Crisis Watch: An Assessment of Al Qaeda and Recommendations for the United Kingdom s Overseas Counter Terrorism Strategy

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1 Crisis Watch: An Assessment of Al Qaeda and Recommendations for the United Kingdom s Overseas Counter Terrorism Strategy In the United Kingdom s National Security Strategy (NSS) the National Security Council judges that currently, and for at least the next five years, one of the four Tier One highest priority risks that the UK faces is from international terrorism (HM Government, 2010a). It also acknowledges that, within this, Al Qaeda continues to pose the most potent terrorist threat to the UK (HM Government, 2010a). This means that continually considering the evolving nature of the threat from Al Qaeda, and assessing the viability of the UK Counter Terrorism strategy CONTEST in adapting to deal with this evolving threat, is vitally important to the UK s national security. UK Counter Terrorism efforts can be loosely split into those focused on the UK itself and those focused overseas. Domestic counter terrorism is clearly extremely important but will not be the focus of this essay. Instead it is apparent that with the expansion of the Al Qaeda network, and increasing risk posed by Al Qaeda affiliated movements, continuing to adapt and improve what the UK does overseas is central to the country s national security - as such it is the overseas fragment that this essay will focus on. The essay will comprise of two sections. Firstly it will assess the current state of Al Qaeda, including its evolution, its grand strategy and the threats it poses to the UK overseas. Then secondly the main section of the essay will provide policy recommendations for the UK s Counter Terrorism efforts overseas as part of the CONTEST strategy, as well as outlining some of the difficulties involved in implementing these. Grand strategy itself is clearly a contentious term but for the purposes of this essay the definition contained within the NSS will be used, that is a combination of, and balance between, ends (what is sought to achieve), ways (the ways by which those ends are achieved) and means (the resources that can be devoted to achieving the ends) (HM Government, 2010a). Fundamentally the ends that Al Qaeda Core 1 defined under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, that of establishing an Islamic caliphate that obeys strict Sharia Law, don t seem to have changed a great deal under the leadership of Ayman al-zawahiri, despite the huge changes that the organization has undergone in recent years (Jenkins, 2011). Likewise the ways, that of attacking the far enemy (the United States and its western allies) to undermine and unseat the near enemy (the governments of Arab and Middle Eastern states that are seen as puppets of the west), still remains at the centre of the organization s defined strategy. However the means that Al Qaeda has at its disposal have evolved fairly dramatically since the attacks on the United States in September Whereas previously Al Qaeda was centralized and hierarchical with a clear geographical power base on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border it is now a flat, decentralised organization composed of diverse subcomponents drawn together by little more than a loose ideology (Zimmerman, 2013). As such Al Qaeda s strength no longer comes from the structural unity that the core of the organization had in the early 2000s but instead from the pervasiveness of its 1 Al Qaeda Core being the central leadership of the organisation historically based on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Formerly led by Osama Bin Laden until his death in 2011, now led by his successor Ayman al-zawahiri. 1

2 ideology and the geographical spread of its network of affiliates and associates. Looking to the future it should be expected that the geographical expansion of Al Qaeda into further areas of instability will continue as the organisation looks to spread its ideological footprint and embrace groups that wish to consolidate and affiliate with the Al Qaeda brand (Zimmerman, 2013). It is likely that further atomisation of Al Qaeda will take place as the Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous (VUCA) environment that is currently seen across the Middle East and North Africa in the wake of the Arab Spring perpetuates, heightened by demographic and societal global and regional trends, such as increased urbanisation, resource scarcity and youth population growth. The threat posed by Al Qaeda to UK interests, citizens and infrastructure overseas has also changed in recent years, primarily because of the geographical spread that is now seen through the affiliated movements of the organization. Fundamentally the threat from Al Qaeda now has three main manifestations abroad. Firstly through the immediate threat that these groups, ideologically aligned with Al Qaeda, pose to UK infrastructure and personnel abroad - for instance in 2010 the UK ambassador to Yemen survived assassination attempt when an Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) suicide bomber attacked his security convoy in Sana a (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2014). Secondly through an increased vulnerability of strategically important areas which can either have an economic effect, such as with Iraq s oil fields, the Sinai Peninsula or the Horn of Africa, or simply provides a safe haven for extremist groups which wish to harm the UK (HM Government, 2011). And thirdly the pervasiveness of the al Qaeda ideology through its affiliated movements means that, despite succeeding in negating the operational capability of Al Qaeda Core, the longevity of its ideological capability remains which spreads antipathy towards the west (Zimmerman, 2013). In response to the current state of Al Qaeda, the threat posed to the UK both overseas and at home by areas in which Al Qaeda operates, and what horizon scanning and scenario planning suggests the future holds for Al Qaeda as an organization, this essay will now look to offer some recommendations for UK Counter Terrorism overseas. Through its prior success it is evident that CONTEST is a robust, flexible and wide ranging counter terrorism strategy and it is appreciated that focus areas for UK efforts overseas are defined within the strategy - namely Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, and, recently, Syria (HM Government, 2011). However, while it is important to continue to isolate and harass Al Qaeda Core, as US President Barack Obama stated at West Point in his foreign policy speech in May 2014, the threat that Al Qaeda poses to the west is becoming even more diffuse (The White House, 2014). As such the overseas elements within CONTEST must begin to focus more on isolating, containing and undermining Al Qaeda affiliated movements. Increasing intelligence collaboration overseas, largely covertly because of the nature of this, is one recommendation that can be made for UK Counter Terrorism, especially as keeping CONTEST collaborative is one of the six defined principles for the strategy (HM Government, 2011). In light of the evolving threat that Al Qaeda poses to the UK through its geographical spread and affiliated movements increased collaboration, specifically through intelligence sharing, will become vitally important if this threat is to be adequately addressed. The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) has a 2

