AFTER THE ELECTIONS WITH, AMONG OTHERS, CHANTAL DE JONGE OUDRAAT, ROBERTA HAAR AND DONALD JENSEN

Transcription

1 Ap: SPECIAL ISSUE: AMERICA AFTER THE ELECTIONS WITH, AMONG OTHERS, CHANTAL DE JONGE OUDRAAT, ROBERTA HAAR AND DONALD JENSEN

2 CONTENTS 3 Editorial 4 Analysis Mostly sunny, partly cloudy The transatlantic forecast for the next four years Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Michael E. Brown 10 Analysis The pragmatic president Obama s second term foreign policy 15 Analysis Four more years Presidential-congressional relations in Obama s second term 20 Analysis Ctrl-Alt-Del? Obama recalibrates the Reset with Russia Roberta Haar Erik A. Olsen Donald Jensen 24 Analysis U.S.-Israel relations in the aftermath of the elections Ariel Levite 28 Atlantic News Survey COLOPHON Atlantisch Perspectief is published by the Netherlands Atlantic Association. It appears eight times a year. Office and Editorial Office Bezuidenhoutseweg 237A-239A 2594 AM The Hague The Netherlands telephone: fax: redactie@atlcom.nl internet: Editor Maarten Katsman Editorial Board Dr. Bram Boxhoorn, Chairman Niklaas Hoekstra, Senior Editor Maj. Gen. Kees Homan (MC, ret.) Joris Janssen Lok Prof. dr. Ruud Janssens Prof. dr. Wim Klinkert Hans van Leeuwe Prof. Dr. Marianne van Leeuwen Rik van der Linden Anselm van der Peet Dr. Sebastian Reyn Auke Venema International Advisory Board Dr. Hans Binnendijk Dr. Ann-Sofie Dahl Marten van Heuven Prof. dr. Jan-Willem Honig Prof. dr. Margarita Mathiopoulos Prof. dr. Alexander Moens Dr. Henning Riecke Stanley Sloan Subscriptions Subscriptions to Atlantisch Perspectief are 27,50 a year. Students and schools pay 22,-. Please send applications in writing, by phone or electronically to the office of the Atlantic Association. Layout Arthur Meyer, M/vG Ontwerpers Printing and Lithography De Swart, The Hague ISSN: Atlantisch perspectief: no. 8 / 2012 Volume 36 journal for international relations and security policy All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part is allowed only with written permission from the editors. The editors of Atlantisch Perspectief do not necessarily agree with the content of the published articles. Previous issues can be ordered from the Atlantic Association. For advertisement rates, please apply to the editors. This publication is co-financed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. President Barack Oama was re-elected on November 6. The voters gave him four more years (photo: Flickr/Scout Tufankijan for Obama for Amarica) Ap: SPECIAL ISSUE: AMERICA AFTER THE ELECTIONS WITH, AMONG OTHERS, CHANTAL DE JONGE OUDRAAT, ROBERTA HAAR AND DONALD JENSEN

3 Ap: 2012no8 Editorial 3 Transatlantic relations: from pre-eminence to predominance In 1995 under the auspices of the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission The Brookings Institution (Washington, D.C.) and Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (then based in Ebenhausen, nowadays in Berlin) co-produced a provocative study report. Entitled Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations, this study painted three possible scenarios for future transatlantic relations. The first scenario depicted a declining relationship in which Europe (EU) and the U.S. would grow apart. The second scenario was one dominated by the U.S. (U.S. primacy). The third scenario was defined as an enhanced partnership or symmetric relationship, in which the U.S. and Europe would constitute more or less equal partners. The report also presciently emphasized the importance of the emerging Asian economies and, in this context, argued that a marginalization of Europe and transatlantic relations might take place. Over the past fifteen years the Asia focus of U.S. security policy, a pattern of strategic shifts to Asia, has become increasingly visible. In his first term President Obama called himself the first Pacific President. And whether this claim may be dismissed or not as an exercise in rhetorical grandiosity (George F. Will), in an evolving non-polar world system American forces have now been strategically rebalanced to Asia. But one must not jump too quickly to facile conclusions. While European-American economic relations may no longer dominate the world economy, the economic transatlantic relationship remains very strong. This economic resilience may be less obvious and visible nowadays for many reasons, including the coming to power of non-western countries in global institutions, such as the G-20, World Bank, etc. But despite these shifts and despite the current global economic crisis, the EU and the U.S. remain each other s biggest markets. Moreover, the transatlantic area is still the world s wealthiest. It accounts for 50% of world GDP in terms of value and 41% of GDP in terms of purchasing power. According to foreign affairs experts Daniel Hamilton and Joseph Quinlan (SAIS, Washington, D.C.), the position of the transatlantic economy in the global economic system can be best described as a change from one of pre-eminence to one of predominance. It should be realized that the U.S. has had Pacific interests and involvement since the end of the nineteenth century. The growing importance of the Asian economies and the many security threats since the end of the Cold War and in particular since 9/11 have encouraged the U.S. to move away from a Europe-first policy, first to the Middle East and now further eastwards. So far Europe has had neither the political appetite nor capabilities to follow suit. Although in theory we may be heading for disaster as some columnists would like us to believe, and bad policies can make things worse, it may take a while, if ever, for such a scenario to materialize. The transatlantic world is still among the most peaceful and prosperous regions in the world. But there is never a guarantee for continuity. So far, none of the abovementioned three scenarios has come to pass. The current pace and pattern of global changes are simply too fast to predict fundamental trends. Investing politically and economically in both the transatlantic market and the Asian economies seems the safest way out of today s multiple dilemmas. Bram Boxhoorn 5 December 2012 Would you like to react? Mail the editor: redactie@atlcom.nl.

4 4 Analysis Ap: 2012no8 Mostly sunny, partly cloudy The transatlantic forecast for the next four years Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Michael E. Brown U.S.-European relations have been fundamentally strong for many decades, but they have also had their ups and downs over the years. The last decade alone has seen substantial swings in the transatlantic relationship. What can we expect for the next four years? In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, America s European allies rallied around the United States in a strong united front. NATO s members invoked the alliance s Article V collective defense provision for the first time in the alliance s history. Unfortunately, the pendulum of transatlantic relations began to swing in a less harmonious direction soon thereafter. The George W. Bush administration declined European offers to help go after Al Qaeda, preferring to go it alone in Afghanistan (at least at first). The Bush administration s decision to invade Iraq in 2003 generated even more turmoil in transatlantic relations, with some European governments supporting the action and others displaying less enthusiasm. Many in Europe became dismayed by the Bush administration s handling of what it called the global war on terrorism: the administration s use of enhanced interrogation (torture) and extraordinary rendition (kidnapping), its disregard for habeas corpus, the military prison at Guantanamo Bay, and secret prisons around the world were not consistent with many European (and American) conceptions of due process and human rights. By the end of the Bush administration, U.S.-European relations had reached a post-cold War low. Enter Barack Obama. It is unusual for one person to have an impact on something as deep and complex as U.S.-European relations, but it is fair to say that Barack Obama has made a significant difference. In July 2008, candidate Obama drew one of the largest crowds of his presidential campaign, and it happened in Europe. Speaking in Berlin in front of an enthusiastic crowd estimated at 200,000 people, Obama called for united action against terrorism and other global challenges. Global progress, he said, requires allies who will listen to each other, learn from each other, and most of all trust each other. This was music to Europe s multilateralist ears. Obama s approval It is easy to take rating in Europe stood at 85-90% in 2008 the transatlantic (compared to 20% for fundamentals for Bush). Most Europeans were overjoyed when granted Obama was elected to the presidency in November The last four years have been very good ones for U.S.-European relations, on the whole. President Obama issued an executive order that banned enhanced interrogation. The United States and its allies ended their military

5 Interview operations in Iraq, and they established a timetable for drawing down their combat forces in Afghanistan. U.S. military forces carried out a bold attack that led to the death of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in May U.S. and European leaders have worked together closely and reasonably well to avoid a global economic meltdown. At the same time, President Obama was unsuccessful in closing the military prison at Guantanamo Bay. He has dramatically increased the use of unmanned drone attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, which has raised ethical and legal questions on both sides of the Atlantic. Although U.S.-European relations are far from perfect, they have been very strong over the past four years. This is reflected in President Obama s approval ratings in Europe, which have declined only slightly to 75-80%. Most elected officials would be elated by these numbers. The next four years are likely to be a continuation of this positive trend. The fundamentals of U.S.-European relations are strong. Both the United States and Europe are likely to be pre-occupied with internal challenges economic and political. They will also have to contend with an array of international challenges that are likely to be on the agenda, but American and European leaders are unlikely to disagree sharply on these issues. At the same time, there are several clouds on the transatlantic horizon: Europe s continuing economic and governance crisis; Europe s declining ability to project military power; and Washington s pivot toward Asia. In addition, there is the always-demanding inbox of international crises and tests. Most of the time these are manageable challenges, but successful handling of these issues will require strategic vision, a long-term perspective, and political determination. The fundamentals are strong The fundamentals of U.S.-European relations have been strong for decades. They were strong enough to weather the tensions generated by the George W. Bush administration, and they are likely to endure not just for the next four years but for the foreseeable future. It is easy to take these fundamentals for granted. They are broad, deep, powerful, and enduring, and they deserve a mention. First, the United States and the member-states of NATO and the European Union have many common values. Americans and Europeans have deep, common commitments to human rights, the rule of law, democracy, and free markets. The President Barack Obama delivers his first major speech, in 2009 in Prague. Obama s approval rating in Europe stood at 85-90% in 2008, compared to 20% for Bush. Most Europeans were overjoyed when Obama was elected to the presidency in 2008, and since that moment his approval ratings in Europe have only slightly declined (photo: White House/Pete Souza)

