam Kehidupan Bangsa (ABRI in 21 st Century: Redefinition, Reposition, and Reactualization of ABRI), Jakarta: Headquarters of Armed Forces, of Republic of Indonesia, However, an interesting analysis of the changing military attitudes was conducted by Honna (2003), which argued that the internal power struggle within the military was the primary factor influencing military responses to democratic demands. Honna, 2003, Op. Cit. Disputes within the military are alleged to have started in the mid-1980s between Soeharto and General L. B. Moerdani, who served as Commander of the Armed Forces. The military was then divided into two groups, ABRI Hijau (Green Armed Forces) and ABRI Merah Putih (Red White ABRI). Green ABRI represents Soeharto's group, who then approached the religious Muslim groups, while the Red White ABRI represents nationalist groups that approached Megawati (PDI-P), Frans Husken and Huub de Jonge, Orde Zonder Order: Kekerasan dan Dendam di Indonesia (Orde Zonder Order: Violence and Vengeance in Indonesia ), LKIS: Jakarta, 2002, pp See also A. Pambudi, Kalau Prabowo Jadi Presiden (If Prabowo becomes President), Narasi Press, Yogyakarta,

89 military representatives. 127 In the New Order, President Soeharto had the authority to appoint a quarter of the members of the MPR, including the military. The new regulation removed the authority of the president in determining the members of the assembly. In this period, the amendment to the Indonesian Constitution was conducted, which seemed difficult in Soeharto s era. The first amendment to the constitution was Constitution No.7/1945, which limited the president and vice president s terms in office to a maximum of two five-year periods. The amendment to the 1945 of constitution stated, the term of office of the President and the Vice President is five years, and can be re-elected only for one another period. Finally, the 1999 elections were conducted on June the 9th, Although there was some violations (criminal and administrative), the elections were acknowledged as being Free and Fair elections (the process of the elections will be discussed in section 2). However, according to the results of the 1999 elections, the PDI-P had significant votes with about 33 % of the total votes, followed by Golkar with about 21% of the total votes. Other pro-democracy parties, such as PAN, which was headed by Amien Rais (a political leader and one of the Reformists) and some Islamic parties gained no significant votes in the 1999 elections. Table 3.1 Results of the 1999 General Elections Party Number of Votes Number of Seats PDI-P Golkar PKB PPP PAN Undang-Undang Pemilu Republik Indonesia No. 3 tahun 1999 (The Indonesia Elections Law No.3/1999) available at: accessed on Nov 10,

90 PBB PK PKP PNU PDKB Others 38 Parties Total Source: General Elections Commission, The results of the 1999 elections above show the change in the political situation. Golkar was no longer a dominant party following a decline in the military s role in political aspects. Meanwhile, the PDI-P emerged as a significant political party and other political parties have started to colour the political scene in Indonesia. Moreover, the 1999 elections were conducted under real democratic elections, which never occurred under the Soeharto regime. The participation of 48 political parties, the formulation of new electoral laws to meet the standards of democratic elections and the involvement of election monitoring organisations, especially when conducted by domestic groups, were significant improvements in the democratisation of Indonesia and were a signal that the regime change process was being realised. 72

91 The 2004 Elections: The Process of Transition to Consolidation The 2004 elections were organised under Megawati s Government. 128 Some significant changes to and developments in political situations at that time were related to the 2004 elections. The first was the implementation of direct presidential elections, as Indonesia s presidents were previously elected by the partially appointed and partially elected People s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR). During MPR, this decision was taken as part of the constitutional amendment in August Moreover, the authority of the MPR was limited by the establishment of the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi/MK) and the Judicial Court (Komisi Yudisial/KY). These bodies functioned as the judiciary, particularly with regard to MK. 129 The establishment of the Constitutional Court also seemed to limit the functions of the MPR, which was transformed into a super body in the post-soeharto era. 130 Amendments also led to the establishment of a regional representative council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, or DPD) as a second chamber with limited supervisory powers. In terms of impact, in the 2004 elections, the voters not only had to vote for the DPR, but also for the DPD. The electoral system changed to the use of a restricted open list proportional system for the National Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, or DPR) and for regional parliaments at the provincial and district/municipal (kabupaten/kota) levels. The voters choose legislative members (DPR) at national, regional and district levels. When voting for the DPR, voters have to select a political party as well as 128 In the 1999 elections, Abdurahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and Megawati were appointed by MPR as the President and vicepresident of Indonesia. However, Gus Dur was impeached by the MPR for failing to execute its mandate (the Case of Bruneigate and Buloggate), and Megawati was appointed by the MPR to replace Gus Dur as President on July the 23rd, 2001.For further analysis of this issue, see Leo Suryadinata, 2002, pp See Undang-Undang No. 24 Tahun 2003 tentang Mahkamah Konstitusi (Law No. 24/2003 regarding thejudicial Commission Authority). 130 Further analysis on parliament and democratisation can be found in Patrick Ziegenhein, The Indonesian Parliament and Democratization, Institute of South East Asian Studies (ISEAS): Singapore, 2008, p.8 73

92 name from a list of the party s candidates. The participants in the elections for the DPR were required to originate from political parties, while the new DPD candidates were required to run as individuals. Therefore, DPD voters would only have to vote for a candidate. The method of voting was criticized by Cetro, who said, the leaders want to make a strong party first, and to do that they want to decide who are the MPs and who are not. They are afraid of losing control. 131 In addition, the military representation terminated in Parliament in This meant that, for the first time in Indonesian political history, no military representatives were involved in the Indonesian parliament. The approval for the quota of women in parliament (as a non-binding moral imperative for the parties) was also one of major developments in the 2004 elections. This achievement could be said to be a result of pressure from some leading NGOs and DEMOs, such as CETRO and FPMP. In contrast to the 1999 elections when 53 members of the KPU consisted of representatives of each political party (48) and representatives of the government (5), in 2004, 11 members of the KPU were the result of the open recruitment system, which meant that anybody could apply to become a member of KPU through a selection process arranged by the government. This was the result of pressure from the domestic population through various NGOs to establish an independent electoral management body (KPU). Although the KPU in the 1999 elections was different from the KPU under Soeharto, NGOs criticised the involvement of political parties and the government as members of the KPU, saying that the formation still caused problems with neutrality. Thirdly, only 24 political parties took part in the 2004 elections, while in 1999, there were 48 parties. This was the result of the stringent requirements on the part of the KPU for parties that wished to participate in the elections. This rigid requirement can be seen as a response by KPU to certain 131 FEER, April 8, 2004, see also C.S. Kuppuswamy, Indonesia: Elections 2004, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 981, Available at: accessed on April 8,

93 critics of the 1999 elections, who said that, despite the participation of 48 parties in the elections being seen as respect for the principle of freedom of association, a large number of parties can become a source of inefficiency and can be ineffective in terms of the budget and for the implementation of elections. Moreover, the large number of parties running for elections influenced the situation in parliament. This will lead to no party being likely to the win majority of votes, which has an impact on a heated level of battle in parliament (DPR). Looking at the results of the 2004 elections, we found that Golkar became the largest party in parliamentary elections and had the majority of seats (128 seats), followed by the PDI-P (109 seats). With regard to the decrease in PDI-P votes, Wanandi (2004) pointed out that The people have shown their displeasure with the ruling Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) party, which has not done much for the people (corruption, unemployment, insecurity and bad judiciary). 132 With regard to Golkar s vote result, in the 1999 elections, it was predicted that Golkar would be completely defeated; in fact, Golkar managed to gain a significant percentage of the votes and came in at second place after the PDI-P. Moreover, the 2004 elections demonstrated that Golkar not only continued to survive, they even managed to be in the first position. 133 The 1999 and 2004 results showed the sustainability of Golkar in Indonesia's political life or, in other words, that Golkar still have the power to influence government policy. This could become an obstacle to achieving full democratic consolidation. 132 Jusuf Wanandi, The Indonesian General Elections 2004, Asia Pacific Review, Vo. 11, No. 2, 2004, p Stephen Sherlock also predicted that the PDI-P is a potential winner in the 2004 new election system. See Dr Stephen Sherlock, The 2004 Indonesian Elections: How the System Works and What Parties Stand For, A Report, Centre for Democratic Institutions, Australian National University, 2003, p

94 The 2004 results also saw the emergence of new parties based on religions, namely the PKS (Islamic Party) and the PDS (Christian Party). Surprisingly, the Democratic Party (PD), despite being a new party that was established in 2002, achieved the fifth position. Another interesting phenomenon was the decrease in the number of votes for Indonesia's Islamic parties, compared to the 1999 elections. This demonstrates that, although 87% of the Indonesian population is Muslim, religious fanaticism is not manifested in the political behaviour of Muslim society in Indonesia. Table 3.2 Results of the 2004 General Elections Rank Party Number of Votes Number of Seats 1 Partai Golkar PDI-P PKB PPP PD PKS PAN PBB PBR PDS Other 14 Parties Total Source: General Elections Commission, Indonesia, According to developments in the 2004 elections as explained above, the new elections law that consisted of new procedures and mechanisms was expected to support the process of democratic transition in Indonesia. Although some have predicted that the elections would suffer from logistics 76

95 and other administrative problems, both the domestic and the international society acknowledged that the 2004 elections, followed by the presidential elections that were conducted under Megawati, were successful and peaceful, indicating a transitional process towards democracy The 2009 Elections: Chaotic but Consolidated? The 2009 elections were held under the leadership of the SBY government. 134 The 2009 elections were expected to mark the end of the transition period and to be the next step towards democratic consolidation. Although it could be said that the elections went well, some people judged the 2009 elections as being the worst elections during the reform period. Wimar Witoelar pointed out that there were two major causes of bad management during the 2009 elections: "the quality of the elections committees (KPU) and the huge complexity of the 2009 elections compared to the previous ones". 135 Mietzner, on the other hand, stressed the incompetency of the KPU members and the reduced electoral budget as being the causes of the poor quality of the 2009 elections when compared to those of 1999 and The 2009 elections had many problems, beginning with the preparation stages. Firstly, the selection of members of the KPU was widely criticised by various parties, since the commission consisted of people who were not considered capable and who were inexperienced. 137 This was considered to have an impact on the performance of the KPU in the preparation and the execution of 134 SBY-Jusuf Kalla (JK) was chosen as President and Vice President through the direct Presidential Election Wimar Witoelar, Despite Elections Setbacks, Democracy Moves Forwards, the Jakarta Post, April 15, Marcus Mietzner, Chaos and Consol idation, Inside Indonesia, Online Magazine, Published by the Indonesian Resources and Information Program (IRIP), Australia, available at: accessed on October 19, See interview with ex- KPU Members 2004, April 6, 2009, interview with CETRO, March 20, 2009 and MAPILU PWI, March 17,

96 the 2009 elections, which seemed to be very slow. 138 In addition, the voter list was changed many times and the sluggish logistical preparations showed the KPU s lack of capacity. In the 2009 elections, the determination of the seats in the House was also changed, using a parliamentary threshold of 2.5%. 139 A parliamentary threshold is the minimum threshold of votes that a political party needs in a general election on order to be included in determining the number of seats in the DPD and the DPR. This provision was first applied in the 2009 elections. The system was viewed as being profitable for the big political parties, while the small parties would have little chance of having a seat in parliament. The impact of this is that a sizeable percentage of voters would not be represented. In addition, referring to the electoral law No. 10/2008 article 214, the open list of the popular vote system was also implemented. Based on this system, the voters have to vote for the name of the candidate as well as for the party. However, in the case of the regional representative (DPD), as in the 2004 elections, the vote was only for the candidate. The system has positive points, as ANFREL sys: the systems...to encourage voters to vote directly for a candidate and to make for a more transparent system whereby a party s power to choose and pick close aides for seats at the national and regional level would be reduced. The idea is also to promote the popular votes system, which allows individuals who get the most votes to get a fair chance to get seats in Parliament. In the old closed list system, voters had limited choice that is they could vote for only a party or a candidate. But it was the party prerogative to decide on matters relating to seat allocation. 140 However, considering the low level of participation in the 2004 and 2009 elections, this study argues that, although the system would have a positive aspect as explained above, it could further weaken the smaller parties that do not have sufficient financial capability to fund the campaign, 138 KPU Dinilai Lamban (KPU is sluggish), available at: accessed on June 30, See also: accessed on June 28, UU Pemilu Pasal 202 No. 10 tahun 2008 (Elections Law No. 10/2008Article 202). 140 ANFREL, A Decade of Democracy in Indonesia: the 2009 Legislative Elections, Report of International Elections Observation Mission, 2009, p.8. 78

97 increasing the potential for irrational votes (such as votes based on nepotism), as well as the potential for internal conflict within the parties. The rule was followed by a change in voting methods, which further confused the voters. The voters were familiar with the use of coblos, or perforations, as implemented in the previous elections. In the 2009 elections, this was changed to the 'contreng, or tick (using a pen mark to cast the vote). The lack of familiarity with such changes was seen as the reason for the vast number of votes that were not valid in 2009 (see Chapters5 and 6 for analyses of the direct observation of election results in the 2009 elections). Another important phenomenon was the participation of six local parties (Aceh) in the national elections. This occurred for the first time in the political system in Indonesia. However, the emergence of local parties in Aceh was not a trend that encouraged people in other areas to establish local parties. Furthermore, other important development was the presence of parties fronted by exmilitary leaders, such as the Democrat Party led by SBY, Hanura led by General Wiranto and Gerindra led by General Prabowo. This indicates that, although the military was restricted from being directly involved in parliament, they found another, "democratic" way of being involved through the establishment of political parties. According to results of the 2009 elections, these parties gained a significant number of votes, with even the Democrat Party becoming stronger. 141 Table 3.3 Results of the 2009 elections Rank Party Number of Votes Number of Seats 1 PD Golkar PDI-P The analysis of the reasons for the PD s electoral success and its implications for the future architecture of Indonesia s party system has been conducted by Marcus Mietzner, in Indonesia s 2009 Elections: Populism, Dynasties and the Consolidation of Party System, Low Institute for International Policy,

98 4 PKS PAN PPP PKB Gerindra Hanura Other 24 parties * Total Source: General Elections Commission, 2009 *these parties do not qualify for the provisions of the Parliamentary Threshold based on the provisions of Chapter XIII Article , Law No.10/2008 on General Elections for DPR, DPD and DPRD. Conversely, support for Islamic parties has increasingly declined since the 1999 and 2004 elections. On the other hand, despite a decline in turnout since the 1999 elections, Golkar has enjoyed a stable position at around 1st or 2nd place in terms of the number of votes. It is interesting that, even after the Soeharto regime collapsed, Golkar still has a great influence on the voters. Another important aspect highlighted in the 2009 election was the reduction in international aid for the elections and the decreased activity of election monitoring by domestic organisations. Unlike previous elections, particularly the 1999 elections, the international and domestic societies paid little attention to monitoring activities in the 2009 election. In fact, the number of violations reported continues to increase; this means that monitoring remains necessary in order to prevent violations. On the other hand, the increasing number of violations detected shows the necessity of the monitoring work. In addition, the number of voters who exercised their rights to vote continued to decline. This shows the importance of political education and voter education, which is usually conducted by political parties and domestic EMOs (further analysis of DEMOs will be presented in Chapter 5). Based on the explanations in this chapter, three important points can be summarised. 80

99 Firstly, elections have two functions t hat have different consequences, first as a survival strategy of a regime and, secondly, as a tool for democratic transition. Elections under Soeharto could be seen as a survival strategy for him to maintain power, while the elections after the Soeharto period (from 1999 onwards) can be seen as a tool for democratic transition. Secondly, the development of political parties in the transitional period showed a positive trend. However, the political parties in the transitional period focused on attempts to retain power, meaning that the supervisory function attached to a political party could not function optimally. Therefore, other elements of society, such as DEMOs, need to conduct independent monitoring functions. Thirdly, although domestic factors played a predominant role in democratisation, this study argues that the international factor also played a role in the rise of democratic development in Indonesia, through aid conditionality at the government level and democracy aid promotion, which targeted the grassroots level. Political aid conditionality is an old tool used by donors in promoting democracy, while democracy assistance began in the early 1990s and is thus a new form of donor participation that affects the process of democratisation. In case of Indonesia, political aid conditionality played a role in the democratic process in Indonesia in the 1990s. On the other hand, democracy assistance has played a role since the 1999 elections via electoral and civil society assistance (see Table 3.4). Both were influential factors in the beginning stages of Indonesia liberalisation period (donors approaches in distributing democracy assistance will be discussed in the next chapter). These facts prove that democratisation is not only a domestic matter, but also that international or external factors also play a role in a country entering the process democratic transition Jean Grugel, 1999, Op.Cit., p

100 Electoral system and the number of contestants Table 3.4 Comparisons of Elections under the New Order and the Reform Government Item Elections under New Order Elections Under Reform Government A multiparty system with 2 political parties and 1 functional group (Golkar) as the ruling party of the Soeharto regime A multiparty system with 48 political parties A multiparty systemwith 24 political parties A multiparty systemwith 38 political parties (plus 6 Local political parties in Aceh) The dominant political party Golkar No dominant party* No dominant party* No dominant party* *PDI-P and Golkar had a significant number of voters, followed by PKB, PAN, PKS, PPP and PBB Electoralmanagement body Ministry of Internal Affairs Independent Electoral Management Body/General Elections Commission (KPU)consisted of persons who are representatives of the party *Golkar and PDI-Pstill had more voters than did other parties. *PD participated in elections Independent Electoral Management Body/General Elections Commission (KPU),which consists of persons who have been selected through the open recruitment system. *PD had significant votes, while Golkar was in second place, followed by PDI-P. KPU, which consists of persons who have been selected through the open recruitment system. Electoral system Proportional representation (closed list) Floating candidates chosen as the party symbol. The candidate is selected based on the ordinal number that was already set by the internal party Proportional representation (closed list) Base list mechanism Floating candidates chosen as the party symbol. The elected candidate is a result of a selection process based on the ordinal number that was already set by the internal party Proportional representation (semi-open)- Direct elections Chosen by the party and the picture (?) of candidate; the elected candidate is a result of a selection process based on the ordinal number (?) Proportional representation (open)- Direct elections Chosen by the party and the picture (?) of the candidate; the elected candidate is a result of a selection process based on the number of voters. Presidential Elections system By a General Meeting of the MPR By a General Meeting of the MPR By Direct Presidential Elections By Direct Presidential Elections The number of the People s Consultative Assembly (MPR) and the People s Representatives Council (DPR) Military involvement in parliament Strong Reduced Reduced Reduced Quota for women No 30% 30% 30% The involvement of election- monitoring organisations No (except in 1997, but it was informal activities) Yes (officially acknowledged) Yes (Officially acknowledged, should be registered at KPU) Yes (Officially acknowledged, should be registered at KPU) Foreign electoral assistance, especially for DEMOs - Yes (alarger fund wasallocated) Yes (the amount of funding was reduced, compared to 1999) Yes (the amount of funding was reduced, compared to 1999 and 2004) 82

101 Chapter 4 From Developmental Assistance to Democracy Aid: Comparing Japan s Approach to the US and the EU Approaches Democratisation emerged as a worldwide trend due to international pressure from a wide range of global actors, including the United States, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, internationally significant aid agencies and NGOs. International factors also shape the outcomes and the political struggles that are taking place as democracy is-or fails to be- consolidated. Democratisation frequently has two faces: the internal one and the one that is shown to the international community. 143 The emergence of democracy movements led by local organisations in one country, as a result of the globalisation of democracy, encourages the emergence of similar phenomena in other countries. On the other hand, the international community continues to attempt to facilitate democracy movements by providing funds, as well as by providing technical assistance. Democratisation has become a new area in which the international community, particularly for donor countries, can assist (see a detailed explanation in Chapter 2). Traditionally, technical assistance is provided in the context of economic and development, with the main emphasis on building and strengthening the physical infrastructure. This section will examine the implementation of democracy assistance in Indonesia. Indonesia, as a fledgling democratic country, is an important case for a number of reasons. Firstly, Indonesia is one of the most strategic countries in Southeast Asia, for both geographical and political reasons. Also, Indonesia has been working towards establishing economic relations (trade, investment and assistance) with donor countries for a long time, and has received a significant amount of aid from 143 Ibid. 83

102 donor countries,such as Japan. Secondly, the decline of the Soeharto regime in 1998 allowed for political reform and started the democratisation process in Indonesia. Thus, international factors like democracy assistance have a formal opening to play a role in the democratic process in Indonesia, which had previously been difficult. As a result, the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections were supported by the donor countries via bilateral and international organisations like the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Considering the changing trends of Japanese aid, this chapter will focus on Japanese democracy assistance to Indonesia by comparing this assistance with that of the US and the EU as two of the leading democracy aid providers. This study limits the object of research to Japan as the top donor, the United States (US) as the founder of democratic enlargement, and the European Union as one of the most important actors in the field of democracy aid. Japanese ODA has given priority to Asian countries, and Indonesia has positioned itself at the top of the list, compared to the other ASEAN countries. Based on the net disbursement in 1985, Indonesia received US$ 707, 3 million, while the Philippines received only US$ 379, 4 million, followed by Thailand (US$ million) and Malaysia (US$276, 4 million). 144 During the period of Soeharto s government, the Japanese ODA to Indonesia was clearly focused on economic development. However, after the decline of Soeharto s regime, the Japanese government decided to support the 1999 transitional election in Indonesia, which was a new departure for them. Since then, the Japanese government has been trying to create a new formula for democracy aid in order to support democratisation in Indonesia. With regard to the EU, as this institution attempts to coordinate member states, the EU s development aid policy can be considered to be a European approach. 145 Thus, it is possible to use the EU as a reference point that can be compared to Japan. Moreover, the EU has also stipulated the 144 Wagakuni no Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo (Japan s ODA Annual Report), see also accessed in July

103 promotion of democratic principles and human rights as important parts of the EU s foreign policy in addition to development cooperation. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the EU s aid policy towards democratisation and to compare it to those instigated by other countries. This chapter proposes to map the donors approaches in distributing their democracy aid in the post-soeharto era. Therefore, this chapter addresses the following two questions: 1. How did the Japanese government formulate its democracy aid, particularly in the case of Indonesia? 2. What are the differences and similarities of the Japanese approach to the democracy aid sector compared to the approaches of the US and the EU? The first section of this chapter explores Japan s democracy assistance to Indonesia. As the core of this study, Japan is the first country to be analysed. In order to uncover the pattern of democracy aid of each country, the next analysis is focused on the US and the EU s democracy aid. The second section examines international democracy assistance to Indonesia, while the final section presents analyses of the framework of democracy aid of each donor by comparing the implementation of democracy aid of each donor country. This chapter also explores the relationship between Indonesia and the donors (Japan, the US and the EU) under Soeharto s regime. The purpose of this section is to create a basic understanding of the historical relations and the interests of each donor in distributing their foreign aid. This study argues that, although aid issues are shifting from developmental assistance to democracy assistance, economic and political interest has still influenced donor s approaches in distributing democracy assistance to Indonesia. Moreover, each donor has individual characteristics in distributing aid, which are based on their interest in the aid policy and their understanding of aid distribution. 85

104 4.1. Japan s Democracy Assistance to Indonesia: Half-Hearted Assistance? Japanese-Indonesian Relations under the ODA Scheme 146 Indonesia has become the most important nation in Southeast Asia, and Japan acknowledges that Indonesia is one of the top suppliers of oil, natural gas and natural resources. Indonesia is also a potential market of 200 million people, which can be advantageous for Japan in expanding its economic activities, such as trade and investment. Also, from Japan s point of view, Indonesia s large population has played an important role in supporting the growth and stability of the Southeast Asian economy. These factors are reasons for Japan to sustain a friendly relationship with Indonesia, and ODA has become a way for Japan to maintain such a relationship. Japan s ODA policy gives priority to Asian countries and Indonesia occupies the top position among them. The reasons for Japan giving priority to Asian countries, especially to Indonesia, involves economic as well as political motives, such as trust-building and establishing a positive image in this region. Japan's foreign aid to Indonesia under the ODA scheme started in the1960s, preceded by a change of regime from Sukarno to Soeharto. Japan is the largest donor to Indonesia, as 16% of the total Japanese ODA is given to Indonesia. Since 1987, Indonesia has been the country that has absorbed the largest portion of Japanese ODA funds. 147 Under the Soeharto government s policy, ODA was one of the most important sources of funding in the government s budget plan. Contributions by ODA were a fifth of the total revenue and Japan was recorded as the biggest donor to Indonesia, allocating16% of Japan's total ODA to that country. Table 3.1 below shows the dynamics of Japanese ODA in Indonesia from This section includes data regarding Japan s ODA that was analysed in Asra Virgianita, Democratisation in Indonesia after Soeharto Period: International Settings and Domestic Consequences, Thesis, Graduate School of International Studies, Meiji Gakuin University, 2004, pp Japan s Official Development Assistance (ODA), Annual Report,

105 Year Amount Table 4.1 Japan s ODA to Indonesia Amount in billion Yen Grants Loans Technical Cooperation % of annual total Amount % of annual total Amount % of annual total Annual Total Amount N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Cumulative : N/A N/A N/A 0.86 N/A N/A

106 Total , Source: for Grants and Loans: Wagakuni no Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo: ODA Hokusho (ODA Annual Report). For TC: Kokusai Kyoryoku Jigyodan Nenpo (JICA Annual Report) See also Bachtiar Alam, Statistical ODA, 2001, Centre for Japanese Studies, University of Indonesia.. The first distribution of Japanese ODA was received by Soeharto s government in the form of a loan (10, 80 billion yen). This amount continued to increase significantly every year. The data in Table 4.1 above show that, between 1967 and1998, the ODA loan from Japan dominated the implementation of Japan's ODA to Indonesia. On the other hand, technical cooperation and grants alternately occupy the second and the third place in the distribution of Japanese ODA. Moreover, in 1974, the amount of the loan reached 97% of Japan's total ODA to Indonesia. As a result, anti- Japanese groups emerged to protest the policy. The Japanese government responded to these protests by issuing the Fukuda Doctrine, which was launched by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda. The Fukuda Doctrine contains initiatives to strengthen the relationship between Japan and the ASEAN countries. 148 In 1980, the Japanese government introduced the concept of the Comprehensive Security Policy (sogo anzen hosho), which emphasised the use of economic aid as a tool to guarantee the security of Japan. This concept automatically clarified the functions and motives of Japanese ODA. However, in the mid-1980s and under the increasing demand for political participation, the Indonesian government announced a policy called the politics of openness. The demand was also strengthened by international pressure through political aid conditionality, whereby the donor countries look closely at the recipient countries record of democratisation, human rights and environmental protection Takaaki Kojima, Japanand ASEAN Partnershipfor a Stable and Prosperous Future, 2006, p Amir Santoso, Democratization: The Case of Indonesia s New Order, in Anek Laothamatas (ed.). Democratization in Southeast Asia. ISEAS, Singapore: St. Martin Press, 199,.p

