The EU in a world of rising powers

Transcription

1 SPEECH/09/283 Benita Ferrero-Waldner European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy The EU in a world of rising powers Chancellor s Seminar, St Antony s College, University of Oxford Oxford, 2 June 2009

2 Chancellor, Ladies and Gentlemen, Thank you for inviting me to address you. It is a great privilege to be here and an enormous pleasure to be sitting next to my predecessor as external relations Commissioner. And since I intend to speak frankly about the EU's challenges in a world of rising powers, I am delighted to have him here to help in answering your probing questions. St Antony's has a well deserved reputation as a centre of excellence for international affairs and foreign policy. So I do not need to go into detail about the challenges facing the world. But it may be useful to review the context briefly. The global financial and economic crisis has forced governments around the world into unprecedented measures of fiscal stimulus and financial reform. The EU has done better than most in resisting protectionist pressures and promoting international cooperation in the G20 on financial regulation, reform of the IMF, and helping the poorest countries. Most recently, our proposals to overhaul the EU's fragmented systems of financial regulation based on the de Larosière report offer a model for others to follow. Tackling climate change and energy security is more difficult at a time of economic crisis. Yet time is running fast for the Copenhagen meeting at the end of this year to agree a comprehensive and effective response to global warming. We of course welcome the positive developments in the US, and are also focusing on the important role of emerging countries, especially China, India and Russia. The EU has set an ambitious lead with the so called goals for increased renewable energy, reduced CO2 emissions and greater energy efficiency. Yet I do not underestimate the difficulties for the coming months in getting an international consensus for real and systemic change, including solidarity to help the developing world cope with the necessary changes. Terrorism, failed states, non-proliferation and other aspects of the dark side of globalisation can no longer be considered as new or unconventional threats to our security. Nor will they become any easier as world population increases to 7.7bn in 2020 and beyond. With that will come increased competition for scarce natural resources energy, water and land. This will create pressure for greater migratory flows, civil unrest, ideological extremism, religious fundamentalism and state failure. The nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea, as well as the present instability in Pakistan, are particularly worrying. In the face of all this, the EU struggles to adjust to economic and demographic trends that tend to diminish our influence and our capacity to deal with them. We and other developed nations are increasingly required to reconcile our important values like human rights and democracy with other considerations. And we are confronted with emerging powers with very different ideas on these fundamental issues. We have to face up to the evolution of the multilateral system to a more multi-polar system where the geographic balance of power is shifting. As new powers emerge, "the West" is increasingly unable to dictate the global agenda alone. A recent Goldman-Sachs forecast that in less than 40 years, the BRIC [Brazil, Russia, India and China] economies together could be larger than the G6 [Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the US]. 2

3 Russia is increasingly assertive, China is investing heavily in Africa and Latin America, and India and others rightly claim the level of voice and representation that goes with their growing economic, political and military power. Yet the need for international cooperation has never been greater. For multilateral approaches to work in this new context we need a new form of global governance, with institutions equipped to manage today s challenges. That means addressing voice and representation. For the EU, this means facing tough consequences for our participation in fora like the UN Security Council, IMF and even G8 as we make way for others at the table. In responding to these challenges we now have a tremendous opportunity, with the new US administration. We welcome the new US direction on things like climate change, Guantanamo and engagement in the Middle East, including Iran. And, more fundamentally, an Administration committed to multilateralism and partnership with us. How that declared commitment plays out in practice remains to be seen real partnership means inclusive decision making from the start. But the US s willingness to treat us as genuine partners will depend largely on the EU's own ability to raise our game deciding what we really want and getting our act together to deliver it. That brings me to my main theme for today: three challenges to our playing a more powerful international role political will, making effective use of our internal policies, and developing more effective security capabilities. 1) Political Will In the abstract, it s not difficult to persuade people that the EU is more powerful when it acts as a collective. After all, as Paul-Henri Spaak (one of the EU s founding fathers), put it: Europe consists only of small countries some of which know it and some of which don t yet. But the practice is different. It s partly our institutions. Take the present system of six-monthly rotating presidencies: Mr Putin has seen 20 European leaders representing the EU at successive EU-Russia summits, each with their own nuances and priorities for relations with Russia. We must however take our share of the blame if some of our larger partners are occasionally tempted to divide and rule and drive wedges between Member States' positions. The Lisbon Treaty, if implemented, will address these institutional aspects, giving the EU a more consistent representation on the international stage, including an embryonic EU diplomatic service. But it will not change the more fundamental issue, the EU s tendency to focus on process rather than substance. For example in our neighbourhood policy, the EU needs to put more emphasis on engaging directly with our partners on things that really matter like trade liberalisation or visas, rather than internal debate on the relative priority of countries to the south and the east. And when confronted with a new crisis it can be useful to appoint a special representative or create a new political dialogue. But for these to achieve their potential, we also need tough policy decisions on what we want them to achieve. 3