6 6 Analysis Ap: 2012no8 United States and the member-states of NATO and the European Union do a pretty good job of living up to these values most of the time. Second, the United States and most European countries have common strategic interests, and they face common strategic challenges. There is broad transatlantic agreement on the keys to continued international order, stability, and peace. There The Eurozone crisis is a matter is also a great deal of agreement on the of immediate, main threats to international order. almost existential In the near term, the importance challenges include turmoil in the Arab world, terrorism and violent extremism, Israeli-Palestinian relations, Iran s nuclear program, Russia s growing authoritarianism, Pakistan s instability, and China s maritime behavior. In the longer term, the challenges include the rise of China and other powers, the continuing proliferation of nuclear weapons, the importance of effective engagement with the Islamic world, growing energy demands and climate change, and the need to empower women and girls around the world. Third, American and European leaders agree that international challenges require international cooperation and multilateral action. They recognize that very few global or transnational challenges can be solved effectively by any one power acting on its own. Every American president says that he understands the importance of allies and multilateral action, but most U.S. presidents have strong unilateralist impulses. President George W. Bush is often singled out in this regard, but he was far from alone. President Obama, perhaps more than other recent American presidents, understands the need for joint international action. His embrace of multilateralism isn t just rhetorical; it seems to be genuine. Today, U.S. and European leaders share this strategic outlook. Fourth, the United States and Europe continue to be very formidable global powers. Together, the U.S. and the European Union comprise 54% of the global economy, and they have deep economic ties. The United States and its NATO allies account for approximately 70% of global military spending, and they have unmatched power-projection capabilities. The United States is responsible for much of this spending and most of these capabilities, but America s allies have contributed important capabilities and many lives in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other joint combat operations. These transatlantic capabilities and ties economic and military are part of the bedrock of the strong transatlantic relationship. Clouds on the horizon Although the fundamentals of U.S.-European relations are strong, American and Europeans leaders will face an array of internal and external policy challenges over the next four years. On both sides of the Atlantic, policymakers will inevitably devote much of their time and energy to immediate, internal policy problems. In addition, several longerterm challenges are looming. The first challenge is internal: On both sides of the Atlantic, leaders have to effectively address some very serious fiscal, economic, and governance challenges. The United States needs to continue climbing out of an economic recession, reduce unemployment, strengthen manufacturing, tackle mounting health care and retirement expenditures, reduce the federal deficit, and cut the federal debt now $16 trillion. At the same time, the United States needs to make more investments in the fundamentals of national power infrastructure, education, research and development. A polarized Congress will not make this easy. This will not turn most Americans into isolationists, but it will change our mood, and make us pickier about where we ll get involved, as Thomas Friedman of the New York Times put it. In Europe, the resolution of the Eurozone crisis is a matter of immediate, almost existential importance. European leaders will naturally be focused on Europe s problems in 2013 and perhaps for many years to come. These problems include fiscal insolvency in Greece, staggering unemployment in Spain, financial fragility in many institutions and countries, pulling out of economic recession, and the long-term challenge of bringing welfare state commitments in line with fiscal and economic realities. In addition, many European countries will have to deal with the social consequences of budget cuts. Protests, like the ones seen in late 2012, are likely to continue and may intensify. At the same time, the EU faces continuing internal governance challenges. The crisis has highlighted Europe s lack of political cohesion and the EU s inadequate institutional structures. As a result, Europe s response to the crisis has been slow and at times incoherent. European leaders have been muddling through for the past couple of years.

7 Unfortunately, this is unlikely to change in the near future. Although one may hope for a grand strategy and a grand bargain to materialize, muddling through is more likely and it may ultimately be adequate. But if Europe s leaders fail and Europe collapses economically and politically, it will be catastrophic for Europe, the United States, transatlantic relations, and the world as a whole. The one issue that could substantially disrupt U.S.-European relations over the next four years would be an economic collapse in Europe or the collapse of the EU itself. The second challenge is that European leaders must decide if they are going to make the investments in military capabilities that will be necessary if Europe is to continue as global military power. European defense spending has gradually declined over the years and in the wake of the Euro crisis more defense spending cuts are being enacted. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2010 only 5 out of the 26 European NATO members achieved the Alliance s 2% spending target France, Greece, Portugal, Turkey, and the UK. Total EU defense spending declined from $289 billion in 2008 to $271 billion in U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned the European allies in 2011 that America s 75% share in NATO defense spending was unsustainable and that, unless allies started to bear more of the burden, NATO would risk collective military irrelevance. In addition, much of Europe s military spending generates little in the way of actual military capabilities. As the intervention in Libya in 2011 showed, many European countries lack significant power-projection capabilities. Fighter aircraft, aerial refueling, aerial intelligence assets, missiles, and other ordnance were in short supply in European arsenals. Unfortunately, the shortcomings revealed by the Libyan intervention have not galvanized European governments to reverse recent trends and expand their investments in military capabilities. NATO leaders have argued that its Smart Defense strategy will emphasize more pooling and sharing of assets. Pooling and sharing is unlikely to be an adequate substitute for buying and building actual power-projection capabilities. If the huge gap in U.S. and European military capabilities continues or grows, America s long-standing complaints about European burden-sharing may reach a tipping point. If Europe continues on its current path, it will become increasingly incapable of contributing to international military actions and the United States will increasingly discount Europe as a global partner in the international U.S. Secretary of State meets EU High Representative Catherine Ashton. U.S. leaders carefully reassured America s commitment to Europe; Clinton stated that Europe is and remains America s partner of first resort (photo: Flickr/European External Action Service)

8 security arena. It will not be easy for European leaders to make additional investments in military capabilities when they face other economic and fiscal challenges, but they must face up to this issue or Europe will face long-term geostrategic decline. A third and related challenge is that one of the main mechanisms of transatlantic engagement - NATO - doesn t attract much public attention or support in either the United States or Europe. Many Europeans see NATO as a relic of the Cold War, and they question Europe s involvement in Afghanistan. EU leaders have a hard time convincing their publics that engagement beyond Europe s borders and investments in defense capabilities are not luxuries but preconditions for defending the European acquis and Europe s role and standing in the world. Many Americans see its European allies as free-riders when it comes to military burden-sharing. Even in Washington, D.C., many American leaders do not appreciate the political, economic, and security assets that Europe, the EU and NATO bring to the table. European policy makers need to bring greater policy coherence to their defense and foreign affairs efforts. They should start by revisiting the European Security Strategy of 2003 now long due for review. What commitments are Europeans willing to make with respect to peace and security in their neighborhood, and what role does Europe want to play in the international system? European leaders would do well to engage European publics on these issues. Only then will they be able to mobilize public support for international engagement. The fourth challenge is that the Obama administration s grand strategy for the future features a pivot toward Asia and a rebalancing of military forces toward Asia. Specifically, the idea is to pivot away from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that have preoccupied the United States for the past decade, and focus more on the rise of Asia that will shape the world in the decades ahead. The pivot also includes a rebalancing of U.S. naval forces: for years, the United States has deployed 50% of its naval forces in the Pacific and 50% in the Atlantic; in the future, the balance will be 60% in the Pacific and 40% in the Atlantic. This new strategy was rolled out in late 2011, and it will undoubtedly be the guiding strategy framework for U.S. policy in President Obama s second term. This does not mean that the United States is turning completely away from Europe. The reduction in U.S. naval forces in the Atlantic is unlikely to have an impact on European security. U.S. leaders have been careful to be The Brooklyn Bridge in New York city under a partly sunny, partly cloudy sky. Although the fundamentals of the relationship are strong, there are several clouds on the transatlantic horizon (photo: Wikimedia/Suiseiseki)