107 In the early of 1990, as the Cold War ended with the defeat of the communist bloc, the United States embraced the enlargement of the democratic community as a key element of U.S foreign policy, which also influenced the other donor countries policies (see also chapter 1). As a result, Japan, one of the US allies, changed its aid policy by introducing the Four Guidelines of ODA in At this time, Japan announced the Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter 1992, which clearly emphasised democratisation as one of the main pillars of Japan s aid policy. 150 The Japanese government also supported the Partnership for Democratic Development (PDD) Initiative at the Lyon Summit in June The PDD is an initiative explicitly designed to support democratisation efforts in the developing world. PDD assistance is intended to help recipient countries to develop legal, administrative, electoral and police systems and institutions, as well as to build the human resource capacity necessary for democratisation and human rights protection. 151 However, after adopting the ODA Charter and the PPD, the concern of Japanese assistance with regard to supporting democratisation in Indonesia was not reflected in the distribution of Japan s ODA. Public works and utilities sectors had a large number of projects compared with the other sectors (54% of total projects and 47% of the total amount). Human resource development had only 10 projects (9% of total project with 6% of the total amount) in the eight years after the ODA Charter. Other social sector services also had a small portion of the total loans. For example, public health and medicine had only 4% of the total projects and 3% of the total amount. 150 Japan s ODA Annual Report, on May 12,

108 Table 4.2 Japan s Loans to Indonesia ( ) by Sector (Amount in 100 million yen) Sector Number of % % Projects Amo unt Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries 14 12, Commerce and Tourism 1 0, Energy 10 9, Food Aid Human Resources Development 10 9, Mining and Industry 1 0, Planning and Administration Public Health and Medicine 5 4, Public Works and Utilities 59 54,12 5, Sector Programme Loan 8 7,33 2, Social Welfare Others (Social Safety Net) 1 0, Total , Source: Wagakuni no Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo: ODA Hokusho (ODA Annual Report), 1997& Bachtiar Alam, Statistical ODA, 2001, Centre for Japanese Studies, University of Indonesia. This indicates that either the Japanese or the Indonesian Government paid less attention to the social service sector than to the economic infrastructure, including energy and public works and utilities. Obviously, it is quite ironic that only 13% of the total loan was allocated to the social service sector, as it covers a wide spectrum of developments in terms of supporting democratisation in Indonesia. With regard to the amount of grant, human resource development was the fourth priority, as measured by the amount of the total grant. In terms of the number of projects, the portion allocated to human resource development was higher than was that of the others. There were 17 projects (27.86% of the total projects), which means that the ratio of the total amount was approximately 14.07%. This shows that the budget for human resource development was not as high as that allocated to public 90

109 works and utilities. In this sense, it would actually have been possible to increase the number of projects for human resource development, rather than focusing on public works and utilities. Table 4.3 Japan s Grant Aid to Indonesia ( ) by Sector (Amount in 100 million yen) Sector Number of Projects % Amount % Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries 6 9, Aid for Food Production Increase 7 11, Commerce and Tourism 1 1, Emergency Relief 4 6, Energy Food Aid 2 3, Human Resources Development Mining and Industry Planning and Administration Public Health and Medicine 6 9, ,87 Public Works and Utilities 12 19, Social Welfare Other 6 9, TOTAL Source: Wagakuni no Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo: ODA Hokusho (ODA Annual Report), 1997 & Bachtiar Alam, Statistical ODA, 2001, Centre for Japanese Studies, University of Indonesia. The conclusion from both of the tables is that, even after Japan announced the ODA Charter in 1992 and PDD in 1996, there was no significant change in the distribution of Japan s ODA to Indonesia, particularly with regard to supporting democratisation in Indonesia. The unchanged implementation of ODA for supporting democratisation and human rights was a result of Japan s belief that the development of a democratic society requires a certain level of political stability; therefore, it requires economic development. On the other hand, it is possible to say that economic interest was still a priority of the Japanese government in offering their assistance. The announcement of various initiatives for democratic development was more heavily influenced by international factors 91

110 than it was by Japanese initiative. However, remembering that Japan s ODA is based on request, the Indonesian government also had a certain influence on the distribution of Japan s ODA. Soeharto s regime brought long-term stability to Indonesia. Political stability promoted economic development, which created a supportive environment for foreign investment. At that time, Japan was a prominent investor in Indonesia. Japanese economic activities received many benefits from stability under Soeharto s bureaucratic, authoritarian regime (the form of the Soeharto regime is analysed in Chapter 3). Moreover, Japan s need for access to the natural resources in Indonesia also influenced Japan's commitment to Indonesia. According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), Japan was only able to produce16% of its total energy requirement, while the rest was imported from other countries. Indonesia was one of the exporters of coal to Japan (occupying the third portion after Australia and Malaysia). Thus, the Japanese ODA policy was perceived as a tool to ensure the sustainability of the supply of resources needed by Japan. 152 On the other hand, under Soeharto s regime, Indonesia appeared to be stable and used Japanese aid for infrastructure development. Diagram 4.1 Countries Exporting Coal to Japan Source: EIA (2012) 152 Interview with a specialist in Political Culture, University of Indonesia, September 12,

111 Under Soeharto s regime, the development of Indonesia had no significant focus on political development or on democratisation. Surprisingly, due to the economic crisis, Soeharto stepped down, and the new government faced pressure for democratic reform. The economic crisis not only had economic and social impacts, but also transformed Indonesia s political situation and encouraged Japan to issue some policies, both bilateral and multilateral level, in order the help Indonesia to overcome the crisis. At the same time, international actors such as the IMF, the World Bank, the United States and Japan were also trying to overcome the crisis by advocating economic and political reform. On October 1997, Soeharto asked for international assistance from the IMF and signed an agreement that enabled the IMF to become involved in Indonesia s economic recovery programme and to play a role in determining Soeharto s economic policy. 153 At that time, Japan issued a number of bilateral policies in order to help Indonesia to overcome the crisis. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Measures for Southeast Asia in February 1998 was one of the Japanese policies that focused on supporting Indonesia by utilising the fiscal investment and loan programme. 154 In April 1998, the Japanese government, through the IMF, also decided to make a $1 billion untied aid loan to Indonesia. In addition, Japan promised to provide $1 billion of the $3 billion loan as a secondary line of foreign currency credit as part of the original October IMF Package. This credit was supposed to be available in case the IMF loans proved insufficient, but it seems that the Japanese government had decided earlier to offer part of the money to Jakarta immediately. 155 Then, in October 1998, Japan suddenly announced a bold and large-scale financial assistance programme for the region--the Miyazawa plan. This differed from the US and the IMF s assistance, as package was distributed to five Asian economies that were facing the crisis, but 153 Eric Altbach, IMF, Jakarta Agree on Another Reform Plan, Tokyo Resumes Aid, JEI Report, No. 15, April 17, MITI announced Emergency Measures for the Economic Stabilization of Southeast Asia (Provisional Translation by MITI), Cabinet Decision, 20 February 1998 available at: on February 20, Eric Altbach, Op.Cit. 93

112 without the strict policy reform conditions. However, since most of the Miyazawa Initiative fund had been distributed for infrastructure, such as for the power sector, the initiatives were perceived negatively as an attempt on the part of the Japanese government to achieve and maintain their economic interest. 156 In addition, Furuoka s work stressed that by providing the fund, the Japanese government seemed to believe that Soeharto could overcome the current problems and maintain his power. 157 As the former Japanese Ambassador to Indonesia, Kimio Fujita, said democracy has to be sacrificed a little to achieve political stability. 158 In contrast, with regard to the Tragedy of May 12, the US government issued a statement to the effect that Indonesia needed political reform, which was widely seen as a call for Soeharto to step down. 159 After Soeharto stepped down, the Japanese government had no other choice but to allocate their aid to supporting democratic reform in Indonesia. The Japanese government also released a press statement, Japan s support for democratisation, in the same year. 160 Looking at data regarding the distribution of Japan s ODA to Indonesia post Soeharto, the decrease in Japan s ODA has in effect some years. However, Japan s total ODA to Indonesia has increased. In 2010, the total ODA to Indonesia was US$ 1, 5 million, which approximated the amount of Japan s ODA in Furthermore, compared to others types of ODA (technical assistance and grants), the largest amount has been distributed as loans. However, the loan amounts have fluctuated, especially during 1999 and The economic crisis in and the recovery there from was one of the reasons for this situation. However, since 2005, the total loans have increased every year. 156 Clear, Op. Cit. p Fumitaka Furuoka, New Challenges for Japan s Official Development Assistance (ODA) Policy: Human Rights, Democracy and Aid Sanctions, Kota Kinabalu: UMS Press, 2006, p Asahi Shinbun, June 16, John Bresnan, The United States, the IMF and the Indonesian Financial Crisis, in Adam Schwarz and J. Paris (ed.), The Politics of Post Soeharto Indonesia, NY: A Council on Foreign Relations Books Press, 1999, p accessed on February 20,

113 Detailed data regarding Japan s ODA to Indonesia from 1998 to 2010 can be seenin the graphic below. Chart 4.1 Japan s Total ODA to Indonesia Post Soeharto ( ) (In Million US$) Total ODA 828, , 860, 538, , In addition, looking at the proportion of Japan s ODA according to type, grant and technical assistance is still a smaller proportion than are loans. Furthermore, grants received a smaller proportion than did other types. Compared to the Soeharto period, the pattern of the composition did not change substantially. One of the important changes is the presence of aid to support the elections in Indonesia. The Japanese ODA flow into Indonesian politics began in 1999 in the form of electoral assistance after the fall of Soeharto. The fall of Soeharto brought a significant change to the governance of Indonesia's domestic political system. This assistance was distributed directly to the government of Indonesia in order to prepare for the elections, including international electionmonitoring activities. Japan's contribution to the elections in Indonesia reached U.S$ million and was channelled through the UNDP. This figure is much larger than is the contribution of other donor countries, including the United States and Britain. Not only does it contribute materially, but Japan has 95

114 also sent 20 experts as a form of technical assistance, whereby 17 experts from Japan were employed at the KPU and the other three were employed as UNDP experts. 161 Chart 4.2 Distribution of Japan s ODA to Indonesia (according to type) (in US$ Million) Year Grant Loan Technical Assistance In addition, the Japanese government has also worked with NGOs in support of democratisation. Support for the democratic process in Indonesia after Soeharto was also clearly laid out in the Country Assistance Strategy for Indonesia in 2004, which placed the "creation of a democratic and equitable society as the second pillar in the priority area of assistance. 162 One implementation of the pillar is the provision of assistance to the police. 163 The implementation of assistance is directed at improving the capacity of the police in Indonesia, with a particular emphasis on improving the quality of forensic investigations and providing communications equipment. 164 These facts are evidence of the Japanese government s attention to the democratic process in 161 Clear, International Donors and Indonesian Democracy. Loc. Cit. p JICA Country Assistance Program for Indonesia Asra Virgianita, 50 Tahun Hubungan Indonesia-Jepang: Refleksi Terhadap Implementasi ODA Jepang di Indonesia (50 Years Indonesia-Japan Relations: Reflection on the Implementation of Japan s ODA to Indonesia) Inovasi: Online Magazines, Vol.11/XX/July p Eduardo Lachica, Examining the Role of Foreign Assistance in Security Sector Reforms: The Indonesian Case. Working Paper, No. 47, 2003, Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, p

115 Indonesia, because it had not provided assistance related to elections in recipient countries before. This indicates a difference in the dynamics of Japanese assistance to Indonesia before and after the Soeharto government Japan s Half-hearted Approach to Indonesia Japan is a donor country that does not have a political intention when implementing foreign aid. Japan appeared reluctant to make certain conditions for recipient countries in order for them to receive assistance for Japan. The Japanese Foreign Ministry explained, Japan has a principle of refraining from attaching political conditions to its aid. 165 However, after the end of Cold War, almost all of the Development Assistance Countries (DAC) members put democracy and good governance as the basis of legitimacy when rendering their assistance. It was explained earlier that, in 1991, the Japanese government changed its aid policy by introducing the Four Guidelines of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and announced the ODA Charter 1992, which clearly emphasised democratisation as one of the main pillars of Japan s aid policy. 166 The Japanese government also supported the Partnership for Democratic Development (PDD) Initiative at the Lyon Summit in June The PDD is an initiative explicitly designed to support democratisation efforts in the developing world. PDD assistance is intended to help recipient countries to develop legal, administrative, electoral and police systems and institutions, as well as to build the human resource capacity necessary for democratisation and human rights protection Akaha Tsuneo. (2002), Japan: A Passive Partner in the Promotion of Democracy, in Peter J. Schraeder (ed.). Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality, London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., p Japan ODA Annual Report, accessed in June 8, See also Jun Saito and Seiki Tanaka, Kaihatsu Enjou and Minsyuka Shien (Development Assistance for Promoting Democracy) Kokusai Kaihatsu Kenkyuu (Journal of International Development Studies), the Japan Society for International Development (JASID). Vol. 18. No. 2,

116 Furthermore, since the middle of the 1990s, the Japanese Government created a study group to formulate ways in which Japan could contribute to promoting democracy. This group was composed of researchers and academics from various universities as well as from the government, including delegates from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Japan s International Cooperation Agency (JICA). As a result, the group recommended the formulation recommendations for good governance and decentralisation as ways of promoting democracy that were focused on the long-term approach. 168 Since then, Japan has supported the construction of the legal system in Vietnam, strengthened civil society by focusing on electoral support in Zambia, Cambodia and other countries, and has extended human rights to include women in development programmes. Considering the widespread democratisation movement in the early 2000s, JICA organised a study group that was expected to formulate a proposal for democracy assistance by the Japanese ODA. The study group began their work by examining three main elements of democratisation, namely the democratic political system, the institutions that make democracy work (governance), and an effective socio-economic foundation for democracy. This group concluded that Japan could play a role by focusing their assistance on governance and socio-economic foundations. 169 Meanwhile, Japanese democracy aid has been continually debated by many scholars. As Juichi Inada says, Japan tends to disconnect the three factors; development, democracy and security (conflict)-which are closely linked to one another in fact. 170 Furthermore, Inada also argues that Japan s ODA still clearly prioritises development, while the Japanese government justifies this policy 168 JICA Study Report, 1995, p JICA Study Group, Roads to Democracy and Governance, Tokyo: JICA Institute for International Cooperation, 2003, p. 12 and Juichi Inada, Japan s Emerging Role in Peace-Building and Post Conflict Reconstruction: Have Traditional Norms Changed? In Japanese ODA at 50: An Assessment, Asia Program Special Report, No. 128, February 2005, the Woodrow Wilson International Center Asia Program, 2005, p.14. See also Junichi Inada, Jinken, Minsyuka to Shien Seisaku: Nichi, Bei Hikakuron (A Comparison between Japan and the US Foreign Aid policy on Human Rights and Democratisation), Kokusai Mondai (International Affairs), Vol. 422 No.5, 1995, pp

117 by emphasising the positive impact of development instead of the other two factors, security and democracy. In addition, Kazuo Inoue, a former member of the House of Representatives, said that the limitations of the Japanese approach to promoting democracy could be explained by two reasons. 171 Firstly, civil society and the non-governmental sector in Japan are not as strong as they are in other countries, such as the US. Secondly, the initiatives to organise a democracy assistance programme are not supported by the bureaucracy. Since the Japanese government has a principle of non-interference in the political affairs of other countries, it is difficult to create the kind of organisation that has a political intention. Some scholars also argue that the long history of the US NGOs, the Western religious inclination towards charity and the Japanese belief in the overarching role of the government created the gap between the American and the Japanese NGOs. 172 Moreover, the relationship between NGOs and the government in Japan and in the US is quite different. The US government believes that the NGOs activities support a principle objective of US foreign policy; therefore, the US government recognises the importance of NGOs in the policy-making and implementation processes. On the other hand, NGOs in Japan face a lack of governmental support for their activities. 173 However, in the 1990s, the Japanese government came to realise the importance of partnerships with NGOs. Thereafter, the government formulated a number of schemes in the areas of social welfare, such as health, education and environmental initiatives in order to build cooperation with Japanese NGOs. Although the relationship between the NGOs and the government has improved over the years, the data show that the Japanese government only allocated 3% of its total to for the NGOs in Inoue s opinion as quoted from Dr Ronald Meinardus, Asia Must Do More to Promote Democracy", Jakarta Post, October 19, See also Sugiura Koichi, 2006, Loc. Cit. p Atsushi Yamakoshi, The changing Face of Japanese NGOs in Japan, available at accessed in July 8, Ibid. See also Junichi Inada, Kokusai Mondai (International Affairs), Loc.Cit. 99

118 This minimal funding distributed to NGOs identifies that Japan tends not to make use of either Japanese or local NGOs as implementing partners. 174 Based on the DAC Report, if we compare the amount of aid in the area of government and civil society (GSC) from Japan, the US and the EU, Japan s aid is far less than is that of the US and the EU. In 2006, this trend in Japanese aid had increased by about 150%, although the amount was still much lower than was that of the other two countries. Furthermore, considering the percentage of the total aid, Japan s GSC aid was only about 1-2% of the total aid every year, with the exception of On the other hand, the US and the EU paid more attention towards GSC programmes than did Japan. This situation is indicated by the percentage of their GSC aid, as shown in the following table. Table 4.4 GSC Aid from Japan, the US and the EU (in millions US$) JPN US EU Year GSC Aid % of Total Aid GSC Aid % of Total Aid GSC Aid % of Total Aid , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Total 2, , , Source: accessed on June 6, DAC Peer Review of OECD 2010, p

119 In addition, the U.S. NGO "Democracy Coalition Project" (DCP) explained three factors that influenced Japan s limited approach to democracy promotion. 175 Firstly, based on the Japanese experience before World War II when the global economic depression emerged in the late 1920s, the emerging democracy in Japan gave a way to the rise of a non-democratic government. Japan had a firm belief that economic development should become a priority in order to build a strong social foundation for democracy. Secondly, Japan s economic miracle during the 1970s-1980s under a strong and centralised leadership became a role model for other countries. These countries usually had experience of authoritarian governance. At that time, since the world was facing a threat in the form of Communism, Japan tolerated and even supported authoritarian regimes that sought to achieve economic and social stability. Thirdly, the instability of social and political situations that occurred in the region during the democratisation process might not have created an ideal situation for Japan to pursue its national economic and security interests. All these factors contributed towards Japan s passive attitude to supporting democratisation. 176 Furthermore, Akaha identified an important reason that Japanese political aid appeared to be passive. The reason is that the Japanese foreign policy was geared towards promoting economic and commercial interests and its foreign aid policy was a means of achieving this goal. 177 Along with the idea of Japanese foreign aid as keizai kyooryoku (economic cooperation) and the slogan seikei bunri, which means the separation of the economic from the political, the Japanese government tended to avoid the political arena in the implementation of its aid. 178 From the perspectives explained earlier, this study points out that Japanese democracy aid was not formulated enthusiastically. Japanese democracy aid had been limited by two main factors, namely the belief that economic stability should be developed first, and the principle of avoiding tampering in 175 Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends ( ), available at accessed in June 8, Ibid. 177 Akaha, Op. Cit. p Clear, Op. Cit., p

120 the political affairs of recipient countries (the non-intervention principle). 179 The introduction of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter 1992 and the Initiative of the PPD in 1996 represented the change in Japanese aid policy. However, even after adopting the ODA Charter and the PPD, the aim of Japanese assistance to supporting democratisation and human rights in Indonesia had not been implemented according to the method of distribution of Japan s ODA. The distribution of the Japanese aid programme to Indonesia was still focused on the infrastructure and manufacturing sectors and was dominated by loans. 180 Considering that political aid programmes are often formulated according to grants and technical cooperation, the dominance of yen loans in the Japanese aid policy, which focused on infrastructure development, became one of the signs that indicated a lack of attention to the political development in Indonesia. However, due to the economic crisis in 1997, the political situation in Indonesia changed from bad to worse. This situation was marked by a clash between the students and the security forces on May 12, 1998, which put a great deal of domestic and international pressure on Soeharto to resign. The Japanese government showed concern regarding the political chaos in Indonesia, but they refrained from taking any strict measures. Although some Japanese NGOs demanded that the Japanese government suspend aid to Indonesia, they were ignored and the government continued to provide aid to Indonesia. 181 The fall of Soeharto, coupled with the instability of the economic and political situation, provided a chance for the international community to play a role in facilitating political reform in Indonesia. The Japanese government had also tried to help Indonesia by giving aid packages 179 This principle also has been recognised as part of why is called the ASEAN Way. Certain principles categorised the ASEAN way, such as respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and renunciation of the threat or use of force. The ASEAN Way: Non Intervention and ASEAN s Role in Conflict Management, on June 06, Japan s ODA White Paper, Furuoka Fumitaka, Japan s Positive and Negative Aid Sanctions Policy toward Asian Countries: Case studies of Thailand and Indonesia, MPRA Paper, 2007, p

121 bilaterally and multilaterally, so as to preserve and maintain Soeharto s regime. As one of the biggest foreign investors in Indonesia, Japan enjoyed the stability of Indonesia under Soeharto s dictatorship. The former Japanese ambassador to Indonesia, Kimio Fujita, said that Soeharto s policy, which emphasised development, was compatible with Japanese thoughts regarding development. 182 Therefore, the Japanese government seemed to believe that Soeharto could maintain his power and stabilise the situation at that time. However, after Soeharto stepped down, the new government was under pressure to carry out democratic reform. A transitional election was soon organised and, consequently, the Japanese government had no choice but to support democratic reform and started to allocate their aid to supporting the transitional elections in Indonesia. Japan announced its commitment to provide technical and financial assistance on March 16, This was the first time that Japanese aid to Indonesia was used directly for political activities. Since the support was channelled through the UNDP, it meant that Japan distanced itself from the political nature of the aid and avoided the negative effect that could possibly have occurred in terms of its bilateral relationship with Indonesia. 184 The decision to support the general election in 1999 appeared to be a late response, as other countries had immediately signed a memorandum for Indonesian electoral assistance through UNDP. The JICA officials explained that because supporting the election was the first time that Japan would be involved in Indonesian political activities, the late response of the Japanese government was understandable. The Japanese government had to design the kind of aid scheme that could be used and determine the activities that could be proposed to support the Indonesian political reform process. 185 From this statement, we can conclude that Japan had neither arranged nor designed their aid to involve supporting political reform in Indonesia. 182 Asahi Shimbun, June 2 nd, accessed in June 8, Clear, Op.Cit., p Interview with JICA Southeast Asia Division, June 11,

122 Following the implementation of Japanese democracy aid to Indonesia, the study found that the limited programmes that were connected directly to democracy and areas of governance were funded by Japanese aid. The election assistance package received the largest portion of the fund. In the 1999 election, most of the Japanese fund (US$30, 97 million) that was channelled through the UNDP was distributed to cover technical and material needs, such as voter registration, press centres, electoral ink, ballot printing and so on. The remaining fund, approximately US$ 3.49 million, was intended to be used by Indonesian NGOs for monitoring and educating the voters, as well as for other purposes like sending international observers and experts to the central and local General Election Commissions (Komisi Panitia Pemilu/KPU) for technical advice in the field of training and IT technical support. In the 2004 Legislative and Presidential election, however, Japan did not distribute their funds through UNDP, but under the bilateral cooperation scheme. The change to the Japanese method of distributing the funds can be perceived as a way for the Japanese government to be more active in and more serious about supporting the democratisation process in Indonesia. Not only did Japan provide financial assistance that was distributed to the KPU for the procurement of electoral equipment (ballot boxes and polling booths), it was also allocated to support the voter education programme that was conducted by Indonesian NGOs. Through coordination with the Indonesian government, a number of Indonesian NGOs (Pemuda Muhammadiyah, LP3ES, Parwi Foundation and LSI, JAMPPI) were selected to conduct such programmes in Java, Sulawesi, Sumatera and West Nusa Tenggara. 186 The programmes were aimed at disseminating information concerning the new election and voting systems through the distribution of PR materials, the organisation of seminars and through various talk shows on the radio. In the 2009 election, Japan also distributed aid to NGOs, but the amount was less than the aid that was allocated to the government. The involvement of NGOs in accessed in June 8,

123 Japanese aid can be perceived as a positive response to criticism of the low degree of involvement by NGOs as an element in Japanese aid. However, considering that most of the funds were still distributed for logistics and material supplies, this shows that the method of Japanese democracy aid, particularly with regard to electoral assistance, had not changed substantially. Table 4.5 Japan s Electoral Assistance to Indonesia Year of Contents of Assistance Amount Total Amount/scheme Election 1998 Financial assistance to cover technical and material support, such as ballot printing (400 million pieces), electoral ink (600 bottles), guideline books (2, 8 million books), Radio Single Side Band (1,000 sets) and others materials for vote tabulation. $30,970,000 $34,450,000/ Emergency Assistance Financial assistance for voter education and election monitoring 2004 Financial assistance for ballot boxes (623 boxes) and polling booths (112 million sets) Financial assistance for domestic and international NGOs and Voter Education 2009 Financial assistance for socialisation through the government of Indonesia (Ministry of Home Affairs) Financial assistance for domestic and international NGOs and Voter Education $ 3,480,000 $22,000,000 $270,000 $3,338,190 $127,878 $22,270,000/ Governance Aid $3,466,068/ Governance Aid Source: UNDP ( and accessed in June 9, Although during the second half of the 1990s JICA began to strengthen its cooperation with NGOs, the NGOs, both Japanese and local, still received limited Japanese aid compared to that from 105

124 other donor countries. Most Japanese NGOs conduct activities that are not directly connected to democracy in Indonesia. Taking this in to consideration, this study argues that by focussing the analysis on the direct assistance in terms of democracy by the government, it may be possible to determine the policy orientation of the Japanese government by restricting the analysis to its direct involvement in assistance. If certain policies are regarded as being important, the government would be directly engaged with them, given that the Japanese government has been characterised as 'Statist', or state oriented. The other Japanese democracy and governance programmes focused on reforming Indonesia s National Police by promoting Indonesia's civilian police force activities. Under the scheme of the Supporting Program for the Reformation of Indonesian National Police, this project was aimed at socialising a model police station and designing the police station in Bekasi, West Java. Moreover, in order to promote citizens trust of the civilian police force, this project also established a citizen-police partnership centre that was used as a base for citizen-police force activities at the local level. This project shows that the core of the programme was a technical cooperation project, which was focused on the state level. Similarly, other programmes, such as judicial and bureaucratic reform, were conducted on the state level rather than in collaboration with the civil society or NGOs. Therefore, Japan's support for the democratisation process in Indonesia can be concluded as follows. Table 4.6 Japanese Aid for Democracy and Governance Programmes in Indonesia No. Name of Project Years Amount 1. Electoral assistance - Emergency Assistance for Democratisation (The 1999 Transitional Election) - Support for administrative reform and the 2004 election support package - Support for local elections in Aceh (using the framework of the human security project at ,97 22,27 0,