3 broad network of contacts worldwide and being able to work in partnership with other intelligence services is important both offensively, in terms of isolating, containing and undermining Al Qaeda affiliated movements, and defensively in terms of thwarting attacks on the UK (HM Government, 2011; Secret Intelligence Service, 2014). For instance coordination with Saudi intelligence services helped to prevent the October 2010 Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula planned and executed operation involving two explosive devices concealed in air freight. Likewise, aside from bilateral collaboration between the UK and the security apparatuses of other states, further exploitation of the databases of multilateral intelligence and law enforcement agencies, such as those of INTERPOL and EUROPOL, will also be required to expand the UK s Counter Terrorism capability, and its ability to deal with the broadening overseas threat, in the near to medium term. Alongside developing covert intelligence collaboration increasing the UK s capacity building of international partners should also form a key part of the continued adaptation of CONTEST (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2014). The strategy recognizes that building the capacity of failed and fragile states is vital to the UK s national security, primarily because of the ability of Al Qaeda and its affiliates to flourish in these kinds of states (HM Government, 2011). Militarily as the British mission in Afghanistan draws down, and the political will for large footprint military interventions remains low, increased defense engagement and overseas military capacity building, for instance developing the Special Operations capability of international partners, will be an essential part of UK Counter Terrorism efforts. This fits in with the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and its desire to invest in the UK s own Special Forces so as to aid the delivery of defense engagement while keeping the number of UK forces committed to operations abroad and the level of risk they are to face relatively low (HM Government, 2010b). Within this recommendation, increased bilateral and European Union coordination in overseas upstream operations, such as seen between the UK and France in Mali in 2013, should also be looked into - especially as the European External Action Service (EEAS) is looking to increase cooperation over these kinds of European Union Force (EUFOR) upstream interventions. Coordinating bilaterally and multilaterally with other European states and the EU is vitally important for the UK for a number of reasons, namely because of mutual interests overseas, a reduced ambition and ability to intervene individually and declining national budgets devoted to counter-terrorism across the EU (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2014). This is all in a contemporary environment where the threat that the UK and other European states face, as mentioned in this essay, is becoming more decentralized, diffuse, and diverse. Non-military capacity building should also form a part of this development of CONTEST. The cross- Government Counter-Terrorism Programme, managed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) with a 30 million budget, is an important instrument in the delivery of a wide variety of nonmilitary capacity building measures intended to help stabilize failed and fragile states overseas (HM Government, 2011). Further coordination with other UK government departments that work abroad, such as the Department For International Development (DFID), the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and UK Trade and Investment (UKTI), is required for a holistic approach to overseas counter terrorism, an approach that will build the capacity of failed and fragile states to pursue, prevent and 3

4 prosecute terrorists themselves, therefore reducing the threat posed to the UK by Al Qaeda affiliated movements (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2014). Fundamentally the geographical spread of Al Qaeda affiliates means that developing UK Counter Terrorism overseas will be important in the near to medium term, both through furthering intelligence collaboration and through the capacity building of overseas partners. However it should be recognized that there are a number of difficulties in the actual manifestation of this advancement of the CONTEST strategy. Firstly there is the issue of simply accessing the areas of instability that Al Qaeda and its affiliates tend to thrive in - especially when the local law enforcement, intelligence, military and criminal justice architecture may be ineffective or even corrupt. Secondly maintaining the UK s commitment to international law and to human rights must underpin any development of the country s counter terrorism strategy. Ruefully this will at times hamper the capability and operational effectiveness of the UK s security apparatus overseas - certainly in both of the recommendations, collaboration with foreign intelligence services and capacity building of overseas partners, offered in this essay. Fundamentally, though, this is why helping to build law enforcement, human rights and criminal justice architecture in international partners, as well as setting up human rights partnerships, will go some way to both increasing the UK s national security and not compromising the values which underpin our society (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2014). As this essay has shown since CONTEST was first published in 2006, and indeed even since the last version was published in 2011, the dynamic of the threat posed by Al Qaeda has changed dramatically, especially overseas. Success in reducing the operational effectiveness of Al Qaeda Core on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border has reduced the threat posed to the UK emanating from there. However this has been matched by the rise of Al Qaeda affiliated movements across the Middle East and North Africa, resulting in a need to re-focus CONTEST to deal with this new threat - especially as it is judged that the organization will see further atomization as regional instability continues in the wake of the Arab Spring. While there are sensitivities to conducting counter terrorism overseas that must be accepted, such as the UK s commitment to human rights, the two recommendations for adaptation of CONTEST made in this essay will have both an offensive and defensive effect. Increasing intelligence collaboration and capacity building of overseas partners will help protect the UK and its interests, infrastructure and citizens from attacks emanating from areas where Al Qaeda affiliated movements are active. They will also help regional security apparatuses to isolate, contain and harass those movements. As such if these recommendations are followed CONTEST will likely continue, as it has done previously, to succeed in negating the threat posed to the UK by international terrorism, one of the top four Tier One threats defined in the NSS. 4

5 Bibliography HM Government, 2010a. A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy. [Online] [Accessed 25 January 2014]. HM Government, 2010b. Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review. [Online] dg_ pdf [Accessed 25 January 2014]. HM Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism. [Online] House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, House of Commons Home Affairs Committee Counter-terrorism Seventeenth Report of Session [Online] Jenkins, B. M., Al Qaeda After Bin Laden. RAND Testimony. The White House, Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony. [Online] Zimmerman, K., The Al Qaeda Network: A New Framework for Defining the Enemy, Washington DC: Critical Threats. 5