9 Ap: 2012no8 9 Analysis reassuring about America s continuing commitment Europe. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasized in February 2012 that Europe is and remains America s partner of first resort. She went on to stress that that the transatlantic community has never been more closely aligned in confronting the challenges of a complex, dangerous, and fast-changing world. At the May 2012 NATO summit in Chicago, President Obama emphasized that Europe remains the cornerstone of our engagement with the world. Even so, there is no doubt that the United States will place greater emphasis on Asia over the next four years and for many years to come. This will include greater attention to issues such as China s claims to islands in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, China s military and naval build-up, maintaining open sea lanes for commerce, maintaining close relations with allies and other friendly powers in the region, and promoting stability in East, Southeast, and South Asia more generally. Europe could and should be an able partner in this effort, but that will depend mainly on European decisions in the years ahead. The inbox is full: the forecast is mixed All of these formidable challenges will have to be addressed in conjunction with an international arena that will be exceptionally active. In an ideal world, American and European leaders would be able to focus all of their time and energy on the enormous internal problems they face and the long-term strategic challenges they must address. In the real world, they will not have that luxury. In 2013, American and European leaders will have to deal with continuing problems in the Arab world, including the civil war in Syria, the possibility of more Israeli-Palestinian confrontations, stabilization in Libya, the evolution of the new government in Egypt, continued turmoil in Yemen, and the possibility that instability could spread to Jordan and other countries. The future of Iran s nuclear program will probably reach a decision point in the Spring or Summer of American and European leaders will also have to develop and implement their plans for a drawdown of their military forces in Afghanistan as the year unfolds. Other international challenges abound: Pakistan has a growing nuclear arsenal and growing internal stability problems. North Korea has growing nuclear capabilities and a new, inexperienced leader. China has a new leader; Japan and South Korea will have new leaders in 2013 as well. Russia does not have a new leader, but it may present new problems for its neighbors. Together the United States and Europe have a broad array of capabilities to bring to bear on these international and regional problems. Unfortunately, and despite the strong strategic alignment that currently exists between American and European leaders, there is no guarantee that the United States and Europe will be able to make great progress over the next four years on these international problems. Their first and overriding priority has to be addressing their internal problems. Preventing worst-case scenarios from happening is mandatory. This will consume much and perhaps most of the policymaking energy that is available. Whether European leaders can achieve greater coherence in EU policies, prompt greater action by EU member states, and rekindle popular support among European citizens remains to be seen. But, without greater political unity and action on the European side, transatlantic relations will face a cloudy future. In sum, internal preoccupations, asymmetric power-projection capabilities, and shifting geostrategic outlooks may prevent the United States and Europe from taking full advantage of their opportunities to tackle immediate international challenges and shape the international system in the 21 st century. One of the barometers of transatlantic relations in the years ahead will be the extent to which the United States and Europe work together, not just in NATO, but in a wider array of international institutions on a wide array of global issues. It will require strategic vision, a long-term perspective, and political determination. Political leaders are capable of long-term thinking and political will, but this is not guaranteed. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat is Executive Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) North America office in Washington, D.C. Michael E. Brown is Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University, also in Washington, D.C. Would you like to react? Mail the editor: redactie@atlcom.nl.

10 10 Analysis Ap: 2012no8 The pragmatic president Obama s second term foreign policy Roberta Haar With the ratification of the New START Treaty, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and the death of Osama bin Laden, President Obama accomplished several of his foreign policy objectives in his first four years. This article addresses the three main foreign policy priorities the re-elected Obama faces in his second term. The first principal concern entails the multifaceted challenges emerging from the Greater Middle East, in particular continuing the fight against Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Obama s second priority relates to China s rise as a regional power while the third involves stabilizing America s place in the world economy, especially ensuring that the European Union does not break up and that Europe remains an important trade partner. Fighting with sanctions and drones Obama took office four years ago with an ambitious plan to reduce the antagonisms between the U.S. and the Muslim world. He intended to reach out to America s enemies with an open hand rather than a clenched fist. However, Obama s policy did not succeed and by the end of his first term he shifted strategy toward sanctions for Iran and a preemptive targeted killing approach against militant Islamists, authorizing far more drone strikes on terrorists than his predecessor George W. Bush had endorsed. Even though he emphasized a conciliatory policy toward Iran, from the beginning of his presidency Obama had also been exploring how sanctions would affect the regime s willingness to curb its nuclear weapons program. Thus when his outstretched hand was rebuffed, Obama moved to prioritize sticks over carrots. One of his first initiatives in this direction was to make stopping Iran s nuclear program a high priority in discussions with allies in Europe and with governments in Russia and China. The joint statement that Obama made with French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown in September 2009 at the Pittsburg G-20 Conference certainly was designed to send a clear message to Iran that Obama s tactics were shifting and that America and its allies where in sync. 1 When negotiations broke down with the Iranians, Obama made his change in policy complete with a decision to support the Iranian opposition and a move towards enacting internationally-enforced sanctions through the UN Security Council. Obama convinced the Russians and the Chinese to support these sanctions, which remain in place today and for the foreseeable future. With regards to Obama s preemptive targeted killing strategy, like Bush s before him, it is based on the idea that imminent attacks justify a response. While Bush used preemption to validate full-scale military invasion, Obama uses it to defend killing specific individuals. Over his first four years in office, Obama expanded the program to Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. In his second term the program is likely expanding to Mali and Libya. Drone strikes have also controversially killed a member of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Anwar al-awlaki, who was an American. Although al-awlaki was linked to

11 the 2009 attack at Fort Hood, Texas, in which twelve U.S. soldiers were killed, and he directed the underwear bomber s plot to explode a plane over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, the deliberate killing of an American citizen still raised legal and moral dilemmas for the Obama administration. Despite the moral questions, Obama is likely to continue his intense use of drones in his second term because the decision to use them is multidimensional, the first being financial. Bush s military interventions had clearly ignored costs. Brown University Costs of War Report 2011 calculated that the expenditures since 2001 in Afghanistan and Iraq amounted to $2.3 trillion and over 6,000 American lives. 2 At present it costs $250,000 a year to keep one American soldier in Afghanistan. 3 Disregarding the expenditure of foreign policy is a practice that Obama is unable to follow. In fact, Obama not only stated in his first term that he refused to set foreign policy goals that exceeded America s means but he and his Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta propose to cut the U.S. defense budget by $487 billion over ten years. 4 Such actions certainly point to a more circumspect attitude toward costly foreign policy adventures in his second term and a continued reliance on drones, which are much cheaper by comparison to committing soldiers abroad. Another reason why Obama will continue to use drone strikes is because Republicans have sought to depict him as weak on terrorism. The Navy Seals strike against Osama bin Laden has made this characterization harder to sell, but Obama s emphasis on his efforts at protecting national security in the third presidential debate clearly illustrate that he does not want the decades old stereotype that Democrats are weak on defense issues to apply to him. The decision to use drones is also a response to domestic pressure to bring the boys home from Afghanistan as soon as possible. In his first two years Obama tried to combine an expanded use of drone attacks with General David Petraeus counterinsurgency strategy (COIN), which had worked so well to improve the situation in Iraq. The COIN doctrine specifies waging war against insurgents by protecting the local population and developing close ties with them. Unfortunately, counterinsurgency also requires many boots on the ground; Obama complied by announcing in December 2009 that he would send a surge of additional troop deployments to Afghanistan. But his surge came with clear deadlines for when the troops would come home, whether they had succeeded or not. Such limits undoubtedly reflect domestic views. Pew Research polls in June 2011 revealed that 56% of Americans wanted troops to return home A U.S. soldier launches a drone. Obama will continue to use drones intensively for financial reasons, among others. This and other actions certainly point to a more circumspect attitude toward costly foreign policy adventures in his second term (photo: U.S. Army/ Michael J. MacLeod)

12 quickly from Afghanistan and not wait for the situation there to stabilize. 5 More recent polls indicate some twothirds of Americans think that soldiers in Afghanistan should come home. 6 Americans also appear willing to let drones take the place of returning soldiers. The fact that drone attacks are more discriminating with whom they target adds to their relative popularity with the American public. This further contributes to the likelihood that Obama will continue to rely on drones. The pragmatic use of force Obama s use of force in the Libyan intervention showed that he clearly understood the current American frame of mind pertaining to sending troops abroad. After Republicans ridiculed the unfortunate leading from behind phrase, Obama nevertheless further accentuated the point that America s involvement in the war was minimal. So minimal in fact that it did not fall under the provisions of the War Powers Resolution, which necessitates that presidents ask Congress permission if hostilities last longer than 90 days. 7 Obama further clearly stated that he sees the Libyan intercession exemplifying his intervention strategy vis-à-vis future humanitarian crises. In the last of the debates with Romney, Obama said that Libya was an example of how his administration makes choices carefully, thoughtfully and making certain that the opposition forces that it deals with are moderate and will be friendly to the U.S. over the long-term. In the case of Syria both candidates were explicit in their remarks that neither wanted to commit American troops. Obama s approach to intervention in Libya coupled with his remarks on the crisis in Syria, indicate that despite his rhetoric that the U.S. has a moral obligation to prevent humanitarian catastrophes, he is careful how he deploys the U.S. military. Obama will also continue his policy of cautious pragmatism with challenges emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, this policy may create negative long-term results. This is because Obama s counterterrorism tactics produce high levels of anti-americanism that ultimately lead to further radicalization or Talibanization in the tribal areas of Pakistan s North West Frontier Province. Talibanization has resulted in as many as 24 jihadi groups forming, including the Lashkar-e-Taiba, which is the largest group and most recognized because it carried out the terror attacks in Mumbai, India, in November The rise of such groups undermines the notion that drone attacks will continue to support U.S. interests in the future and may necessitate a reconsideration of current policy. Obama s shift from COIN to President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao at a ceremony in Beijing. It did not take long for Obama to realize that his initial policy of accommodation was in fact emboldening China. He generally toughened his policy towards China, and is expected to continue this stance during his second term (photo: White House/Pete Souza)