125 the grassroots level) - Support for the 2009 General election ,46 (In US$ Million) 2. Police reform assistance - Capacity-building project for police activities - Project capacity building activities in Balinese police force - Indonesian police capacity-building projects - Citizen Police promotion of partnership projects (in million yen) 3. Regional Development and Decentralisation - Development of local human resources - Research projects for the removal of the central government of Indonesia - Support for Decentralisation (Nusa Tenggara Barat and Sulawesi) NA 4. Good Governance - Emergency assistance for administrative reform - Technical cooperation with theeradicate Corruption Committee Na 0,034 (In US$ Million) 5. Women s Empowerment NA NA: Not Available Source: JICA Report (2002, ) and Japan s ODA Annual Report ( ), compiled by Author In 2004, Japan s Country Assistance Program for Indonesia was formulated by stressing three areas of priority, as follows: 1) Sustainable growth driven by private sectors; 2) Creating a democratic and equitable society; and 3) Peace and stability, and the provision of maximum assistance to the Indonesian government s self-reliance efforts (see diagram 4.2). 187 With regard to the second pillar of aid, namely creating a democratic and fair society, the programme has been divided into the following programs: accessed on January 10, Ibid. 107

126 1) Poverty reduction, which is broken down into: a) Development in agricultural and fishing communities; b) Education; c) Health and Medicine; d) Improving basic public services; 2) Governance, including a) Judicial and police reform; b) Assistance for decentralisation; and 3) Environmental conservation and disaster prevention 108

127 Diagram 4.2 Japan s Country Assistance Program for Indonesia

128 Thus, it can be seen that the programme is not directly connected to democracy promotion, but can be more easily classified as a developmental approach. Indonesia is considered to be a country that has converted to a democratic political system, but which has an insufficient socio-economic foundation. Therefore, in order to support democratic reform in Indonesia, it is important to first address the socio-economic foundation. In addition, the governance programmes (judicial reform, police reform and decentralisation) show that the Japanese government is still using the same strategy when working with the Indonesian government (G-to-G). In short, based on some of the approaches of democracy assistance explained in Chapter 1, this study argues that although Japanese aid policy has created programmes for implementing a democratic and fair society (Japan Country Assistance Program for Indonesia, 2004), Japan still prioritises non-political areas when distributing their aid. It would appear that the Japanese aid policy did not identify a specific area as the target for democratisation, as the Japanese government tends to use the developmental approach when distributing their aid. Japan also has a firm belief that democracy can never be secure without economic development and social stability. Therefore, Japan tends to support policies and programmes designed to strengthen national economies over those directly designed to support democracy. The Japanese efforts to avoid becoming directly involved in the political arena could also indicate that Japanese democracy promotions are carefully formulated. The Japanese government is concerned that working in the democracy arena may be interpreted as a form of intervention. 110

129 4.2. American Democracy Assistance: A Political Approach The US- Indonesian Relations under Soeharto The partnership between our two peoples is strong and is growing stronger. In all that lies ahead, in the defence of freedom, in the advance of tolerance and democracy, Indonesia will have a firm ally in the American Government. And you ll have the friendship and respect of the American people. - President George W. Bush- Indonesia is one of the most strategic countries for US foreign policy in Southeast Asia. Having a large population of about 240 million people, being the world s largest Muslim-majority country and occupying a strategic position alongside the Straits of Malacca (one of the world s most important shipping lanes), Indonesia is automatically an important country in terms of US economic and political interest. Therefore, since the Cold War period, the US government has been trying to maintain its relationship with Indonesia as a part of its containment policy, mainly by giving economic and military assistance through bilateral and multilateral channels (see Table 4.4). For Indonesia, the US is one of the five top donor countries, along with Japan, Australia, Germany and the Netherlands. 189 Table 4.7 US Economic and Military Assistance to Indonesia ( ) In million US$ Sector Military Aid 19,7 21,0 46,0 47,0 60,1 Economic Aid 90,0 89,8 145,9 126, 147,9 Source: Donald E. Weatherbee, US Policy and the Two Southeast Asia, Asian Survey, April 1978, p accessed on November 3,

130 Returning to the history of political development in Indonesia, the development of democracy in the New Order was supported by anti-communist states such as the USA, European states and Japan. During the Cold War Period, Indonesia received a large amount of aid in the form of development assistance from those countries as a part of their containment policy. This aid was intended to prevent Indonesia from becoming a communist country. Under Soeharto s regime, the US clearly supported the economic stability of Indonesia, as the US believes that economic stability is the source of political stability. At that time, countries supporting the US also believed that changing the direction of political development in Indonesia was risky. They were afraid that pro-communist groups would take over the political situation. Moreover, referring to the table 3.4, the U.S had contributed greatly in terms of economic and military assistance to Indonesia during the first period of Soeharto s regime. The amount of this funding is the largest, compared with the funding given to the other ASEAN countries (the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore). After the Cold War, the aid policy had been going through a number of changes that also influenced the aid policy to Indonesia. Foreign aid was formulated by attaching political conditionality, which means that the aid should be distributed to the countries that have a high degree of respect for human rights and the values of democracy. Therefore, the US foreign aid to Indonesia was banned after the Dili accident in Moreover, the US Congress also stopped assistance for International Military Education and Training (IMET) in President Clinton had also given support to the UN Resolution on Human Rights Commission in March 1993 in Geneva. 191 In 1996, President Clinton also banned the sale of the F-5 Air hawk to Indonesia, even though this had been arranged before the aforementioned incident. 192 Furthermore, by reconsidering the poor labour laws 190 Detailed aspects of U.S -Indonesian Relations in the New Order can be found in Paul F. Gardner, Shared Hopes, Separate Fears: Fifty Years of U. S. - Indonesian Relations, Westview Press, The New York Times, March Washington Post, July 9,

131 and human rights issues in Indonesia, in September 1993, the U.S evaluated the GSP (General Specialised Preferences) that had been awarded to Indonesia. 193 Among the human rights violations that influenced the U.S. policy towards Indonesia during the 1980s-1990swerethe suppression of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/GAM), the Independence Papua Movement (Operasi PapuaMerdeka/OPM) and the mysterious shooting operation (Penembakan Misterius/PETRUS) that was designed to eliminate those people who were identified as criminals. The operation was carried out by the government as part of a security operation. In order to respond to the various pressures applied by the United States, the Indonesian Government established the National Commission for Human Rights (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia/ KOMNAS HAM). The Commission was established on June 7, 1993 through the Presidential Decree no. 50/1993 and it still exists today. These facts indicate that the US government blatantly tried to introduce the concepts of democracy and human rights to Indonesia by concentrating on human rights issues. Of course, this is part of the US effort to the increase democratic society in Indonesia The US Democracy Aid to Indonesia: A Political Approach After the end of the Cold War, the containment strategy was replaced by the strategy to spread democracy. Promoting democracy has always been the most important element of American global strategy, and remains so today. Democracy and governance are the core elements of the USAID and the fund, which had increased every year, reached the peak in However, the process of American democracy aid is not free from criticism. For example, the military operations in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) under the banner of democracy promotion are still debatable. 193 Los Angeles Times, September 24,

132 The US policy of democracy building is divided into four specific areas: (1) Establishing the electoral processes; (2) Promoting the rule of law within recipient governments; (3) Governance; and (4) civil society areas by funding independent media, labour unions and professional associations in orderr to enhance the accountability of government and to provide broad-based politicall participation. 194 The civil society sector has become the priority sector of US democracy assistance alll over the world, with the exception of the Middle East, where it is focused on the governance sector (see chart 4.3). 195 Chart 4.3 Distributionss of US Democracy Assistance by Sector and by Region (In million US$) Governance Civil Society Rule of Law Elections (Region) Source: Azpuru etal., The case of U.S. democracy assistance to Indonesia is unique. Indonesia has been the largest aid recipient of US democracy assistance, compared with other Asian countries. It received Ste 195 Azp even W. Hook, (2002), Op. Cit., p puru, et.al, Trends in Democracy Assistance: What Has the United States been Doing? (Supplementary Graphics, Loc.Cit. 114

133 million dollars for 16 years, from This indicates that the US government paid more attention to the political development in Indonesia, despite Indonesia not having received any significant attention during the Cold War period. As reported in the USAID Congressional Presentation in 1997, building democracy has been actively implemented by the USAID, which has three specific outcomes: the increase of NGO advocacy for democratic participation, the promotion of rule of law activities and the enhancement of the capacity, reliability and responsiveness of selected NGOs. 197 The NGOs supported by USAID have worked with the Indonesian Government to improve policy formation, labour law and legislation. Thus, Golub s explanations of the overlap of two kinds of democracy promotion, namely Big D and small d, can be represented by this case. After the decline of the Soeharto regime in 1998, USAID s democracy section started to implement a programme called Democratic Transition Strengthened in Indonesia. Furthermore, in the 1999 transitional election, the US government provided financial support to approximately two hundred Indonesian NGOs for electoral monitoring projects and voter education programmes, such as political education programmes, workshops, talk shows on television and interactive dialogue, in order to educate the Indonesian people regarding elections, political participation and the value of democracy. 198 US democracy aid also operated aggressively in politically sensitive geographic areas, such as East Timor, Irian Jaya and Aceh. During the period of , the US Government committed $ 129 million to democracy and governance programmes, including justice sector reform, legislative-strengthening programmes, elections and local governance, mitigation of conflict, support for peace and the promotion of 196 Ibid accessed on April 3, accessed on January 4,

134 democratic culture. 199 Aceh became the most favoured area for American aid distribution according to region. Two programmes were conducted by collaborating with Indonesian civil society organisations, a method that has long been perceived as a characteristic of the US aid approach. Working with civil society is believed to be a substantial component of the democratic process. Table 4.8 the USAID Democracy and Governance Sector Programmes in Indonesia ( ) PROGRAMS ACTIVITIES PARTNER 1. Mitigation of Conflict and Support for Peace USAID remains a key donor in mitigating social violence and enhancing peace building efforts in conflict-affected areas, including Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Papua, Maluku, and Central Sulawesi. Through the Support for Peaceful Democratisation (SPD) and the new SERASI Initiative, USAID supports: conflict-sensitive approaches to development; technical capacity building; livelihoods development; civil society and academic input in legislative drafting and transition assistance to conflict-affected persons. Consolidating the Reform Agenda - Building on the Foundations: Strengthening a Professional, Responsible, and Responsive Broadcast Media in Indonesia (Area: Aceh, East Java, West Java, Central Java and North Sumatra, October 2005 October 2007). INTERNEWS 2. Justice Sector Reform Through the Justice Sector Reform Program (JSRP) and the Democratic Reform Support Program (DRSP), USAID provides technical assistance and training to judges, prosecutors and staff members at the Constitutional Court and Attorney General s Office with the aim to develop a more effective, professional, transparent, accountable and independent judicial branch. 3. Legislative Strengthening USAID provides institutional support to the National House of Representatives, National Regional Representative Council, and over 60 district-level legislative councils. Activities include: promoting constituency and media outreach; developing the capacity to draft and analyze legislation and operational budgets and encouraging legislative commissions to carry-out their functions. 4. Local Governance Strengthening and Support for the Decentralization Process - Democratic Reform Support Program (Area: Aceh, Banten, West Java, Central Java, East Java, Papua, North Sulawesi, South and North Sumatra, April April 2009) - National Legislative Strengthening Program (Area: Jakarta, September 2005 September 2008) - Post Elections Support to the DPR, DPD and DPRDs (Area: Jakarta, East Java, West Java, Central Java, Papua, South Sulawesi and North Sumatra, March 2005 March 2007) - Strengthening the Initiatives of Government and others against Human Trafficking (Area: Aceh, Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, East Java, Riau, Research Triangle Institute The Foundation Asia Consortium for elections and Political Process Strengthening American Center for International Labor Solidarity accessed on April 3,

135 The Local Governance Support Program (LGSP) supports Indonesia s decentralization by helping local governments become more democratic, more competent at the core tasks of governance and more capable of managing public services and resources. In more than 60 districts, LGSP offers technical assistance and capacity development to local governments, local legislatures, civil society organizations, the media and citizens in strategic and participatory planning, finance, budget and accounting and management systems for service delivery. At the national level, LGSP works to improve implementing regulations and policies. This work is complemented by DRSP, which supports decentralization policy at the national level. 5. Elections and Political Processes USAID has initiated a program of support for the upcoming 2009 Presidential and Parliamentary elections. Working through both international and local non-governmental organizations, the election support package includes: political party development, election administration, voter education, election monitoring and oversight and strengthening of the legal framework. 6. Promoting Democratic Culture Through the new RESPECT program, USAID will work with civil society organizations and government institutions to strengthen democratic civic culture, focusing on respect for pluralism, religious diversity and the rights of women and minority groups. Activities under this program will include civic education, advocacy, engaging traditional leaders, building networks to support tolerance and pluralism, and assisting the government in reviewing policies that conflict with the constitution and human rights standards. North Sulawesi, North Sumatra, West and East Kalimantan, Nusa Tenggara Barat, September September 2006) - Victims of Torture (Area: Aceh, Jakarta and Papua, May 2004 May 2008) Expanding Participatory, Effective and Accountable Local Governance - Local Government Support Program (Area: Aceh, Banten, West Java, Central Java, East Java, South Sulawesi, South and North Sumatra, May September 2009) Addressing Conflict and Encouraging Pluralism - Reintegration Support for Internally-Displaced Persons (IDPs), Returnees/ex-IDPs, Their Dependents and Local Communities in NAD (Area: Aceh) - Support for Peaceful Democratisation (Area: Aceh, West Irian Jaya, Maluku, Central Sulawesi, August September 2007) International Catholic Migration Mission Research Triangle Institute NA Development Alternatives Inc. NA: Not Available Source: (compiled by author) This study finds that, during , the democracy aid program to Indonesia was designed under the name of the democracy-building programme. During those years, the objective of the programme was to increase the effectiveness of selected institutions that promote democracy and to focus on the strengthening of civil society. Subsequently, in 1999, the name of the programme 117

136 was changed to the democracy programme. However, the objective was still the same. In 2000, the title of the programme was changed to Democratic Transition Strengthened and the objective was to strengthen the key democratic institutions in order to bolster the Indonesian democratic transition. However, during , the title of programme was changed yet again, this time to democratic reform, which included broader areas such as conflict and humanitarian issues. Since 2004, democracy support has been clearly titled democracy and governance, which includes broader areas like decentralisation, mitigation of conflict and support for peace. 200 Between 1997 and1999, the US democracy programme was focused on supporting political arenas and was designed as direct assistance. This means that the political approach dominated US democracy assistance to Indonesia. However, after 2000, the US democracy programme was formulated more broadly and had a tendency to become involved in developmental approach areas, such as decentralisation. Considering these facts, after 2000, we can see that US democracy aid to Indonesia was influenced by a mixture of developmental and political approaches. Although the USAID Democracy and Governance (DG) Sector Program in Indonesia ( ) had created a number of programmes related to the developmental approach, by placing the consolidation and the reformation of democracy in national level as the umbrella of the USAID DG programme, it shows that the political motive still dominated the US democracy assistance approach to Indonesia EU Democracy Assistance to Indonesia: A Cautious Approach EU-Indonesian Relations Indonesia is one of the most strategic of the ASEAN member countries for the European Union. This is because Indonesia has a large population, as well as a strategic position in Asia, both accessed on April 3,

137 geographically and politically. The EU is Indonesia s second largest trading partner, yet in terms of the distribution of foreign aid, the contribution of the EU aid is less than 10 percent of Indonesia s total bilateral aid. In recent years, the volume of aid has been increased by the EU s programme for Indonesia. 201 Indonesia's relationship with the EU was formulated under the EU and ASEAN partnership in the 1970s. Indonesia, which was one of the founding members of ASEAN, held the first ministerial meeting in January 1978 in order to participate in a dialogue with the European Commission, and signed the EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement. 202 Since the 1970s, the EU has distributed support to Indonesia through development assistance. In the beginning, the EU-Indonesian relations were not flexible, particularly with regard to political and security issues. The dominant factor was the East Timor issue, especially the Dili Incident, which placed tension on the EU-Indonesian relations. Consequently, the EU reduced their aid commitment for 1993, compared that in to 1992 and 1994 (see the table below). Table 4.9 The EU Aid Commitment to Indonesia (in million EUC) Year Commitment Disbursement The Foreign Policy Centre, Supporting Democratic Indonesia: British and European Options, Policy Brief, available at: accessed on August 3, European Union Activities in Indonesia, available at: EN3.pdf accessed on June 4,

138 Source: Laporan Pelaksanaan Proyek Bantuan Luar Negeri, Biro PPKELN, BAPPENAS RI (Report on the Implementation of Foreign Aid, PPKELN Bureau, BAPPENAS, RI), In terms of trade relations, although there was no trade agreement as an umbrella for such relations, the trade relations between EU and Indonesia increased significantly every year. 203 With regard to investment, the amount of EU member states investment in Indonesia was the largest of all the donor countries. 204 This indicates that the political tension between the EU and Indonesia did not significantly influence the economic relationship between the two partners. In fact, since 1984, the EU has paid more attention to the East Timor issue and has situated it as the main issue in the EU-Indonesian relations since Portugal became a member of the EU in However, considering the significance of Indonesia as one of the largest Muslim populations, the EU seems to be careful in responding to the issue of East Timor. However, after the Dili Incident in 1991, as the President of the EU, Portugal successfullyput more pressure on Indonesia, as was declared on the EU statement at the UN General Assembly in Since that time, in tandem with the US policy regarding the enlargement of democratic society, the EU has given more attention to low-profile political issues, such as human rights and democratisation. Then, in 1998, Soeharto s regime was finally over and the demand for democratisation increased in Indonesia. The political situation changed and, since 1998, the government has formally allowed the donor countries to become involved in political and security areas such as human rights 203 Annual Report on Export of Indonesia, Indonesia Statistic Bureau, Economic and Financial Statistics, Bank of Indonesia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, Profil Uni Eropa (The Profile of European Union), Jakarta, September, 1999, p Alvaros de Vasconvelos, Portugal Pressing for an Open Europe, in Christopher Hill (ed.), The Actors in Europe s Foreign Policy, London: Routledge, 1996, pp

139 and the support of democratisation in Indonesia. Although the involvement of the donors in support of democratisation was already allowed, the EU seems to be more careful in defining how they should become involved in this area, as will be analysed in the next section EU Democracy Assistance: A Cautious Approach After 1998, the objective of the EU aid to Indonesia was broadly formulated to encourage the consolidation of democracy and to promote good governance through support for Indonesia s sustainable economic, social and environmental development. Referring to the EU s Indonesia Country Strategy Paper ( ), the EU emphasised that sustainable development in Indonesia must be seen as an equilibrium between good governance, economic growth, social development and environmental conservation (as opposed to being development projects only ). 207 This shows that the EU tried to formulate their aid strategy in order to be seen as not merely being development oriented, but as taking a broader by including social development and good governance. The EU development cooperation programme for the period of was formulated within two policy sector frameworks: 208 1) Good governance, public administration and democratisation, the public provision of basic health and educational services for poor sections of the population to achieve poverty reduction, and economic liberalisation and international business cooperation to reinforce the private sector s role in better governance and economic growth 2) Natural resources management (forest, water and rural environments). The EU policies concerning democracy promotion, including human rights, democracy, good governance and peace building, have developed significantly since 1990, parallel with the emergence 207 Indonesia Country Strategy Paper (Policy Brief,CSP) Ibid. 121

140 of the democraticc enlargement strategy. Following this, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) was established. 209 The EIDHR is the financial instrument that underpins and complements the EU s democratisation and human rights policy. It provides financial support, predominantly to the civil society and non-governmental organisations and, at some point, to the relevant international organisations, for activities in third-world countries thatt are aimed at promoting human rights, democratisation and conflict prevention. In order to implement the EU Policy on Democracy Promotion, EIDHR has formulated its programme activities according to themes such as strengthening civil society, human rights education, the rule of law and justice and the like. Looking at the distribution of EIDHR projects across the world, it is clear thatt the priorities of the aid given by the EU are human rights and social themes (see Diagram 4.3). Diagram 4.3 EIHDR Projects World Wide by Theme Rule of law and justice including penal system; 139 Strengthening and civil society, 170 Fight of person belongings to minorities and ethnic groups, 48 Right of indigenous peoples, 74 Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedeoms; 466 Personss with Disabilities; 39 Torture; 142 Trafficking of human beings, 25 Women; 184 Abolition of the death penalty, 21 Children; 90 Fight against racism, xenophobia and discrimination; 95 Governance; 345 Peaceful conciliation; International 100 criminal justice, 42 Human right protection mechanism; 8 Human right dialogues; 23 Human right defenders; Th his was renamed the European Instrument for Democracy from 2007 onwards. European Initiatives for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) Programming for , available at: /ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/worldwide/eidhr/documents/eidhr-programming _en.pdf accessed on June 6,

141 Source: accessed on June 6, In carrying out EIDHR, Indonesia has been positioned as one of the focus countries for EIDHR funding in the Asian region. The following table shows that Indonesia received 11.1 million Euros, followed by Cambodia with 6.1 million Euro, and Nepal and Bangladesh with approximately 5.1 million Euros. The data show that the focus of the EU on issues of democratisation and human rights in Indonesia had increased significantly compared to the attention they paid to other Asian countries. At the same time, the number of projects reveals that Indonesia is positioned as a top recipient country, followed by Nepal with 29 projects and Cambodia with 24 projects. Table 4.10 EIDHR Funding and Projects in Asian Countries Country Number of Projects Budget (in Euro) Burma 2 1,605,691 Cambodia 24 9,513,656 China 13 4,331,386 India 3 2,603,361 Indonesia 39 11,165,464 Nepal 29 5,157,021 Pakistan 18 4,191,952 Sri Lanka 9 2,269,051 Total ,450,377 Source: The EIDHR Report (compiled by Author) This study finds that almost all EU aid is distributed to the Indonesian NGOs, most of them working for advocacy (see table 4.11). Moreover, this study also finds that the EU projects in the human rights and social sectors work better than do those in the political sector. This is clearly shown 123

142 by various programmes, such as the promotion of human rights education, the creation of professional journalism and the empowerment of women. Table 4.11 The Implementation of EIDHR in Indonesia Programme Titles Project Titles Organisations Number (Projects) Budget ( ) Support to strengthen democratisation, good governance and the rule of law Media for democracy, Women transforming conflict in Indonesia, Community Radio: Assisting Indonesia s new media expansion European NGOs 3 2,388,274 Election Observation Missions and Assistance Election Observation Mission to elections in Indonesia Intergovernmen tal organisation 1 5,000,000 Combating Racism, Xenophobia and Discrimination Against Minorities and Indigenous Peoples People s Voices Helping Indigenous People to Decide their own Development, Gender Perspective of Legal Service for Women Victims of Violence in Aceh, Strengthening the Understanding and Attitudes towards Pluralism and Multiculturalism among Young Journalists and Young Religious Leaders, Institutionalising Women s Participation in Local Government Budgeting in Gunung Kidul Regency, Building Dayak Indigenous People s Culture of Peace and Non-Violence Through Independent Media Indonesian NGOs and Independent Organisations 19 2,192,601 Campaign 4- Advancing Equality, Tolerance and Peace Promoting Human Rights Education in Indonesian Universities and High Schools, Education and Health Rights Strengthening through ECOSOC Rights Implementation on Local Public Policy, The Protection and University, Indonesian NGOs and Independent Organisations 16 1,584,

143 Improvement of the Rights of Marginal Groups. T o t a l 39 11,165,464 Source: EIDHR Report (compiled by the author) The EIHDR fund for Indonesia has been allocated according to specific themes, as explained earlier. From these themes, we find that the support for elections and election observation missions made up the largest EIDHR fund for the period of However, this kind of project (sending international observers from donor countries) continues to be debatable for a number of reasons (see Chapter 1). 210 Firstly, the conditions for international observers include that they will only stay for a short period and almost all of them focus only on the election days. Their short stay is problematic, because of their lack of knowledge regarding local situations. They are not able to develop good relationships and cooperation with local people or with non-governmental organisations. 211 The second reason is the limitations of the international observers themselves. International observers cannot force profoundly polarised political factions to cooperate with each other. Moreover, even when fraudulent practices are found during elections, they cannot take punitive actions. This is a very sensitive issue because, if they try to take punitive actions, this will initiate debates on the issues of intervention. In addition, the significance of international observers tends to be symbolic. 212 This is why certain scholars have said that the international observers activities are a waste of money, and have called the observers political tourists. 213 Similarly, Richard Youngs also notes Europe, like 210 Carothers,1997, Loc.Cit. See also Asra Virgianita, Foreign Observer in 2009 Elections, the Jakarta Post, March 19, Kazuyoshi Kuroda, 1999, Op.Cit. 212 Carothers, 1997, Loc.Cit. 213 Hermawan Sulistyo, Foreign Observer or Tourist, the Jakarta Post, June 18, See also Sharon Bessel, Monitoring the Indonesian Elections, Jakarta June 3-9,1999, Report, Centre for Democratic Institutions. 125

144 the United States, has long been thought to have a myopic strategy for democracy promotion-funding only elections or providing only short term aid. 214 In the table 4.11, it is clear that almost all of the EU aid has been channelled to Indonesian NGOs, and most of them are working for advocacy. In addition, this study discovers many varieties of programs designed for supporting democratisation in Indonesia, such as funds for education, media/journalist professionalism, women s empowerment, human rights etc. This trend shows that the EU aid policy is trying to support many sectors of Indonesia s political reform without focusing on a specific sector as a favourite area. The diversity of the EU member states is probably an influential factor that creates the variety of programmes. Referring to Richard Youngs, he notes that Denmark, for example, frequently directs its aid towards anti-corruption projects and gender rights, while France focuses heavily on the legal training of state officials. German democracy aid typically seeks to boost democratisation, while the United Kingdom concentrates on fostering sound financial governance. Sweden prioritises media independence, Dutch aid falls mainly under the auspices of a new, fragile-states initiative and Spain s good governance programme is framed under the terms of social-cohesion. 215 The diversity of the programmes and the actors can be seen in a positive light by arguing that this should be a major asset for the EU. 216 Consequently, good coordination and cooperation among the actors is obviously necessary. Moreover, it can be interpreted negatively, by stating that the EU effort has been created to compete with the other donor countries in order to influence or, more extremely, to balance the influence or power, particularly with regard to the US as the dominant player in democracy assistance across the world, including in Indonesia s political reform. 214 Richard Youngs, Trends in Democracy Assistance: What Has Europe Been Doing? Journal of Democracy, Vol. 19, No. 2, April Youngs, Ibid., pp World Wide Promotion of Democracy: Challenges, Role and Strategy of The European Union, Proceedings of Conference, the European Union Office of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Brussels, June 5-6, 2007, p Available at: accessed on June 8,