4 What the EU needs is to define clear policies which will make a difference, and raise the lowest common denominator. That will take political will and a shift in understanding of the balance between national interests and European value added. It will also mean working harder to get the maximum political leverage from the significant amounts of financial assistance that we give to third countries, most clearly illustrated in the Middle East. In the years that I have been working on this issue, it was always my political aim to help finding peace in the Middle East, in particular between the Palestinians and Israelis. 2) Joining up the internal and external Increasingly, the EU s external policy has been going beyond the traditional bounds of diplomacy - think of the international dimensions of energy security, competition policy, the environment, transport, fisheries, or migration. This trend is accelerating; even in areas which are still a strong national competence, like energy, the international dimension is critical. It was both welcome and necessary that Member States were ready to act through the EU in response to the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute in January. But we need to go further. Energy policy is a good example. I have raised energy in my external contacts around the world in China, Russia, Latin America, the Middle East, and our Eastern and Southern neighbours. My aim has been to diversify the Union s sources of energy, suppliers and transmission routes, with the goal of enhancing our energy security. We have just held a useful conference on the Southern Corridor with countries from the Mashreq, Middle East, Central Asia and South Caucasus. But our efforts externally can only go so far. While our internal energy policy is still work in progress, we are vulnerable to the energy politics of our principal suppliers. 3) Developing more effective security capabilities The EU prides itself on its soft power, its ability to win friends and influence people. It has brought us unprecedented peace and prosperity on the European continent in particular with the success of enlargement - and is the key to strengthening alliances with China, India and new emerging markets. And we have a growing capacity for civilian crisis management ranging from our very successful election observation missions in countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan, to justice reform and policing in the Balkans and elsewhere. Yet soft power alone is insufficient to deal with the threats we face. I have spoken elsewhere about smart power an amalgam of soft and hard power. That requires beefing up the EU s military and crisis management functions. We have a growing list of European Security and Defence Policy missions, from the Balkans to Congo, Afghanistan, the Middle East and beyond. For example our ability to monitor the elections in Afghanistan this summer will depend on NATO s willingness to provide us with security support. Last year s review of the European Security Strategy and the French Presidency s efforts to get Ministers to take a hard look at the security challenges we face were important steps forward. But much more needs to be done. While it s unrealistic to hope that Member States sensitivities will be overcome over night, we need a serious discussion about backing up our ambitions with sufficient resources and commitment. The problem is two-fold: the level of resources devoted to European defence and the lack of flexibility to deploy them freely in times of crisis. 4

5 Ladies and Gentlemen, The EU may not always get the credit it deserves for our efforts to develop a strong and influential role in the world, particularly in large Member States who are proud of their national diplomatic traditions. And it is clear that when Member States are deeply divided as Chris will recall during the Iraq war the EU has its hands tied. But there are many areas where gradually and patiently we are making progress for example in the long-term business of strengthening relations with our neighbours. Focusing on the three challenges I have outlined: summoning up the political will to act collectively; joining up our internal and external policies; and developing our security capabilities, will help fit us for a more effective international role. And in that, I hope that we will be better able to meet the expectations of the new Obama administration. But more than that, to take greater responsibility for our own security, stability and prosperity in a world of emerging and changing challenges. Thank you. 5