13 Ap: 2012no8 13 Analysis a counterterrorism strategy also further weakens the assurance that America is in Afghanistan for the long haul. Relations are further complicated by the fact that Democrats and the Obama administration have had a difficult relationship with the inept Afghan President Hamid Karzai and question whether he is a reliable partner. Interactions with Afghanistan are further complicated by U.S. relations with Pakistan. Unfortunately the strategic partnership with Pakistan is riddled with mistrust and hostility. In the past when America s strategic priorities changed the U.S.-Pakistani alliance of convenience could turn antagonistic, as it did in 1985 after the end of the Afghan war. While the Pakistanis are wary of U.S. future intentions, the Americans worry that the Pakistanis are untrustworthy allies in the fight against terrorism. Although in response to Obama s urging the Pakistani Army sent as many as 140,000 troops to the tribal areas, the Army refuses to go after the Haqqani insurgent group s base in North Waziristan. In September 2012 Congress added the Haqqani network to the U.S. State Department s terrorism blacklist because it is responsible for some of the deadliest attacks on U.S. troops in Afghanistan. The Pakistani Army s continued support of Islamic jihadists will force Obama to put more strings on military and economic aid to Pakistan, further adding fuel to Pakistan s abandonment fears. Additionally, Congress will continue to put pressure on Obama, for example, by threatening to designate Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism. In addition to questioning Pakistan s trustworthiness, Obama is worried about its political stability. America has long desired to stop Pakistan from building a nuclear capability but now that it has one, Obama worries that political instability might result in material or bombs falling into the hands of terrorists. In his June 2012 book Confront and Conceal, David Sanger argues that America only continues in Afghanistan because of its fears and strategic interests in Pakistan. Sanger recounts Obama telling his staff in late 2011 that his chief national security concern was that Pakistan would crumble making its nuclear weapons and fissile material vulnerable to Al Qaeda or other militant groups, who are known to be desperate to get their hands on anything nuclear. Several known sites linked to the Pakistani nuclear program have already been targeted by Islamist militant attacks. Although America has already given hundreds of millions of dollars to keep Pakistan s weapons safe, after Osama bin Laden was killed Pakistani officials paradoxically viewed the U.S. as the chief threat to their arsenal and moved to hide various components around Pakistan. The pivot toward Asia Challenges emerging from the Asia-Pacific will be some of the most difficult for the second term Obama administration. Aggressive territorial claims by China in the South China Sea fuel concerns about China s regional role will a rising China be disruptive or will China become a responsible world power, continuing with Hu Jintao-era ideas of peaceful development? Unlike presidential candidates before him, who used tough talk on China to appeal to voters, Obama tried to avoid belligerent language in relation to China in his first campaign. Once in office, in a move similar to his ambitious plan to reduce the antagonisms between the U.S. and the Muslim world, Obama started with a plan to reduce the American confrontational stance toward China. However, it did not take long for Obama to realize that his policy of accommodation was in fact emboldening Chinese bellicose behavior. This was in part because by the time Obama took office the world had changed. The costs of Bush s military interventions when combined with his underfunded domestic expenditures and the necessary stimulus after the financial crises resulted in the U.S. becoming the world largest debtor. China was not only a key holder of American debt but had in the recent past (2006) overtaken Japan as the world s second-largest economy. These shifts in economic power meant that Chinese officials projected an air of ascendancy in their meetings with their American counterparts and intellectuals in China contemplated the finer points of U.S. declinism theory. In such an atmosphere Obama s policy of minimizing conflict was interpreted by the Chinese as an affirmation of American decline. The December 2009 conference on climate change (at which the various slights perpetrated by the Chinese became downright insulting to Obama personally) marked the boundary of Obama s conciliatory policy. Soon after, in January 2012, Obama approved a new sale of weapons to Taiwan and generally toughened his policy towards China. In a very public way Obama moved to build up America s military presence in the region as well as strengthen defense cooperation with allies. The latter was partly in response to countries in the region requesting that the U.S. reassert its role as a power-balancer. Obama s toughened policy stance was in further evidence in the final of the three presidential debates in which he said that China was a potential partner but that he would insist that it plays by the rules, especially when it comes to international trade. Ensuring that China adheres to international rules and norms is complicated by the fact that China is going through its own leadership transition and there are general concerns about whether the

14 14 Analysis Ap: 2012no8 new leadership will be able to maintain control over China s independently-minded nationalistic generals, its corrupt and avaricious ministers and its growing corporate enterprises. Stabilizing economies and rebuilding partnerships Europeans worried about their relevancy after Obama announced his pivot to Asia in The election campaign also largely ignored relations with Europe as a topic, leading some in Europe to argue after Obama won that it was time for Europe to step up its game. 8 However, Europe remains essential to America s ability to stabilize the world economy and especially for its own financial recovery. In the summer of 2012 Obama explicitly said that he was worried about Europe s recovery from its own debt crisis. He made his remarks soon after a dismal U.S. jobs report heightened concerns about the impact of Europe s predicament on U.S. growth. Obama emphasized that pro-growth policies need to be part of Europe s plan to deal with its crisis in addition to austerity tactics. Obama said that if Europe goes into a recession it means we re selling fewer goods, fewer services, and that is going to have some impact on the pace of our recovery. 9 He urged EU member states to keep Greece in the Eurozone and sent his Secretary of the Treasury Tim Geithner to meet with European leaders seventeen times. In particular, Obama has focused attention on Germany s Chancellor Angela Merkel, who has been less flexible on relaxing austerity approaches, and the UK s David Cameron, who made clear when he rejected tighter EU controls that did not include special guarantees for Britain s financial sector in December 2011 that he is weighing-up the pros and cons of remaining in the EU. Obama clearly sees a fragmenting European Union as a threat to international economic security as a whole and that a well-functioning European internal market is beneficial to American interests. Thus, Obama s second term will not neglect the EU-U.S. economic relationship, which is the most substantial economic partnership in the world in terms of trade (including services) and foreign direct investment. European companies are the leading foreign investors in the U.S., with Great Britain, Germany, France and the Netherlands being the top four sources of jobs created by foreign investment in America. In turn, American companies invest far more in EU countries than in Asian ones. In fact, U.S. investment in just the Netherlands is nine times more than U.S. investment in China. 10 A 2009 Commission study found that the transatlantic economy has even more potential. The report concluded that roughly 50% of non-tariff measures and regulatory divergence could be eliminated resulting in an increased Gross Domestic Product of 163 billion in In order to bring about a recovery of the U.S. economy as well as improve the world s economy, Obama will seriously consider ways in which to renew the transatlantic economic relationship and help Europe emerge from its current crisis. Roberta Haar is a Lecturer in International Relations and American Foreign Policy at University College Maastricht, Faculty of Humanities and Sciences, Maastricht University. Would you like to react? Mail the editor: redactie@atlcom.nl. 1. Statement by President Obama, French President Sarkozy, and British Prime Minister Brown on Iranian Nuclear Facility, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, September 25, 2009, 2. Costs of War Report, June 2011, Eisenhower Study Group, Brown University, 3. Larry Goodson and Thomas H. Johnson, Parallels with the Past How the Soviets Lost in Afghanistan, How the Americans are Losing, April 2011 E-notes, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 4. Department of Defense, January 2012, Defense budget priorities and choices, 5. Pew Excellence in Journalism News Coverage Index: June 20-26, 2011, Afghanistan War Jumps Back into Headlines, 6. Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Half Say U.S. Should Speed Up Afghanistan Withdrawal, Gallup Politics, March 15, 2012, 7. Barack Obama, Letter from the President on the War Powers Resolution. The White House, 15 June 2011, www. whitehouse.gov. 8. Time to Grow Up: What Obama s Re-election means for Europe, European Council on Foreign Relations, 9. Remarks by the President, June 8, 2012, gov. 10. Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan, The Transatlantic Economy 2011, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, Non-Tariff Measures in EU-US Trade and Investment An Economic Analysis, Reference: OJ 2007/S , Final Report.

15 Ap: 2012no8 15 Analysis Four more years Presidentialcongressional relations in Obama s second term Erik A. Olsen President Obama begins his last term in office at the head of a nation marked by ideological partisanship with a citizenry that has expressed radically different interpretations not only about the so-called direction of the nation but also about the very purpose of the nation, back to its most fundamental and Constitutional roots. The culture of American politics since the days of Ronald Reagan has only become more divisive and factional, with displays that would supply ready validity to the warnings offered by James Madison in the Federalist Number 10. What does this mean for the next four years under a second Obama administration? This is a particularly important question given the electoral status quo in both chambers of Congress following the election. Although most observers expected some shift in the balance of political power in Washington from what has existed over the last four years, the November 6 results did not provide that possibility. Although the Republicans suffered some losses in the House of Representatives, they maintained control still buoyed in part by the Tea-Partyfueled wins from the 2010 cycle. The Republicans also failed to gain seats in the Senate, thus remaining in the minority in that Chamber. In the face of this electoral status quo, this article will offer two alternative and probable scenarios that may help predict the presidential-congressional relationship that will materialize over the next presidential term. This dynamic can best be illustrated in the immediate through an examination of the current negotiations over the fiscal cliff. Scenario A will be one in which the status quo of the last four years remains the same. During the run up to, and during his very first month of, the new term the President will attempt to pursue a series of policy options such as proposals to address the deficit, debt and funding crisis called by both the press and politicians, the fiscal cliff. In the process of addressing these issues the Republican-controlled House of Representatives and their filibuster-prone party members in the Senate will adopt the same postures of obstructionism that marked their relationship with their Democratic counterparts as well as with the White House over the last two years. I will also attempt to explore some of the possible repercussions for both the President and Congress should this scenario become a reality. As an alternative to this gridlock scenario, Scenario B offers a view in which there is a greater, even if less than unanimous, era of bipartisanship between the two parties where the most radical demands will need to be abandoned in favor of more moderate and popular measures. It must, however, be noted that this article is more interested in the likelihood that either scenario be adopted than with the form that adoption may take. The aim of this article is to provide an interpretation of the President s and Congress ability to deal with the fiscal cliff and how this interaction can be interpreted over the longer term as an example of future negotiations for the President. A fortuitous alignment in December 2012 and January 2013 marks not only the legislative deadline placed upon the resolution to the fiscal cliff but also the beginning of a new presidential term. The postures and compromises