145 Considering the focus of the EU democracy aid to Indonesia was on human rights and social sector, it can be seen that this aid is similar to Japanese democracy aid, as the approach used by the EU has been influenced by the developmental approach. However, compared to Japanese democracy aid, the EU s aid is more focused on collaboration with civil society Political Approaches versus Developmental Approaches and Big D versus small d: A Comparison After exploring the framework and the implementation of three donors -Japan, the US and the EU- this study examines the variety of approaches and strategies of democracy assistance formulated by these donor countries. Looking at Japan s democracy aid to Indonesia, it seems that democracy with a Big D is influenced by the developmental approach (area 3). The Japanese government formulated their democracy assistance broadly, but they seemed to be unwilling to become directly involved in the political arena. Although a programme for creating a democratic and fair society was formulated by the Japanese government, poverty reduction and the environment are still high on the programme. Moreover, by focusing the aid programme at the government level, Japanese aid has worked more in Area 3. In contrast to Japanese aid, the US aid has worked more on small d with a political approach (Area 2). The US formulated their programmes directly in the political area in terms of elections, strengthening political parties and monitoring the election. This was also characterised by collaboration with the civil society. However, after 2000, the US aid began to include a number of programmes related to the development approach in promoting democracy in Indonesia. With regard to the EU democracy aid to Indonesia, the aid policy connected democracy with human rights, social rights and the economic rights of the people. Moreover, EU democracy aid to 127

146 Indonesia was formulated to encourage the consolidation of democracy and the promotion of good governance through the support of Indonesia s sustainable economic, social and environmental development. This indicates that, similar to the Japanese democracy aid programme, the EU aid programme also implemented the developmental approach. However, comparing the level of civil society participation between both countries, it can be seen that participation in the EU programme is higher than is civil society participation in the Japanese programme. This means that the EU s democracy aid has been implemented more in Area 4, but it is necessary to note that the EU still pays attention to maintaining the partnership with the Indonesian government. In fact, the EU s approach also consists of a political approach with regard to the Indonesian electoral reform. From diagram 4.4, we can see that the US and the EU have implemented a mixed approach, although each has a different level, while Japan seems to limit its approach strictly to the developmental approach. According to Part 3, the passivity of Japan with regard to becoming involved in the promotion of democracy can be explained by the following reasons. The first is the economic reason, which is in line with the idea of Japanese foreign aid as keizai kyooryoku (economic cooperation). This means that working in the democracy field, which is considered to be political activity, is beyond the purposes of the Japanese aid. This is related to the slogan seikei bunri and to the limited economic benefit of working in the field of democracy aid. The second is the political reason, which is related to the perception that working in the democracy aid field can be interpreted as a form of intervention in the sovereignty of other countries. Moreover, considering Japan s belief that economic development is an indispensable precondition for democratic development, it is clear that the Japanese democracy aid policy has been designed for democracy assistance areas. When considering these reasons, the first involvement of Japanese aid in support of the 1999 Indonesian transitional elections can be understood as the result of outside pressure, rather than their own willingness. In contrast, the US and the EU were actively involved in supporting the election by 128

147 providing financial support to approximately two hundred Indonesian NGOs. This kind of activity has never been considered by the Japanese aid policy. The largest amount of Japanese aid for the election was distributed to the KPU for technical and material support. The Japanese way, which is to give priority to the government level (G-to-G), continued in the 2004 and 2009 elections. The civil society element was still low in the Japanese aid programme for Indonesia. Diagram 4.4 Mapping of International Democracy Assistance to Indonesia -Japan, the US and the EU- Big D Area 3 Area 1 Developmental Approach J A P A N US Political Approach EU Note: Diagram designed by the author. Area 4 Area 2 small d Furthermore, the Japanese belief that economic development is an indispensable precondition for democratic development requires the achievement of political stability. As a result, as long as economic development can be guaranteed, Japan is more likely to support a non-democratic government. Japan s support for Soeharto's government is one of the examples that can provide a picture of the Japanese practice of the belief, particularly from When Soeharto s regime 129

148 was being pressured with regard to political reform by the domestic and the international society, the Japanese government still supported Soeharto s regime by continuing economic assistance. The Japanese government expected the government to overcome the problem and maintain its power. Considering the large number of projects and the Japanese investment in Indonesia, Japanese behaviour cannot be separated from the interests of Japan itself. The focus of Japanese democracy aid on economic cooperation, rather than on imposing political interest, can be perceived in a positive way as it differentiates Japan from other, Western countries. However, according to Fujiwara, with the era of developmental authoritarianism coming to an end, Japan must alter its policy to fit the changing times. 217 Remembering that the struggle for democratisation in Indonesia is on-going, Japanese aid policy should be reviewed in the context of a democratisation framework. Certain problems, such as electoral reform, corruption, the rule of law, the weak civil society, poverty and disintegration, are still major obstacles to the process of democratisation in Indonesia. Japan should be more active in supporting the political reform in Indonesia by considering the programmes (requested by Indonesia) that would have a direct impact on Indonesian political reforms. Moreover, the developmental approach taken by the Japanese government with regard to supporting democracy would be better directed towards collaboration with the local community and civil society. Focusing the programme at the government level would be interpreted negatively by Indonesian society, as the relationship between the Japanese and Indonesian governments is close (the progovernment). The role of international donors with regard to political development in Indonesia also cannot be ignored. They support the democratic political reform in Indonesia by formulating and 217 Kiichi Fujiwara, Japan Must Plant Seeds Democracy, see accessed on March 4,

149 implementing policies with different approaches, strategies and patterns. This research finds that Japan s aid policy towards democratisation in Indonesia was not ambitiously formulated. Economic and political reasons, such as economic profit and intervention, can be the key to understanding the passivity of Japanese democracy promotion. However, considering the fact that involvement in democracy promotion could not be avoided, the Japanese government tried to formulate a new framework for the Japanese democracy aid policy. As a result, the socio-economic foundation became the main aim of the Japanese democracy aid in supporting political reform in Indonesia. Therefore, Japanese democracy aid can be categorised as democracy aid with a Big D, which affects the developmental approach. The Japanese government seems to believe that economic development should be achieved before political development. Without economic development, the social foundation of democracy will remain fragile. In contrast, the US government, as an initiator and a dominant player in democracy assistance, seems ambitious to become involved in Indonesia s political reform. In Asia, the greatest amount of aid and a number of projects sponsored by the US aid have been distributed to Indonesia. The US has formulated their aid to Indonesia with an emphasis on the political approach with small d. However, the active presence of the US policies towards political development in Indonesia was sometimes perceived in a negative way, as in the case of Aceh, Papua and East Timor. With regard to the EU democracy assistance in Indonesia, this research finds that the EU paid a great deal of attention to Indonesian political reform, as indicated by its large distribution of EIDHR funding to Indonesia. Although most of the funds were allocated to electoral assistance, almost all of the other programmes focus on human rights and social issues. By collaborating with civil society and connecting democracy work with human rights, social and economic rights, the EU democracy aid can be identified as small d, which is influenced by the developmental approach. However, in contrast to Japanese aid, the EU s aid is more flexible, as they also pay more attention to the political arena. 131

150 Based on the analyses above, this study summarises that the donor approaches have been influenced by the political and economic orientation of each donor. Japan believes that the economic stability is the basis of democratisation and that becoming involved in the political arena of recipient countries constitutes intervention. These beliefs have coloured the Japanese approach in distributing democracy assistance, which was focused on developmental issues and then channelled to the government. Secondly, the US and the EU assistance focused on the political approach and the participation in civil society, which could be categorised as effective assistance when compared to Japanese assistance. Less attention being paid to society could make Japanese assistance be negatively perceived, as they could be viewed as cronies of the government. Conversely, the US and the EU approaches appear to be ideal models and effective approaches because they attempt to form a link between developmental and political approaches that are channelled to the government and to civil society simultaneously. Thirdly, the various approaches and strategies of donor countries should not be merely judged as negative in supporting democratisation. In the case of Indonesia, since political changes were initiated by an economic crisis, both developmental and political approaches are needed in order to build a democratic Indonesian society. The various approaches used by the donor counties in formulating and distributing their democracy support can be perceived in a positive way, as long as they are conducted peacefully and are relevant to the needs of the democratic political reform of the target countries. 132

151 Chapter 5 Characteristics of Indonesian DEMOs and their Roles in Democratisation Elections in the transitional phase are a strategic point for democratisation, because they are a way of forming a new democratic government. 218 Moreover, elections in the transitional period are an important stage in the process of democratisation, because unsuccessful elections in this phase would createimmense opportunities for the re-emergence of the old regime. Therefore, considering the importance of elections during the transition period, the quality of the elections should be guaranteed. The election-monitoring activities by domestic and international actors are one way of guaranteeing the quality of the elections. 219 The phenomenon of election observers started in the mid-1980s and began to be discussed in an academic context as part of democracy promotion in the mid-1990s. Early implementation of election observers emphasised the involvement of international election observers and has recently begun to slide towards the relationship between international and domestic election observers. However, the discussion has largely focused on the debate regarding the role and influence of international election observers in transitional countries such as Abbink and Heseling (2000), Teshome (2008), Hyde (2008, 2010) and Gelley (2012). In the other hand, literary work on the role of domestic election observers are still very rare and 218 Juan Linz and Stepan A (eds.), 1996, Op.Cit., p. 1. See also Jorgen Elklit and Palle Svensson, 1999, Loc. Cit., p Eric Bjornlund, Making Every Vote Count: Domestic Elections Monitoring in Asia, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1996, p

152 limited, although they do include studies by Chand (1997), Carothers (1997), Nevitte and Canton (1997), Bjornlund (1996, 2004), Lean (2007), Yamada (2008) and Makulilo (2011). Works on domestic election observers are dominated by the discussion of the positive role of DEMOs, while only few works criticise the neutrality of DEMOs, as discussed by Makulilo in the case of Tanzania. Furthermore, a limited number of works discuss Indonesian DEMOs - such works include those of Bjornlund (2004) and Yamada (2008). Bjornlund, using the example of the 1999 elections, emphasises the importance of collaboration between international and Indonesian DEMOs. He also stresses the necessity for supporting and working with Indonesian DEMOs as local actors. Meanwhile, Yamada's work stressed the role of international assistance and international networking (INGOs) in the success of the first Indonesian DEMOs (KIPP) in the 1997 and the 1999 elections when conducting monitoring activities. This section examines the domestic election observers, particularly the role of DEMOs in supporting the implementation of democratic elections in Indonesia. The study will explore and investigate the characteristics of Indonesian DEMOs which, until now, has not been done by any study. This study argues that, referring to the Indonesian case, network DEMOs are the best type of DEMOs. Further analysis will focus on the activities of DEMOs in the 1997, 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections. However, this study pays more attention to the 1999 elections, which were acknowledged as being an important step in the democratisation of Indonesia. This study argues that EMOs roles can be divided into three phases, namely pre-elections, elections-day and post-elections (guard/escort). DEMOs in the 1999 transitional elections were successful in conducting their roles as election observers, although their activities were mainly conducted on election day. This means that the role of Indonesian DEMOs has tended to improve the procedural aspects of elections, rather than the substantial aspect of elections. This tendency has been influenced by the donors and by domestic 134

153 situations. Moreover, considering the duties of DEMOs in all phases of the elections, this study proposes a third category of DEMO roles related to the democratisation phase, namely as a transmitter of idea DEMOs, an agent of legitimising, monitoring, educating and advising. The role of DEMOs as a transmitter could be indicated in the pre-liberalisation phase while, as an agent of legitimisation, it can be explained in relation to the elections that are conducted in the transitional (initial) phase. Elections in this phase need verification that the election was free and fair. Considering this necessity, DEMOs, as independent actors, can play a role as agents of legitimisation in this phase. In the 1999 elections, Indonesian DEMOs played a role as agents of legitimisation. 220 The third category is the role of DEMOs as monitors, educators and advisors. This study argues that the role of DEMOs as monitors, educators and advisors was explicitly seen in the later stages of transition. After the initial phase of transition, DEMOs had sufficient time to conduct the role of educators. Moreover, the main problems with the elections in this phase is not the emphasis on free and fair elections, which is more of a procedural aspect on election day, but on ways of building community awareness of the role in supporting the sustainability of the process of transition to the next stage. However, the role of DEMOs in the consolidation phase emphasises advisors, rather than monitors and educators Elections and Indonesian DEMOs The 1997 Elections: A Struggle Period for the First Indonesian DEMOs Based on the involvement of election monitors, the 1997 elections were very different elections 220 Bjornlund and Garber stressed that observation and monitoring is a third-party mechanism that should ensure effective and legitimate government structures. See Garber L. and E. Bjornlund, Election Monitoring in Africa in Festus Eribo, et al., eds., Window on Africa: Democratization and Media Exposure, Greenville: Centre for International Programs Publication No. 1, East Carolina University,

154 from the other elections that were conducted under the Soeharto regime (see Chapter 3). In the 1997 elections, without acknowledgement or permission from government, KIPP monitored elections with support from various domestic leaders and the international community. KIPP was founded on March 15, 1996, by about fifty prominent lawyers, intellectuals, NGO leaders, journalists and members of SMID (Indonesian Students Solidarity for Democracy). Inspired by NAMFREL in the Philippines in 1986 and Poll Watch (a Thai organisation) in 1992, it was conceived initially as more of a tool for rallying democratic groups than as a technical body that could actually make a difference on election day. Goenawan Moehammad was selected as president of the newly formed KIPP, and Mulyana W. Kusumah as Secretary General. In their joint statement, they declared: The establishment of our committee reflects our desire to voluntarily contribute to the processes of democracy, and support the call for a free and fair election through a direct and secret ballot 221 Goenawan also said that: We are no under illusions, our initial goal is just to make people aware of their democratic rights and encourage them to organize themselves 222 However, the establishment of KIPP became an issue for debate, as the government did not agree with the idea of election monitoring by independent organisations. Refer to HRW Report, Soesilo Sudarman, Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security Affairs, argued that the creation of KIPP was unnecessary because there was already a government monitoring body called the Organization for Election Supervisory (Panitia Pengawas Pelaksana Pemilu/Panwaslak), which had been established since the 1982 elections. 223 However, he stressed that it could be accepted as long as 221 Human Rights Watch Report, Loc. Cit. 222 Sidney Morning Herald, April 6, Santoso and Supriyanto, 2004, Op.Cit. 136

155 it did not disturb the activities of the state body or We will smash it. 224 KIPP met with strong disapproval from the armed forces Commander-in-Chief, General Feisal Tanjung, and the Minister of Information, Harmoko, who was also chairman of Golkar, the ruling party. On the other hand, it was welcomed by the chief of social political affairs for the armed forces, Lieutenant General Syarwan Hamid, who said he saw KIPP as a positive intention from members of the public who want to make the elections smooth and better. 225 In addition to harassing KIPP activists and stopping KIPP meetings, the government created rival organisations Team for Objective Elections Monitoring or Tim Objektif Pemantau Pemilu (TOPP). On April 10, 1997, TOPP was set up in Jakarta by Ruhut Sitompul and others from government-backed organisations, such as Pemuda Pancasila. Ruhut complained that KIPP was based on liberal democracy rather than onpancasila democracy, but he denied that TOPP had been set up on the orders of Golkar, even though most of its founders were Golkar activists. The statement was clearly intended to obscure the purpose of TOPP in order to get sympathy from the people. 2. The Independent Body for Monitoring KIPP or Badan Independen Pengawas (BIP) KIPP. On the same day, in Surabaya, BIP-KIPP was created by two protégés of the East Java governor, Basofi Sudirman. The governor said that he believed the main objective of KIPP was to denigrate the government. BIP-KIPP drew its support from the East Java branch of the government-sponsored youth organisation, the Indonesia Youth National Committee, or Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (KNPI), which was also part of Golkar. 224 Government warns election watchdog," Jakarta Post, March 19, 1996, see also HRW Report, Loc. Cit. 225 Human Rights Watch Report, Loc.Cit. 226 Ibid. 137

156 3. The Institute for the Study of the Independence of KIPP (Lembaga Pengkajian Independen KIPP or LPI-KIPP), established in Solo on April 7, The organisation was set up by Heru Notonegoro, a Golkar official, who was convinced that KIPP was an anti-government body, and who said that if KIPP tried to influence the public through the mass media, LIP-KIPP would use the same tactics against it. In addition, beginning in mid-april, old accusations began to resurface that Mulyana W. Kusumah, Secretary General of KIPP, had been involved as a high school student in 1965 in the Association of Indonesian Student Youth (Ikatan Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia or IPPI), a group that was considered an onderbow or affiliate of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia/PKI). 227 This issue is very sensitive in Indonesia, since the PKI was related to the tragedy of September 30, Soeharto s government expected that brandishing the term communists meant that the KIPP would not get support or sympathy from the international community, particularly from the United States. The effort to cut off KIPP s activities showed the anxiety of the government with regard to the power of KIPP as a citizens group. Moreover, after the emergence of the democratisation issue in the early 1990s, Soeharto s regime was concerned that if KIPP were left to pursue its activities, it would gain the support of the international community. This would mean that Soeharto s government could face simultaneous international and domestic pressure. Nevertheless, no matter the government sreaction towards KIPP activities, KIPP has continued to advocate the idea of election monitoring by opening branches in various provinces. Mulyana W. Kusumah (ex. Secretary General of KIPP) told how difficult the situation was for KIPP under the Soeharto regime: 227 Ibid. 138

157 Considering that KIPP has always been watched by government, we wrote report and published it by organising press conference held in secret 228 In addition, KIPP was getting support from the international community, especially from the United States, which sent members of the NDI (National Democratic Institute) to Indonesia to discuss ways of monitoring the 1997 elections using KIPP members. The NDI then promised to give technical assistance, to fund, or to share information regarding election monitoring in order to provide professional, independent monitors. 229 The United States decision to support KIPP activities could be seen as part of America s interest in expanding democracy. In addition, the international community expected that the 1997 general elections would provide momentum for political change, taking into account new, significant developments in Indonesian politics. While the outcome of the 1997 elections was predictable, it attracted international attention, as reported by the National Democratic Institute (NDI): These elections are perhaps the most vivid fundamental paradox facing Indonesia s political development at the end of the 20th century. Indonesia s population is becoming increasingly affluent, better educated and more politically aware...moreover, the elections come at a sensitive and uncertain time in Indonesia s modern history, as Indonesians contemplate the transition to a post Soeharto era.these parliamentary elections are not competitive by international standards, but they offer a brief opportunity for a higher level of independent political activity than is usually tolerated by the military backed government. As such, the elections present a window of opportunity for both politically active Indonesians and for others concerned about Indonesia s political development 230 The report impressed that the international community, particularly the US, expected that a political change would occur in the 1997 elections in Indonesia. This could explain why the US was so keen to help the KIPP. 228 Interview with Ex-General Secretary of KIPP, March 16, Tempo Interaktif, Masalah yang dihadapi KIPP tidak Unik, Interview with Lynn Hellen (NDI Staff), May 25, 1996, available at accessed on April 5, See also, Detektif & Romantika (DR), April 5-10, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, The May 29, Parliamentary Elections in Indonesia: A Background Paper, NDI Report, May 23,

158 Besides monitoring on the day of elections by placing monitors at each poll, KIPP had also been monitoring voter registration by clipping elections news, collecting information from KIPP branches and making press releases in order to publicise information. KIPP was also active in giving input to and criticism of election policies. For instance, a door to door system of voter registration was criticised by the KIPP, who argued that it was better to let voters register voluntarily, because the door to door system gave the impression that people had to make a choice at the polls even if they did not wish to do so. 231 A door to door method of voter registration continued until the end of Soeharto s rule, and was changed in the 1999 transitional elections to allow voters to register voluntarily as KIPP had previously suggested. Unfortunately, the process of the 1997 elections under Soeharto was overly stage-managed and the government tended to ignore the existence of KIPP. Although KIPP could not successfully carry out its functions, as an initial effort to monitor the elections, KIPP s efforts should be appreciated in terms of the ability of KIPP to deploy around 12,000 volunteers at 20 provinces in the 1997 elections. Moreover, this study pointed out that the most important achievement of KIPP at that time was its success in bringing the idea of election monitoring to Indonesia s political system and informing Indonesian society about the necessity of election monitoring activities. Therefore, this study classifies the role of the KIPP in this phase as a transmitter of the ideas of EMOs. As a result, since the 1999 elections, election-monitoring activities have become more familiar in the Indonesian political system, as is indicated by the focus of domestic organisations on conducting monitoring The 1999 Elections: A Golden Era for Indonesian DEMOs 231 Pendaftaran Dimulai, Pelanggaran Terjadi (Register started, Violations happened) available at: Tempo Interaktifhttp:// accessed on April 5,

159 In an attempt to organise free and fair elections, Habibie had the opportunity to officially accredit foreign and domestic monitors as observers at each stage of the elections. Habibie s policy seemed open to domestic and international participation in the political development of Indonesia, considering his image as one of Soeharto s cronies, which caused his administration to lose domestic and international confidence. He needed to boost his image at home and abroad in the face of the international press and widespread domestic demands for democratic reforms The EMOs, both domestic and international, were expected to conduct monitoring at all stages of the elections. In the past, the role of the observer focused on observations at the polling stations. However, in accordance with the rise of the new actors, domestic groups that are interested in conducting election-monitoring activities, the role of observers has expanded. 232 The role of the domestic observer is not limited to observing the conduct of the polls on election day. Many observer groups engage in civic and voter education efforts prior to election day. These activities help to inform potential voters about the elections and provide information regarding the parties manifestos. During the pre-election period, election-monitoring organisations also review, and often attempt to reform, elections laws and regulations, monitor voter registration, report on election related violence and intimidation, asses the fairness of media coverage and monitor compliance with campaign expenditure law. 233 The role of domestic EMOs, which was acknowledged by government, was the first time in Indonesia s political process. The role of DEMOs in elections has been strengthened by the Elections Law and the rule of General Elections Commission No. 12/1999, which clearly mentions the rights, obligations and restrictions of domestic and international EMOs. Moreover, the announcement of the new law by the government at that time in relation to issue of election monitoring activities indicates recognition by the government and society regarding the necessity of DEMOs. 232 Nevitte and Canton, 1997, Op.Cit., p ODIHR, Elections Observation Handbook,

160 As a response to that policy, various domestic EMOs were established. Major election monitors at that time included KIPP (the first Indonesian DEMO), the University Network for Free and Fair elections (UNFREL), the Rectors Forum, JAMPPI and SBSI. UNFREL was established on December 5, 1998, by a student group that had been instrumental in the struggle to bring down Soeharto. Lead by the University of Indonesia, 14 universities decided to monitor the 1999 elections. UNFREL placed volunteers to monitor the elections at each poll. In addition, UNFREL also monitored the monetary politics that could potentially have occurred before the elections. 234 The Rectors Forum established itself as the medium for heads of university to participate in election monitoring, particularly in terms of the counting and tabulation of votes, called parallel vote tabulation (PVT). PVT was adapted by the Rectors Forum to conduct a statistical quick count, using data from approximately one thousand randomly selected polling stations. The results of the quick count are useful for projecting the final results. The National Democratic Institute provided technical assistance for this OVT for International Affairs (NDI). 235 KIPP was the only EMO that had experience in monitoring, and has branch offices in 26 provinces. In the 1999 elections, KIPP decided to monitor only a half of the total poll, which meant that KIPP needed a minimum of monitors, because total number of polls was Although KIPP has advantages over other DEMOs in terms of having experience in conducting election-monitoring activities, this did not mean that KIPP did not have problems organising their 234 In August 1999, the founders of UNFREL agreed to dissolve UNFREL. The problems of coordination and communication and the different visions of the founders became complicating factors for UNFREL. Some of the founders established a new organisation called the Centre for Electoral Reform (CETRO) with a vision that was more focused on voter education and advocacy. Interview with Hadar Nafis Gumay, Former Chairman of UNFREL, March 20, 2009.See also DR, and Todung Mulya Lubis, The Role of EMOS in Free Elections, Proceedings, JICA International Symposium, 2000, p Tim Meisburger, Domestic Monitoring and Elections Integrity: A Case Study of the 1999 National Elections in Indonesia, Report, 1999, Asia Foundation: on May 8,

161 activities in the 1999 elections. They had to work hard to increase the monitor system, particularly in terms of training monitors in an attempt to operate integrated monitoring system[s]. 236 In addition to the support for the three DEMOs as mentioned above, UNDP also supported the Society Network for Election Monitoring (Jaringan Masyarakat Pemantau Pemilu-JAMPPI) by distributing $1,3 million and about $476,000 to the Indonesian Labour Union (Serikat Buruh Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia SBSI). Ultimately, international donors financed 83% of all domestic monitors. 237 Referring to the UNDP report, the number of volunteers that was deployed at the polling stations in 27 provinces totalled volunteers. The details are below: Table 5.1 The Number of Volunteers in the 1999 Elections Name of Organisation Amount of Funding ($) Number of Volunteer Number of Provinces (Covered) Number of Polling Stations (Covered) KIPP UNFREL Rector Forum JAMPPI SBSI TOTAL Source: UNDP Report for the 1999 Elections. The mushrooming of domestic EMOs, besides showing the great desire of the people to participate in political processes, also seems to show a financial motive as a background to the establishment of various domestic observer organisations. The impression that elections were a financial project is shown by the fact that most of the observer organisations, both large and small 236 DR, Loc. Cit. 237 Ibid. 143

162 organisations, applied to the United Nations for Development Program (UNDP) to get funds for their activities. For example, UNFREL submitted a proposal with an amount of approximately 100 billion rupiah. In fact, even if only 20 percent of fund had been approved by UNDP, UNFREL was still able to conduct their activities with the 20% of the fund. 238 The bargaining process between the UNDP and domestic observers gives a clear impression. Moreover, donors also distributed some funds to supporting voter education activities, which were conducted by various domestic groups. However, since the distribution of the fund was very late, the effectiveness of this programme is questionable. Another problem was the different perspectives of the international community regarding the ways in which monitoring the elections would raise the possibility of problems among DEMOs. This was shown by the different methods of observation that were conducted by DEMOs, which would impact on the different results of each organisation. UNFREL used the quick counting method, the Rector s Forum used parallel tabulation and KIPP used the integrated election monitoring system. It also shows the lack of coordination among domestic EMOs, as noted by leaders of DEMOs who said that each organisation was operating independently according to their own interests and international donors contributed to this situation. 239 Although lacking experience in monitoring elections, their roles in the 1999 transitional elections were significantly different from those in the elections conducted under the Soeharto regime. Elections under the Soeharto regime, as mentioned previously, purported to maintain Soeharto s power and regime. In contrast, the 1999 elections during the Habibie period, domestic and international pressure proposed the arrangement of a new government by organising free and fair elections. Habibie had no choice but to follow and adjust his policy based on international and domestic demands. In the 1999 elections, fraud was still evident in UNFREL s report (see the number of violations in table 5.2). However, after the elections, the emphasis was on the rest of the three 238 Ibid. 239 Interview with CETRO, March 20, 2009 and LP3ES, January 09,

163 pillars (the polling and counting procedures, the indelible link and the role of EMOs).Therefore, the international community recognised that the 1999 transitional elections were free and fair. Table 5.2 The Number of Violations in the 1999 Elections Category of Violation Number of Violations Administrative 3992 Criminal 1083 Total 4278 Source: the Supervisory Elections Body Report. In the Indonesian transitional elections in 1999, almost 600 hundred international observers were deployed. Among the largest groups (funded in part by Australia through the UNDP) were 105 people from NAMFREL, the European Union s 30 long-term observers and 64 short-term observers, the NDI (National Democratic Institute/Carter Center s 100 person delegation and 69 people from ANFREL (Asian Network for Free Elections). Australia sent two groups, one of them a governmental delegation. Japan sent an official mission headed by its former ambassador to Indonesia. 240 In addition, through the UNDP, the EU provided four technical advisors for election monitoring-one to UNFREL, two to KIPP and one to the Rector s Forum-to provide organisational and logistical advice. Also, the United Kingdom financed three consultants from Electoral Reform International Services (ERIS), a British NGO, to work full time with UNFREL s national secretariat and provincial offices. They advised UNFREL on a number of key issues, including training materials, deployment plans, observation forms and methodologies, provincial reporting on election day, producing press statements and the benefits of coordination with other groups UNDP Report in Annete Clear, Op. Cit. 241 Ibid, p

164 The result of the lack of knowledge of the elections system was that international observers placed their members at central polling stations, while the fraud almost always occurred at a provincial or local level. 242 The use of different checklists by domestic EMOs introduced by international observers became one of the negative aspects of the participation of international observers. The Rectors Forum uses a longer list of items (over 70 items), while the KIPP uses a shorter checklist. Most international observers did not reveal their standard checklists to their domestic and local counterparts. Without agreed parameters concerning the democratic degree of fairness and justice of the election process, international observers added potential conflict to the result among domestic observers. 243 Moreover, the international observers have been criticised for the limited time frame of their observations. The short time period of their observations has been blamed for the lack of knowledge regarding the election process, which affected the effectiveness of the international observers. Although international observers have received many negative comments, international observers played a significant role in supporting local observers' activities. For example, the NDI, the Carter Centre and the European Union set up training programmes for domestic EMOs regarding ways of monitoring the elections and gave guidelines for election monitoring. In addition, this study argues that, since the international community had lost confidence in Indonesia s economic and political situation, it was believed that the presence of international observers would increase international confidence by reporting on the progress of the elections. The role thereof was emphasised by the Asia Foundation reporting that the credibility and integrity of the 242 These levels are four more stages that add the results from the count at the first level. These additional processes occur at the village (PPS), sub-district (PPK), regency or mayoralty (PPD II) and provincial (PPD I) levels. Sulistyo, Loc. Cit. 243 The first checklist, however, does not include open-ended questions, making it easier to count violations in matrices, while the second checklist, although more difficult to tabulate, has open-ended items and therefore provides a narrative of incidents. Ibid. 146

165 1999 transitional elections rested on three pillars, namely the polling and voter procedures, the indelible ink and the role of EMOs. 244 Looking at the role of DEMOs as explained above, the Indonesian DEMOs in the 1999 elections focused on election monitoring on election day. This meant that they did not play a significant role in the pre- and post-election periods. However, some Indonesian DEMOs reported that the reasons for this situation were two-fold and involved both international and domestic factors. The international donors stressed the necessity of free and fair elections for Indonesian reform which, in turn, influenced the programmes conducted by the Indonesian DEMOs because they were being supported by the international donors. Almost all the Indonesian DEMOs were dependant on international donors during that period. Furthermore, one of the donor agencies remarked, since the international donor has provided the great amount of funding and technical, the 1999 elections can be claimed as the elections that organised by international donors". 245 Another aspect is the domestic situation at that time. The history of elections in Indonesia under the Soeharto regime, which was coloured by violations, raised the people s hopes of having free and fair elections after the fall of Soeharto. Meeting these demands is most easily done via monitoring activities. In addition, considering that 1999 was a transitional period and the forces of the old regime were still assumed to be strong, the effectiveness and neutrality of the supervisory body was questionable at that time. Therefore, election monitoring conducted by an independent organisation was necessary in order to ensure that the elections were conducted freely and fairly. Because of this, Indonesian DEMOs played an important role in legitimising the process of the 1999 elections The 2004 Elections: A Crisis Period for Indonesian DEMOs 244 Tim Meisburger. Loc Cit. 245 Interview with UNDP, April 6,

166 In contrast to the 1999 elections, there were two substantial changes with regard to election monitoring activities in the 2004 elections. Firstly, in the 1999 elections, the election observation organisations could participate freely; however, since the 2004 elections, DEMOs that want to participate in or monitor the election process must be accredited by the KPU. Moreover, DEMOs were not allowed to conduct monitoring inside the polling stations. These regulations have been criticised by many DEMOs, arguing that the rules can be viewed as a form of restriction on civil society in terms of participating in the political process. 246 The other change was the decrease in funding from donors to support election-monitoring activities. For instance, in the 1999 elections, the USAID provided financial support for almost two hundred Indonesian NGOs for election monitoring and voter education activities. Specifically, through the Asia Foundation, it funded the People s Voter Education Network (JPPR), which consists of fifteen Indonesian organisations, including mass Islamic organisations like NU and Muhammadiyah, to conduct voter education and election monitoring. However, in the 2004 elections, although the USAID still distributed aid for DEMOs activities, the amount of the funding was significantly decreased. Moreover, the Japanese government only provided around US$ 270,000 for election monitoring and voter education in the 2004 elections, whereas it had provided almost US$ 3, 4 billion in The funding from the UNDP also decreased. In 1999, the UNDP provided about US$ 90 million while, in the 2004 elections, there was only around US$32 million in electoral funding, most of which was channelled to the KPU, leaving only small portion to be directed to the DEMOs. In addition, the pattern of funding distribution changed. In the 2004 elections, the UNDP fund was only distributed via the Rectors Forum, meaning that other organisations had to submit their proposals to the Rectors Forum. Meanwhile, the Japanese government also changed its approach by 246 Interview with CETRO, March 20, See also Soal Akreditasi Pemantau, KPU Terjebak Administrasi (Accreditation of Observers, KPU stuck on the Administration Problem), Kompas, February 27, 2004 and KPU tidak Paham Peran Pemantau (KPU does not Understand the Role of Observers), Kompas, February 3,

167 distributing the funding via a bilateral scheme, not through the UNDP (multilateral scheme) as was done in the 1999 elections (see Chapter 3). With regard to the decreasing donor funding for electoral assistance, particularly for election monitoring, the director of CETRO stated that Unlike the 1999 elections, donors are not interested anymore to support elections monitoring activities in the 2004 due to assumption that Indonesia in the 1999 elections has been successful of conducting democratic elections. In fact, Indonesia has just started the process of democracy. Therefore, Indonesia still needs international support to assist that process until Indonesia can assure that the process of democratisation goes on the track 247 However, the debate regarding international support in terms of electoral assistance has also arisen in Indonesian society. The leader of the PBIP said that electoral assistance from donor countries to government organisations such as the General Elections Commission should not be accepted for two reasons. Firstly, the government has its own budget for running elections. Secondly, if the KPU receives funds from abroad, then it cannot be seen as doing its job independently. 248 Similarly, the NGOs, including DEMOs that received funds from abroad, have also been criticised by those who feel that these NGOs became channels for donor countries to intervene in Indonesia s political life. As stated by Logan Siagian (Member of Parliament), Foreign assistance, no matter the amount, should be strictly watched, anticipated, managed and run by the government and do not let NGO to manage it, as will have the political implications 249 Moreover, BAPPENAS (National Development and Planning Bureau) has also criticised funding from foreign countries that was given directly to NGOs and which was not reported to 247 Interview with CETRO, March 20, Interview with PBIP, December 17, See also: KPU dilarang Terima Dana Asing (KPU is prohibited to receive External Funding), available at: accessed on June 7, Pemilu Butuh Rp. 3, 23 Trilliun (Elections need Rp Trillion), Suara Merdeka, Feb 11,

168 BAPPENAS. 250 In contrast, the director of CETRO said, as long as the government does not allocate a budget to strengthen civil society, then there is no choice for NGOs but to receive funds from foreign countries. 251 Despite the debate concerning the foreign electoral assistance, the DEMOs conducted various activities that were still supported by international donors. Unlike the 1999 elections when the preparation time was very short, DEMOs had more time to prepare the activities that would be conducted at all stages of the 2004 elections, with the cooperation and support of international donors. The variety of activities is described in the table below. Table 5.3 DEMOs Activities Pre-elections The ElectionDay Post-elections Voter education Monitoring political party campaign processes, including the expenditure of parties Monitoring Electoral Management Body activities, such as voter registration, logistic distribution and so on. Review/reform the Election Law and systems Monitoring the media Monitoring the election process at the poll Quick count Observing fraud or illegal activities by political parties outside of the polling area Monitoring the tabulation of the results Resolution of complaints Monitoring public reaction to the results Adjudicating in disputes Source: created by the author from various resources. 250 Interview with BAPPENAS, July 20, Interview with CETRO, July 25,

169 Most DEMOs were still focused on election monitoring activities. The 2004 elections were monitored by many organisations, including both DEMOs (stand-alone and networking) and DOOs. A total of 29 organisations were accredited by the KPU to carry out monitoring on election day. Of the 29 organisations, 11 were DEMOs and only around four DEMOs had received international funding for election monitoring. As a result of monitoring, the number of violations that were reported increased (see the table below). Table 5.4 The Number of Violations in the 2004 Elections Category of Violations Number of Violations Administrative 8946 Criminal 3153 Total However, only a few organisations focused on voter education activities, including JPPR, CETRO, YAPPIKA, FPMP and KOPPEL. Each DEMO had its own target and method of conducting voter education activities. CETRO focused on disabled groups, while FPMP focused on women in rural areas. On the other hand, JPPR, YAPPIKA and KOPEL conducted voter education without limiting their target audience. Table 5.5 Indonesian DEMOs and Voter Education Activities Organisations CETRO JPPR FPMP (Women s Solidarity) YAPPIKA KOPEL Activities - Voter education for disabled groups - Advocacy regarding the - Monitoring - Information about the candidates - Community Political education through the community and public dialogue via radio - TV advertisements - Talk shows on the radio - Pamphlet and leaflet distribution using Training, Workshops, Mentorship for the 151

170 Organisations CETRO JPPR FPMP (Women s Solidarity) YAPPIKA KOPEL system and electoral mechanisms dialogue and TV local languages - Dialogue with local communities - Film - CD distribution for purposes of political education community Scopes - Disabled groups - National National 5 areas ** 10 subdistricts in 9 districts Networks CSOs in local areas, academics, mass media International donors CSOs in local (gender issues) and national areas (KIPP, CETRO), academics specialising in gender issues ** Print media, academics and CSOs ** Data not available Source: Laporan Penilaian Pendidikan Pemilih dan Kewarganegaraan (Report on Assessment of Voter Education and Nationality), published by Civic Engagement in Democratic Governance (CIVED) and the Ministry of Home Affairs, RI, 2008.The table has been modified by the author. Apart from DEMOs (as part of CSOs), certain other organisations are responsible for conducting voter education, including political parties, the general election commission, central and local government, and mass media. Mass media, which is usually categorised as civil society, is expected to participate in the public sphere and public discourse. However, mass media can be categorised as a private company because of its dependency on advertisements. Mass media can conduct voter education programmes based on requests from the government, funding agencies, political parties and CSOs. 252 As a result, in the 2004 election, almost 85% of registered voters exercised their right to vote and only 8, 8% of the votes were invalid. 252 Laporan Penilaian Pendidikan Pemilih dan Kewarganegaraan (Report on Assessment of Voter Education and Nationality), published by Civic Engagement in Democratic Governance (CIVED) and the Ministry of Home Affairs, RI, 2008, p

171 Table 5.6 Voters in the 2004 Elections Aspect Numbers and Percentages (%) Registered voters Registered voters who exercised the right to vote (84,1) Registered voters who did not vote ( gol put ) (15,9) Valid votes (91,2) Invalid votes (8,8) Source: Indonesian General Elections Commission The 2009 Elections: The End Stage of Indonesian DEMOs Only a handful of DEMOs, both stand-alone and networking, participated in observing the 2009 election. Of the 24 NGOs that observed the election, 16 were DOOs and only eight were DEMOs. In addition, only four DEMOs were reputable organisations, while the other four were are new organisations (TEPI, ISCEL, LP3-SWI and the National Election Institute). Even CETRO, one of the leading NGOs active in election-related issues, could not participate in observing the 2009 elections because of a lack of financial support. There was also a lack of domestic observers in several provinces. The Indonesian government itself was not particularly enthusiastic about the DEMOs participation in observing the 2009 elections. This was indicated by the exclusion of DEMOs activities from the Indonesian government s list of top priorities in the 2009 elections. Moreover, in 2007, the Indonesian government established BAWASLU (Supervisory Elections Body) as the supervisory institution for the elections, which handled many issues from administration to observing the elections. On the other hand, the number of donors for election-monitoring activities also decreased significantly. Two factors could have been the cause of this. The first factor is the changing perception 153

172 of Indonesia s ability to conduct a democratic election, as most of the donor countries expressed belief in Indonesia s ability and even categorised Indonesia as a democratic country. Some of the donors argue that Now we are better to give our money to other countries. 253 The second factor that influenced the donor countries behaviour was the Paris Declaration of The Paris Declaration, followed by the Jakarta Commitment in 2009, was signed as a result of the heavily criticised issue of aid effectiveness. The criticism revolved around the belief that foreign aid was a conduit for donor countries interests, including political interests, socio-cultural interests and economic interests. The Paris Declaration could be perceived as the developing countries (the recipients) triumph against the donor countries, because the declaration agrees on five principles of aid effectiveness, which are ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results and mutual accountability. The role of recipient countries governments is significantly boosted. They were positioned as important actors in deciding the distribution of budgets and top priority projects. With regard to aid in the 2009 elections, the Indonesian government did not mention the observation of the election in the list of top priority projects. Therefore, the donor countries did not provide for observation of the election in their aid because, according to the Paris Declaration, the donor countries must harmonise their aid with the recipients top priorities. Furthermore, the donor countries direct aid to NGOs was also technically limited by the implementation of a new mechanism. The new mechanism required the government s involvement in transferring the aid to the NGOs. Therefore, the NGOs proposals for the donors are selected by a selection team consisting of representatives of the Indonesian government, as well as the donor countries. The representatives of the Indonesian government consist of BAPPENAS (National Planning Agency), the Ministry of Domestic Affairs, KPU, BAWASLU, DPP, the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Youth and Sports. This intervention by the government was criticised by 253 Interview with UNDP, April 6,

173 the NGOs, particularly by the DEMOs. They stated that the government s involvement was an indication of intervention that targeted the ability of civil society to observe and to monitor the 2009 elections. 254 This new mechanism was not the only approach for the Indonesian government s involvement, as it appeared to be eager to maximise its role in the elections. One of the significant moves by the government was the establishment of a permanent Supervisory Elections Body, called BAWASLU. However, the establishment of BAWASLU was criticised by several individuals, thus: Monitoring agency like BAWASLU/Panwaslu funded by the state budget is not necessary. It is better to support Independent DEMOs that is more effective to conduct the monitoring and raising awareness on the importance of monitoring and empowering people to conduct the monitoring voluntary. 255 In reality, the limited personnel agency of BAWASLU has to cooperate with DEMOs when conducting monitoring activities. In the 2009 elections, BAWASLU signed an MOU of cooperation with 11 DEMOs. As a result, the number of election-related violations reported by BAWASLU increased in the 2009 elections, as seen in Table 4.4. The increasing number of reported violations reveals the positive collaboration between BAWASLU and the DEMOs. Nevertheless, it also indicates the limitation of the DEMOs role in monitoring the election. Table 5.7 The Number of Violations in the 2009 Elections Category of Violations The Number of Violations Percentage (% ) Compared to the 2004 Elections Administrative (71,8) Criminal 6019 (28,2) Total (80%) Source: the Supervisory Elections Body Report, The table was created by the author. 254 Interview with LP3ES, Janury 9, 2009; PBIP, December 17, 2008; FPMP, April 1, 2009, and CETRO, March 20, Interview with Ex-KPU members for , March 27,

174 The DEMOs role in voter education also decreased. This is indicated by the declining number of DEMOs working in that particular field. In the 2009 elections, only LP3ES, FPMP and JPPR were involved in activities related to voter education, even limiting their target groups within the society. In addition, the DEMOs could not execute voter education programmes independently, as they first had to present their proposals through the aforementioned mechanism that involved both the government and donors. Conversely, some aspects of voter participation also changed between the 2004 and 2009 elections. Table 4.5 shows a comparison of certain aspects of voters participation in the 2004 and the 2009 elections. In the 2009 election, the percentage of the number of registered voters who exercised the right to vote declined, compared to the 2004 election. In parallel, the number of registered voters who did not vote and the number of invalid votes increased, compared to the 2004 election. From the data, it could be argued that there are two factors affecting the elections, namely the decline of popular participation and the lack of socialisation with regard to the election system and electoral procedure. Table 5.8 Voters in the 2004 and 2009 Elections: A Comparison Aspect The 2009 Elections Percentages Compared to the 2004 Elections The number of registered voters (29,0) The number of registered voters who exercised the right to vote The number of registered voters who did not vote (70,9) (29,0) The number of valid votes (85.6) The number of invalid votes (14.3) Source: General Elections Commission, RI. The table was created by the author. 156

175 Thus, the decreasing role of DEMOs in election monitoring, socialisation and voter education should go hand-in-hand with the increasing role and capacity of the government and other actors, such as political parties, in order to effectively conduct these activities. Nonetheless, based on the direct observation of the 2009 election, 256 some important points must be noted: 1. With regard to the popular participation in the election, the percentage of voters who came to the TPS (voting booths) was only 40-50%. This means that about 50-60% of registered voters did not come to the TPS to vote. This situation was observed not only at the central (city) level, but also at the local level. This situation indicates a lack of political education for the masses. 2. The involvement of domestic and/or international election observers, as well as observers from the political parties, was minimal, both at the central and at the local level. Of the 38 political parties that participated in the 2009 elections, only 5-10 political parties (such as the Democratic Party, Golkar, PDI-P, PKB, PPP, PAN, PBR, PDS, Hanura, Gerindra and the Patriot Political Party) participated in monitoring the election at each TPS. In addition, most of them only monitored the early stages of the election, left, and returned for the ballot counting. Similar problems also occurred with the representatives of the supervisory election body, as one representative had to cover more than one TPS. 3. There was very little enthusiasm on the part of the communities around the polling stations with regard to monitoring the election process, in terms of both voting and ballot counting. Regarding the participation of people watching the election process, all of the polling stations that reported on the voting process remarked that people were less enthusiastic about the voting process than they were about the counting process. However, although many people paid more attention to the counting process, some TPS reported that they only watched the early stages of the counting process. In the middle of process, many people were returning home. 256 Direct observation was conducted on the election day of the 2009 elections. See the explanations of direct observation in Chapter 2. Detailed results of direct observation are analysed in Chapter

176 4. The election violation data, which were collected from all TPS, showed that many administrative violations were committed by the election committees themselves. Some technical and substantive problems were responded to by the election committees without referring to the rules;for example, the election committees allowed people that were not registered as voters to vote. Thus, the misbehaviour of the election committees contributed to the increase in administrative violations in the TPS Types and Characteristics of Indonesian DEMOs: Survey Results and Findings At the beginning of this chapter, it was explained that this section would explore Indonesian DEMOs by focusing on mapping the types and characteristics of Indonesian DEMOs. A similar study by Lean (2007) has been conducted on DEMOs in Latin America. She used the domestic context (the nature of intra-societal relations) and the international context (the nature of past intervention) to classify the kinds of DEMOs that are favourable for democracy when supported by international assistance. Since Indonesia does not have the same contexts as has Latin America, this study will examine the classification of DEMOs by Lean and will attempt to indicate the types of DEMOs that are best suited to conducting election monitoring and which should receive the support of the international society in the Indonesian case. This study argues that network DEMOs are the best type of DEMOs in this context. When analysing the Indonesian DEMOs, the different types of DEMOs and which of these exist in Indonesia s political system should first be understand. Referring to Lean (2007), there are two basic categories of DEMOs. The first is organisations that are created for the specific purpose of monitoring elections (stand-alone DEMOs) and the second is networks or coalitions of previously existing organisations that combine efforts and create a staff infrastructure (network 158

177 DEMOs). 257 However, looking at the survey results, this study found that there were some organisations that participated in election monitoring but which could not really be identified as DEMOs. Therefore, this study argues that the classifications proposed by Lean (2007) should be defined in more detail, particularly with regard to network DEMOs. Are all the organisations that are involved in election monitoring networking DEMOs? At what level can these kinds of organisations be classified as DEMOs? Survey Results of Indonesian DEMOs 258 The questionnaire consists of three parts and is structured to explore the characteristics of Indonesian DEMOs. 259 The first part focuses on the historical aspects of DEMOs. The second part investigates the scope of activities and funding resources. The third part contains an evaluation of the performance and the prospects of organisations. The results from the first part can be summarised as follows. Referring to the question of when the organisation was established, most of organisations (13 DEMOs) were established around This result indicates that of the twenty-two organisations surveyed, nine organisations were established during , while the other organisations were established after the beginning of the reform period. This means that some of the Indonesian DEMOs did not originate for the election monitoring purposes. The survey results are as follows: 257 See Lean, 2007, Loc.Cit. 258 Details of survey results can be found in Appendix For an explanation of the survey, see Chapter 2.The questionnaire can be seen in Appendix

178 Chart 5.1 The Number of New Indonesian DEMOs based on Period 8 Number > Period On the other hand, with regard to the original activities, ten organisations were focused on electoral activities, while twelve were focused on other activities such as the empowerment of women, corruption watch, migrant labour issues and so forth. This shows that most of the organisations (12 DEMOs) were not originally established as organisations related to electoral issues. Chart 5.2 Centre of Activity 13 Number Electoral Others Centre of Activity Furthermore, most of the organisations (15 organisations) conducted their activities via the networking system, while only a few organisations (7 organisations) are based on the stand alone organisational style. The data indicated that, although the first of the Indonesian DEMO (KIPP) is stand-alone DEMO type, the number of stand-alone DEMOs type had not increased significantly. 160

179 Chart 5.3 The Number of Organisation that operate Via the Networking System 20 Number Yes No Networking The survey also found that the number of organisations involved in election monitoring activities was highest in 2004, compared to the 1999 and 2009 elections (see Chart 5.4). Since the 1999 election was the first election that introduced election monitoring activities conducted by NGOs, this phenomenon can be understood as a reflection of the increasing societal concern regarding the quality of elections. However, the decreasing number of DEMOs involved in the 2009 elections can be explained by two reasons. The first is the maturing of the election process and the second is the decrease in funding for election monitoring. Chart 5.4 The number of Indonesian DEMOs involved in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 Elections Yes No

180 Another important aspect to be explored is the variety of activities that are conducted by the Indonesian DEMOs. Based on survey results, monitoring at the polls on election day is the main activity conducted by Indonesian DEMOs, followed by voter education and the quick count. This means that most of the Indonesian DEMOs focus their activities on the election day rather than on preor post-election activities. Chart 5.5 Activities Conducted by Indonesian DEMOs Monitoring at poll Voter Education Quick Account Advocacy Others In addition, monitoring at the polls was the main method that Indonesian DEMOs used to monitor the election (see Chart 5.6). Although monitoring at the polls was the main method, the implementation of the quick count method has increased from the 1999 to 2009 elections. Chart 5.6 Methods of Monitoring Conducted by Indonesian DEMOs Monitoring at poll Quick Account

181 Another important aspect to be explored when determining the characteristics of Indonesian DEMOs is their funding sources. The survey results found that international donors were the main source of Indonesian DEMOs funding in the 1999 and 2004 elections. However, it became the smallest source in the 2009 elections. Instead of sourcing funding from international donors, revenue from membership dues and donations increased significantly from the 1999 to the 2009 elections. However, government sources have never be a source of funding for Indonesian DEMOs to conduct their election monitoring activities. Chart 5.7 Funding Sources Int'l Donors Government (0) Membership Dues Donation Considering the evaluation of Indonesian DEMOs performances, most of the Indonesian DEMOs said that the primary internal factor required by the organisations in order to conduct their activities effectively was funding. They also indicated various other factors, such as a lack of members capabilities, members commitment and geographical factors. Since membership is on a voluntary basis, the capabilities and commitment of the members are two problems that cannot be avoided. The geographical factor is related to the fact that Indonesia consists of many islands, which causes logistical problems with regard to the effectiveness of Indonesian DEMOs when conducting their activities. 163

182 Chart 5.8 Internal Factors that Influence the Performance of Indonesian DEMOs Funding Lack of member's ability Lack of member's commitiment Geographical factor On the other hand, most of the Indonesian DEMOs indicated that the external factors that influenced the performance of Indonesian DEMOs were a lack of governmental and donor commitment. Moreover, inharmonious relationships with other DEMOs also affected the performance of Indonesian DEMOs. The lack of government commitment was related to the fact that there was nongovernmental budget for the empowerment of Indonesian CSOs in general and Indonesian DEMOs in particular (see Chart 5.7). The lack of donor commitment was related to the decrease in funding and to the slow distribution of funding. It was reported that, on occasion, although the donor had agreed to support a project one year before the election, they only distributed the funding between one and three months before the election. 260 Another problem was programmes that were not synchronised with the programmes of other DEMOs. This is related to the decrease in coordination among Indonesian DEMOs after See also the interview with CETRO, March 20,