16 16 Analysis Ap: 2012no8 adopted in this first interaction between the President and the Congressional Republicans may predict the pace for the remainder of Obama s term as well as the political fortunes of those members of Congress in opposition to the compromises. The issues at stake speak to the core ideologies of both parties. Republicans have been emphatic in their belief that lower taxation policies translate directly into gains in the economy across all income spectrums. Democrats have similarly claimed, although they have been less vigilant in standing up for this principle, that a strong democracy is tied to a fairer taxation burden best exemplified by a graduated taxation scheme in which the greatest burden is placed on those at the highest income levels. The following two sections will examine in detail both scenarios and the possible outcomes for both the President and Congress based upon the contemporary political climate. Scenario A: status quo Scenario A constitutes a status quo in the critical relationship between Democratic President Barrack Obama and the Republican-led House and their minority members in the Senate. In their quest to avoid any revenue increases tied to any increase in tax rates, Even Conservatives Congressional Republicans will call Republican remain resistant to any negotiations that fall core policies into short of their total demands. This style of question obstructionism, often followed by cries of a lack of bipartisanship from the very same Republicans, has helped contribute to and likely would prolong the decline in public approval for Congress, specifically for its Republican members. Scenario A would not only likely be characterized by obstruction of Democratic initiatives, it would also in keeping with the events of the last four years, include a recipe for the advancement of Conservative-Republican-Tea Party fiscal goals. The vast majority of citizens have reported in recent polls that the wealthiest Americans should be paying more in taxes. A July 2012 Pew Research poll found that a 2:1 majority among Americans support a higher tax on those in the top tax brackets while leaving cherished programs such as Medicare and Medicaid alone. Both programs would face substantial reorganization under current Republican budget plans offered by former Vice- Presidential candidate Representative Paul Ryan. Interestingly, this same study found that similar percentages also believed that a progressive tax scheme is fundamentally more fair 1, implying that the current tax arrangement, as well as Republican plans to perpetuate it, are viewed as less fair among the electorate. Presumably such attitudes among the public would be easy for politicians to gauge in any debate regarding the fiscal cliff and would help provide these same politicians with guidance regarding the overall mood of the nation. However, such presumptions do not always translate into political realities and so may not play a decisive role in determining the Republicans actions. While public opinion alone is not sufficient incentive for Republicans to abandon the status quo in their relationship with the President, it needs to be noted that on November 6 the electorate refused to reelect some of the most conservative members of the 2010 Tea Party faction. 2 In order to better assess the likelihood of Scenario A coming to pass, it bears noting that this scenario relies upon congressional Republican obstruction in addition to their clinging to their taxation policy. From the standpoint of President Obama, the sine qua non of this scenario rests upon the actions of the Republicans and not on those of the President or the Democratic-led Senate. The President can gain no political capital for future legislative negotiations by cooperating with the radically right-leaning House in compromises over core positions. Neither will such compromises burnish his presidential legacy. A November 19 Gallup poll found that 65% of Americans thought that the President would make a sincere effort to work with Republicans in Congress to resolve the fiscal cliff. Only 48% of respondents thought that Congressional Republicans would make such an effort to work for a bipartisan solution. 3 Therefore the President enters the discussion with a wide margin of public support regardless of his eventual negotiating position. Ironically, the President may be therefore less inclined to make any grand concessions whereas the Republicans are already viewed with less favor and are not expected to change direction. This situation increases the pressure on Republicans to avoid a Scenario A option as it will not only make them look worse in the estimation of the electorate but will also act to bolster Obama s image. Scenario A is still probable, if for no reason other than that it is the course that the President and the congressional Republicans are currently embarked on. What makes Scenario A perhaps less likely to persist rests increasingly on the shift that sees large-ticket negotiations such as those over the fiscal cliff being guided more by party leaders such as

17 House Speaker John Boehner, with less Tea-Party influence. The Speaker, instead of acting as herald for a radically charged Republican caucus, has recently been adopting a more conciliatory tone in negotiations with the President as well as a stronger leadership role within his own party. National Public Radio columnist David Welna noted in his November 17 article, Solving Fiscal Cliff Math Might Come Down To Two, that while the President has not changed his tone since the last negotiations on this issue, the Speaker has become less dogmatic in his refusal to consider alternative means of funding the government. After a November 16 meeting Boehner remarked: To show our seriousness, we ve put revenue on the table, as long as it s accompanied by significant spending cuts. 4 The public pressures on the President and Congress, especially the Republican Party, to find an acceptable resolution to the fiscal cliff are compounded by the political realities of inaction. The fiscal cliff describes the January 2013 alignment of the expiration of the Bush Tax Cuts on all income levels as well as the activation of the sequestration provisions of the Budget Control Act of Although the Congressional Budget Office had previously reported that such a possibility would lead to long-term growth for the economy, in the short term these two events would lead to a recession over the 2013 fiscal year. Given that both parties have been loudly lamenting the ramifications of sequestration and that the passage of the Budget Control Act of 2010 followed an impasse over budgetary compromise, the political consequences could be fatal to the Republicans, an out-of-power party increasingly perceived as obstructionist. It has already been established that the public strongly supports higher taxes on top earners and there is no disagreement between the parties over the maintenance of tax relief for the middle and lower classes. Therefore, the only point of contention with regard to the Bush Tax Cuts is whether to retain these rates for top earners, but given the opinion data cited above, this may not be a defendable position for House Republicans. In order for the Republicans to maintain these cuts on top earners they would need to abandon Scenario A and the status quo in favor of negotiation with the President or suffer the fallout for being viewed as risking the economic well-being of the middle and lower classes in favor of tax benefits for the wealthiest Americans. This sea change away from the presidential-congressional relationship as it has existed over the last four years is perhaps attributable to the ready acceptance of the political realities that have seen approval rates for Congress fall to a President Barack Obama is greeted by Speaker of the House John Boehner before delivering the 2011 State of the Union Address. In the face of the fiscal cliff, Boehner seems more willing to cooperate with Obama than before, indicating the likelihood of the author s Scenario B following Obama s re-election (photo: White House/Pete Souza)

18 record low of 21% in pre-election polling, 5 while post-election studies indicate a rise in in the approval rates for the President and the Democratic Party in general. 6 These public perceptions about the two parties are perhaps consequences of the Republican adoption of Scenario A over the course of President Obama s first term and clear signs that such a scenario will continue to be a political loser for the Republicans. Scenario B: moving forward President Obama has been identified more with prior progressive presidents than any other president in nearly fifty years. Early in his first term he was likened to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, carried into office on a wave of popular support for a progressive agenda. This popular support was seen as a repudiation of the ideology of the now seldommentioned and largely dead neo-conservative movement and the military and financial ruin it had wreaked upon the United States. Some, even in the President s own circle, have dared to call Obama a Lincolnesque figure, a pragmatic manager overseeing a divisive nation. More recently some admirers have shifted the Roosevelt comparison from FDR to Teddy Roosevelt. The President himself invoked that Progressive Party candidate in a speech on economic fairness. 7 Given the last four years of near government shutdown in Washington, there is not merely a hope that a departure from the status quo is politically possible but an expectation that no political party will use the economy and national credit rating as a tool in a macro-game of chicken. Recent polling by Gallup placed a positive resolution to the fiscal cliff as very important or extremely important to roughly 82% of Americans. 8 Across party lines there is an enormous expectation among the voting public that none of the brinkmanship that played out in the summer of 2010 over budget issues will reappear in these negotiations. Therefore along with the aforementioned positive favorability ratings for the President and his party and the negative ratings of Republicans, as well as the widely held perception that places responsibility for the 2010 events specifically on the Republican-controlled House, there is a strong possibility that a consensus will be reached on this issue. Even in Conservative circles the core policies of the Republican Party are being called into question. Conservative television personality and pundit Ben Stein recently lambasted Fox News correspondent Greg Gutfeld for defending the maintenance of the Bush era tax cuts for all income brackets: We have a lot of rich people in this country, they have an awful lot of money, and they re not taxed enough. Although both host and guest agreed that Federal spending accounts for some portion of the deficit problem, Gutfeld seemed to be apologizing for the Republican tax ideology. Stein then challenged him with, President Obama celebrates his victory on election night. He won with a significant Electoral College vote and a plurality of the popular vote. Both are indicators the recent conduct of the Republicans has been deemed less than acceptable (photo: Flickr/Scout Tuf ankjian)

19 Ap: 2012no8 19 Analysis What do you care if they raise taxes on some rich person? 9 Another recent development that makes Scenario B more likely concerns the stunning hiccup in the otherwise untarnished career of Washington lobbyist Grover Norquist who for the first time faces publicly stated opposition to the once-vaunted Taxpayer Protection Pledge whose signatories agree to oppose all tax increases, that he imposes upon newly elected Republicans. In the November 20 edition of the New York Times, Jeremy Peters reports: Some top Republicans, including Speaker John A. Boehner, are saying they now agree with Democrats that the government must collect more tax revenue. Others have gone so far as to break with Mr. Norquist publicly. 10 Norquist has even had to make media appearances in an attempt to minimize the impact of this rebellious activity among the GOP members. 11 Certainly such changes in the political winds bode well for the eventual adoption of Scenario B, as the Republicans are not only privately reevaluating their positions, but even ideological holy cows such as Grover Norquist and his Pledge are for the first time facing skepticism from those who had previously bowed to his demands. Should Scenario B in some form be adopted by both parties, the result may prove to be a huge political win for the already popular President and make future negotiations with the Republican leadership over the remainder of his term easier. The Republicans in the House and the Senate are enjoying the fruit from the previous presidential term that was more devoted to trying to make Obama look bad in the eyes of the electorate than to improving their own image. Despite brave talk in the immediate wake of the November 6 election that saw an already hurting Republican Party lose even more national standing, recent admissions by both Republican politicians as well as the party apparatus that supports them have confirmed that a significant change is required if the Grand Old Party wishes to remain relevant. All of these factors, taken collectively, portend a more positive future for the final Obama term in office. Conclusion Despite the Republican Party s hopes to defeat President Obama, the incumbent was returned to office with not only a significant portion of the electoral vote, but a plurality of the popular vote as well. Both are indicators that not only are the President and the Democrats viewed with more favor among the electorate in general, but that the recent conduct of the Republicans has been deemed less than acceptable. This new political environment outlined above is what ushers both the President and the Republican-led House into these crucial budget negotiations, as well as the new presidential term. More important than the specific results of these negotiations will be what the stances adopted say about the future relations between the President and the Republicans. It is felt that while there are still hardliners within the Republican caucus who feel that their recent political setbacks have been due to a lack of dogmatism, more pragmatic members of the GOP leadership have reluctantly concluded that some cooperation with the opposition may be inevitable. Erik A. Olsen is a PhD candidate at the University of Amsterdam. Would you like to react? Mail the editor: redactie@atlcom.nl. 1. Raising Taxes on Rich Seen as Good for Economy, Fairness, Pew Research Center, July 16, 2012, Accessed on November 15, 2012, 2. Tea Party still a force, despite some losses, Michael Mathes, AFP, November 9, 2012, Accessed on November 20, 2012, 3. Americans Still Think Obama Will Seek Bipartisan Solutions, Lydia Saad, Gallup Politics, November 19, 2012, Accessed on November 20, 2012, 4. Solving Fiscal Cliff Math Might Come Down To Two, David Welna, National Public Radio, November 17, 2012, Accessed on November 19, 2012, 5. US Congress Approval Rating at 21% Ahead of Elections, Jeffrey M. Jones, Gallup Politics, October 24, 2012, Accessed November 11, 2012, 6. In U.S., Views of Obama, Democrats Improve After Election, Jeffrey M. Jones, Gallup Politics, November 16, 2012, Accessed on November 18, 2012, 7. Obama, Teddy Roosevelt, and the Politics of Fairness, Merrill Matthews, Forbes, December 8, Accessed on November 20, 2012, 8. Americans Urge Congress, the President to Avoid Fiscal Cliff, Gallup Politics, November 14, Accessed on November 20, 2012, 9. Fiscal cliff negotiations kick off at the White House, Fox News.com, November 16, Accessed on November 20, 2012, For Tax Pledge and Its Author, a Test of Time, Jeremy Peters, The New York Times, November 20, Norquist Says Some Republicans Are Having Impure Thoughts On Taxes, The New York Times, Michael D. Shear, November 26, 2012.

20 20 Analysis Ap: 2012no8 Ctrl-Alt-Del? Obama recalibrates the Reset with Russia Donald N. Jensen The Obama administration s Reset with Russia, a key foreign policy initiative when it came into office in 2009, sought to reverse what it saw as a dangerous drift in relations between Washington and Moscow in the final years of the presidency of George W Bush. This article examines the results of the Reset and the outlook of this initiative in Obama s second term. By the fall of 2008 ties were strained due to the Russia- Georgia war, the global economic recession and ongoing conflicts over European security. The Obama administration calculated the U.S. and Russia shared common interests, that both sides needed a more multidimensional relationship and that it could engage the Russian government and Russian society, longstanding objectives, at the same time. The approach also assumed that a Reset could be pursued without compromising Washington s relations with other countries, especially NATO aspirants Georgia and Ukraine, and that linkage of unrelated issues could be avoided. 1 At its core, the Obama administration calculated that improving the relationship would be in the U.S. interest in order to secure Moscow s help in areas that were important to the White House, such as maintaining pressure on Iran and protecting NATO access to Afghanistan. It therefore set about trying to address some Russian concerns in order to secure Russian help. 2 Washington pursued the Reset by increasing interaction between top officials, stepping up structured government-to-government engagement through almost a dozen bilateral working groups, more society-tosociety contact, and seeking to improve condition for more trade and investment. After initial hesitation the Kremlin accepted Washington s outstretched hand. Reset achievements After four years the Reset has seen several notable achievements. The New START Treaty entered into force in February 2011 which limited each side to 1,550 deployed warheads, 700 deployed delivery vehicles and 800 deployed and non-deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and heavy nuclear bombers, along with strong verification measures. Russian cooperation on Afghan transit has helped keep NATO troops supplied in Afghanistan, which was especially important after Pakistan cut off supply lines. On Iran, Russia canceled the sale of the sophisticated S-300 anti-aircraft missile and supported a UN Security Council Resolution that imposed an arms embargo on Tehran. The warmer tone in the relationship was also marked by military cooperation in other areas, including on North Korea and counterterrorism. After the longest accession process in the history of the World Trade Organization, Russia finally entered that organization after substantial U.S. lobbying. With relations thawing between Washington and Moscow, America s European allies also moved to improve relations with Russia. President Obama s personal relationship with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who had succeeded Vladimir Putin as Russian president in 2008, came to symbolize the

21 Ap: 2012no8 21 Analysis new rapprochement. Medvedev was widely regarded in the West as more liberal than Putin with an agenda that included the modernization of Russia s economy, especially the country s reliance of oil and gas. During his tenure, Russia emerged victorious in the South Ossetian war and recovered from the recession of Recognizing corruption as one of his country s most severe problems, Medvedev launched a Russia saw the high-profile anticorruption campaign and Reset as a way to law enforcement reform. From the take advantage of beginning of his tenure, however, the U.S. goodwill legitimacy of his presidency and relationship with Putin was subject to open speculation. The formally powerful Russian president was flanked by a highly influential Prime Minister who remained informally Russia s most powerful leader. Obama, who enjoyed a considerable rapport with Medvedev, actively courted his counterpart as a diplomatic partner. Reset revisited Although the Reset fostered agreements on key issues in its initial months - though several were oversold or were already in train when Obama came to power - it steadily lost momentum as Obama s term wore on. 3 From the beginning Washington and Moscow saw the Reset differently. For the Obama administration, the Reset promised an enduring strategic partnership; for the Kremlin, however, the Reset was a chance, in the words of the Russian Foreign Minister, for the U.S. to correct the mistakes it made in the relationship since the fall of the Soviet Union in its taking geopolitical advantage of Russian weakness in the 1990s, for example, and leading the war against Serbia. Russia also saw the renewed impetus to the relationship as a way to take advantage of U.S. goodwill - which it viewed as a sign of weakness - to reduce American influence in the world. Finally, both sides miscalculated the extent to which domestic politics would determine the Reset s fate. The Obama administration s simultaneous pursuit of dual track goals, state-to-state cooperation and engagement of Russian civil society, was incompatible in a Russian domestic climate which was increasingly authoritarian. Washington had to choose. Obama initially de-emphasized democratization before tilting back to values promotion in response to developments inside Russia. Moscow, in turn, calculated that the White House could neutralize Reset skeptics in the U.S. Congress, the Republican Party, and the U.S. human rights community. Tensions beginning in 2011 showed the Reset to be less the beginning of a cardinal change in the relationship between the United States and Russia than a more short-term diplomatic clearing of the air. Moscow reacted cautiously to the wildfire of the Arab Spring an understandable position given its own large Muslim population and its concern that news of mass actions in the streets in the Near East could spread to Russia and pose a threat to the Kremlin s hold on power (as had demonstrations earlier in the decade to authoritarian regimes in Georgia and Ukraine). Russia enabled Western military action in Libya by abstaining from a vote in the UN Security Council authorizing the use of force, but afterwards it opposed NATO action. Moscow had acquiesced to a humanitarian relief effort, it argued, not regime change. Putin s return to power Vladimir Putin s announcement in September 2011 that he would return to the Russian presidency was the second blow. Through much of the first Obama term, members of the U.S. administration had worked with President Medvedev, who they saw as the symbol of Russian reform. Some U.S. officials therefore openly supported a second presidential term for Medvedev, thereby pushing Putin to the sidelines. The latter, according to many reports, was not pleased with Washington s preference or its interference in Russia s internal affairs. With this castling in the Russian leadership, Washington realized it had exaggerated Medvedev s role and fundamentally misread the political dynamics inside its would-be partner. Putin s return shook Russia to its roots within the elite, The obstacles to some of whose members favored a progress are more second presidential term for Medvedev, formidable than in and in the society at large, where portions the past four years of Russia s middle class had viewed Medvedev as a force for greater political democratization. Falsified parliamentary