183 Chart 5.9 External Factors that Influence the Performance of Indonesian DEMOs Less Coordination with other lack organizations of donor's commitment lack of government's commitment Although Indonesian DEMOs have faced these kinds of internal and external problems before, most of the Indonesian DEMOs claimed that broadening the network is a strong point of their organisations, followed by the ability and strong commitment of their members, 261 while only one organisation said that funding is its strong point. Chart 5.10 Strong Points of Indonesian DEMOs Funding the ability of member Strong Commitment Broaden Network With regard to the data above, certain aspects of Indonesian DEMOs can be identified. It can be seen that most of the Indonesian DEMOs are the networking type and that they consider monitoring 261 Member means not only a person running a programme in the field, but also includes the managerial staff. 165

184 at polls to be their main activity, as very few organisations conducted other methods of monitoring such as the quick count. Another aspect is the high dependency of Indonesian DEMOs on international support and less governmental attention on supporting CSOs in their election-monitoring activities. A new phenomenon is the increasing number of Indonesian DEMOs that rely on other sources of funding, such as membership dues and donations. Moreover, it should be noted that most of the Indonesian DEMOs acknowledged networking as a strong point of their organisations, emphasising this over other aspects such as funding from domestic and foreign sources. This is as a result of two factors. The first is the effort on the part of Indonesian DEMOs to be independent of foreign support and the second is the shift in the of core activities of the donors (detailed explanations of donor approaches and the relationship of donors, Indonesian DEMOs and the KPU/government can be found in Chapters 4 and 6) Some Findings regarding Indonesian DEMOs Based on the survey results, this study found that many organisations that participated in election monitoring could not be classified according to either of the categories proposed by Lean. These kinds of organisations were not created for election monitoring purposes and they either conduct observations without having a network or they have a network but do not see election monitoring as one of their main activities. Moreover, these organisations are only involved on election day and do not take part in other electoral activities in the pre- and post-election stages. Therefore, this study defines of these kinds of organisations as Domestic Observer Organisations (DOOs). 262 This study indicates that there are two motives for these DOOs being involved in election monitoring as they are either financially driven or are the existence seeker type of NGO. 262 Nevitte and Canton (1997) also used the term domestic observers to describe the groups that participated in election-monitoring activities. 166

185 Diagram 5.1 Survey Results regarding the Types of Indonesiann DEMOs Stand Alone (7) Networking (8) DOOs (7) monitoring activities are conducted by civil society, which Putnam calls social capital, The phenomena of the involvement of DOOs can be viewed from both a positive and a negative perspective. It can be viewed positively for two reasons. Firstly, considering that electionit could be considered to be part of the political participation of civil society. Another reason is that election- monitoring activities need more people to be involved in order to maximise the monitoring results. 263 However, the leader of the DEMOs remarked that Although it could be seen as positive trend, but since these organisations have other activities which are not related to the electoral aspects, it raises the questions on the focus and continuity of electorall activities that will be conducted by these organisations. 264 Looking at the DOOs that participated in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections, no DOOs weree involved continuously in each period of the elections. It can therefore be said that since electorall activities are not the core function of DOO, it is difficult to expect them to further engagee in electorall activities. Looking at table below, this study found thatt of the thirteen organisations that participated in the 1999 elections, eight of the organisations were DEMOs and the others were DOOs. In the Bjo ornlund, 1996, Op.Cit., p Interview, CETRO, March 20,

186 elections, twenty-nine organisations conducted the monitoring activities and the majority of them were DOOs (18 DOOs and 11 DEMOs). Similarly, in the 2009 elections, DOOs also dominated the number of organisations (16 DOOs and 8 DEMOs) that participated in election monitoring on election day. Table 5.9 Classifications of Indonesian DEMOs in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 Elections NO Category 2004 Category 2009 Category 1. UNFREL Network PBIP Stand Alone LPP NKRI DOOs 2. Rectors Forum Network JAMUS NEGERI DOOs LSM PRTI DOOs 3. SBSI DOOs LIPP Stand- Alone JAMUS NEGERI DOOs 4. JPPR Network FOPIN DOOs Garda Santri Nusantara DOOs 5. JAMMPI Network MAPILU-PWI Network Migrant Care DOOs 6. APPI Network KPP-PRAKIN DOOs KIPP Indonesia Stand-Alone 7. FPMP Network MAPELU Stand- Alone LPPM UGM DOOs 8. YPBHI DOOs FKPPK DOOs LP3-SWI Network 9. YAPPIKA DOOs PIPI Stand Alone GMP-AM DOOs 10. PBHMI DOOs PWII-SP DOOs LSM-Patriot Indonesia (LSM-PI) DOOs 11. Yayasan Mitra DOOs LPAB- Yapernus DOOs JPPR Network 168

187 Mandiri 12. KIPP Stand-Alone KPP- GARSANTA RA 13. LP3ES Network LSM PROSPEK DOOs ISCEL Stand-Alone DOOs LSM Gerhana DOOs 14. TI Indonesia DOOs PPA GMNI DOOs 15. KAHMI DOOs Warna Press Peduli Pemilu 16. LSM-PI DOOs National Elections Institute DOOs Network 17. Indonesian Volunteers Organisation DOOs TEPI Stand-Alone 18. ICW DOOs Mappilu-PWI Network 19. LP3ES Network YPKB- LSI Ora et Labora DOOs 20. The Habibie Center DOOs KPP KAHMI Network 21. PM3-UI DOOs GERBANG DOOs 22. KMI DOOs Cirus Surveyor Group 23. KAPU-IPHI DOOs LPAB YAFERNUS 24. Bina Swadaya DOOs SPMI- UNIMIG Indonesia DOOs DOOs DOOs 25. Rectors Forum Network 169

188 26. LKIP Network 27. JAMPPI Network 28. JPPR Network 29. Konsorsium 9 LSM Network Note: The list refers to organisations that are registered with and are accredited by KPU Source: General Election Commission RI. The table was created by the author. Moreover, this study found that network DEMOs are the dominant type of Indonesian DEMOs. By analysing the survey results and the interviews with DEMOs, this study has indicated that the historical and cultural background to the existence of civil society organisations is the main factor in explaining why network DEMOs are the dominant type in Indonesia. In addition, this study has pointed out that networking DEMOs has advantages over standalone DEMOs (see Appendix 3, Survey Results). Firstly, during the initial phase of creating the initiative, some organisations just built intensive communication channels with each other without facing the problem of gathering members with a shared interest in electoral activities, as encountered by stand-alone DEMOs. Secondly, since network DEMOs consist of many existing organisations, they have much more experience in conducting certain programmes than do stand-alone DEMOs, which are relatively new. Thirdly, since network DEMOs consist of organisations, their membership is more solid/consolidated than that of stand-alone DEMOs. Fourthly, network DEMOs have more access to information because they have many networks at the central and the local levels. Moreover, although networks DEMOs sometimes have issues with effective and efficient communication within their organisations, having networks at many levels means that network DEMOs tend to be effective when covering many areas of electoral activities. Fifthly, network DEMOs are not based on a hierarchical structure, but place more emphasis on coordination and cooperation with each other. This means that each organisation has the freedom to 170

189 design the kinds of activities that are needed and which are appropriate to the given situation. By contrast, stand-alone DEMOs are highly dependent on central command. Sixthly, while stand-alone DEMOs are dependent on foreign assistance, network DEMOs are more independent of foreign assistance when conducting their activities, particularly with regard to election monitoring on election day. For example, referring to the survey results, some of the network DEMOs did not receive foreign assistance for conducting monitoring activities in the 2009 elections, but they still conducted monitoring activities using other funding resources like membership dues and donations from individuals, while stand-alone DEMOs, such as KIPP and PBIP, disappeared in the 2004 and the 2009 elections. Moreover, CETRO, one of most influential and well-known stand-alone DEMOs, also disappeared in the 2009 elections. A unique case is exemplified by the MAPILU PWI organisation. This kind of organisation, which is based on mass media activities, had a significant effect in terms of reporting violations without needing much funding to conduct monitoring. They have the advantage of being journalists. However, this kind of organisation could not do much with regard to voter education activities. Table 5.10 Characteristics of Indonesian DEMOs Characteristics Stand-Alone DEMOs Network DEMOs Membership Individual Organisation Degree of solidity Low High Structure Hierarchical Coordinative Scope of Area Limited Broad Level of Dependency on External Funding High Low Note: The table is created by the author. 171

190 The advantages listed above have formed the characteristics of both stand-alone and networktype Indonesian DEMOs. With reference to these advantages/characteristics and the analysis above, this study argues that network DEMOs are the best type of DEMOs. Thus, this also an answer to one of the questions raised in this study: why could the Indonesian DEMOs perform successfully when they did not have enough experience, resources or a strong basis in Indonesian political systems? 5.3. Assessment of the Evolving Role of Democracy Assistance and Indonesian DEMOs in the Democratisation Process: The Position of Democracy Assistance in the Process of Democratisation in Indonesia Considering the implementation of the elections as explained above, the 1999 election could be said to have been successful in terms of delivering the nation of Indonesia to the transition period. Although there was much fraud and many violations, the 1999 elections were largely recognised as being free and fair. Diamond classified this era as a grey area of democracy that is neither clearly democratic nor clearly undemocratic. 265 Looking at the results of the 1999 elections, Golkar, as the former ruling party, had still a great number of votes. As a result, Golkar still had the opportunity to influence the political process in parliament. Therefore, although a change in the regime had occurred, Bakti noted that this period was coloured by a compromise between the authoritarian regime and a new democratic power, calling it the paradox [es] of democratic transition. 266 With regard to both opinions, this study has highlighted that this phenomenon was a result of the initial phase of transitional process. Golkar could not be directly removed from Indonesian 265 Larry Diamond, the Global State of Democracy, Current History, Vol. 99 No. 641, December 2000, p Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, The Transition to Democracy in Indonesia: Some Outstanding Problems in Jim Rolfe (ed.), The Asia-Pacific Region in Transition, (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), pp

191 political life, given that it and New Order groups had played a role in the economic and political life of Indonesia for about 32 years. Although the old regime still existed in the reform period, the participation of civil society increased compared to the situation under the Soeharto regime, which was powerful in terms of controlling and limiting civil society. Democratisation created the opportunity for civil society to be involved in the process of democratisation in Indonesia. In terms of the involvement of international donors in the democratic process in Indonesia, particularly with regard to supporting the elections, it is clearly seen that, after the fall of the Suharto regime, the attention of international donors was directed towards the 1999 elections and their role as "founding election". The founding elections were the target of international donors. The largest amount of funding by these donors was distributed to support the 1999 elections. The focus of international donors was to support the transitional elections in order to ensure a democratic election by introducing the idea of and support for election monitoring conducted by both domestic and international observers, as well as promoting the idea of multiparty elections. At the domestic level, the public was also focused on the 1999 transitional election. The main indicator of this is that the percentage of people that participated in the 1999 election was higher than it was in the 2004 and 2009 elections. From the above explanation (see also Chapter 3), it could be concluded that multi-party elections under the post-soeharto regime have led the democratic process in Indonesia. In other words, elections could be deemed to be one of the causes of democratisation. Thus, it should be acknowledged that elections, particularly transitional elections, are an important moment in the process of regime change and in the transition of Indonesia towards becoming a democratic country. 173

192 This is reinforced by the findings of Teorell and Hadenius, who s pointed out that: although fragile, multiparty election has significant and positive impacts in the process of Democratisation. 267 However, this study argues that too much focus on the founding elections does not guarantee the sustainability of democratisation. Transitional elections are not the end but the means of the process. Therefore, the support from domestic and international actors should not be brought to an end. Conversely, both actors, especially domestic actors as the main power of Democratisation, should maintain their support in order to prevent violations and to guarantee that democratic elections result in a clean government that consciously conducts its function based on the principles of good governance. Considering the above explanations, it could be summarised that democracy assistance has played a major role in the liberalisation and at the initial phase of transition. The mushrooming of international support during those phases had a positive impact on the future of democratisation in Indonesia. However, the position of democracy assistance should be understood as a supporting power for democratisation in Indonesia as a newly democratic country The Role of Indonesian DEMOs: From Transmitter to Advocacy The purpose of this section is to map the role of DEMOs in Indonesia s democratisation process. The main argument is that the DEMOs play different roles within each phase of the democratisation process. As explained in Chapter 2, there are three main phases of the democratisation process: liberalisation, transition and consolidation. In the case of Indonesia, the democratisation process could be further divided into the pre-liberalisation phase, the transitional (initial) phase, the 267 Teorell and Hadenius analysed the relationship between elections and democratisation in 151 countries between and, although they found no systematic relationship between elections and democratisation, it was general felt that elections have a positive and significant impact on democratisation. Teorell and Hadenius, Elections as Levers of Democratization: A Global Inquiry, in Staffan I. Lindberg (ed.), Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition, The John Hopkins University Press, 2009, pp

193 transitional (deepening) phase and consolidation. The first phase is pre-liberalisation, in which Soeharto s government begun to loosen their grip on the population s political activities. Thus, in the 1997 election, KIPP -as Indonesia s first DEMO - could participate in observing the election. KIPP, which was supported by the NDI, brought new ideas and perspectives of Indonesia s election as the organisation stresses the importance of observing elections just as they did in the 1997 election. The idea of an independent observer in the election was successfully planted in the popular mind, as many people are enthusiastic about becoming election-observer volunteers. Thus, the observation of elections, which was previously unknown in the Indonesian political system, has increased in popularity since the 1997 election (with DEMOs as the transmitter). Therefore, many new election-observer organisations were established during the 1999 election. The astonishing popular interest in establishing DEMOs was also supported by the transitional government s policies that openly invited the international community, as well as domestic groups, to observe the election. In additional, the international community s support for Indonesia s democratisation was an important factor that led to the development and creation of many electionobserver organisations in Indonesia. The 1999 election was considered a very important stage in the democratisation process of Indonesia, as the country-in-transition needed an election with fullyfledged legitimacy recognised by both the international community and by domestic groups. Thus, DEMOs were very important in this phase, as they not only carried out their function as election observers, but also played a role as an agent of legitimising the 1999 elections. With regard to the transitional (deepening) phase, the roles of the DEMOs were very important, especially in Indonesia s election in DEMO activities, in both the pre- and postelection periods, involved supervising, voter education programmes and other duties and were quite successful. The DEMOs success was attributed to two main factors, namely financial support from the 175

194 international community and having enough time to prepare and conduct many of the activities, whichh was not the case with the 1999 election. However, the role of DEMOs was in decline in the 2009 elections because the Indonesiann government was trying to contain their influence on the Indonesian election system, as explained in the previous section. The decrease in international aid, especially financial aid, for election observing activities also triggered the decline of DEMOs role in the 2009 elections. The relatively successful Indonesian direct election in 2004 also contributed to the international community s perceptions of Indonesia. The country is perceived to be able to independently conduct a democratic election, both administratively as well as financially, because Indonesia is positioned as a middle-income country. Therefore, the DEMOs focus was shifting from their previous activities, which were observing the election and voter education. However, it must be noted that several networking DEMOs (JPPR and KIPP) still conduct election observing activities and rely on organisational budgets. They also stilll perform advocacy work, which targets both the government and the general population. Figure 5.1 Democratisation and the Role of Indonesian DEMOs Consolidation DEMO's Roles: Advocacy Transitional (Deepening) Phase DEMOs' Roles: Monitor and Educator Transitional (Initial) Phase or (Liberalisation phase) DEMOs' Roles : agent of legitimation pre Liberalisation Phase DEMOs' Roles : transmitters of the idea of Election Monitoring Note: This figure is created by the author. 176

195 According to the analysed data regarding the decline of the DEMOs role, this study argues that the DEMOs role is clearly declined in the democratisation process consolidation phase. The reason behind the decline of the DEMOs role is developments in law and order that cause the organisations to focus only on advocacy, which does not require a large budget or extensive financial resources. Moreover, there is the possibility that the role of DEMOs might disappear as the government is trying to strengthen their election-related agencies, including supervisory bodies such as BAWASLU. It is also interesting to note that there are no elections supervisory or observatory organisations, in mature democracies. Thus, the previous explanations could support this study s argument that DEMOs played a vital role in the transitional phase, which is supported by international factors as well as by developments in the domestic situation. In summary, this study points out that domestic and international factors influenced the process of democratisation, particularly with regard to election monitoring. The dynamics of foreign assistance for observing the elections affected the existence of DEMOs activities and caused the advent of other types of election-monitoring organisations, called DOOs. In the case of Indonesia, the network type of Indonesian DEMOs has shown its ability to maintain the sustainability of activities without relying entirely on foreign assistance. While most of the stand-alone DEMOs have reduced their activities due to the decrease in foreign support, network DEMOs still conduct their activities, not only at the central level, but also at the local level. This organisational characteristic of DEMOs is found to be a source of strength for network DEMOs. Therefore, international assistance should be channelled to this kind of organisation if the assistance is to be effective. However, international donors seem to have focused too much on founding election, which caused them to provide assistance without considering the importance of the sustainability of the activities. In relation to the above argument, since elections are an important aspect of democratisation, the role of Indonesian DEMOs should be acknowledged as having been necessary in order to assist the 177

196 process of democratisation by enhancing the quality of the elections, particularly during the transitional phase of regime change. However, as O Donnell has noted, the key is not only free and fair elections today, but also the generalized expectation that a fair electoral process and its surrounding freedoms will continue into an indefinite future Guillermo O Donnell, Loc. Cit., p

197 Chapter 6 Analysis of the Dynamic Relationship between International and Domestic Actors: Donors, Government and Indonesian DEMOs The relationship between domestic and international actors (donors) in the process of democratisation in Indonesia post-soeharto is an important issue to be explored. Many works have focused on the dynamic relationship sof domestic actors in Indonesia, but only a limited number of works has focused on the relationship between donors (international actors) and domestic actors in the process of democratisation in Indonesia post-soeharto. Theoretically, the interaction between domestic and international actors in democratisation can be investigated through the phenomenon of conditionality. 269 Conditionality is acknowledged as one of ways in which international actors (donors) can play a role in encouraging democratisation within a country. However, this study argues that it is difficult to explore the dynamic relationship between domestic and international actors post-soeharto from the conditionality aspect for two reasons. Firstly, conditionality clearly expresses the dominance of donors over domestic actors. Secondly, the initiative for the democratic movement in Indonesia is a result of pressure from domestic actors rather than from international actors. Clear s work is one of the more remarkable works concerning this issue. She analysed donor strategies in supporting democratisation in Indonesia post-soeharto. Based on the development of the democratisation theory, she classified democracy according to three different approaches, namely state-oriented, society-oriented and state-society interactive. 270 The first, state-oriented approaches (state reformer strategy) to democracy focused on formal and informal institutions that structure the policymaking process and determine how society is governed. The state has the responsibility to ensure sufficient channels and opportunities for people s participation and to be the supreme guarantor 269 Laurence Whitehead, International Aspect of Democratization, Op. Cit., p Clear, Op.Cit. 179

198 for the democratic process. 271 Schumpeter and Dahl s views on democracy are categorised by Clear as being state-oriented. The second category, societal-orientation (grassroots mobiliser strategy), is defined as an approach that focuses either on the behavioural aspect of the institutions or on the institutions generated by societal initiatives. This approach stresses the necessity of civil society in the democratic process. The civil society is believed to be a critical component/actor in balancing the state s power or in influencing state policy in order to build and maintain the democratic process. 272 Some scholars, such as Carole Pateman, Robert Putnam, Larry Diamond, and Almond and Verba have explored this category. The third category proposed by Clear is that of state-society interactive (mediator strategy), emphasising the linkages and interactions between the state and the society in the democratic process, which colours the recent theories of democratisation. This interactive approach emphasises that formal and informal institutions that structure the policy making process and determine how the society is governed are combined with the behavioral aspects and the institutions generated by societal initiative. 273 With regard to this strategy, she pointed out that donors would do better to focus on mediator strategies. However, she suggested the necessity of the donor country/organisation having a role as a mediator in bridging state-society interaction in democratisation without an explanation of how donors could play such a role. She concluded that the donors strategies (Government-Government (G to G) approach and Society-Society (S to S) approach) had an effect on Indonesian state-society interaction in that it can be viewed as overlapping with what she categorised as being state-oriented and societyoriented approaches. 271 Ibid., p Ibid., p Ibid., p

199 Considering Clear s work, this chapter will focus on an analysis on how the relationship between international (donors) and domestic actors (EMBs and Indonesian DEMOs) in supporting democratisation in terms of democratic elections have performed, based on a data survey and on the results of direct observation. Exploring the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections will allow for an analysis of the dynamic relationship of donor-government-society in the democratisation process of Indonesia, as well as trends in these relationships. Furthermore, this study will investigate the shift in EMBs, donors and DEMOs relationship in each step of the democratisation process. This study argues that, parallel with the positive results of the transitional elections, the relationship between EMBs as part of the government body, donors and DEMOs as part of civil society has changed, which is indicated by the rise in the EMBs' control over donors and Indonesian DEMOs. Therefore, this study argues that, in this kind of situation, donors find it difficult to play a role as mediators. Donors do not have any choice but to focus on the government (state-oriented approach) while still trying to promote the necessity of state- society interactions. The next section will explore donors-government-civil society relationships during Soeharto s regime by dividing the analysis into three periods: 1) ; 2) : and 3) In the final section, this study will present the scheme of dynamic relations of the actors during the Soeharto regime. Thereafter, the analysis will focus on the relationship of those actors post-soeharto. The analysis will be based on data surveys and direct observation results. Similar to the first section, the scheme of relationships among the actors will be presented in this section. 181

200 6.1 Donor, Government and Civil Society Relationships during Soeharto s Era This section will briefly explore donors-government-civil society during Soeharto s regime. The purpose of this section is to map the relationships in that period in order to provide basic analysis of the relationships post-soeharto. Therefore, in order to comprehensively reveal the dynamics of the relationships during that period, the analysis will be divided into three periods, thus: the Period of Development ( ), the Period of Conditionality ( ) and the Period of the end of the Soeharto epoch ( ) The Period of Development ( ) Historically, donor-government relationships were very close under Soeharto s regime. When he took the position of president in 1967, he faced a dire economic situation. Therefore, he put economic stabilisation as the target for his government. One of his strategies was to ask for international development assistance. On the other hand, the international political situation at that time was engulfed by the international political situation that was engulfed by ideology war between communist versus non-communist countries.. Considering that about 60% of Indonesian debt came from communist countries such as Beijing and Moscow, Soeharto on at that time asked them for help first. However, since there was no response from those countries, Soeharto then asked Japan for help. With Japanese help, the first assembly of all international donors, with the exception of the communist counties, was conducted. This became the initial force behind the establishment of the Paris Club and the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), which was proposed as a forum for discussion regarding the provision of foreign aid to Indonesia Further analysis of the foreign aid relations under Soeharto can be seen in Clear (2001), 182

201 Therefore, at that time foreign aid (ODA) was considered to be one of the most significant financial sources within the Indonesian National Budget under the Soeharto regime. Foreign aid contributed about one-fifth of the total national income and Japan was a major donor, as approximately 16% of Japan total ODA was allocated to Indonesia. Hence, donor-government relations were influenced by a call for financial aid by Soeharto regime in order to stabilise the domestic economic situation and by the effort of non-communist countries to keep Indonesia away from communist influence (containment policy). Considering that economic stability would lead to political stability, under Soeharto, Indonesia received a large amount of development assistance aid. Because of the economic and political stability, pro-communist groups could not take over the political situation (see also Chapter 3). In the case of government-society relations, since the 1970s Soeharto s government had restricted the civil freedom for political participation under the banner of preserving Indonesian unity. Soeharto s government also announced the laws called the subversion law and the Civil Society Organisations Law (UU ORMAS) in 1985 that purposed to limit individual and organisational/association freedom. Therefore, government-civil society relations under Soeharto weretainted by conflict relations. Confrontation and negotiation were two of strategies that were often implemented by society when addressing the government The Period of the Issues of Conditionality ( ) However, in tandem with the end of Cold War in the 1990s, almost all donors and international institutions focused on democracy as prerequisite of assistance, by stressing the conditionality of political and administrative reform in recipient countries. Democracy, human rights and good governance became objectives of aid conditionality. As explained in Chapter 4, all the donors except Japan began to force Soeharto to pay attention to these issues. The Dili Incident in

202 was one of the issues that attracted international donor concern, reflected in frozen aid and the reduction of the amount of aid. Since that time, the relationship between the Soeharto and the donors was coloured by the issue of human rights and others issues related to democratisation (see Chapter 3). On the other hand, although society-donor relations under Soeharto s regime were limited, international support for civil society, especially from the US, was indicated as one of the sources of civil society movements and NGOs activities in Indonesia. With reference to Azpuru's work, she noted that the US democracy assistance to Indonesia has been distributed since This means that the US had already distributed democracy assistance to Indonesia when Indonesia was still ruled by Soeharto s regime. One of the organisations that emerged as a result of international support was the KIPP, one of the leading Indonesian DEMOs. As explained in Chapter 5, the activities of KIPP had been supported by international donors through providing funds, technical assistance and training. However, the KIPP had to face the negative response of government towards its existence (see chapter 3). With regard to government-cso relations in this period, it could be said that conditionality on the part of the donors indirectly advanced the position of CSOs. Moreover, many of the CSOs were established in this period, including LBH (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum/Law Advocacy), INFID (International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development) and SBSI (Serikat Buruh Pekerja Indonesia/Labour Union). 276 CSOs and donors had more power and were closer than they had been in the previous period. On the other hand, the relationship between the CSOs and the government was nuanced by conflict relations. 275 Azpuru, Op.Cit. 276 The estimation of the number of NGOs by 1996 was around 8,000 organisations. Republika, November However, Fakih (1996) pointed out that the CSOs under Soeharto actually had a similar position to that of the government. The reason is that, ideologically, the CSO s paradigm on development was not very different from the government s paradigm, which was based on the developmentalism paradigm. The differing aspects are that the CSOs rely on bottom-up approaches (participatory ideas), while the government s approach was topdown (non-participatory). See Fakih Mansour, Masyarakat Sipil untuk Transformasi Sosial: Pergolakan Ideologi LSM Indonesia (Civil Society for Social Transformation: The Battle of Indonesian CSOs Ideology), Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1996, p