22 elections three months later, which brought to the State Duma a pro-putin majority, spurred unrest in Moscow and other cities and sparked the emergence of an organized opposition to the regime for the first time in more than a decade. Putin orchestrated his election to the presidency in March 2012 through a combination of formal and informal controls on opposition activity. After his victory, the regime relentlessly ratcheted up repression. Under laws passed following Putin s inauguration in May, the government handed out huge fines and long prison terms for unsanctioned demonstrations, expanded the definition of treason, branded humanitarian and civil rights organizations as foreign agents for accepting international funding, censored the internet, and arrested opposition leaders. With barely any protest from the White House, the Kremlin expelled the U.S. Agency for International Development after twenty years of U.S. taxpayers expenditures to promote civil society, democracy and economic development. In foreign policy, Russia sided with Bashar al-assad s regime in Syria as it massacred thousands of its citizens, casting three vetoes in the UN Security Council to protect Damascus from international sanctions. Russia expert Leon Aron criticized Putin s foreign and domestic policies for they have been nothing but a brazen, in-your-face challenge to U.S. interests and values. 4 The U.S. Congress reacted, despite misgivings by the Obama administration, by passing the Magnitsky Act, which imposed financial penalties on Russian officials who violated their citizens civil rights and beyond Russian officials openly favored President Obama over his Republican rival, Mitt Romney, in the U.S. presidential race. Republicans had long called into question the wisdom of the START Treaty, criticized cutbacks in military spending and claimed that Obama had been too timid in its response to the Russian domestic crackdown and Russia s attempts to pressure its neighbors. In the presidential and vice-presidential debates, Republicans blamed Obama for his failure to change Russian policy in the Syria unrest. 5 Particularly galling to Obama critics was the president s open mike reassurance to Medvedev in South Korea that he would be more forthcoming on missile defense after the election. Romney, however, was widely ridiculed for claiming that Russia was still America s greatest geopolitical enemy, a comment more appropriate to the Cold War, Reset champions argued. A Russian military honor guard welcomes then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen in Washington pursued the Reset, among other measures, by increasing interaction between top officials (photo: U.S. Department of Defense/Chad J. McNeeley)

23 Ap: 2012no8 23 Analysis In November 2012 U.S. Secretary of State Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov met on the sidelines of the 21 st summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Phnom Penh to map out goals for the U.S.-Russia relationship for the second Obama term. The agenda includes missile defense, further START reductions, the upheaval in the Middle East, Iran s nuclear program and expanding the two countries economic ties. The obstacles to further progress, however, are more formidable than in the past four years. The easy issues have already been addressed. Mistrust between the two sides is growing. Russian domestic politics, a key driver of its foreign policy, is pushing the two countries apart the Kremlin needs an external enemy such as the U.S. to justify its tight grip on power even as Russian elites, many of whom profit financially from business in the West, increasingly see Putin as a liability. The prospects for the economy are uncertain. Whether the approaching end of the Putin era is marked by continued erosion of the system he has ruled for the past twelve years or by an abrupt discontinuity, the once bright hopes for the Reset appear to be fading. Dr. Donald N. Jensen is a Resident Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Would you like to react? Mail the editor: redactie@atlcom.nl. 1. The Reset : Theory, Results, Future, Michael McFaul, U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation. 2. Robert Coalson, What Obama s Second Term Could Mean for U.S.-Russian Relations, 3. Ariel Cohen, Why Russia roots for Obama, 4. Leon Aron, Don t Go There. Why President Barack Obama should not visit Russia, 5. Angela Stent, US Russia Relations in the Second Obama Administration, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 54:6, Thank you to our patrons and subscribers! I d like to take this opportunity to thank all our patrons and subscribers for their interest and support in A particular thanks goes to those who have contributed to the Netherlands Atlantic Association an amount over and above the regular subscription price. In 2013 we hope to continue providing you with news and information about transatlantic security issues and related matters. On behalf of the Board and the staff, Bram Boxhoorn Director

24 24 Analysis Ap: 2012no8 U.S.-Israel relations in the aftermath of the elections Ariel E. Levite In the Jewish tradition, prophecy has been predominantly assigned to fools since the collapse of the Temple. With the January 22, 2013 Israeli elections two months away and Obama s second term administration barely beginning to take shape when this article went to print, key factors affecting the bilateral relationship remain highly uncertain. The tremendous present volatility in the Middle East, including in key countries of immediate concern to both the U.S. and Israel (such as Syria and Lebanon and even Egypt and Jordan) further exacerbates the forecasting challenge. All one can do at this point, therefore, is to offer an informed speculation about the issues that will be at the top of the bilateral agenda in This at least is the modest aim the article has set for itself. Continuity amidst challenges Notwithstanding who ends up sitting in the leader s chair in the Israeli Prime Minister s office come 2013, a few things seem clear. The U.S. and Israel have strong common interests in the Middle East and selectively beyond it as well. Moreover, broad and deep-rooted social, cultural, and even religious bonds lubricate the relationship between the two countries and even more importantly between their peoples. These are bound to remain largely unchanged for at least the next decade even if domestic, especially demographic, transformations on both ends could produce meaningful changes in the relationship over the longer term. The U.S. and Israel will remain close allies even if at times their relationship experiences some strains and the personal chemistry between their leaders may leave something to be desired. Additionally, the two countries will in all likelihood sustain their intimate collaboration across a broad range of domains. The U.S. will continue to be Israel s pre-eminent foreign ally. And American preferences will continue to weigh especially heavily on Israeli decision-making. So for the foreseeable future both countries should continue to have a disproportionate impact on each other s policies in certain key areas, first and foremost security. And the domestic and foreign policies of both nations should continue to be closely interwoven in most areas related to the bilateral relationship. Such intimacy, as we all know from our personal lives, typically is a recipe for both collaboration and occasional friction. So at the most fundamental level continuity and cooperation can be expected to remain the name of the game for U.S.-Israeli relations well into the future. Early developments after the Obama re-election, such as the bilateral cooperation effective during the brief Gaza air operation and the Palestinian bid for statehood at the UNGA in November 2012 reaffirm this assessment. At the same time the personal chemistry between U.S. President Obama and the next Israeli Prime Minister might prove less than ideal, certainly if Prime Minister Netanyahu were also to be re-elected. It might make the day-to-day management of the relationship more challenging, especially given the delicate nature of issues that are likely to dominate the bilateral agenda early in the second terms of both leaders. Leaving aside the personal dimension of the leadership relations and the toll that could be exacted by accidents and other random events (which in the Middle East should never

25 be discounted), Iran and its nuclear program (and potentially NPT-inspired related efforts to promote a WMD disarmament process in the Middle East) promises to be the number one challenge for the bilateral relationship in Palestinian matters (ranging from peacemaking to West Bank settlement expansion, and from settlers activities to the fraying of the Palestinian authority) are in turn likely to be a very close runner up. The two issues might even be interconnected in various ways. Additional issues that could impose themselves on the bilateral agenda and cause some friction therein involve disagreements over the responses to regional development ranging from matters that are general and political in nature (say, regarding the policy toward political Islam and its rise to power in Egypt and perhaps elsewhere in the region before too long) to concrete and acute concerns posing immediate threats to Israel. The latter could include ominous developments following the disintegration and eventual collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and its aftershocks in Lebanon, friction with Hamas and other factions in the Gaza strip, lawlessness in the Sinai Peninsula, and even possible upheaval in Jordan. Shared goals but potentially conflicting tactics It seems highly unlikely that early in his second term President Obama would voluntarily devote a big share of his precious time to foreign policy generally and to the Middle East in particular. True, every U.S. president, especially in his second and last term, is eager to leave his imprint on history, not in the least on the world stage. Moreover, personally President Obama undoubtedly cares about the relationship between the U.S. and the Muslim world, worries about the prospects of a nuclear Iran which he is determined to stop, and is highly motivated to see progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front. But he faces an overwhelming American domestic agenda. And after his traumatic experience in his first term he is undoubtedly also painfully aware of the exceptional challenges hampering quick progress in settling Middle East disputes, all the more so since the Arab Spring. Taken together these constraints are bound to sustain at least for a while the timidity and humility that have characterized Obama s Middle East policy since his second year in office. His policy toward the region, certainly early in the second term, is thus most likely to manifest great caution and an ad hoc approach, largely eschewing a grand design for the region. It would confine the U.S. role Jewish settlements on a hill above a Palestinian town. Renewed American pressure on Israeli settlement activity could become a bone of contention between the U.S. and Isreali governments (photo: Wikimedia/Almonroth)

26 26 Analysis Ap: 2012no8 mostly to routine diplomacy and crisis management unless either a golden opportunity for rapid progress presents itself or an exceptional crisis imposes itself on the U.S. The preference to avoid a massive and sustained U.S.-led intervention in any one of the numerous crises in the region notwithstanding, both the Palestinian and Iranian issues seem certain to draw the U.S. in early in the second term, most Continuity and probably in the first half of And cooperation can be these in turn might ultimately become expected to remain impossible to manage without broadening the name of the the scope of the engagement toward a game Middle East regional initiative. In any event, both issues have profound implications for the bilateral U.S. ties with Israel. Importantly, in both cases the U.S. and Israel see eye to eye on the goals: to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and avert a collapse of the Palestinian Authority and sustain its security collaboration with Israel, on the other. So they hold promise for intimate U.S.-Israeli collaboration in the pursuit of these common goals, very much along the lines of the process to date. Yet some of the means the U.S. is likely to employ toward these ends - diplomatic negotiations with Iran and renewed pressure on Israeli settlement activity and down the road perhaps also on the contours of its permanent settlement with the Palestinians - could, as before, become a bone of contention between the two governments. These disagreements could certainly spill over into the public domain and even play out on Capitol Hill. But bruising as they might initially seem, in all likelihood they should ultimately prove perfectly manageable, except if it were to turn out that the U.S. manifests impatience or insensitivity toward fundamental Israeli concerns or that the Israeli government resists U.S. pressure because it is inextricably beholden to hawkish domestic interest groups. Natural disagreements between the U.S. and Israel over policy and tactics in these two areas could become clouds overshadowing the bilateral relationship only if it were to turn out (which I consider quite unlikely) that the U.S. would be willing to settle for a nuclear stalemate with Iran or accept what Israel deems to be a badly flawed deal with Iran. The flaws in such deal could manifest themselves in what the U.S. would be willing to settle for as nuclear restraint from Iran as well as in what it might be willing to offer Iran in return in general and in Israeli currency in particular. Additional trouble on this front could emerge in the absence of a deal if it were to turn out that the U.S. is unwilling to take more drastic action against unchecked, continuing Iranian enrichment and other forms of a march toward nuclear weapons or refuses to go along with unilateral Israeli action against Iran under such a scenario, all the more so if the U.S. is then drawn into the conflict. Similar prospects for serious deterioration in the bilateral relationship are possible (though with equally low likelihood) in response to two clusters of developments on the Palestinian front (both perhaps not unrelated to the developments on the Iranian front). One is in response to an unlikely but not impossible premeditated policy of annexation of the West Bank or unbridled settlers activity toward the Palestinian population after the coming Israeli elections or in response to Palestinian violence (a new Intifada) and perhaps even the collapse of the Palestinian Authority. The other is in response to the U.S. applying pressure on Israel to make serious unilateral concessions toward the Palestinian Authority that are not matched by Palestinian or Arab ones or inordinately push Israel to make risky and contentious compromises on issues of borders, refugees and Jerusalem. Both of these extreme scenarios seem like a sure recipe for damaging the bilateral relationship. And they might trigger defiant Israeli actions not only in defense of its core national interests but possibly also as an extension of the ideology and political preferences of its leadership of the day. This holds especially true if the Israeli government were to be led by, as is presently widely expected, a right-of-center coalition. The outliers Many other Middle East issues seem ripe for close bilateral U.S.-Israel cooperation and perhaps also for broader cooperation with several other U.S. allies as well. This is not only because the U.S. and Israeli goals in these areas converge, but the respective tactics applied by both states to handle them also seem compatible. Moreover, most of these issues also lack for either or both parties the same saliency and political sensitivity (in both countries) that characterize the more contentious concerns above. For example, both Israel and the U.S. are eager to prevent a rollback of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty or any deterioration of the security situation in the Sinai Peninsula. And both seem equally resolved to primarily employ diplomatic,

27 Ap: 2012no8 27 Analysis economic, and other - low profile - means to attain these goals. The same applies for the aim of dissuading and if need be preventing Syrian use of chemical weapons, deterring Hezbollah and Hamas from sustained aggression against Israel or working diligently to prevent a collapse of the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan. Israel might sometimes show signs of frustration with occasional U.S. timidity, hesitancy, or slowness in responding to deteriorating conditions on all of these fronts, probably because the U.S. would factor in additional and different considerations that will hold it back from lending Israel the unequivocal support in crisis that Israel yearns for on issues it feels could have a much more profound bearing on its security than on core U.S. interests. Israeli anxiety under such circumstances might propel Israel to take decisive unilateral action to protect its territory and population, at times to the chagrin of the U.S. Yet in the final analysis it is hard to imagine a serious wedge being driven between the U.S and Israel by any of these issues because the bonds between the two nations fundamentally run so deep. This is not to suggest that there are no issues on which U.S. The Obamaand Israeli policies will not only differ Netanyahu personal greatly but may even run at cross purposes. chemistry leaves a It is easy to envisage a whole slew of such lot to be desired issues, especially of a regional Middle East nature, and their number and saliency is actually on the rise since the unraveling of the peace process and even more so since the onset of the Arab Spring. The handling of political Islam throughout the region and dealing with Erdogan s Turkey and supplies to the Arab countries, commonly known in the bilateral parlance context as qualitative-military-edge issues, are just a few cases in point. But then such a situation is hardly unique to U.S.-Israeli ties and commonly affects even the relations among the closest of allies, all the more so in an international and regional system characterized by so much volatility, complexity, and uncertainty. This inevitably brings us back to the question of how skillfully the leaders of both nations can navigate their bilateral relations in the coming year, especially when their personal chemistry leaves a lot to be desired. A clear answer to this question remains for now in the realm of the imponderables. Ariel E. Levite is a Non-resident Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Would you like to react? Mail the editor: redactie@atlcom.nl. President Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Their personal relationship lacks chemistry, further complicating the difficulties of the U.S.-Israel bilateral relationship (photo: White House/Pete Souza)

28 28 Atlantic News Survey Ap: 2012no8 News Survey on Transatlantic Relations, European Security, and Dutch Foreign Policy Period 19 October December 2012 Authors Lisanne Brans and Koen Janssen Sources NRC Handelsblad, de Volkskrant, International Herald Tribune, The Washington Post, Financial Times, Le Monde, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Jane s Defence Weekly, CNN, BBC News, e-newsletters Eastweek, RFE/RL Balkan Report, ISN Security Watch, and websites of NATO and other international organisations United States President Obama has been re-elected to a second term, defeating former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney. Obama and his running mate Joe Biden took a number of key battleground states, including Ohio, Florida and Virginia, which gave them a total of 332 electoral college votes compared to 206 for Romney and Ryan. Obama received 60.1 million popular votes, Romney 57.4 million. 57.7% of all eligible voters cast their vote, a lower turnout rate than in 2008 and Democrats held control of the Senate, while Republicans held control of the House of Representatives, assuring a divided government for at least another two years. General David H. Petraeus, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, resigned from the CIA after evidence of his involvement in an extramarital affair with the author of his biography was found by the FBI. Intelligence officials were concerned that his affair would make Petraeus susceptible to blackmail. President Obama has accepted his resignation and announced that Michael J. Morell, deputy director of the CIA, will take over as acting director. Furthermore, General John Allen, another top US military command- er who is in charge of the American troops in Afghanistan, is being investigated by the FBI for allegedly sending inappropriate s to a woman linked to the Petraeus scandal. President Obama planned on nominating Allen to become commander of the American forces in Europe and supreme commander of NATO (SACEUR) but he has put this nomination on hold. Europe Russia President Putin has fired his minister of defense, Anatoly Serdyukov, because of a corruption scandal. Sergei Shoigu, former minister of emergency situations, governor of the Moscow region and one of Putin s political allies, will take his place. Putin stated that he relieved Minister Serdyukov of his duties in order to be able to create conditions for an objective investigation of all the issues. Serdyukov, who was appointed in 2007, was the first civilian with no military experience to become a minister of defense in post-soviet Russia. He belonged to President Putin s inner political circle. Spain Artur Mas, leader of the Catalan regional government, lost 12 seats in the Catalan parliament after regional Spanish elections, securing him a total of 50 out of 135 seats. Before the election, Mas had pledged to hold a referendum on Catalan independence. Such a referendum seems more likely now that the elections have shown a divided Spain and pro-referendum separatist parties have won 95 seats in the Catalan parliament. However, before a referendum can take place Mas will have to form political alliances with other parties that share the same goal with regard to separation from Spain but have different social and economic plans. Moreover, Spain s Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has said he will block a referendum on Catalonia s independence. Middle East Israel/Gaza Conflict erupted in Israel and the Gaza Strip in mid-november. On 14 November, Israel killed the commander of the Hamas military wing in response to days of rocket fire from Palestine. During the following days, the two sides attacked each other almost continuously. Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets were fired from Gaza, reaching major cities in southern Israel and even as far Atlantic News Survey

29 Atlantic News Survey Ap: 2012no8 29 as Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. A bus bomb wounded 20 civilians in Tel Aviv. Israel conducted a large number of air strikes against Hamas government buildings, missile launch sites and other targets within Gaza during its eight-day operation Pillar of Defense. It also called up its reserve troops for a possible ground invasion. One week of fighting left a total of 140 Palestinians and five Israelis dead. An estimated 1,500 rockets were launched from the Gaza Strip, killing five Israelis and wounding more than 200. Many rockets (84% according to the Israel Defense Forces) were intercepted by the Iron Dome defense system, which tracks incoming rockets and fires interceptor missiles to destroy them. A ceasefire was eventually brokered by Egypt, after pressure from the United States. Hamas agreed to stop firing missiles at Israel, which in turn promised to end its military operations in Gaza and to refrain from attacking Hamas leaders. Israel also demanded measures against the inflow of rockets and other weapons into Gaza. Palestine The United Nations General Assembly has endorsed an upgraded UN status for Palestine. Pales- The Iron Dome system in Ashdod intercepts a rocket fired from the Gaza Strip. Since the beginning of Operation Pillar of Defense, the Iron Dome system has intercepted hundreds of rockets fired at Israeli communities from the Gaza Strip (photo: Flickr/Israel Defense Forces) Atlantic News Survey