203 6.1.3 The Period of Economic Crisis ( ) The relationship of the Soeharto regime and the donors peaked during the economic crisis that started in mid In 1997, Indonesia was engulfed by the Asian financial crisis that began in Thailand, followed by Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. Indonesia was the hardest hit. The value of the rupiah dropped to Rp. 2,350 per US dollar in June Conditions became worse after the Central Bank of Indonesia allowed the currency to float, resulting in devaluation from around 2,600 to nearly 3,000 rupiah to the US dollar. The highest devaluation of the rupiah approached Rp.17, 000 to one US dollar in January In order to overcome the economic crisis, which became worse after the Central Bank of Indonesia allowed the currency to float, Soeharto asked for international assistance from the IMF in October The first agreement between Indonesia and the IMF was signed in October 1997, and continued for the second and third agreements on January 15 and April 8, As a result of these agreements, the IMF became deeply involved in Indonesia s economic recovery programme and played an important role in determining the economic policy of Soeharto. As a result of the economic crisis, the political situation became worse and, finally, Soeharto had to resign from his position (see Chapter 5). Therefore, various observers have indicated that the IMF did not really help Soeharto. The IMF package was designed to remove Soeharto from his position, thus creating the opportunity for political reform. 277 On the other hand, CSOs and many other kinds of social movements, such as student movements, applied great pressure for democratic demands, this caused Soeharto to step down. Students around the country continued to demand economic and political reform and a change in 277 Steve Hanke, Tujuan Utama IMF Menyingkirkan Soeharto (The Main Purpose of the IMF (is? was?) to Overthrow Soeharto), Loc. Cit. See also, Timo Kivimaki, U.S.-Indonesian Relations during the Economic Crisis: Where Has Indonesia s Bargaining Power Gone? Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 22 No. 3, December 2000, pp

204 national leadership. The tragedy that occurred on May the 12 th as a result of a clash between students and security forces was one of causes a nationwide riot. 278 Considering the above situation, the power of the donors and the CSOs increased significantly, supported by the economic crisis that hit Indonesia during this period. Soeharto s government did not have much choice than to follow the IMF s plan and accede to domestic demand. Therefore, the characteristics of the donor-government-csos relations during the Soeharto regime can be summarised as follows: Table 6.1 Characteristics of Donor-Government-Civil Society Relations under Soeharto Period Indicator Form of relations Political Context Control of Government Form of relations Political Context Characteristics of Relations Donor-Govt Govt-Society Donor-Society Harmonious Conflicted Informal Influenced by the Cold War and Characteristics of Soeharto s Authoritarian Regime Strong Harmonious but Coloured by the Issue Conflicted Informal Relations of Human Rights The end of Cold War, the rise of democratisation issues and the emergence of aid conditionality 278 On May 13, rioting broke out against Indonesian Chinese in many parts of Jakarta. In addition, most of the shopping centres, shops, shop houses, private homes and vehicles that were attacked, looted and burned during the riots belonged to ethnic Chinese. Nearly 1,200 people were killed during the riots, along with 40 shopping centres, 2,47 9 shop/houses and 1,604 shops being attacked, looted and burned, as well as 1,119 vehicles, 1,026 private homes and 383 offices, The Strait Times, July 16,

205 Control of Government Form of relations Political Context Still strong, but donors and society became more powerful Tending to be hostile Conflict Formal and direct The Asian economic crisis andthe rise of the demand for democratic reform Control of Government Note: The table is created by the author. Strong, but became weaker at the end of the Soeharto regime 6.2 The Relationship between Indonesian DEMOs, the Government (the EMBs) and Donors in the Reform period : Survey Results This section will explore the relationship between Indonesian DEMOs, the government and donors after 1998, based on the survey results. Therefore, this part will be divided into two sections. The first section will explain the survey results with regard to the relationship between domestic actors, and second section will explore the survey results with regard to the relations between Indonesian DEMOs and donors. Based on the results, this study finds that, although some theories of democracy and democratisation have pointed out the importance of the transition period in starting the implementation of democratic ideas, in the case of Indonesia, the legitimacy of government that is achieved through democratic elections had affected the power of the government to control society and donors. Moreover, international events concerning the new discourse on aid also directly affected the relationship between the government and the donors,as well as indirectly affecting the relationship between the government and society. 187

206 6.2.1 The Relations among Indonesian DEMOs and between Indonesian DEMOs and EMBs As explained in the methodology section, twenty-two respondents participated in this survey. In order to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between DEMOs and other organisations (other DEMOs and EMBs), the target respondents are divided into two categories, namely organisation at a central level and those at a local level. Nine questions were in the survey in order to analyse the relationship between DEMOs and other organisations, as follows: 1. Does your organisation have a good relationship with EMBs and other DEMOs? 2. In your opinion, did the Election Commission (KPU) provide adequate space and communication for non-governmental organisations to be involved in election-related activities in order for them to run well? 3. From your point of view, how did Supervisory Body (BAWASLU) see the DEMOs in relation to the election activities? 4. In interacting/communicating with similar organisations, do you feel any alteration in the interactions built so far? 5. Do you think you need to build interaction/communication with similar organisations? 6. Has your organisation ever encountered any conflict with KPU, BAWASLU or other DEMOs? 7. For those that answered in the affirmative, did any third party (government/international donor agency) play a role in the conflict resolution? 8. For those who answered in the negative, how did you resolve the conflict? 9. From your point of view, how do you rate the interaction/cooperation with EMBs (KPU and BAWASLU) and other DEMOs? 188

207 For the first question, most of the DEMOs answered that they have good relationships with other organisations, while only a few DEMOs answered no (see Chart 6.1. below). This indicates that, in general, three of the main organisations involved in the elections have a good relationship. However, referring to the survey, a few DEMOs indicated that their relations with BAWASLU and other DEMOs were not good. Chart 6.1 DEMOs Views on their Relations with Other DEMOs and EMBs KPU BAWASLU Other DEMOs Good Not Good However, when the respondents were asked about support from the KPU for DEMOs in order for them to communicate and conduct their activities freely, although most respondents had a positive answer for each selection, the number of respondents that answered in the negative increased in each election. Moreover, the positive response of DEMOs with regard to the KPU declined in the 2009 election, when compared to the 2004 election. Chart 6.2 DEMOs Opinions regarding the KPU s Support for DEMOs Good Not Good 189

208 Regarding the third question and referring to the survey results, most of the DEMOs noted that the KPU and BAWASLU viewed the existence of DEMOs as a partner rather than as a rival. However, although BAWASLU and KPU (both locally& centrally) felt that DEMOs play a supporting role for governmental electoral bodies activities, in the context of relations with DEMOs, BAWASLU and the government declared that the relationship with DEMOs was close and quite good. Since BAWASLU consists of limited personnel and has similar duties, BAWASLU felt that collaboration with DEMOs was both necessary and complementary. 279 Conversely, the KPU at both the local and the central level said that since DEMOs do not share the monitoring results with KPU, the relation with the DEMOs is not close. 280 Chart 6.3 DEMOs Perspectives on the view of EMBs towards the existence of DEMOs Partner Rival No Relations Regarding the relationships among DEMOs themselves, although the survey results show that most of the DEMOs felt that there was no change in their relationships and that they were satisfied with these relationships (see Charts 6.4 and 6.8), some leaders pointed out that coordination between DEMOs had gradually decreased from the time of Soeharto s regime. As the director of LP3ES pointed out, "In the Soeharto s era, NGOs had a common enemy and the issue of the democratic movement 279 Interview with BAWASLU, March 18, Interview with KPU (Local and Central), 25 & 23 March, 2009, and BAWASLU, March 18,

209 that we learn from each other, mutually reinforcing and protecting one another. Well, now democracy is already running, then NGOs feel have no common enemy more, so cooperation among each other becomes less than before" 281 Moreover, the ex-leader of JAMPPI stressed that budget constraints had affected the relations in terms of decreasing cooperation among DEMOs. DEMOs have not been able to carry out regular meetings or mobilize a network and coordination to conduct the activities together without having enough funding. 282 Other respondents said that each DEMOs was now has focused on their own program, and do not put the cooperation with other DEMOs as the important aspects for their program. 283 Chart 6.4 DEMOs views on the changing relations among DEMOs Yes No Although relations among DEMOs decreased after 1999 elections, referring to the questions concerning the importance of building interactions among DEMOs, all the respondents replied positively, asserting the importance of maintaining the relationship among DEMOs (see Chart 6.5). Moreover, referring to the question of whether they have any conflicts with other DEMOs, the majority of respondents said they did not (see Chart 6.6) 281 Interview with the director of LP3ES, January 9, Interview with the ex-national Coordinator of JAMPPI, March 18, Interview with the director of CETRO, Marc 20,

210 Chart 6.5 DEMOs Views on the Importance of Relations among DEMOs Yes 0 No Similarly, with regard to the above questions concerning relations between DEMOs and other organisations, such as KPU & BAWSLU, the majority of respondents also answered in the negative. Only few respondents have experienced conflicts with each other and resolved these by referring to the rules and working intensively on communication. Therefore, they did not need external actors to overcome these conflicts. Chart 6.6 DEMOs Experiences of Conflicts with other DEMOs and EMBs KPU BAWASLU Other DEMOs Yes No Concerning the satisfaction of DEMOs regarding their relationships with EMBs (KPU and BAWASLU), most of the responses were positive; with respondents saying that they were satisfied. 192

211 However, some of the respondents gave a negative answer. Similarly, in terms of the relationship among DEMOs, although some DEMOs pointed out the change in relations among DEMOs, most of the DEMOs said that they were satisfied. However, some of the DEMOs said that they were not satisfied. Even though the results of this question shows that most of the DEMOs had a generally positive view of their relationships with other organisations, at the same time it appears that the number of DEMOs with a positive response towards their relations with other DEMOs is smaller than the number that are satisfied with the relationship with KPU and BAWASLU. Chart 6.7 Views of DEMOs on the Relationship among DEMOs, KPU and BAWASLU Satisfied Unsatisfied KPU BAWASLU Other DEMos Don't Know No Answer Considering the above survey results, the relations between DEMOs and other DEMO or EMBs can be summarised as being generally positive. However, the fact that the dynamics of the relations between DEMOs and other organisations has altered cannot be ignored (Dynamic relations among DEMOs and other organisations will be analysed in the next section). 193

212 6.2.2 The Relations between Indonesian DEMOs and Donors This section will describe the survey results concerning the relations between DEMOs and donors. DEMOs were asked ten questions in order to investigate how the relationship between the DEMOs and the donors were conducted. The questions are: 1. Has your organisation co-operated with a foreign country/international donor agency in relation to national/local election activities in Indonesia? 2. If Yes, what kind of activities did your organisation conduct with the foreign country/international donor agency? 3. Which foreign country/international donor agency has ever been in partnership with your organisation? 4. When interacting/cooperating with a foreign country/international donor agency, was the relationship good and fair? 5. When interacting/cooperating with a foreign country/international donor agency, have you ever encountered any pressure/intervention or negative action on the part of the country/agency towards your organisation? 6. From your point of view, how do you rate the interaction/cooperation with donors? 7. In your opinion, does foreign country/international donor agency assistance cause financial dependency of your organisation on foreign funding? 8. In your opinion, what were the major difficulties that you encountered in interacting/cooperating with a foreign country/international donor agency? 9. In your opinion, can the current cooperation system involving the government (National Development Planning Agency, Ministry of Home Affairs), the Election Commission and foreign countries/international donor agencies (in which the domestic organisation has 194

213 previously come into direct contact with a foreign country/international donor agency and vice versa) be considered satisfactory? 10. If your answer to Number 35 was No, what kind of cooperation system between nongovernmental organisations and a foreign country/international donor agency should exist? 11. In your general opinion, does foreign country/international donor agency assistance help to forge a relationship between non-state actors, state actors and the democratisation process in Indonesia, particularly with regard to election activities? In order to separate DEMOs that had experience of working with donors and those that had not, the first question asked whether the respondents (DEMOs) have any experience of working with donors. The results show that 14 (fourteen) of the respondents said yes, while 8 (eight) respondents said no. From the data, this study found that not all DEMOs have worked with donors when conducting their activities. Chart 6.8 The number of DEMOs that had/had not experienced working with donors Yes 8 No 195

214 For respondents who had experience in working with donors, election monitoring and voter education were the primary activities that donors had funded and they were conducted collaboratively between the DEMOs and the donors. Other activities, such as the quick count had been conducted, but only a few DEMOs were concerned with this type of activity. 284 The complicated procedure and method of the quick count and the funding capacity for to conducting this programme were two reasons that very few DEMOs were involved in it. Chart 6.9 DEMOs Activities Funded by Donors Monitoring Advocacy Voter education Quick Count Furthermore, when the respondents were questioned about the variety of assistance that was implemented by donors in support of DEMO activities, it was found that most donors provided financial support. Other aspects of support, such as expertise, training and capacity building did not seem to be a priority for the donors. 284 For questions relating to Tables 6.9 and 6.10, respondents could choose more than one answer. 196

215 Chart 6.10 Variety of Donor Support to DEMOs Financial Supoort Expert Training Capacity Building Other questions that were asked concerned the respondents perspectives of DEMOs with regard to cooperation with donors and whether this was conducted fairly and satisfactorily (see Chart 6.11). Most of respondents said that the donors were fair in their treatment of DEMOs, while only a few respondents had controversial responses. Chart 6.11 The Views of DEMOs regarding their Cooperation with Donors Good No Similar to the responses to the question on donor intervention, most of the respondent said no, while only one respondent said yes (see Chart 6.12). 197

216 Chart 6.12 DEMOs Perspectives regarding Donor Intervention Yes No In addition, when respondents were asked about their opinion regarding the implementation of cooperation with donors, most of them answered that the cooperation was conducted in good manner. From the all responses to these questions, the results indicated that in general the relationships between DEMOs and donors were conducted in a seemly manner. Chart 6.13.The Satisfaction of DEMOs regarding Relations with Donors Satisfied Unsatisfied Don't Know No Answer However, most of the Indonesian DEMOs (10 organisations) acknowledged their dependency on foreign support (Chart 6.14). Moreover, they also indicated some problems that had affected their relations, such as the problem of communication with donors, domination by donors and the belated 198

217 response of donors to DEMO requests. The results of the interviews supported these findings. As explained by leaders of the FPMP, The international support for 1999 elections had been delivered earlier than the 2004 and 2009 elections. In the 2009 elections, the assistance was delivered close to the election day. We have only 1 month to conduct our program. So, I do not understand whether international funding supported us seriously or they delivered their funding just to give the impression that they are supporting democratisation in Indonesia 285 Similarly, the leader of CETRO expressed that I was interviewed for many times by international funding but the fund was not distributed until the election was close. Even though I already told to them that if they want to help us to conduct a program to supporting the election, the fund should be distributed earlier, they did not pay attention on how to conduct one program optimally. So, I said to them that I am tired out for the belated response of funding 286 Chart 6.14 The Views of Indonesian DEMOs concerning the Issue of Dependency on Foreign Support Yes No Don't Know No Answer In addition, when respondents were asked about their perception of donors behaviour towards a new mechanism of donor assistance formulated by the Indonesian Government after the Interview with the Coordinator of FPMP, April 1, Interview with UNDP Indonesia Office, April 6, 2009; USAID, April 7, 2009, and EU Indonesia Office, April 8,

218 elections, the response varied. A new mechanism regulates the methods and process in which donors can distribute their assistance in support of the DEMOs activities. In the 1999 and 2004 elections, the donor countries could distribute their aid directly to the DEMOs. However, after 2004, the DEMOs have had to submit a proposal to donors, which should be discussed at a committee meeting that consists of the Indonesian government representatives (BAPPENAS and Ministry of Domestic Affairs), the KPU and the donor. Although the donors recognised that the mechanism could be viewed negatively because it seemed to involve convoluted bureaucracy, it would determine donor approaches and could provide an opportunity for the government to restrict the democracy movements. Donors also emphasised the positive aspects of the mechanism, saying that it could become a way of facilitating interaction between governmental and non-governmental actors. 287 Moreover, other donors that stressed the positive aspect of the mechanism said that The government primarily engaged in the administration and monitoring of the activities carried out by NGOs. For example, NGOs must be registered, so that the NGOs who are involved have a legitimate and a track record. In addition, with the involvement of many government agencies within the mechanism, it can be said that the mechanism has uphold the value of fairness 288 However, referring to the survey results, most of the DEMOs (17 DEMOs) perceived the new mechanism as not being a good method of building the relations between the government and the DEMOs. These negative perspectives were based on the DEMOs argument that this could become a way for government to control and limit the DEMOs activities Ibid. 288 Interview with UNDP Indonesia Office, April 6, Interview with LP3ES, January 6, 2009; FPMP, April 1, 2009, and CETRO, March 20,

219 Chart 6.15 The views of DEMOs on the New Mechanism of Donor-Government-DEMOs Relations Good Not Good Don't Know No Answer The implementation of the mechanism affected the relations between donors and DEMOs. DEMOs could not interact with donors directly as they had done before. Moreover, some DEMO leaders argued that although the mechanism was aimed at bridging the relations between the DEMOs and the government, these mechanisms actually caused the relations between both the DEMOs and the government and the DEMOs and the donors to become more convoluted. In addition, most of respondents argued that the previous, direct mechanism was a good mechanism. Moreover, they felt that the role of the government should be limited to a supervisory role and that the positions among actors should be balanced. This describes the different standpoints of the government, the donors and the DEMOs. As a result, most respondents felt that the donors failed to bridge the relationships between the government and the DEMOs (see Chart 6.15). Considering the survey results, this study points out that, in general, the relationship between donors and DEMOs was implemented in seemly manner. However, this does not mean that the relationship is always smooth. The next section will explain the directly observed results of the dynamics of DEMOs relations with donors, EMBs and among DEMOs in the 2009 election. 201

220 Chart 6.16 The View of DEMOs regarding the Role of Donors in bridging the relationship between the governments (EMBs) - DEMOs Agree Not Agree Don't Know No Answer 6.3 Direct Observation of Donors-Government-Indonesian DEMO Relations in the 2009 Elections: Data Results and Analyses Data from the Direct Observation As explained in Chapter 2, direct observation was conducted in three provincial areas, namely Jakarta (East Jakarta, West, North and Central areas), West Java (Depok and Bekasi City) and Makassar (Makassar City and Gowa District). These areas covered 19 polling stations (TPS). In order to collect the same information in each TPS, this study formulated a guideline that consisted list of questions to be answered. These questions are: 1. Polling Station Location 2. Description of the location (in terms of geography, demography, society, etc.) 3. Conditions at the polling stations: 3.1. Is there any local or international institutional body involved in the process of voting and the counting of the ballot? If yes, please mention the institution. 202

221 3.2. Please take note of how they conduct the monitoring and their interaction with other election monitoring organisations and election committees Do all political party send witness to the voting process? 4. Did you witness any violations or were any reported by local/international monitoring institutions or political parties? If so, how did the committee at the election post respond? 5. Were there any protests at the polling stations you monitored in the process of voting and the counting of the ballot? 6. How do you see the interaction/communication among the election committee, the monitoring committee, or independent local/international monitoring institutions at the polling stations? Please describe. 7. How do you see the process of voting and the counting of the ballot at the polling stations you observed? Was it good or bad? Please describe. 8. How enthusiastic were members of the pubic regarding the process of voting and the counting of the ballot at the polling stations that you observed? Was the population involved in both processes? 9. Which political party gained the highest vote at the polling stations you observed? From the observations, this study reveals the following findings: 1. Election Monitoring Activities Regarding the election monitoring activities, of the all polling stations at the central level only two polling stations were visited by international observers from the Carter Center and the local DEMOs from KIPP. The polling stations were TPS 02 and 03, Taman Sari, Glodok and West Jakarta, where the majority of the population consists of Chinese Indonesians and most of them are traders in this area. The TPS was located in the central part of West Jakarta. However, at the local level, there were no international observers at any of the polling stations 203

222 and only one polling station was monitored by local DEMOs from MAPJ (Masyakarat Anti Penyalahgunaan Jabatan). The polling station was TPS 06, Mattoangin, Mariso, Makassar City,were the majority of the population are civil servants, private employees and entrepreneurs. The environment around the TPS was very convenient and very easy to reach. With regard to representatives of the election supervisory committee and political parties, committee members were present at almost all the polling stations at the local and central level, but only a few political parties sent representatives. Only about 5-10 political parties participated in observing the election at each TPS. These political parties were the Democratic Party, Golkar, PDI-P, PPP, PKB, PAN, PDS, PBR, Hanura, Gerindra and the Patriot Political Party. The parties that sent the most representatives to each TPS were as follows: the Democratic Party, Golkar and the PDIP. However, almost of them only monitored the election at the beginning process and returned for the ballot counting process. 2. The violations and problems at the polling stations and the response of the election committee Regarding the violations and problems at the polling stations, the observations at all the polling stations found many people who were not registered as voters. At one TPS, people reported to the election commission that one resident could not come to TPS because of a health problem; however, the committee did not respond to this situation. All the polling stations complained about the width of the ballots in comparison to the size of voting booths. Furthermore, almost all the polling stations voting booth would not close properly, so the confidentiality of the electoral process was not well maintained. Another technical problem was the lack of a sufficient number of voting booths at some polling stations. Voters had to wait their turn for a long time. Moreover, many voters were over 50 years old and found it difficult to understand the 204

223 voting procedures. In some polling stations, the committee took the initiative to help the elderly by accompanying them into the voting booths. At one polling station, the organisers let ten peoples that were not registered on the voters roll vote. The committee argued that because they had ID cards, they had the right to vote. However, referring to the rules, people whose names do not appear on the voters roll are not allowed to vote. Representatives of political parties and of the Election Supervisory Committee at the TPS did not respond to the decision. At one of the polling stations, a voter arrived 30 minutes after the time-out of the voting period; however, the election committee allowed the resident to vote. Moreover, at one polling station, the ballots marked with more than one line were counted as valid. According to the rules, ballots marked with more than one line should not count as valid ballots. Furthermore, there was a debate among the election commission members and other representatives regarding how the votes should be counted. The debate was finally resolved by referring to the counting rules. Another problem was the fact that residents could wander freely in and out of the polling stations without being banned. 3. Rioting at the polling stations There were no significant problems that led chaos or riots at any of polling stations covered. There was some debate regarding counting process and categorising valid and invalid ballots, but this was resolved. However, as explained in point 2, both substantive violations and technical problems occurred. 4. The interaction of the election committee, political parties and election monitoring organizations (both domestic and international). 205

224 Almost all the observers reported that the interaction between the election committee, representatives of political parties and monitoring organisations did not appear to be as intense as it was the early election processes. Many of representatives of political parties and monitoring organisations came to the TPS and watched the proceedings without communicating with each other. At some polling stations, even when violations or problems occurred, they did not respond. However, intensive interaction occurred when the ballot counting began. These interactions mainly happened when determining whether or not a ballot was valid. 5. Evaluation of the processes of voting and ballot counting From the all the observation reports, it can be concluded that nine TPS (6 TPS at a central level and 3 TPS at a local level) ran elections based on procedural guidelines. However, according to reports, there were still some technical problems that could affect the essential value of democratic elections. For example, many of the voting booths could not close properly. Meanwhile, at ten other TPS (9 TPS at a central level and 1 TPS at a local level), the implementation of elections could not be categorised as elections that were run according to procedure. This is because there were technical and substantive problems that were responded to by the election committee without referring to the rules. For example, the election committee allowed people who were not registered as voters to vote. 6. The enthusiasm of the community around the polling stations for monitoring the election processes, both at the voting and the ballot counting stages. At the all of polling stations, the percentage of voters was only about 40-50%. This means that about 50-60% of voters did not come to the TPS to vote. This situation not only happened at the TPS at the central level, but also at the local level. 206

225 Regarding the participation of people observing the election process, all the polling stations reported that the enthusiasm of people watching the voting process was less than of those watching the counting process. However, although people paid more attention to the counting process, at some TPS, many people appeared to be enthusiastic at the beginning of counting process, but went home in the middle stages of the process. 7. The majority party won the election. At all the polling stations, big parties like the Democratic Party, Golkar, PDI-P, PPP, PKB and some middle-sized parties such as PPP, PBR and PDS won the elections for positions at the central, provincial and city levels. However, the Democratic Party, Golkar and PDI-P were in the majority for those positions in almost of all the TPS. Photo 6.1 Situation of the Voting Process at TPS 003, Banta-bantaeng Village, Rappocini, Sub-District Makassar City, South Sulawesi 207

226 Photo 6.2 Situation of the Ballot Counting Process monitored by police, representatives of political parties, the Committee of KPPS, TPS 003, Banta-bantaeng Village, Rappocini Sub District, Makassar City, South Sulawesi Data Analysis of Direct Observation Based on the above results, this study has analysed various aspects. The first isthat international and Indonesian DEMOs monitoring the election process at the TPS were not as enthusiastic as they were in the Jakarta and Makassar areas. Although there were 24 organisations (both DEMOs and DOOs) and 14 international observers (both international NGOs and Diplomatic Representatives) registered at Central KPU, the areas that were monitored by international and Indonesian DEMOs were limited. In the 2009 elections, most of the international observers and some of the Indonesian DEMOs focused their programmes in Aceh. In addition, since there were limited personnel from International and Indonesian DEMOs, it seems that the participation of international and Indonesian DEMOs was merely symbolic. With regard to Indonesian DEMOs, lack of funding is one reason that they were not 208

227 further involved in monitoring the elections as they had done previously in the 1999 and 2004 elections. In the case of BAWASLU, although they had more legitimate authority than before, the limitation of the number of personnel was their biggest problem for monitoring on election-day. Although BAWASLU had established a consortium for election monitoring, a limited number of organisations was involved. Therefore, BAWASLU relied on volunteer participation. Related to the participation of political parties, although all the political parties had the opportunity to monitor the election, only the big parties and some at the middle level participated in observing the election. Moreover, those political parties were the ones that won the majority at the polling stations. The limitations of funding and personnel affected the willingness of the small political parties to monitor the election. Regarding the violations, most of violations were committed by election officers at the TPS. This indicates three points: first, the rules were not clearly formulated. Second, the officers at the TPS did not understand the rules in detail. Third, referring to point 4 above, the weak interaction among the actors affected the number of violations at the TPS. Communication and coordination was not established at the TPS. Moreover, weak interaction among the actors at the TPS indicates that each actor perceived their duties as being individual and as not having any relation to other actors. From aspects of people s attention to the 2009 election, it can be seen hat people were less enthusiastic to participate and to watch the election processes of ballot casting and the counting process. This indicates that more effort on the part of the government, political parties and other actors is needed in order to educate and to build people s awareness of the necessity for participation in elections. Thus, considering the above analysis, some of the points can be summarised as follows: 209

228 Table 6.2 Summary of Direct Observation Results of the 2009 Elections Aspects Actors Results Election Monitoring Activities 1. International and Domestic Limited EMOs 2. Representatives of political parties 3. Supervisors of the Election Communication and Coordination 1. International and Domestic Weak at TPS EMOs 2. Representatives of political parties 3. Supervisors of the Election, 4. Election Committee at TPS People s enthusiasm (to vote and 1. Voter Less to watch the process) 2. Non-Voter Level of knowledge about election procedure s 1. Election Committee at TPS Low The Dynamics of Donor-Government-Indonesian DEMOs Relations: The Case of the 1999, 2004 and 2009 Elections Referring to the survey and the direct observation results, this study points out that a shift in relations of DEMOs, the KPU/government and donors have occurred between the 1999 and In the early stages of political liberalisation that demanded regime change, the relationships among these actors were quite strong. The mature democracy and democratic legitimacy of the government, including KPU members that were selected through a free and fair process has resulted in a shift in the relationship of both international and domestic actors. The government has more confidence in formulating and revising election laws. With regard to election monitoring organisations, the 2004 and 210

229 the 2009 Election Laws restricted the role of Indonesian DEMOs. Furthermore, there are 60 articles related to the existence of Indonesian DEMOs, which are formulated in Election Law No. 10/2008. For example, Election Law no. 12 /2003 states that the election monitoring organisations should register with and obtain an accreditation from the KPU. The KPU also publishes a manual code of conduct that contains the explanations of activities that should be conducted and which should not be conducted by DEMOs. One of the rules that have been criticised by Indonesian DEMOs is the rule that restricts the Indonesian DEMOS from conducting monitoring activities inside the TPS area. Some leaders of Indonesia s DEMOs have viewed this rule as the way of KPU to limit the role of Indonesian DEMOs. It is also indicated that KPU has perceived the Indonesian DEMOs not as a partner and not necessary. 290 However, both the KPU and BAWASLU have a positive view of the existence of Indonesian DEMOs. Both organisations said, the existence of Indonesian DEMOS are needed and playing an important role to assist BAWASLU and KPU to conduct a free and fair election. 291 However, KPU s officer noted, since Indonesian DEMOs did not report or share their monitoring results to KPU, we are thinking that KPU-Indonesian DEMOs relations have not been so close. They had just reported the result to their funding provider. 292 On the other hand, with regard to the relations between BAWASLU and Indonesian DEMOs, BAWASLU stated that the main problem is to build a network with all Indonesian DEMOs, so we can conduct our function optimally, 293 The observation results supported the phenomenon of domestic actors relations. As explained above, the intense interaction and communication among actors at the TPS had decreased. In one respect, this resulted in many violations being committed by the electoral officers at the TPS, because there was no opportunity for discussion if there was a problem at a TPS. 290 Interview with CETRO, March 20, Interview with BAWASLU, March 18, 2009 and KPU at local and district level, 23 & 25 March Interview with KPU, March 23, Interview with BAWASLU, March 18,

230 Furthermore, after 1999, the international society viewed democratisation in Indonesia as being stable. This has caused a change in donor behaviour in terms of directly supporting elections in Indonesia, as well as the relations among domestic. However, the internal factors of the donors have also influenced behaviour. As the EU s officer stated, Considering the progress of democratisation in Indonesia, the EU s budget has been shifted to second pillar the EU s aid i.e. trade and investment, and education. It is also caused by the perspectives of EU itself to view democracy as a cross cutting issues. Moreover, internally, EU has a myriad bureaucratic that it sometimes causes the sustainability of program 294 Similarity, the UNDP also pointed out that: UNDP in 1999 has different condition with UNDP in In 1999 UNDP is an organization that is more loose, not bureaucratic and easier to distribute the money. However, there were scandals and food aid, North Korea issues, etc, so that UNDP institutionally held a myriad of internal control framework. Therefore, in 2009 the institution of UNDP has changed. Since that time, it is difficult to distribute the money because of multilayered procedures 295 Furthermore, the inclusion of Indonesia as a middle-income country has been perceived by donors as an increasing ability on the part of the government to run the election without having to rely too much on international assistance. As expressed by one of donors, 296 Actually, after 1999, donors agree that democracy in Indonesia has been conducted successfully. In addition, after year 2000, Indonesia reached the status as a middle-income country, so that donors thought that Indonesia already has a capacity in terms of budget. Moreover, the phenomenon has caused a decrease in the international electoral assistance that was previously distributed to Indonesia. The decrease in funding has directly and indirectly influenced the activities of Indonesian DEMOs, because most of them still rely on international funding. However, in the 2004 and the 2009 elections, the Indonesian government still calculated he international contribution as one of the financial resources for conducting the election. In 2004, the 294 Interview with EU Officer, the EU Indonesia Office, April 8, Interview with UNDP, Indonesia Office, April 6, Interview with a USAID officer, Jakarta Office, April 7,

231 government received approximately US$32.67 million from international donors (UNDP), which was specifically for voter education and election monitoring, while there was no government budget (Rp. 4,4 trillion) allocated for these kinds of activities. 297 Similarly, for the 2009 elections, the government provided about Rp. 8.6 trillion to conduct the elections, but there was no budget allocated for supporting the monitoring activities. 298 Another factor, as described above and in Chapters 4-5, is the Paris Declaration (followed by the Jakarta Commitment), which emphasises five basic principles (ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results and mutual accountability) and which stresses the role of the government of the recipient countries as key to determining the direction of foreign assistance. This agreement has had a great influence on donor approaches to the relations between government-donors and donors-demos. As stated by a USAID officer, USAID funding for the 2009 election was limited. Therefore USAID decided to support the activities that are a priority of Indonesian government. Election monitoring conducted by local organization has not included in the list of priority of government. Since USAID is one of country which signatory to the Paris declaration, USAID commits that assistance must be in accordance with the needs and priority of Indonesian government 299 Based on these explanations, this study points out that donor and Indonesian DEMOs played a significant role in the process of the democratic elections in the 1999 elections, while the government had no choice but to follow the international and domestic demands. Donors and Indonesian DEMOs were dominant actors in the 1999 elections and had a direct relationship. However, after 1999, in tandem with the developments in the international and domestic situations, the relations shifted. The government (KPU and BAWASLU) was positioned as the dominant actors in the election process. 297 Kompas, October 15, See also Suara Merdeka, July 29, Available at: milliar/ accessed on November 28, Interview with a USAID officer, Jakarta Office, April 7, Similar comments were also expressed by other donor officers. 213

232 Donors were positioned outside of the process, while Indonesian DEMOs still played a role, although they are not as necessary as they were before. Moreover, donors and Indonesian DEMOs could not communicate with each other directly (see Figure 6.1.) Referring to democratisation theory, the shift, as explained above, is a sign of a positive trend of democratisation. As Linz and Stepan pointed out, the power of the government in a democratic transition would be increased both de facto and de jure. 300 Similarly, as with democracy assistance concepts, the shift in relations should be viewed as a constructive development in democratisation. However, in terms of donor-recipient relations, this shift expresses increasing recipient control of the donor. On the other hand, for Indonesian DEMOs as part of civil society activities, this shift is viewed as a backward step. They argue that the Indonesian DEMOs is necessary for various reasons. The independence of EMBs is still in doubt, the Indonesian DEMOs are the representatives of civil society (social capital) in democratisation and the importance of independent election-monitoring organisations ensure and enhance the integrity and quality of the elections. 301 Figure 6.1 the Shifting Relations of Government-Donors-Indonesian DEMOs Donor DEMOs Donor DEMOs Shifting Government (KPU & Govt International and Domestic Factors: BAWASLU) The 1999 Elections The 2004 and the 2009 Elections 300 Linz and Stepan, 1996, Op.Cit. 301 Interview results from Indonesian DEMOs. 214

233 6.4 The Patterns of Donor-Government-Indonesian DEMO Relations and The Future of Democratisation in Indonesia Mapping the Relations of Donor-Government-Indonesian DEMOs This section will map the trends and patterns of donor-government-indonesian DEMO relations from 1997 to The first part will examine the KPU-donor relations, KPU-DEMOs and BAWASLU-DEMOs based on level of government control. This study puts the strong level of government control at point 3 (three), moderate at point 2 (two) and low at point 1 (one). The second part will examine the relationship among DEMOs, DEMOs-Donors, DEMOs-KPU and DEMOs- BAWASLU based on the level of coordination and cooperation. This level will be divided into three categories in terms of levels of control. Considering the above analysis of the dynamic relations between EMBs, DEMOs and donors, this study has formulated the trends of the relations as described in Chart 6.1 below. In general, it describes the increasing governmental control of both donors and Indonesian DEMOs since As explained in Chapter 4, the new election law for the 2004 elections and the Paris Declaration affected governmental behaviour. Control of the KPU over Indonesia DEMOs became stronger, as did donor- KPU relations. At the same time, control of BAWASLU over Indonesian DEMOs has also gradually increased. However, since BAWASLU and Indonesian DEMOs have similar duties, the relations between BAWASLU and Indonesian DEMOs could be viewed as being more flexible compared to relations between the KPU and Indonesian DEMOs. Although these relations indicate increasing governmental control, this study argues that it suggests a positive trend towards democratisation in Indonesia. This should be viewed as being positive, since an increase in the government's responsibility and confidence in carrying out the elections by minimising the involvement of external actors (donors and DEMOs). Moreover, since the 215

234 hardware and software of the elections (see the explanation in Chapter 4) has already been constructed, this is the reason that the relationship of DEMOs, donors and the government gradually decreased during the three periods of the elections during the reform period. In addition, the Paris Declaration has given greater authority for governmental control of donor activity and the process of aid distribution. Similarly, it has also had an effect on the KPU-DEMOs relations. KPU has excluded election-monitoring activities from the list of governmental priorities proposed to be funded by international donors. Therefore, this relation can be described in Chart 6.1. With regard to the relationship among DEMOs, referring to the above analysis, this study found that the level of coordination and cooperation among DEMOs was lower in the 2009 elections than it was in the two previous elections. This is supported by the analysis of DEMO activities insection 4.3, which shows the decrease in activities that were conducted by DEMOs after the 1999 elections, particularly in the 2009 elections. Moreover, as noted above, the coordination and cooperation among DEMOs decreased after the 1999 elections. The relationships are described in Chart The trend tends to continue, since most of the Indonesian DEMOs focused on conducting activities based on their internal resources, both financial and personnel (see Chapter 4). Chart 6.17 Government-Donors-DEMOs Relationships Based on the Level of Control Level of Control (By government) 3,5 3 2,5 2 1,5 1 0, KPU Donor KPU DEMOS BAWASLU DEMOs 302 In order to present an uncomplicated analysis, the level of control by the government is divided into three categories: low (range 0-1 low), moderate (range 1, 1-2) and strong (range 2-3). 216

235 In addition, this study found that the shift of donor-demos relations occurred since the 2004 elections. This shift has positive implications for DEMOs. As explained above, the DEMOs are highly dependent on aid donors for conducting their activities, particularly for stand-alone DEMOs. However, the dependency of DEMOs seems to be gradually decreasing, especially for network DEMOs. While many of the stand-alone DEMOs have limited their election activities due to a lack of financial resources, network DEMOs have been trying to find alternative financial resources and no longer rely on international assistance to conduct their activities. On the other hand, the intensity of relations between DEMOs and BAWASLU has gradually increased. Starting from zero coordination and cooperation in 1997, the trend in relations changed in 1999, parallel with the beginning of the liberalisation period (Chart 6.2). Since the existence of DEMOs has been recognised by international and domestic societies, BAWASLU has had to cooperate and coordinate with DEMOs in order to conduct their duties. However, the relations of BAWASLU and Indonesian DEMOs are still challenging, as noted by BAWASLU s officers that the challenge is optimizing or establishing an effective communication and coordination with DEMOs that spread all over Indonesia. 303 Chart 6.18 Government-Donors-DEMOs Relationships Based on the Level of Coordination and Cooperation Level of Coordination and Cooperations 3,5 3 2,5 2 1,5 1 0, DEMOs Donor DEMOs DEMOs DEMOs BAWASLU 303 Interview with BAWASLU, March 18,

236 The trend of government-demo-donor relations based on governmental control can be viewed both negatively and positively. If the increasing governmental control is aimed at limiting the participation of Indonesian DEMOs to observing the process as was feared by some Indonesian DEMOS, it should be viewed negatively. However, if it is aimed at showing the capacity of the government to conduct the elections by itself the budget that it sets, then increasing governmental control of donors can be viewed positively. In the event that the intensity of coordination and cooperation between DEMOs and donors decreases, so will the level among DEMOs themselves. Considering the trends of donors-demo relations, since this describes the independence of DEMOs with regard to finances, this should be viewed as a positive trend. On the other hand, considering the cooperation and coordination among Indonesian DEMOs as important aspects of conducting their duties effectively and efficiently, the trend can be viewed as a negative one. From the all of explanations above, concerning the phases of democratisation, this study has reached three conclusions. Firstly, during the liberalisation period, because of the uncertainty of the political situation, the government had no choice but to follow the international and domestic demands. Donors and DEMOs had more power to become intensely involved in the election process compared to the situation during the transitional period. This was supported by the economic conditions at that time, which meant that the government had to rely on external funding to conduct the general elections. In addition, considering that the elections in this phase were part of the regime change process, the existence of independent Indonesian DEMOs was necessary. Moreover, the societal level of trust towards the government was low at that time. Therefore, the phenomenon of electoral assistance as part of democracy assistance and Indonesia DEMOs peaked at that time and influenced the dynamic relations of those actors. In the transitional (deepening phase) period, while the economic and political situation was 218

237 relatively stable, the government had more power to manage the elections by formulating the rules and allocating budgets to conduct the elections. Therefore, the trend in the relations shows that, since 2004, the government has had more power to control other actors. In the case of the intensity of relations among actors, the intensity of relations was close in the liberalisation period. However, in the transitional (initial and deepening) period, the relations among DEMOs (DEMOs-DEMOs relations) and Indonesian DEMOs-donor decreased in tandem with the maturing political and economic situation in Indonesia. In contrast, Indonesian DEMOs-BAWASLU relations tended to increase in the liberalisation period and became stable in the initial phase of the transitional period, although they decreased in deepening phase period. Furthermore, in the case of donor-indonesian DEMO relations, a general trend shows that relations tend to decrease in the case of electoral assistance. In addition to the reasons explained previously, this study argues that democracy assistance provided by donors has shifted from elections (which are focused on civil society support) to governance. Looking at the above analysis, it can be concluded that the pattern of relations among actors differs in each phase of democratisation. The relations between society and donors were strong in the pre-liberalisation and liberalisation phase; however, they tended to be weak in the next phase of democratisation. Similarly, the relations among societies (DEMOs) also declined after the first phase of democratisation. Conversely, the control of government over DEMOs and donors became low in the liberalisation phase. However, it became stronger in the next phase of democratisation (see Table 6.3). 219

238 Table 6.3 the Patterns of Relations among the Actors in the Democratisation Phase Relations Among Actors 1. Level of Control Pre- Liberalisation Democratisation Phase Transitional Liberalisation Initial Deepening Phase Phase 1.1. Government (KPU) to DEMOs Strong Weak Moderate Strong 1.2. Government (KPU) to Donors Strong Weak Moderate Strong 1.3. Government/BAWASLU to DEMOs 2. Level of Cooperation Strong Weak Moderate Moderate 2.1. DEMOs- donors Strong Strong Moderate Weak 2.2. DEMOs-DEMOs Strong Strong Moderate Weak 2.3. DEMOs-BAWSLU Low Moderate Moderate Weak Note: The table is created by the author Democratisation in Indonesia under a New Pattern of Relations between International and Domestic Actors: A Paradox Interaction between actors is a must in the process towards democratic consolidation. The interaction process is essential to ensure the continuity of democratic development towards a consolidated democracy. Linz and Stepan defined consolidated democracy as a political situation in which democracy has become the only game in town and which should not be considered as the end 220

239 of the political process. 304 Moreover, the exercise of the mature interaction should be examined based on the following five aspects: a civil society, a political society, the rule of law, a state bureaucracy and an economic society that mediates between the state and market. The five aspects above need to support each other. Therefore, Linz and Stepan stressed that democracy is more than a regime, it is an interacting system. 305 Looking at the development and direction of the relationship of the donor-state-society in Indonesia described above, this study argues that this kind of phenomenon is a paradox of democratisation. Support from domestic factors (legitimised by elections) and international factors (the Paris Declaration, which was followed by the Jakarta Commitment) has produced a paradox regarding the development of democracy in Indonesia. In terms of relations with international actors, particularly with donors, the donors engagement is expected to bridge the relationship between society and the government. However, the role of the donor cannot be optimally conducted in the deepening phase, along with the strengthening of the position of the government as a regulator its position as a recipient country. Donors do not have much choice but to follow the government's directives. Considering this development, this study argues that Clear s work, which suggested that donor strategy that focuses on mediator strategy, would be difficult to implement. However, this study agrees that the mediator strategy is a strategy that can best be done by the donor. In addition, the weakening of civil society s position in terms of interaction with the government is a setback to the process of democratisation in Indonesia. The weakening of the role of civil society as predicted by Marcus Mietzner, who wrote 306 To be sure, given that in 2009 alone 40 countries in the world saw the quality of their democracy declining, Indonesia s holding operation may not be such a bad outcome..but 304 Linz, J. and Stepan, A., Toward Consolidated Democracies, in L. Diamond and M.F. Plattner (eds.), The Global Divergence of Democracies, John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 2001, p Ibid. 306 As quoted by John McBeth in his article Indonesia Democracy at Standstill? available at: accessed on October 20,

240 there is no guarantee that civil society will be able to pull off more victories over antireformists in coming years. On the other hand, the weakening proximity of the interaction between civil society and donors can be seen as a positive trend in relation to the issue of dependency. However, if it is associated with the democratic process, the intensity of the strong relationship between civil society and donors becomes an important component in terms of the provision of experts, knowledge sharing and technical assistance to support the optimal participation of civil society in the democratisation process. In addition, in a situation of strong governmental control, the donor is an important partner for civil society in order to improve the position of civil society in ensuring that the democratic process goes according to plan. 307 In connection with the elections, direct elections also bring positive effects, not only when held at the central level, but also when held at the local level. However, referring to ICW s report, this positive development was followed by increasing violations in the local elections. The ICW noted that corruption in local elections could take two forms, namely capital accumulation and winning efforts. Capital accumulation is conducted either through the reward of special concessions and the use of state funds, while winning efforts are made through offering money to [the] election committee and he delivery of money politics. 308 This situation shows that behind of the success of Indonesia's democratisation process, which is primarily measured by the implementation of democratic elections, there are developments that cannot be controlled and therefore should be observed in order to prevent negative effects on the 307 Although the role of civil society has been recognised in the democratic process, there has also been criticism of the civil society, as civil society has contributed to the so-called "democracy by proxy" and not being a "true democracy", because it emphasises the responsibility of civil society towards donors rather than to the public or the state. See NU Online, LSM dapat Memperlemah Negara (CSOs can weaken the State), available at: accessed on October 18, Indonesia Corruption Watch, Hasil Riset dan Monitoring Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah (Research and Monitoring Results on Local Elections), Policy Brief, 2013, pp

241 substance of democracy itself. As stated by Mietzner which summed up the current situation in Indonesia that, "Indonesia's Democracy, despite its successes remains vulnerable". 309 Considering the entire analysis of this chapter, this study points out that, in each stage of democratisation, relations between international and domestic actors have unique pattern. This pattern is based on the dynamics of the economic and political environment at domestic and international levels. In the case of Indonesia, after the 1999 elections (initial phase of transition), control by the government has increased gradually. This shows that the positive trend towards democratisation does not means that governmental control of civil society has automatically decreased. Conversely, increasing governmental control has been justified via legal processes like elections and the Paris Declaration. This has resulted in the paradox of democratisation. Therefore, the role of civil society as a balancer of government should be strengthened in order to keep the process of democratisation on the right track. 309 Marcus Mietzner, Indonesia in 2009: Electoral Contestation and Economic Resilience Asian Survey, Vol. 50, Number 1, 2010, p

242 Chapter 7 Conclusions 7.1. Summary of Findings Indonesia s economic development became the source of legitimacy of Soeharto o authoritarian regime for 32 years by suppressing political participation. The implementation of two principles - political stability for development and the family principle- was very strong under Soeharto participation. The emergence of the idea of democratisation in the early 1990s and the increase of democracy movements in developing countries, particularly in Southeast Asia, had an impact on the political movement in Indonesia. The democracy movement was on the rise, as was the demand for freedom of speech and organisation. In response to the international trend and the domestic demand for democratisation, Soeharto announced the politics of openness in the mid-1980s. Some scholars have called this democratisation from above. Soeharto formulated the policy for international acceptance and legitimised his regime, both domestically and internationally. However, the policy could not prevail, since Soeharto felt that it would become a threat to his regime. Therefore, he tried to limit and suppress political activity. However, the democracy movement had gained an opportunity from the policy. In addition, the increase in the democracy movement in other countries inspired the Indonesian democracy movement. While Soeharto s regime came out in full force to repress the movement, the popular movement was continuing and tried to change democratisation from above to democratisation from below, Thus, the economic crisis that occurred in mid-1997 undermined the economic development that had legitimised Soeharto s authoritarian regime. The IMF package was not successful in overcoming the crisis. Moreover, there was domestic and international pressure for Soeharto to resign. 224

243 Soeharto s lack of ability to overcome the crisis became an opportunity to topple his authoritarian regime. Finally, on May , Soeharto decided to resign and Habibie, the vice president, was approved to take over his position. The fall of the Soeharto regime, which started with the economic crisis, opened the door to a regime change, from Soeharto-authoritarian to a democratic regime. The regime change was indicated by the implementation of the general elections in 1999, which established a legitimate government via a democratic election. The elections in the post-new Order era also gave way to the involvement of domestic and international election monitoring. The development of domestic election monitoring in Indonesia is associated with the influence of the international community, which promoted the idea of election monitoring to ensure the democratic process of elections. Election monitoring has become an integral part ofthe democratisation process in a country, especially those in the era of transition. In addition, the support of international donors in the form of funding, technical assistance and expertise has encouraged the mushrooming of domestic and international election monitoring. However, the methods used by international donor agencies to support democratisation, including the election monitoring movement conducted by domestic groups, is highly dependent on the pattern and approach of each donor country (see Chapters 2 and 4). On the other hand, during the liberalisation and transitional eras, the government requires strong legitimacy; thus, the incumbent will pursue the image of a democratic government. For instance, President Habibie conducted a transitional election in 1999 and began the era of domestic and international EMOs (Election Monitoring Organisations) involvement in election monitoring in Indonesia. Therefore, EMOs, especially DEMOs (Domestic Election Monitoring Organisations) play an essential role in assuring the legitimacy of political regimes, particularly in terms of election results. 225

244 With regard to Indonesia, Indonesian DEMOs have held an important position in the history of democratic elections in Indonesia after the fall of the Soeharto regime. Indonesian DEMOs, particularly the networking type, work with strong networking, a wide scope, a coordinated base, high solidity and variation in financial resources. Thus, even though they are considered a new form of organisation in the Indonesian political system, Indonesian DEMOs are imperative in ensuring free and fair elections in the context of the democratisation process in the era of the initial democratic transition. Furthermore, this research also defined another category of election monitoring, which cannot be classified as either networking or stand-alone DEMOs. This research classifies this group as DOOs. DOOs have become a new phenomenon in relation to monitoring activities in Indonesia. Unlike most DEMOs that concentrate on continuous election monitoring activities, DOOs focus only on the election-day. Nevertheless, the plethora of DOOs in Indonesia indicates a positive development, not only in terms of the legitimacy and quality of the elections, but also in terms of civil societies' engagement in the democratisation process. On the other hand, public engagement in election monitoring is apparently low. There is a lack of concern on the part of the general public, who tend to surrender their monitoring responsibility to the government or to DEMOs. Consequently, the role of DEMOs and DOOs is imperative in order to complement the lack of public involvement and to affiliate with the Election Monitoring Body (BAWASLU) as a non-state monitoring agency. This research reveals that has been a shift in the DEMOs role in every phase of democracy. This shift is influenced by external and internal factors. The external factors include the decline of donor support for election monitoring activities during the post-liberalisation era. Meanwhile, internal factors include domestic political development during the post-liberalisation era, in which elections 226

245 require strong legitimacy. Thus, in the era of the initial transition, DEMOs are directed towards strengthening the legitimacy of the elected government. Figure 7.1 Elements of Election Monitoring DEMOs (+): Network (The Best Type) Stand Alone DOOs (+ +) People ( ) Int'l EMOs EMOs BAWASLU Note: (+) means high participation, (-) less participation In term of donor-government-society interaction, there is also a shift of the interaction pattern in every phase of democratisation. In the pre-liberalisation phase, there was strong governmental control on donors and societies. Meanwhile, in the post-liberalisation phase, there was a shift towards the decline of governmental control and an improvement in DEMO-donor and DEMO-DEMOO cooperation. However, the situation changed, not only as government legitimacy grew stronger via nationally and internationally supported elections, but also as the international society pledged the Paris Declaration in 2005 and the Jakarta Commitment in Since 2009, the assistance distribution mechanism, which was initially conducted by donors and Indonesian DEMOs, has also changed. International assistance must be under the surveillance of the coordination committee, which consistss of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Development Planning Board (BAPPENAS) and the Election Commission (KPU). Donors can only allocate assistance to Indonesian DEMOs/NGOs thatt are endorsed in the coordination meeting. The increase of governmental control and the decline of 227

246 Indonesian DEMOs position has becomee a paradox in the success of the democratisation process in Indonesia. In addition, in the context of the increase of governmental control of donors, mediator strategies as proposed by Clear cannot function properly. This indicates a gap between the democratisation agenda of the government, democracy aid providers and civil society. Figure 7.2 Positive and Negative Impacts of Democratisation (Democratic Elections) (+ +) Strong Legitimisation of government ( ) Increasing governmental control Paradox of Democratisation Furthermore, Aspinall contended that..bundling democracy assistance into a government-controlled framework raises questionss about aid effectiveness. It also raises deeper questions about what local ownership actually means in a country like Indonesia in which much democratic progress has been made but where many of the chief obstacless to improved democratic development are located inside the very government that is now positioning itself as the leading player in controlling its own democracy assistance agenda As spinall, 2010, Op.Cit., p